Israeli Air Defense and Missile Defense Systems Involved in Repelling Iranian Strikes and Analysis of Their Effectiveness

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Israeli Air Defense and Missile Defense Systems Involved in Repelling Iranian Strikes and Analysis of Their Effectiveness

According to Israeli military doctrine, reliable air and missile defense must be achieved primarily through air superiority and the preemptive destruction of attack weapons before they are used by the enemy. It is assumed that interceptor fighters will encounter enemy air targets that have survived strikes on their bases at a significant distance from the objects they are trying to attack. However, the fighter aviation unable to shoot down ballistic missiles missiles, and the last line of defense on their path is missile interceptors launched from ground-based launchers.

In Russian media covering the Israeli-Iranian conflict, there are often various inaccuracies in the description of the structure and combat performance of Israel's anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense systems. Often, based on video footage of individual Iranian ballistic missiles hitting Israeli cities, conclusions are made about the ineffectiveness or even complete incapacity of the anti-missile defense system as a whole. This publication attempts to briefly describe the anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems of the Israel Defense Forces and, based on the available data, to analyze its effectiveness.



Structure of the Israeli air defense and missile defense system


In the Israel Defense Forces, the air and missile defense systems are located within the Command Defense (516th Air Defense Division), which is directly subordinate to the headquarters of the Aerospace Forces.

The basic unit is a platoon. A company (battery) is formed from three or four platoons. Batteries are consolidated into separate fire battalions (divisions), which are under the direct control of the air defense headquarters.

Currently, the Air Defense Command has three sectors: Northern, Central, and Southern. They are protected by seven fire battalions: the 66th, 136th, 137th, 138th, 139th, 946th, and 947th. There is also the 533rd Separate Mobile Communications Battalion, the 883rd Training Battalion (Air Defense School), and the 168th Logistics Wing, which services storage bases and includes repair units and three security battalions. The Missile Threat Display Center, which interacts with the Rear Command, is responsible for warning the population and issuing target designations to anti-missile systems.

The fire divisions are armed with the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-missile systems, the Kela David air defense system, the MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2/GEM+, Barak MX and SPYDER, the Iron Dome short-range anti-missile systems, as well as the Light Blade and Iron Beam combat lasers.

Radar systems of the Israeli air defense and missile defense system


As is known, any air defense and missile defense system relies on radar detection equipment. In the past, Israeli radio-technical units used mainly American-made radars and communications equipment. In the 1990s, the situation began to change, and the armament is mostly equipped with nationally produced radars. The main supplier of radar stations for the Israel Defense Forces is Elta Systems, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries.


Layout of stationary radar posts on the territory of Israel

Currently, there are three radar posts operating on the territory of Israel, located on hills with stationary radars of the centimeter and decimeter range, covered with radio-transparent spherical fairings, and one aerostat radar post.


Google Earth satellite image: a fixed radar post on Mount Meron. The command post of the northern air defense sector is also located here. The image was taken in May 2024

Radiotechnical units are also attached to anti-aircraft missile battalions armed with anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. In addition, G550 CAEW AEW aircraft and Eitan UAVs can be used for the timely detection of air targets (cruise missiles and UAVs) and the provision of target designation to air defense systems.

The site for the Hila radar reconnaissance tethered balloon is located 10 km south of the city of Dimona, near the Israeli nuclear center.

The EL/I-330 MPAS (Multi-Payload Aerostat System) aerostat reconnaissance and patrol system using the EL/M-2083 radar was developed by Israel Aircraft Industries.


The phased array radar is lifted into the air by the American-made TCOM 32M aerostat, which is 32 m long, has a payload of up to 225 kg and is capable of being on duty at an operating altitude of 900 meters for 15 days. A mobile platform is used to transport and lift the apparatus into the air. The received data is transmitted to the ground control point via a fiber-optic cable. The cable reserve is 2700 meters.


Google Earth satellite image of an Israeli airborne radar reconnaissance system deployed 10 km south of Dimona

According to information provided on the IAI website, the aerostat-mounted radar is capable of detecting low-altitude air targets at a range exceeding 250 km. The maximum detection range is up to 500 km. However, it is unknown whether the aerostat-mounted radar system can provide target designation or is intended only for early detection.

At the Ein Shemer airbase, approximately 6 km east of Hadera in the Haifa district, there is an EL/M-2080S Super Green Pine (Green Pine Block-B) radar, designed to detect ballistic missiles and provide target designation to missile defense systems, with a detection range of up to 900 km. Two more EL/M-2080 Green Pine stations were located at the Sdot Micha and Palmachim airbases.


Google Earth satellite image: EL/M-2080S Super Green Pine radar at Ein Shemer airbase

The Green Pine family of radars are transportable but not mobile. It takes about a day to deploy on a specially prepared site. The radar with AFAR operates in the frequency range of 500 MHz - 2000 MHz and can detect, track and guide anti-missiles. According to advertising data, it is possible to simultaneously track more than 30 targets flying at a speed of more than 3000 m/s.


The antenna consists of 2000-2300 receiving and transmitting modules and weighs over 50 tons. The radar also includes transformers, diesel power generators, a cooling system and a control center linked to communications equipment.

In 2012, the American AN/TPY-2 radar, operating in the 8,55-10 GHz frequency range, was deployed on Mount Keren in the Negev Desert. This station, created by Raytheon, was initially intended to detect tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles, track and guide interceptor missiles to them as part of the THAAD missile defense system.


Radar AN / TPY-2

With a warhead detection range of 1000 km and a scanning angle of 10-60°, this station has good resolution, sufficient to isolate a target against the background of debris from previously destroyed missiles and separated stages. According to Raytheon's advertising information, the AN/TPY-2 radar can be used not only with the THAAD system, but also as part of other missile defense systems.


Google Earth satellite image of a military base on Mount Keren in the Negev desert

Several sources claim that the facility located on Mount Keren, known as Site 512, is a key element of the missile early warning system, which is operated by the US military and staffed by personnel from the 1st Brigade of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The media reported that a battery of the THAAD missile defense system is also deployed in the area, but this has not been officially confirmed.

About 10 years ago, Elta Systems introduced a new over-the-horizon radar with AESA EL/M-2090 TERRA, designed for the long-range detection of ballistic missiles.


The EL/M-2090 TERRA radar, which has high energy, can operate in different ranges: UHF and S-band. Due to this, high noise immunity, measurement accuracy and range are achieved. The characteristics of the station are not disclosed, and there is no information about where it is deployed.

Since 2008, Elta Systems has been supplying EL/M-2084 family radars, which have completely replaced the outdated American-made AN/TPS-43 radars and are used as standby radars for monitoring airspace and providing target designation to various short- and medium-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems.


Antenna post of the EL/M-2084MMR radar, used as part of the SPYDER air defense missile system

The three EL/M-2084 family of coordinate radars operating in the S-band employ active phased array antenna technology. The basic modification of the EL/M-2084 MMR has an instrumental detection range of about 470 km.


Antenna post of the EL/M-2084 M-MMR radar

The IDF also uses the compact EL/M-2084 M-MMR stations, designed to detect medium-range threats and control the fire of the Iron Dome system, which is designed to intercept large-caliber artillery shells and rockets at ranges from 4 to 70 km.

