Military Review

Tanks in the Chechen war

83
In the 1990s, the Russian army became involved in an endless series of new Caucasian wars in which Tanks although they did not play a decisive, but still quite noticeable role, although most often they had to act in the most inappropriate conditions for tanks - in street battles.


We will not go into the political background of the conflict, but go straight to the description of military operations. The first significant event was the attempt to assault Grozny, undertaken on November 26 on 1994 by anti-Dudayev opposition forces. The decisive role in this operation was played by the tanks - 35 T-72А, transferred to the oppositionists from the warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District. If it were not for these tanks, then the assault could not take place at all, so we can say that they became the key factor, although not in the sense that the tank forces play in army-wide operations. This operation failed miserably because Dudayev and his entourage were well informed about all the plans of the opposition. The attacking groups were met with concentrated fire, and only 4 tanks managed to escape from the city, the rest were either destroyed or abandoned by crews.

T-72B1 2 Tank Company 276 MSP before going out to support the assault groups leading the battle on Noah Bauchidze Street (in the foreground, Sergeant E. Lyapustin's 441 tank). For all the fights in Grozny, the tank has never been hit by an RPG. January 1995


The failure of this attempt to fight with “little blood in a strange land” pushed the Russian leadership to take more active steps, and on November 29, the Russian Security Council approved the plan of the military operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. In early December, several military groupings were created that were to enter the territory of Chechnya and in the event of the Dudaev’s refusal to lay down weapon take by storm Grozny. At Mozdok, a group of 15 battalions was formed, which had about 230 BTR and BMP, as well as 40 tanks. A group of 11 battalions with the 160 BTR and BMP and 30 tanks was advanced from the Vladikavkaz sector. The strongest group of 34 battalions, which had about 700 units of armored vehicles, including more than 100 tanks, advanced from the Kizlyar area. Already one enumeration of the forces involved shows that a hull scale operation was carried out.

However, from the very beginning everything did not go as planned, only to advance to Grozny’s troops needed 16 days instead of 3 as planned. As a result, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev only 27 December ordered the beginning of the storming of Grozny December 31 with a mandatory report to the Russian President on taking the city on January 1 in 00.01. As we see, the rotten tradition of the Russian-Soviet-Russian army to take cities to the red dates of the calendar over the past two centuries has not been shaken at all. Then we take Pleven to the king's birthday, then Kiev - on November 7, Berlin - on May 1, and now a New Year present ... "The birthday cake made from stuffing human brother prepares the sovereign brother ..." These lines were written in 1877 year, but I'm afraid they are relevant today.

Combat positions 324 msp at the breeding farm at the time of blocking the road to Grozny. The command of the federal troops at the third stage of the storming of the Chechen capital provided for complete control over the city from the south. February 1995


Approximately 10 000 fighters who defended Grozny were concentrated around 15 000 federal troops. They were supported by 230 tanks and 879 light armored vehicles, several hundred guns. However, there were street battles, where this superiority in technology was largely leveled by the positional advantages of the defenders. At the same time, in the West, they continue to be in an unshakable confidence that the Russians were concentrating enormous forces to storm the Terrible. For example, a study by the Danish Royal Military College categorically states that more than 38 000 soldiers participated in the assault. Of course, from Copenhagen everything is seen much better.

Before the attack on the city after the heavy battle, the airport of Khankala was busy, but, unfortunately, the command did not draw proper conclusions on the results of this battle. It seems that for unknown reasons, the generals counted only on the symbolic resistance of Dudaevs. The storming of the city was carried out according to an underdeveloped plan, and once again the command did not have a reliable connection with its troops, which cost the assault dearly. In general, in the troops, the plan for the rapid roll of mechanized columns to the city center was regarded as an adventure. Subsequent events showed the validity of this assessment.

The spares of the SPTA saved the T-72B1 tank from hitting the cumulative jet into the engine compartment. Terrible. January 1995


The storming troops were divided into 4 groups in directions. In 06.00, the North group launched an offensive. It was part of the 131-I Maikop Motorized Rifle Brigade. Having lost several tanks and armored personnel carriers, the column nevertheless broke through to the railway station, where the brigade occupied the all-round defense. The “Northeast” group, having applied a successful diversion, rushed relatively freely into the city, where it also took up defensive positions. The Vostok and Zapad groups did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them. At the same time, if the North-East group set up checkpoints along the way, which ensured, however difficult, but still a connection with the rear, the North and West groups were surrounded.

The worst thing in all of this was that it was the Soviet troops who at one time got a lot of experience in fighting in the city. Königsberg, Breslau, Berlin showed how to act in such cases. But this experience was completely forgotten. And another gross error was made - it was not at all necessary that the Russian troops gave the initiative to the enemy. Instead of systematically sweeping the city using superiority in firepower, assault groups turned defensively. At one time, a well-known British admiral, who himself had fairly fought, said: “Moderation in war is the greatest idiocy. Ruthlessness, tirelessness, persistence - that is the key to success. " All these principles have been violated.

Tanks in the Chechen war
A hit from the top floor of the RPG grenade into the commander’s turret T-72B1 pierced the armor and hit the tank commander. Terrible. January 1995


As a result, Dudayev had the opportunity to pull down his most combat-ready units to the center of the city and proceed to the elimination of the surrounded groups. In a particularly difficult situation, the 131 Brigade found itself, which by January 1 had lost all its armored vehicles to about 16.00. At the same time, it should be said that the new-generation tanks (T-72 and T-80) showed noticeably better survivability than the tanks that fought in the Middle East in 1973 year. A single hit of an RPG projectile or ATGM was not enough to disable it. As a rule, at least 6 — 7 hits were required, and a record case was recorded when the tank withstood almost 20 projectiles. Dynamic protection systems worked extremely well. But the BTR and the BMP turned out to be completely defenseless. The important role played by self-propelled artillery in such battles was again confirmed, since the weight of the 152SZM “Acacia” SAU 2SMM projectile was noticeably greater than that of tank guns, and had a markedly greater destructive effect when shooting at buildings.

After regrouping and approaching reinforcements, the assault continued. Already about any anniversary dates we were not talking. In general, the organized resistance of the militants in Grozny was finally broken only by March 26. This assault cost the Russian army about 6000 people killed and wounded. Irreversible loss of armored vehicles, according to the Main Automobile and Armored Directorate Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, comprised 49 tanks, 132 BMP, 98 BTR. The number of damaged but repaired tanks remains unknown.

The lack of protection of the stern of the tower in the form of a spares box led to the penetration of armor and the death of the tank commander in the battle for Grozny. January 1995[/ Center]

One should not think that the fighting in Grozny went on continuously for the 3 of the month; they fall into several stages, separated by interruptions of official truces and temporary respites. The first phase ended on January 18 after the taking of the presidential palace, when the northern and central parts of the city came under the control of the Russian army. Only after this did the offensive begin on the southern part of Grozny, which was conducted with the strongest artillery support. There were days when our artillery fired missiles at enemy positions up to 30 LLC. So it was necessary to act from the very beginning.

In August, the battles broke out again in Grozny’s 1996, although this time they were relatively short. 6 August militants broke into the city. They did not attempt to storm the strongholds of the federal troops, but simply isolated them and subjected them to mortar fire, waiting for the defenders to surrender. However, by energetic actions of the command of the federal troops, it was possible to prevent the worst case scenario. Although the battles were still stubborn, 11 August was broken through the corridor to the Government House, which lifted the siege from this important point. And by 13 August a decisive break was reached. Federal troops began to push the enemy in all directions, and the militants began to withdraw from the city. By the time of the signing of the August 14 truce, the city was under the control of the federal troops. Losses at the same time amounted to all 5 tanks, 22 BMP, 18 BTR. We will not even comment on the chatter of some Western newspapers about the hundreds of tanks burned.

