A. V. Isaev: Was it possible to avoid the defeat of June 22, 1941?

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A. V. Isaev: Was it possible to avoid the defeat of June 22, 1941?

June 22, 2025 is the next anniversary of one of the most tragic pages of our history. stories. 84 years ago, on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. That day marked the beginning of the Great Patriotic War – cruel, bloody and not sparing a single corner of the country. This date still evokes pain and bitterness, and at the same time – pride for those who survived.


On the eve of this memorable date, it is especially appropriate to recall the speech of military historian Alexey Isayev. The video “Was it possible to avoid the defeat of June 22?” was recorded several years ago, but has not lost its relevance. The topics raised in it remain important and alive - after all, we are still looking for answers to questions that more than one generation has been asking themselves.



Isayev calmly and convincingly explains why defeat in the first days of the war was virtually inevitable. He shows that the tragedy was not the result of a single miscalculation, but the consequence of a whole series of circumstances: insufficient preparation, poor intelligence, late mobilization, and ill-considered deployment of troops. The picture is complex, but honest.

The video pays special attention to the technical and organizational condition. tank connections, the lack of mobile reserves and how these factors influenced the development of events. Isaev, as always, relies not on emotions, but on facts, documents and real evidence. This makes his conclusions especially valuable - both for historians and for those who simply want to understand why everything happened the way it did.

But this video is not just an analysis of the tragedy. It is about how, in conditions of almost complete helplessness at the beginning of the war, the Soviet army was able to hold on and turn the tide. About how, despite all the horror of June 41, the country found the strength not only to endure, but also to win.

That is why these days it is especially important not just to remember. It is important to delve into, to understand, to try to figure it out. To preserve not only the facts, but also the meaning of what our ancestors went through. In this sense, Isaev does an important job - he helps us look at the past soberly, without myths, but with respect.
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  1. -7
    22 June 2025 04: 22
    Purely theoretically, if intelligence had gotten all the plans of the German side or a time traveler with a good knowledge of history had traveled to the past, then the army could probably have concentrated in advance on the spearheads of the attack, launched aircraft an hour before the Germans, deployed in Dubno, left the Brest Fortress and dispersed, and so on. Technical weakness, of course, would not have mattered, but maybe in the summer of 1942 they would have fought to the death not for Stalingrad, but for Kharkov, Leningrad would not have known the blockade, the Germans would have gotten fewer resources, we would have had a couple of million fewer losses and they would all be in the ranks, the mobilization potential would have been greater. We have a specialist on how to drag Chelyabinsk to Tsushima, maybe there is some specialist from Omsk who could put it all together on the shelves, how to pull out the border battles and take Berlin in the spring of 1943? recourse
    1. -2
      22 June 2025 05: 24
      It wasn't a matter of intelligence.
      read about why there were the most air rams on the first day of the war. sabotage is a tool of the Western forces that they use constantly.
      1. +2
        23 June 2025 21: 34
        The reasons are quite objective: miscalculations in preparing the country for war, including partial unpreparedness of the army, errors in the deployment of forces on the border, weakening of the military command and fighters due to repressions, lack of coordination and insufficient level of training of troops, incompleteness of military equipment, fluctuations in Stalin's position regarding the beginning of the war, which damaged the actions of the army and commanders both in preparation for the war and immediately before it, contradictory orders (and their implementation) of the leadership in the pre-war period.
        1. 0
          28 June 2025 21: 41
          "If I had known where I would stumble, I would have laid down some straw"
    2. +2
      22 June 2025 09: 11
      Purely theoretically, if intelligence had obtained all the plans of the German side or a time traveler with a good knowledge of history had traveled into the past, then the army could probably have concentrated in advance on the spearheads of the attack, launched aircraft an hour before the Germans, deployed in Dubno, left the Brest Fortress and dispersed, and so on.


      The failure of such theories is that their authors take Germany's actions as a constant. Not knowing that the Germans had several plans of attack, operational adjustments to current intelligence actions.
      1. +1
        22 June 2025 10: 36
        The failure of such theories is that their authors take Germany's actions as a constant. Not knowing that the Germans had several plans of attack, operational adjustments to current intelligence actions.

        This is true. Moreover, these plans could change right in the process of changing the situation.
        In principle, this is how they fight, Napoleon, I think, said, like, all plans are made before the first shot. wink
      2. +1
        22 June 2025 12: 16
        Quote: vovochkarzhevsky

        The failure of such theories is that their authors take Germany's actions as a constant.

        And the actions of the “allies” in a different scenario are also not obvious.
        "The Unthinkable" could have happened in a different version.
      3. -3
        22 June 2025 14: 25
        It is clear that they would change. But if their intelligence did not know that we know and act, everything could have turned out differently.
    3. -5
      22 June 2025 10: 50
      Purely theoretically, if intelligence had gotten all the plans of the German side or a time traveler with a good knowledge of history had traveled into the past, then the army could probably have concentrated in advance on the spearheads of the attack, launched aircraft an hour before the Germans, deployed in Dubno, left the Brest Fortress and dispersed, and so on. Technical weakness, of course, would not have mattered, but maybe in the summer of 1942 they would have fought to the death not for Stalingrad, but for Kharkov, Leningrad would not have known the blockade, the Germans would have gotten fewer resources, we would have had a couple of million fewer losses and they would all be in the ranks, the mobilization potential would have been greater. We have a specialist on how to drag Chelyabinsk to Tsushima, maybe there is some specialist from Omsk who could put it all on the shelves, how to pull out the border battles and take Berlin in the spring of 1943? recourse

      These are details. There was a global political screw-up. At the very top.

      Just as now they tried to sit on three chairs, it never occurred to anyone that Hitler would strike, we have a pact! fellow
      It’s as if China had now crossed the border with all its might and started to squeeze Siberia.

      Although, if Ukraine is now, it is Finland then... it's not evening yet, in short... wink
      1. -2
        23 June 2025 13: 25
        Yeah, the Germans calmly violated the non-aggression pact with Poland, but they will keep it with the USSR! And AiF also declared war on Germany, despite the pacts.
        The USSR expected claims or provocations from Germany, and now the Germans will say: interference in elections, opening fire, invasion of troops, downed Boeings, it's time to exchange territories, the USSR is supplying something else... And it was worth starting from this point. And the fact that the Germans today have peace, and tomorrow there will be war and an attack on all fronts - that's what they didn't expect.
        1. +1
          25 June 2025 15: 56
          Everything is simpler. If the USSR had attacked first, it would have been declared the aggressor. We actually see now attempts by the West and its creatures to revise history and declare the USSR the aggressor in that war. Stalin understood this. Therefore, he categorically suppressed all attempts to respond to provocations with force.
          1. -2
            25 June 2025 20: 53
            England and France are declared aggressors? After all, they were the ones who attacked (declared war) on Germany
            1. 0
              26 June 2025 05: 00
              But Germany was already at war at that moment.
              1. -2
                27 June 2025 21: 21
                Germany attacks Poland - Germany is the aggressor.
                England and France are attacking Germany, they are not the aggressors.
                The USSR attacks Germany, it is the aggressor
                Didn't get anything wrong?
                i.e. AiF declaring war on Germany is normal, but if the USSR declares war on Germany, then that is not normal (that is different!)
                1. +2
                  28 June 2025 15: 41
                  It seems like we are talking about the same thing.)
                  I simply reminded that the USSR entered WWII later than everyone else and cannot in any way be considered the country that started this war.
                  1. 0
                    2 July 2025 04: 33
                    Amendment: The US was the last to join
          2. +1
            25 June 2025 23: 44
            Who would declare him an aggressor? Great Britain and the USA? Hardly.
            1. 0
              26 June 2025 05: 01
              Well, excuse me, even now attempts to declare the actions of the USSR as the cause of the Second World War do not cease, although the USSR entered this war later than everyone else.
    4. +5
      22 June 2025 13: 24
      Firstly, the attack plans changed. And the fact that our intelligence officers constantly named different dates for the attack was not only disinformation, but also a postponement of the dates.
      Secondly. It would have been possible, of course, to prepare better for the first strike (by the way, the fleet and the OVO somehow managed to prepare), but there were unfinished fortifications, poorly trained personnel (including command personnel), new equipment had only just begun to arrive and had not been mastered, communications were very poor, etc.
      The attack was carried out at a time when the Red Army was highly unprepared, and this unpreparedness could not be corrected in a short time. Therefore, they tried to delay the beginning of the war as much as possible.
      1. -2
        22 June 2025 14: 30
        Quote from shikin
        Firstly, the attack plans changed. And the fact that our intelligence officers constantly named different dates for the attack was not only disinformation, but also a postponement of the dates.

        Our intelligence officers did not sit in the German General Staff, they sat in the embassies, where messages were sent down about when the war would start. That everything was bad - that was already clear. But with this "bad" the war was somehow turned back. If, thanks to intelligence, they had prepared better for this, then probably it would not have become worse.
      2. -2
        23 June 2025 13: 30
        By the way, the fleet did not have time to prepare.
        The fact that the ships opened fire and not a single Soviet ship was sunk does not indicate anything about preparation for the first strike.
        A ship is a compact thing, anti-aircraft guns on the deck...
        And the Germans themselves laid mines (even before the war), and did not throw bombs.
        If the Germans had decided to destroy the Soviet fleet instead of blocking it, the USSR would have had its own Port Arthur/Pearl Harbor
      3. -1
        23 June 2025 16: 47
        Quote from shikin
        by the way, fleet

        Don't compare a dozen ships in ports and dozens of divisions in the fields.
        Quote from shikin
        The attack took place at a time when the Red Army was highly unprepared, and this unpreparedness could not be corrected in a short time.

