Long-range strikes by Ukrainian UAVs: methods, capabilities and reactions

29 012 56
Long-range strikes by Ukrainian UAVs: methods, capabilities and reactions
Ukrainian UAV "Lyuty" in flight. Photo Telegram / "Military Chronicle"


Every day, Ukrainian formations try to attack various objects in Russia with unmanned aerial vehicles. There are attempts to strike targets in border areas and deep inside Russian territory. Some attacks are successful and cause some damage. In such a situation, it is necessary to understand how exactly the enemy organizes long-range terrorist strikes - and take measures to protect yourself.



Ranged attacks


Ukrainian militants launch attack UAVs into Russia almost every day. They use medium and heavy class devices, both specially designed and made on the basis of available aviation technology. The most advanced models of this kind have a flight range of hundreds of kilometers and carry a warhead of tens of kilograms.

So far, the enemy has the ability to use UAVs en masse. Dozens of devices are used daily. For example, on the night of July 4, Russian air defense intercepted about fifty Ukrainian dronesIn the morning and afternoon, another 20 destroyed air targets were added to them.

Ukraine is trying to attack targets in different regions. First of all, these are recently annexed and border "old" territories. In addition, attempts are being made to strike at long ranges. Thus, on the night of July 1, the enemy attacked defense industry enterprises in Izhevsk. On July 4, due to the appearance of UAVs, it was necessary to close air traffic in the Perm region and other cities.

Attacks deep in Russian territory require special attention. They show that the enemy is finding ways to break through the existing Defense, and its UAVs are at least approaching their intended targets. This situation requires special attention, understanding of the causes and appropriate measures.


Preparations for the launch of the “Palyanytsya” product. Photo by OP of Ukraine

Drone threats


Thanks to foreign aid, the remnants of Ukrainian industry have been able to develop and bring to production several types of long-range UAVs. Almost all of the previously presented examples of this type are now being used in raid attempts. Work on new drones may already be underway.

The recent attack on the Izhevsk enterprise involved the use of the An-196 Lyuty UAV. This is a twin-boom aircraft with a straight wing and a gasoline engine. In appearance and design, it is similar to some foreign models. The drone carries a warhead weighing up to 75 kg. The flight range is stated at 1000 km.

In August 2024, Ukraine presented the Palyanitsya kamikaze strike drone. This was another simplified projectile aircraft with an autopilot. It was claimed that with its help, Ukrainian formations would be able to attack targets deep in Russian territory, including long-range aviation airfields in the Ryazan and Nizhny Novgorod regions. Later, there were reports of attempts to use the Palyanitsya UAV in real strikes.

At the end of last year, the winged one was shown for the first time rocket "Hell". Based on available components, a subsonic aircraft with a range of up to 700 km was manufactured. As before, Ukraine promised to use it against Russian targets.

Thus, by now Ukrainian enterprises have mastered the production of several types of UAVs and cruise missiles with different characteristics. According to official reports, the flight range of such products has been increased to 1000-1200 km.


Downed Banshee Jet 80+ UAV. Photo Telegram / D.V. Pushilin

It is not difficult to imagine the operational capabilities of such equipment. For example, Cherepovets, Naberezhnye Chelny and Astrakhan are located within a radius of 1000 km from Kharkov. Increasing the flight range and/or changing the launch point allows threatening other Russian regions and cities.

Route planning


Apparently, long-range UAVs are launched from Ukrainian territory and then directed towards Russian facilities. The vast majority of the devices come under fire from Russian air defense, but some manage to reach their intended targets. The success of such an attack largely depends on its organization.

The decisive factor in this context is the route and flight profile. They are constructed in such a way as to reduce the probability of detection of the UAV by air defense systems. If the drone cannot move covertly, it will definitely be suppressed or shot down.

When preparing for raids, the enemy carefully studies the available data on Russian air defense. Probably, information from foreign intelligence services obtained using various means is used. The terrain features and other non-obvious factors are also taken into account.

The attack plan must take into account the location of air defense systems, their actual detection and engagement zones, and other variables. The UAV route is planned to avoid dangerous areas. In addition, the flight is carried out at a minimum altitude to further reduce the likelihood of detection. The drones receive a flight mission that takes all factors into account and take off.