Trophy tank T-72A, captured by federal troops from illegal armed groups during the fighting in Grozny. For the characteristic towers, painted white lime, these cars from the feds got the nickname "white crows". After the repair, the tank was used by the North group in battles on the Minute Square. January 1995


During the Second Chechen War, Grozny had to be attacked once again, but now armored vehicles were used in the minimum necessary quantities. The assault began on 11 on December 1999 of the year. This time the main emphasis was placed on the artillery and air support of the assault infantry groups. As a result, the anti-tank defense system, thoroughly prepared by the militants, turned out to be simply useless. The advance of the federal troops was slow, but they suffered only small losses. A significant role in this operation was played by installations of volley fire TOC-1. Realizing that they could not oppose anything to such a gradual advancement, on January 31, the militants tried to break out of Grozny under the cover of a snowstorm. They suffered heavy losses, but some of their forces still managed to escape.

Burnt in the battles for the Terrible tank T-80B and KSh R-145. January 1995


T-72B (M) 74 Guards. OMSBR hit by an RPG shot in the unprotected gap between the CDS of the turret chase and the nadgusenichny fuel tank (apparently, they tried to hit the tank with the second grenade in the turret unprotected by the fuel tank). The crew of the tank was killed. January 1995


Broken sniper shot panoramic sight. January 1995
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  1. awg75
    awg75 April 18 2013 08: 24 New
    56
    ETERNAL MEMORY OF THE GUYS PROTECTING THE HOMELAND
    1. beech
      beech April 18 2013 15: 21 New
      19
      it was not a war, it was a game of war, with the smallest success of our troops negotiations took place immediately, moratoriums were announced and the militants managed to leave ... this war is a monument to how soldier life is valued in Russia and how they betrayed their own army, as they threw it to their own devices and how they mocked it !!!
      I advise you to watch a series of doc.films. Chechen trap
      1. cumastra1
        cumastra1 April 18 2013 17: 48 New
        16
        The complete truth, I want to add the opinion of my classmate, an officer who passed the first and heroically died during the second war. He said treason, starting from the highest echelon — the generals (not all of course, of course, but there were traitors) and ending with individual officers and soldiers in the warring army. So we need to pay more attention to the moral qualities of people who are trusted in the country's defense. And we had a big failure in this matter.
        And you know, I agree with him.
        1. beech
          beech April 18 2013 21: 36 New
          +4
          what infuriates most * the behavior of human rights defenders * and deputies who urged soldiers to surrender during the first assault ... some surrendered (the ammunition is not endless) and fell into slavery ... Now all these comrades are free, provided with money up to the 7th generation and they don’t have anything done. In addition, they yelled about the genocide of the Chechen people, but in fact there was genocide of the Russian people: for 10 killed, 9 Russian civilians
          1. bask
            bask April 18 2013 22: 48 New
            +4
            but armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were completely defenseless. Once again, the important role played by self-propelled artillery in such battles was confirmed, since the weight of the 152 mm ACS 2SZM Akatsia shell was noticeably greater than that of tank guns and had a noticeably greater destructive effect when shooting at buildings.

            About the betrayal and inept-criminal actions of generals and politicians, it is said quite a bit. Not only one ....... did not suffer punishment for her crimes.
            But I'm not talking about that. They remembered the experience of the Second World War. But there, when storming cities, they showed excellent self-propelled guns with assault guns, with anti-shell armor. ISU-152,, St. John's wort,
            And now the experience of 2 Chechen wars is taken into account? No, it is not taken into account. The same BMP-2,3, BTR-80/82. And not one assault gun of 152 mm caliber.
            If tomorrow is a war. We will fight by the same technique as in the storming of Grozny in the 94th ???? Conclusions have not been made until today. The new Armata will appear no earlier than the 20th year in the troops.
            Based on the available T-72, T-80 armored hulls, it is simply necessary to create an assault gun, cal 152 mm. WITH ANTIMOIN AND ANTI-LOAD ((RPG, ATGM)) RESERVATION.

            The armored body of the self-propelled gun was welded from rolled armored plates 90, 75, 60, 30 and 20 mm thick. On the machines of the first modifications, the frontal part of the hull was an armored casting; subsequently, as more stable rolled armor was available, the design of the frontal part of the hull was replaced by a welded one. Armor protection differentiated, protivosnaryadny. Armor plate felling installed at rational angles. Compared with the previous model of self-propelled guns of the same class and purpose - SU-152 - the ISU-152 armored hull was slightly higher. The main armament is the 152,4 mm ML-20S howitzer gun. Gun recoil devices were protected by a fixed cast armored casing and a movable cast spherical armored.
            1. Alexander Kirov
              Alexander Kirov April 19 2013 03: 00 New
              +3
              The idea is true for all 100! Simply, I would remove the tower from the terminator and put in the fighting compartment of VENA 2s31, with DZ armor and KAZ type BARREL. 120 mm, low ballistics, a thermobaric flamethrower charge through the barrel and 120 mm mine, and ARKAN and God knows what you can launch. The crew is in an armored capsule, in the tower there is an assault rifle, warheads in a niche with a knock-out roof, the ability to work on remote control. Well, take me ...
            2. Scythian 35
              Scythian 35 April 20 2013 15: 44 New
              0
              Good achievements in the Red Army have been since the battle of Stalingrad. But one thing happened !!! 1945 during the assault on Berlin, Marshal from .... Comrade Zhukov drove two tank armies into Berlin in columns (most of them were not T-34s), where schoolchildren and pensioners (Faustpatrons) burned them safely and without any benefit. The assault continued with the participation of guns of various types and assault groups. After the capture of Berlin, when the debriefing began, it came to a loss. Stalin was oh ... from the difference in losses between the first Ukrainian front and the first Belorussian front. The loss of life to Joseph Vissarionovich was of little concern to him, but he was very jealous of the losses of armored vehicles and aircraft. And so, when he found out how much Comrade Konstantinovich had pissed off the latest tanks with the “IS” abbreviation, Stalin was furious, for Georgy Konstantinovich, the business took a bad turn. And in order to somehow get out of this, Zhukov began to repeat, and in unison with the entire command of the front, since no one knew how this could all end, the introduction of tanks in Berlin was justified and necessary. I don’t know whether Stalin believed it or not, but the thesis “ABOUT JUSTIFICATION OF TANK TERMS IN BERLIN” remained and took root.

              So this is what I’m leading to, it’s not necessary to strictly judge Russian officers and generals in stupidity and betrayal, my opinion is because it was taught by the Marshal from .... and the great warrior comrade. Zhukov already taught our officers, and, referring to this knowledge, they planned and conducted military operations. If something is wrong, please correct !!!
        2. Scythian 35
          Scythian 35 April 20 2013 15: 47 New
          0
          Good achievements in the Red Army have been since the battle of Stalingrad. But one thing happened !!! 1945 during the assault on Berlin, Marshal from .... Comrade Zhukov drove two tank armies into Berlin in columns (most of them were not T-34s), where schoolchildren and pensioners (Faustpatrons) burned them safely and without any benefit. The assault continued with the participation of guns of various types and assault groups. After the capture of Berlin, when the debriefing began, it came to a loss. Stalin was oh ... from the difference in losses between the first Ukrainian front and the first Belorussian front. The loss of life to Joseph Vissarionovich was of little concern to him, but he was very jealous of the losses of armored vehicles and aircraft. And so, when he found out how much Comrade Konstantinovich had pissed off the latest tanks with the “IS” abbreviation, Stalin was furious, for Georgy Konstantinovich, the business took a bad turn. And in order to somehow get out of this, Zhukov began to repeat, and in unison with the entire command of the front, since no one knew how this could all end, the introduction of tanks in Berlin was justified and necessary. I don’t know whether Stalin believed it or not, but the thesis “ABOUT JUSTIFICATION OF TANK TERMS IN BERLIN” remained and took root.

