Increasing the protection of reconnaissance UAVs from FPV interceptors

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Increasing the protection of reconnaissance UAVs from FPV interceptors

Aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs are one of the most important elements of reconnaissance and strike circuits (RSC) in the area of ​​a special military operation (SVO). It is from aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs that all other RSC elements often receive target designation – aviation, artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), operational-tactical missile complexes (OTRK) and FPV operatorsdrones.

Aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs have a fairly long range and flight duration, and their small size, combined with the frequently used “wing” type design, makes them relatively invisible to enemy radar stations.



However, low-visibility does not mean invisible. Presumably, aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs are well detected by Israeli RADA radars, and the presence of a two-way control channel allows them to be detected using electronic intelligence (EI) systems. And while enemy radars can be detected by their radiation and destroyed by anti-radar missiles (ARM) or other means of destruction, it is practically impossible to detect EI systems operating in passive mode.


RADA radar somewhere in Ukraine

Using anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) to destroy aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs is not very effective both due to the high cost and shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) on the part of the enemy, and due to the risk of destroying the SAMs themselves. At the same time, the flight altitude of aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs makes them invulnerable to small arms and cannon weapons.


Modern Western air defense systems with their expensive SAMs are not very effective in hunting Russian aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs

It would seem that the eye sees, but the tooth does not feel?

However, the enemy has found a solution – the destruction of aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs is ensured by FPV drone interceptors. According to open data, the enemy has already destroyed dozens, if not hundreds, of Russian aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs using FPV interceptors.

Russian specialists took countermeasures, for example, reconnaissance UAVs were equipped with means of detecting FPV drones - when they approach, an evasive maneuver is automatically performed with a change in altitude and direction of flight. The range and flight time of FPV drones at high altitudes are limited, so theoretically a reconnaissance UAV can evade until the enemy runs out of batteries.

However, passive measures alone are not enough – aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs pose an existential threat to the enemy’s defense, so he will attack regardless of the losses of FPV drones, and the cost of FPV interceptors is an order of magnitude less than the cost of reconnaissance UAVs.


Stills from video of successful and unsuccessful attacks by Ukrainian FPV interceptors on Russian fixed-wing reconnaissance UAVs

Given the above, there is an objective need to increase the security of aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs from attacks by enemy FPV interceptors, which is what we will talk about today.

Presumably, the most effective way to increase the protection of aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs from FPV drones may be to equip them with an onboard defense system, but first the approaching enemy FPV interceptor must be detected.

Drone detector


Judging by the implementation of automated evasion of Russian aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs from FPV interceptor attacks, this task has already been solved by installing drone detectors, most likely detecting the video transmission channel.

Since it is impossible to implement control of FPV interceptors via fiber optics, and the Starlink communication terminal for an FPV drone is too large and expensive, the enemy will not be able to get rid of the outgoing video signal.


Drone Detector Hawk V8

At the same time, at present In the US and other leading countries of the world, low-orbit satellites are being created and deployed that provide communication even with smartphones that support 5G communication technology, while the data transfer speed will potentially allow them to be used to transmit video signals and control commands, and the cost and size characteristics of such terminals (in the dimensions of a smartphone) will allow them to be placed even on FPV drones - this must be taken into account.

Once the approach of an FPV interceptor has been detected, its exact location must be determined.

Thermal imager/camera


If you watch the video recordings of attacks by Ukrainian FPV interceptors on our reconnaissance aircraft-type UAVs, these attacks are always or almost always carried out from a top-down position. Accordingly, to accurately detect the location of the attacking FPV interceptor in the upper part of the reconnaissance aircraft-type UAV, it is necessary to install a bundle of a daytime video camera and a thermal imager in the tail section of the UAV.

Considering that the FPV interceptor will be detected at a fairly close distance, we will not need a bulky optical-electronic station (OES), that is, approximately the same models as those installed on FPV drones can be installed.


Thermal and video cameras for FPV drones can be quite compact

Ideally, a reconnaissance UAV should include an automatic recognition and tracking unit - this would significantly simplify the use and increase the efficiency of the suppression subsystem. Various Russian manufacturers of FPV drones are currently testing and even already using target acquisition systems, especially for ground targets, which is much more difficult than detecting contrasting targets against the sky.