Ukrainian product "Peklo". Photo Telegram / BMPD

This type of attack planning generally allows solving the task. However, a complex route bypassing dangerous zones forces one to sacrifice the combat radius. In addition, the Russian army's air defense configuration on the drone's route can change at any time, which is why it will be detected and destroyed.

At a shorter range


Quite a long time ago, a version appeared about the possibility of attacks not only from Ukrainian territory. The nature of some strikes indicated the possibility of UAVs being launched from the territory of third countries or even from Russia. However, for a long time this was only an assumption.

On June 1, Ukrainian formations carried out a terrorist attack on several Russian airfields. They used tractor-trailers with semi-trailers, on which specially prepared containers were placed. The latter were equipped with devices for storing and launching copter-type UAVs. At the specified time, the vehicles arrived at the specified positions, after which the drones were launched and the attack began.

This terrorist attack demonstrated the fundamental possibility of launching attack drones directly on Russian territory. It cannot be ruled out that the enemy is preparing new attacks with the same or similar means.

In particular, domestic media outlets have voiced a version about the possibility of using full-size UAVs like the Lyuty. Such a device and its launcher, after some modifications, can be fitted into a standard container or placed on a truck with an awning. After that, the area of ​​responsibility of the unmanned system will depend not on geography, but on the mobility of the chassis and the selected launch point.


Russian Tor-M1 SAM system in the Special Operations area. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense

However, organizing such a strike is also difficult. The construction of a camouflaged self-propelled launcher and its delivery to the launch site require special measures. Now, after the recent air raid, it will be extremely difficult to carry out a similar action for a number of reasons.

Measures are being taken


Ukraine is trying to attack Russian targets using various weapons. For a number of reasons, unmanned aerial vehicles have become the main means for such strikes. In turn, the Russian army has taken into account the emergence of new threats and has taken a number of necessary measures.

First of all, air defense is being improved. Existing systems and complexes are being improved, and new ones are being developed. Additional radars, air defense systems and complexes are being deployed. EW. Air defense is being strengthened in critical areas and previously existing gaps are being closed.

Radical measures are also being taken. The army is identifying and destroying sites for the production of unmanned vehicles. Also under attack are storage and temporary placement sites, launch sites, etc. Timely strikes on such objects allow reducing the enemy's overall capabilities, and in the future, reducing the burden on air defense. For example, the latest strikes on production facilities took place on the night of July 4. This time, the targets were production sites in Kyiv.

At the moment, the air defense and related structures demonstrate high efficiency. The vast majority of Ukrainian UAVs and other air attack weapons are successfully shot down en route and do not hit their intended targets. However, individual drones can still break through and strike. This indicates the need for further improvement of defense and its performance.
56 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +5
    5 July 2025 04: 01
    It is obvious that we need a network of airborne radars that can detect all movements of aircraft in the air. Until this happens, enemy UAVs will break through our Trishkin caftan regularly.
    It was not tank biathlons that should have been done before the SVO, but FPV and UAV competitions.
    Alas, alas, such is c'est la vie...it's too late to realize it.
    1. +11
      5 July 2025 04: 39
      But it is never too late to put the main biathlete in jail and confiscate from him and his accomplices the money for purchasing additional air defense systems winked
      1. +4
        5 July 2025 04: 55
        No, he's "one of us". And Vasilyich doesn't abandon "his own".
      2. 0
        11 July 2025 18: 32
        But it is never too late to put the main biathlete in jail and confiscate from him and his accomplices the money for purchasing additional air defense systems
        - Where can we buy them? Who will sell them to us?
        1. 0
          11 July 2025 18: 43
          Almaz-Antey, KBP and Dome, no? Do you think that if you give them an extra couple of hundred billion they won't be able to expand production?
    2. +7
      5 July 2025 04: 58
      There has been talk about aerostats for a long time, but the "wise men" say that an aerostat attracts the enemy's attention. I really don't understand what's wrong with that? So it's possible to create a lot of false aerostat targets.
      1. -1
        5 July 2025 10: 24
        Aerostats are a proven carrier of airborne radars, and both the US and Israel use them to control their borders. However, the main thing is that in order to use them, the air defense must be completely suppressed within a radius of at least 300 km. Aerostats are a very easy target, and a decoy is very easy to detect using radio reconnaissance methods, since it does not have a radar. And for some reason, the Aerospace Forces have not suppressed the enemy's air defense for four years now, so that such operations are possible.
        1. -3
          5 July 2025 12: 52
          Air defense must be completely suppressed within a radius of at least 300 km
          Why not a thousand km? What is the operating range of the Ukrainian air defense system?
        2. +4
          5 July 2025 15: 47
          What kind of Ukrainian air defense is there in Voronezh and Izhevsk?
  2. +19
    5 July 2025 04: 36
    the author is so sure, without even blinking, that long-range UAVs flying 1500 km deep into Russia and carrying 70 kg of explosives but flying at only 200 km/h, supposedly overcome all Russian air defense systems along the way and are detected only when approaching the target. The article does not even hint that Ukrainian UAVs are most likely launched deep into Russia from the territory of Russia itself or from neighboring countries that are near Russia in a place in relation to which Ukraine is 1500 km. These are the so-called friends of Russia under all sorts of security agreements with them. Well, one can only guess how many "sleeping" UAV operators Ukraine has sent to Russia, but one will be horrified by their number
  3. +6
    5 July 2025 04: 48
    They say that these drones are assembled in garages and you can't shoot all the garages. I think that if you find out the addresses of these garages using intelligence, it's still cheaper to send a geranium to each one than to catch their products later. But the engines for the drones are made in a fairly limited number of factories. They say one of them is in the Czech Republic. And if it's not good to hit the Czech Republic with missiles, then burning transformers in the Czech Republic, the factories themselves, and ordering valuable Czech employees from all sorts of Albanian bandits will help solve the problem and not start a war with the Jewry ahead of time. The same goes for explosives for drones, they are not cooked in garages.
    1. +6
      5 July 2025 09: 05
      A separate question - what are these drones actually assembled from? Who supplies them with components? By chance - not one of our strategic partners and almost ally? With whose management our leaders regularly kiss?
      1. 0
        5 July 2025 21: 10
        What are these drones actually made of?