        Why not? What, couldn't the troops occupy the forts in advance? I'm afraid it's all about the philosophy of "With little bloodshed, on foreign territory." If they had completed building the forts along the old border and kept the mobilized units there, then the attack wouldn't have been a surprise. Well, the technical lag in communications also played a role. Doesn't it remind you of today's situation? In our time, they couldn't establish normal communications in 20 years of getting up from their knees, let alone in the 30s and 40s.
      4. -2
        26 June 2025 23: 40
        What are you talking about, my dear? Merkulov's report, dated five days before the German attack, has been published, everything is clear there. The German divisions are deployed and ready to attack. What else do yours lack?
        All that was required was to issue fuel and ammunition, withdraw troops to the required areas, and also cancel vacations.
        1. 0
          27 June 2025 10: 23
          What are you talking about, dear?
          - So, the illegitimate son has shown up?
          I do not argue that not everything was done as it should have been at the beginning of the war. There was probably a reason to put Pavlov on trial. But in any case, the problems with the training of personnel and command staff did not go away. New equipment was just beginning to arrive in the troops and was practically not mastered. Communications were generally bad. And these problems could not be overcome in 5 days, or even in a month (it would be good if they were partially solved in half a year of war).
          So the loss of control and confusion in the first days of the war were practically a foregone conclusion.
          1. 0
            27 June 2025 12: 48
            I have it clearly written down what needed to be done based on Merkulov’s report.
            ...Major Kuznetsov arrives in Kobrin on June 17, 1941 and obtains an appointment with the commander of the 4th Army of the Red Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, and reports to him the real situation on the state border.
            The report includes a list of forces concentrated by the German command, the presence of landing craft and the identified artillery positions. The border guard major demands that all this information be reported to the very top at the General Staff of the Red Army. In addition, he makes a forecast that a major military operation will begin within 10 days at the most and suggests to the commander that the rifle divisions take up prepared positions along the state border behind the border guards. On the recommendation of the NKGB of the USSR, Kuznetsov suggests to Korobkov, without waiting for the decision of the district headquarters in Minsk, to form separate engineering and sabotage companies to strengthen the protection of the border bridges.
            There was an urgent need to cover the border
            Major General Korobkov will evaluate the reasonableness of all the proposals of the border guard major on the morning of June 22, but on June 17 he can think of nothing better to do than to arrest the head of the border detachment for panic and exaggeration of the enemy’s strength...
            1. 0
              27 June 2025 13: 09
              Are you having difficulty understanding what is written? The army was in a state of reorganization, its combat readiness was very limited (I already mentioned why) even with full mobilization and readiness to strike. Plus, there were errors (and probably not only errors) of an organizational nature.
              Major General Korobkov will evaluate the reasonableness of all the proposals of the border guard major on the morning of June 22nd.
              - I fully appreciated it a month later, when he was executed by order of execution.
              Even after almost a year of war, systemic shortcomings and errors led to disasters, as in Kharkov in May 1942:
              But hundreds of thousands more soldiers had to die in infantry attacks before Soviet generals learned to coordinate their actions and react more skillfully to the changing situation during the battle. And in May 1942, the Red Army staff plans did not provide for either the coordination of actions of neighboring large units or the initiative of individual commanders. In addition to all the other omissions, the accumulation of forces on the Barvenkovo ​​bridgehead was carried out without proper camouflage. And the Germans were well aware of all the movements of Soviet divisions.
              .
              The success at Barvenkovo ​​left Timoshenko stumped. After a quick breakthrough of the German defenses, it became clear that the tank units that were supposed to advance on Kharkov and Krasnograd were not ready to move forward. There was a shortage of fuel, there was no way to transport combat vehicles across rivers, and, for some reason, the tanks could not move at night.
    5. -4
      22 June 2025 15: 51
      Everyone knew everything, the intelligence was working. There were even plans for a preemptive strike. But Stalin's wisdom, not miscalculation, was that Germany's aggression was obvious and clear. Otherwise, England and the USA would have fought for Hitler.
      1. +4
        23 June 2025 09: 57
        Does it matter that the British were at war with Germany since 1939?
        1. 0
          25 June 2025 16: 00
          Yeah. And they were preparing to fight the USSR for Finland.
          But you are right that the German-Polish war of 1939 was made world war by England and France, who declared war on Germany.
  2. +6
    22 June 2025 04: 33
    In light of today's US strike on Iran...the topic is relevant and burning.
    For me, June 22, 1941 is an important lesson in how not to prepare for war.
  3. -3
    22 June 2025 04: 52
    Isaev also works in Russia. So facts are facts. I'll say right away that I respect him very much and watch his videos. But he also pours water when it's impossible to tell the whole truth (in full). Of course. The Rzhev operation. I understand him. He gets his salary from us and we need to tell the truth - Facts. As it should be.
    I think 100 years will pass, when we can say - EVERYTHING.
    1. +4
      22 June 2025 05: 15
      So facts are facts.

      The classified archives need to be made public...and many people may not like them.
      1. +1
        22 June 2025 06: 28
        The TsAMO archives are open; before the beginning of their time, it was quite fashionable to order materials from NARA and from Germany.
        1. +4
          22 June 2025 07: 01
          Quote: Andrey VOV
          The TsAMO archives are open

          Not all, unfortunately. The spare shelves, for example, are not open. I suspect some other things too.
          1. -1
            22 June 2025 08: 16
            Some of the political reports and FSB archives have not been opened. Again, imagine what a mass of documents and what staff, it is physically impossible to have time for everything.
      2. 0
        22 June 2025 07: 01
        Quote: The same LYOKHA
        The classified archives need to be made public...and many people may not like them.

        I trust A. Bushkov's book "Stalin. The Ice Throne" more. You can have different attitudes to his work, but here the facts and documents are clearly presented. And, of course, they make us proud of our naval soldiers! For example: "(June 22) when German planes crossed the Soviet border, a couple of minutes later all the anti-aircraft artillery of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets roared. NOT A SINGLE Soviet ship was sunk, because no one was caught by surprise... the famous bombing of Berlin in the summer of XNUMX was carried out not by army aviation, but by naval aviation"
        1. 0
          22 June 2025 07: 04
          Quote: Egoza
          , of course, they make us proud of our naval personnel!

          I had the same...the sailors were not afraid to put all their forces on full combat alert and the result was obvious.
          I read the memoirs of Tributs, Kuznetsov...impressive. True, later on, not everything went so smoothly for the Black Sea and Baltic sailors...in war as in war. request
        2. 0
          22 June 2025 08: 46
          And why did they scold Oktyabrsky then? For being prepared for a Nazi attack?
          1. +2
            23 June 2025 12: 24
            During the Great Patriotic War the navy showed itself to be weak.
            Give examples of shameful failures?
        3. +5
          22 June 2025 13: 30
          NOT A SINGLE Soviet ship was sunk because no one was caught off guard.....

          Because they were not bombed, the Germans tried to limit the fleet's actions by laying mines, planes with mines, not bombs, flew to Kronstadt and Sevastopol, in the Gulf of Finland German and Finnish ships laid mines, many mines.
        4. -4
          22 June 2025 22: 07
          You probably haven't heard about the "breakthrough" of the Soviet fleet in Kronstadt?
          Remind me of the losses during the "breakthrough"?
          The Pe-1941 and Pe-8 bombed Berlin in 2 - these are heavy long-range aviation, not naval
          1. +1
            22 June 2025 23: 49
            The Pe-2 could not bomb Berlin in 1941, even in theory. It was a frontline bomber. The Baltic Fleet pilots bombed the Germans in August - early September on the Il-4, and several Pe-8s and Er-2s were also assigned. There was no long-range aviation in the USSR at that time - Stalin created it only in March 1942. Study the material (i.e. history), my friend, then such opuses will not happen to you. laughing
            1. 0
              24 June 2025 05: 42
              In my opinion, they bombed Il-4s, which at that time were called DB-3f. Fleet, then. I could be wrong.
          2. -2
            23 June 2025 16: 39
            Are you absolutely sure that these were Pe-2s?
            1. +2
              23 June 2025 21: 15
              I was wrong - they bombed the Er-2, not the Pe-2.
        5. The comment was deleted.
    2. +10
      22 June 2025 05: 55
      It will be possible to say everything when the topic of the Second World War ceases to be political and becomes purely academic.
      And for us, even the origin of Rus' is still a political topic.
  4. +12
    22 June 2025 05: 32
    So A. Isaev is trying to convey to everyone that even if one learns about Germany’s attack presumably
    On June 19, it was already useless. Map of the balance of forces of the USSR and Germany along the border line
    available since the 4s. Given the ratio of forces of 6-XNUMX German divisions deployed according to the state with reinforcement forces against one USSR division according to the peacetime state, the result was expected.
    And to create a comparable group of forces with Germany on the border, it was necessary to announce the deployment and mobilization of the Red Army at least a month before June 22 and bring the missing forces to the border by rail and on foot. The use of the cover plan and the exit from the Brest Fortress would have given nothing to the Red Army. They would have been defeated in the field, as they defeated the 125th Rifle Division in the Baltics.
  5. 0
    22 June 2025 07: 01
    it was necessary to oblige the countries that attacked us and lost the war - to prohibit them from having weapons more powerful than a pistol and to pay repatriation (tribute)% of GDP for life. And now there would be no such conflicts and everyone would sit silently, but this game of give-in does not lead to anything good - history is cyclical
    1. +3
      22 June 2025 08: 47
      REPARATIONS! Correct it!
    2. 0
      22 June 2025 13: 40
      it was necessary to oblige the countries that attacked us and lost the war

