On the damage that predetermined the death of the Oslyabya in the Battle of Tsushima
As is known, the squadron battleship Oslyabya perished as a result of flooding that was beyond the crew's control. During the battle, the ship suffered a strong trim by the bow and a list to the left side, and the list increased very quickly, causing the battleship to lie on its side, and then capsize and sink.
In order to recreate the picture of the death of the Oslyabya with any degree of reliability, it is necessary to understand which of its compartments were flooded. There are different versions on this issue, including one according to which the squadron battleship perished as a result of two, possibly three hits in the waterline area. But the respected A. Rytik did a great job, analyzing the available evidence, and came to the conclusion that seven Japanese shells hit the left side of the ship, in the waterline area. A. Rytik gave a very detailed description of each of them. To date, this is probably the most detailed and detailed version of the damage to the Oslyabya, containing, moreover, the maximum number of hits - that is why I take it as a basis. But I do not agree with A. Rytik's conclusions in everything, and my reasons will be set out below.
Hit #1. Breach in the 1st compartment of the living deck
A twelve-inch Japanese shell hit the Oslyabya's bow, striking the side plating almost at the waterline opposite the first compartment of the living deck. The consequences for the battleship were very serious: due to the fact that the hit damaged the bulkhead separating the first and second compartments, both of them began to communicate freely with the sea. This could only be corrected by patching the hole, but the crew was unable to do this.
The exact time of the hit is not recorded, but the senior mine officer of the Oslyabya, M.P. Sablin, indicated that the battleship was hit by "one of the first shots", and the mine-engine conductor of the Oslyabya, V.N. Zavarin, later testified that this hit occurred "no more than 10 minutes after the start of the battle". Considering that the Japanese opened fire on the Oslyabya at 13:52 and the time required for sighting, it is most likely that this shell hit between 13:55 and 13:59. A. Rytik believes that the hit was "around 13:55".
The fact of this hit does not raise the slightest doubt – it is well described by many witnesses, including M.P. Sablin and mine-machine conductor V. Zavarin.
Holes in the 2nd, 10th and 16th coal pits
Having analyzed eyewitness accounts, A. Rytik came to the conclusion that the Oslyabya was damaged in the area of the waterline, as a result of which water began to flow into three coal pits: the 2nd, 10th and 16th. And, since these pits are located at a considerable distance from each other, there could not have been less than three hits. However, A. Rytik assumes that not one, but two shells hit the 2nd coal pit.
In my opinion, which does not claim to be the Absolute Truth, in this case eyewitnesses describe a single hit by a single projectile. Such an assumption may seem strange, but let us carefully study the available materials.
In support of the hole in the 2nd coal pit, A. Rytik cites two testimonies: the commander of the squadron battleship "Sisoy Veliky" M. V. Ozerov and the galvanizer K. S. Boltyshev. Thus, A. Rytik cites the testimony of M. V. Ozerov:
“I believe that the armour plates on the left side of the Oslyaba opposite the command bridge fell off, since I clearly saw the burning side, and the list... formed quickly.”
However, the respected author did not quote the battleship commander's words in full. M. V. Ozerov stated the following verbatim:
“I believe that the armor plates on the Oslyaba fell off on the left side opposite the command bridge, since I clearly saw the burning side and the list right formed quickly."
I can assume that A. Rytik considered that M. V. Ozerov made a clear slip of the tongue here, since it is well known that the Oslyabya was listing to the left side, but not to the right. Perhaps that is why he did not quote M. V. Ozerov in full. However, M. V. Ozerov was indeed sure that the Oslyabya was listing to the right, which he not only testified to the Investigative Commission, but also reported in his report on the battle:
"At 14:30 o'clock in the afternoon "Oslyabya" with a large list to starboard "came out of line to the right."
Of course, both of his testimonies in this part are incorrect, but the reason why M. V. Ozerov's memory gave such an interesting failure is not important. The answer to another question is important: why did M. V. Ozerov consider the list to be right on board confirming that with left the armor plates fell off the sides? In my opinion, this is quite obvious.
Opposite the "command bridge" the armor plates of the "Oslyabya" were deep in the water, since there was no upper armor belt there - only the main one. If the battleship had really heeled to the starboard side, then the upper edge of the armor plates of the starboard side would have gone deep under the water, and the left side, on the contrary, would have risen above the water.