        From civilian materials.
        Engine - Europe, Explosives - USSR, Electronics - China, Fuel - Russia, Everything else is partially our own but most of it is Chinese.
        FPV drones can generally be assembled in a garage.
        We print the case on a 3D printer, order electronics on Aliexpress, assemble and install software, then attach an RPG shell and send it to the SVO, receiving a salary in the process.
  4. +14
    5 July 2025 04: 50
    Until Russian troops stand on the Polish and Romanian borders, this epic with UAV raids can continue forever, because having NATO countries as an industrial rear, Ukraine will systematically produce a huge number of UAVs. Anyone who does not understand this is either a layman or a half-educated person.
    1. +8
      5 July 2025 21: 12
      Until Russian troops stand on the Polish and Romanian borders

      Yes, yes, all that remains is to take Kramatorsk, and then it’s like clockwork, even to the English Channel.
    2. +1
      6 July 2025 22: 38
      Have all troops already been withdrawn from the Kaliningrad region? Or is there a border with some other Poland there?
  5. -4
    5 July 2025 05: 24
    Quote: avia12005
    Until Russian troops stand on the Polish and Romanian borders

    I absolutely agree with you, Yuri! Did the Nazis really think of bombing Moscow, Leningrad and our other cities in 44, not to mention 45? And REVENGE! Revenge can be just! Not words, but deeds! Our military leader was killed, the response was swift and precise!
  6. +11
    5 July 2025 05: 26
    What kind of reaction can there be in a country whose borders are left unguarded?
    We are no longer able to track the possible routes of enemy drones that “suddenly appear out of nowhere” a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border...
    1. +1
      5 July 2025 20: 31
      ROSS 42, you are absolutely right. But I want to add - what other reaction, other than "beautiful" phrases for the people, can there be in a country in which real power is in the hands of an oligarchic elite, the essence of which is betrayal and surrender of national interests to please their own private ones?
  7. +1
    5 July 2025 05: 28
    Quote: fiberboard
    There has been talk about aerostats for a long time, but the "wise men" say that an aerostat attracts the enemy's attention. I really don't understand what's wrong with that? So it's possible to create a lot of false aerostat targets.


