Western View of the Crisis in the Confrontation between Soviet Armor and Shells
Today, there is much talk about the fact that the special military operation in Ukraine was marked by a crisis in the confrontation between armor and projectiles. They say, Tanks have lost their relevance - drones rule the world and all that jazz. But in reality, this is far from the first time that armored vehicles, so to speak, become “uncomfortable” on the battlefield.
The full understanding of this problem came back in the 1970s after the Arab-Israeli war, during which tanks were effectively destroyed by infantry anti-tank weapons, which naturally led to discussions about the future of tanks in different countries. And especially in the two opposing powers - the USA and the USSR, which were keenly interested in each other's opinion on this issue.
An article written by Phillip Karber, a professor at the US National Defense College, touches on the topic of this “interest.” It examines the reaction of Soviet senior military officials to the widespread and growing power of anti-tank weapons. We publish it here — not because we claim to be the ultimate truth (it is not an authoritative source, a priori), but as an example of Western thinking at that time.
The Soviet Antitank Debate
On June 21, 1339, an outnumbered Swiss infantry force armed only with pikes met the elite of the feudal knighthood, unseated the knights from their armored horses, and ushered in a new era of military art. The Battle of Laupen was a tactical innovation that not only demonstrated the superiority of light infantry over the striking power of mobile and heavily armored forces, but also heralded political and social change.
Almost literally the same “democratization of war” could be observed 634 years later – in the early days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in the Middle East, when Arab infantry equipped with anti-tank weapons were able to stop the advance of Israeli tanks.
The implications of the Arab success have been hotly debated in the West. Many observers have agreed that the balance of power on the battlefield has shifted towards infantry at the expense of tanks, which have dominated the battlefield since World War II. Many have welcomed this development, believing that the same weapons that enabled the Arabs to succeed – anti-tank guided missiles missiles (ATGM) and hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers - will give NATO countries a good chance to compensate for the superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in tanks in Central Europe.
Moreover, one author argued that even the Soviet Union's tank formations were too armor-oriented, suggesting that "Soviet tables of organization and equipment are influenced by the experience gained in a war that ended 30 years ago" and that Soviet thinking was still dominated by "battleship thinking" that influenced the military intellectual environment.
Another study concludes that the Soviet Union's commitment to tanks as the primary strike and shock element of the army is unlikely to change. "The debate in the Western military community regarding the combat effectiveness of armored vehicles in conditions where the battlefield will be saturated with high-precision weapons, had virtually no impact on the USSR."
These conclusions betray a naive assessment of the Soviet Union's force structure and ignore contemporary Soviet doctrinal literature. Not only were the Soviets aware of the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (it was, after all, Soviet antitank weapons that the Arabs used), but they also demonstrated a deep understanding of the potential of antitank technology in modern warfare. This understanding is well reflected in professional military publications. Changes in Soviet doctrine and force structure clearly demonstrate this concern, and these changes have important implications for Western defense.
In mid-November 1974, a scientific and practical conference on ground forces issues was held at the Malinovsky Armored Forces Academy. More than 200 people took part in it: marshals, generals, officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, military research teams, Soviet military advisers and instructors located abroad, teachers of military academies and representatives of other scientific institutions. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the tactical and organizational consequences of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, especially in the context of the future fate of armored vehicles on the modern battlefield.
The discussions raised doubts about the sustainability of the Soviet Union's offensive doctrine. This conference was followed by an unprecedented second conference in January 1975, attended by Defense Minister A.A. Grechko and Ground Forces Commander I.G. Pavlovsky. Both emphasized the importance of the lessons learned from the events of October (the Yom Kippur War) and sharply criticized the Soviet Army's contemporary operational exercises, calling for a doctrinal discussion of the implications of the antitank threat. Neither of these conferences has yet been fully analyzed in the West.
Marshal Grechko's comments were included in the second edition of his recently published book:
"More than any other event in the last 10 years, the events in the Middle East have focused military experts' attention on the relationship between offensive and defensive means in the ground forces. They have revealed a number of characteristic features of the struggle between offensive and defensive doctrine, as well as the development of new methods of warfare."
“It should be noted that modern defense—with its massive use of powerful weapons—has become more resilient.”