The mobile three-coordinate radar EL/M 2106 ATAR 3D, operating in the frequency range of 1,5-2 GHz, has an instrumental range of up to 180 km. Low-flying drones-kamikazes are detected at a range of 40-60 km. There is a possibility of tracking 60 targets simultaneously and transmitting data to a common network for exchange with other anti-aircraft systems.


Radar EL/M 2106 ATAR 3D

The radar hardware and antenna post can be mounted on various chassis or towed vans.


Israeli anti-aircraft missile defense systems


To intercept ballistic missiles before they enter the atmosphere, the Israel Defense Forces Air Force uses the Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 systems. Israeli and American companies have been involved in their development and production since 1994: Israel Aerospace Industries, Boeing Defense, Space & Security, Elta Systems, Elisra Group, Rafael Advanced Defense, Israel Military Industries, Alliant Techsystems, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Ceradyne.

The key elements of the missile defense system are the launchers (up to eight launchers) with six long-range interceptors, the EL/M-8 Green Pine or EL/M-2080S Super Green Pine radars, the Elisra Golden Citron command and communications center, the Israel Aerospace Industries Brown Hazelnut launch control center, a diesel power plant, a radar cooling unit, and communications equipment. The Arrow-2080 system is serviced by approximately 2 people.



1. Towed launcher. 2. Golden Citron command and communications center. 3. Communications node. 4. Brown Hazelnut launch control point. 5. EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar antenna. 6. Radar control center. 7. Diesel electric plant. 8. Radar cooling unit

The Golden Citron command and communications center, which serves a combat crew of 8-10 people, can monitor up to 14 interceptions simultaneously and is capable of operating in automatic mode. Interaction with other theater missile defense systems and automated control systems is ensured, using the Link 16 protocol. In addition to guiding anti-missiles, the computing complex calculates the impact point of the warhead of an enemy ballistic missile - in the event of an unsuccessful interception of a missile or the formation of large debris, this information is transmitted to the Rear Service to notify the population.

The Brown Hazelnut launchers and launch control center can be located up to 300 km from the command and communications center. The trailer-mounted launcher weighs 35 tons. After launching the launcher, it recharges within an hour.


Arrow-2 launcher

The two-stage solid-fuel Arrow-2 anti-missile is equipped with a thrust vector-controlled engine. The homing system is combined and includes infrared and radar channels. Unlike the American Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD, which destroy a target with a kinetic strike, the Arrow-2 has a 150 kg fragmentation warhead with an effective destruction zone of 50 m. The Arrow-2 anti-missile is 6,8 m long, 800 mm in diameter, and has a launch weight of 1300 kg. Maximum speed is 3 km/s. Maximum interception range is up to 80 km. According to information voiced by the developers, the probability of interception by one missile at maximum range is at least 90%.


Currently, the most advanced version is the Arrow-2 Block-5. This modification is compatible not only with Israeli Green Pine family radars, but also with American radars such as AN/TPY-2, AN/SPY-1 and AN/SPY-6.

The first Arrow 2 battery was deployed in March 2000 at Palmachim Air Base, near the city of Rishon LeZion, and reached full operational capability a year later.


Google Earth satellite image: Arrow-2 missile defense system and radar position at Ein Shemer airbase

Another battery was deployed in October 2002 at the Ein Shemer airbase near the city of Hadera, and a third in 2012 at a military facility near the settlement of Tal Shahar, in the center of the country, between Gedera and Latrun. However, this battery was subsequently moved to the Palmachim airbase. Positions for Arrow-2 were also equipped in the vicinity of the Sdot Micha airbase. The presence of several equipped positions allows for the maneuvering of firing batteries and flexible response to changing situations.


Google Earth satellite image: Arrow-2 missile defense system position at Palmachim airbase

Israeli media reported that each Arrow-2 system was initially supposed to have 150-200 anti-missiles. However, apparently, the order was subsequently increased.

In 2008, Israel and the United States began jointly developing a longer-range missile defense system, designated Arrow-3, with the goal of achieving a single-target hit probability of at least 99%.


To provide target designation for solid-fuel anti-missiles with a deflected thrust vector, it was planned to rely on the EL/M-2080S Super Green Pine and AN/TPY-2 radars, as well as high-altitude UAVs equipped with highly sensitive optoelectronic sensors. The range of the new heavy interceptor should be several times greater than that of the Arrow-2, and in fact it is limited by the detection system's coverage area. Interception altitude is up to 100 km. Anti-missile speed is up to 4,5 km/s.


Arrow-3 anti-missile model at ILA 2024

Unlike the Arrow-2, which is equipped with a fragmentation warhead, the Arrow-3 interceptor destroys an enemy ballistic missile with a direct hit.


Like the Arrow-2, the Arrow-3 interceptor missiles are stored in sealed transport and launch containers and are launched vertically from a towed launcher.


Following a series of tests, the Arrow-3 system was put on trial combat duty in 2017. Serial production of the anti-missile system was established at the production facilities of the US-based Stark enterprise, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries.

The test launches were carried out from the launch pad at Palmachim Air Base, but the system was not fully deployed there. Several sources claimed that a launch pad for long-range anti-missiles was being equipped in Tal Shahar, but it was not possible to find it there.


Google Earth satellite image: alleged position of Arrow-3 launchers at Ein Shemer airbase

A launch site with two launchers located next to reinforced concrete shelters is located at Ein Shemer Air Base. It is possible that these are the towed Arrow-3 launchers.

Israel received its first two Patriot SAM batteries from the US Army at the start of the 1991 war. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Israel Defense Forces Air Force had eight PAC-2/GEM batteries with AN/MPQ-53 multi-function phased array radars, AN/MSQ-104 fire control posts, M901 launchers with four SAMs each, MIM-104D surface-to-air missiles, AN/MSQ-26 power supplies, communications equipment, electronic and visual camouflage, and auxiliary equipment.


The MIM-104D SAM weighs about 900 kg and has radio command guidance with sighting via its own receiver. The missile is 5,3 m long, 400 mm in diameter, and has a wingspan of 863 mm. The maximum flight speed of the SAM is 1190 m/s. Range is over 100 km. Ceiling is over 30 km.


This modification was mainly focused on combating aerodynamic targets and has limited anti-missile capabilities. Subsequently, with technical support from Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, the Israelis upgraded the existing Patriots to the PAC-2/GEM+ level, and this variant with expanded anti-missile capabilities was named Yahalom (Diamond) in Israel.

In 2024, it was announced that all Israeli Patriots were to be decommissioned, and relatively recently, information appeared in the media about the transfer of "obsolete" systems to Ukraine. However, there is a possibility that this is not entirely true and was part of a disinformation campaign designed to hide preparations for a strike on Iran.

In 2006, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems was awarded a contract to develop a surface-to-air missile system designed to intercept enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, drones and operational-tactical missiles.

The system, known as Kela David, was developed jointly with the American corporation Raytheon and entered service in 2017 at the Hatzor air base in the central part of the country. There are currently two batteries deployed at this location.

The interception is carried out using a highly maneuverable two-stage Stunner anti-missile with a combined multi-channel guidance system, including a combination of radio command, active radar and infrared guidance.