    Balloons cost money even without electronics. Wind is harmful to balloons.
    And to create false targets you need more than a shell, kilometers of cables and cubic meters of helium. Surely they can't be made lighter than air with hydrogen?
    1. +4
      5 July 2025 06: 39
      Quote from Fangaro
      Wind is harmful to balloons

      UAVs also do not fly in strong winds. Their weather range is approximately the same.
  8. +4
    5 July 2025 05: 54
    Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan provide their territories for UAV launches in any case. Given the low saturation of air defense systems in this region, drones easily reach their targets. In the northwest, the Finns and the Balts initially tried to do the same, but apparently received a serious warning and kept quiet for now. It's time to organize self-defense units, with duty to help the military, but we live in peacetime.
    1. -1
      5 July 2025 17: 24
      On what basis to organize self-defense units? Initial training, weapons? The entire infrastructure has been destroyed. And at the same time, some shady "investors" are buying up closing schools for some sports camps, in the border zone.
  9. 0
    5 July 2025 06: 59
    Quote: igorra
    Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan provide their territories for UAV launches in any case. Given the low saturation of air defense systems in this region, drones easily reach their targets. In the northwest, the Finns and the Balts initially tried to do the same, but apparently received a serious warning and kept quiet for now. It's time to organize self-defense units, with duty to help the military, but we live in peacetime.


    "Astana is discussing drone flights over the country's territory with Kiev and is taking measures "to put an end to such practices," Lavrov said. Residents of Kazakhstan have found unknown drones several times."
    This is from RBC news.
  10. BAI
    -2
    5 July 2025 08: 31
    1. NATO provides information about the air defense areas of the Russian Armed Forces - there is no continuous zone. And the hohols bypass these areas.
    2. If the drone's range is 1200 km, and the target is 1300 km from the border - of course, the attack was from the territory of the Russian Federation. There is nowhere else
    1. +1
      5 July 2025 12: 58
      1 - So why haven't they built a cordon yet? In places where radars don't reach, you can already put a turret for the armored carapace on the nearest hill
      2 - Are our special services so stupid that components for five-meter drones are brought in across our border every day along with hundred-kilogram bombs? Or maybe they fly through the Baltics and Finland, and some of them don't have the guts to respond?
    2. 0
      11 July 2025 18: 26
      If the drone's range is 1200 km, and the target is 1300 km from the border - of course, the attack was from the territory of the Russian Federation
      Why can't we use UAVs with a range of more than 1300 km?
  11. 0
    5 July 2025 09: 02
    A comprehensive air defense around the nest of Sumerians is one of the measures BUT even taking into account the increase in the production of detection and destruction systems, it is still not possible to build a continuous zone (there are many factors - from an insufficient amount of equipment to improving the tactics of using drones
    The question of SMERSH is overripe within the country... well, we can't allow such a number of different kinds of khokhlo-hit people and just stupid self-seekers to walk free and commit obscenities
    1. +6
      5 July 2025 10: 21
      Quote: silberwolf88
      The question of SMERSH is overripe within the country... well, we can't allow such a number of different kinds of khokhlo-hit people and just stupid self-seekers to walk free and commit obscenities

      "SMERSH, SMERSH, SMERSH" - those who repeat this abbreviation do not understand sterile conditions of his work. If those conditions are introduced now, the entire population will howl wholesale - a complete ban on movement and dismissal from work, buying products in one fixed store, a total ban on any communication, the introduction of execution in the Criminal Code for all military crimes and especially grave others.
      Yes, just from disconnecting the Internet - the population's attics will collapse...
      And by taking away the sterile conditions from SMERSH, we will get our regular FSB, which copes quite well.
  12. +2
    5 July 2025 09: 06
    Yes, the war is in its fourth year, and everything is the same for us. The country is not at war, but lives separately from the SVO. There are a decent number of conscripts inside the country. I will ask a simple question. Why are these units not used to repel attacks? If the enemy knows our gaps, then our air defense forces know about them too. So why not place temporary observation and fire control posts on such routes? Or they are boys, they are not soldiers yet and it is dangerous to give them weapons. Then why the hell do we need such an army. In short. Interaction with the branches of the armed forces is, as always, below the baseboard.
    1. -1
      5 July 2025 19: 10
      Why the hell do we need such an army then?