      And end up with a naked butt in the Cold War good
      In fact, the situation after WWII was more complicated and sorting things out with the new (!!!) governments of European countries was not the best solution. At the same time, Germany paid reparation payments, unfortunately, mainly from the part that was occupied by Soviet troops.
  6. +4
    22 June 2025 07: 24
    This interview is 5 years old and Isaev would not have repeated some points. Being a fan of Zhukov, in the interview he denies the visit of Commissar Vashugin to the 8th Mechanized Corps, although Ryabyshev writes about this in his memoirs, and Brigade Commissar Poppel turned out to be a better commander than Lieutenant General Ryabyshev, whom Zhukov praised, but Stalin refused to trust. The Pamyat Naroda website has scans of the Lives of Poppel's group, and Poppel's memoirs themselves are interesting. Isaev treats Poppel from the point of view of Zhukov, who belittled the merits of Katukov, and accordingly Poppel, who was a member of Katukov's military council. Ryabyshev, at the instigation of Zhukov, was appointed commander of the Southern Front in the fall, but in October he was removed by Stalin and for a short time commanded an army, and then even a rifle corps, but Isaev subjectively compares the actions of Ryabyshev and Poppel.
    1. +2
      23 June 2025 16: 41
      Many people wrote something in their "memories". But these memories often do not match the documents.
  7. +5
    22 June 2025 07: 33
    Civil society, as well as civilian experts, have the right to evaluate events and have their own opinion, but in military language everything was formulated long ago - the enemy forestalled the USSR in strategic deployment, and in the direction of the main attacks the enemy's advantage was critical...
    But I will correct the readers of VO regarding the intelligence part...
    Intelligence is ONLY a type of combat support! It is conducted by commanders and staffs of all levels! And the Chief of Intelligence may have any opinion - the decision will still be made by the Commander...
    It was so then, and it is so now.
    And attempts to assess the nature of the enemy's probable actions, and this is what intelligence officers MUST do, without assessing the political component will be flawed (a specific example is so clear that it cannot be conveyed in words, but it cannot be cited now - there is a SVO, and the matter concerns our stable defense in the Glushkov and Tetkinsky directions of the Kursk region in the spring and summer of this year)
    So, just like for us - Pushkin is our everything))), so is Bismarck for Germany - it is unacceptable for Germany to fight on two fronts, defeat is inevitable, which is what actually happened...
    So, in 1940, the war between Germany and England began! And very few people know - but until 1942, England had an up-to-date plan to carry out bombing strikes on oil fields in Baku! And the country's Supreme Leadership was aware of these plans! So Stalin himself can be understood, with his resolution on the intelligence information of the GRU General Staff about a possible attack by Germany on the USSR))))
    In a continuous stream! From different sources! In the period FROM MAY 15 UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR...
    But when they realized that Germany's preparation for the offensive was irreversible, it was already too late! They didn't have time...
    But it is not enough to have modern technology! You also need to MASTER it.
    About the armored vehicles separately, with the Air Force it will be more clear...
    You are the commander of a fighter aviation regiment! YESTERDAY you received a set of aircraft for the regiment...
    There are two questions! First, where to put the old ones? And second, will the pilot himself be able to sit in two planes with just one butt?))) Here are the monstrous losses of the Red Army aviation... The rearmament of the Western districts was proceeding by leaps and bounds!
    It is impossible to give a full analysis in the comments! But to defame the courage of Soviet soldiers and the entire Soviet people as a whole, who won that terrible war, is NOW unacceptable...
    1. -1
      26 June 2025 23: 48
      You are confusing army intelligence with foreign intelligence. And if the head of foreign intelligence Merkulov gives you information that Germany is fully prepared to attack five days before, it would make sense to listen to him. Please read Merkulov's report from that time. It is not at all clear how it was possible not to take any action on it. This was completely beyond the bounds of reason.
      1. 0
        27 June 2025 06: 10
        Let's put it this way))) army, troop, intelligence and foreign))) - slightly different things for specialists)))) who understand the subject of the conversation)))
        You will figure it out yourself))) which departments were conducting intelligence AT THAT TIME....
        Let's do it one more time)))
        But when they realized that Germany's preparation for the offensive was irreversible, it was already too late! They didn't have time...))))
        NOT U S P E V A L I!!!
        But the Germans were considered smart!!! They REALLY KNEW the military, but most importantly - the economic potential of the USSR...
        And all the fables about the fool Stalin, to whom everyone reports everything, and he is a dunce, are the legacy of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the personal merit of Khrushchev N.S. - they have nothing in common with reality.
        1. 0
          27 June 2025 12: 51
          Stop your agitation, it won't get me. I'll repeat an interesting quote for you.
          ...Major Kuznetsov arrives in Kobrin on June 17, 1941 and obtains an appointment with the commander of the 4th Army of the Red Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, and reports to him the real situation on the state border.
          The report includes a list of forces concentrated by the German command, the presence of landing craft and the identified artillery positions. The border guard major demands that all this information be reported to the very top at the General Staff of the Red Army. In addition, he makes a forecast that a major military operation will begin within 10 days at the most and suggests to the commander that the rifle divisions take up prepared positions along the state border behind the border guards. On the recommendation of the NKGB of the USSR, Kuznetsov suggests to Korobkov, without waiting for the decision of the district headquarters in Minsk, to form separate engineering and sabotage companies to strengthen the protection of the border bridges.
          There was an urgent need to cover the border
          Major General Korobkov will evaluate the reasonableness of all the proposals of the border guard major on the morning of June 22, but on June 17 he can think of nothing better to do than to arrest the head of the border detachment for panic and exaggeration of the enemy’s strength...
          1. 0
            28 June 2025 08: 28
            A complete namesake!))) What I didn't want was to conduct propaganda and agitation))) - this is a slightly different Department!)))
            Let's do it ONE MORE time!)))
            "And the Chief of Intelligence can have any opinion - the decision will still be made by the Commander...)))
            Assessing the enemy without taking into account the political component will be incorrect))) I almost got burned on this (relatively)))/)
            And as a starting point we need to take the Non-Aggression Pact between Nazi Germany and the USSR - it contains the reasons! Neither the division commander nor the Army Commander can INDEPENDENTLY make a decision to withdraw units from the permanent deployment...
            They could, of course, but only for the purpose of checking combat readiness and BY AGREEMENT!
            But the Chief of General Staff would not have approved these actions!
            Non-aggression pact... direct provocation...
            So what? Was YOUR Kuznetsov right?))) Formally?)))
            You can inquire about the affairs of the OTHER Kuznetsov! Who was the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy! Inquire about the losses of the USSR Navy on June 22, 1941...
            Now I ALREADY don't have that library, but you will definitely remember how many Red Army units were routed on the march from the depths of the USSR to the state border! They were marching! They were late....
            The above is called secrecy of deployment; units and subdivisions are most vulnerable before taking up their initial position, both during an offensive and during a defensive operation...
            And without intelligence data it is IMPOSSIBLE to determine the GOAL of troop concentration!
            The non-aggression pact is a direct provocation.....
            The units covering the state border COULD NOT repel the German attack! In the direction of the main attacks - categorically! They were late with the strategic deployment of troops, the mobilization measures were not carried out IN A TIMELY manner!
            But there was a Directive of the Chief of General Staff! It was idiotic in content - but it was there! And it was also late...
            A HUMAN creates a stereotype of thinking for himself, and destroys it - also independently...)))
            THIS is the timing of the start of the SVO! My opinion (at that time I did not have the opportunity to report)))), a little immodest - but also one of the reasons
            stable defense of our troops since May of this year))) in the Kursk region...
            And I was wrong too!))) for a week)))
            And just like THEY, he considered his opponent smarter...
            And if the discussion is interesting, let's continue!)))
            WITH THE UNDERSTANDING that we NOW know EVERYTHING, and THEY COULD only make assumptions!
            Finally, on the night of June 21-22, a German communist swam across the river and indicated the exact time of the beginning of the offensive...
            Strategic deployment of troops! Non-aggression pact....
  8. +4
    22 June 2025 07: 42
    Isaev is one of the historians who, after conducting research, professionally and reasonably conveys information on a complex topic.
    Sometimes, it is not his problem that the level of understanding of those who read or listen to him does not correspond to the level of the problem. It happens.
  9. +7
    22 June 2025 07: 47
    Researching the problem of the beginning of the war, many people with a straightforward mindset, starting immediately after the beginning of the war, constantly try to personify. Their inability to hear that there are "historical patterns" is colossal.
    There was no special alternative on June 22, 1941, and there could not have been. we have to come to terms with this.
    Ten years before the war began, we didn’t even have modern industry, and given the structure of agricultural production, if we hadn’t concentrated and mechanized it, we would have suffered severe famine during the war.
    The hero of K. Simonov's book, the grandfather, reproaches Serpilin and all the "military people", why didn't they warn us, why didn't they tell us, we would have given everything for defense. But this is a logical trap, the majority of society before the war "I wanted to live better and more joyfully" and not to starve on the eve of a hypothetical war: will it happen or not?
    And accelerated militarization is unlikely to solve the problem.
    The second factor is the level of training of the soldier. Yes, yes, and as a Russian soldier I was always flattered by the myth that Russians are the best of the best soldiers. But historical analysis tells a different story. In terms of education, understanding of technology, and discipline, we were significantly inferior to the Germans, because universal education (one of the factors) was introduced in Prussia back in the 18th century, and in our country, after 1917, its application began much later. The same can be said about our technology, etc.
    But...glory to the Soviet soldier and commander! And to the party with its leader, who united all the forces of the country.
    Because... Hitler and Napoleon invaded Russia almost on the same day (the second one 4 days later), in Moscow, after the most grandiose battle of the Napoleonic wars, Napoleon entered on September 14, the Nazis reached the outskirts on September 30!!!! Feel the difference.
    And finally, if we did not live under a capitalist system, we could continue to rant about the enormous mistakes of the stupid Soviet government, but now, looking at the successes of the past 34 years, this is mauvais ton.
  10. +2
    22 June 2025 08: 05
    Even if all the troops had taken up combat positions and the aviation had been dispersed and not destroyed, much would not have changed at the beginning of the war. The Germans' level of troop command was head and shoulders above, and their interaction with aviation was at a level we had not reached even at the end of the war. The ability to quickly redeploy and concentrate aviation contributed to successful initial actions during breakthroughs of our troops' defenses. Isayev mentioned radio communications, but did not say that division headquarters and above practically did not use them because communications were triangulated and headquarters were subjected to air raids almost immediately. The elimination of enemy troop command was a priority for the Germans. The Wehrmacht's main attacks were always preceded by powerful air strikes for which the Luftwaffe gathered aviation from almost the entire Eastern Front. This is how it was during the defeat, one can say in turn, on October 1 they cleared the way to Orel for the 2nd Tank Group, and already on October 2-3 the 3rd and 4th (transferred from Leningrad) Tank Groups to Moscow and Tver. Our aviation could not redeploy so quickly to dangerous areas, so the troops were left without air cover. The battles in July 42 of Lizyukov's tank army near Voronezh showed that in a year we still had not achieved the controllability of troops at the level of the Wehrmacht ... Rotmistrov wrote notes from the forest, did not turn on the radio. Lizyukov practically did not command his units, which were unable to independently interact with each other. In addition, he did not have air support, which allowed one German tank division to defeat our tank army in parts. And one more fact, the commander of the German tank division, and this is like our tank corps, commanded directly from the front, being in the command tank by radio. For example, Rotmistrov commanded his corps also from a tank, but from the rear, 10-15 kilometers from the battlefield, without turning on the radio, by notes through liaison officers, fearing air strikes. And this was 42...
    1. +1
      23 June 2025 22: 32
      Quote: Konnick
      And one more fact, the commander of the German tank division, and this is like our tank corps,

      A small correction: By June 41, Hitler had halved the Wehrmacht's tank divisions. The "Southern" Army Group, the divisions practically did not exceed 150-160 tanks (as an example), I refer to Müller-Hilebrand.
  11. +4
    22 June 2025 08: 39
    I once read a science fiction story about a confrontation between a modern airborne platoon on a BMD-2 and a Wehrmacht infantry company. Like Groundhog Day. Each time, the Russian Airborne Troops platoon commander built a defense differently, but the Nazi Hauptmann was successful each time.
    What am I talking about? That the experienced Wehrmacht, which had defeated the best armies of Europe, had an organizational superiority over the Red Army.
    The boxer-ranker catches up with the village thug in any case. But if he doesn't beat him to death right away, then the collective farmer, who has gained invaluable experience and has an advantage in muscle mass, will crush the boxer. And if someone trips the boxer, then it's a real tragedy.
    1. +1
      22 June 2025 09: 15
      Quote: Whitesnow
      The boxer-ranker catches up with the village thug in any case. But if he doesn't beat him to death right away, then the collective farmer, who has gained invaluable experience and has an advantage in muscle mass, will crush the boxer. And if someone trips the boxer, then it's a real tragedy.