At the same time, the commander of the Sisoj Velikiy reported that he saw a fire, but the armor should definitely not be burning. So, if M.V. Ozerov saw the left side burning at the waterline, while the ship was listing to starboard, this should have indicated that the armor plates had fallen off and the lining underneath them that had come out of the water was burning, or coal in the coal pit, or maybe something else. In this interpretation, M.V. Ozerov's remark makes sense. But, since in fact the battleship was listing to port, his testimony cannot at all indicate that the left side had hit the 2nd coal pit.
Let us move on to the memoirs of the galvanizer K. S. Boltyshev, who, according to the words of the hold sailors, wrote:
"After several hits to the armor of the side opposite the conning tower, the plates began to fall off like damp plaster, and two new large shells hit the exposed unprotected side at the waterline and immediately broke through the entire gate. Water rushed in and quickly spread along the slope of the armored deck. A work division led by engineer Zmachinsky was called in to plug the hole, and they tried to close the hole with wooden shields, propping them up with stops. However, the wave knocks out the beams, and they have to work waist-deep in water. The spare coal pit on the slope has already been flooded, which is why the ship is listing."
So, objectively assessing this evidence, we see an internal contradiction in it. On the one hand, K.S. Boltyshev writes about hits "in the side armor opposite the conning tower", which indicates a hit in the area of the 2nd coal pit, which was located there. But on the other hand, the upper coal pit was not protected by armor. Obviously, something that does not exist cannot fall off. If we assume that it was not the upper armor belt that fell off, but the main armor belt, which were opposite the 2nd coal pit, then the description of the struggle for survivability under the leadership of Zmachinsky looks like complete surrealism.
In this case, the lower coal pit would have been literally overwhelmed by a stream of water, which would have been impossible to stop with any wooden shields. Let's not forget that the upper edge of the Oslyabya's armor belt in its bow part, in the best case, rose above the water by 10 centimeters, and most likely was somewhere at sea level. That is, with such damage, the battleship would have received a large underwater hole, and the coal pit on the slope would immediately fill with water.
It would be a different matter if the hits had hit the upper 102 mm belt, which, as we now know thanks to the research of A. S. Rytik, was made of low-quality armor plates. If such a plate had fallen off, then yes, water would have flooded into the pit, of course, but it would still have been an above-water breach, and trying to cover it with shields was quite realistic. But in the area of the 2nd coal pit there was no 102 mm belt.
It turns out that the respected galvanizer got something mixed up, or rather, he was confused by the sailors from whose words he wrote. Either K.S. Boltyshev described the location correctly - damage to the side in the area of the 2nd coal pit, but was mistaken about the armor, or he reported the armor correctly, but was mistaken about the place of impact. This alone does not give grounds to consider his recollections as evidence of hitting the 2nd coal pit. At the same time, indirect evidence indicates that the hit described by K.S. Boltyshev has no relation to the 2nd coal pit.
Let's start with the fact that the phrase of K. S. Boltyshev: "After several hits to the side armor opposite the conning tower, the plates began to fall off like damp plaster" does not necessarily mean that the plates began to fall off exactly opposite the conning tower. It can also be read as if first there were hits to the main armor belt in the bow of the Oslyabya, and then armor plates began to fall off somewhere else. And these are not my personal insinuations. For example, V. P. Kostenko holds this opinion, writing in his memoirs:
"The Japanese zeroed in on the motionless Oslyaba with the first salvo, which received heavy hits from 12-inch shells in the bow along the waterline against the conning tower... ...And when the Oryol entered service ahead of the Oslyaba, the latter already had a trim by the bow up to the hawse pipes. Its 10-inch bow turret was destroyed, two bow casemates were smashed, and a large fire was blazing on the rostra. Then the Oslyaba began to receive salvoes of 8-inch shells from the cruisers. As a result of repeated hits, the armor plates of the upper 5-inch belt began to fall off the side, the bolts of which were destroyed by the explosion of high-explosive shells. In the exposed side, new hits made a huge gap on the slopes of the lower deck..."
That is, we have the same sequence as K. S. Boltyshev: first, the shells hit the bow opposite the conning tower (where the armor belt was at the waterline), then the armor plates fall off. But - completely different armor plates and in a completely different place on the ship.