      This is not an army, it is a mechanism for preparing mobilization potential, training courses.
      Only specially selected soldiers can be trusted with anything serious. Motivated and responsible.
      And such people either sign a contract, or they are immediately snatched up by those units where such conscripts are needed.
  13. -2
    5 July 2025 09: 52
    The buzzer flies 1000 km without a trace, author, you yourself don't find it funny.
  14. -3
    5 July 2025 13: 28
    It is obvious that without significant external assistance, the Russian Federation is not able to stop the strikes of Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles. As the SVO continues, the strength and mass of such strikes will only increase, and the geography will also expand. Up to the possible loss of control of the SNF.
  15. +1
    5 July 2025 13: 45
    The authors of the comments give recipes for fighting that are as stupid as you can imagine:
    For example:
    Quote from alexoff
    But it is never too late to put the main biathlete in jail and confiscate from him and his accomplices the money for purchasing additional air defense systems

    How can confiscated money help revive the electronics industry in a short time? This is impossible in principle.

    Quote: The same LYOKHA
    It was not tank biathlons that should have been done before the SVO, but FPV and UAV competitions.

    What should Shoigu have done - shoot the Ministry of Finance or the WTO supporters in the Russian Federation, those who are building up the territory of destroyed factories with multi-story kennels for people? It turns out that Shoigu is to blame for everything - everyone else is in white...
    Quote: fiberboard
    There has been talk about balloons for a long time, but the "wise men" say that the balloon attracts the enemy's attention.

    What nonsense? What to do in case of strong wind, how to provide power supply, what is the economics of all this? Should we close all borders, or what?
    Quote: north 2
    The author is confident, without even blinking, that long-range UAVs flying 1500 km deep into Russia and carrying 70 kg of explosives but flying at only 200 km/h, supposedly overcome all Russian air defense systems

    What surprises you so much is that UAVs fly at extremely low altitudes and are almost impossible to detect by ground radars, especially against the background of the earth.
    Quote: paul3390
    A separate question - what are these drones actually assembled from? Who supplies them with components? By chance - not one of our strategic partners and almost ally? With whose management our leaders regularly kiss?

    Well, if the supplier is China, what can you present to him - express concern? He doesn't give a damn about the Russian Federation, which is already a raw materials appendage of China.
    Quote: avia12005
    Until Russian troops stand on the Polish and Romanian borders, this epic with UAV raids can continue forever, because having NATO countries as an industrial rear, Ukraine will systematically produce a huge number of UAVs.

    How can a person in their right mind write something like this? What will hit the consumers of Russian gas, oil, grain and fertilizers? And where to get consumer goods, seeds, consumables for the supplied equipment, gadgets and so on?
    Quote: Michael55
    Our military leader was killed, the response was fast and accurate!

    Dreamer - who will do this - graduates of the academy who organized a motor rally in Gelendvagens on the streets of Moscow?
    1. -3
      5 July 2025 18: 36
      How can confiscated money help revive the electronics industry in a short time? This is impossible in principle.
      and now we don't produce air defense, so, since there is no industry? Or maybe there is not enough money to expand production? fool
    2. 0
      7 July 2025 11: 14
      Quote: Dozorny - severa
      What should Shoigu have been doing - shooting the Ministry of Finance or the WTO supporters in the Russian Federation, those who are building up the territory of destroyed factories with multi-story kennels for people?

      Maybe by training personnel? So as not to disgrace themselves at an international forum, when T-80 crews were regularly smeared with TURs in front of all honest people? So that night vision devices and other valuable items do not lie in warehouses and in the command vehicle, in order to protect them from the hands of personnel? It reached the point of insanity - after the start of the SVO, in one of the units, a UAV suppression station was used as a bed for a cat, because "but we don't know what it is and it doesn't work"The price of the issue is two letters to the manufacturer.
      Or maybe it was worthwhile to work on coordinating the units and working out the tactics of use? So that divisions would not burn their rear columns on the march, and units would not abandon serviceable equipment when retreating?
      Quote: Dozorny - severa
      What nonsense? What to do in case of strong wind, how to provide electricity supply, what is the economics of all this?

