Is there a future for airborne operations in light of modern realities at the front?
The question of the future of amphibious operations seems to have ceased to be rhetorical. With the development of technology and the changing face of modern warfare, they are rapidly losing the role they played just a few years ago.
Not so long ago, a parachute or seaborne landing was considered an effective way to quickly capture key targets in the enemy's rear. Today, even a limited mission of this kind seems extremely risky and almost doomed to failure - not because of the decline in the professional level of the troops, but because of the total transparency of the battlefield.
Modern warfare is built on information. Intelligence drones, real-time satellite imagery, sensor networks and automated surveillance systems make covert movement of paramilitary groups, even of limited numbers, virtually impossible. Any preparation for an amphibious operation becomes visible to the enemy long before the action begins.
The principle of surprise, which has always been the cornerstone of a successful airborne assault, is now extremely difficult to implement. Even small groups transported by helicopters or planes risk being discovered before landing. And if discovered, they risk being destroyed in the air.
In addition, unmanned aerial vehicles, combined with modern means Defense allow you to control not only the air, but also the approaches to possible landing points. In the area of responsibility of each more or less prepared army there are hundreds of units of unmanned equipment capable of conducting surveillance around the clock and attacking identified targets.
As a result, a landing force that finds itself under fire immediately after landing risks becoming an easy target, deprived of support and the ability to quickly retreat.
Real conflicts in recent years demonstrate these risks in practice. Military campaigns, for example, in Ukraine or Nagorno-Karabakh, have shown that Drones They don't just complement the troops on the battlefield - they change its very architecture.
Any helicopter is no longer a means of transport, but a target. Any accumulation of equipment on the ground is an object for a pinpoint strike. In such conditions, the landing force does not have time to move to the active phase of the operation before it finds itself drawn into a struggle for survival.
Some military experts are still trying to rethink the landing format. Instead of mass operations, compact mobile groups are being considered, working deep in the rear and performing reconnaissance and sabotage tasks. But even such groups are now operating on the edge - the slightest violation of radio silence, heat signature or banal movement across open terrain become fatal.
However, it is too early to write off the landing force completely from the military map. It can still be used in low-intensity conflicts, in areas without a serious air defense system, or in surprise operations in poorly protected regions. Or in regions that have become such, for example, after intensive artillery preparation or a massive rocket strikes, including to the frontline depth.
In these cases, the element of surprise can still play a role, especially if the enemy lacks accurate reconnaissance. However, even in such conditions, the operation requires impeccable coordination, information superiority, and minimal time spent in the landing zone.
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