The intensity of military tension on the Korean Peninsula is growing. International economic sanctions, large-scale military exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States provoked retaliatory steps by the DPRK leadership. The level of military tension between the two Korean states has reached a critical point. What is the ratio of the military potentials of the opposing sides and how likely is war?
According to military experts, the personnel of the North Korean army have good combat training, and the command has a high level of operational training. Ideological treatment and the mentality of the people determine the extremely low sensitivity of personnel to casualties and their readiness to fight to the last soldier.
Assessing the DPRK armed forces as a whole, it can be stated that they are capable of conducting effective defensive actions even against a high-tech enemy in the conditions of his domination aviation. However, the offensive operations of the North Korean army against such an enemy will be accompanied by exceptionally large losses with very dubious chances of success.
The internal political stability of North Korea, the high level of political and ideological motivation of the population and the army, the determination of the country's political leadership to fight to the end, significant stocks of weapons and ammunition, a large mobilization resource, as well as the ability to rely on their own production of weapons and ammunition, allow DPRK to count on long-lasting success. war, even with significant losses of the population and the armed forces.
In general, to defeat the North Korean armed forces, their opponents will have to put up comparable groups.
Army of the DPRK
North Korea has powerful enough, although equipped with obsolete weapons of about a million. More than 4,5, a million military-trained reserves, allow the North Korean military and political leadership to deploy a group of several million armed forces at the beginning of the war.
The basis of the North Korean army is the ground forces, which in peacetime number about 900 thousand people. In stock about 3500 tanks (1800 of them are T-62, the rest are T-55, T-54 and their Chinese replicas), 200 infantry fighting vehicles and 2500 armored personnel carriers, more than 12 field artillery guns and 000 MLRS, more than 2500 units of anti-tank missile systems and guns.
In the air defense of the ground forces, there are about 10 000 units of MANPADS and more than 11 000 anti-aircraft guns of various calibers, as well as a certain amount of the Krug and Cube systems, probably, and Buk.
The missile armament of the North Korean army is represented by more than 50 launchers of operational tactical and tactical missiles. It is armed with tactical missile systems of the Soviet development "Luna" and operational-tactical "Scud". Based on the latest, the DPRK created its own missile with a range of 550 kilometers.
The total number of tactical and operational-tactical missiles is estimated at approximately 1000 units. Created as part of its own missile program, the Nodong-1 rocket has a firing range of up to 1000 kilometers, and the medium-range rocket Tepodon-1 and Tephodon-2 are 3500 and 6000 kilometers, respectively.
All operational-tactical missiles and medium-range missiles of the North Korean army have low accuracy of firing, which makes them ineffective for hitting point protected targets with the exception of those equipped with nuclear warheads.
According to military experts, the DPRK currently has 10 – 12 nuclear weapons. Basically it can be ammunition adapted for use as aerial bombs or underground nuclear mines. Given the weakness of the North Korean bomber aircraft, those nuclear weapons that cannot be used as missile warheads are more likely to be used as underground nuclear bombs.
The DPRK Air Force has about 1500 aircraft of various types. Among the relatively modern can be attributed only 36 fighter MiG-29 and 45 MiG-23, as well as 34 attack aircraft Su-25. The remaining aircraft have extremely limited combat value.
The DPRK's air defense system is based on 24 СРК С-200, 128 ЗРК С-125 and 240 ЗРК С-75. There is a significant amount of anti-aircraft artillery.
The air surveillance system is built on the basis of Soviet-made ground-based radars, mainly 60-s of production and their Chinese copies, which makes it extremely vulnerable to modern electronic jamming.
A significant amount of radar allows you to create a multi-layered radar field with a lower limit of 200 – 300 meters on the most dangerous directions of enemy EIA strikes, and on others - 400 – 600 meters.
According to its technical level, the air defense control system complies with the 60 – 70 years of the last century and does not satisfy the requirements of modernity either in terms of noise immunity or in terms of operational efficiency. However, a large number of anti-aircraft fire weapons in a relatively limited area of the country allows you to create their extremely high density. This, despite outdated equipment, makes the DPRK air defense system quite effective even in the fight against modern types of aircraft.
North Korea does not have modern means of electronic suppression, but it has significant capabilities for the implementation of operational camouflage measures, which is facilitated by the favorable terrain. It must be assumed that it is precisely operational camouflage measures that can play a decisive role in disrupting the air offensive of a potential enemy.