      Great comparison
      1. -1
        22 June 2025 13: 19
        Similar comparisons were used by "PseudoSuvorov" in his comparisons of Teutonic and Soviet tanks!
        The Teutonic tanks were slow and weak, but the Soviet highway "Shushpanzers" were ready to tear apart all of Europe!
    2. +1
      22 June 2025 13: 21
      Was the boxer alone or with comrades?
      Has anyone invited boxers from Romania, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Italy, Croatia?
      1. 0
        23 June 2025 13: 40
        Well, let's put a wall on a wall: Great Britain, Canada, Australia. Plus the USA, which helps one side
        1. +1
          23 June 2025 13: 56
          Great Britain, USA, Canada (production) when did they start "helping" the USSR?
          Right from June 22, 1941?
          Or a little later?
      2. +1
        23 June 2025 17: 10
        Quote: hohol95
        Was the boxer alone or with comrades?
        Has anyone invited boxers from Romania, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Italy, Croatia?

        If you mean the industrial potential of Europe, then it was of course higher, but how did the USSR have more tanks, guns and planes at the beginning of the war?
        If you mean the human potential of Europe fighting directly on the Eastern Front, then it was small compared to the reserves of the USSR.
        On June 22, 1941, on the Eastern Front, Germany and its allies had concentrated 4 men, 329 calculated divisions, 500 guns and mortars, 166 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 42 aircraft. The Red Army, in turn, numbered 601 men.
        In total, more than 30 million people were mobilized into the Red Army.
        1. 0
          23 June 2025 19: 12
          If you mean the industrial potential of Europe, then it was of course higher, but how did the USSR have more tanks, guns and planes at the beginning of the war?
          If you mean the human potential of Europe fighting directly on the Eastern Front, then it was small compared to the reserves of the USSR.


          The old song about the Main Thing!
          There were eight Russians and both were wearing felt boots...
          1. +1
            23 June 2025 19: 17
            Quote: hohol95
            If you mean the industrial potential of Europe, then it was of course higher, but how did the USSR have more tanks, guns and planes at the beginning of the war?
            If you mean the human potential of Europe fighting directly on the Eastern Front, then it was small compared to the reserves of the USSR.


            The old song about the Main Thing!
            There were eight Russians and both were wearing felt boots...

            Expect new history textbooks then. The old ones were completely wrong, it turns out.
            1. +1
              24 June 2025 06: 58
              You forgot to compare the number of cars of all kinds, tractors, trucks, and horses in the enemy armies and in the Red Army.
          2. 0
            24 June 2025 00: 09
            well not eight
            but since 1942 the total number of Soviet troops was higher than the German and its allies by 1,5-2 times on average
            1. +1
              24 June 2025 05: 17
              But it should have been 1,5 - 2 times less?
              The total number - is this at the front or throughout the entire territory of the USSR?
              1. 0
                24 June 2025 20: 25
                these are the opposing forces on the front line + reserves, relatively speaking without Soviet troops, for example, in the Far East, Iran, and without German troops, for example, in France and inside Germany
                We calculated conditionally divisions, their staffing by periods, etc.
                1. 0
                  24 June 2025 21: 47
                  It turns out that some people wanted to see a ratio of 1 to 1 or 1 to 0,5 in favor of the Teutons?
                  How many people and equipment did the Americans and British gather in North Africa to destroy the remnants of Rommel's "army"?
                  1. 0
                    24 June 2025 22: 27
                    It turns out that some people wanted to see a ratio of 1 to 1 or 1 to 0,5 in favor of the Teutons?

                    there is nothing bad in these numbers, it does not mean that the Germans were much cooler than the Soviet soldiers
                    that is, we must understand that until 1943 the Germans had the initiative, that is, they themselves chose the direction of attacks, accordingly they concentrated on one area, while the Soviet troops had to saturate several directions.
                    Unfortunately, we didn’t have any Zhukovs along the entire front line.

                    a striking example. I don't remember which historian considered it, for the attack on the Kalinin Front the Germans pulled all the troops into the strike zone, leaving cooks and drivers in the trenches in a secondary direction to indicate their presence.

                    How many people and equipment did the Americans and British gather in North Africa to destroy the remnants of Rommel's "army"?

                    Well, you have to take the Italians into account
                    The Italians started with a four- or five-fold advantage over the British in 1940, they got their asses kicked (and actually took out the Italians) by the British, after which by the fall of 1941 there was already a numerical advantage, in my opinion 100 thousand to 80 thousand Italian-German troops, until the landing of the Americans, in my opinion, the advantage of 1,2 British remained.
                    1. 0
                      25 June 2025 07: 02
                      a striking example. I don't remember which historian considered it, for the attack on the Kalinin Front the Germans pulled all the troops into the strike zone, leaving cooks and drivers in the trenches in a secondary direction to indicate their presence.


                      Did they really force cooks and clerks into the trenches?
                      And the Russians didn’t even notice the difference between a panzer grenadier and a cook...
                      At the same time, they forget what happened to Soviet industry.
                      How much did she lose, and how much did the industry of the Third Reich lose, let's say, by the end of 1941...
                      The issue of supplying and transporting everything necessary for conducting military operations must not be forgotten!
                      "2 or 3 shots per gun per day" is the reality of Soviet artillery in some areas of the front in 1942-1943.
                      1. 0
                        25 June 2025 08: 12
                        Did they really force cooks and clerks into the trenches?
                        And the Russians didn't even notice the difference

                        it was an allegory )))
                        Well, roughly speaking, auxiliary parts
                        and even if they had seen it, so what, we didn’t have the initiative in this area, well, we would have knocked down these positions and that’s all

                        "2 or 3 shots per gun per day" is the reality of Soviet artillery in some areas of the front in 1942-1943.


                        I agree with you here, the same Isaev had this to say about this, that during the Rzhev operation for every shell we made there, seven came back to us
                        that is, the Germans could solve their problems more effectively
        2. 0
          23 June 2025 22: 40
          Quote from Kartograph
          On June 22, 1941, Germany and its allies had concentrated 4 men on the Eastern Front,

          Let me correct you. In total, the Wehrmacht concentrated 3 million 48 thousand for aggression. All the rest of the scum, pulled themselves together later. As for tanks, planes, etc., you stated it correctly.
  12. 0
    22 June 2025 08: 51
    "insufficient preparation, poor intelligence, late mobilization and ill-considered deployment of troops."
    The army leadership and the General Staff are behind all this. Especially about the ill-considered deployment of troops. Therefore, sabotage and betrayal played an important role in the defeat in the first days and months of the war. Especially against the background of the SVO. How Stalin prepared the country and how Putin. But the conclusion is one: with the beginning of the war, Stalin and the people made every effort to win this war, and not like now - they trade with the enemies in full, and even bring in potential enemies of Russia. Thereby creating the preconditions for a civil war. "War for some is a mother for others"
  13. 0
    22 June 2025 10: 41
    The most important fact is not mentioned - the army was not ready for an attack, since the top leadership did not believe in this attack, and they had every reason to do so - Hitler at that time simply did not need it and even found it harmful. There was a war with England, Hitler himself in his Mein Kapf rightly warned against a war on two fronts, like in the First World War. There were quite normal relations, in the fall and winter of 1940 negotiations were underway on the full accession of the USSR to the pact, and they failed only because of the position of Germany's other allies (primarily in Southern Europe), but not Germany itself - what kind of attack could there be talk of? Why would Germany attack if there were no fundamental disagreements between the countries, and Germany itself was busy with a completely different war.
    The Four Axis Powers Pact was a draft treaty of friendship and economic support with the possibility of joint military action against other countries, which was planned to be concluded between the USSR and the Axis countries at the end of 1940.

    On November 12, 1940, Hitler proposed to Vyacheslav Molotov, who was visiting Berlin, that the USSR join the Axis powers as a full fourth participant[2]. The draft Treaty was developed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and was read to Molotov on November 13, 1940... as in the case of the Three Power Pact, the participating countries were obliged to provide each other with political and economic assistance and defined their own spheres of influence in the world. The Soviet side also insisted on the possibility of mutual military assistance between the Pact countries.

    https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Пакт_четырёх_держав
    That is why no plans for an attack on Germany by the USSR were found anywhere - the USSR simply did not need it, there was no reason for such a war.
    And only Hitler's stupidity led to the fact that he believed that if the USSR was defeated, England would immediately agree to peace negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement. As a result, the bloodiest part of the Second World War began - as a means of pressure on England :((
    1. +5
      22 June 2025 12: 57
      Sergey, you have a typical "alternative history" address.
      What 4-party pact?
      Links to Wikipedia, which in turn links to archived documents? Not to a specific Archive with the location of the folder, but to an “archived” link. laughing
      Love of pure water. All links are archived!!! Not a single real one. German article with a link to a work that is not under such data. A weighty source. But more on that later...
      Hitler himself, in his Mein Kapf, rightly warned against a war on two fronts, as in the First World War.

      Hitler himself wrote in the same book that Germany needs colonies, and there is no need to look for them in the senseless lands of Tanzania when there are the black soils of the USSR right next door.
      This is what Hitler wrote about.
      The most important fact is not mentioned - the army was not prepared for the attack, since the top leadership did not believe in this attack.