          So this is what I’m leading to, it’s not necessary to strictly judge Russian officers and generals in stupidity and betrayal, my opinion is because it was taught by the Marshal from .... and the great warrior comrade. Zhukov already taught our officers, and, referring to this knowledge, they planned and conducted military operations. If something is wrong, please correct !!!
          1. iliq
            iliq April 20 2013 18: 15 New
            +2
            Quote: Scythian 35
            So this is where I lead

            you would have read something more serious than Suvorov-the storyteller, according to the history of the Second World War, and would not have written frank nonsense.
            1. Scythian 35
              Scythian 35 April 21 2013 23: 01 New
              0
              and the armament of the two tank armies where did it go? and secondly, if you do not read Suvorov, then do not sculpt it anywhere. Please indicate to me where on the subject of the loss of armored vehicles in the Berlin operation and about the background of this story Suvorov wrote ??????? And the “history of the Great Patriotic War” or the tales of the CPSU where the fighter “Ivanov skillfully killed twelve with a bayonet and butt, wounded seven and captured before the German fascist invaders platoon” I stopped believing in my childhood when the agitation system was still working, by the way, like your Suvorov.
              1. iliq
                iliq April 22 2013 11: 24 New
                0
                Quote: Scythian 35
                and the armament of the two tank armies where did it go?

                which ones?
                1. Scythian 35
                  Scythian 35 April 22 2013 14: 49 New
                  0
                  For the most recognized 1 and 2 guards tank armies. Apart from two tank corps - officially and two more not officially.
                  1. iliq
                    iliq April 22 2013 14: 54 New
                    -1
                    these are the two tank armies that were introduced due to the strong resistance of the Zeelov heights? so they didn’t go to Berlin ...
                    and for example, the 1st GTA lost “only” 150 of 650 cars during the Berlin operation ...
                    so learn the materiel.
                    1. Scythian 35
                      Scythian 35 April 25 2013 07: 53 New
                      -1
                      What are you talking about !!! The figure is ceiling !!! If there is no minimum of knowledge then at least google. Even with the .. wikipedia this fact could not be silenced. Here is a reference to the backbone of the 1st Guards Tank Army - the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, if the guggle provides you with an insurmountable obstacle !!!
                      http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/1-я_гвардейская_танковая_бригада
                      henceforth I ask you not to troll and not to rush with "smart" numbers, the materiel for you is an empty sound.
      2. Grishka100watt
        Grishka100watt April 19 2013 23: 26 New
        0
        with the slightest success of our troops, negotiations took place immediately, moratoria were declared

        Affected by the proximity of Berezovsky to power in Russia. He was the secretary of the Security Council and at the same time had connections with the Chechen diaspora.
        I advise you to watch a series of doc.films. Chechen trap

        Better yet, Chechnya: On the Other Side of the War. Although there are odious faces, it gives some logical idea of ​​what happened. You can’t say about the movie "Chechen trap", although I reviewed it 4-5 times for a more complete understanding of what happened.
    2. Civil
      Civil April 19 2013 10: 14 New
      +1
      I would like to analyze the use of armored vehicles during the storming of Grozny 1999-2000
  2. radio operator
    radio operator April 18 2013 08: 25 New
    +5
    Still, in the city, the use of tanks is extremely difficult. The front for him is all 6 directions. And not all areas are equally protected.
    1. Trailer
      Trailer April 18 2013 09: 17 New
      +4
      The use of tanks is good in the presence of infantry cover and protected rear areas!
  3. Canep
    Canep April 18 2013 08: 26 New
    21
    "Against the roughly 10 militants defending Grozny, about 000 federal troops were concentrated." - The alignment of forces at the beginning of the operation is a failure. The campaign command did not read combat manuals. A successful offensive operation requires a 15-fold superiority, and in urban battles, a 000-fold superiority.
    1. Denis_SF
      Denis_SF April 18 2013 12: 29 New
      12
      With the commanding abilities of some generals, a 20-fold advantage would not give anything, only the number of losses increased.
    2. Smol79
      Smol79 April 18 2013 12: 33 New
      +6
      On day-tv there is a broadcast on this occasion. The multiple advantage is simply the statement of one of the military commanders. This is not provided for in combat manuals. As they say, you can not number, but skill.
      1. broker
        broker April 18 2013 13: 43 New
        0
        Here it is
        http://topwar.ru/26896-chislennoe-prevoshodstvo-ne-vsegda-zalog-pobedy.html
    3. savoj
      savoj April 18 2013 12: 36 New
      -2
      totally agree .... at least three times.
    4. Rakti-kali
      Rakti-kali April 18 2013 18: 18 New
      +2
      Quote: Canep
      and in urban battles 10 times.

      6 times. So in the charter.
  4. zambo
    zambo April 18 2013 08: 30 New
    10
    The worst part in all of this was that it was the Soviet troops that at one time had extensive experience in fighting in the city. Königsberg, Breslau, Berlin showed exactly how to act in such cases. But this experience was completely forgotten.
  5. Alekseev
    Alekseev April 18 2013 08: 59 New
    25
    Nobody forgot anything. We forgot that the war in Chechnya began at the time of the collapse of the state. EBN president, Berezovsky secretary, Pasha-Mercedes minister, all the bastards often infiltrated generals.
    What experience is there. Dynamic protection, and then not always hung. Say, no time. In Grozny it is necessary to hurry. SWAT hurries ... request
    1. Chaplain
      Chaplain April 18 2013 19: 50 New
      +2
      One of not many sensible comments on a highly controversial article. hi
  6. Stiletto
    Stiletto April 18 2013 09: 11 New
    18
    The main disadvantages were not in technology, but in a moronic high command, lack of coordination between units, outdated communication systems, and the participation in the assault of young, unshooted fighters, some of whom had never themselves shot from an automatic rifle.
  7. Chicot 1
    Chicot 1 April 18 2013 09: 47 New
    23
    Regarding the assault on November 26, 1994 ... Adventure. Ill-conceived and criminal. Mediocre and wasted military equipment, and most importantly human lives. All those who planned this assault should have been punished ...
    A lot has been written and expressed about the storming of Grozny. And I just don't see the point of repeating ...

    Eternal memory to all those who died in Chechnya ...
    1. Zhaman-Urus
      Zhaman-Urus April 18 2013 10: 27 New
      12
      There was a lot of information that the tanks used by the FSK recruited Russian tankers exploded themselves from an INTERNAL blast i.e. explosives were laid in advance. I think the London Hangman could tell a lot about this. Eternal memory of the fallen Russian soldiers.
      1. Denis_SF
        Denis_SF April 18 2013 12: 31 New
        +4
        There was no ammunition for anti-aircraft machine guns, which in the conditions of urban combat (with a large number of high-rise buildings) and the lack of infantry cover is already criminal.
      2. Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock
        0
        I found only two links to your statement ..... "We thought that tanks explode from our cries of" Allahu akbar "! but in reality it turned out to be a provocation of a long, terrible war ... ”(allegedly from Kadyrov’s statement) https://www.proza.ru/2013/02/02/53 give the exact source of your information.
    2. fzr1000
      fzr1000 April 18 2013 19: 34 New
      +3
      This was one of the first betrayals at the top in a series of 1000 of the following.
  8. PDM80
    PDM80 April 18 2013 10: 25 New
    +8
    eternal memory to our fallen guys soldier
  9. Drappier
    Drappier April 18 2013 10: 45 New
    +9
    here they are, real heroes ...
  10. savoj
    savoj April 18 2013 10: 47 New
    +5
    .... This assault cost the Russian army about 6000 people killed and wounded. Irretrievable losses of armored vehicles, according to the information of the Main Armored Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, amounted to 49 tanks, 132 infantry fighting vehicles, 98 armored personnel carriers. The number of damaged but repaired tanks remains unknown ...
    That's how Russia is fighting .... on its own land ..... with the meat of its people, as in the Second World War. Nothing changed. This is Pyrrhic victory. And it’s very embarrassing for the Russian people, who chose such commanders and leaders. It is especially pleasant that the children of millionaires and billionaires also fought shoulder to shoulder with children from villages and cities.
    1. Argon
      Argon April 18 2013 12: 04 New
      +4
      Yes you really? AI WHAT GOOD FELLOWS, but you can find out the number of these heroes part numbers, well, at least five names.
      1. Denis_SF
        Denis_SF April 18 2013 12: 33 New
        +3
        Yes you really? AI WHAT GOOD FELLOWS, but you can find out the number of these heroes part numbers, well, at least five names.