The strike force of the DPRK Navy is made up of 22 submarines of the 033 project (a Chinese copy of a Soviet submarine of the 633 project developed at the end of the 50-s), 50 small and ultra-small submarines of its own construction, as well as 34 missile boats of Soviet construction and their Chinese and North Korean copies.
In addition, the North Korean Navy has significant mines weaponsmostly obsolete types.
The mountainous terrain and the system of fortifications built over 50 over the years, including underground tunnels and deep laying objects (more than 100 meters deep in mountain ranges), make it possible to cover even the tactical nuclear weapons located in them, large military contingents with heavy weapons, including armored vehicles, field artillery and air defense systems, as well as launchers of medium-range missiles.
Spectrum of capabilities of the DPRK
Evaluating the capabilities of the armed forces of the DPRK, can be noted.
1. Despite outdated weapons, the DPRK ground forces have a sufficiently high combat potential. A significant amount of anti-tank weapons, field artillery and a well-developed network of fortifications allow them to conduct effective defensive actions even against a high-tech adversary that is one and a half to two times in size and under the rule of his aircraft in the air.
However, the offensive capabilities of the ground forces in such conditions are very limited due to the outdated tank fleet.
The mountainous terrain, pre-prepared shelters and stocks of weapons and ammunition will allow the deployment of a large-scale guerrilla war, which can last for years. At the same time, in order to suppress the partisan movement, the aggressor in the occupied territories will have to devote considerable ground forces (based on the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq — up to 200 thousand people and more).
The cash composition of the DPRK special operations forces, taking into account the possibilities of their delivery to the enemy’s territory, makes it possible to deploy effective sabotage activities of several dozen sabotage groups in the enemy’s operational and even strategic depth, that is, practically throughout South Korea.
The tactical and tactical complexes of the DPRK ground forces allow striking targets at tactical and operational depths. With this composition they are able to disable or destroy four to six objects.
Taking into account the possible opposition of the enemy, the operational-tactical and tactical missile systems of the ground forces can destroy or disable for some time up to 10 – 15 objects such as an airfield, command post, communications center.
The limited size of the territory of South Korea will actually make it possible to exert influence on operational-tactical missile systems on the entire depth of the operational construction of the enemy grouping.
2. The number of medium-range missiles "Tepkhodon-1" and "Tepkhodon-2" is relatively small. The low accuracy of their shooting will cause significant damage to no more than one American base.
The estimated available stockpiles of nuclear weapons give reason to talk about the possibility of the DPRK using such missiles from one to two to four to five nuclear strikes against military targets in South Korea, Japan and the United States within reach.
3. The DPRK air forces have very limited capabilities for attacking ground targets in South Korea due to the outdated fleet of aircraft.
With the beginning of the war with the southern neighbor, the main part of the bomber and attack aircraft is likely to be destroyed as a result of attacks by the enemy’s aircraft and missiles, as well as the effects of its air defense weapons within two to five days.
DPRK air defense capabilities are significantly higher.
If stationary anti-aircraft missile systems are destroyed with a high probability within three to four days of an air offensive, then mobile SAM systems will most likely mostly retain their combat capability, forcing the enemy to devote a significant aviation resource to support the actions of the attack groups. A large number of anti-aircraft artillery will not allow aviation to proceed to actions at low altitudes to identify and destroy the equipment and facilities of the ground forces of the DPRK.
As a result, the effectiveness of enemy aviation will be significantly reduced. In combination with effective operational camouflage measures, this will jeopardize the success of not only the air offensive operation, but also the entire air campaign, even with the overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of the enemy aircraft.
In general, it can be assumed that the DPRK air defense system in combination with operational masking measures and taking into account the complex terrain will be able to successfully resist the US-South Korean aviation grouping up to 800 – 900 aircraft. And for the success of the US air campaign, South Korea and its allies will have to create a group of aircraft of at least 1800 – 2000 aircraft of various classes.
4. Navy of North Korea can create a threat the fleet enemy only in the coastal part of the adjacent seas and oceans, mainly mine weapons, as well as the forces of missile boats and ultra-small submarines.
The submarines of the 033 project have extremely limited capabilities in the fight against modern surface ships and are valuable only as carriers of mine weapons.
Missile boats, armed with outdated missiles, do not pose a threat to modern cruisers, destroyers and frigates with powerful air defenses.
Owing to their low autonomy and speed, ultra-small submarines are capable of hitting ships that are stationary near the coast or moving at slow speed.