      Use the experience of those who have been using aerostat AWACS since the 80s. The same TARS system is deployed in the hurricane zone (Puerto Rico, Florida and the southern coast of the USA), and its carriers operate at wind speeds of up to 120 km/h.
    3. 0
      7 July 2025 12: 24
      How can confiscated money help revive the electronics industry in a short time? This is impossible in principle.
      But with this money it is possible to produce an additional number of serial radars, Pantsirs and Tors.
  16. +1
    5 July 2025 15: 03
    Judging by the pictures of Geranium routes provided by Ukrainian publics, the scumbags have long ago hung cameras and microphones on all mobile phone towers and connected them into a single network. It looks like they are doing well with detection. The air defense is really bad.
    Here it looks the other way around. If there were cameras and microphones on all the towers, it would definitely be clear where the drones are flying from. From Ukraine or Finland or Kazakhstan. Or maybe even from inside Russia.
  17. -3
    5 July 2025 19: 17
    The best solution. Install the AWACS on a stationary stratospheric unmanned airship, which is several times cheaper than an airplane and a satellite. At an altitude of 25-40 km, the continuous operation time is 12 months (it descends and is serviced). A disc-shaped airship with a diameter of 250 meters will have a payload of up to 40 tons. The airship is launched to a given point and maintains the specified coordinates with electric motors. Power comes from solar panels and batteries. At this altitude, solar cells produce more than 75 W per square meter. With an area of ​​35000 square meters of solar cells, well illuminated by the sun, we have 2625 kW / h. At an altitude of 20 (35) km, the optical visible horizon is 535 (709) km, direct radio visibility is 1000 km. Such an airship - AWACS plus optical and thermal detection, allows detecting and tracking any flying object, even a very small drone, an inflated balloon, a bird, and also ground objects. AWACS on an airship will allow closing the holes that the Russian Air Defense Forces have today. The weather does not affect it, there is practically no wind there, jet streams are known, such an airship can hang for decades. It is unlikely to be shot down at such an altitude, especially since it will hang on the territory of the Russian Federation.
  18. +2
    5 July 2025 23: 05
    What a fierce "Ryabovshchina" am !
  19. -1
    6 July 2025 01: 30
    Quote: Vlad Gor
    It is unlikely to be shot down at such a height, especially since it will be hanging on Russian territory.

    and how much will all this trinity weigh - panels, batteries, inverters. What's with the wind at such a height? What to do at night, in the fog? In general, many questions, at the moment difficult to resolve.
    1. 0
      6 July 2025 06: 09
      It will cost as much as the Vostochny Cosmodrome, take the same amount of time to build, and take even longer to debug/configure. But its effectiveness against small targets is highly questionable.
    2. -4
      6 July 2025 06: 26
      The road will be mastered by the one who walks it. Now helicopters are used for electronic warfare in border areas. They hang as long as the fuel and resource lasts).
      Because helicopters are the little that remains of the USSR's aviation and even a few are produced.
      And, of course, Russian "realism" - lack of coordination between missilemen and electronic warfare - they raised a helicopter, and at the same time the order came to launch an Iskander. Both missilemen and helicopter pilots swear because of this. And the command is unperturbed.
      Even what exists is used at best at a C. If there is something new, there will be many new problems.
  20. -3
    6 July 2025 11: 45
    When a GREAT LOVER of fraternal nations is at the head of the state, enemies will terrorize HIS people. It can't be any other way. People sit in airports for days. We've come to this. Even some stinking blockheads mock and laugh at the nuclear superpower.
  21. 0
    6 July 2025 13: 07
    What about installing radars on TV towers and repeaters?
    1. 0
      6 July 2025 17: 55
      a distributed network of miniature radars on towers would be really cool
    2. 0
      11 July 2025 18: 14
      Will these radars disrupt the operation of TV towers and repeaters?
      1. 0
        11 July 2025 18: 50
        The radar wavelength is about 3 cm, the TV signal has meter and decimeter ranges.
  22. -1
    6 July 2025 17: 50
    What measures should/can be taken to protect the country from drones?

    passive measures:

    -Build cheap shelters everywhere to make it difficult for the enemy to identify concentrations of vehicles, equipment, people, and cargo, to make it difficult to identify targets using satellite photography

    -High fences, barriers, planting tall trees around production areas to hide from stray photographers/agents.

    -Aerostatic barriers for production facilities, industrial sites, fuel and lubricant storage facilities.