“It should be noted that modern defense—with its massive use of powerful weapons—has become more resilient.”
This is explained, first of all, by the vulnerability of tanks - the main striking force of the advancing troops, and the fact that their use on the battlefield has become much more difficult. Continuous efforts to improve anti-tank weapons have made them a real threat to tanks and at the same time prompted the search for new means of protection and more effective systems for reliable suppression of enemy anti-tank weapons."
Grechko's provocative statements marked the beginning of the Soviet antitank debate, and over the past year more than 50 analytical articles have been published in Soviet journals examining the challenges associated with the high effectiveness of antitank weapons demonstrated in the near-war conflict.
Although this debate remained largely a subject of discussion in the professional journal Voyenny Vestnik, interest in anti-tank issues was also reflected in an increase in publications in more “open” publications such as Krasnaya Zvezda and Sovetskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (the latter also published in English). Given the number of publications, their high level, and the clear and openly expressed concerns, it can be concluded that the Red Army did indeed face a problem.
However, before NATO starts viewing ATGMs as a deus ex machina, it is necessary to take into account several key points that follow from the Soviet anti-tank debate: The Soviet Army has changed its approach in recent years: it does not put all its “eggs” in the tank basket. The main trend in recent years is, on the contrary, a gradual reduction in the specific role of tanks in combined arms formations.
Paradoxically, anti-tank weapons pose the greatest threat not to tanks, but to infantry fighting vehicles, that is, armored personnel carriers that closely interact with infantry.
The Soviet antitank debate is not about abandoning tanks, but about how to maintain offensive capabilities while responding to the growing antitank threat. Each of these points is explored in more detail below.
Threat from anti-tank weapons
The Red Army has long been aware of the potential of anti-tank weapons. In fact, the USSR was one of the first countries to begin developing and deploying ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) en masse. As early as 1964, after one of the demonstration launches at a tank, Khrushchev said:
It hurts. After everything we've invested in tanks... If we were bourgeois, the tank factory shares would have already caught fire before they even reached the front lines.
Throughout the post-war period, the Soviet military showed a keen interest in the state of Western anti-tank technology. In 1967, Soviet military publications began a “serious” discussion of the technical characteristics of ATGMs, as well as ways for the Soviet military industry to adapt them. They wrote about a “qualitatively new method of combating tanks,” in particular about an “anti-tank guided missile capable of hitting a tank at a distance of several kilometers.”
In 1972, the classic Soviet work "Anti-tank War" was published, which paid special attention to ATGMs, their penetrating ability, technical characteristics, and the ability to destroy armored targets from a long distance. New forms of interaction between tanks were also considered, artillery and infantry against the backdrop of the growing role of anti-tank weapons.
In 1973, immediately after the Middle East conflict, additional studies appeared emphasizing the need for a revision of the doctrine. They stated: “The experience of the Middle East conflict forced the recognition that ATGMs provide infantry with a weapon comparable in effectiveness to tanks: the probability of hitting a moving armored target has increased dramatically.”
The Soviet Army's Reliance on Tanks
Although the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries have a clear advantage in tank forces compared to NATO, the Soviet Army has not neglected other branches of the armed forces. In fact, contrary to popular belief in the West, over the past decade the Soviet Army has reduced the relative importance of tanks in favor of other elements of combined arms formations – especially motorized infantry and artillery.
In the early 1960s, the ratio of tank and motorized rifle divisions was 1 to 1,8. By 1974, the ratio had changed - the Soviet Army was replenished with another 20 divisions, all of which were motorized rifle. The ratio became 1 to 2,2 in favor of the infantry.
This increase in the proportion of motorized infantry coincided with a doctrinal shift from the “one option” of nuclear war to the acceptance of conventional (non-nuclear) options for the theater of war. These changes were accompanied by reforms in the command and control system of the ground forces.
Already in the late 1950s, the Soviet Army began reorganizing to adapt to the new conditions of nuclear war. Artillery lost its former importance, and the emphasis was shifted to tank and mechanized forces, which were expected to be able to survive on a nuclear battlefield.
With the transition of infantry units to full mechanization in 1963, a new branch of the military was formed - motorized rifle troops. At the same time, the concept of "deep offensive" was restored, which was developed by Tukhachevsky in the 1930s, but later abandoned. In 1967, with the appointment of I.V. Pavlovsky to the post of commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, the USSR began to actively deploy motorized infantry forces near the western border.