        Sarcasm? She .. did not hear.
        1. Argon
          Argon April 18 2013 13: 28 New
          0
          No B ... L ... I am serious.
    2. Avenger711
      Avenger711 April 18 2013 16: 54 New
      -1
      It is a shame that such illiterate people like you pour dirt on WWII commanders.
  11. Axel
    Axel April 18 2013 10: 54 New
    +4
    Regiment TU-95 equip ODAB-500PM, and then tanks can be. Why do so many people send death?

    Maps were only medium-sized (1:50 thousand, or even 1: 100 thousand), and the commanders were not given precise instructions about what would happen. Moreover, the tankers were not given ammunition for machine guns to respond with fire to attacks from above, from the zone beyond the reach of the guns, they did not explain what to do and to whom they obey, some cars were painted with white stripes on the roofs for the convenience of non-existent air support, so it was easier for the enemy aim.
    1. beech
      beech April 18 2013 21: 40 New
      0
      the Maykop brigade generally went to the wrong place, ended up in a trap ... and all because they could not find normal maps
  12. Day 11
    Day 11 April 18 2013 11: 17 New
    +5
    It’s just that in the beginning the Chechens were not taken seriously at all. Everyone thought that when they saw the tanks, they would just scatter home, throwing their weapons. Everything turned out to be much more serious
    1. Black
      Black April 18 2013 15: 11 New
      +5
      Quote: Den 11
      the Chechens were not taken seriously at all. Everyone thought that when they saw the tanks, they would just scatter home, throwing their weapons. Everything turned out to be much more serious


      Well, those who thought so were those who were not next to them "across the river."

      I am absolutely convinced that until the “generalsimuses” (and the presidents too) receive real sentences for crimes such as “the seizure of Grozny,” “Komsomol,” “Lebedyansky’s world,” etc. they, the future fathers-commanders soldiers will be sent to the same rake.
  13. Prometey
    Prometey April 18 2013 11: 20 New
    +1
    In the photo, where the trace from the defeat of the tank tower by a grenade - just think - such a neat little hole and the entire tank is out of order belay
    I’m an ignoramus in this matter, explain why the whole crew of the tank died if there weren’t any visible damage to the tank (there was obviously no detonation and fire inside). Barotrauma remain. But here in the article they once wrote that the crew does not receive any barotrauma if the hatches are closed.
    1. Argon
      Argon April 18 2013 12: 26 New
      0
      I think it’s not at all obvious that there was no fire, most likely the charges burned out. Well, imagine for yourself, a very small, enclosed volume (hatches are closed) in which pressure increases by a factor of 100 or more in a split second. Third option: Hatches are open, it’s clear with the operator , the commander blows through the hatch, vodmeh secondary factors of defeat. The hole is clearly not RPG-7, something more serious. maybe even the "Fagot" well, in my opinion. And finally you can’t return the guys without a difference.
    2. kind
      kind April 18 2013 12: 57 New
      +2
      The first damaging factor is the cumulative jet with particles of molten armor, and the second is just a barotrauma with closed hatches. Try to shoot an empty cartridge into an aluminum flask, it will inflate like a ball, the same effect in a closed tank, only the hull naturally does not inflate, and it squashes people inside from a sharp expansion of gases.
      1. LeXXSkAt
        LeXXSkAt April 18 2013 13: 05 New
        +9
        Zabronevy action of the cumulative ammunition is provided by high-speed cumulative jet penetrated through the barrier, and secondary fragments of armor. The temperature of the jet is sufficient to ignite the powder charges, fumes lubricants and hydraulic fluids. The damaging effect of the cumulative jet, the number of secondary fragments decrease with increasing armor thickness.

        Now for more information on overpressure and shock wave. By itself, the cumulative jet does not create any significant shock wave by virtue of its small mass. The shock wave is created by undermining the explosive charge of the ammunition (high-explosive action). The shock wave CAN NOT penetrate beyond the thick-bronch barrier through the hole punched by the cumulative jet, because the diameter of such an opening is negligible, it is impossible to transmit any significant impulse through it. Accordingly, excessive pressure cannot be created inside the armored vehicle.
      2. iliq
        iliq April 18 2013 14: 51 New
        +2
        barotrauma with closed hatches.

        more than once this nonsense was understood. there is no "barotrauma". hole in 1 cm2 and internal volume of 3 m3 - where does the pressure increase come from?
        the same thing on Abrams - RPG hit, penetration - mehan got in his foot - and EVERYTHING !!! no more injuries.
        1. LeXXSkAt
          LeXXSkAt April 18 2013 14: 57 New
          +3
          Here I am about that ... they do not believe (Damn grabbed the minuses solely from what I was trying to explain)
          1. ramsi
            ramsi April 19 2013 11: 20 New
            0
            somewhere I met with a clear explanation that yes - no burning or penetration - there is a break through. The speed of a jet of liquid metal lining the reverse cone of an explosive reaches: at the beginning, about 5 km / s, and at the end, up to 1,5 km / s. It stretches, it seems, up to one and a half meters in length, after which (at the end) it begins to disintegrate into drops. The crew is struck by the jet itself and the fragments of armor. If the detonation of the ammunition did not occur, then with closed hatches there should be no barotrauma. (I don’t remember only - is it molten metal, or “disassembled” to some other state? ..)
            1. cth; fyn
              cth; fyn April 19 2013 12: 28 New
              0
              In my opinion, approximately the same thing happens as a water stream in sand or earth.
  14. Axel
    Axel April 18 2013 11: 44 New
    +3
    Quote: Prometey
    In the photo, where the trace from the defeat of the tank tower by a grenade

    From the textbook "The action of means of destruction", NSTU, Doctor of Technical Sciences Balagansky, Dr. Yurovsky.

    In addition, a number of testimonies "BTR-60PB. N. Kupriyanov, who served in Afghanistan in 1981-83 as part of the BTR-60PB crew, recalled:" ... A grenade burst into the starboard side, just above the warhead. Everything inside was covered with smoke , a grenade, gnawing a hole in the armor with a nickel, spewed a stream of molten metal inside. The floor of the car vibrated underfoot, the upper hatches threw pressure, the membranes ached with pain, the pain became unbearable with every beat of the pulse ... "
    1. Argon
      Argon April 18 2013 13: 20 New
      0
      And, my dear, BMD also often survived, design features — it breaks down the landing hatch, the same is described by a respected veteran. With BMPs and tanks it doesn’t tear hatches more critical. And that you think there is a shock wave in a closed cluttered volume increase in pressure.
      1. LeXXSkAt
        LeXXSkAt April 18 2013 13: 33 New
        +3
        Dear, please learn the materiel ... I have already explained this topic twice. The off-target action of the cumulative ammunition is provided by a high-speed cumulative jet penetrating the barrier and secondary fragments of armor. The jet temperature is sufficient to ignite the powder charges, fuels and lubricants and hydraulic fluids. The amazing effect of the cumulative jet, the number of secondary fragments decrease with increasing thickness of the armor.

        Now for more information on overpressure and shock wave. By itself, the cumulative jet does not create any significant shock wave by virtue of its small mass. The shock wave is created by undermining the explosive charge of the ammunition (high-explosive action). The shock wave CAN NOT penetrate beyond the thick-bronch barrier through the hole punched by the cumulative jet, because the diameter of such an opening is negligible, it is impossible to transmit any significant impulse through it. Accordingly, excessive pressure cannot be created inside the armored vehicle.