    - Anti-drone protection of critical buildings (see Iranian factories covered in netting)

    - Timely shutdown of high-speed mobile communications in the areas where UAVs are flying (the shameful "web" operation would not have worked if there were cheap cellular jammers at the airfields)

    active measures:

    - Widely dispersed mobile air defense groups for physical interception, with machine guns and drones, naturally with good communications and a unified command

    -Develop and implement a system of sound and visual monitoring of the sky from high-rise buildings and towers (cellular communications) using panoramic high-resolution and zoom cameras (if there are budgets and thermal imaging cameras can be implemented), at first people from the control room could carry out identification, then implement AI to isolate false alarms.

    - Implement the US experience of using light aircraft for surveillance and radio reconnaissance (google "fbi cessna surveillance aircraft")
  23. 0
    7 July 2025 08: 34
    We need radars with phased arrays to track low-flying targets. Look, the IDF has both a radar and a phased array on the border, with full airspace tracking.
    1. 0
      11 July 2025 17: 19
      To track low-flying targets, it is not necessary to use a phased array; a regular antenna will do.
      The IDF front line is about 50 km, and the line of combat contact of the North Caucasus Military District is almost 2000 km. Comparing such things is simply incorrect.
  24. -1
    7 July 2025 09: 42
    To create a continuous radar field, it is quite possible to use tethered aerostats or patrolling unmanned airships, which must carry radars for detecting and tracking air targets. Such systems are capable of staying in the air for days and scanning large areas with their detection equipment.
    And piston aircraft with a speed of 350-360 km/h, armed with rifle-caliber machine guns, are quite suitable for destroying all these UAVs. They must be guided to the target by commands from control operators, and for attacks at night, they must have small-sized radars suspended under the wing (a la the radars of the Second World War, which the Anglo-Saxons had). The range of such radars may be small, because the UAV interceptors are guided to the target by operators, and only when approaching, the onboard radar begins to work.
    Machine guns can be either synchronized or six-barreled in suspended containers.
    Considering that the UAV does not maneuver and does not conduct defensive fire, such a piston interceptor can easily make several approaches if the target is not destroyed the first time.
    The only problem is that:
    a) there is no engine for such an aircraft;
    b) there will be a huge hassle with coordinating the launch of the aircraft development, because in all sorts of ministries it will be necessary to overcome the sabotage of officials - “I personally don’t need such an aircraft”;
    c) it will be necessary to overcome the rigidity within the Ministry of Defense itself, when it will be necessary to prove long and hard that without such an interceptor aircraft it will not be possible to fundamentally solve the problem of enemy UAVs.
    And with airborne radars on balloons or airships, problems can also arise with engines and with overcoming obstacles and sabotage.
    The most terrible thing is that the saboteurs are not even afraid of the thunder and lightning that will follow from Olympus itself. For each of them is protected by a "good fairy godmother" from among the little people who are pleasant to this Olympus, who will always cover their protégés and will not let the lightning strike accurately. And warm relations with the little people who are pleasant to Olympus come first, and only then - the interests of the state.
  25. +1
    9 July 2025 15: 43
    Ryabova Kirill - another attempt to write an independent article, and not a translation under his own name.
    Bad try.
    Strikes deep into our rear, 1300-1400 km away, are already a reality.
    There is no real means of protection against enemy UAVs over the entire flight range.
    They are destroyed only by object air defense in the form of Tor, Pantsir, helicopter - Moskva is more important than the others. Less important - only Pantsir and rifle.
    Some, like the Dome, turned out to be completely unimportant and were not protected in principle. Nonsense, but this is Russia - nothing surprises you here anymore and you don't laugh at the circus anymore.
    The most important thing is that thousands of kilometers of "transit" flight - enemy UAVs generally fly freely and calmly. This means that we do not have any single radar field. There is nothing to detect low-altitude targets "in transit".
    And what will happen when the production of Ukrainian UAVs increases 2-3-4 times? When all European countries began to sponsor the increase in production of these Fierce?
    1. osp
      +1
      9 July 2025 16: 11
      Here I am reading the comments. And what is amazing here? That most people still believe that hundreds of heavy UAVs (read light aircraft) are launched every night from our territory and assembled somewhere.
      But these are only judgments for people with inflamed consciousness.
      The number of "Lyuty" and A-22 that fly per week is the production level of several large aircraft factories where tens of thousands of people work, taking into account cooperation.
      And most importantly, to fuel this number of drones, tens of tons of aviation leaded gasoline are needed.
      I just can’t imagine how this could be produced and launched covertly on Russian territory?
      Well, this is from the point of view of witnesses of the echeloned air defense sect.