The missile is 4,6 m long and can reach speeds of up to 2500 m/s. It does not carry a warhead, striking the target with a kinetic strike. The system has an effective range of up to 250 km, a ceiling of up to 30 km, and is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a firing range of up to 300 km. The battery includes: a multifunctional IAI Elta EL/M-2084 MMR radar with AFAR, a command post, and 12-container vertical launch launchers mounted on semi-trailers.


The Kela David system, like the Patriot SAM, is capable of combating both aerodynamic and ballistic targets and is universal. It is considered an intermediate link between the long-range anti-missile SAM Arrow-2/3 and the Iron Dome close-in defense system.

The most widespread and frequently used system in the past is the Iron Dome, designed to protect against missiles and artillery shells with a range of up to 70 km, as well as to destroy aerodynamic targets such as cruise missiles and aircraft flying at an altitude of up to 10 km. The minimum range is 4,5 km. Now the firing range has been increased to 120 km. It is stated that one battery can cover an area of ​​up to 150 km². The developers of the system are Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries.


Launch of the Iron Dome interceptor missile

The interception is carried out by the Tamir anti-missile with an active radar guidance system. The launch weight is 90 kg, the diameter is 160 mm, the length is 3 m. The speed is about 750 m/s. The target is destroyed by detonating a fragmentation warhead. Raytheon Corporation is involved in the production of parts for Tamir interceptors.

Typically, an Iron Dome battery consists of 3-4 launchers (20 missiles per launcher). Target detection is performed by the EL/M-2084 multi-purpose radar from ELTA Systems.


Iron Dome Radar

The battery command post was developed by mPrest Systems. Launcher control, radar data acquisition and data exchange with other systems are carried out via high-frequency wireless channels. The reaction time from target detection to interceptor missile launch is less than 1 s. The operating algorithm provides that the target is intercepted at the highest point of the trajectory. This is done to minimize damage in the event that an enemy unguided missile or artillery The projectile will be loaded with a chemical warfare agent.

The deployment of the Iron Dome began in southern Israel in the first half of 2011. In 2012, the system's effectiveness was approximately 70%. The cost of one anti-missile was estimated at $30.


As of August 2014, Israel had nine operational Iron Dome batteries. During the 50 days of the conflict, the Palestinians fired 4594 rockets and mortars. Iron Dome batteries intercepted 735 targets that they deemed dangerous based on trajectory data, with an interception success rate of approximately 90%. Only 70 Qassams fired from Gaza into Israel were not intercepted. One civilian was killed and three others and nine soldiers were wounded by mortars, but they were not in areas protected by Iron Dome. The IDF has ordered 15 Iron Dome batteries, but it is unknown how many are currently deployed.

Until a certain point, the IDF leadership considered the main threats to be Palestinian Qassams made from water pipes and Iranian ballistic missiles. However, due to the mass production of kamikaze drones in Iran, more attention has been paid to anti-aircraft missile systems capable of combating aircraft operating at low altitudes.

It is known that the Barak MX SAM was used against Iranian UAVs. This complex is a variant of the Barak-8 SAM, which was designed by Israel Aerospace Industries based on the ship-based Barak-1, commissioned by India.


The Barak MX land-based SAM battery consists of a combat control center, a multifunctional illumination and guidance radar, supported by other radars, three launchers with eight vertical launch missiles, transport and loading vehicles, a mobile diesel power plant, and a communications vehicle.

The solid-fuel two-stage SAM with an active radar homing head weighs 275 kg and is 4,5 m long. The warhead weighs 60 kg. The range of destruction of aerodynamic targets reaches 90 km. Ballistic missiles can be intercepted in a zone of 20 km.


After launch, the missile is placed on an interception trajectory and receives illumination from the ELM-2248 guidance radar. When approaching the target to the distance of the active seeker activation, the second engine is started. The in-flight guidance equipment provides information transmission to the missile and can retarget it after launch, which increases the flexibility of use and reduces the consumption of SAMs.

About 20 years ago, the Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems developed the SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) mobile anti-aircraft missile system, designed to intercept air targets at short and medium ranges, suitable for use in military and object air defense.

Initially, the Israeli military was not interested in this system, and it was supplied only for export. However, export success, based on good service and operational characteristics, and a favorable cost-effectiveness ratio, as well as the increased threat from Iranian drones, forced the IDF command to reconsider its opinion regarding the SPYDER air defense system.

In 2024, the IDF accepted a number of Spiders into service and put them on combat duty. Details are not provided, but according to unconfirmed reports, we are talking about two batteries integrated into the air defense/missile defense system.

Apparently, the Israeli army purchased a modification in which all components of the system are placed on a common wheeled base, including transport and launch containers and a radar. When searching for targets, the anti-aircraft battery relies on the EL/M-2084 radar.


Two types of SAMs are used to destroy air targets. At a distance of up to 20 km, an air-to-air missile with an IR homing head Python-5 is used, adapted for launch from a ground installation. It has a launch weight of 105 kg, a length of 3,1 m and is equipped with a warhead weighing 11 kg. The Derby missile with active radar guidance is capable of destroying targets at a distance of up to 50 km. It is more than 3,6 m long and weighs 118 kg. It was reported that the Derby can attack both aerodynamic and ballistic targets.

Israeli laser air and missile defense systems


The high cost of the Iron Dome interceptor missiles has forced the search for low-cost alternatives. In August 2020, the Light Blade laser system was tested on the border with the Gaza Strip, primarily designed to destroy helium balloons under which the Arabs hung incendiary devices.


In addition to balls, this combat laser could combat light drones at a distance of up to 2 km. It is reported that the complex shot down almost 100% of balls and quadcopters that flew into the kill zone, but its effectiveness was greatly limited by its short range.


In addition, the Light Blade system, due to its low energy potential, could not shoot down unguided rockets and mortar mines.

More powerful laser weapons is the Iron Beam system, which Israeli sources claim has a range of up to 10 km. However, it is worth understanding that the effectiveness of a combat laser is highly dependent on weather conditions, atmospheric conditions, and the type of target. An unofficial expert analysis published in 2020 states that Iron Beam can destroy homemade Palestinian rockets from a distance of 7 km, provided that two high-energy 100 kW fiber optic lasers are simultaneously applied to the target.

The Iron Beam concept as part of a multi-layered air and missile defense system was announced at the Singapore Air Show in 2014. It was developed by Rafael in cooperation with Lockheed Martin. From the outset, the system was envisioned as mobile. Iron Beam consists of a radar station that detects targets and accurately determines coordinates, a control unit, and two laser installations that operate synchronously.


In April 2022, the Israeli Defense Ministry and Rafael announced that in a series of experiments, the system successfully shot down drones, rockets and mortar bombs at the U.S. White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

In late 2023, it was revealed that the Iron Beam system had been deployed on the border with the Gaza Strip. The first combat use occurred in October 2024. By January 2025, the combat lasers had intercepted more than 40 drones launched by Hezbollah. Based on the results of the trial operation, a decision was made to create a more powerful installation, designated Iron Beam-M.

