How the Allies Tried to Repeat Waterloo in Crimea
The Allied attack on the Kamchatka lunette on May 26 (June 7), 1855, painting by P. A. Prote
170 years ago, the defenders of Sevastopol repelled a powerful attack by the enemy. The allies timed the capture of the city to coincide with the next anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo. The first serious defeat of the Anglo-French army.
General situation
During the 1855 campaign, the allies continued to build up their forces in Crimea and tried to distract Russian forces in other directions.
Under enemy pressure in the spring, the Russians abandoned Kerch, Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik and Anapa, the fortifications of the Black Sea line were destroyed. The strongholds of the former Black Sea line were occupied by detachments of Turks and highlanders. Russian troops retreated to the Temryuk positions.
The Turkish command proposes that the allies land significant forces on the Caucasian coast and develop an offensive on Yekaterinodar, which would ease Turkey’s position on the Caucasian front, where the Russians threatened Kars.
In May, the "light" allied squadron entered the Sea of Azov, destroyed Genichesk, bombarded and unsuccessfully stormed Taganrog with a landing force, and shelled Mariupol. Allied landing forces landed without encountering resistance in Berdyansk, Yeisk, Temryuk, destroying forage and food supplies there. At sea, the allies sank and burned all the ships they caught, including fishing boats.
The enemy squadron entered the Sea of Azov for the second time on June 10. This time it was at sea for a month and a half and shelled most of the coastal villages. The allies often landed troops, smashed and burned. Villages were attacked along the entire coast, from the Arabat Spit to the mouth of the Don. The cities of Berdyansk and Taganrog were subjected to particularly brutal bombardment.
The Allies again sent a large force to the Baltic fleet with the aim of destroying the Russian Baltic Fleet. But the Russian ships did not go to sea, so the allies again limited themselves to shelling coastal fortifications and fortresses.
The allied squadron was also sent to the White Sea again. The allies caused material damage to the White Sea region by destroying coastal settlements and capturing ships. During the navigation of 1855, Anglo-French ships approached Solovki five times, but did not dare to storm it.
In the Pacific theater, Russia successfully evacuated Petropavlovsk, which successfully repelled an enemy attack in 1854 (Heroic defense of Petropavlovsk). In May 1855, the Anglo-French squadron bombarded the now empty city. Zavoiko's squadron successfully passed the enemy forces, crossed to the Amur and founded Nikolaevsk. In September, the allies occupied Urup (Kuriles) and held it until the conclusion of the Paris Peace.
By the beginning of 1855, Russian forces near Sevastopol ("We will fight to the last!") were superior to the allied forces. Emperor Nicholas I insistently demanded decisive action from the commander-in-chief of the Russian ground forces in Crimea, Alexander Menshikov, but he hesitated, showed indecision and missed opportunities for a counteroffensive.
As a result, the Allies significantly increase their forces in Crimea, mainly at the expense of the French. The Allies, not without difficulty, have established logistics and sanitary matters. In January, Sardinia enters the war on the side of England and France and sends its expeditionary corps to the peninsula. The Allies conduct engineering preparations, carry out local attacks, preparing a decisive assault.
Deterioration of the foreign policy situation
In December 1854, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, who had already supported the allies, proposed to St. Petersburg to hold a meeting in Vienna to find a peace agreement.
The meetings of the ambassadors of England, France (Lord Westmoreland and Burken), Russia and the Austrian Foreign Minister Buol began in December 1854 and lasted until April 1855, when they were interrupted without producing any results. Russia was represented by Alexander Gorchakov, the future Foreign Minister under Alexander II.
Gorchakov agreed that Russia was ready to renounce its protectorate over the Danubian principalities in exchange for the patronage of five powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia, England and France); agreed to freedom of navigation in the Danube; to a revision of the 1841 treaty on the straits. Tsar Nicholas also agreed to grant patronage to the Christians of the Ottoman Empire to the collective of all five great powers.
However, England and France wanted to destroy Sevastopol as a base for the Russian fleet, to deprive Russia of the opportunity to have a fleet in the Black Sea. The allies were playing for time so that they could present the captured Sevastopol. At the same time, the French and British were pushing Austria to war with Russia.