        If the cumulative jet and fragments of armor do not hit people and fire / explosive equipment of the tank, then the crew survives safely: provided they are inside armored vehicles and closed hatches!
      2. iliq
        iliq April 18 2013 14: 56 New
        +1
        god what a dream of reason ...
    2. iliq
      iliq April 18 2013 14: 54 New
      0
      the fact that the RPG breaks the sides of the Russian armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles is no secret. RPG tank armor is not able to break through - also a fact.

      Well, do not read the "artistic whistle" of some veterans who saw the flight of a cumulative jet ...
      1. Prohor
        Prohor April 19 2013 14: 49 New
        0
        If someone carefully watched the shooting from the RPG, then you probably saw that when the grenade exploded, which did not hit the armored target, sometimes a red line is visible. This, apparently, is a cumulative stream. And inside the armored vehicles you definitely will not see it.
  15. Prometey
    Prometey April 18 2013 12: 05 New
    0
    Axel
    That is, after all, barotrauma? Thanks for the answer.
    1. LeXXSkAt
      LeXXSkAt April 18 2013 13: 08 New
      +2
      Zabronevy action of the cumulative ammunition is provided by high-speed cumulative jet penetrated through the barrier, and secondary fragments of armor. The temperature of the jet is sufficient to ignite the powder charges, fumes lubricants and hydraulic fluids. The damaging effect of the cumulative jet, the number of secondary fragments decrease with increasing armor thickness.

      Now for more information on overpressure and shock wave. By itself, the cumulative jet does not create any significant shock wave by virtue of its small mass. The shock wave is created by undermining the explosive charge of the ammunition (high-explosive action). The shock wave CAN NOT penetrate beyond the thick-bronch barrier through the hole punched by the cumulative jet, because the diameter of such an opening is negligible, it is impossible to transmit any significant impulse through it. Accordingly, excessive pressure cannot be created inside the armored vehicle.


      If the cumulative jet and fragments of armor do not hit people and fire / explosive equipment of the tank, then the crew survives safely: provided they are inside armored vehicles and closed hatches!

      I hope so clear?
      1. Prometey
        Prometey April 18 2013 13: 42 New
        0
        Quote: LeXXSkAt
        I hope so clear?

        Yes, I see. Just don’t get excited, I really do not understand much in the physics of the effects of explosives, so I wanted to enlighten my ignorance a bit. Again, I remember the film “Purgatory” (yes, I know that a lot of fiction), when the militants shoot the tank point blank (they are either complete stupid people who are not afraid of ammunition detonation, or 100% were sure that there was nothing to detonate). Was it possible to survive inside the tank after this?
      2. Volkhov
        Volkhov April 18 2013 13: 57 New
        0
        The cumulative jet + is ionized and heated, therefore, when an electron is taken away from air molecules, they decompose into atoms and the pressure rises, also from heating. It's just that science is specialized and takes into account 1 factor - gas dynamics, but there are no electrical effects.
        The lining material is important - it may be a passing chemical (from uranium) or electronic damage. (German Fausts sometimes left a dead crew in an unburned tank) Electronic defeat involves the removal of an electron from oxygen molecules, incl. blood and rapid death from suffocation, so birds perish in flight and dolphins with fish in the sea.
        1. LeXXSkAt
          LeXXSkAt April 18 2013 14: 02 New
          +1
          http://topwar.ru/20498-esche-odin-kumulyativnyy-mif.html

          Read it please. There are facts about temperature, pressure and damaging effects.

          Regards, Alexey.
        2. Dim Dim
          Dim Dim April 18 2013 22: 42 New
          +1
          Learn physics, the cumulative jet is not ionized, and its temperature is really below the melting point of the metal, this is the penetration of metal through another under super high pressure. And stories about all kinds of flowing electrons are nonsense. Same as an air molecule. For your information, air is just a mixture of gases, 70% nitrogen, 20% oxygen, carbon dioxide, and other little things.
      3. malkor
        malkor April 18 2013 14: 43 New
        -2
        Dear lekskskskat shock wave is a sharp pressure drop - the wave propagates in the volume through the hole and the gases of the cumulative jet penetrate and despite its small WEIGHT, the cumulative stream SALES a few centimeters METAL (It smelts it and not how it is thought to be thermal and kinetic energy of the gases generated after the explosion of an explosive rocket RPG projectile hot gases penetrated through the melted hole create the effect of an explosion of a small explosive inside the tank and with open hatches not getting directly under the stream, the crew survives, and when closed it gets barotrauma.
        1. LeXXSkAt
          LeXXSkAt April 18 2013 14: 54 New
          +2
          I cited a reference there so as not to be unfounded ... Please read I do not want to quote the entire article ... And it doesn’t melt or burn because the temperature is lower than the melting point of the armor, but it breaks through.
          1. Volkhov
            Volkhov April 18 2013 17: 22 New
            0
            It does not penetrate, but sprays - the electron shells are combined, the electrons are released, then the ions of the armor and the jet.
            1. Argon
              Argon April 19 2013 02: 55 New
              -1
              Actually, all calculations on the cumulation processes are based on pressure equations, the jet pushes through the armor. And the key parameter of the armor is stupid, yield strength
          2. Argon
            Argon April 18 2013 21: 31 New
            -2
            Dear LeXXSkAt, we already understood your opinion, as well as your love and ability to press the keyboard. The Internet, of course, is good, however, it seems to me that you should be "savvy" academically. Sorry, for the mentor tone
    2. Avenger711
      Avenger711 April 18 2013 16: 52 New
      0
      With open hatches. If they were bullied, the shock wave would be low hazard.
  16. Prapor Afonya
    Prapor Afonya April 18 2013 12: 20 New
    +2
    Yes, it’s not the tanks and the soldiers that matter, but the government and the command, which was then, but the worst thing is that many of those traitors who were then in charge still walk on the sinful earth.
  17. Mohomax
    Mohomax April 18 2013 12: 40 New
    +2
    Chechnya is an experience that must not be forgotten and repeated. Soldiers, too, people they do not want to die because of the criminal actions of their state. If you need to capture the city, you need to draw up a capture plan and not hope for invulnerability of tank technology.
  18. Alexander Kirov
    Alexander Kirov April 18 2013 12: 49 New
    +5
    God still had mercy on us from August 1981, when there was a team preparing according to the Czechoslovakian scenario. And I have a BMP-1 and in Krakow. I remove the top-bottom limiters, the bypass, the gun searchlight, I prepare plugs for the rear tanks, sandbags for my feet , boxes on top so what? Jaruzelsky saved. And I was reprimanded for damage to property, and the lives of soldiers who need them neither then nor now.
    1. Orik
      Orik April 18 2013 20: 00 New
      +2
      And if you did not save Jaruzelsky? Then you would save the soldier, and a reprimand ... that’s always the case in Russia.
      1. Alexander Kirov
        Alexander Kirov April 19 2013 02: 52 New
        +1
        If he hadn’t saved Jaruzelsky, they would have burned us in Krakow, as in Grozny. In the school in 1974, the justified dispute 2A28 THUND was not a gun but a fart. Give us the infantry at least 37 mm automatic machine, the ACS for armor, better 2, the elevation angle 65-80 cumulative screens and how did it end? Even Afghanistan was UNFAVORABLE but only the Hungarian events of 1956, which I studied very well from the stories of veterans. The dispute ended in a special department, well, as usual, dislike for your weapons and praise of the enemy and the political department. All the same stupidity repeated on New Year in Grozny, after 21 year! AK-74 appeared. Step forward, after 5 days I added an SVD sniper scope to the AK, not yet a collimator, and so, the flight paths of the bullet are almost the same and what again? Evaluated for shooting in the mountains? Yeah, spoilage of weapons, 5 days of arrest. And I then shot back at the PRIKVO check, the general saw a reprimand again, we violated it, and who forbade it? 30% of the norm, like that. The officers of the beer company didn’t dry out. We only shot at the beer and boxes, the incentive! We are the best with beer.
  19. _KM_
    _KM_ April 18 2013 13: 25 New
    +1
    The Interior Minister said that the idea was to quickly and covertly capture the city, but the army could not do everything quickly. As a result, the militants prepared very well.