Analysis of the combat effectiveness of the Israeli air and missile defense system


After the end of the acute phase of the armed confrontation between Israel and Iran, it can be stated that more than 1000 launched Iranian kamikaze drones and cruise missiles did not fulfill their purpose and were mostly shot down outside Israeli territory. The main role in repelling the attacks of UAVs and cruise missiles was played by interceptor fighters, combat helicopters and Jordanian air defense systems. There is no information yet on how the new Israeli medium- and short-range air defense systems, as well as combat lasers, performed in this conflict.

One way or another, the slow Iranian Shaheds, flying to the target of attack for more than 8 hours, turned out to be easy prey for a modern multi-level air defense system, and one drone crash was recorded on Israeli territory.

In many ways, the task of countering Iranian ballistics was made easier by the fact that the launch areas were constantly monitored by American and Israeli reconnaissance satellites. Considering that the flight duration of a ballistic missile launched from Iranian territory at Israel is 12-15 minutes, the Israeli missile defense system, based on over-the-horizon radar stations, had sufficient time to prepare to repel the attack.

The greatest threat to Israeli civilian and military targets was posed by Iranian ballistic missiles. According to American estimates, by the beginning of the conflict Iran had more than 3000 ballistic missiles of various classes on solid and liquid fuel and approximately 300 launchers. A significant portion of Iranian missiles have an archaic design, based on a North Korean copy of the Soviet R-17, created in the 1960s. In particular, such a missile is the Shahab-3, capable of carrying a cluster warhead containing several hundred fragmentation submunitions. Further developments of the liquid missiles of the Shahab family were the larger medium-range ballistic missiles Ghadr, as well as Emad with a launch range of 1800 km and Khorramshahr-1 with a launch range of over 2000 km. The two-stage liquid Safir and Simorgh are capable of hitting targets at a range of 2200-4000 km. In addition to the liquid-propellant rocket engines, the Islamic Republic of Iran developed and mass-produced the solid-propellant Sejjil MRBM with a range of up to 2000 km. There is information that China supplied the solid rocket fuel components.


According to information published in Iranian media, missiles built after 2006, thanks to the use of a new control system, managed to achieve a CEP of 50-100 meters. Whether this is true is unknown, but most Western experts agree that the actual deviation from the aiming point can be 10 times greater. Which, in general, is confirmed by the results of using Iranian ballistics.

Detailed statistics on Iranian missile strikes vary from source to source. However, based on the available information, it can be said that before the exchange of strikes ceased, Iran was able to launch more than 3 ballistic missiles at Israel during Operation True Promise 500. Yemen's Houthis also joined the missile attacks.


In the first three days of the conflict, Iran launched an average of over 120 missiles per day. However, starting in the evening of June 16, the number of launches dropped to 3-5 per day. A number of Russian media outlets explained this by the fact that the surviving Iranian military-political leadership had decided to wage a "war of attrition" and was saving missiles. In reality, the decrease in the number of attacks was primarily due to the disorganization of the IRI armed forces, the destruction of missile arsenals, and the Israeli air force's total hunt for launchers. Subsequently, there were surges in the number of missile launches, but despite the extremely belligerent Iranian rhetoric, no more than 25 units were launched in one salvo, which indicates a decrease in Iran's strike potential.

Thirty-three Iranian missiles struck populated areas of Israel, killing 33 people and injuring 28. The wounded included people who suffered “emotional shock” and injuries while evacuating to shelters.

A number of publications covering the 12-day long-distance Israeli-Iranian war talk about the ineffectiveness of the Israeli Iron Dome, which is, at the very least, strange. Even non-specialists know that the Iron Dome system is primarily designed to intercept short-range unguided rockets and artillery shells, but not to counter medium-range ballistic missiles. However, launches of Iron Dome interceptors also took place. First of all, this was done to crush large fragments of already intercepted missiles in order to reduce the damage from their fall.


The main burden of combating Iranian ballistics fell on the Arrow 2, Arrow 3 and Kela David systems. It is possible that the MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2/GEM+ and Barak MX SAMs were also involved.

Overall, it can be stated that Israel's missile defense system demonstrated good efficiency, neutralizing at least 85% of Iranian ballistics. Considering that in the first days Iran tried to oversaturate Israel's missile defense system, this is a very good indicator. It is also noteworthy that Israel had been carefully preparing for an armed confrontation with Iran for a long time. Knowing the approximate number of Iranian IRBMs, the IDF had a sufficient number of detection systems, anti-missiles, and firing batteries at its disposal.
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  1. -5
    2 July 2025 04: 20
    With the advent of UAVs, the balance of attack and defense has shifted. If we take the general fundamental layout, then it turns out that an air defense missile is more expensive than a drone and the probability of hitting an airborne target is lower than the probability of hitting a stationary object with a drone. Therefore, the side that has found the opportunity to produce a large number of cheap drones will have an advantage despite any quality of air defense: shooting down drones with missiles is both expensive and can be overloaded with larger numbers of drones. Anti-aircraft artillery systems usually do not have sufficient range to effectively control all the necessary airspace, lasers and other things are still in the development stage and also do not differ in effective range. So it is necessary to produce a lot of fairly effective, but inexpensive drones.
    1. +3
      2 July 2025 17: 10
      In Israel, Apaches shot down drones.
      1. -1
        2 July 2025 17: 54
        The fact that UAVs shot down helicopters and planes is very bad for the Jews. Because there are many "shaheds" and they are relatively cheap. And the cost of air-to-air missiles + the cost of one hour of aircraft flight + the cost and time of subsequent maintenance and repairs of the aircraft - says that the Jews asked for peace at the right time. In 3-4 weeks there would be no one and nothing to shoot down Iranian UAVs with.
        And in general, what kind of analysis of the effectiveness of Jewish air defense/missile defense can we talk about if the results of Iranian ballistic missile strikes are unknown. All we know is what got into the lenses of cameras and smartphones. When the damage inflicted on Jewish military facilities is known, then we can talk about effectiveness.
  2. +7
    2 July 2025 04: 47
    It is worth remembering that American destroyers with their SM3 and THAAD also worked on ballistics, and also fired several hundred missiles.
    Well, they already wrote about situational awareness, but they didn't add that it was supplemented by American radars. Without the help of the Americans, the result would have been different.
    1. +2
      2 July 2025 05: 56
      Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
      American destroyers with their SM3 and THAAD also worked on ballistics

      This was due to the fact that after repelling the first attack, Israeli air defense units needed to redeploy to reserve positions and replenish their ammunition. Otherwise, they could be destroyed in the second attack. At this time, the American destroyers took on the burden of repelling the attacks. The Americans could only work together to ensure their own survivability.
      1. +1
        2 July 2025 11: 38
        no matter, if they hadn't covered up the mattresses and the missile defense system hadn't even been destroyed but had simply been thinned out, then the result, as I already wrote, would have been different
    2. +3
      2 July 2025 18: 00
      4 "Bjerka" near Haifa generally worked in "non-stop" mode. After firing, they ran to Suda, loaded the SAMs and back. If it weren't for them, Haifa would have been "horns and legs". And yes, in the US they have already started thinking that the SAMs are being used up very quickly. In addition to the US, intelligence from the entire West worked for the Jews. And tanker and transport aircraft. I wonder if the mattress makers understand that such intensive work of the military transport aviation, at some bad moment, can leave them "naked"? At the beginning of the Central Military District, transport aircraft flew to Rzeszow 5-7 times a day, now to Israel - up to 10 times a day. The mattress makers understand that the resource of engines and airframes is by no means infinite and the moment will come, with such operation, when all this will be abandoned.
  3. -2
    2 July 2025 06: 08
    Iran managed to launch more than 3 ballistic missiles at Israel during Operation True Promise 500

    I still don't understand the choice of targets for Iranian missiles. Why didn't they hit air bases? After all, they could have tried to damage runways, fuel stations, and aircraft weapons depots.
    1. +6
      2 July 2025 10: 02
      Quote: severok1979
      I still don't understand the choice of targets for Iranian missiles. Why didn't they hit air bases? After all, they could have tried to damage runways, fuel stations, and aircraft weapons depots.

