Recent events have extremely aggravated the problem of military reform. It is proven at a high price that the strength of the army is not in its size, but in quality: in the professionalism of the soldiers, the art of leadership, the level of armaments and the morale of the troops. The achievement of a high level of these indicators should be ensured by the reform, the need for which is recognized both in the authorities and in society. But not everything depends on intentions.
There are objectively existing laws and trends in the development of military affairs. They can be ignored for the time being, but ultimately it is to them that the decisive word in the historical process belongs. For their knowledge, there is science, only on the basis of which effective practical activity is possible. In this case, we are talking about the military science complex, among which the role of military history science is great.
Components of success
Military reform involves a significant change in the military system of the state, including the military-political, military-economic, military-legal, military-technical, military-social and military spheres proper. In each of them, transformations are being carried out, for all their independence and specificity, united by a common plan and time frame. Thus, military reform is a complex of fundamental changes leading to a new qualitative state of the army and fleet, like the entire military organization of the country, coupled with the military needs and economic capabilities of the state.
Each reform is unique. But there are some general patterns.
First, the modernization of the military mechanism is doomed to success only if it is systemic. That is, it modifies all the components of a military organism, the conditions of its functioning - the economy, science, technology, and personnel training.
Secondly, any, all the more radical reform is doomed to failure, if it ignores the national specifics of the state, is not connected with its historical roots, does not take into account the military-historical experience accumulated over the centuries. There is an old Russian proverb: “If you look into the past, if you lose the eye, you forget the past, you lose both.” Alexander Herzen, the great Russian thinker of the XIX century, reiterated and emphasized this idea, noting that “by achieving a better understanding of the past, we clarify the present, gazing deeper into the meaning of the past, we discuss the meaning of the future, looking back, we move forward.”
In Russia, there is a long and rich tradition of research in the field of national military history. This tradition was born in the first quarter of the 18th century, when Peter the Great and his “chicks” gathered on the morning of every Saturday to write the history of the Great Northern War. Up to the second half of the last century, there were only a few people who inherited and followed the traditions of the great transformer, such as A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, M. I. Bogdanovich, D. A. Milyutin. However, with the advent of the era of reform and the creation of the General Staff Academy, entire schools replaced individual individuals. “Academic” and “Russian” trends in military historiography were born, combining an interest in the past with concern for the present and future of the Russian army.
Military history has gained recognition as an important means of shaping the theory, organization, and military art of the Red Army. In 1918, military researchers and historians began to create analytical historical works on world war, collecting lessons from recent combat experience. The conclusions of the authors of these works, combined with the combat experience of the Civil War, stimulated the development of a new military theory and laid the foundation for organizational changes. Much of what appeared then was a synthesis of the old and the new. Thus, in the middle and second half of the twenties, knowledge of military experts, such as A. A. Svechin, on the one hand, and young red commanders, such as V. K. Triandafillov, on the other, stimulated further searches, including strategy development and development. deep combat theory (operation).
Our military history science assigns a special chapter to the Great Patriotic War. It requires a deep understanding of its lessons, a synthesis of leadership experience. Modern historiography should give a balanced, objective assessment of the activities of the High Command in the first place.
For a long time purposefully created the myth that Stalin in the early days of the war was confused. This is a myth, and the Americans are well aware of this. They carefully study the management experience of Stalin and implement Stalinist ideas, especially after the events of 11 in September of 2001. In fact, it was in the first days of the war that Stalin did a titanic work to create an organizational and informational mechanism for Victory. The situation was the hardest. June 24 left Vilnius, June 28 - Minsk. June 30 fascists captured Lviv, July 1 - Riga.
Numerous documents recorded energetic actions of the chairman of the USSR SNK, aimed at mastering the situation, creating an effective management system. Stalin worked on 16 – 18 hours a day, the amount of work that was inhuman in scale and responsibility fell on his shoulders. June 23, on his initiative, creates the Supreme Command Headquarters. The working bodies of the Headquarters are the General Staff, the Office of People's Commissariat of Defense and the Navy. First, it was headed by Marshal Timoshenko, but already in August 1941, Stalin took full responsibility for himself and led the Stavka until the end of the war.