The mine weapons of the DPRK Navy will pose a major threat to the fleet of the likely enemy. A large number of various mines allows you to create dense minefields, to overcome which will require significant mine-sweeping forces and a lot of time. If these barriers are covered by coastal artillery and ground-based missile anti-ship complexes, the fight against the danger of mines will also be accompanied by significant losses.
It is mine weapons that could jeopardize the possibility of a naval landing operation by a possible opponent of the DPRK.
Army of the Republic of Korea
The main opponent of the DPRK on the Korean Peninsula - the Republic of Korea also has very numerous armed forces - about XXNX of thousands of military personnel. Just like in the DPRK, the basis of the South Korean army is ground troops (about 700 thousand people). Unlike their northern neighbor, they are equipped mainly with modern combat equipment.
More than 2000 tanks, which are in service with the ground forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 880 relatively modern types, of which 800 own production (type 88) and 80 Russian (T-80).
The field artillery of the land forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan numbers 3500 non-self-propelled and 900 self-propelled guns.
Missile armament is represented by 12 PU OTR NHK-1 / 2 and order 200 of ATACMS tactical missiles with a range of 150 and 300 kilometers.
The Army of the Republic of Kazakhstan is armed with 2500 BTR and BMP, as well as more 500 helicopters, including 60 AH-1F and 80 UH-60P.
The Korean Air Force has about 600 airplanes, among which the most modern are the 60 F-15K and 165 F-16 fighters.
Other combat aircraft that retain combat value include the 170 F-5 and 68 F-4.
Anti-aircraft fire cover includes American-made 200 air defense missile systems Nike-Hercules, 110 air defense missile systems Advanced Hawk, 35 air defense missile systems Mistral and around 500 ZSU Vulkan.
Automated air defense control system basically meets modern requirements.
The basis of the Republic of Korea Navy is quite modern destroyers, frigates and corvettes of UROs with a total number of 43 units, as well as about 20 submarines, including eight newest non-nuclear submarines of the German production 214 project.
The surface ships of the main classes of the fleet of the Republic of Kazakhstan are armed with the Garpun anti-aircraft missile, but the air defense weapons are mainly represented by anti-aircraft artillery complexes, which significantly reduces their combat stability from attacks against even the old means of air attack.
Mine-sweeping forces are represented by XMUM minesweepers.
The airborne assault vehicles of the Republic of Korea have 11 tank landing ships, three small landing ships and more 30 landing craft, which allow for the landing of amphibious assault forces on a tactical scale.
The Marine Corps has about 28 thousand people.
The main component of naval aviation is anti-submarine aviation, represented by eight American-made P-3В and P-3С aircraft, as well as 15 S-2F, which allow for effective combat against North Korean submarines.
In addition, the Navy of the Republic of Korea has about 100 combat boats of various classes, including five missile ones.
The level of combat training of personnel and operational training of commanders of the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan is assessed by experts as average, and according to this indicator the South Korean army is inferior to the North Korean.
Low in comparison with the North Korean army and the moral potential of personnel. In this regard, we can assume that the South Korean armed forces will be very sensitive to combat losses.
Evaluating the army of the Republic of Korea as a whole, it should be recognized as one of the most technically equipped and numerous in the region.
Its ground forces are able to conduct successful offensive and defensive operations on an army scale.
Tactical missile systems are able to hit up to 30 point and area targets.
However, given the terrain and scale of fortification preparation in the southern regions of North Korea, the ground forces of South Korea are unlikely to be able to realize their offensive capabilities against their northern neighbor.
The South Korean air force is also unable to solve the problem of suppressing the North Korean air defense system, and therefore, to render effective assistance to ground forces. Its air defense system can almost completely eliminate the threat from the DPRK air force, and the Navy can independently dominate the sea in its operational zone. However, the composition of their mine-sweeping forces is not able to ensure the maintenance of an effective mine-risk control.
The armament of the main ships of the South Korean Navy does not allow for providing effective fire support to ground forces in the coastal direction and suppressing the enemy’s coastal defenses.
In combination with the low capabilities of the South Korean air force to suppress North Korean air defense and the limited mine risk capabilities of the South Korean Navy, it is unlikely that they will be able to conduct landing operations.
In general, assessing the military potentials of the two Korean states, we can state the parity of military power: the technological superiority of the armed forces of South Korea is offset by the number and incomparably high morale of the North Korean army.
The ground forces of the Republic of Korea cannot conduct successful offensive operations against the North Korean army due to the presence of its deeply defensive defense, saturated with a large number of anti-tank weapons and artillery and based on a developed system of powerful fortifications and a favorable relief.
