Why the 1917 Revolution Was Inevitable? Living on the Edge: Poverty in Tsarist Russia
“Russia is starving, impoverished, degenerating, and the government is powerless to prevent this or to alleviate the suffering of the people under the current monetary system.”. S. Sharapov, from a report to Emperor Nicholas II.
“The revolution was inevitable, it is called a nationwide revolution… the revolution was the result of dissatisfaction with the old government of absolutely all strata of the population”. A.I. Denikin.
In the second part of the series about the CR: “What the common people could afford in Tsarist Russia. Comparing then - 1914 and now - 2025" an assessment of the purchasing power of the population then and now was made, the costs of food and the approximate cost of living were estimated. The exchange rate of the tsarist ruble was estimated at 1317 rubles/c.rub.
History has preserved for us a large number of photographs from that time. Very often these "frozen" testimonies tell of the high level of poverty of the common people. The stamp of that time, placed on people's faces, often exudes hopelessness and sadness, drying up their eyes and glances.
Let's try to dispel the myths of the liberal media about a well-fed Russia, "which we lost", "splashes of champagne and the crunch of French rolls", directly assessing the most important indicator of the standard of living according to statistics - per capita GDP and the average salary in the Central Rada. But first, let's re-evaluate the income of peasants and find the total number of the poorest strata of the population.
Clarification: assessment of peasant income
In the previous note it was stated that Allen (USA) determined the annual income of peasants at 230 rubles based on Strumilin's work. However, this figure may be overstated - seasonality and expenses are not taken into account.
There is a huge scientific problem of assessing the income of peasants, often received in kind, and not as wages, with associated expenses for maintaining the farm. Assessments were made based on the results of so-called budget studies (not always representative in scale), when economists went to villages. The range of farm profitability could vary greatly depending on the availability of land, horses, and workers (see Chayanov, "Agriculture"). The income of kulaks was much higher, but it is also difficult to find studies.
According to the widely known work of Chayanov, the net annual income per worker in the sample he presented in the CR was from 65 to 140 rubles, or 90 rubles per year on average.
According to another very detailed study: Peasant budgets. Shcherbina F.A. Peasant budgets (1900) we can see the following data for the end of the 19th century. The first table provides very interesting our and international data.
As can be seen from the table, the Yenisei peasants (Siberia) at that time lived quite well (comparable to Ohio and Indiana in the USA), despite the harsh climate and difficulties with agriculture, which was due to the high availability of land - on average, one peasant household had 1213 dessiatines of land, which was more than in European Russia, and developed cattle breeding. But we see that at the same time, our peasantry on average lived much poorer - 2-3 times than abroad.
In the book “The Economic Situation of Settlers in Western Siberia in the Late 1893th – Early 1905th Centuries (71,2-79)” by E. I. Solovyova, data is provided on the distribution of wealth levels of “settlement households” (incomes are not specified): “The poor include those without horses and households with one or two working horses. There were 3% of such settlers in the Tobolsk province, and 4% in the Tomsk province. The middle group in Siberia includes households with 24,8-17,6 working horses. There were 5 and 43,1% of them, respectively. Kulak households had XNUMX or more working horses per household. There were XNUMX% of such households among the settlers in Western Siberia.”
In the book by B. E. Andyusev "SIBERIAN LOCAL STUDIES. Economy, Life, Traditions, Culture of Old-Timers of Yenisei Province in the 4th - Early 6th Centuries" "The middle class included the bulk of old-timer peasants. An ordinary "average" family consisted of 3-550 people with 900 adult workers. The annual income of such a family was on average from 25 to 22 rubles." Here the maximum amount, counting for "adults", is over XNUMX rubles per month, which is slightly higher than the average worker's salary (XNUMX rubles).
Below is the budget balance of peasant farms from Shcherbina's work based on his research:
In the famous work of the Russian ethnographer Olga Semenova-Tyan-Shanskaya, based on her surveys of peasants in the Ryazan province at the turn of the 12th and 77th centuries, “The Life of “Ivan”” paints the following picture: “A peasant family consisting of a husband, wife, the husband’s old mother, and three children, one of whom is a teenager (28 years old). Average income. One horse, one cow, two sheep.” The family’s income for a typical year was 81 rubles, with only 18 rubles earned from selling agricultural produce (sale of oats and cattle), the rest being payment for work for the landowner and transportation. Expenses for the year were 5 rubles. Of these, a fairly large share went to taxes: “duties” - XNUMX rubles, zemstvo tax - XNUMX rubles. If it were not for the extra income outside the farm, the farm would be unprofitable.