    IMHO - for fighting in the city, a heavy BMP with reliable armor and powerful weapons with large elevation angles suggests itself.
    1. skeptic
      skeptic April 18 2013 14: 19 New
      +2
      Quote: _KM_
      The Interior Minister said that the idea was to quickly and covertly capture the city, but the army could not do everything quickly. As a result, the militants prepared very well.


      Subsequent events say that the cause of the defeat was laid before our troops left. The betrayal of Russia's interests, as exemplified by the Chechen wars, is a clear indicator of putrefactive processes at the top of power and among the "big boys" in uniform.
    2. Alexander Kirov
      Alexander Kirov April 18 2013 18: 35 New
      0
      Here's a gift for a couple? Kharkov repair plant, last year. It is a pity. In one copy.
    3. Orik
      Orik April 18 2013 20: 03 New
      +2
      Reconnaissance, artillery, mobile groups with support (!) Of armored vehicles, stripping and fixing of captured terrain. No rush and snot about the "civilian" population (warned, released, gone).
  20. Terrible ensign
    Terrible ensign April 18 2013 14: 03 New
    +3
    Glory to the tankmen! Eternal memory to the dead guys! ..
  21. George
    George April 18 2013 14: 31 New
    +2
    Hello everyone .
    Honestly, I expected another from the article. I thought the author would write about how quickly I had to learn to fight and interact:
    Fire support of the 255 guards. In the defensive battles for the hospital complex, the SME from the Northeast group provided a tank battalion in the number of 7 tanks T-72А and T-72Б1.


    Tankers, leading the battle in the environment, were one of the first to use the “swoop” technique when the 2 of the tank, successively rolling out from around the corner of the building, fired 3-4 shots at the detected targets and backed off.


    An attempt to capture an attack from the hospital complex of the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Sunzha led the 3 of January to the loss of two T-72B (M) tanks from artillery-grenade launcher fire from the 74 Guards that entered the city on the eve. Omsbr After the infantry was cut off from the tanks, the latter were instantly knocked out at the bridge, replenishing the account of the irretrievable losses of the tank units storming Grozny. Covering the crew’s withdrawal with fire from the machine, the wounded tankman Private A. Ryabokon died at his combat vehicle (posthumously awarded the Order of Courage),


    A change in tactics of the action of federal forces tanks in urban conditions was outlined with the expansion of the fully controlled infantry zone of residential areas and the transition from defensive battles to offensive ones. The deficit in tanks caused by the initial losses forced the creation of mixed armored groups, which included the 2 of the tank and the ZSU-23-4 or BMP-2. Assigned to specific assault motorized infantry units, armored groups were to provide constant cover for the assaulting motorized infantry building with powerful fire. In subsequent battles, due to the different level of protection of these combat vehicles and their various maneuverable capabilities, the mixed composition of the armored group was used extremely rarely.


    Two main methods of action of armored groups were used. In the first case, one tank fired in the interests of the infantry, and the crew of the second, observing the situation, could at any time notice and repel an attack preparing for the lead tank. According to the ammunition consumption of the first tank, the second provided its head exit from the position with its fire. ZSU-23-4 and BMP-2, hiding in tanks due to their weak booking, fired on the upper floors of high-rise buildings.


    The time interval of fire impact on the enemy depended on the speed of replenishment of ammunition armored group in the rear. On average, a day a pair of tanks made two to four exits to the assault target, while reaching the firing line, the crews tried to go at low speeds for sound masking, and when they left the engine they squeezed everything that they could do.


    Controlling the assault units of the federal forces over separate scattered buildings and quarters made each raid of the tank group a risky event, because on the extension route or when returning via 15-30 minutes for replenishment of ammunition, the armored group could easily be caught in the crossfire of anti-tank weapons of an illegal armed formation that ambushed on the way tanks. The absence of large-scale maps of the districts and streets of the city led to a limitation of the maneuver of armored groups when advancing to firing lines and moving away from them. Whenever possible, the crews tried every time to change routes. The typical situation was on January 10 during the battles for Lenin Square. With the task of blocking the intersection of Pervomaiskaya and Naurskaya streets, our T-72Б1 (board number 430), moving to a firing position, was fired from an ambush when approaching the square. One of the RPG shots fell on board, the absence of a bulwark earlier torn off led to through penetration of the armor in the area of ​​fuel tanks and the ammunition. Instant detonation did not leave the crew a chance to escape.

  22. George
    George April 18 2013 14: 38 New
    0
    The second method was called a "carousel" or "pinwheel." The essence of the combat work of the armored group was the continuity of the fire impact on the target. Several pairs of tanks, alternately, conducting a shift change at the firing line, provided continuous firing of targets, in pairs leaving for the rear to replenish ammunition.


    This method was used with the support of the 876 th dshbr, which stormed the Council of Ministers of the Czech Republic. Tanks T-72B (M) from the armored group of the 74 Guards. Omsbr brigade fired on suppression of firing points and blocked the building, not allowing the approach of reserves of illegal armed groups on the bridge over the river. Sunzha. This position also made it possible to fire direct fire at the Kavkaz Hotel and the Presidential Palace. During the battle, each of the vehicles received several hits from the RPG, P. Nemtsov’s tank burned down. Having used up the ammunition, the armored group of two tanks and the “horseless” crew of P. Nemtsov transferred the position to the two T-72B1 tanks from the tank battalion of the 276 SME (probably S. Novokshonov and E. Lyapustin).


    The need for assault groups in tank support led to their intensive use in urban battles. According to the memoirs of the commander of a tank platoon of the 133 guards. from Captain V. Baglai, during the battles near the tram park, his tankers had to literally live six days in their cars. The infantry refueled tanks, supplied ammunition, products, after which the armored group immediately went to the suppression of firing points.


    In these battles, as an additional protection against RPGs and heavy machine guns, the crews of tanks and light armored vehicles of the federal troops began to intensively hang shell boxes, nets, and additional spare parts on their armor.


    A large number of tank losses in Grozny was exacerbated by the lack of contact dynamic protection (KDZ) or explosive in it. For example, the 20 tanks of the T-72 131 th ombre and the 7 tanks T-72 255-th MSP, as well as the T-72 (172M) and T-72 693 th SMPS and 503 th SMPS SKVO did not have contact dynamic protection and the 14 T-72B1 tanks had KDZ "snuff-boxes" empty. The T-72B1 tanks belonging to the 276 th SME and the T-80 from the 81 th SME joined the battle for Grozny with empty KDZ blocks. Waging an intense battle in the narrow streets of the city, hiding from return fire, tank crews pressed cars to buildings or drove inside houses, demolishing bulwarks and crushing KDZ blocks. There was practically no time for repairs in a combat situation. The absence of new blocks made it impossible and pointless to install explosive plates brought from the rear.


    Like this .And the article is similar to the chronology of those events and the topic itself is given a minimum of attention. No offense will be said to the author, but the article could bring practical benefits and serve as a guide to action, if there is suitable material. IMHO
  23. iliq
    iliq April 18 2013 15: 10 New
    0
    not so long ago, Denis Mokrushin (http://twower.livejournal.com/1027197.html) had an analysis of the American operation in Baghdad - one in one capture of Grozny ... but with a diametrically opposite result ...
  24. Aleks tv
    Aleks tv April 18 2013 15: 11 New
    10
    "P. Grachev only on December 27 gave the order to begin the assault on Grozny on December 31 with a mandatory report to the Russian president on the capture of the city of January 1 in 00.01."
    Bastards, they would be there so that they would famously “rattle their arms” by the round date ...