Let us now recall the testimony of M. P. Sablin. In his report to the commander of the Vladivostok port he reported:
"...the shell hit the 10th coal pit on the left side, penetrating the armor. Then water appeared in the left reserve powder chamber, and the list began to increase. As the list began, three side corridors on the right side began to fill with water, and then, as the list increased, the right ammunition magazines."
In another report addressed to the commander of the Siberian naval crew, M.P. Sablin described this moment in a little more detail:
"After the hole in the coal pit and the spare powder magazine, the list began to increase significantly. I spoke about this with the hold mechanic and the ship's engineer Zmachinsky. The ship's engineer found that such a list could not be allowed. At this time, the starboard corridors filled with water, and he insisted on flooding the starboard ammunition magazines."
There are two oddities here.
Firstly, the picture of a huge hole as described by K.S. Boltyshev is astounding. But M.P. Sablin was in the bow of the Oslyabya and in close proximity to the 2nd coal pit, but he did not report any damage to it. Let us recall how noticeable were the consequences of the hit opposite the 1st compartment of the living deck, according to M.P. Sablin:
"When we got a hole in the nose compartment, the smoke in the 1st and 2nd nose compartments was so thick that the incandescent light bulbs were completely invisible and there was complete darkness."
And it turns out that the hit into the 2nd coal pit was completely unnoticeable? This is probably only possible if the pit was filled to the brim with coal. But if this were so, then where did Zmachinsky and the sailors of the repair division, who were trying to stop the water from entering the hull, find room in it?
Secondly, according to A.S. Rytik, it turns out that the Japanese hit the 2nd coal pit at the very beginning of the battle, even before the hit in the 10th coal pit, described by M.P. Sablin. Let's assume that this is how it all happened. But then it turns out that M.P. Sablin spoke with Zmachinsky after he tried to eliminate the consequences of this hit. Let's take into account that the conversation between them was about how to stop the increasing list to the left side. Under such conditions, Zmachinsky obviously should have informed M.P. Sablin about the presence of a hole in the 2nd coal pit, but nothing of the sort happens.
It turns out that M.P. Sablin is somehow aware of the holes in the 10th coal pit, the leak in the reserve powder chamber, which are very far from his control and which he could not have seen personally. But the most serious hole in the bow of the ship, where M.P. Sablin was, and even after talking with the person who directly supervised its sealing, remains a mystery to him.
All of the above allows me to assume that there were no hits in the 2nd coal pit, and K.S. Boltyshev’s description refers to the 10th coal pit, not the 2nd.
Let us now move on to the entry into the 16th coal pit. A. S. Rytik believes that this took place, based on the following data:
1. Memories of Prince S. V. Gorchakov, who served on the Oslyaba as a watch officer;
2. The significant distance between the 10th coal pit and the spare powder chamber, which makes the version about water flowing from the former to the latter look very doubtful.
Let us first examine the prince’s testimony:
“…I began to notice an increasing list, which was initially caused by underwater holes, the largest of which, as far as I remember, was in the rear 16th coal pit, from which the pit filled with water...”
The evidence is, to put it mildly, weak. Firstly, it is obvious that S. V. Gorchakov himself did not see this hole, but heard it from third parties. In addition, his reservation "as far as I remember" indicates that S. V. Gorchakov is not confident in his memory and allows for the possibility of error.
Let's assume that S. V. Gorchakov was right. But why then do we have information about water being pumped out of the 1st and 2nd boiler rooms, but we know nothing about the flooding of the 3rd boiler room, opposite which the 16th coal pit and the spare powder chamber were located? After all, if S. V. Gorchakov is right and the 16th pit was flooded the most, then the water should have gone into the 3rd boiler room.
Now about the water in the spare powder chamber. Indeed, between the 10th coal pit and this chamber the distance is quite large, both on the living deck and on the lower one. Such a spread of water is difficult to explain by combat damage to the 10th coal pit.
It’s difficult... But the fact is that the water in the Oslyabya’s hull was distributed in a very strange way.