Naturally, Russia could not afford to lose its main position on the Black Sea without a decisive defeat in the war. Nicholas demanded that the allies leave Crimea. This was his main demand to sign the armistice.
No one was going to give in, so the Vienna Conference failed.
At that time, there were active rumors in Europe (unstructured governance) about the redrawing of the entire map of the continent. Austria was promised to give up all of the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire if Vienna would oppose the Russians and allow the French army to pass through its territory. Vienna was also to cede all of Lombardy and Venice in Italy to Sardinia. Belgium was to be completely annexed to the French Empire. And the Belgian royal dynasty, represented by the Duke of Brabant, was to reign in Poland, which would be taken away from Russia. Egypt and the islands of Cyprus and Crete were to be given to the English, and Savoy to the French.
A number of German states were inclined to say that they had come out against Russia. That is, a new "campaign of twelve languages" against Russia was being prepared.
John Carmichael. "The Bombardment of Sevastopol in 1855".
Death of the Emperor
On February 18 (March 2), 1855, Emperor Nicholas I died; his heir Alexander II Nikolaevich was not in favor of continuing the war.
The death of the Russian Tsar became another mystery. According to the official version, he caught a cold and died. The failure of foreign policy in Europe and military failures undermined his health.
Nikolai himself was very upset. news, which were coming from the front. Before the war, the Russian Empire was considered the "gendarme of Europe", with the strongest army. Nikolai Pavlovich made a number of mistakes, allowing Russia to be drawn into a trap organized by the British. He was completely mistaken in the pre-war foreign policy situation, believing in the friendly position of England itself, Austria and Prussia.
Rumors were circulating in St. Petersburg that the Tsar had committed suicide. Nikolai Pavlovich, already suffering from a cold, went out in light clothing to parade the troops, then to review the marching battalions. The Tsar's appearance before the troops in the cold without a greatcoat was perceived as an intention to catch a fatal cold. According to the stories, the personal physician Mandt told the Tsar: "Sire, this is worse than death, this is suicide!"
However, the tsar's robust health did not give in. He was recovering. On February 17, his health deteriorated sharply, and on the morning of the 18th, his agony began. Rumors immediately began that the sovereign had taken poison (or had been poisoned). Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna directly accused Mandt of poisoning her brother.
There are a number of oddities. The rapid nature of the disease. Nicholas himself forbade the autopsy and embalming of the body. Mandt's immediate departure from Russia. The opinion of the Romanov biographer N. Schilder that the sovereign "poisoned himself." There are others. Another dark page in the Romanov case.
Siege of Sevastopol
In January 1855, 20 Turkish corps of Omar Pasha were transferred from the Danube theater to Yevpatoria. A Turkish-Tatar garrison and a small detachment of Frenchmen were already stationed in the city. The total forces of the allies reached 30 people.
On February 5 (17), Khrulev's 19-strong corps attempted to defeat the enemy forces in Yevpatoria, but failed. The poorly prepared attack failed. The Russian troops, having lost about 800 men, retreated.
The defeat led to the removal of Commander-in-Chief Menshikov from his post. He was replaced by Mikhail Gorchakov, who had previously unsuccessfully led our troops on the Danube Front.
The new commander-in-chief believed that further defense of all of Sevastopol was futile due to the enemy's superiority in artillery (ammunition) and the growing losses of the Russian garrison. In March, about 9 thousand people were lost killed and wounded, in April - more than 10 thousand, in May - about 17 thousand. Gorchakov proposed to leave the South side.
Meanwhile, the Allied forces at Sevastopol had grown to 120 soldiers (against 40 Russians) with 541 guns (including 130 heavy mortars). There were 466 guns (including 57 mortars) on the Sevastopol fortifications. By laying a narrow-gauge railway from Balaklava to the siege batteries, the Allies quickly received ammunition in large quantities. Supply by sea was faster than transporting supplies to Sevastopol by horse-drawn transport. Therefore, the Russians' supply of shells was limited to 150 charges per gun.
A skilled French military engineer, General Adolphe Niel (Niel), arrived. After the death of General Michel Bizot in April, he took charge of the French engineering units and siege works.