    "The worst thing about all this was that it was the Soviet troops who at one time gained extensive experience in conducting battles in the city."
    The generals simply needed to read BUSV, and not just poke us in their nose.

    "Dynamic protection systems worked exceptionally well."
    Yes, only we fastened them on the go, but not all had time, and there were few of them, not enough.

    "This assault cost the Russian army about 6000 people killed and wounded."
    It’s still painful to see the photo ...

    Tankers without infantry are nowhere, just like infantry without tanks. Until we walk through the territory together, it will not be cleansed, no matter who says anything about contactless wars.

    And war is a terrible thing. It does not work out about rassusolivat ...
    Thanks to the author for the article, sorry about the application itself, the topic is not disclosed.

    Video in memory:
    1. Naval
      Naval April 18 2013 15: 33 New
      +2
      Thanks for the video, impressive .... Hats off.
  25. Naval
    Naval April 18 2013 15: 16 New
    +5
    As we see, the rotten tradition of the Russian-Soviet-Russian army to take cities to the red dates of the calendar over the past two centuries has not hesitated. Now we take Plevna for the Tsar’s birthday, then Kiev for November 7, Berlin for May 1, and now a New Year’s present ...
    Still have not learned how to protect a soldier, it’s a pity for the guys who again had to sacrifice their lives in order to please politicians.
  26. Avenger711
    Avenger711 April 18 2013 16: 50 New
    +1
    Now we take Plevna for the Tsar’s birthday, then Kiev - for November 7, Berlin - for May 1


    The author. Do not know, do not write. And if they focused on the plan, then how? Would they also take it by January 1, and not 13 days earlier?

    Dynamic protection systems worked exceptionally well.


    Yeah, only the mass of tanks was without them and taken from storage bases.

    In August 1996, fights broke out again in Grozny, although this time they did not last long. On August 6, militants broke into the city. They did not try to storm the strongholds of the federal troops, but simply isolated them and subjected them to mortar fire, waiting for the surrender of the defenders. However, the energetic actions of the command of the federal forces managed to prevent the worst case scenario. Although the fighting was still stubborn, a corridor to the Government House was broken on August 11, lifting the siege from this important point. And by August 13, a decisive turning point was reached. Federal troops began to crowd the enemy in all directions, and militants began to withdraw from the city.


    Of course, the army always copes with the partisans. Only after this, for some reason, shamefully ended. From which it clearly follows that the raid on Grozny did not imply anything else, the main thing is to create hysteria in the media and surrender the country, and that the commanders on the ground will disperse the bandits, it does not matter.
  27. silver_roman
    silver_roman April 18 2013 18: 59 New
    +1
    terrible war. sorry for our guys. so pity....
    I imagine what would happen to Yues Marins if they had met at least once in a similar battle with the militants. and in fact, militants are their outgrowths, which were both funded and supported from across the ocean. These are not the puppets now fighting against Assad in Syria, these are real animals!
    1. iliq
      iliq April 18 2013 19: 29 New
      0
      I imagine what would happen to Yues Marins if they had met at least once in a similar battle with the militants.

      see the assault on Baghdad, operation 1: 1, the opposite result.

      http://twower.livejournal.com/1027197.html
    2. Prohor
      Prohor April 19 2013 15: 08 New
      0
      The militants, of course, were supported by our enemies, but in their leadership there were many former officers of the Soviet Army (the same Dudaev and Maskhadov), and it was they who directed the actions of the militants. Very effective, unfortunately.
    3. Scythian 35
      Scythian 35 1 May 2013 17: 20 New
      0
      Which on from zaokena !!! He trained the FSB for the war in Abkhazia, armed the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation by transferring the military skill of the military units previously deployed in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Heal while medicine is free!
  28. spanchbob
    spanchbob April 18 2013 19: 44 New
    0
    He said treason, starting from the highest echelon — the generals (not all of course, of course, but there were traitors) and ending with individual officers and soldiers in the warring army. So we need to pay more attention to the moral qualities of people who are trusted in the country's defense. And we had a big failure in this matter.
    And you know, I agree with him. [/ Quote]
    Why all the time they nod at the traitors. Is betrayal a trait of the Russian army? You think badly of yourself!
  29. crambol
    crambol April 18 2013 20: 40 New
    +1
    Quote: spanchbob
    Why all the time they nod at the traitors. Is betrayal a trait of the Russian army?


    I want to recall the words of Napoleon: -This is worse than betrayal. This is mistake!