In the same year, 1967, the Soviet Union for the first time seriously began to rely on conventional operations in addition to nuclear ones. Since then, many Soviet authors have expressed the opinion that motorized rifle units are more resistant to modern threats than tank units. In the 1970s, a theory even appeared in the West that the Soviet Union could launch a mixed attack of motorized infantry and tanks in order to avoid excessive losses in armored vehicles.
Contrary to Western estimates that it took the USSR 15 years to recognize the vulnerability of tanks in Central Europe, the Soviet Union took this threat into account during the initial deployment of its new infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). The first IFV (model BMP-1) had a 73mm cannon, an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) on the turret, and at least one RPG-7 grenade launcher operated by troops.
This emphasis on combined arms formations was also reflected in the growth of Soviet troops in East Germany: over the past 5 years, motorized infantry, artillery, anti-tank and Defense-funds.
Soviet motorized infantry is more vulnerable than tanks
The growth of combined arms units in the USSR plays an important role in the new perspective of the anti-tank debate. As recent Soviet publications show, the issue is not so much the vulnerability of tanks as the vulnerability of motorized infantry, especially those deployed in BMPs.
The Army has conducted assessments that show that the combat vulnerability of BMPs is twice that of tanks. Exercises and combat trials since the Middle East war have shown that BMPs are even more vulnerable than expected, and their new generation of anti-tank weapons further increases this threat. Soviet doctrine recognizes that a successful offensive depends heavily on the survival and mobility of motorized infantry.
Until recently, it was assumed that infantry on board IFVs, accompanied by massive tank and artillery support, could overcome NATO defenses. However, the growing vulnerability of IFVs is starting a chain reaction that is beginning to undermine the entire structure of offensive doctrine. If IFVs are destroyed faster than the tanks that accompany them, then:
- infantry dies before entering the battle;
- BMPs are not capable of delivering infantry to the required point;
- tanks are left without cover, which increases their vulnerability.
In practice, this could mean the failure of an offensive operation, since tanks, without infantry cover, become easy targets for anti-tank weapons and defending troops.
Maintaining offensive power
It may well be that calling recent Soviet publications an “anti-tank debate” is not entirely correct. After all, the fact that anti-tank weapons are effective is not disputed by anyone. Almost everyone acknowledges that the development of ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) was a tactical revolution. Moreover, there is no significant disagreement among Soviet commentators about who these systems primarily threaten: motorized infantry, not tanks.
The problem being discussed is different: how to maintain a high offensive tempo in the face of NATO's reinforced anti-tank defenses. Although no clear "solution packages" are offered in open Soviet sources, consistent trends are emerging. Two main trends can be seen in Soviet military discussions, reflecting the old Khrushchev-era debate about reducing ground forces.
Nuclear option
For thirty years, the concept of nuclear warfare was the basis of Soviet strategic thinking. The Soviet Union's ground forces were repeatedly reformed to support offensive operations in a nuclear battlefield. Such reforms included:
- abandonment of traditional artillery in favor of self-propelled artillery;
- emphasis on mobility and combat groups;
- the desire to break through the enemy's defense with a blow, which is immediately followed by breakthrough forces.
With the outbreak of World War II, this approach lost its relevance, and the emphasis was on breaking through the defense with heavy artillery, which was supposed to soften the defense, and was then supported by infantry and tanks.
With the development of ATGMs, the Soviet army underwent a tactical revolution, and some experts once again proposed a return to the nuclear scenario as a way to overcome anti-tank defenses. Thus, there is a strong motivation to return to a doctrine in which nuclear weapons are considered as a means of suppressing AT threats.
The Soviet Union never shared NATO's love of low-yield tactical nuclear charges launched from self-propelled artillery. However, in recent years, interest in such an idea has increased, especially in conjunction with the development of self-propelled artillery. Some Soviet sources even link low-energy nuclear charges to the tasks of self-propelled artillery. In addition, it is argued that the problems of IFVs associated with anti-tank threats are irrelevant in a nuclear war, where:
- the enemy disperses its forces, and the attack can be launched without the risk of massive losses;
- when using nuclear weapons, defensive positions are suppressed, and motorized infantry can quickly advance without losing their BMPs to anti-tank weapons.