24 Jun. Stalin set about creating an information mechanism to support the Stakes. On his initiative, a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government "On the establishment and tasks of the Soviet Information Bureau" was adopted.
“It was a great happiness for Russia that during the years of difficult trials, it was headed by genius and unshakable commander J. V. Stalin,” said W. Churchill on December 21 on December 1959 in the House of Lords in a speech on the occasion of J. V. Stalin's 80. - He was an outstanding personality, imposing our cruel time of the period in which his life was spent ...
Stalin made the greatest impression on us. His influence on people was irresistible. When he entered the hall of the Yalta conference, we all stood up, as if on cue, and, strangely, for some reason kept our hands at the seams ...
He took Russia with a plow, and left it equipped with atomic weapons.
Not! Whatever may be said about Stalin, such history and peoples are not forgotten. ”
It is logical to refer to the historical past of our country. Since the percent of 80 in our history is a military one, it is she who is called upon to play a decisive role today in shaping the spiritual and moral values of military service. No matter how distorted our history may be, the interest of every true patriot in the military glory of the Fatherland, the comprehension of the sources of its centuries-old age, continues unabated. This is easily explained: after all, military history is an important part of the national cultural heritage with its irreplaceable educational, educational, and educational functions. Contrary to this indisputable fact, it was eradicated from the educational process of civilian universities, the old teaching staff of military historians were lost, new ones are not prepared, there are no good books and full-fledged didactic material.
Our people and the army need a genuine, not distorted by opportunistic predilections, the military history of the country, the history of its army and navy. Today, we all need to re-create just such a story, contributing to the formation of healthy state patriotism, especially since the spiritual and moral guidelines that should be guided do not need to be invented - the Russian army and navy always had them in their richest practice. The Russian thinker I. A. Ilyin expressed this feature of our native army in the following words: “The army is the concentration of the strong-willed power of my state, the embodiment of the courage of my people; the organization of honor, dedication and service ... ”These values only need to be reasonably brought into the minds and hearts of soldiers and sailors, young officers, corrected with democratic realities.
It is about the system of spiritual and moral criteria and at the same time about the simple norms of military service - honor, courage, duty, dignity, military fraternity, a feeling of elbow, love of the Fatherland, loyalty to the best military traditions.
The ideals of military service in the past were represented by the motto “For the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland”. The Fatherland and the belief in the greatness of Russia and its peoples with the intrinsic value of each person, each soldier, defender of the Fatherland, not excluding the return and some values of religion, remain unshakable in this triad.
In general, the essence of the Russian military system is the predominance of spirit over matter. Its basics were as follows. In the field of the structure of the Armed Forces, originality (“We have little resemblance to other European nations” - Rumyantsev), the predominance of qualitative elements over quantitative ones (“Not many win” - Suvorov). In the field of education - religiosity and national pride (“We are Russian - God is with us!” - Suvorov), a conscious attitude to the matter (“Every soldier must understand his own maneuver”), showing initiative from below and encouraging this initiative from above (“A local judge better ... "). These covenants have yielded great fruits. They can be given in the future, being preserved for posterity by military history science.
So, the education of soldiers on the fundamental basis of national military history saves us from the need to invent artificially a new system of spiritual and moral values of military service. They only need to be extracted from the centuries-old experience of the Russian army and supplemented with the values that are being formed in the new social and political conditions of modern Russia. I will cite a number of specific proposals for reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The most important component of the military reform should be the upbringing, spiritual, moral and psychological hardening of the personnel of the Russian army. According to the experience of the old Russian army to introduce the institution of volunteers, to restore the institute of ensigns. Specialists for engineering positions to train, including in civilian higher and secondary educational institutions. This will provide cost savings and a higher level of special training for officers. Restore the financial and economic service of the Armed Forces. In 2008 – 2012, instead of a harmonious and well-functioning service, built on the principles of unity of command, financial bodies were created, with great difficulty solving assigned tasks.