Military Review

The famous "Three-inch"

14
The word "three-inch" we understand not only the gun arr. 1900 g. And arr. 1902, but the latter was in fact a deep modernization arr. 1900, and then, in turn, went through another upgrade and was named “76-mi gun mod. 1902 / 30. These three guns were in serial production for 36 years and were in service for about 50 years, made a worthy contribution to all the wars waged by Russia from 1900 to 1945.


Three-inch made a literal revolution and the Russian field artillery. With a greater or lesser degree of approximation, we can say that from Peter the Great to the present day, field artillery developed evolutionarily, that is, each new system had quite a few design elements from the previous ones and retained much of the tactical and technical data. Even the transition from smooth-bore to rifled guns was evolutionary in nature - the first rifled guns differed from the smooth-bore guns only in canal cutting and projectiles. Weight, caliber and appearance of the barrel remained unchanged. Wooden carriages also have not changed.

Three-inch was the only field system in which all elements differed sharply from old guns. This is a new caliber, a sharp increase in the initial velocity of the projectile, unitary loading instead of a cap, a carriage with recoil devices instead of a hard carriage, a new projectile, and even a new fuse.

Graduates of the commanding artillery courses of the Red Army near the "three-inch" arr, 1902 Moscow, middle of the 1920-s.


The birth of the "Three-inch"

No matter how strange it may seem, the device of a three-inch and even its projectile and detonator was definitely a big policy, or rather, the drama of the Russian army, which later led to the death of the empire.

During the reign of the Romanovs, and especially during the reign of Nicholas II, command, and most importantly, material supply (bread places), was left to the royal family - the grand dukes. So, at the beginning of the XX century. fleet General Admiral Aleksey Aleksandrovich (the son of Alexander II, who later received the “title” - the prince of Tsusimsky) was in charge. Cavalry - Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (grandson of Nicholas I), the engineering part - Grand Duke Peter Nikolaevich (grandson of Nicholas I), aviation - Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich (grandson of Nicholas I).

All of them were something like feudal princes. They were subordinated only to Nicholas II, and the relationship of the great princes with the military and maritime ministers (managing ministries) was not determined by law - and those and others were subject only to the emperor and were independent of each other.

Artillery in 1856 by 1909 The Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich was in charge. By the end of his life, he spent most of his time in France, and from 1903 he was “leading” artillery from Cannes, where he rested in Bose in 1909.

Light field gun arr. 1900 on position near Liaoyang. 1904



Since the last years of the XIX century, in fact, and since 1909, and officially as inspector-general, the Russian artillery was led by his son, Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich.

In 1890, young playboys Grand Dukes Sergei Mikhailovich and his colleagues in the regiment Vorontsov and Sheremetev organized a "potato club". In France, this sort of "potato" was called "strawberry". Soon the heir to the throne, the future emperor Nicholas II, enters the "potato club". In his diary, there are references to campaigns for "potatoes". Ballerina Malechka Kseshinskaya turned out to be a delicious potato, and the affair with Tsarevich Nicholas dragged on for several years.

However, having married Alice of Hesse in 1894, Nikolay breaks up with Kseshinskaya, but continues to give her protection. Ballerina goes to his friend in the "potato" club Sergey. During 4's year of living together with the heir to the throne, the well-being of Malechka almost did not change, but over the years of the affair with Sergey, the poor single mother becomes one of the richest women in Russia. Two-storey palace in Strelna, a huge palace in St. Petersburg on Kronverksky Avenue, a luxury villa on the Cote d'Azur, two cars, several horse-drawn carriages, jewels worth several million rubles, etc. And this is all with the annual salary of a ballet dancer 5 thousand rubles to 1903 g and 8 thousand - after.

General view of a light field gun arr. 1900 g from the instruction manual.


Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, Kseshinskaya, the leadership of the French-speaking company Schneider and the Russian-language government of the Putilov factory entered into a criminal conspiracy. Sergey and Malechka received rubles and francs, while Schneider and Co. received orders.

1865 to 1894 Russian artillery is focused on the German firm Krupp, and Russian guns shared the first place in the world with the German ones. The anecdotal situation turned out: Krupp's guns won the war with France in 1870, and Russia decided to abandon Krupp's guns in favor of the losing side.

But it's not so bad. The idea of ​​a single caliber and a single projectile and field artillery came from France. This idea fits well into the doctrine of a maneuverable short-term war. The ruling circles of France had a vital need for Russia to launch a massive offensive in the very first days of the war with Germany. It was assumed that the Russian and German armies would mutually bleed each other, and the winner, naturally, would be France. Unfortunately, our generals, not without pressure from above, of course, fell for the French trick. At the same time, three defeats of the Russian troops in 1877 near Plevna were completely forgotten, where the Russian field guns could not cope even with the fortifications of the Turks.