Suppression subsystem


Of course, ideally we would like to ensure the complete destruction of the enemy's attacking FPV interceptors, but it is far from certain that it will be possible to place any small arms or projectile systems on small-sized aircraft-type UAVs.

Functional jamming is not a guaranteed way to disable attacking FPV interceptors, but it can significantly increase the chances of reconnaissance UAVs to disrupt an enemy attack, while, as we have already discussed above, the range and flight time of FPV drones at high altitudes are limited.

Potentially, powerful laser emitters based on solid-state laser diodes of blue and infrared (IR) spectrum, which are currently widely used in various household appliances and tools, can be used in the suppression subsystem. The power of blue laser diodes with a wavelength of 445 nm, used in projectors, reaches 8 W, the power of IR laser diodes with a wavelength of 808 nm, used in engraving machines and machines for cutting various materials, can reach 10 W.

The basic composition of the functional suppression subsystem can use both of the above-mentioned diodes at once, with individual focusing lenses and a single guidance drive in the horizontal and vertical planes. Or, based on the test results, it is possible to focus on one type of laser.


NICHIA NUBM47A1 8W 445nm laser diode and Hangzhou Technology TO808DL10 10W 808nm laser diodes (not to scale)

It can be assumed that the mass of the suppression subsystem, made in an aluminum case (to ensure heat dissipation), will be several hundred grams. The efficiency of laser diodes is about 30-40%, i.e. the total power consumption of the suppression subsystem will be about 50 W during active work on enemy FPV interceptors.

In fiber optic assemblies, the output power of blue and IR diodes can be tens of watts.


40W 445nm, 30W 808nm and 30W 966-986nm lasers

Here it is necessary to make a remark - in open sources various bloggers conducted experiments on defeating household IP cameras using blue laser pointers of 445 nm with a real output power of about 1 W. At the same time, the CCD matrices of such cameras showed high resistance to laser radiation - as a result of exposure to laser radiation from a distance of several meters for several tens of seconds, only minor damage remained on the CCD matrix in the form of a certain number of burnt pixels.

In our case, the radiation power can be an order of magnitude higher, but due to the fact that both the protected reconnaissance UAV and the attacking FPV interceptor are mobile - they change their flight path and oscillate due to the influence of atmospheric turbulence, the time of continuous exposure of radiation to the matrix of the video camera and thermal imager of the attacking FPV drone will be significantly less. Therefore, it will be possible to understand whether the lasers of the suppression subsystem will damage the enemy's cameras only experimentally.

Second operator


There is a possibility that automated laser beam guidance will be ineffective, in which case laser guidance to FPV interceptors can be done manually, well, once on combat aircraft it was considered normal to have a gunner-operator of defensive weapons, perhaps the time has come for collective control of reconnaissance UAVs - in fact, in addition to the pilot-operator, we add a gunner-operator to the crew of an aircraft-type reconnaissance UAV.


Something like this, but remotely

It can be assumed that the transmission of UAV control commands and commands for controlling the suppression subsystem will be able to proceed in parallel without problems. As for the video signal, everything depends on the channel width - either this will also not cause problems, or it is possible to reduce the quality (resolution and frame rate) of the main video signal, giving priority to the video signal from the onboard defense system at the time of attack.

Conclusions


Does the proposed UAV onboard defense system remind you of anything?

In fact, something similar already exists – this is the Russian airborne defense system L-370 “Vitebsk” / “President-S”, designed for installation on airplanes and helicopters, providing suppression of optical homing heads of attacking air-to-air missiles and SAMs in a similar way, in a fully automatic mode.


L-370 "Vitebsk"

In essence, the proposed onboard UAV defense system is a kind of conditional simplified analogue of the Vitebsk/President-S complex, but made on the basis of commercially available components.

Will the enemy be able to protect FPV interceptors from laser beam blinding?

Theoretically, there are filters for a selected wavelength, that is, you can install such filters on a daytime video camera, but in reality everything is not so simple - a weak, thin filter will still let through most of the radiation, for example, protective glasses for certain wavelengths protect only from reflected laser radiation, and a direct hit of laser radiation with a power of several watts is guaranteed to damage your eyesight, which everyone can see for themselves, albeit only twice. If you install several filters, then nothing will be visible through them even without any laser illumination.