      The grief is a conclusion that does not lend itself to adequate analysis.
      That is, all of Germany was thirsty for new colonies in the USSR, for example, in the work of modern researcher Alam Tuz, “The Price of Destruction,” but the Soviet leadership was not ALYO.
      All the industrialization and modernization of agriculture, is it just for "living better, more fun" or preparation for war?
      Exercises of 1935 of the Kyiv Military District?
      The leaders' recollection that it was necessary to delay the war, the army and the economy were not yet sufficiently prepared in 1939, 1940, 1941?
      And Hitler's desire to quickly attack the USSR, in order to prevent these preparations from being carried out, the Yugoslav campaign disrupted the start date of "Barbarossa".
      What logic, why would Germany and Japan drag the USSR into the pact? Maybe just to lull their vigilance?
      Only in the USSR there were no simpletons in the leadership, “we were deceived” - that’s not about them.
      This is what Molotov said about this Act:
      They wanted us draw in and fool about that
      We came out together with Germany against England. Hitler
      :I wanted to know if we could be drawn into an adventure.
      They remain Hitlerites, fascists, and we help them.
      Will they be able to drag us into this?
      1. -1
        22 June 2025 13: 16
        The French and British almost did it with their own hands.
        Preparations were made for attacks on Baku and the USSR oil fields in the Caucasus.
        And they were almost ready for a decisive blow to the USSR, when the Germans began active military operations against them!!!
        1. -4
          22 June 2025 14: 55
          The French and British almost did it with their own hands.
          Preparations were made for attacks on Baku and the USSR oil fields in the Caucasus.
          .

          You wrote correctly that there was preparation for attacks on Soviet Transcaucasia by the Anglo-French coalition, but this was after the start of World War II, not before. At that time, the USSR had an official friendship treaty with Germany, and the Germans, who were at war with the Anglo-French coalition at that time, wanted to get raw materials from the USSR.
          On February 5, 1940, the Germans addressed a letter to Stalin in which they referred to the fact that they had made major concessions in favor of the Soviet Union and insisted on rapid and large-scale deliveries of raw materials. As a result, on February 11, 1940, an economic agreement was signed between the countries, which, in essence, lifted part of the blockade of Germany by England and France.
          ...
          And they were almost ready for a decisive blow to the USSR, when the Germans began active military operations against them!!!

          The Germans began military operations not against them, but against the USSR, which radically changed the situation.
          Operation Pike (from English pike - pike or spearhead) is the code name of the Anglo-French plan for strategic bombing of the Baku oil fields in the early period of World War II. ...
          Despite the formal neutrality of the USSR in the war that broke out in Europe, the British and French came to the conclusion that the Soviet-German pact made Moscow an accomplice of Hitler[1].

          https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Операция_Pike
          1. +2
            22 June 2025 14: 59
            At that time, the USSR had an official friendship treaty with Germany, and the Germans, who were at that time waging war against the Anglo-French coalition, wanted to obtain raw materials from the USSR.

            Who prevented the French and the British from concluding an agreement with the USSR before the agreement between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich?
            Weren't they the ones who got in their own way?
            1. -7
              22 June 2025 15: 01
              They wanted to do this, but the USSR decided to make a treaty with Germany instead. And not just one, but several.
              1. -2
                22 June 2025 15: 34
                Chatting is not like carrying bags!!!
                Once again, the Union is to blame, not the Europeans!
                And you, as I see, love the memoirs of the French and British, but reject domestic historical documents!

                Who prevented the Poles from being defended in 1939?
                USSR again?
                1. -3
                  22 June 2025 16: 07
                  And you, as I see, love the memoirs of the French and British, but reject domestic historical documents!

                  And where in our historical documents did you find that England and France refused to conclude a treaty? The negotiations continued until the moment when the USSR concluded treaties with Germany and refused to conduct further negotiations with England and France.
                  1. -2
                    22 June 2025 16: 13
                    And where in our historical documents did you find that England and France refused to conclude an agreement? 


                    One of the initiating memoranda drawn up by the British government stated: “It is desirable to conclude some agreement with the USSR to the effect that the Soviet Union will come to our aid if we are attacked from the East, not only in order to force Germany to fight on two fronts, but also, probably, because - and this is the most important thing... if war begins, then an attempt should be made to draw the Soviet Union into it.


                    And the British themselves were going to fight if the Teuton attacked the USSR, but would not fight against Great Britain?

                    What do the memoirs of British politicians say?
                    1. -1
                      22 June 2025 16: 35
                      And the British themselves were going to fight if the Teuton attacked the USSR, but would not fight against Great Britain?

                      Yes, they were going to. This was provided for in the agreed draft agreement on the entry into force of the union.
                      According to the Anglo-French draft agreement of May 27 (with Soviet amendments of June 2), which was taken as the basis for further negotiations, the entry into force of the union was envisaged in the following cases:
                      in the event of an attack by one of the European powers (that is, Germany) on one of the contracting parties;...
              2. 0
                25 June 2025 16: 33
                They wanted to do this, but the USSR decided to make a treaty with Germany instead.

                No, they were simply stalling for time, by the very fact of negotiations interfering with Soviet negotiations with Germany. For example, the English representative had no written authority at all and the task in the instructions was to stall for time. Therefore, Stalin looked at this circus and turned to the one who really wanted to negotiate. It's a pity that he overestimated Hitler.
                1. 0
                  25 June 2025 18: 15
                  The negotiations proceeded slowly, as the parties did not trust each other (interestingly, such problems did not arise with Germany).
                  But they were generally in agreement.
                  According to the Anglo-French draft agreement of May 27 (with Soviet amendments of June 2), which was taken as the basis for further negotiations, the entry into force of the union was envisaged in the following cases:

                  in the event of an attack by one of the European powers (that is, Germany) on one of the contracting parties;
                  in the event of German aggression against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia or Finland (it was assumed that the contracting parties would provide guarantees of protection to all these states);
                  in the event that one of the parties is drawn into a war due to the provision of assistance at the request of a third European country.
                2. 0
                  25 June 2025 18: 22
                  But after the basis for the negotiations had already been agreed upon, the USSR put forward a demand for “indirect aggression,” the meaning of which boiled down to the fact that the USSR itself would decide where to introduce troops, including in the absence of a threat.
                  This was regarded by representatives of Great Britain and France as a demand by the USSR to be given the opportunity to introduce its troops into neighboring countries at will and under any pretext.

                  The negotiations stalled because the USSR insisted on this point.
                  The main problem was that the small European countries believed that if Soviet troops entered the countries, they would not simply leave. As we now know, they were right...
                  1. 0
                    25 June 2025 18: 29
                    The negotiations stalled because the USSR insisted on this point.

                    Naturally he insisted, because a year earlier these same people had sold Czechoslovakia to the Germans. And the most important thing is how the French and the English treat the signed agreements can be seen in the example of Poland negative
                    1. 0
                      25 June 2025 19: 56
                      Uh, are you talking about that Poland, part of which was taken by the USSR, and part by Germany, or about some other Poland? If about that one, then this explains why negotiations were difficult with England and France, and easy with Germany.
                      because a year earlier

                      Half a year earlier.
                      As for the Czech Republic, there was nothing to drain, the Czech Republic did not fight with the Germans.
                      1. 0
                        25 June 2025 20: 18
                        Uh, are you talking about the Poland, part of which was taken by the USSR and part by Germany, or about some other Poland?

                        Yes, the same government whose government crossed the border with Romania on September 17, the same France which pledged to bomb Germany immediately, to launch an offensive a week after the start of mobilization with limited objectives, and to launch a general offensive after the concentration of the main forces. Instead, 21 million leaflets were dropped on Germany.
                        As for the Czech Republic, there was nothing to drain, the Czech Republic did not fight with the Germans.

                        A year ago, right in Munich, in September 1938. The transfer of the Sudetenland created a huge hole in the border fortifications, on which the Czechoslovakians planned to defend themselves.
                      2. 0
                        25 June 2025 23: 44
                        The Czech Republic did not fight because its army fell apart due to the fact that a significant part of them were Slovaks and together with the entry of the Germans they went home. And the Sudetenland had nothing to do with it.
                        the very one to which France pledged to bomb Germany immediately...

                        The French and the English immediately declared war on Germany, which eventually led to the fall of fascism. And the fact that they had fewer opportunities than they wanted is no secret. It is better to be rich and healthy than poor and sick, who argues.
                        France, in any case, did not lay claim to the territory of Poland, otherwise it would have been an embarrassment. Thanks to Churchill with three matches, he found a solution to the problem.
                      3. 0
                        26 June 2025 12: 18
                        The Czech Republic did not fight

                        At the time of the crises, the army was combat-ready, but when an "ally" persuaded them to surrender part of their territory, and Poland joined the banquet, the Czechs simply chose the best option possible. By September 1938, France had mobilized 37 infantry divisions against 7 German reserve divisions (they had only managed to train first-priority reservists, and had only just recruited the second), and another was being formed from border guards. If France had supported Czechoslovakia, the Germans would have had to dismantle the strike group, and their Czech army would have been enough for that.
                        The French and the British immediately declared war on Germany

                        They announced it, but didn't start it.
                        France, in any case, did not lay claim to the territory of Poland, otherwise it would have been an embarrassment.

                        Thus, Poland did not consider France its main enemy, and did not occupy part of the territory of France, which it received while trying to capture Vilnius. wink
                        Thanks to Churchill and his three matches, I found a solution to the problem.

                        And this guy occupied part of Denmark's territory when necessary.
                      4. 0
                        4 July 2025 18: 49
                        and there the Czech army would have been enough.

                        There was no Czech army at all as such at the time of the Germans’ entry; it was incapable of fighting, since Slovakia had declared independence, and the Slovaks did not want to fight for the Czechs.
                      5. 0
                        5 July 2025 07: 12
                        since Slovakia declared independence

                        The Slovak Parliament declared the independence of the Slovak Republic on March 14, 1939.
                      6. 0
                        5 July 2025 11: 25
                        Yes. And it is not accidental. At the same time as the introduction of German troops into the Czech Republic. The Czechs had no opportunity to reorganize the army - and the Slovaks did not want to fight for them. The army fell apart. The situation with the possible separation of Slovakia was known and expected - in Slovakia, Hlinka's Slovak People's Party was in power - a clerical-fascist Christian ultra-nationalist Slovak party. The autonomy of Slovakia was declared back in the fall of 1938, the question of complete separation was hanging in the air, everyone was waiting for it.
                      7. 0
                        5 July 2025 13: 21
                        Yes. And this is not by chance.