Frivolously adopting the French, the doctrine of a lightning war of maneuver and, as a result, its universal cannon and universal projectile, our generals took the choice of a specific cannon very seriously.

General view of a three-inch field gun arr. 1902, before the introduction of the shield.


In 1892-1894 In Russia, rapid-fire cartridge guns were tested: 61-mm and 75-mm Nordenfeld systems, 60-mm and 80-mm Gruzon and 73-mm Sep-Chamon. And the 75-mm gun of Nordenfeld and Saint-Chamond were tested in two versions: on foot and lightweight equestrian.

In September, the 1896 was tested by the 76-mm field cartridge cannon of the Alexander Plant with an eccentric bolt.

On the basis of preliminary tests of various ammunition cannons in December 1896 of GAU, tactical and technical requirements for a field-firing gun were developed:

Caliber, inch / mm ......................... 3 / 76,2
Vertical guidance angle, degrees .......- 5 °: + 17 °
Barrel weight, kg ....................... no more than 393
System weight:
in combat position, kg .............. no more than 983
in the stowed position, kg ........... no more than 1900
Projectile weight, kg ....................... about 6,35
Projectile initial velocity, m / s ............ 548,6

GAU offered four Russian (Obukhovekom, Aleksandrovsky, Putilovsky and Metallic) and four foreign factories (Krupp, Shatilop-Kamantry. Schneidor and Maxim (England)) to supply in two years no more than a rapid-fire field system with a gun, cutting, charging box and 250 cartridges. Systems must meet the requirements of the Artillery Committee.

To test the rapid-fire volitional guns, a committee was formed under the leadership of Major-General Valevachev.

In 1897-1898 11 prototypes of 76-mm field guns of domestic and foreign factories were put at its disposal. After conducting preliminary tests, the commission decided to continue testing only four systems of the Schneider, Saint-Chamond, Krupp and Putilov factories.

After lengthy testing by shooting and returning over a distance over 600 km, the Putilov plant system was recognized as the best.

In 1899, military trials of eight gun batteries (6 on foot and 2 horse) of the Putilov factory in five military districts were launched. Overall, the test results were satisfactory, and 9 February 1900 was followed by the Highest Command of adopting the system and the beginning of gross production. The gun was named "3-inch field gun obn.1900 g."

In the same 1900 g. 76-mm gun received baptism of fire. In August, the 1900 2 battery of the Guards Rifle Artillery Division was sent to 3792 in the battle area in China. The batteries participated in eleven battles with the Chinese and passed 389 km, in total, XNUMX combat shots were made.

In 1901 -1903 at the Putilov, St. Petersburg Oruzheyny, Obukhov and Perm plants, 2400 three-inch guns of the 1900 model were manufactured.

The new gun represented a sharp qualitative leap in comparison with the field guns arr. 1877. However, there were many obsolete elements in the design of its mast. The barrel did not roll away along the axis of the channel, but parallel to the frame of the gun carriage and had trunnions with which it lay in the trunnion nests of the beds of the upper machine, which, after a shot, rolled back along with the barrel through the gun carriages. The hydraulic brake rollback cylinders were located between the mast bed. The thumb cushions consisted of rubber buffers mounted on the steel bar of the buffer column.

Therefore, it was decided to radically change the construction of the gun carriage. In 1900, at the disposal of GAU for testing, new systems of field-firing guns of the Krupp, Saint-Chamond, Schneider and Putilovsky factories were received. All four systems had a coil brake hydraulic, and a spring tensioner. The systems were tested by shooting and hauling over a distance of 600 km.

16 January 1901 g, followed by the Highest Resolution to order the Putilov factory 12 guns with new carriages for military trials. According to the results of the military tests of 1901, the final conclusion on the system could not be made and the Putilov plant was asked to change the design of the carriages by April of 1902. After the new military tests and new alterations, the gun was adopted by the Order of artillery from 3 March 1903, under the name "3-dm field gun obn.1902 g.". The highest command of taking guns was followed by 19 March 1903.

Ballistics and internal device barrel gun arr. 1902 was no different from arr. 1900 g. Barrel arr. 1902 different from arr. 1900 r. Only by the absence of pins and pin of the ring and linked with the cradle with the help of a beard and two guide grippers.

The carriage has changed dramatically. The rollback for the first time in the Russian land guns occurred along the axis of the channel. The recoil devices were placed in the cradle under the barrel. After the shot, the hydraulic brake cylinder recoils with the barrel. The springs of the brace were put on the cylinder of the recoil brake.