Installing any protective filters on a thermal imager will most likely not work at all, since it has special germanium or chalcogenide glass that is transparent in the IR range, and any other glass or plastic will completely block the thermal image, and in general, the thermal imager will most likely fail due to exposure to an IR laser.

It cannot be said that the proposed onboard UAV defense system will allow them to be 100% protected from attacks by FPV interceptors - the enemy will use them in groups, trying to attack simultaneously from different directions, but such is the continuous war of the "sword and shield".


Nevertheless, it can be assumed that, in combination with active maneuvering, the use of laser onboard defense systems for reconnaissance UAVs of the aircraft type will significantly increase their survivability on the battlefield, ensuring stable and highly effective operation of the reconnaissance and strike contours of the RF Armed Forces.
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  1. +1
    4 July 2025 04: 42
    No matter how many shots I've seen of enemy reconnaissance drones being intercepted, I don't recall our reconnaissance drones being camouflaged... But camouflage significantly reduces the detection range, especially with the low-quality optics of FPV interceptors, and can significantly complicate an attack, especially if disorienting color schemes are used.
    And it's easy to quickly adapt to the underlying terrain these days; aerosol paints are freely available...
    Lasers in turrets are expensive, and what's important - they require energy, so simply calculating the mass of the turret is not enough, you also have to calculate the mass of the batteries/generator, etc.
    1. +1
      5 July 2025 17: 32
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      No matter how many shots I've seen of enemy reconnaissance drones being intercepted, I don't recall our reconnaissance drones being camouflaged.

      It seems to me that it would be better to make the case from a transparent material, if such exist, of course.
      There is immediately no need to “adapt” the camouflage to the conditions.
      And those components that cannot be made of transparent material are themselves small in size, which complicates their remote visual detection. hi
      1. 0
        2 August 2025 15: 01
        There are transparent materials, but they are not suitable. In sunny weather, such material will act as a lens, giving a clearly visible glare
    2. 0
      2 August 2025 15: 08
      Camouflage only works on the ground, it is useless in the sky. Note that all fighters are gray, and the night interceptors were generally black. This is enough. Any motley color, on the contrary, will highlight objects against the gray sky
      1. 0
        4 August 2025 15: 22
        Quote: futurohunter
        Any variegation, on the contrary, will highlight objects against the gray sky.

        In fact, all attacks of the wings by fpvhs are from top to bottom, which means the camouflage will be against the background of the ground, and this is definitely better than white on a motley background.

        Quote: futurohunter
        Note that all the fighters were grey, and the night interceptors were black.
        Have you ever seen a plane in green camouflage? Even the grey one has spots...
        1. 0
          4 August 2025 15: 36
          all attacks of wings by fpvhs go from top to bottom
          What prevents increasing the flight altitude? By the way, the ceiling of the "wings" is much higher than that of the "copters".

          Camouflage has one huge drawback. It perfectly "smears" a stationary object. But the background of a moving object is constantly changing. And you also take into account the properties of perception. Camouflage works great against human vision or photographic equipment. It does not save from multispectral cameras, especially with machine vision, from the word "completely". On the contrary, a motley object is much easier to distinguish by machine vision algorithms than a monochromatic one.

          Have you ever seen planes in green camouflage?
          You probably didn't read carefully. I wrote FIGHTERS and INTERCEPTORS. The sand-green-brown spots are exclusively low-altitude attack aircraft. I repeat that multi-colored camouflage masks aircraft parked, on the grass, or aircraft in flight, at low altitude, from view from above. But in flight, on the contrary, it increases visibility.

          Yes, even gray has spots.
          That's right, after all the experiments with gray spots, everyone came to a single-color gray color. At most, with low-contrast spots of the same color. Even our fighters in the second half of the Great Patriotic War were painted gray with gray spots - look at the camouflage of the "Lavochkins" and "Yaks" from about 43-44.

          The Americans had an experiment, but again with gray spots (see the picture below). Yes, the pilot's eyes were blurry, but notice how visible the plane is against the background of the earth. And for video cameras, this doesn't matter at all.

          So camouflage in this case is an extra expense of money and time. And increasing the flight altitude will give much more. And for a high-altitude drone, all these stupid turrets with gunners will not be needed at all
          1. 0
            4 August 2025 15: 53
            Quote: futurohunter
            You probably didn't read carefully. I wrote FIGHTERS and INTERCEPTORS.