The North Korean navy is also unable to count on the success of offensive operations due to outdated weapons.
The Air Force of the Republic of Korea is unable to suppress the deep-defiled DPRK air defense system, which is saturated with anti-aircraft fire weapons, and the Air Force of its northern neighbor does not have modern aviation for successful actions against it.
The fleet of South Korea is able to win supremacy on the sea, the significance of which is leveled by the inability of the South Korean fleet to effectively fight against the mine threat and the inability to render effective assistance to the coastal flank of his army with firing means of ships and the landing of amphibious assault forces.
Takes place rare in the military stories a case in which both opposing sides have a defense potential that far exceeds the offensive potential.
Nevertheless, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are growing and there is concentrated a sufficiently large military potential, which can be significantly enhanced by the factions of the armed forces of other states.
A military clash in a limited space of the Korean Peninsula will also be affected by countries bordering the conflict zone, in particular Russia.
Under these conditions, predicting the nature of possible military actions on the peninsula is a very urgent task.
Who and why will fight
The goal of a possible military conflict on the Korean Peninsula by the opponents of the DPRK will be the elimination of its state sovereignty with the inclusion of the Republic of Korea.
China in this case, most likely, will seek to prevent the defeat of Pyongyang. That is, for North Korea, this conflict will be a war for survival.
To defeat the North Korean armed forces, their opponents will have to put up comparable in size, but significantly superior in combat potential groups of armed forces.
On this basis, it can be argued that for a war with North Korea, its opponents will need to form a coalition of states. It will be based on the United States and South Korea. If the international political situation is favorable for them, Japan and some other countries of the region, as well as a number of European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, may additionally be part of it.
The total number of groups of coalition armed forces can reach from 900 thousand to a million people and more, up to three thousand tanks, five to six thousand armored fighting vehicles of various types, 8 – 10 thousand units of field artillery, 1800 – 2000 aircraft of various classes, to 150 surface ships (including up to six aircraft carriers) and up to 40 submarines (including up to 25 atomic with cruise missiles "Tomahawk").
The high sensitivity of the people of the United States and South Korea to the human, material and political losses that are inevitable if the war against North Korea is delayed will force the leadership of the anti-North Korean coalition to look for ways to win the short-term campaign.
Delaying the war with North Korea could lead the United States, South Korea and its allies to the need to complete it without fully achieving their political goals.
In the event of the threat of the complete defeat of the North Korean armed forces, China will put forward a grouping of its armed forces sufficient to prevent the fall of the North Korean state.
North Korean nuclear missile
A likely reason for a decision on a military operation against North Korea will be the achievement of a certain critical milestone in the nuclear missile sphere, for example, a series of nuclear tests or launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
With the adoption of a decision on military aggression against the DPRK, a period of advance preparation for war against it will begin. The goal is to create military-political, international legal, moral-psychological and military-strategic conditions that ensure the possibility and success of a future war.
A large-scale information operation will be launched, aimed at discrediting the political leadership of the DPRK in the international arena, within its own states and among the population of North Korea itself. Special attention will be paid to the search for individuals from among the military and political leaders of the DPRK at various levels who are ready for treason for the sake of security guarantees and monetary rewards.
Intensive activities will begin in the UN in order to obtain a mandate from the Security Council for a military operation against the DPRK.
Great efforts will be made in the diplomatic sphere, aimed at forming a coalition of states ready to take part in the operation against the DPRK. A special role is likely to be assigned to NATO, which will demonstrate its ability to act globally.
The duration of this stage can be from six months to one and a half years. Then will begin direct open preparation for war against the DPRK. The formal reason will be armed provocation near the land or sea borders of the DPRK, which will cause adequate actions of the North Korean armed forces.
The purpose of this stage is to create a grouping of the armed forces of the coalition for the war against the DPRK, to form the necessary material and technical reserves and to provide immediate moral and psychological preparation for the war.
In the face of explicit preparations for military aggression, the DPRK will mobilize its armed forces and strategically deploy groups in areas of upcoming hostilities.
The main content of this stage will be the strategic deployment of groups of armed forces of the opposing sides, including a set of mobilization measures, and for the United States also strategic deployments of troops and military assets, totaling up to five to eight million tons.
At the same time, information operations will be conducted aimed at misinforming the military-political leadership of the DPRK, suppressing the will to resist its people and armed forces, bribing individuals from among the military and political leadership at different levels, moral and psychological preparation of their people and troops for the upcoming war.