In the carriages of both samples, the lifting and turning mechanisms were of screw type. Laft steel axis, wooden wheels. The gun was fussing with six horses,

In 1903, 4520 three-inch field guns were ordered in 1902. The Putilov, Obukhov and Perm factories were made entirely of guns. Petersburg Gunsmith the plant made only trunks, and even that from the blanks of the Perm and Obukhov plants, carriages for it came from the Petersburg, Kiev and Bryansk arsenals.

By the beginning of the war with Japan in the Kwantung Region and the Amur District, there were 245 field guns arr. 1900

Russian battery guns arr. 1902 The army of Brusilov is firing at Austro-Hungarian chains. 1916


By the end of the war, the 2086 cannons arr. 1900 g, and 8 guns arr. 1902

During the war, 125 cannons were arrested in armaments. 1900 and “hit and fell into disrepair” about 100 such guns.

Three-inch guns of the 1900 and 1902 models during the war, in general, proved to be good, but at the same time there were serious problems.

To protect the servants from bullets and shrapnels, the gun required a shield. Test site shields were launched as early as 1902, but the shields were adopted by the Highest Command from 10 in August 1906. Along with panoramic sights. Three-inch guns received shields relatively slowly, the last to come were shields on the batteries of the Odessa VO in 1912. So the shields on the three-inch we see in movies about the first Russian revolution will be left to the conscience of highly titled military consultants.

Three inches in World War I
Before the beginning of the war, Minister of War Sukhomlinov inspected a newspaper article stating that Russia was ready for war. Russia was really ready for war, but not with Wilhelm II, but with Napoleon, by the beginning of the war the Russian field artillery consisted of:

Number

State guns

Composed

batteries

in battery

total

in the army

76-mm rapid-fire light guns arr. 1900 and 1902

685

8

5480

5480

76-mm rapid-fire horse cannons obr.1902 g.

72

6

432

390

76-mm rapid-fire mountain cannons arr. 1904 and 1909

45,25

8

362

346

76-mm rapid-mount horse cannons

7

8

42

42

76-mm horse and mountain cannons of the Zaamur border guard

5

4

20

20

122-mm field light howitzers

85,3

6

512

512

152-mm field heavy howitzers

41

4

164

164

107-mm heavy field guns

19

4

76

76

Total 956

-

7088

7083


The missing 42 equestrian and 16 mountain cannons were manufactured and handed over to the troops before the outbreak of hostilities.

Thus, Russia began a world war, having all field light and heavy artillery, laid down according to 1910’s mobilization schedule for the army.

Here Sukhomlinov was right - Russia, starting a war, for the first time in stories had artillery, fully brought to the state. Artillery designed to hit enemy infantry columns and cavalry lavas consisting of several divisions. But of all the listed weapons, only 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers could destroy the enemy’s fortifications less effectively.

But there was no heavy artillery in Russia at all. Heavy artillery existed in Russia since the XV century, then it was called a siege. And Nicholas II abolished the siege artillery in 1908 - 1910. for lack of new heavy weapons, and the old, arr. 1867 g. And 1877 g., Was ordered to pass in the fortress. Our "holy" tsar planned to begin the formation of heavy artillery in 1917, and to finish in 1923, and in the gun fortresses arr. 1867 and 1877 should have been replaced in 1930.

The organization of the Russian field artillery in Russia to 1914, in general, remained at the level of the Napoleonic wars. The field battery had eight 76-mm guns arr. 1902 d. Starting with 1915, 6-gun batteries also appeared.

Battery state

8-Gun

b-gun

Battery commander

1

1

Officers

5

4

Soldier

270

218

Horses

219

175


The batteries were divided into three divisions, with the exception of horse and howitzer artillery, which had divisions of two batteries. In each division, the batteries were armed with the same type of guns, with the exception of field heavy artillery, where the battalions consisted of two 152-mm howitzer batteries and one 107-mm cannon battery. In the light artillery divisions were reduced by two in the artillery brigades. Divisions of horse and mortar artillery in the brigade were not reduced.

Artillery brigades were subordinate through the brigade commander to the commander of the infantry divisions. Horse-artillery divisions - the heads of the respective cavalry divisions. Mortar (howitzer) and field heavy divisions - to the corps commanders.

In peacetime, the artillery brigades existed on their own - regardless of the “native” infantry or cavalry divisions, and only in wartime did they enter operational subordination to the division commanders.

Imagine a picture: from the edge of the forest, they opened fire on the bottom of the enemy machine gun and forced the infantry to lie down. In a normal situation, the company commander should report to the battalion commander, etc., up to the division commander. The division commander must give the order to the commander of the artillery brigade, and he will again follow the chain to the commander of the battery. Further, there are problems of delivery of six heavy three-inch horses to the front line for direct fire shooting, and so on.