      I saw "Lyuty" literally last night. Tver region. He was going from West to East towards either Dubna or Yaroslavl region.
      We call 112, he reports and that's all. Again.
      And yes, when these bomb planes fly over the Smolensk or Tver region, for example, there are forests, forests and forests. A lot of it. Villages and settlements at a distance of tens of kilometers.
      When flying over the forest, only birds will hear these devices.
      However, they usually do not fly in dense clouds, snowfalls and thunderstorms.
      This is likely due to the stability of the Starlink satellite signal for operator guidance when entering the application area.
      And the way they skillfully follow the terrain speaks of the use of TERCOM data.
      The characteristics of the "Lyuty" are very high, since they decided to increase its production so much.

      From the ground, such a target can be shot down only with a minimum of anti-aircraft guns or MANPADS, with the presence of searchlights, thermal imagers and a detection radar like "Repeynik". "Tunguska" or "Pantsir" are better, since they already have everything together.
      But! The drone fragments (or even the drone itself, together with the 50-100 kilogram aerial bomb inside that serves as its charge) will fall on the city near the protected object and cause severe damage.
      This means that the interception zone must be significantly expanded - it extends beyond the city limits to unpopulated or sparsely populated areas.
      But this is a significant increase in forces, resources and personnel.
      1. 0
        11 July 2025 18: 12
        I completely agree with you. There is a small remark why they do not fly in bad weather. A thunderstorm can of course "clog" Starlink, but in other cases it seems to me that the matter is different. Starlink is usually used to allow the operator to intervene in the control process, using optical lenses. But in this case, poor visibility will be a significant obstacle. But this is only my opinion.
        1. osp
          0
          Yesterday, 01: 45
          Snow charges, dense low clouds, heavy rains, fogs can "obscure" the optics of the low-level television guidance system and the operator will not be able to put the drone on target.
          Especially if you need to get into a specific workshop of a military plant (last night the aircraft plant in Lukhovitsy came under attack) or a column of an oil refinery - there is high precision. Sometimes they make several passes. And it is clear that this is not artificial intelligence, it is a person controlling it remotely. It is not a fact that it is even from Ukraine, but it can be much further.
          TERCOM data, weather satellite data, electronic reconnaissance satellite data, optical space imagery data. Mathematical analysis centers for these data.
          Without this, nothing can be done - the drone won’t even fly to Orel or Ryazan.
          It will crash into trees or power line supports, of which there are plenty along the route.

          Well, in order to get to Kazan, Izhevsk or Cheboksary, then I apologize - there must be very detailed maps of the terrain (with marks of the heights of power transmission line supports, free-standing trees, buildings, etc. that TERCOM displays) so that the drone can fly around it using a radio altimeter.
          Detailed weather report for the ENTIRE flight route from, say, Chuguev to, say, Kazan.
          The speed of "Lyuty" is approximately the same as that of airplanes from the First World War. That is, in the above case, from point A to point B is about 7-10 hours of flight. It is extremely tiring, or rather, completely impossible for the operator to fly such a drone manually.
          Moreover, hundreds of them can fly in one night.
          A Starlink communication session can be started when there are 20-30 minutes left before entering the combat zone.
          And it is especially noticeable (I personally saw it twice, on September 2, 1 and May 2024, 28) - they know how to hold the launch "window".
          This is when drones (and there can be 20 of them going to one target, as in the second case with Dubna, it was a little over a month ago) fly at approximately the same distance and hit the target one by one, not at the same time. It is possible for the operator to cope if he is alone on one target.

          P.S.

          I will not comment on the talk that Starlink does not work over Russian territory.
          Because where the satellites fly, there is their signal.
          Alternatively, the communication session is established on the territory of Ukraine and smoothly flows into the territory of Russia.
          Yes, the operator will take control of the drone in 5-7 hours when it is already approaching the target.
          Why should you be in contact with a drone the entire route? It's just that while it's flying, it gives the operator information (maybe once every hour or two) that it's alive. They get shot down, after all.
          Without the data and calculations provided by NATO countries, nothing like this would fly beyond the border regions.
          This is impossible for Ukraine.
          Without satellites. Without centers for analyzing their information.
          "Storms", "Neptunes" similarly.
          Without TERCOM data these are just blanks.