      Theoretically, Iranian ballistic missiles could hit Israeli air bases, even though their accuracy leaves much to be desired. But the results of such strikes would be questionable. All major Israeli air bases have several runways, and damage to one runway is of little significance. In addition, airfield services have become adept at quickly repairing local damage to runways. All Israeli combat aircraft, with the exception of military transport Hercules and KC-707 tankers, were constantly in well-protected concrete shelters or underground. The same applies to warehouses and fuel. In this regard, missile strikes were mainly carried out on residential areas and were of little military use. However, this does not prevent Iran from loudly celebrating its victory over the Zionist entity.
      1. -4
        2 July 2025 11: 40
        Iran did not strike at urban areas, it struck at military targets, but due to low accuracy, the strikes were anywhere but at military targets.
        On the video it was seen many times that they flew into the area from where the rockets were launched, but they deviated by a hundred or two meters.
        1. +2
          2 July 2025 11: 51
          Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
          Iran did not strike urban areas, it struck military targets

          If you want to believe it, no one can stop you. However, it does not fit with the facts.
          1. -4
            2 July 2025 11: 55
            and what are your facts? that it hit civilian targets?
            so watch the video of the landings, there are many videos of air defense from urban areas shooting at ballistic missiles and seconds later landing in that area. specifically in the area from where the anti-missiles were fired. that is, they were specifically targeting the missile defense, but because of the CEP, the landings were close by, not exactly on target.
            1. 0
              2 July 2025 13: 20
              Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
              and what are your facts? that it hit civilian targets?

              Do I understand correctly that the Israeli missile defense batteries were located in the middle of residential areas? wassat It seems that you are commenting on a publication that you not only failed to read, but didn’t even look at the photos.
              1. 0
                2 July 2025 13: 45
                and I see you haven't even managed to watch many videos on Telegram?
                1. -2
                  2 July 2025 13: 54
                  Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
                  I see you haven't even managed to watch many videos on Telegram?

                  On the merits of the question, is there anything to say?
                  1. +1
                    2 July 2025 13: 57
                    here is the first video of arrivals in Israel
                    https://t.me/dva_majors/73337
                    there are others, just look at the military correspondents' TG channels for those dates, after that decide for yourself what is essential, your photographs where the destruction of civilian objects around the missile defense system and buildings of military ministries is shown in close-up, or the video where it is clear that the missile defense system is arriving in the area from which the missile defense system was firing.
                    1. +1
                      2 July 2025 14: 06
                      Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
                      here is the first video of arrivals in Israel

                      This is ridiculous! How did you come to the conclusion that the anti-missile launches from the city limits? What is the distance from the launch point and the fall of the BR?
                      The fact that in the shooting angle two points are on the same plane does not indicate anything.
                      Do you even understand what a long-range anti-aircraft missile division is and what requirements are imposed on its deployment? Apparently, no. In any case, Iranian ballistic missiles are not suitable for destroying point targets, and such a task was not set.
                      1. -4
                        2 July 2025 14: 17
                        It's clear that tests are not tests, videos are not videos.
                        if anything, Quo is a circular VO. and not vertically or horizontally. and besides this video, you still couldn't scroll to the next videos? there should have been a deviation along the cross there too?
                        By the way, what photos led you to the conclusion that if there are no military objects in the photo, then there are definitely none nearby, out of frame? I remember a video from an Israeli TV channel about a ballistic missile attack on a building and blah blah blah, and then footage from a phone where you can see that there was an Israeli Defense Ministry building nearby and they were hitting it.
                2. +2
                  2 July 2025 17: 14
                  I had an arrival in km. The nearest base is 4 km away. But even though it is a military base, there is no heavy weapons there. They deal with personnel issues, conscription, etc. The nearest tasty target is 10 km away.
              2. +5
                2 July 2025 15: 57
                Iran fired at both military targets and infrastructure, but not at missile defense positions.
                Due to the low accuracy of the ballistic missiles, there were no hits on the military, but there were hits on infrastructure (oil refinery, where three people died, Weizmann Research Institute, Soroka hospital).
                Destruction and casualties occurred in residential areas.
                1. +4
                  2 July 2025 16: 22
                  Quote: voyaka uh
                  Iran fired at both military targets and infrastructure, but not at missile defense positions.

                  For those who believe that Israel suffered a crushing defeat, you will not prove anything. No.
                2. 0
                  2 July 2025 20: 38
                  yes, they shot at infrastructure. no, they shot at residential areas. They were hit there because of the low accuracy of the missiles. but there is a missile defense system within the city limits, which was visible in many videos.
      2. -4
        2 July 2025 13: 31
        However, Iran destroyed many planes and helicopters at airfields.
        1. +2
          2 July 2025 13: 38
          Quote: Nastia Makarova
          However, Iran destroyed many planes and helicopters at airfields.

          Nastya, are you delirious?
          1. -4
            2 July 2025 13: 42
            When the photos are declassified, then we will know the truth.
            1. 0
              2 July 2025 13: 43
              Quote: Nastia Makarova
              When the photos are declassified, then we will know the truth.

              It is impossible to declassify something that does not exist.
              1. -3
                2 July 2025 13: 43
                It's your right to believe it or not.
                1. +1
                  2 July 2025 13: 46
                  it's true, you believe in your fantasies, and no one has the right to forbid you from doing so
                  1. 0
                    2 July 2025 13: 52
                    Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
                    it's true

                    Well, of course, and you are certainly able to confirm this with geolocated photographs? wink I look forward to! lol
                    1. -1
                      2 July 2025 13: 54
                      Sorry, I forgot to add the "Sarcasm" sign. Without it, for some people the text becomes completely different in meaning.
                2. 0
                  2 July 2025 13: 47
                  Quote: Nastia Makarova
                  It's your right to believe it or not.