As a result, already in the course of the war, the regimental and battalion artillery had to be introduced. Note that regimental artillery existed in Russia since the times of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and was abolished by Paul I. In the absence of special battalion and regimental guns, various guns were included in the battalion and regimental artillery: from 37-mm Hotchkiss to 76-mm mountain arrays. 1904 - 1909 various types of bomb bombs, regimental guns and mortars. Three-inch artillery in the regimental artillery during the First World War were not included. Only by order of the Red Army Directorate from October 7 1924, rifle regiments received 6-mm guns with an 76-gun battery. 1902 d. From 1928 to 1935 vols. three-inch were gradually replaced in the regimental artillery 76-mm regimental guns arr. 1927 g

But back to the First World War, to the beginning of the war making 76-mm guns arr. 1902 was conducted by only one Petersburg Gun Plant. From 1915, the Putilov, Obukhov and Perm plants began to produce them, and from 1916 - the so-called "Tsaritsyn group of plants". Note that all the plants, except for the Tsaritsyn troupe, were state-owned (the Putilov factory was nationalized during the war). From August to December 1911. 235 was made, in 1915 year - 1368, in 1916 - 6612 and in 1917 - 4289 76-mm guns arr. 1902 g. Total 12504 guns.

In 1914 — 1917 In Russia, 368 light batteries were formed, for which 2992 guns were allocated, of which 2193 is 76-mm gun mod. 1900 g. And 1902 g. The rest of the guns were sent to replace the guns in the existing battery

On 15 June 1917, the existing army had 8605 serviceable 76-mm field guns (of which 984 sample 1900 and 7621 sample 1902), in addition, there were no less than 500 pieces in warehouses inside Russia. 76-mm field guns.

By 20 August 1914, the Russian army consisted of 76-mm shots:
To field and equestrian guns ............................... 5 774 780
To mountain cannons .......................................... 657 825
Total ............................................ .6432605

The expenditure of shells already in the first months of the war significantly exceeded the command calculations, and in 1915, there were cases of a shortage of 76-mm shells on the front. However, an increase in the production of ammunition in domestic factories and orders abroad led to the fact that since the beginning of 1916, the flow of projectiles has significantly exceeded their consumption. 1914-1917 total Russian factories produced about 54 million 76-mm shots, including about 26 million shrapnel and 28 million grenades. According to various sources, 37-56 million 76-mm shots were ordered abroad at the same time, but about 13 million arrived in Russia.

In 1915, the length of 76-mm guns arr. 1900 g. And 1902 g. Began to receive chemical, smoke, lighting and anti-aircraft missiles. It should be noted that the use of chemical munitions was effective not only when operating on infantry units, but also used to suppress artillery batteries. Thus, on a clear, quiet day of 22 in August, 1916, at a position near the village of Lopushany, not far from Lviv, the Austrian 15-cm howitzer brigade opened a battery of 76-mm field guns using a spotter plane. 1902. Austrian howitzers were hidden from Russian guns by crests of height and were outside the zone of defeat of Russian guns. Then the commander of the Russian battery decided to respond with chemical “suffocating”, shooting at the areas behind the crest, behind which smoke from shots of the enemy’s battery with a length of about 500 m, quick fire, 3 projectile at the gun, was found, jumping through one division of the sight. After 7 minutes, firing chemical shells around 160, the battery commander ceased fire, because the Austrian battery was silent and did not resume fire, despite the fact that the Russian battery transferred the fire to the enemy’s trenches and clearly showed itself with brilliance of shots.

One of the guns that participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt insurgency. 1921


Three inches in the red army

During the civil war, the three-inch was literally the queen of the fields. The maneuverable nature of the war severely limited the capabilities of the already imperfect field and battalion guns. And heavy artillery practically did not participate in the war, except for heavy armored trains and vessels of river and lake flotillas. But on the armored trains and mobilized ships, the main weapons were three-inch arr. 1900 and 1902

During the civil war, 76-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells and shrapnel were mainly used. Chemical munitions were used quite rarely, and this was due not to the “humanism” of the parties, but to a number of organizational difficulties. In addition, the use of chemical shells is effective only when a massive artillery fire, and in the Civil War such firing was rare.

Several times, three-inch red guns had to fire at white tanks, mainly in English Mk V. When firing at tanks, conventional high-explosive grenades or shrapnel, put on strike, were used. In any case, when it gets into the tank, the armor made its way at all real combat distances, and the tank failed. In January 1920, in the Sultan-Saly area, 25 km northwest of Rostov, the advancing 3rd brigade of the 6th cavalry division of the 1st Cavalry Army was counterattacked by white infantry with the support of three tanks. Toward the tanks, a battery of D. 3 was put forward. The Kompaniets, who opened fire with direct-fire high-explosive grenades and knocked out two tanks. The advancing infantry was scattered with shrapnel fire.