            You apparently didn't read at all... Because "wings" in the article are scouts...

            Quote: futurohunter
            or airplanes in flight, at low altitude, from a view from above.

            "Krylo" is a low-altitude, oil-speed aircraft, and if you think that the white color on top is no worse than camouflage, then you are just stupid...

            Quote: futurohunter
            On the contrary, a colorful object is much easier to distinguish by machine vision algorithms than a monochromatic one.
            Don't write nonsense, although what am I talking about...

            Quote: futurohunter
            gray color with gray spots - look at the camouflage of the "Lavochkins" and "Yaks" from about 43-44.
            And they painted it khaki, and summer camouflage, and whatever. No fairy tales needed here.
            1. 0
              4 August 2025 16: 28
              You didn't understand what I wrote. I wrote "FIGHTERS and INTERCEPTORS" precisely because they tried to camouflage them against the sky. A reconnaissance drone is in a similar situation. By the way, have you noticed that almost all drones used are gray? Do you think their developers are fools?

              "Wing" is a low-altitude, oil-speed aircraft
              What prevents increasing the height? I don't see any problems. Just don't talk about clouds - I don't see any problems either, clouds are even a plus.

              Do not write nonsense
              Do you even know what "machine vision algorithms" are? Have you ever heard of such a concept?

              And they painted it khaki, and summer camouflage, and whatever else you like.
              First understand the topic, and then argue!
              During the Great Patriotic War:
              1. Il-2 attack aircraft were painted in multi-colored camouflage to reduce their visibility at airfields and for enemy fighters flying higher
              2. The situation is approximately the same with the Pe-8 and Pe-2 bombers.
              3. The I-16, MiG-3, LaGG-3 and first Yaks fighters were painted in green and black camouflage to reduce their visibility at airfields.
              4. By the time of the Battle of Kursk, when our aviation had gained air superiority, there was no longer such a fear of attacks on airfields, and fighters were camouflaged to match the color of the sky - in shades of gray
              5. The Germans came to the same conclusion at the end of the war - initially bright Messerschmitts and Fokkers began to be camouflaged with gray spots. But bombers were camouflaged with green-dark gray, or brown-gray spots (depending on the theater of military operations), again, to reduce visibility at airfields.
              6. Night fighters and bombers were usually painted black, sometimes white (from the rays of searchlights).
              And that's not all. The topic of camouflage is very large, and everything depended on the conditions in which the aircraft were operated. But it is impossible to approach it so straightforwardly. Especially now, with the development of various detection means.
              For those who like to speculate, but are not interested in the real state of affairs, I provide pictures
              1. 0
                4 August 2025 16: 30
                Adding pictures - I was only able to insert 4 in the previous one
  2. +1
    4 July 2025 09: 10
    Possible solutions include altitude and heading maneuvers, noise-like video transmission signals, highly directional receiving antennas, and a large number of inexpensive decoy drones.
    1. 0
      4 August 2025 15: 40
      It is much easier to increase the flight altitude. And no one has cancelled electronic warfare, with the detection of the drone-transmitter signal and the barrage interference. Decoy drones are now already used in massive raids Geraniums
  3. 0
    4 July 2025 10: 53
    Without experience of damaging cameras with a laser beam, all other work is premature.
    Although a rear view camera is useful in any case - to make the evasive maneuver more successful. For this, it is not necessary to have a second operator - just another monitor, or switching between two cameras.
  4. +1
    4 July 2025 12: 33
    In the basic composition of the functional suppression subsystem, both of the above-mentioned diodes can be used at once, with individual focusing lenses and a single guidance drive in the horizontal and vertical planes.

    There is a possibility that automated laser beam guidance will be ineffective, in which case laser guidance to FPV interceptors can be done manually, well, once on combat aircraft it was considered normal to have a gunner-operator of defensive weapons, perhaps the time has come for collective control of reconnaissance UAVs - in fact, in addition to the pilot-operator, we add a gunner-operator to the crew of an aircraft-type reconnaissance UAV.