                  People who are prone to blind faith unsupported by facts are usually far from the realities of life. And you have no facts, only faith. As they say - blessed is he who believes.
        2. +6
          2 July 2025 15: 49
          Iran's aviation was completely destroyed, as was its air defense, and Israeli aircraft flew as if they were at home and destroyed, among other things, BP launchers, BP production plants, warehouses, etc. During the military operations, not a SINGLE Israeli aircraft was destroyed.
  4. +3
    2 July 2025 07: 39
    According to Israeli data, the Iranians launched about 600 missiles (I recall the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies wrote about 591 missiles), of which about 200 were launched in the first 20 hours, in the following days the number of launches dropped to about 40-XNUMX missiles per day and remained at this level until the ceasefire. There was only one day before and during the American attack, when Iran did not launch any missiles at all, clearly expecting American strikes.
  5. +3
    2 July 2025 09: 27
    Will there be a detailed article on Israeli aviation weapons systems used in the war? Only without assumptions, with a clear yes - they were used... and where what kind of BP was used, what kind of carrier... on what object and with what effectiveness. I am especially interested in BP for UAVs and aviation missiles. Everything would be good with good photos, like for advertising brochures at air shows.
    1. +3
      2 July 2025 10: 22
      Quote: rosomaha
      Will there be a detailed article on Israeli aviation weapons systems used in the war? Only without assumptions, with a clear yes - they were used... and where what kind of BP was used, what kind of carrier... on what object and with what effectiveness. I am especially interested in BP for UAVs and aviation missiles. Everything would be good with good photos, like for advertising brochures at air shows.

      The review of Israeli combat aviation and ASP was a few days ago. But regarding what you are asking, I can't help you here. This information is mostly classified and I don't have access to it. request
      1. +1
        2 July 2025 10: 47
        yes, I saw... the Israeli military-industrial complex is very closed in terms of even general information. But there are exhibitions... there are deliveries of some samples abroad... here it would be good to start a correspondence with a big fan of aviation weapons from abroad or countries where the supplies go... so that the guy would take good photos of the samples at exhibitions and parades (if possible)... or on specialized forums of those countries.. or related topics (aircraft modeling, computer games). For example, the Rampage missile is delivered to India, and they like to show off at parades.. maybe they can find fans who have good access to the shows
        1. +1
          2 July 2025 10: 57
          Quote: rosomaha
          yes, I saw... the Israeli military-industrial complex is very closed in terms of even general information. But there are exhibitions... there are deliveries of some samples abroad... here it would be good to start a correspondence with a big fan of aviation weapons from abroad or countries where the supplies go... so that the guy would take good photos of the samples at exhibitions and parades (if possible)... or on specialized forums of those countries.. or related topics (aircraft modeling, computer games). For example, the Rampage missile is delivered to India, and they like to show off at parades.. maybe they can find fans who have good access to the shows

          This requires a qualified specialist with recruitment skills. I have other talents and no access to foreign citizens with such information, nor free time.
          1. 0
            2 July 2025 11: 06
            what kind of recruitment...these are just conversations on topics that interest both of us...only very thoroughly interesting ones
            1. +2
              2 July 2025 11: 08
              Quote: rosomaha
              what kind of recruitment...these are just conversations on topics that interest both of us...only very thoroughly interesting ones

              This is how recruitment often happens...
              1. +1
                2 July 2025 22: 38
                Hmm... Where did you get such knowledge, did you have experience? laughing
                1. +2
                  3 July 2025 00: 13
                  Quote: Oleg Zorin
                  Hmm... Where did you get such knowledge, did you have experience? laughing

                  Some people on the site know about the author's work history, but you don't need that.
                  1. 0
                    3 July 2025 00: 14
                    You are right, I really don't need it.
                    1. 0
                      3 July 2025 00: 17
                      Quote: Oleg Zorin
                      You are right, I really don't need it.

                      Thank you! I disabled T-2 on my phone. Now typos are creeping in.
                      1. 0
                        3 July 2025 00: 17
                        No need to thank me, always feel free to contact me
                      2. -1
                        3 July 2025 00: 18
                        Quote: Oleg Zorin
                        No need to thank me, always feel free to contact me

                        Very grateful!
                      3. +1
                        3 July 2025 00: 21
                        Come on. I don't have to know the details of all the authors' biographies. And the article is really good. The only downside is that the efforts of the US, Jordan, etc. to intercept Iranian UAVs and missiles are not mentioned.
          2. 0
            2 July 2025 11: 21
            This requires a qualified specialist with recruitment skills. I have other talents and no access to foreign citizens with such information, nor free time.
            Somewhere far, far away, a monitor breathed a sigh of relief - "he has no free time" - and the Shabak employee went to eat some fresh matzah... lol

            P.S. Several "spies for Iran" closer to the 12-day war in Israel were caught, mainly, IMHO, by recent repatriates who did not need very much money... request
            1. +2
              2 July 2025 11: 25
              Quote: Wildcat
              Several "spies for Iran" closer to the 12-day war in Israel were caught, mainly, IMHO, recent repatriates who do not need very much money... request

              Yes, I know. There are idiots everywhere. wassat
              1. +3
                2 July 2025 11: 57
                Quote: Bongo
                Quote: Wildcat
                Several "spies for Iran" closer to the 12-day war in Israel were caught, mainly, IMHO, recent repatriates who do not need very much money... request

                Yes, I know. There are idiots everywhere. wassat

                Apparently the person who gave you a minus thinks it's normal to work for a hostile state? The competent authorities should take an interest in this potential traitor. lol
                1. +3
                  2 July 2025 14: 06
                  Quote: zyablik.olga
                  Apparently the person who gave you a minus considers it normal to work for a hostile state?

                  It's not that simple, there are many anti-Zionists among Jews, I thought you were aware of the situation:
                  "Three Oaths" from the Talmud.
                  God made three oaths with people:
                  1. The Jews vowed not to “rise up as a wall,” that is, not to return the Land of Israel by force.
                  2. The Jews swore not to rebel against the nations of the world.
                  3. The nations of the world swore not to enslave the Jews excessively.
                  - The ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) view it as legally binding and object to the creation of a Jewish state.
                  - Zionists do not reject the Three Oaths, but they believe that Jews were freed from the need to observe them after other nations broke their oath and continued to oppress Jews.

                  P.S. Many thanks to Sergey for the interesting material on a relevant topic. hi
  6. +2
    2 July 2025 09: 34
    -The main role in repelling the UAV and cruise missile attacks was played by interceptor fighters, combat helicopters and Jordanian air defense systems.
    Plus air defense of American ships in the Persian Gulf, Red and Mediterranean Seas. And also air defense systems of military bases in Iraq and the Emirates.
    Sergey, thanks for the review.
    1. +2
      2 July 2025 10: 20
      Quote: knn54
      Sergey, thanks for the review.

      drinks
  7. +2
    2 July 2025 10: 43
    hi
    As always, great article!
    And the photographs are selected perfectly!
    ...a launch pad for long-range anti-missiles was being set up in Tal Shahar, but it was not possible to find it in that location.
    ...well, at least the Israelis hid something from Bongo's watchful eye! wink

    It seems that the Israeli Navy also fired, but it was the same "navalized" Barak/Iron Dome, IMHO.
    1. +3
      2 July 2025 11: 03
      Andrey, welcome!
      Quote: Wildcat
      As always, great article!
      And the photographs are selected perfectly!

      drinks
      Quote: Wildcat
      ...well, at least the Israelis hid something from Bongo's watchful eye!