Let's take the case in Port Arthur, when on the day of S.O. Makarov's death, the Pobeda ran into a Japanese mine. The explosion occurred at a depth of 11 feet, the hull of the Pobeda received serious damage - an underwater hole from frame 54 to 58, 24 x 16 feet (7,31 x 4,87 m). And what happened? Two coal pits were flooded, No. 2 between frames 8 and 49 and No. 54 between frames 7 and 54. That is, coal pits where water had direct access. In addition to them, there were two sections of the side corridor between frames 58 and 49 and a minor leak in one of the two ammunition magazines, about which Kuteinikov later wrote:
"The ammunition magazine inside this one, 6 feet from the outer side, was damaged only slightly in the corner closest to the hole, and even then it did not leak much."
That's it! The water didn't go anywhere else.
Damage to Pobeda
And what about the Oslyabya? So, the shell hits the 102-mm belt opposite the 10th coal pit. Let's say it penetrates it and explodes in the compartment. Let's say it damages the deck, causing water to flow into the coal pit on the slope. This is normal.
But then the water finds a way through the bevel. Well... let's say that's still okay. Through the "poorly sealed necks" the water gets into the 10th lower and 12th coal pits. Okay, but should the spread of water be stopped here? But no - the water flows on, straight into the boiler room.
And it flows so intensely that M. P. Sablin has to turn on the turbines to pump water out of the 2nd boiler room. That is, where at Pobeda after an underwater explosion, a huge hole, streams of water under pressure, the latter does not go further than the neighboring compartment, at Oslyabya it calmly spreads not even to the second, but to the third compartment from the one that was damaged!
And one more thing. The water didn't just gush into the 10th lower and/or 12th coal pits like a river. It should have flowed in there gradually. So what, the stokers didn't have enough time to close the doors to these coal pits to prevent the 2nd boiler room from being flooded? But M. P. Sablin turned on the turbine not only in the 2nd, but also in the 1st boiler room. That is, sea water even managed to flow in there!
But even if we assume that I am wrong and that the water entered the 1st boiler house not from the 10th, but from the flooded 2nd coal pit, it does not become any easier. Because then it turns out that at Oslyabya neither the slope nor the lower coal pits were able to limit the water flow in two cases out of two.
Therefore, I state: after sea water gained access to the hull of the Oslyabya, it felt extremely at ease there, spreading through the compartments as freely as it could not even dream of in the case of the same Pobeda. But if this is so, then the leakage of water from the 10th coal pit into the spare powder chamber ceases to look like something completely beyond the pale.
Of course, there are other options. For example, water in the reserve powder chamber could have appeared as a result of a Japanese shell exploding near the side of the Oslyabya, which, under the influence of a hydraulic shock, gave a small leak. Or M.P. Sablin was simply given incorrect information, someone mixed something up, so that the leak was not in the reserve powder chamber, but in another room, say, in the shell cellar in the immediate vicinity of the 10th coal pit. There can be many options, and the flooding of the 16th coal pit is only one of them.
Based on the above, it turns out that there is, in general, no evidence of a hole in the 16th coal pit, and the evidence can be explained by other reasons.
And here's what's interesting. Each of the witnesses writes about only one hole in the coal pit. None of them describes two holes at once or more. S. V. Gorchakov writes about one, although he mentions other holes, but does not hint at all that these were holes in coal pits.
M.P. Sablin? A hole in the 10th coal pit, and that's it. Yes, "water appeared in the reserve powder chamber", but M.P. Sablin does not write anything about the reason for its appearance. Moreover, according to the text of the report, he speaks of them as one hole: "After a hole in the coal pit and the reserve powder chamber..." A hole. Not "holes".
K. S. Boltyshev? Again, a description of one hole in one coal pit.
The commander of the destroyer "Bravy" Durnovo 1st, who described the damage from the words of the crew members of the "Oslyabya" he rescued?
"Soon after the first shell, the second hit the tenth coal pit, penetrating the armor. According to the crew, the impact of this shell caused a whole sheet of armor to fall off. Water appeared in the left reserve powder magazine of the 10-inch guns, and the list began to increase sharply."
Simply put, we have a number of people involved in the battle, and each of them reports one hit in the Oslyabya coal pit. Only the locations of the hits are different. But this is not surprising, since they all wrote about this hit from hearsay.
In my opinion, this is what happened. First, the Oslyabya was hit by a 12-inch shell in the living quarters opposite the 1st compartment, as described above. Then, a few minutes later, another 12-inch shell hit the 102-mm armor plate opposite the upper 10th coal pit. It may have exploded as it passed through the plate, causing severe damage to it, or it may have passed through the armor and exploded immediately behind it, causing the plate or its main part to simply break off with the impact and its fragments to fall overboard – a serious “hole” was formed, which, in fact, became the source of stories about the “gate” in the side of the Oslyabya, formed by Japanese shells.