Actions in the information sphere by the DPRK will be directed mainly at the moral and psychological preparation of the armed forces and the population for war.
According to the experience of other wars and armed conflicts of the 21st century, the duration of this phase can be six to nine months.
At the beginning of the war, armed confrontation will be conducted mainly in the air. A coalition of states led by the United States will try to completely win air supremacy over North Korea, destroy its military and government system, eliminating the leading North Korean leaders, first of all Kim Jong-un, destroy the nuclear potential and the North Korean Navy, crush or crush ground forces in the regions the upcoming offensive and landing operations of their troops, crush the will of the North Korean people to resist by striking civilian targets.
During the air war phase, the DPRK will try not to allow its air defense and other groups of troops to be completely destroyed, to preserve the stability of the defense and nuclear missile potential, to ensure the normal functioning of the military and state control system, and to inflict a limited defeat on the air force and ground forces in within the reach of missiles and artillery, primarily with the aim of achieving a moral and psychological effect.
The main content of this phase will be the launching of missile and air strikes by the American-South Korean coalition against North Korea’s facilities and its air defense operations.
From an analysis of the experience of recent wars and the state of the DPRK armed forces, it follows that the United States and its allies launched a campaign consisting of a series of air offensive operations.
The first, most likely, they will begin hostilities, inflicting a massive rocket and air strike on the primary targets of the air defense system and the nuclear complex of North Korea.
North Korea can also begin hostilities by launching a preemptive missile and artillery strike, slightly reducing the effectiveness of the enemy’s first massive missile and air strike.
However, the political damage to North Korea from such a strike will be incomparably more - it will be exposed to the world community as an aggressor.
The information operations of the aggressor at this stage, in addition to directly ensuring military actions, will be aimed at creating a favorable international reaction to their actions, preventing third countries, primarily China, from being dragged into this conflict, as well as preventing the use of nuclear weapons by the North Korean leadership.
Given the state of the armed forces of the DPRK and its people, the experience of the Yugoslav and Libyan conflicts can be assumed that the duration of the air war can be from two to three to six to seven months or more.
The stage will end either with the cessation of hostilities or with the transition of the aggressor to the conduct of ground operations.
The cessation of hostilities may result from:
1. The refusal of the leadership of North Korea from further resistance, which is unlikely.
2. Diplomatic pressure of the world community or direct intervention in this conflict on the side of the DPRK of China.
3. The immediate threat from the DPRK is the transition to the use of nuclear weapons.
The reason for the cessation of military aggression may also be the overrun of weapons and the unacceptable losses of aviation, the growth of anti-war protests of the population in the leading countries of the coalition and economic problems.
At this stage, it is possible to use nuclear weapons from the DPRK, most likely of a demonstrative nature (without causing damage to the enemy) to intimidate the population and political elites of the opposing states in order to force them to negotiate peace.
The reciprocal use of US nuclear weapons is unlikely due to the inevitable negative reaction of the world community and the possibility of the actual use of nuclear weapons by the DPRK.
Already at the end of this stage, the probability of cessation of hostilities is high.
The next stage of the war will begin with the creation of conditions for the aggressor to conduct successful offensive land and sea landing operations with minimal losses.
This is possible with the reliable suppression of the enemy’s anti-landing defense and the destruction of the fortification system at least in a limited area of the North Korean defense.
The purpose of the ground operations phase by the aggressor will be the rout of the DPRK armed forces and the occupation of its territory. On the part of North Korea - the disruption of the offensive and amphibious operations of the enemy with the application of unacceptable damage to it, which can force it to peace.
The main content of the stage will be operations and combat operations of the ground forces of the parties in the territory of North Korea. Its duration can range from several months to a year.
The land invasion of the territory of the DPRK proper will most likely begin with an air-naval landing operation of a strategic scale. Up to 150 warships of various classes and up to 150 – 200 thousands of marines, airborne, mechanized and tank forces that will land on the coast of the enemy as part of three or four echelons, as well as the main forces of the air force United States and its allies.
Given the geographical features of the theater of operations and the presence of a developed network of powerful fortifications, high morale of the army and the population of the DPRK, this period will be accompanied by large losses of personnel and equipment from both sides. Thus, the number of killed and wounded from all sides can reach tens of thousands of people, including at least 25 – 30 percent of them will be the loss of the coalition.
Such victims may be critical for the aggressor grouping, which may force it to abandon further hostilities and go to peace talks.