At the end of 1917, the production of three-inch field guns dropped sharply and in 1918 almost ceased. Due to the expansion of the civil war, the production of field guns was restored, albeit in smaller quantities. So in 1919, around 300 field guns were manufactured.

By the beginning of 1920 in the Red Army, the 2429 of three-inch field guns was supposed to be in the Red Army, but 1920 was also expected from the repair of 1200. After the end of the civil war, the production of 76-mm field guns was again reduced. For example, in 1922, only 99 guns were manufactured.

In the middle of 1920's, the leadership of the Red Army decided to modernize the 76-mm cannon arr. 1902 g. The main purpose of the upgrade was to increase the firing range. The goal seems to be good, the technical level of the then leadership was small. Deputy People's Commissar for Armament before 1937 was permanently Tukhachevsky. The main military-mobilization department of [GVMU] was headed by Pavlunovsky I.P. He was the deputy from 1932. People's Commissar of Heavy Industry and part-time member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The first of the lieutenants jumped into the deputy. People's Commissar, but unlike Junior Lieutenant Buano-Parte, he did not write any tracts on ballistics. The second was an old underground worker, which replaced him with both higher and secondary education.

Above them, moreover, few people understood the artillery and therefore our artillery in the 20-З0-s. thrown from side to side, from one hobby Tukhachevsky and Pavlunovsky.

"Iron" battery in Bugorino. 1918


So, they decided to increase the range of divisional guns without increasing the caliber of the guns and even leaving the sleeve of the 76-mm cannon of the 1900g intact. As they say, and eat fish, and ride on the fence. But the obvious thing is to increase the caliber, and not only the firing range will increase, but the weight of explosives in the projectile will also increase in the cube. Engineer Durlyakhov, back in 1923, proposed a project for the 85-mm divisional gun.

And how to increase the firing range without changing the caliber and liner. Well, the sleeve is designed with a margin and you can stick a larger charge, not 0,9 kg., But 1.08 kg. but it won't fit any more. Then you can improve the aerodynamic shape of the projectile. And they did it. You can increase the angle of elevation of the gun. Thus, a grenade weighing 6,5 kg with an initial speed of 588 m / s flew at 6200 m at an angle of + 16 "and at an angle of + 30" - at 8540 m. But with a further increase in the elevation angle, the range almost did not increase, so at + 100 the range amounted to 8760 m, that is, it increased only by 220 m, while the average deviation of the projectile sharply increased (in range and lateral). Finally, the last resort was to increase the barrel length from 30 to 40 and even to 60 calibers. The range increased slightly, but the weight of the gun increased, and most importantly, maneuverability and maneuverability sharply deteriorated.

Using all the above-mentioned means, they achieved, at firing, a grenade "long-range" at an angle 450 from the barrel in 50 calibers of a range 14 km. And what's the use? Observing 76-mm breaks of weak grenades at such a distance to a ground observer is impossible. Even from an airplane from a height of 3-4, there are no visible gaps of 76-mm grenades, and the scout was considered dangerous from anti-aircraft fire to descend below. And, of course, a huge dispersion, and even such low-power projectiles.

It should be said about another "fantasy" - polygonal shells. These are shells that have a regular polygon in section, the same section has a gun barrel. When firing polygonal shells can significantly increase the weight of the projectile and the range of the projectile. In the USSR, from 1928 to 1938. polygonal guns of almost all calibers from 76 mm to 356 mm were tested. Not spared this, and "three". In 1930-1932 were converted into polygonal 76-mm guns arr. 1902. The channel had 10 faces, the caliber (diameter of the inscribed circle) was 78 mm. The sleeve is the same, the connection of the chamber with the edges is conical. In 1932, when shooting with a P-1 polygonal projectile weighing 9,2 kg, the range 12850 m was reached, and П-3 weighing 11.43 kg - 11700м.

However, the technology of manufacturing polygonal shells was very difficult. It was a long time to load an instrument with such a projectile, and the calculation was to consist literally of virtuosos. In order to gain weight, you need to make a long polygonal projectile, but with a length of about 6 calibers, the shells gave a lot of dispersion, and with a length of 7 calibers some kind of tumbled in flight, contrary to all calculations. Of course, in artillery, as in other areas of technology, everything goes by trial and error. But all these conclusions about polygonal tools were also made at the end of the 60s. XIX century after long experiments with polygonal cannons in Russia and abroad. It was enough to read the Artillery magazine for 1865-1870. After all, in 1937. A mine list was compiled of works on polygonal artillery systems for 10 years and the results obtained. The report was sent to the GAU, and a copy - to the NKVD. What ended the case for amateur polygonals - it is not difficult to predict.