    A military professional has no right to be mistaken!
    1. crambol
      crambol April 18 2013 21: 54 New
      0
      Feels minus came from the Potomac!
  30. alert_timka
    alert_timka April 18 2013 22: 11 New
    +2
    Tired of listening to betrayal, if everyone at the top was such villains and traitors, the question arises, and who were those who executed these orders, who knew that from the commander in chief and the minister of defense to the generals there were all bastards, villains and traitors. it turns out all the country's leadership was not legitimate ??? Then the war itself in Chechnya was not legitimate. They also said that the tanks were without DZ, and here on all and in other pictures all the tanks were with them ... Everywhere they say that there was no experience, etc. and you read articles on this and other sites about the people participating there, all the time people who have passed Afghanistan, Transnistria, Abkhazia and something else ...
    1. Dad Uassia
      Dad Uassia 7 October 2015 19: 32 New
      0
      The command had no experience. This is the first. Secondly, after the war, realizing what happened, they began to call them traitors. And what's the point in DZ if there is no explosive? This is also something to go to war without DZ.
  31. Argon
    Argon April 18 2013 22: 48 New
    +1
    Dear commentators, the fighting in the city has always been and will be a bloody affair, do not consider it as valuable, but the key factor in the assault on the city (isolated fortified area) is time. With all the consequences. The assault must be preceded by a siege. victims among attackers. One should not compare with amers, firstly, objective information has just begun to appear, and secondly, amers in Baghdad still managed to deprive the defenders of centralized control by turning them into disparate groups, languidly interacting with each other. Unlike Chechens, the governance structures which, they acted even better than the federals. The Amers had two assaults, and not successful, after some time the situation was strikingly reminiscent of Grozny 96. The difference is that we knew when to stop — big losses — analysis — change of tactics. normal command. In 94-96, this was very lacking.
    1. crambol
      crambol April 18 2013 23: 05 New
      +1
      Smart words are nice to listen to. Plus to you!
  32. Larus
    Larus April 19 2013 01: 02 New
    +1
    How many sensible commanders and soldiers died and all because they were afraid to say no, when it was necessary to prepare and after that to go and wet the bandiuk. It is clear that the orders are not discussed, but again we need to reasonably and be aware of their actions. it is this officer’s honor when you know that he did everything right, and did not fulfill the order to ....
  33. Lieutenant colonel
    Lieutenant colonel April 19 2013 04: 44 New
    +2
    I'll put in my five cents. No one thought about such a fact - for what time was the army operation planned? If we take a weather report for the period from November to March in the territory of Chechnya - what will we see? On the flat part of the territory during this period, the most frequent phenomena are fogs, wet snow or snow with rain, low cloud cover. In the mountainous part, the most frequent weather events are fogs located in gorges; good visibility is possible above the mountain peaks. EXTREMELY unsuccessful time for meteorological characteristics was chosen for the operation. How many problems - you need to fly - no weather! Neglecting weather data has limited aviation's ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance and engage ground targets. And this is one of MANY victory bricks. Here, many write about traitors, etc. - how then did the North East group manage to conduct military operations effectively? Only there they read BUSV h 3,2,1? Betrayed by the military rather (although in the family and not without freaks) and politicians-they just put the pressure on - a truce! After a couple of weeks, a month - again in a new way - the illegal armed formations seized this, that - to destroy it. But these are emotions, and in essence the article - thanks to the author for not letting the memory "subside". The tank CAN and MUST fight in the city. And they should not fight in the city of BMPTs or heavy BMPs / armored personnel carriers - ANY armored object can be knocked out / destroyed, but in the city it is easier to do it in triple. The city should be "cleaned" by assault groups in close cooperation with artillery, tanks (as a means of direct fire support) and aviation. And in order for this to work, you need to work out the interaction in detail - first on maps, then play in the sandbox, conduct radio training (which, by the way, was done in the North East) - these are also victory bricks.
    After the assault groups, the “clean territory” should be “secured” by second-tier troops with the establishment of roadblocks and the organization of control sectors, where MRIs and other “heaviness” may be needed.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 April 19 2013 14: 17 New
      +1
      Here I will give you a counterargument. The Germans, planning in November 41 to take Moscow what they thought? About the weather to a lesser extent. The same story.
      For the rest I agree with you.
      1. Lieutenant colonel
        Lieutenant colonel April 21 2013 05: 18 New
        0
        Without comprehensive training, planning (selection of the time of the year, season, time of day - warfare) of military operations. comprehensive support and ORGANIZATION of interaction to win is not possible. And our "Achaeles heel" is a connection. It was organized according to the scheme of PEACE time! His father’s signalman himself — from childhood he saw how this is done — was not done there. The result is what we have. And about the Germans - they planned the blitz krieg just right - for the driest months of the year in the USSR. They did not take into account the stoic value of the Soviet soldier. And our Pasha did not choose SAMONE a favorable time for military operations, but even in these conditions it was possible to succeed - it was not necessary to take the city by 010.01! I also propose to recall his dictum - Take Grozny with one RAP !!! The top of ideotism !!!!! And what do you prefer, Andrei - a trench in summer or winter, or a dirt road in summer or autumn, arable field in summer or autumn? Real hostilities are not a counter strike.
  34. Lieutenant colonel
    Lieutenant colonel April 19 2013 04: 44 New
    +3
    Here in the comments they wrote that we needed a machine like ISU 152 - but what, excuse me, is the MSTA not happy? And again, in many comments, the people are slipping into heavy armored infantry fighting vehicles and insufficient armor protection of tanks - is it again supposed to put the equipment forward? And the infantry behind her? And again, look at the frames of the heap of twisted iron? And to say - how bad everything is! If you look at the offensive in more detail, we will see that there are periods like fire preparation of the offensive and fire support of the advancing troops. This is all good in the area where there is an adversary who seems to be "disgusting" to us - hit him and hit him, they would deliver the ammunition on time - but what about the city located on the territory of his country? This is another problem that everyone somehow forgot. Our guys did not expect such actions from the militants, no one prepared them for the fact that they were going to war in their country. At 60 hours, carefully listen to what the battalion’s NS says - they did not understand that this was a war and people would die in it, some time passed while everyone realized that it really was. I do not write that they were UNPROFESSIONAL! We were prepared to fight with an external enemy (at least the armed forces)!
    Here, some “buttered” about the cumulative effect - when I was a cadet (tank school) at the department of operation there was a colonel who fought on T-62 in Afghanistan. So, in the first lesson, he told us the yellowhorns and showed how to mitigate the effects of a cumulative hit in the tank - a wooden stick lies across the hatch, a rope is tied to the manhole cover, the hatch closes and the other end of the rope is tied to the back of the seat (it’s not important for the gunner’s commander ) and if the CS gets into the tank and the armor breaks through with the EXCEEDED EXCESSIVE pressure, the hatches open, the crew does not receive barotrauma. You can certainly not close the hatches at all - but then where to go shooters from the upper floors?
    A blessed memory to all those who died for their homeland and country. And the EBN, Grachev and the “London gallows” had to be dug up and hung up - then again buried and in place of the graves to build a track for testing tanks. In general, I am glad that they became "only leash history"
  35. mojohed
    mojohed April 19 2013 06: 40 New
    0
    I believe that the use of BMPT Terminator in the course of street fighting would not give a significant result, because in fact, the BMPT is the same tank, but without a powerful gun, the review from the BMPT also leaves much to be desired. However, if the DMPT had not 1 combat module, but two forward and backward, the chances of a support effect and suppression of resistance would increase.
  36. Rainger
    Rainger April 19 2013 07: 02 New
    0
    I am interested in a few questions about this article:
    1. What sources did the author use?
    2. On the basis of what facts does it make such "thoughtful" conclusions about the "betrayal and incompetence" of the command?
    3. Did the author of General Troshin's memoir read The Diary of a Trench General?
    4. Does the author have access to the MO document for that period in order to so boldly discuss the motives of the generals in general and P. Grachev in particular ...
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 April 19 2013 14: 08 New
      0
      "The 131st brigade found itself in a particularly difficult situation, which on January 1 at about 16.00 p.m. lost all armored vehicles."

      131 brigades were given the task - to take the railway station. The task was completed. After that, the equipment was left near the station, and the personnel were located in the station building, awaiting further action from the command. The result is known to everyone - the abandoned equipment was burned, and the personnel were forced to accept the battle surrounded in the station building. This is to the author. If "lost armored vehicles", then you need to give a reason.
  37. cth; fyn
    cth; fyn April 19 2013 11: 49 New
    -2
    Königsberg, Breslau, Berlin showed exactly how to act in such cases.

    Well, I was always surprised at the stupidity of officers, there are certainly pros, but the main gray mass dilutes them so much that these pros look almost miraculous heroes, although everyone should work like that.
    I was also interested in this picture in the article:

    And now here’s what:
    1. cth; fyn
      cth; fyn April 19 2013 12: 26 New
      0
      I don’t understand how pictures are inserted, it used to be simpler.

      And now here’s what:



      [img]https://encrypted-tbn2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcS-lgjx6mIQ6EA3Qi9KNvc
      cJaZw-gM8Z0_5otwDKqF1mfwMmvHv0A[/img]
    2. LeXXSkAt
      LeXXSkAt April 20 2013 05: 25 New
      0
      The officers are, of course, not far ... Where can we think, we are stupid boots. In addition to being heroes of jokes, they are not capable of anything.

      Regards LeXXSkAt Guards Captain Shapovalov A.V.
  38. Andrey77
    Andrey77 April 19 2013 14: 09 New
    0
    131 brigades were given the task of taking the railway station. The task was completed. After that, the equipment was left near the station, and the personnel were located in the station building, awaiting further action from the command. The result is known to everyone - the abandoned equipment was burned, and the personnel were forced to accept the battle surrounded in the station building. This is to the author. If "lost armored vehicles", then you need to give a reason.
  39. V. Ushakov
    V. Ushakov April 19 2013 14: 31 New
    0
    There was no need to send any troops, some tanks to Chechnya ... A one-stage bombing and missile strike over the entire territory of the rebellious enclave, and even corpses need not be collected. And now it would be quiet and quiet - no Chechens - anywhere and - much less than other Gaster ... oh, self-serving leadership and - on the contrary ...
  40. sandrmur76
    sandrmur76 April 20 2013 19: 05 New
    0
    Quote: LeXXSkAt
    The officers are, of course, not far ... Where can we think, we are stupid boots. In addition to being heroes of jokes, they are not capable of anything.

    Regards LeXXSkAt Guards Captain Shapovalov A.V.

    Not addressed to you. Just someone puts everyone on the same line! Our homeland has many excellent officers !!! But the family is not without ..... recourse
  41. Scythian 35
    Scythian 35 1 May 2013 17: 27 New
    0
    Quote: _KM_
    The Interior Minister said that the idea was to quickly and covertly capture the city, but the army could not do everything quickly.

    But how should the army capture Grozny quickly? Do not repeat the words of the Minister-Dybila !!! Just the army captured Grozny, just then the Chechens began to crush the army into cubes, straws and circles.