The possible reasons for the cessation of hostilities at this stage are also the diplomatic pressure of the world community, direct intervention by China, the threat of the DPRK to transfer to the use of nuclear weapons and the growth of anti-war protests of the population and crisis phenomena in the economies of the leading coalition countries - the United States, South Korea and Japan.
The risk of transition to the use of nuclear weapons at this stage is very great. Facing a real threat of complete defeat, the DPRK is likely to decide on a nuclear strike by all possible means.
Such a strike can be made shortly after the start of the landing operation and will include explosions of nuclear land mines, launches of medium-range missiles and air strikes. In total, it is possible to use from two to three to five to six nuclear weapons, depending on the effectiveness of the opposition of the enemy. Probable objects of nuclear strikes are coalition troops, parts of the military infrastructure and administrative-political centers in South Korea, as well as one of the American military bases.
The impact will result in huge casualties (several hundred thousand people, mostly South Korean civilians) and large, almost insurmountable areas of radiation contamination.
The United States will strike back with strategic and tactical nuclear weapons on the main administrative and political centers of North Korea, the protected objects of its nuclear complex, the key nodes of North Korean defense on land and coastal directions.
The scale of the retaliatory strike will be limited by the desire to minimize the zone of radioactive contamination both in the direction of Russia and China, and towards South Korea and Japan, especially to the areas where their troops are located.
In this regard, the probable number of nuclear warheads in the US retaliatory strike can be estimated at six to eight small and medium power units. Victims among the population of the DPRK will exceed hundreds of thousands and even millions of people.
In the future, the United States may use single nuclear strikes with ultra-low-power ammunition to destroy specially protected fortifications.
The exchange of nuclear strikes will lead to the loss of the ability of the DPRK to organize resistance. However, the considerable losses among the population of South Korea and the troops of the anti-North Korean coalition, the huge zones of radioactive contamination, as well as international pressure and intervention by China will force the parties to look for ways to end hostilities. As a result of a nuclear exchange, the war can be ended.
If the DPRK does not dare to use nuclear weapons, the war will continue.
Even after the defeat of the main groupings of the North Korean troops, the likelihood of the North Korean leadership refusing to resist, unless pressure is put on it from China, is extremely low.
Part of the North Korean leadership in the interests of preserving the political representation of the DPRK under the occupation of the country by the enemy can be evacuated to China.
The units and formations that have preserved their combat effectiveness will continue their resistance on their own, guerilla warfare will begin to develop in the occupied territories.
The goal of the third period of the war - the period of "disorganized resistance" - on the part of the aggressor will be to establish control over North Korea with the complete destruction of its statehood. On the part of the surviving representatives of the North Korean leadership and the units that have retained their combat capability are the prevention of the complete political liquidation of North Korean statehood.
The probability of using nuclear weapons at this stage is low due to the loss of command and control, the loss or destruction of nuclear weapons by the aggressor, and their duration can be several months, during which the units and formations of the North Korean army that have retained their combat capability will be consistently destroyed.
With their defeat, the stage of the partisan war will begin.
The developed network of fortifications, mountainous terrain covered with vegetation, and the considerable reserves of armaments, ammunition and other materiel in advance created by the North Korean leadership will make it possible to deploy a large-scale partisan war in North Korea, which can also be transferred to South Korea.
The actions of the partisan formations are very likely to be coordinated and materially supported from the territory of other states, in particular China.
This period can last for several years and, judging by the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, will ultimately lead to the withdrawal of the United States and its allies from North Korea with the restoration of statehood there.
The war against North Korea can last from several days to several years. Expected losses can also vary within wide limits - from a few hundred people, while limiting the war only to its air phase to several million in the event that this war develops into a nuclear one.
It is most likely that the war will end after a few weeks of air campaign, when the high risk of its escalation into the nuclear phase becomes apparent. As a result, a compromise is possible: the DPRK will completely curtail its nuclear missile program, and the United States and its allies will go to a forced cancellation of sanctions against North Korea and sign an agreement to guarantee the non-use of military force against it. Most likely, the United States will radically reduce its military presence in South Korea.
At the same time, dragging the war into a nuclear phase will lead to enormous casualties, especially among the peaceful Korean population, and unprecedented destruction with dubious chances of success in establishing and maintaining control over the territory of the DPRK.
Thus, the war on the Korean Peninsula will not bring substantial gains to its participants, primarily the United States, and the losses from it, both material, political and moral, will be incomparably greater.
In this regard, the beginning of the war in the country of morning freshness (the poetic name of Korea), at least in the short and even medium term, should be considered unlikely.