                        Naturally, because our first Sudeten crisis was in March 1938, and the second in September, the annexation of the Sudetenland in October 1938. But you are putting the cart before the horse.
                      8. 0
                        5 July 2025 14: 44
                        You have a substitution of concepts. The Sudeten crisis and the Munich Agreement and the invasion of Czechoslovakia are not the same thing.
                      9. 0
                        6 July 2025 11: 29
                        You are confusing the Sudetenland Crisis and the Munich Agreement with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939.
                      10. 0
                        7 July 2025 12: 33
                        I'm not getting anything mixed up, if instead of the Sudetenland the Germans get a hole from a donut they will have to fight, and if the French army starts an offensive, the Germans will simply die fighting on two fronts at the same time. That's it, World War II is over.
                      11. 0
                        7 July 2025 22: 46
                        Ah, an alternative reality. In the usual reality, the French didn't really want to fight, they had fought enough in the First World War, like Bumbarash from the movie, so they only started fighting when they were really pressed.
                      12. 0
                        8 July 2025 11: 39
                        alternative reality.

                        They didn't really want to, but by September 1938 they had assembled 37 infantry divisions. Let me remind you that on the other side there were 7 German reserves, in which they managed to train the first-priority reserve, they managed to recruit the second and only began training. Another one was formed from border guards. To the front 144 km, yeah.
                        Well, the French are so "stupid" that they couldn't add 2+2.
      2. -2
        22 June 2025 14: 43
        Not to a specific Archive with a folder storage location

        Everything is indicated there. A specific archive with the folder storage location.
        AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 675. L. 108. Typescript. Certified copy.
        Go for it.
        Hitler himself wrote in the same book

        That Germany should under no circumstances wage war on two fronts - in the West and in the East at the same time, this leads to losing the war. If you haven't read this little book, write to me, I'll send you a quote.
        Sergey, you have a typical "alternative history" address.

        The grief is a conclusion that does not lend itself to adequate analysis.

        For me, everything is based on facts that have been known for a long time. But for you, it is based on internal convictions, contrary to reality.
        Try reading this.
        https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Эскапизм
        All the industrialization and modernization of agriculture, is it just for "living better, more fun" or preparation for war?

        Towards an abstract war, not a concrete one. The world revolution was postponed, but no one removed it from the agenda, only the tactics changed.
        Exercises of 1935 of the Kyiv Military District?

        In 1939, the situation changed radically - the USSR concluded two key treaties with Germany - one on non-aggression with appendices on the delimitation of spheres of influence, the second treaty - on friendship with Germany, if you are not aware, as well as trade agreements.
        ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дого_о_дружбе_и_граница_между_СССР_и_Германии
        The USSR openly spoke out against England and France, calling them aggressors against Germany, especially noting that it is impossible to fight against the ideology of Hitlerism, as the Anglo-French coalition declared. Read Molotov's speech at the extraordinary congress.
        And after this, Molotov went to Berlin - an unprecedented rarity, before that he had not traveled abroad since 1921 - to negotiate the accession of the USSR to the alliance of the Axis powers.
        The photo shows him on November 12, 1940, at a meeting in the Reich Chancellery during this trip.
        The leaders' recollection that it was necessary to delay the war, the army and the economy were not yet sufficiently prepared in 1939, 1940, 1941?

        Please provide the relevant documents. pre-war (and not post-war "memories"). There is a famous article by Putin about how no plans for war with Hitler were found in the archives - and he is undoubtedly right, this followed from the entire logic of relations with Germany before the war.
    2. 0
      24 June 2025 06: 00
      I read somewhere long ago that Molotov later assessed these negotiations as a bait, Stalin agreed with him. And Ribbentrop's invitation was rejected by Molotov immediately without consultations with Moscow, since such an option was assumed and worked out.
      1. +1
        24 June 2025 08: 56
        I read somewhere a long time ago that Molotov later...

        This is all hindsight reasoning, when we already knew what happened next.
        What's the temptation?
        And Ribbentrop's invitation was rejected by Molotov immediately, without consultation with Moscow.

        Nothing of the sort. The USSR put forward a list of its proposals for concluding an agreement, but it did not satisfy Germany's other allies, in particular on the Black Sea straits and other issues.
    3. +1
      24 June 2025 22: 56
      The most important fact is not mentioned - the army was not prepared for the attack, since the top leadership did not believe in this attack.

      the fact that from 1938 to 1941 the Red Army grew from 1,5 million to 5 million indicates that the leadership was preparing for war

      back in the autumn and winter of 1940, negotiations were underway on the full accession of the USSR to the pact, and they fell through only because of the position of Germany's other allies (primarily in Southern Europe), but not Germany itself - what kind of attack could there be talk of? Why would Germany attack if there were no fundamental disagreements between the countries, and Germany itself was busy with a completely different war.


      This is the first time I've heard about the position of other allies
      Regarding the claims, Germany's strategy was to conquer living space in the east, precisely to provide itself with raw materials and remove the threat of a war on two fronts

      That is why no plans for an attack on Germany by the USSR were found anywhere - the USSR simply did not need it, there was no reason for such a war.

      you are right, there were no serious plans in principle, but this only speaks of the senselessness of such goals for the USSR, but does not speak of close friendship
      1. 0
        25 June 2025 00: 00
        the leadership was preparing for war

        And even fought - in Europe, in the Far East, Germany was arming itself. We are talking specifically about the situation after September 1939 and December 1940.
        Germany's strategy was to conquer living space in the east, precisely to provide itself with raw materials and remove the threat of a war on two fronts

        Germany started a war on two fronts, if you didn't know.
        this only speaks of the senselessness of such goals for the USSR

        Of course, there was complete friendship with Germany since September 1939, officially confirmed by the corresponding treaty.
        1. 0
          25 June 2025 00: 04
          Germany started a war on two fronts, if you didn't know.


          Can you tell me where was the western front for Germany after December 1940? In the middle of the English Channel? And how were the battles there? Heavy?
          1. 0
            25 June 2025 07: 26
            World War II started in 1939 and ended in 1945, if you didn't know. And, surprisingly, Germany was involved the whole time. But do you have your own history, an alternative one? I won't disturb you...
            1. -1
              25 June 2025 08: 15
              you've gone off the deep end in a few years, you wrote it yourself
              about the situation after September 1939 and December 1940

              I wrote to you about the situation with the second front at that moment
              1. -1
                25 June 2025 08: 37
                I understood your position perfectly - there was no war before 1941. Alternative reality.
  14. -1
    22 June 2025 16: 36
    It shows that the tragedy was not the result of a single miscalculation, but the consequence of a whole series of circumstances: insufficient preparation, poor intelligence, late mobilization and ill-considered deployment of troops. The picture is complex, but honest.

    Not a late mobilization, but rather a concept of war in which there will be time for mobilization.
    1. -1
      24 June 2025 17: 27
      That is, today, everyone is so smart and literate in strategic and operational terms, it would be possible to reach the English Channel in a troika with bells in two weeks... But for some reason it’s like in the forties - the fourth year...
  15. -1
    22 June 2025 19: 44
    Quote from shikin
    Secondly. It was possible, of course, to prepare better for the first strike (by the way, the fleet and the OVO for some reason managed to prepare)
    From the memoirs of M. Zakharov.
    In fulfillment of the NKO directive of June 12, 1941, the border districts began to pull up a number of divisions and corps located in the depths, closer to the state border.
    At the urgent request of the Military Council of the Odessa Military District, by personal order of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov of June 14, the Odessa Military District According to the mobilization plan, it was permitted to "separate the army command and on 21.6.1941 move it to Tiraspol", that is, transfer the command of the 9th Army to the field command post. At the same time, it was ordered that the district command, headed by the deputy commander of the district, General N. E. Chibisov, be left in Odessa to lead the troops located in Crimea.

    In the Odessa Military District, the Red Army units began replacing border guards on June 14.06.1941, XNUMX, since the Military Council of the Odessa Military District, having received the consent of G.K. Zhukov to allocate an army command, understood it in a broader interpretation.
    Fleet.
    As I recently wrote, the Red Army had two levels of combat readiness at the beginning of the war.
    a) Daily combat readiness
    b) Full combat readiness

    Due to its specific nature, the Red Navy had three levels of combat readiness established at the start of the war.
    Operational readiness No. 3 - the normal readiness of ships and units in service. In this case, they are engaged in daily combat training, live a normal life, but maintain fuel reserves, keep weapons and mechanisms in good working order and at a certain level of readiness. Corresponds to the concept of "daily readiness" in the Red Army.
    Operational readiness No. 2 is higher. The ships take on all necessary supplies, put their equipment in order, and establish a certain duty. Shore leave is reduced to a minimum. The personnel remains on the ships. In such a state, the ships can live for a long time, although such a life requires a certain amount of stress. (There was no analogue in the Red Army in 1941)
    The highest level of readiness is Operational Readiness No. 1. It is declared when the situation is dangerous. Here, all weapons and all mechanisms must be able to go into action immediately, all personnel must be at their posts. Having received the agreed signal, each ship and each unit acts in accordance with the instructions they have. (The equivalent in the Red Army is full combat readiness).
    It so happened that the Black Sea Fleet returned from scheduled exercises on June 18, 1941. During the scheduled exercises, the Black Sea Fleet was in operational readiness No. 2. People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov decided to leave the Black Sea Fleet in this readiness "until the situation becomes clearer."
    Seeing that German ships began to leave Soviet ports on the Baltic en masse from June 16, 1941, without having completed loading or unloading, N.G. Kuznetsov (read his memoirs)
    On June 19, the Baltic Fleet was transferred to operational readiness No. 2. This, to some extent, protected it from any surprises. The Northern Fleet was calmer than the Baltic, but we transferred it to the same readiness.