      Actually, I've wanted to write an article about Israel's air defense/missile defense for a long time, but somehow it never worked out. In this case, the trigger for me was that I was once again tired of reading the outright nonsense of "patriotically" minded characters.
      But as far as satellite images of Israeli sites go, it's a stroke of luck that anything was found at all. A significant portion of the "interesting places" are clouded or in extremely low resolution.
  8. +2
    2 July 2025 10: 46
    However, launches of Iron Dome interceptors also took place. First of all, this was done to break up large fragments of already intercepted missiles in order to reduce the damage from their fall.
    Don't underestimate even spent rocket stages - the only person killed by an Iranian strike last time (an Arab who was outside with a bag of his own food during the air raid) was killed by a rocket part falling right on him... there is a video from a street camera online.
  9. +4
    2 July 2025 14: 36
    Unfortunately, the article is biased, as it does not reflect at all that at least one more THAAD battery and some of the five American destroyers with SM-3 missiles were involved in the interception of the Iranian ballistic missiles, which were in the region. Obviously, they made a very significant contribution.
    https://news.usni.org/2025/06/20/5-u-s-ballistic-missile-defense-destroyers-now-in-the-mediterranean-sea
    As a result, it is impossible to talk about any percentage of the effectiveness of Israeli missile defense systems, since it is impossible to single them out from the overall performance of US and Israeli missile defense systems based on currently available information.
    1. 0
      2 July 2025 16: 04
      Quote: Kosh
      Unfortunately, the article turned out to be biased,

      You can simply say that it is pro-Israeli. The issue of combating Iranian hypersonics, the effectiveness of which we have all seen with our own eyes, is not reflected.
      1. +1
        2 July 2025 17: 07
        Quote: Silhouette
        You can simply say that it is pro-Israeli.

        Please quote where in the article the article is "pro-Israeli"?
        Quote: Silhouette
        The issue of combating Iranian hypersonic weapons, the effectiveness of which we have all witnessed with our own eyes, is not reflected.

        Your eyesight is failing you, or perhaps you have an overly rich imagination or insufficient knowledge of the "material part". All IRBMs without exception are "hypersonic".
    2. +1
      2 July 2025 17: 10
      Quote: Kosh
      Unfortunately, the article turned out to be biased, since it completely fails to reflect the fact that at least one more THAAD battery and some of the five American destroyers with SM-3 missiles that were in the region participated in the interception of Iranian ballistic missiles.

      I do not operate on unconfirmed information and I do not advise others to do so. No.
      1. +3
        2 July 2025 17: 21
        For some reason you seem to ignore confirmed information that American missile defense systems were involved in intercepting missiles.
        Moreover, judging by the work of American researchers on the known videos, the number of identifiable THAAD launches was almost equal to the Arrow-2/3 launches.
        https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1220527/exhaustion-and-inflection-estimating-interceptor-expenditures-in-the-israel-iran-conflict/
  10. -1
    2 July 2025 18: 55
    Excellent objective and informative article! Had to read it twice.
    The feeling from the June war is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, Israel was able to create a multi-level air defense/missile defense system, organize a "forefield," and attract allies. On the other hand, even so, 15% of the missiles were missed. It seems like a little, but it turns out that out of 600 missiles, 90 got through. In a year, we'll see the second take (and there will definitely be one). Iran has gotten rid of the "junk" and will work on promising missiles, Israel will build on and optimize its system. In general, it will be interesting.
    1. -3
      2 July 2025 21: 50
      Quote: dzvero
      Excellent objective and informative article! Had to read it twice.
      The feeling from the June war is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, Israel was able to create a multi-level air defense/missile defense system, organize a "forefield," and attract allies. On the other hand, even so, 15% of the missiles were missed. It seems like a little, but it turns out that out of 600 missiles, 90 got through. In a year, we'll see the second take (and there will definitely be one). Iran has gotten rid of the "junk" and will work on promising missiles, Israel will build on and optimize its system. In general, it will be interesting.

      Interesting - yes. Informative - yes. Objective? Not even once. Nothing is written about the work of the allies.
      1. +2
        2 July 2025 23: 07
        The article is supposedly about the Israeli air defense/missile defense system. Analysis of the allies' actions on land and at sea will require at least another article. I doubt that anyone will be brave enough to write such material in the near future.
  11. -2
    2 July 2025 19: 30
    Often, based on videos recording the moments of individual Iranian ballistic missiles hitting Israeli cities, conclusions are drawn about the ineffectiveness or even complete incapacity of the missile defense system as a whole.
    Yes, yes, yes... If the "Iron Dome" had not been the "Leaky Dome", then there would have been no peace in 12 days.
  12. -2
    2 July 2025 21: 49
    Quote: Pavel Kislyakov
    It is worth remembering that American destroyers with their SM3 and THAAD also worked on ballistics, and also fired several hundred missiles.
    Well, they already wrote about situational awareness, but they didn't add that it was supplemented by American radars. Without the help of the Americans, the result would have been different.

    To be honest, the fact that the author did not write about the help of the USA and individual Arab states is at least strange. As if super specialists from Israel decided everything.
    Yes, and has Israel shot down at least one hypersonic missile? Iran has them, that's a fact.
  13. -4
    2 July 2025 22: 04
    All this is crushed at once by a massive attack of drones!
  14. -1
    2 July 2025 22: 19
    All this is nonsense. Israel without American military aid will at most hold out for a week of intensive air strikes from the enemy on critical infrastructure facilities of the Jews. And then there will be a collapse of the entire state of Israel. The trouble with Israel's opponents is that they do not have such a missile base against the Jews. Look how afraid they are that someone will get nuclear weapons. We need to help Middle Eastern states create or sell missile weapons of different ranges. And then they will succeed.
  15. +1
    2 July 2025 22: 28
    A sensible article. It is true that 14% of the launched missiles and 10% of the UAVs reached Israel. Yes, of course, well-wishers from the US-Jordan-SA-UAE helped. At least the video of debris falling on Jordan confirms this. It is also true that of those that reached, literally 2-3 hit more or less significant objects. Not a single critically important one was hit. The hits on residential areas and civilian infrastructure are tragic, but they did not affect the military actions in any way.
  16. +4
    2 July 2025 23: 46
    Some statistics "from the other side": "In the case of Iranian ballistic missiles, only the Hetz-3 and Hetz-2, with the Hetz-3 clearly preferable. In addition, the American THAAD and ABMD (the Aegis ballistic missile defense system with RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 missiles). However, the latter is an additional level of missile defense, and a parallel one, i.e., during the reflection of missile salvos, some ballistic missiles are intercepted by the Hetz-3, others by THAAD, ABMD and the Hetz-2.
    On one of the days of the operation, the IDF reported that it had managed to shoot down something with the help of the Kela David. However, this was apparently a rare stroke of luck, as the Kela David was not designed for such purposes. There were also cases of the Kela David and Kipat Barzel firing at large debris if it was heading towards urban areas.
    Iran launched slightly more than 550 missiles in 42 salvos at Israel. About 20 missiles did not reach Israel due to malfunctions, 533 did. 63 missiles (11.8% of 533) penetrated the missile defense system, i.e. the effectiveness of the latter is 88.2% (there is a higher figure - 56 penetrated the missile defense system, 10.5% of 533, respectively, the effectiveness of the missile defense system is 89.5%). However, this calculation is not correct, Israel deliberately did not intercept some ballistic missiles in order to save interceptors, since these ballistic missiles were heading for open terrain (i.e. unpopulated areas). So the real effectiveness of the missile defense system is between 80 and 88%. Against heavy ballistics - not bad at all.
    Of the 56-63 rockets that broke through, 33 caused real damage. The missiles killed 29 people (to be more precise, 28, and another woman died of a heart attack during the shelling), 1 were injured, including 3,238 seriously. The economic damage from the strikes is estimated at 23 billion shekels, the total cost of the war is 4.5 billion shekels (almost 22 billion dollars).
    UAVs – about 1,000 were launched, mostly Shahed-136. Only 1 caused damage – it hit an empty house in Beit Shean. More than 480 were shot down by Israel, using fighters, Apache attack helicopters, electronic warfare systems, Iron Dome and Barak MX air defense systems (the latter is not normally in service with the air defense system, apparently temporarily borrowed from an export batch; the first interception was on 19.06.25), as well as naval assets (intercepted about 30 UAVs) – the same Iron Dome (naval version – C-Dome) and Barak MX (Barak Adir, the first interception was on 16.06.25). The remaining 520+ UAVs either crashed en route due to technical reasons or were shot down by allies. Thus, Jordan claims to have intercepted 200 UAVs. France – about “up to 10” (using SAMs and Rafale fighters). The US shot down many, whether the UK participated – there is no data yet.
    CR - were practically not used. Only once Iran announced the launch of 1 salvos of 2 CR in each. If this is true - they were intercepted by the allies, Israel itself did not report any interceptions of CR.
    PS 28.06.25/39/60 it was published: American THAAD launched at least 80 missiles, and most likely more, 12-15. The cost of one such interceptor is estimated at $810-1,215 million, and the total cost of this operation is from $60 million to $80 billion. 15-20 missiles are XNUMX-XNUMX% of the entire THAAD arsenal in the United States.
    PS2. On 01.07.25 articles appeared (for example, on ynet and on walla), with reference to the results of the operation on behalf of the R&D system of the Ministry of Defense (MAFAT). They reported:
    550 BR, interception percentage – 86%"