As we have seen from many examples cited earlier, a significant number of working households also had "deficit" budgets. In 1902, with an average salary of a Donbass miner of 24 rubles, expenses for the worker himself (food and clothing), according to a survey of 200 families, amounted to 12,33 rubles, for the wife - 9,24 rubles, for two children - also 9,24 rubles. A total of 30 rubles 81 kopecks, which exceeded the worker's income by more than 6 rubles.
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Russian and Soviet historian A. Ostrovsky in his article “On the Degree of Social Stratification in Pre-Revolutionary Russia” examines the assessments of the well-being of the population, including the peasantry, made by B. N. Mironov, the author of the book “panegyric” about tsarist Russia “The Well-being of the Population and Revolutions in Imperial Russia”.
According to Ostrovsky, Mironov, relying on budget research data, does not fully take into account the expenses of peasant farms, as a result, the estimate of the average peasant income of 150 rubles, in his opinion, is overstated. But even this figure, or 12,5 rubles per month, is quite low.
On the contrary, the incomes of agricultural workers were officially reflected (see table) and were comparable or even higher - from 120 to 165 rubles per year (not counting the "rich" Baltics - 216 rubles). Perhaps this is how rich farmers could pay them - on average 10-12 rubles per month.
Taking into account the clarification of data on peasant income, the new table on the level of wages in the Central Region will look like this (conversion rate - 1317 rubles/central ruble).
Wages of the Main Classes in Tsarist Russia (1914)
As the calculations of the famous economist V. Nemchinov showed, in Russia on the eve of October 1917 the social structure of the population included the following groups: peasantry and artisans - 66,7%, bourgeoisie and landowners - 16,3% (including kulaks - 11,4%), workers - 14,8% and intelligentsia - 2,2%. The kulaks, as the support of the system in the village, were quite numerous - 11,4%. Based on this, it can be estimated that the group of middle class and rich people in the Central Rada included about 20% (bourgeois, landowners, kulaks, part of the intelligentsia and the upper layer of workers). A typical figure for a raw materials economy.
About 80% of the population lived quite poorly on wages with an upper limit of about 12,5-16 rubles per month or 16-500 rubles in today's money. For comparison: the average food expense for single workers at that time was 21 rubles, with organized cooperative food - 000 rubles. It was a constant life "on the edge."
Which classes of the population lived the poorest?
To assess the social situation, it is necessary to have an idea of the distribution of income, especially of the poorest part of the population.
Data on the total income of various population groups and their numbers are available in the book by B. N. Mironov, “The Welfare of the Population and Revolutions in Imperial Russia.”
The work contains data on the poorest strata of the population:
According to Ostrovsky, the poorest part of the population in Mironov did not include artisans, whose “annual average per capita earnings” E. E. Kruse determined at 133 rubles, and whose numbers could be estimated at 5 to 15 million people. It has already been pointed out that the peasants’ incomes according to Mironov are overstated and “after the author corrects the data, the average income of 80% of the population is estimated at approximately 70 rubles (i.e., less than the cost of a prisoner).” Let us try to assess whether this is true using macrostatistics.
It should be added that in the late 90s, a number of conferences were created to resolve the problem of the “impoverishment of the Center”: the “Special Conference” chaired by A. I. Zvegintsev, the “Commission of 1901,” and the “Special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry.” The conclusions of the commission boiled down to the fact that the main reason for the “impoverishment” was overpopulation. The commission found that for 50 provinces of European Russia, the number of surplus workers was 23 million, and the percentage of surplus workers to the available number was 52%. This percentage was especially high in the Black Earth Region, where it was from 64 to 67%. These facts determined the possibility of living in poverty among the peasants, about 23 million people, which corresponds to Pershin’s estimates of the number of people who starved during crop failures in Russia. The poorest also included families of workers and peasants who had an insufficient income for their full support. These estimates prepare us to understand the overall level of poverty in the country, which was clearly reflected in the low per capita GDP.
Relationship between per capita GDP and average wage
According to the definition of GDP by income, GDP = total income + gross profit of all enterprises + taxes on imports and production + depreciation + subsidies + income from abroad.
Per capita GDP and average wages are calculated differently: the first is for the entire population N, the second is for those employed - Nw. In this case, Nw/N is the share of those employed w.
If GDP/w is per capita GDP per worker, and v is the share of wages in GDP per worker, then (GDP/w)*v=wages.
Average wage is calculated as the sum of all wages divided by the number of employees.
Per capita GDP (GDP per capita) is an indicator that evaluates the average level of activity and quality of life per inhabitant of a country. It is calculated by dividing the total GDP by the population.
The share of employed in the economy is the share of the economically active population (employed and unemployed) in the total population of the country.