    Well, already on the night of June 22.06.1941, 1, a coded cipher message was sent to the fleets, transferring three fleets to operational readiness No. XNUMX.
    After all, the Red Navy compared to the Red Army is like a battalion compared to a division.
    On June 22, 1941, the Red Army numbered 5 people.
    On June 22, 1941, the number of the USSR Navy was 344 thousand people.
    And this is together with coastal bases and naval aviation.
    The number of actual sailing personnel was significantly smaller.
    As of June 22, 1941, the Red Navy's naval complement consisted of:
    3 ships of the line;
    7 cruisers;
    59 leaders and destroyers (of which 9 are from the Pacific Fleet)
    218 submarines (of which 89 are Pacific Fleet);
    269 ​​torpedo boats (of which 135 are Pacific Fleet);
    22 patrol ships (including 6 from the Pacific Fleet);
    88 minesweepers (of which 30 are from the Pacific Fleet and 24 from the Amur and Caspian flotillas);
    77 submarine hunters and a number of other ships and boats, as well as auxiliary vessels (33 of which are Pacific Fleet).
    There is radio communication with all ships. With bases and airfields - too. That is why the transfer to Operational readiness No. 1 (to full combat readiness) in the RKKF was more coordinated than in the RKKA.
    Kuznetsov himself was People's Commissar of the USSR Navy from April 29, 1939 (at the age of 34). By the beginning of the war, Kuznetsov had already been in the post of People's Commissar for more than 2 years.
    Timoshenko became People's Commissar of Defense on May 7, 1940 (at the age of 45).
  16. +1
    22 June 2025 23: 46
    I didn't watch Isaev, but the reason for the defeat is not hidden behind seven seals. The main thing is the lack of competent strategists in the Red Army, like Barclay in the war of 1812. Let's imagine that the Russian army tried to give a general battle to Napoleon at the beginning of the war. 100% defeat would have been ensured. Zhukov did not understand the strategic situation and tried to mobilize the maximum number of troops to repel the first attack. Which was completely consistent with the plan of the German command. What could have been done? - Withdrawal of the main forces to the Stalin line, including all mechanized corps, organization of ambushes and partisan bases along the enemy's path, redeployment of the fleet to Kronstadt and Murmansk, organization and dispersal of food depots in Leningrad, withdrawal of aviation beyond the range of enemy fighters. And our losses in the war would have decreased at least 10 times.
    1. 0
      24 June 2025 14: 03
      Zhukov did not understand the strategic situation and tried to mobilize the maximum number of troops to repel the first attack. Which was completely in line with the plans of the German command. What could have been done? - Withdraw the main forces to the Stalin Line, including all mechanized corps, organize ambushes and partisan bases along the enemy's path, redeploy the fleet to Kronstadt and Murmansk, organize and disperse food depots in Leningrad, withdraw aviation beyond the range of enemy fighters. And our losses in the war would have been reduced by at least 10 times.

      This is all an effect of hindsight. And a lack of understanding of reality. Like "organizing food warehouses" in a city with a population of 3 million people. Or "withdrawing the main forces" under the dominance of enemy aviation.
    2. -1
      24 June 2025 23: 41
      I do not agree with you
      Yes, if we talk about losses, the USSR essentially lost its professional army in 1941,
      but what did this give in terms of the strategy you are talking about
      two tank groups from the main direction to Moscow had to be turned first to the south, to encircle Kyiv, and then to the north to help the other flank, the Germans stopped for 2 months near Smolensk to tighten their flanks. At the same time, these tank groups were constantly involved in battles, suffering losses, losing resources, and even in this state they reached almost Moscow. What would have happened if they had gone to Moscow without stopping?
      That is, during the battles of 41, tank groups were worn down and lost their power, which led to the fact that already in 1942, instead of 4 tank groups, the Wehrmacht de facto had only two.

      Withdrawal of the main forces to the Stalin Line

      We wouldn't have even had time, the Germans had already reached the Stalin line on the 4th day
      Well, let me remind you of France and the Maginot Line (it was a more powerful fortification than the Stalin Line), it was broken through in one day, two infantry armies, sorry, even the tanks didn't have time to arrive
  17. +1
    23 June 2025 09: 09
    The fact that for over a year we have been stepping on the same rake - regularly ending up surrounded by entire armies and even fronts - shows that no matter how we prepared for the first blow of the Germans in 41, the result by mid-42 would have been almost the same. The reasons are weak intelligence, weak troop mobility, a catastrophic lack of radio communications, and inept command from the top down.
  18. +1
    23 June 2025 11: 03
    Could the defeat of June 22, 1941 have been avoided?

    1. The defeat in 1941 did not happen. If the USSR suffered a defeat in 1941, it could not have happened on May 9, 1945.
    There was a temporary retreat in the face of a superior enemy.
    2. The retreat in 1941 was absolutely inevitable since the German army was already mobilized and the German transport network had 2 or more times better throughput capacity and XNUMX or more times shorter average distance for transportation. So the scenario when the Red Army is ahead of the Wehrmacht in mobilization and concentration on the border is fantasy. No intelligence can change anything here. If the USSR was the first to strike a preventive blow with limited forces or declared mobilization before the German attack, then the result would be much worse than in reality both from the military and from the creation of an anti-German coalition and from the motivation of the population of both sides for war.
    3. It would have been possible to reduce the losses of the Red Army in 1941 at least 2 times if the Soviet military command had a more realistic idea of ​​the war, and did not fly in the clouds with its tank illusions and crazy counterattacks by tank corps. The defense of Brest, Odessa, Tallinn, Leningrad, Sevastopol and so on is a demonstration of what they could do in 1941, on a much larger scale and not improvised. They could have prepared supplies in advance and defended several dozen cities (in the first place Minsk and Kyiv) much further west and avoided rapid disintegration and the capture of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. But this is knowledge after the fight.
    What is even more depressing is that this has not been understood to this day by a number of military historians and they continue to relish reconnaissance, concentration on the border and a preemptive strike.
    And this non-conceptual lesson of history causes damage even today under the form of "preventive strike with extremely insufficient forces" or in other words SVO. SVO is a classic legacy of the idea occupying the heads of Soviet commanders at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War until Stalin took direct command of the Red Army into his own hands at the end of July 1941.
    I don’t want to think what could have come out of such a military operation in May-June 1941 against the Wehrmacht.
  19. The comment was deleted.
  20. +1
    23 June 2025 22: 31
    The pain and misfortune of our people, who lost 27 million.
    And there is no simple, unambiguous explanation for the catastrophe of 41-42. There are several factors, each of which is quite significant.
    And yet I cannot absolve Stalin's leadership of blame for the incompetent preparation for war at the last stage. The probable enemy, that is, Germany, was known from the Spanish events of 36-38. And the events of 39-40 pointed to this. So there can be no talk of any "surprise" or "insidiousness". Here someone remembered Simonov's "The Living and the Dead". So one of the characters there - an old militiaman said something like - they gathered an entire army under our noses, and they say "surprise". Yes, there were no satellites, but wasn't it clear from other reconnaissance methods that an invasion was being prepared.
    Don't provoke and observe the Pact - for God's sake, withdraw the bulk of the troops 50-100 km from the border and slowly build a defensive line. There is no way to accuse them of provocation. But in fact, what happened was the June-July defeat for which Pavlov was shot, although the General Staff and the Politburo headed by Stalin were to blame.
    1. +1
      23 June 2025 22: 45
      Apparently, the USSR leadership did not have a real plan of action in case of a German attack. And it definitely should have been and updated monthly, if not more often. It is simply beyond comprehension how they could have actually given over a million of their soldiers to be torn apart in just the first months of the war.
      And the plan for starting the war should be defensive on prepared lines. Because Germany had, thanks to its technological advantage, more mobile troops equipped with more modern weapons, better officers and generals.
      The USSR's advantage is in territory, human and material resources. And in order to realize it, it is necessary to hold out in a defensive battle, mobilize the economy, and complete the rearmament of the army that has begun.
      I don’t think that Stalin and his entourage didn’t understand this, but it still turned out the way it did.
      1. -1
        24 June 2025 00: 32
        Apparently, the USSR leadership had no real plan of action in the event of a German attack
        There were plans, of course, but they expected German attacks in other places and in other directions. Historians are still arguing whether our VPR knew the details of "Barbarossa" and to what extent. It is quite possible that the Germans, having received information about our plans, adjusted theirs and struck where we least expected.
      2. -1
        25 June 2025 16: 30
        And the plan for starting a war must be defensive on prepared lines.

        Doesn't it bother you at all that it is more difficult to defend than to attack? For example, the Germans' strategic defense in 1943-1945 ended with the fall of Berlin, England and France held out from a defensive position from May 10 to June 22, 1940. Where does such confidence come from in the senior command staff of the Red Army of 1941?
    2. 0
      24 June 2025 00: 18
      The probable enemy, that is, Germany, was known from the Spanish events of 36-38. And the events of 39-40 pointed to this.


      Well, how did you know? Between us and Germany in 1936-38 there was still Poland and its allies France and England, in the east there was another enemy - Japan
      so I would say that most likely Germany was seen as a source of danger, nothing more
      and the fact that France will fall in 40 days and Poland in 36, most likely came as a surprise to the whole world
  21. The comment was deleted.
  22. 0
    24 June 2025 19: 44
    Shaposhnikov proposed not to move the main forces to new territories. This was not accepted by Stalin. There were other proposals to arrange defense lines not along the new border, but in depth. Stalin accused the military of defeatism.

    The USSR was able to use several resources: huge open spaces - there was somewhere to retreat. And resources prepared in advance for evacuation and deployment of industry in the rear.
    1. +1
      24 June 2025 23: 58
      Shaposhnikov proposed not to move the main forces

      you didn't get the whole phrase
      "Shaposhnikov proposed to keep the main forces of the western border districts within the old state border, and to deploy only cover units to the territories annexed after the division of Poland, capable of ensuring the deployment of the main forces in the event of a sudden attack"

      The question is, what number of forces would be sufficient to ensure the deployment of the main forces on June 22, 1941?
      taking into account that in the Minsk region the Germans, with real resistance, reached the old border already on June 24
    2. -1
      25 June 2025 16: 27
      Shaposhnikov proposed not to move the main forces to new territories.