In 1927-1930 It was manufactured and tested above two dozen prototypes of modernized 76-mm guns, presented by the Motovilikhinsky plant (Permsky), Plant No.7 (Arsenal) and Plant No.13 (Bryansk). Consider the three most interesting options for modernization.

In the OAT variant, the following changes were made:
a) the muzzle brake is introduced;
b) the elevation angle is increased from + 160 to + 26 ... 27 °;
c) the knurled springs were reduced, which made it possible to reduce the maximum rollback length from 1000 to 600 mm;
d) cut out the middle part of the mast and insert a new one;
e) the rod and spindle are replaced in the compressor;
e) increased the length of the lifting screw.

Plant №7 presented three samples of upgraded three-inch guns, differing in details. All samples were designed under the direction of Sokolov.

Sokolov system had a muzzle brake. The recoil devices were taken from the OAT system. A constructive feature of Sokolov's carriage was a carriage machine (hinged), which makes it possible to increase the elevation angle without a major rework of the carriage, which was inevitable in the OAT and POS systems. In addition, eccentrics were used in the Sokolov system, although the system could fire without them.

Sokolov system weight:
without eccentrics ........................................... 1210 kg
With Eccentrics ........................................... 1258 kg

The Sokolov system in different positions had different elevation angles, and the maximum angle was obtained in a position with an inverted axis and a carriage in a broken position:
HV angle without eccentrics .............. + 38 "
HV angle with eccentrics ....... ---------- ..... + 45 "

From 27 August to 8 in October 1930, the ground test of Sokolov’s carriage took place - option # 3 (articulated carriage). The estimated length of the cooldown is 600 mm, and the actual on-test 625-628 mm.

When the combat axis was rotated, the elevation angle increased from 310 to 380300 on wheels on the ground to 44 ° 500 with eccentric wheels. When the axis was rotated, the height of the line of fire increased from 1210 mm to 1450 mm, which hampered the work of the gunner.

At the Motovilikhinsky plant modernization of a three-inch gun arr. 1902 was produced under the direction of VN Sydorenko.

The principal features of the Sidorenko variant were the absence of a muzzle brake, it was significantly changed in the carriage and a balancing mechanism was introduced. A significant advantage of the system was the possibility of imposing on the carriage of barrels of length in 40 and 30 calibers.

The test results of the Sidorenko system with a barrel length 40 21 August caliber 1930 G.:
Projectile weight, kg 6,5 6,5
Early speed, m / s 660 660
HV + 40 angle
Rollback length, mm 720 700-723

the commission, evaluating the polygonal tests, indicated that the Sidorenko system was structurally the most complex, and, by the way, the most expensive. Cost alterations 76-mm guns arr. 1902 in the OAT version was 2786 rubles, in the Sokolov version - 2767 rubles, and in the Sidorenko version - 6640 rubles. However, at the beginning of 1931, the Sidorenko system was adopted under the name "76-mm gun mod. 1902 / 30.

On the upgraded cannons, both old barrels with 30 calibers of length, which did not change anything in the device, and new elongated barrels with 40 calibers were installed, after 1931, the barrels with 30 calibers were no longer made.

In gross production, the 76-mm gun obr. 1902 / 30 was located before 1937. It is interesting that at the factory number 92 this gun was produced under the symbol F-10.

In 1930, Sidorenko designed a new three-inch modernization project. The project had two options - with and without cushioning. The most perfect was the project of sprung modernization of the 76-mm cannon arr. 1902 / 30 r. Length in 40 calibers. The gun had a cushioning in the form of a single transverse plate spring. The cradle is shortened, the muzzle brake is introduced. The weight of the system in a combat position increased slightly - to 1306 kg.

Artillery on the fur. MBO, 1932


Classes in mastering artillery shooting. KOVO. 1934


In the intervals between battles, gunners listen to the agitator. In the background 76-mm gun obr. 1902 / 30 Khalkhin Gol, 1939


Sprung system arr. 1930 3 arrived in December 1933 on NIAP from plant number 92. From 14 December 1933 to February 19 1934 g, 478 shots fired. The muzzle brake allowed to make a part of shots with new experienced weighted projectiles weighing 7.1 kg. Initial speed 673,4 m / s. 13400 distance m. During testing, springs sometimes burst, but the system could walk for a long time at a speed of 25-30 km with a tractor tank based on T-26. However, on 1934, the Sidorenko gun was an anachronism, and they did not refine it. In total, 1933, Plant No. 92, manufactured 10 cannons arr. 1930 was both sprung and not sprung.