The sailors under Zmachinsky's leadership tried to seal the resulting "gates", but were unsuccessful, the water went down, both deep into the ship (into the 10th lower, and possibly the 12th coal pits), and to the sides, spreading along the armor slope. I do not claim, but I cannot exclude that it was through the slope that the water eventually reached the spare powder chamber of the 10-inch guns. Zmachinsky, seeing that it was not possible to seal the hole, and having received news that the water had already spread very far, and also observing the increase in the list, went to organize counter-flooding. It was then that a conversation took place between M.V. Sablin and Zmachinsky together with the bilge mechanic, at which a decision was made to flood not only the starboard corridors, but also the starboard ammunition magazines.
K.S. Boltyshev, based on the words of the hold sailors, later completely correctly described the struggle for survivability - an attempt to block access to water that had gushed into the 10th coal pit. But he or the hold sailors made a logical error "after this - therefore as a result of this", and they described the "falling out" of the plate as a consequence of shells hitting the bow of the Oslyabya. Although this was absolutely not the case. And perhaps K.S. Boltyshev did not mean at all that the plates fell out opposite the battleship's conning tower or as a result of hits to its bow.
Prince S.V. Gorchakov simply confused the 16th and 10th coal pits in his memories.
This version explains almost everything, including the lack of information about the struggle for survivability in the Oslyabya coal pits. When a shell hit the battleship's bow in the area of the 1st compartment of the living deck, the fire-holding division headed by F. S. Lebedev was sent to fight the breach, and M. P. Sablin came up there. Below we will consider other hits on the Oslyabya, where there are also mentions of attempts to seal the breaches that threatened to flood. But for three breaches in the coal pits (according to A. S. Rytik), there is only one description of the struggle for survivability given by K. S. Boltyshev, which is extremely strange. The version that there were not enough divisions can hardly be considered reliable - the same artillery The ship's starboard crew was not occupied at the guns and could be used to repair critical damage.
But if we assume that the hole was not in three coal pits, but in one, then everything fits. One hole - one description.
A hole in the living deck near the mine apparatus
A.S. Rytik takes her description from Novikov-Priboy:
"About 20-30 minutes after the start of the battle, we got a second small hole opposite the left mine apparatus, above the waterline, where the armor ends. It was somehow patched up with so-called hawse-sacks."
Whether this hole existed or not, I cannot know. Not only did the ship's butler from the Orel describe the damage to the Oslyabya from hearsay, but his memoirs were also compromised by obviously unreliable information. But even if the hole was described correctly, it turns out that the damage was small and was repaired very quickly, which is why it could not have seriously affected the stability of the Oslyabya.
A hole in the 2nd compartment of the living deck
There are several sources that testify to it, and there is no reason to consider them unreliable. It was a hit in the bow of the Oslyabya, not far from the first hit in the living deck, but not against the first, but against the second compartment. Since, according to F. S. Lebedev, it was "no more than two meters from the first", it is possible that these two hits became the basis for the legend about the "hole through which you can drive a carriage".
The important thing here is the following.
Firstly, this hole appeared practically at the moment of the Oslyabya's failure, when the ship already had a strong list and trim and was doomed. Secondly, in essence, this hole did not reduce the stability of the Oslyabya at all, since it only paved the way for water into the 2nd compartment of the living deck. And this 2nd compartment was already freely communicating with the sea through the hole in the area of the 1st compartment of the living deck, since the shell that made it also damaged the bulkhead between the compartments, and it was not possible to fix it. Therefore, this hit can be considered, with a stretch, only as having accelerated the death of the battleship, but it could not have been the cause of its death.
Conclusions
In view of the above, it is possible that during the battle the Oslyabya received three or four hits in the waterline area, of which two (in the area of the mine apparatus and in the 2nd compartment of the living deck) were insignificant, and the other two (opposite the 1st compartment of the living deck and in the 102-mm armor belt in the area of the 10th coal pit) predetermined the death of the ship.
Is this possible? Let's try to test this hypothesis by calculating the flooding of the Oslyabya compartments.
To be continued ...
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