    I seriously doubt that the second operator will be able to adequately cope with all this flickering, since both the reconnaissance and FPV drones are small in size, and therefore have low inertia, i.e. maneuvering of both will be very sharp and fast. In addition, the "gunner's" view in this case will be limited by the video camera. We will have to make a camera with a variable focal length. Short focus - for finding the target and long focus - for precise aiming, and the change of focus should occur almost instantly.
    Turrets are great, of course. good but isn't it easier to automatically aim with the entire body in attack reflection mode (what difference does it make whether it's in front or behind)?
    However, there is another assumption, wink that it is much easier and much cheaper to protect against an attack in the rear hemisphere from FPV interceptors using a very light (and possibly even transparent) towable snake-type structure attached to the wing consoles with Kevlar threads. It is probably possible, for starters, to simply tow a loop of Kevlar thread. Unfortunately, this will probably be a one-time "thing".
    The third option is a powerful electronic flash followed by maneuvering, or the firing of "aircraft grenades" - also automatic.
    1. +1
      5 July 2025 16: 52
      You could probably just tow a loop of Kevlar thread to begin with. Unfortunately, this would probably be a one-time "thing".

      You need to wind a thread with loops on a spool and reel it back ten to twenty meters when attacking from behind. After performing a "crossing" maneuver, winding this thread on the enemy's propellers, we cut the thread. I think that the spool can hold 100-200 meters of Kevlar thread with loops - enough to repel several attacks.
    2. +1
      2 August 2025 15: 57
      Towing a light and strong Kevlar net is a very good idea. But it must be easy to tear off the net, otherwise an attacking drone entangled in the net will greatly complicate the flight of the defending drone.
    3. -1
      4 August 2025 15: 42
      All this nonsense with the gunner is not needed. The automatics are enough - it will cope well. It is not the loop that needs to be laid out, but the trap nets. And the grenades are excessive - they can hit the protected object. And you can take a lot of light nets. But the smoke generator will be very useful
  5. 0
    4 July 2025 17: 22
    I don't understand how one can discuss technical tasks without numbers. Manilovism.
    Does anyone have any idea what kind of spot a laser diode can be focused into at tens of meters?
    What about the parameters of rejection filters based on multilayer interference coatings?
    Glasses and optical systems with variable transparency?
    And what about the delay in the communication channel, taking into account electronics and optics?
    Or tried to adjust the optical system on an optical table and feel the necessary precision and tolerances with your hands.
    1. +1
      4 July 2025 21: 39
      Does anyone have any idea what kind of spot a laser diode can be focused into at tens of meters?

      Laser is a magic word, you just need to have strong faith and it, with power from the onboard batteries of the UAV, and it will cut everything into pieces at any distance. Multimodality, ratios of length and aperture, diffraction limit is information noise.
    2. 0
      4 August 2025 15: 44
      what spot on tens of meters can a laser diode focus?
      Have you ever shined a laser pointer at clouds? Try it!

      Yeah, variable transparency. When illuminated by a laser beam, the camera will immediately go blind.

      rejection filters based on multilayer interference coatings
      What are you even talking about? Where did you find this grass? laughing
      1. 0
        4 August 2025 17: 39
        First, learn to have a normal conversation (Where did you find this grass?) - talk to your friends like this if they allow it.
        Secondly, read technical literature. Unfortunately, your understanding of modern laser technologies is at the level of a laser pointer.
        Rejector filters based on multilayer interference coatings are optical devices designed to selectively suppress (reflect) certain wavelengths of light while passing the rest. They are widely used in spectroscopy, laser technology, telecommunications and other areas where selective filtering of an optical signal is required.

        Principle of operation
        Multilayer interference coatings consist of alternating layers of materials with different refractive indices (e.g., high- and low-refractive dielectrics). The thickness of each layer is typically a quarter of the wavelength (λ/4) for which the filter is designed.

        When light falls on such a multilayer package, the waves reflected from the boundaries of the layers interfere with each other. With the correct selection of the thicknesses and refractive indices of the layers, constructive interference of the reflected waves is created for a given wavelength (or range), which leads to a strong reflection of these wavelengths - that is, a rejection effect.

        For other wavelengths, the interference of reflected waves is destructive, and the light passes almost without loss.