However, the Soviet command is not ready to write off the AT threat and rely entirely on nuclear weapons. For both political and operational reasons, they need a more realistic, non-nuclear option.
Artillery variant
Of all conventional weapons, artillery is given the greatest importance. Many Soviet sources emphasize that the only way to counter anti-tank systems is to suppress them with powerful artillery fire, especially with the use of self-propelled artillery. These systems allow firing at the pace of the advancing battle.
Soviet authors cite the following advantages of this approach:
[i]Artillery can affect anti-tank crews before they open fire;
Self-propelled artillery can move together with the advancing units;
Massive fire strikes disrupt coordination and destroy the positions of anti-tank systems.
"If we can't suppress AT weapons before the battle starts, our tanks have no chance of surviving."
Opponents of this idea insist that artillery is not enough, especially in the conditions of a dense NATO defense. They argue that fire support from artillery is rarely accurate and timely. Nevertheless, it is the artillery route that is currently considered the most realistic and acceptable way to solve the anti-tank threat.
For artillery to be truly effective in direct fire mode, it will need to be decentralized to the battery and battalion level, and have multiple direct-fire weapons capable of penetrating defenses.
To give artillery tactical mobility and the ability to accompany advancing units, it must be self-propelled and protected.
Over the past year, the Soviet Union has fielded two new large-caliber self-propelled artillery systems with direct-fire capability, marking a major departure from traditional Soviet doctrine, which relied on massive barrages of towed guns.
However, even such measures are not without difficulties.
Soviet experts understand that dividing artillery into small tactical units and attempting to coordinate its actions with tanks and infantry greatly complicates the entire command and control system. Even at the battalion level, such integration requires an expansion of staff and the creation of a reliable logistical structure. In an offensive, artillery becomes more vulnerable, and coordinating massive salvos is a serious problem.
Maneuver option
As expected, representatives of the armored forces strongly object to the "artillery approach." They do not want to slow down the offensive, but, on the contrary, seek to speed it up. In particular, General Bukharenko from the tank forces asserts:
“Considering that on the modern battlefield every second is worth its weight in gold, the method of attacking with infantry landing from an infantry fighting vehicle is not the best way.”
General Skorodumov, citing the Israeli experience, emphasizes maneuverability and firepower, not slow advance with artillery barrage. Tank officers believe that the problem is not the vulnerability of the BMP as such, but the restrictions imposed by the artillery that hold back the advance.
BMPs, in their view, are well suited to moving in battle formation alongside tanks. They are not ideal, but they are quite functional, especially if you avoid the traditional offensive scheme. Tank command insists on maneuverability, rapid strike and action on weak points, and not on building lines and fronts.
Density of anti-tank defense
Why is the anti-tank threat mentioned so often in Soviet works, especially in relation to the BMP? The key is probably in the density of NATO AT deployment. Soviet analysts have long argued that the more AT weapons per unit of front, the slower the army advances, since any movement requires overcoming narrow defensive zones.
The enemy, in turn, with low troop density, has high mobility, which allows them to escape, regroup and use anti-tank strike groups deep in the rear, disrupting supplies.
In the event of a conflict with NATO, the Red Army would prefer to launch a surprise attack without the need for full mobilization. This is especially true for NATO army groups stationed in Central Europe. Such strike units are already combat ready and do not require additional manning. The goal is to prevent NATO from deploying a stable anti-tank defense and wrest the strategic initiative from it.
Conclusion
Soviet commentators emphasize that Western armies, especially the American and German, are not ready for the new doctrine of maneuver, which combines armor, mobility, and the rejection of the traditional frontal offensive. They are held back by their focus on defense, which requires dense battle formations and dispersed anti-tank weapons.
The Soviets, in turn, are not going to abandon offensive operations and are focusing on how to overcome anti-tank defenses without reducing the pace of the offensive. Although the nuclear option remains in the arsenal, the main reliance is on conventional means - and above all on the flexible interaction of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery.
Source:
The Soviet Antitank Debate by Phillip A. Karber. Armor Magazine, November-December 1976.
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