      Sounds more like a fairy tale. Let's assume that the main forces were left on the old border, and some cover forces on the new one. The distance from Brest to Minsk along the highway is 351 km, 3 normal daily marches for a tank division or 2 forced ones. Will the Red Army have time to mobilize and deploy in 2 days? How to deploy obviously weaker cover forces in such a way as to slow down the tank groups? When he was Chief of General Staff, Shaposhnikov proposed completely different actions as the first operations of the fronts in the West.
  23. -1
    25 June 2025 01: 28
    I am interested in history, including the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. For several years, I have read various sources. What can I say on this topic?
    The first thing I want to draw attention to is that almost all the analysis comes down to arrows on maps, counting tanks, planes, guns. Moreover, they begin the analysis guided by their modern ideas, not understanding that at that time there were much more limited opportunities, which we do not know about, because we simply did not have to deal with such limitations in our lives.
    Second. The Germans had excellent intelligence, and it is safe to say that they had their agents, including in our General Staff. And as I understand it, they were absolutely confident in their plans to defeat the USSR.
    Third. I am sure that the tragic beginning of the war was due to the development of the USSR economy. Yes, industrialization was carried out and continued in the USSR. In fact, the basis of industry at the beginning of the war was seven to eight years old. It is impossible to raise a highly skilled worker from an illiterate peasant in such a short period of time, especially in conditions when there was no one to teach properly, everyone learned on the go. Yes, the industry of the USSR was able to establish mass production of certain types of products, but very often at the expense of quality. Probably one of the most serious failures is the failure in transport engineering.
    Well, fourth, but not least important. All the preparation of the USSR for war, the preparation of the economy, army and navy, allowed to survive in this war. The Red Army, in overwhelming numbers, with all its shortcomings, perished, but was able to delay the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him, and disrupted the blitzkrieg. Having gained time to move and deploy industry. The war was won by another army, the one that was recreated in the late autumn-winter of 1941-1942.
    What can I say? Just bow before their courage, both those who died directly in battle, and those who were captured in the chaos of the beginning of the war, their fate was terrible. And remember.
    1. +1
      26 June 2025 18: 17
      Yes, you have correctly noted this aspect of the tragedy of 41/42. Let's call it objective. But there were also subjective ones. For example, how to evaluate the vague orders from Moscow literally on the eve of June 22. Either do not give in to provocations, or stop violations of the border, but do not cross it, or declare combat readiness, or not. I will not try to repeat these orders verbatim, but their meaning was this - essentially criminal, since it predetermined the confusion of the first days and at the same time the events of June-July.
      Not long ago (maybe a year ago) there was a discussion somewhere about 41 in the form of criticism and reviews of a book published on this topic. Sorry, I don't remember. I want to note another subjective aspect - the low qualifications of our generals and officers compared to the Germans. The USSR could not create its own military school in less than 20 years, and very little was left as a legacy from the tsarist army. This was aggravated by mass repressions among officers and generals. Although Tukhachevsky and his ilk apparently deserved their fate.
      In Germany, despite the defeat in WWI, the military school and caste have been perfectly preserved since the 19th century.
      1. 0
        27 June 2025 20: 35
        Unfortunately, what we mostly studied about the history of the Great Patriotic War was developed under Khrushchev, when it was accepted to blame everything on Stalin and his closest associates. Some military leaders joined Khrushchev, who wanted to deflect responsibility from themselves. It is very difficult to understand without delving into the primary sources, often the documents show the exact opposite of what is considered true. And since most of the memoirs of war participants were written in the 70-80s, the authors were forced to adhere to the party line when writing.
        You noted that the Germans were experienced, well-trained and qualified soldiers. Yes, it was, although I do not agree, a negative assessment of our officers and generals. It is just that our and the German command had a different set of tools.
        As for the confusion before the war and at the very beginning. Here it must be said right away that our intelligence lost to the Abwehr, yes, truthful information came to us, but there was also a lot of false information. Unfortunately, our intelligence got tangled up in the triangle of England, Germany, USSR. The Germans were already at war with England, and said that they did not need a war on two fronts, and were moving troops closer to the USSR, to demonstrate to the British. The British, in turn, fiercely hated the USSR, and were interested in pitting Germany and the USSR against each other. Although it was perfectly known that in 1939, the British were going to occupy Baku and only the beginning of the world war prevented them. The second point is that the Abwehr managed to almost completely disrupt military communications. Which led to confusion at all levels, and basically decisions were made based on assumptions about affairs at the front. Hence, accordingly, there were many, as it seems to us, inadequate orders.
        The fact that they said that on the morning of June 22, the Germans bombed cities, naval bases, destroyed all aircraft at the airfields - this is Khrushchev's nonsense. Well, the Germans did not physically have so many planes to cause such damage. Moreover, according to German data, the daily losses of the Luftwaffe, for the first three days, were the highest in the entire war on the Eastern Front.
        The catastrophe began when German tanks reached the airfields. When relocating, faulty aircraft were abandoned, and even in a peacetime regiment there are usually 15-20 of them, sometimes more, sometimes less. There was simply nothing to transport them with. The same situation was with the ground forces, when there was nothing to tow, although good, but quite heavy artillery guns. As a result, after two or three waves of retreat, the aviation was left without aircraft, the ground units without heavy weapons, and then warehouses with ammunition, fuel, spare parts were lost, and the crisis gained even more power. The troops did not flee, fought to the best of their ability and capabilities, often surrounded, died, but gained time.
  24. +2
    25 June 2025 16: 16
    I wonder what happened to the well-armed, experienced, mobilized French army that had been sitting in the trenches for a year, had allies, and surrendered France in a matter of weeks.
    1. +1
      25 June 2025 16: 24
      I wonder what happened to the well-armed, experienced, mobilized

      She also gave the initiative into the hands of the Germans, lost her advantages and was defeated in 6 weeks. hi
  25. -1
    26 June 2025 18: 08
    that's exactly it, it wasn't about intelligence! It's just that a tired, all-knowing sage put half the generals in jail and shot others
    and he put yesterday's brigade commanders like Pavlov in charge of the districts, who had no idea
    how to manage such connections!!! for which they also paid with their lives later
    that's the whole story down to the last penny
    1. -1
      26 June 2025 18: 11
      and he put yesterday's brigade commanders like Pavlov in charge of the districts, who had no idea

      Come on, come on, tell Pavlov how to fight successfully with a manpower ratio of 1:6,5?
      1. 0
        26 June 2025 18: 11
        this is the second point! and the first is that the guy didn't know how to manage such a number of troops
        which were not yet equipped, tanks in one place, fuel God knows where
        The logbook of many divisions in the Central Intelligence Agency is still classified
        what else can I tell you? read more all the questions will fly away by themselves
        1. +1
          26 June 2025 18: 19
          this is the second point!

          This is the first point, it is called preemption in mobilization and deployment. Actually, you can always compare, French generals were not imprisoned, the republic was "correct", the experience of WWI... however, the allies in continental Europe lasted for 6 weeks.
          1. -1
            26 June 2025 20: 03
            I don't give a damn about these rooster troops, think about your own if they are yours
            1. 0
              26 June 2025 20: 05
              I don't give a damn about these rooster troops, think about your own if they are yours

              Well, yes, once the specifics started coming, did they give up?
              1. 0
                26 June 2025 20: 48
                where are the specifics? tie some kind of cock-and-bull tales from the ceiling??
                here are all your specifics
                1. +1
                  27 June 2025 08: 46
                  where are the specifics?

                  How can Pavlov successfully defend himself with a 1:6,5 manpower ratio?
                  1. 0
                    30 June 2025 21: 19
                    he would have screwed everything up even with the same ratio!
                    you look at what he did and what others did in the same circumstances
                    it's just that they were scientists and he wasn't
                    1. 0
                      1 July 2025 13: 42
                      he would have screwed everything up even with the same ratio!

                      What equality? War is not a sporting duel, the struggle for initiative presupposes an offensive, i.e. in some areas we would have more forces.
              2. -1
                27 June 2025 00: 03
                Very simple specifics. All that was required was to issue ammunition, fuel, and bring the troops into the field to the defense lines and prepare the reception points for the personnel of the PPLS. What other specifics were needed?
                1. +1
                  27 June 2025 08: 53
                  Very simple specifics.

                  Okay, let's assume the divisions were brought out into the field. We have peacetime, the 4/100 rifle division has a staff strength of 10 people, for example, in the 291th Army there are 4 rifle divisions and the 4nd fortified region on a front 62 km wide, an average of 150 km per unit. How are you going to successfully defend yourself?
                  1. 0
                    27 June 2025 12: 42
                    You are obviously not a military man, since you did not pay attention to the text in its entirety.
                    1. 0
                      27 June 2025 13: 51
                      You are obviously not a military man, since you did not pay attention to the text in its entirety.

                      This is a hint that the commander of a military district cannot declare mobilization in a single Western Special Military District and begin deployment.
                      1. 0
                        28 June 2025 12: 07
                        In fact, the deployment of the PPLS does not mean mobilization, but preparation for reception. There are packages, secret, in the headquarters. They are opened, and it is written where, how and what to deploy.
                      2. 0
                        28 June 2025 15: 12
                        They are opened and it says where, how and what to unfold.

                        What's the difference? According to the note from September 1940, the 4th Army was supposed to have 10 rifle, 2 tank, motorized division, Pinsk river flotilla, not counting the front reserves. Compare 4 and 10.
      2. 0
        5 July 2025 13: 21
        Well, he himself created, in some areas, such a balance of power.
        1. 0
          5 July 2025 13: 25
          That's right, this is the struggle for initiative, when the enemy is forced to leave part of his mobile forces in reserve, like the Germans did with the 24th Panzer Corps in the summer of 1943.
  26. 0
    27 June 2025 09: 47
    The Molotov line of defense could have helped if it had been completed and staffed, but construction was already proceeding at lightning speed. There was no time. In addition, the population in the border areas was extremely anti-Soviet and interfered with the construction. There was a nation of businessmen there who were simply waiting for German Mercedes.
    1. 0
      28 June 2025 21: 43
      "A bad dancer... is always hindered by something"
  27. 0
    28 June 2025 21: 42
    Don't you think that the situation with SVO is somewhat... similar?
    1. 0
      28 June 2025 23: 04
      The similarity is that the forces of international capitalism today support Ukraine, and then the Third Reich, their enemy was communism - the greatest threat to the enemies of humanity, sadists, psychopaths. Today, Russia is not a mortal enemy for them, because of the economic system, so the involvement is less. But in the future, it is unknown how it will be. If someone thinks that this is nonsense, because the US fought the Germans and Japan, then they do not know that under capitalism, war must continue, this is a feature of this system. They do not kill "their own", because they themselves do not go into the trenches. And as long as they themselves are untouchable, the war can continue. But the USSR was something more, it was a system that threatened them more than bullets from rifles, from which they were always safe.
  28. 0
    30 June 2025 16: 43
    Isaev (supposedly a historian) is today’s Solzhenitsyn and Guarantor!
  29. 0
    5 July 2025 13: 19
    There was nothing that could be done. This is our price for all the centuries of backwardness, starting from Batu.
  30. 0
    5 July 2025 18: 16
    Defeat could have been avoided, but then the United States would have helped Hitler, and London would have concluded a separate peace in August 1941.
  31. 0
    6 July 2025 10: 35
    I still find it hard to understand. It was not a defeat, it was a misfortune, the army stood firm, and the memory of the difficult year of 1941 should only be discussed before experts. This time is heartbreaking, we cry, but we should be happy, we won. am