Attempts to modernize the three-inch continued even after the adoption of the cannon arr. 1902 / 30 g. The main areas of modernization have already become an increase in the survivability of the barrel and an improvement in the maneuverability of the weapon (mainly the speed of carriage). In 1930-1933 Several 76-mm shafts were tested in 30 and 40 gauges, both with liners and with free pipes. On this occasion, the Resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense of 14 April 1933 was even adopted, according to which all new barrels of 76-mm guns in 30 and 40 calibers were “to be carried out exclusively with a free pipe or liner.” The resolution, however, remained on paper due to difficulties with the establishment of the production of liners and the transition to the manufacture of new divisional guns.

To increase the speed of carriage in 1936, tests of the 76-mm cannon arr. 1902 / 30 with metal disc wheels with a GK tire. At 1937, the industry was ordered 600 wheels with a GK tire for 76-mm guns arr. 1902 / 30

Since the three-inch suspension failed, in the 1937, in the design bureau of plant No. 92 (Grabina), a special spring-mounted F-29 bogie was manufactured to transport divisional artillery with mechtyag. The gun rolled on this cart and could move behind the car at a speed of 30-40 and more than a mph on the highway.

However, neither the trolley nor the metal wheels were distributed, and there was no particular need for them. With the mech traction in the Red Army, divisional weapons were unimportant, both before the war and in the 1941-1943. the vast majority were still six horses.

In service with the Red Army to 1 in November, 1936 consisted of: 76-mm guns arr. 1900 G. - 711, Arr. 1902 G. - 1684, Arr. 1902 / 30 g. The length of the 30 gauge is 1595, and the 40 gauge is 1210. In addition, in cannon fighters there were 76-mm guns arr. 1902 g. - 472 and arr. 1900 G. —54. On the armored trains was installed 139 76-mm guns arr. 1902 on the thumbs.

By the beginning of World War II, the artillery of the rifle divisions of the Red Army consisted of 8521 divisional gun, of which 1170 units were SPM, 2874 units were F-22 and 4477-guns obr. 1902 / 30 g. Thus, 53% divisional guns to 22 June 1941 were the old three-inch.

This number does not include 805, seemingly outdated 76-mm guns arr. 1900 g., Adapted for firing at anti-aircraft targets, as well as several hundred 76-mm guns arr. 1902, established in fortified areas and on armored trains.


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  1. svp67
    svp67 April 15 2013 09: 28 New
    +3
    "Three-inch", for the German and Austro-Hungarian infantry and cavalry, thanks to the high training of Russian artillerymen, she became a "scythe of death" soldier
    1. Mikhado
      Mikhado April 15 2013 12: 35 New
      +8
      Quote: svp67
      "Three-inch", for the German and Austro-Hungarian infantry and cavalry, thanks to the high training of Russian artillerymen, she became a "scythe of death"

      Yeah, only in the first weeks or months, while we were still thinking about the maneuver war. And when they dug into the trenches, then 76 mm and the flat trajectory became a fat minus. I venture to suggest that the overspending, and after it the lack of shells were the result of ineffective attempts to destroy something.
      And now, in order to draw conclusions, increase the production of at least 122 mm howitzers and shells for them, look at the caliber 106.7 for conducting counter-long-range firing, the command, with tenacity worthy of better use, frantically rivets 76 mm, and again half of the SHRAPPELS, by the way more expensive than RP grenades.
      And then these millions of reserves became the very suitcase without a handle for the Red Army - since we already have it, we’ll make new guns for this cartridge. So with him and the whole Second World War passed.
      The caliber and guns are legendary, of course, but if there hadn’t been them, had we introduced something more successful, you would have looked and the effectiveness of Russian artillery would have been higher.
      1. Bigriver
        Bigriver April 15 2013 13: 28 New
        0
        Quote: Mikhado
        ... the command with a tenacity worthy of better application, frantically rivets 76 mm, moreover half shrapnel againBy the way, more expensive than RP grenades.
        And then these millions of reserves became that very suitcase without a handle ...

        And where does infa produce 50% shrapnel?
        Over the preceding WWII 10th anniversary, the share of shrapnel in the division’s BC was constantly falling. By the 41st, only every fifth shell was shrapnel.
        Which, in general, is not bad. You can beat and manpower and armored personnel carriers, and other lightly armored crap beat.
        As for the millionth reserves. This OFS 76 mm was more than 20 million pieces by the 41st. Moreover, Grabin wrote that most of them remained from the time of the 1st World War, and it was this presence of ready-made shots that hindered the design of more powerful guns, both in 76 mm caliber and beyond.
        1. Mikhado
          Mikhado April 15 2013 17: 08 New
          0
          Quote: BigRiver
          And where does infa produce 50% shrapnel?