        Design
        Materials: Dielectrics with high and low optical density are commonly used, such as TiO₂ (titanium dioxide), SiO₂ (silica), Ta₂O₅ (tantalum oxide).
        Number of layers: from several tens to hundreds, which allows achieving very high selectivity and suppression depth.
        Layer thickness: approximately λ/4 for the target wavelength, with possible variations to broaden the suppression band.
        Strengths
        High selectivity and filter cutoff steepness.
        Low losses for transmitted wavelengths.
        Possibility of precise adjustment of spectral characteristics.
        Applications
        Cutoff of laser lines in spectroscopy.
        Protecting photodetectors from unwanted wavelengths.
        Channel separation in optical communications.
        Creation of mirrors with specified spectral properties.
        1. 0
          4 August 2025 18: 03
          Yes, for God's sake. I wrote this because I was struck by your phrase. I am not so much an optics expert as I am an electronics and digital expert. And it seemed to me like something scientific and not really existing. Sorry if I was wrong.

          And this filter of yours is too narrow-band. Yes, the laser beam is monochrome, but what prevents using several lasers with different wavelengths? Tunable lasers? Laser converters, for example, into the same beam of almost white light?

          In my opinion, this multilayer coating of yours will greatly weaken the incident light wave. And I think that "exposing" a camera with such a coating is much easier than selecting light filters, even in the form of your coatings.

          Besides physics, there is also electronics. Any camera has a certain scanning frequency. If you slightly "pump" the light beam, literally for a few angular seconds, and also modulate it with a certain signal, then you can simply drive crazy either an enemy operator or a computer vision system.

          I wrote about the laser pointer only as a simple example of how much a laser beam diverges over a distance. And a laser source of interference will act at approximately the same distance, even less.
          1. 0
            4 August 2025 18: 22
            The first point is accepted.
            Optical filters are a tricky thing, but with a proven technology, they are cheap. They are made by sputtering thin films and can cut not just one band, but a set of frequencies at once. The frequencies of powerful lasers are, in principle, predictable; you can have a set of glasses and, in the simplest case, put them on optics.
            You are proposing laser systems that are an order of magnitude more complex than those that exist now.
            I didn't just say that everything needs to be counted. Every complication leads to losses.
            You can use electro-optical shutters - protective glass that darkens when a certain level of illumination increases. It works quite quickly.
        2. 0
          4 August 2025 18: 44
          Oh, by the way, I forgot the question. These interference coatings of yours... Do they take into account the power of laser radiation? At high radiation power per unit area, won't the coating heat up and lose its properties? Or even just mechanical damage (clouding, bubble formation, etc.)?
          1. 0
            4 August 2025 20: 47
            Everything is possible. But the power at the receiving end is an order of magnitude less than at the emitter. And what do you think, mirrors are made on solid-state lasers, for example. Films are also sprayed.
            Here you are an engineer. You can easily draw an optical diagram with optical elements on which 4 laser beams with different wavelengths are "knocked down". Different dividing cubes, lenses, collimators, etc. Calculate the number of optical surfaces that need to be clarified or filters installed, estimate the losses at each step, the heating values per unit area. Such an estimate is not super complicated.
            Then the beam divergence, losses for each carrier in the air with non-ideal characteristics and, finally, the energy density on the target surface. Specify a white color or a mirror metal (foil is enough). As a result, the radiating complex will be very complex.
            Currently, UAVs are not protected from the threat of laser weapons because they are practically non-existent. If the threat is real, the zatsi will appear quickly and quite effectively. Not 100%, but above 50%. And the destruction system will grow, become more complex and more expensive, becoming a target itself. Dialectics.
            This is not the place to remember the past, but I had experience working with atmospheric optical communications. In order to work stably in the city at acceptable ranges, the power of the infrared laser was such that a sheet of black carbon paper would fall apart in the air. We worked in special glasses.
  6. 0
    4 July 2025 21: 57
    A useful article. Let's hope that those who actually produce drones will read it. By the way, mirrors can be used to change the direction of the laser beam.
    1. 0
      4 July 2025 23: 11
      No need, they'll fall off their chairs laughing and might hurt themselves.
  7. 0
    5 July 2025 16: 26
    It can be assumed that the transmission of UAV control commands and commands for controlling the suppression subsystem can proceed in parallel without any problems.