Adolphe Niel (1802 - 1869) in a portrait from 1859.
The main efforts of the allies were directed against the key point of the Russian defense – Malakhov Kurgan. To counteract these works, Nakhimov and his closest assistants, Rear Admiral Istomin and engineer Totleben, moved forward with their left flank and, after a stubborn fight, erected very important advanced fortifications: the Selenginsky and Volynsky redoubts and the Kamchatsky lunette. They covered the approaches to Malakhov Kurgan and kept the allied batteries under crossfire.
The first attempts of the allies in February-March to take these advanced fortifications failed. The battles were extremely stubborn. Thus, at the height of the battles, from 50 to 150 defenders died daily on the Kamchatka lunette. On March 7 (19), 1855, in the area of the Kamchatka lunette, one of the leaders and heroes of the defense of Sevastopol, Rear Admiral Vladimir Ivanovich Istomin, was killed by a cannonball.
Hero of the defense of Sevastopol, Rear Admiral Vladimir Ivanovich Istomin (1810 - 1855). Source: "Portraits of persons who distinguished themselves by their services and commanded active units in the war of 1853-1856". Vol. 1. St. Petersburg, 1858-1861.
Irritated by the delay, under pressure from the French Emperor Napoleon III and public opinion, the allied commanders-in-chief François Canrobert and Lord Raglan (Raglan) tried to increase the pressure on Sevastopol.
From March 28 (April 9) to April 7 (19), the 2nd intensive bombardment of Sevastopol was carried out, during which the allies fired 165 thousand artillery shots, against 89 thousand shots from the Russians. The artillery preparation, contrary to expectations, did not cause serious damage. The Russians restored everything that was destroyed at night. The decisive assault was postponed again.
The allies increase their forces to 170 thousand people. The Kingdom of Sardinia, to which the French promised to transfer lands in Northern Italy (belonging to the Habsburg Empire), sent an expeditionary corps and a naval division in April-May, a total of 24 thousand people.
Napoleon III demanded decisive action and tried to direct military operations from Paris. Canrobert, who did not want interference in his affairs, handed over command to Jean-Jacques Pélissier on May 16. Canrobert himself remained in the army. He commanded a corps.
Pélissier distinguished himself by extremely tough and decisive actions in Algeria. When things in Crimea went sluggishly, Paris began to worry. "We need Suvorov," Napoleon III told his Minister of War. "We have Pélissier," he replied.
K. Hibbert in his book "The Crimean Campaign of 1854-1855" described Pelissier as follows: "This man was the complete opposite of his predecessor. Straightforward and decisive, tough and brave, as cautious as the previous commander was, he was ready to send his soldiers to their death without the slightest hesitation. ... The way Pelissier behaved independently surprised many. It seemed that the numerous telegrams, letters, orders and dispatches with which Napoleon III exhausted Canrobert's nerves did not make any impression on him. He casually shoved the received papers into his pocket, and many were sure that the new commander did not read them at all."
On May 26 (June 7), after the 3rd artillery preparation, Pélissier threw 5 divisions at the fortifications in front of the bastions of the Ship's side. The Russians fought fiercely, but were forced to retreat under the superior forces of the enemy. Having taken the advanced fortifications, the allies opened the way to Malakhov Kurgan.
Before the assault on the Selenginsky and Volynsky redoubts, as well as the Kamchatka lunette, the commander of the 16th Infantry Division, Iosif Zhabokritsky, significantly weakened the garrisons defending them. When the enemy's movements and preparations for the assault were noticed from the forward posts, the general was informed about this. Engineer General Totleben wrote: "But, instead of taking measures to strengthen the garrisons of these fortifications, General Zhabokritsky reported sick and left for the Northern side." Therefore, many accused the general of outright treason.
Russian Commander-in-Chief in Crimea M. D. Gorchakov in Sevastopol, 1855. Portrait taken by an enemy photographer
Allied commanders Lord Raglan, Omer Pasha and J.-J. Pelissier near Sevastopol in 1855. Portrait presented to M. D. Gorchakov
To be continued ...
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