          Infa directly from the article itself, if Shirokorad is not whistling.
          Quote: BigRiver
          Which, in general, is not bad. You can beat and manpower and armored personnel carriers, and other lightly armored crap beat.

          Imagine how much more effective it is for the APCs of the OF, put on a high-explosive? And shrapnel for manpower ... during the Second World War there were few such cases, mass accumulations for an effective range for 76mm were rare. Plus the high cost of ammunition (remote "tube"), plus an increased demand for adjustment (timing of detonation).
          1. Bigriver
            Bigriver April 16 2013 06: 11 New
            0
            Quote: Mikhado

            Infa directly from the article itself, if Shirokorad is not whistling.

            Oh yes.
            It seemed that the speech was about pre-war proportions of output.
      2. xan
        xan April 15 2013 20: 40 New
        -2
        Quote: Mikhado
        The caliber and guns are legendary, of course, but if there hadn’t been them, had we introduced something more successful, you would have looked and the effectiveness of Russian artillery would have been higher.

        this is already a question for the industry. it was necessary to choose, either one 122 mm, or 4 76 mm guns. Stalin was not there, and the tsarist organizers could not mobilize the rear, the guts are thin for "Everything for the front, everything for victory!"
        And there were legends about the qualifications of Russian gunners in WWI. I read the memoirs of one artillery commander of a battery, he could not understand the logic and expediency of the methods of waging a battle by German artillerymen - at first he believed that those who were half-trained or inexperienced, who considered Russians to be stupid, were fighting against the Russians, and then he stopped being surprised: “They are strange , German artillerymen ". Our WWI lost not on the field, but in the headquarters and in the organization of supply and support.
      3. Petrovich_2
        Petrovich_2 25 September 2019 13: 46 New
        0
        The actions of Russian artillery were highly appreciated by the Germans themselves. The article does not describe shell hunger as the only reason for the great retreat of the Russian army.
  2. Mikhado
    Mikhado April 15 2013 12: 35 New
    0
    Quote: svp67
    "Three-inch", for the German and Austro-Hungarian infantry and cavalry, thanks to the high training of Russian artillerymen, she became a "scythe of death"

    Yeah, only in the first weeks or months, while we were still thinking about the maneuver war. And when they dug into the trenches, then 76 mm and the flat trajectory became a fat minus. I venture to suggest that the overspending, and after it the lack of shells were the result of ineffective attempts to destroy something.
    And now, in order to draw conclusions, increase the production of at least 122 mm howitzers and shells for them, look at the caliber 106.7 for conducting counter-long-range firing, the command, with tenacity worthy of better use, frantically rivets 76 mm, and again half of the SHRAPPELS, by the way more expensive than RP grenades.
    And then these millions of reserves became the very suitcase without a handle for the Red Army - since we already have it, we’ll make new guns for this cartridge. So with him and the whole Second World War passed.
    The caliber and guns are legendary, of course, but if there hadn’t been them, had we introduced something more successful, you would have looked and the effectiveness of Russian artillery would have been higher.
  3. Andrey77
    Andrey77 April 15 2013 13: 43 New
    0
    I want the author of the article to ask a question. WHY was to upgrade obsolete weapons? The article did not find an answer.
    1. Mikhado
      Mikhado April 15 2013 17: 12 New
      +1
      Quote: Andrey77
      I want the author of the article to ask a question. WHY was to upgrade obsolete weapons? The article did not find an answer.

      From poverty - once, from an overabundance of Civilian experience, where they seemed to our wunderwafers hawks - we will do even better good, add a range. Plus it has already been said - ammunition in warehouses.
      In short, the economy and inertia (conservatism) of thinking.
      1. Andrey77
        Andrey77 April 16 2013 12: 35 New
        +1
        Of all the arguments, only one good one is ammunition in warehouses.
  4. bublic82009
    bublic82009 April 15 2013 22: 38 New
    +1
    well then. it is a tool of the hard worker of war.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 April 16 2013 12: 37 New
      0
      Just like the Mosin rifle. The war was met with a weapons park of imperial times.
      1. Prohor
        Prohor April 19 2013 15: 24 New
        +1
        1941 - 1917 = only 24 years old. Now we will meet the war with 50-60 year old weapons.
  5. Petrovich_2
    Petrovich_2 25 September 2019 14: 23 New
    0
    The article does not describe shell hunger as the only reason for the great retreat of the Russian army.
    The story of the fornication of Matilda and Nicholas 2 is a gross fiction. Although the author refers to the diary of the emperor, he doesn’t seem to have really read it, nor the novels of that time (by L. Tolstoy) - light flirting was typical of the officer environment, but he was not at all intended as fornication, as is often the case today . This is the same fiction as the practice of spiritualism of the moral, later becoming a saint, Tsar Nikolai Alexandrovich.