    It can be assumed that the transmission of control commands to the UAV is carried out without problems. But control of the suppression subsystem is not "transmission of commands to".
    After watching videos of a fighter awkwardly aiming at a drone, they shout that it's time to entrust the guidance to automation. And when they try to fantasize about automation, they remember about gunners-radio operators.
    1. 0
      4 August 2025 15: 46
      The article was written by a technically illiterate person who has never heard of machine vision systems.
  8. 0
    5 July 2025 16: 39
    Quote: balabol
    Does anyone have any idea what kind of spot a laser diode can be focused into at tens of meters?

    I think that if you don’t set “super-tasks” [for incineration], but limit yourself to temporary blinding at a minimum (sufficient to ensure an evasive maneuver) distance, then the focal spot can be made two to three times the diameter of the enemy’s lens - to make it easier to hit.
    It wouldn't hurt to come up with some kind of aerosol that would settle in small, non-deflatable "fogging" on the enemy lens.
    1. 0
      4 August 2025 15: 49
      With the aerosol - the idea is very good! Especially if you combine it with a smoke screen. For example, you can inject some liquid into the engine exhaust, which will give opaque smoke. And the tubes for the smoke screen output can be brought out even along the entire fuselage and wings.
      And also, small pieces of foil can be injected into this curtain. And if you illuminate this beauty with a modulated laser beam, and not mess around with gunners and turrets, then the operators of the drone interceptor will go crazy
  9. 0
    7 July 2025 22: 20
    Hello, an idea came to mind here, since I am a patriot, but war is scary, it must be ended, I could not resist commenting, it seems to me that it would be possible to place in the geranium compartments, conditionally, interceptors, like missiles on an airplane are placed in a closed compartment, for example, arrow-shaped or another, FPV, place lidars on top and on the belly of the carrier, two hemispheres as one, let them scan, it would also be good to hear sound for detection, or perhaps tracking of targets, then capture with a laser and lead the target, what do you think of this idea?
  10. 0
    9 July 2025 13: 02
    The writing about lasers is complete nonsense. The author logically thinks that lasers are needed to protect UAVs. But which ones? =)
    The author suddenly talks about lasers from engraving machines and all sorts of cutting machines. for blinding, and gives pulsed ones as an example.

    In short, a drone won't carry a continuous one. It's heavy. You could just as easily transport a Kalashnikov on a drone, and it would be more effective. But using a pulse laser as a means of destruction is much more interesting. And dodging, cutting the trajectory. Well, or using something else. Throwing a net towards the FPV or something else...
    1. 0
      4 August 2025 18: 47
      What's the problem with "continuous", as you put it? If you don't set the task of burning out the optics and camera (that's too complicated), but only blinding them, then you don't need a lot of power.
      It is also difficult to transport a Kalash on a drone. It is heavy, it is difficult to make a turret, it shakes when shooting, there is recoil, etc. It is easier to interfere or throw out nets
  11. 0
    2 August 2025 15: 59
    Or maybe just raise the reconnaissance drone higher? So that all these FPV-copters don't get to it? And don't need all this nonsense with turrets and gunners
  12. 0
    4 August 2025 15: 57
    The author is technically illiterate. I was especially amused by the turrets with gunners. The author has a poor understanding of how cameras and lasers work. Otherwise, he would have offered a simpler solution.
    Firstly, lidars - laser locators - are quite accessible. A lidar is quite capable of detecting an enemy drone, determining the distance to it, its direction and flight speed. Moreover, a lidar can also detect a drone's camera by the glare from the optics.
    Secondly, each camera has a certain resolution and scanning frequency. They are quite standard. If you provide a slight oscillation of the laser beam (literally, angular minutes) and its modulations, then you can draw such Lissajous figures on the camera that the operators will go crazy. Machine vision systems - even more so. We pair a powerful and bright laser with a lidar on one platform. The lidar scans the sky and, upon detection of an interceptor, turns on a powerful laser with an oscillating and modulated beam.
    You can also throw out small clouds of small pieces of foil and illuminate them with the same beam. It will be even more fun.
  13. 0
    5 August 2025 06: 03
    Quote: futurohunter
    There will be even more fun

    Are you suggesting to synthesize a holographic image on these pieces of foil that drives the operator crazy (or an AI replacing the operator)? The hardest thing here is with the foil - you can't stock up on it (at decent speeds - it blows away). You need to wait for cloudy weather above the attacked object, and form holograms in the clouds so that all the defenders' brains glitch. (But this is a different system, not relevant to the article).