    https://oleggranovsky.livejournal.com/1548653.html
  17. +1
    3 July 2025 09: 28
    Quote: dzvero
    The article is supposedly about the Israeli air defense/missile defense system. Analysis of the allies' actions on land and at sea will require at least another article. I doubt that anyone will be brave enough to write such material in the near future.

    I understand this perfectly well and ask a simple question: how is it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of Israeli air defense/missile defense during a retaliatory missile attack by Iran without taking into account the work of the allies, who were 100% involved in this work:
    1) monitored launches;
    2) processed the received data and transmitted it directly to Israel and its other allies, including the United States;
    3) participated directly, shooting down Iranian missiles, including those on boost trajectories.

    How can one more or less evaluate the effectiveness of Israel's work without taking this into account, as well as the actual destruction in Israel, which gives 15 years for disclosing this data?

    The answer is no way. Which is what I wrote in my previous post, emphasizing the merits of the article itself.
  18. +3
    3 July 2025 14: 31
    With all due respect for the detailed and large article (and it was really pleasant and interesting to read) - I see some bias of the deeply respected Author in favor of Israel. It is not worth so openly "writing" about Iranian missiles as such inaccurate rubbish. Iranian missiles managed to hit the apple of the "Massada" apartment, the NPC in Haifa, the nuclear center, and also American military bases (even though there was no one on them, but this is clearly somewhat more than the half-kilometer KVO hinted at by the Author), past these 85% of interceptions indicated by the Author.
    I believe that the IRGC really preferred to use up old missile stockpiles, mostly because they also probably understand the development of the Israeli missile defense system and that tomorrow these missiles will become even less useful. If we evaluate the "average temperature in the hospital" in this approach, then, of course, we will have a picture of the insane effectiveness of Israeli systems and a somewhat distorted picture of the accuracy of Iranian missiles. However, in my opinion, it is worth analyzing the conflict through the prism of "the adventures of Iranian missiles using the example of hitting specific targets." We take some important (probably) Israeli targets that it is quite logical to attack in the event of a war for Iran and see whether there was an attempt to hit them and whether they were ultimately hit.
    Only this, it seems to me, will give some idea of ​​the real capabilities of Iranian missiles to break into an apple and Israeli systems to somehow counteract this.

    In my opinion, they launched the KRs and "Shaheds" in vain, such a waste of flesh. These instruments, if they are good, then only if there are opportunities to massively and covertly place them in relative proximity to the enemy, minimizing the flight time and synchronizing the ballistic attack with a sudden mass UAV raid. By launching this from their territory, they simply leaked polymers, because the direction was known and the I-side had more than enough time to react. I do not think this is a smart move for the Iranians.
    Further, regarding the strategy of impact for missiles in principle - I also did not get the feeling that this was a reasonable strategy. The author indicated quite expensive stationary objects, the destruction of which would have caused much more significant damage to the defense than the destruction of empty but high-status buildings. Of course, "Masad" and other key structures were evacuated for the most part in advance, so that other than demonstrating capabilities, these strikes were almost notable for nothing useful.
    And vice versa - if the Iranians had taken out the large radar objects indicated by the author, there would definitely have been a bonus to further Iranian attacks.

    From this little sketch, even I, who was rooting for the IRI in this conflict, involuntarily get the feeling that the Iranian side was initially did not set the strategic goal of inflicting critical military damage on the enemy. This may seem paradoxical - but, apparently, both sides adhered to certain escalation boundaries in the conflict, apparently deliberately avoiding the targeted destruction of a number of infrastructure facilities.
    And specifically in this paradigm, Iran has also worked along the extended line of "demonstration of capabilities" rather than methodically weeding out important infrastructure elements.

    In view of this, the analysis of the capabilities of Iranian missiles will also be somewhat blurred - if consciously If the strategy of targeted and methodical removal of key military targets was avoided and the focus was on removing certain fetishes, then we will have a distorted picture of objective effectiveness.
  19. -2
    4 July 2025 00: 29
    There are more Zionists in the comments than in the State Duma.
  20. The comment was deleted.
  21. 0
    6 July 2025 18: 59
    What about the Iranian strikes before the 12-day war? The illumination was impressive then. By the way, the number of missiles launched was not large and some hit their targets. What about the Iranian hypersonic missiles?
    The lack of strikes on Israeli radar detection systems also raises questions, although logic suggests that they should have been destroyed first.
    The conclusion is this: in the first wave, you need to launch a lot of everything in order to overload the air defense and knock out the detection radars and launchers.
  22. +1
    8 July 2025 20: 01
    Excellent article, thank you very much. Everything is to the point, on the shelves and without unnecessary politics in technical analysis. drinks
    1. 0
      11 July 2025 09: 52
      Quote: pudelartemon
      Excellent article, thank you very much. Everything is to the point, on the shelves and without unnecessary politics in technical analysis.

      Thank you! drinks
      I try to write to the point and without bias.
      But alas, not everyone likes it:
      Quote: Kosh
      Unfortunately, the article turned out to be biased.

      Quote: Silhouette
      You can just say that it is pro-Israel
      request