The population in 1914 was 165,7 million people. The national income per capita in Russia for the period from 1894 to 1913 increased by 34 rubles (50%) - from 67 rubles to 101 rubles. An average growth of 2,6% per year is a fairly good indicator. But the income level itself was catastrophically low. According to other data, the share of national income per capita in 1914 was: in Russia - 102,2 rubles, in the USA - 695, in England - 463, in France - 355 and in Germany - 292 rubles.
Below, according to the well-known work of P. Gregory, there is a different review of the estimates of the CR GDP, made with the aim of increasing it. But the maximum value of income per capita, even taking into account the "new estimates", is only 112-118 rubles instead of 101-102.
To begin with, to test the model, let's try to make similar calculations for modern Russia.
Relationship between per capita GDP and average wage: calculations for modern Russia (2024)
Russia's GDP in 2024 is RUB 200 billion with a population of 039,5 million people. The number of employed persons in Russia is 146,15 million in December 74,60. The share of employed = 2024. GDP per capita is RUB 0,51 per year (or USD 1) or RUB 368 per month, or 727,33 per employee, and the average wage is RUB 13 per month. Consequently, the share of wages in GDP is approximately 687,27, which corresponds to Rosstat data, according to which the share of wages in the structure of GDP by income sources in 114 relative to 060,61 increased from 223% to 648%. Neither per capita GDP nor average wages are very low, but they do not relate to the standard of living of the majority of the people, as we estimated in the second note - the income of 87% of the population of Russia does not exceed 952,00 thousand rubles.
It is known that there is a close relationship between GDP per capita and average salary, estimated above. The income of the average German in Germany in 2024 is 20% higher than per capita GDP, and for a US resident it is 9% less.
From the following simple calculations by the author based on Rosstat data, it is clear that for Russia the average salary is empirically lower than per capita GDP by approximately 23-25%. This corresponds to countries such as the USA.
Calculations of the average salary in Tsarist Russia
According to the census, the share of the working population in the Central Region was about 45–48%, therefore, the average per capita GDP for those employed was about 210 rubles (101/0,48) per year or 17,5 rubles per month. Mironov determined the level of the independent population at 60%.
Assuming that the share of wages, as now, did not exceed 45%, the average wage level can be estimated at 94 rubles per year or 8 rubles per month (210*0.45).
There is another method that gives approximately the same estimate, and an upper one at that. Let us assume that for Tsarist Russia the ratio of per capita GDP and average salary was maximum, i.e. 1:1 = 100%. Then the average salary in Tsarist Russia was about 101 rubles per year or 8,4 rubles per month, which roughly corresponded to the income of cooks (96 rubles) and artisans (133 rubles) per year. And it was only 42% higher than the state's expenses on the maintenance of prisoners. This means that Ostrovsky's conclusions are not far from the truth.
The average salary in Tsarist Russia ranged from 94 to 101 rubles per year or 8-8,4 rubles per month.
In B. N. Mironov's book "The Welfare of the Population and Revolutions in Imperial Russia" the income level of the poorest strata of society is estimated by him as the cost of maintaining prisoners in the amount of 70 rubles per year or about 6 rubles per month, or 7900 rubles at our prices. Mironov determined the poverty threshold at 95 rubles, or 7,9 rubles per month, 10430 rubles in our money.
In the second part of the article, we established that the minimum food costs for an adult in the Central Rural Region were about 10-11 rubles, and the subsistence minimum was approximately 22-27 rubles. The cost of the modern minimum monthly food set in Tsarist Russia was 9,98 rubles.
As the most prominent economist of that time, S. F. Sharapov, the author of the emission theory, whose recommendations formed the basis of the financial system of the USSR, wrote in a report to Emperor Nicholas II: “Russia is starving, impoverished, degenerating, and the government is powerless to prevent this or somehow alleviate the suffering of the people under the current monetary system.”
Sometimes we come across data that the average salary in Russia was 22 or even 37 rubles, which is wrong. The first figure - 22 - is the average salary of all workers, and the second - 37 - is the average for the highest paid groups of workers. Sometimes they write that the average salary of workers was 37 rubles, which is also wrong. Once again, we will provide data on the average salary of workers in different industries. And we must understand that the average salary of 22 rubles with a subsistence minimum of 22-27 rubles is also on the edge (for more details on budgets, see the previous note).
Where does the information about the high standard of living before the revolution come from?
According to Nefedov S.A.:
"The most prosperous strata of the population were concentrated in the capital provinces... due to the huge import of food from the provinces. The North, Northwest and Belarus... could not provide for themselves... the level of consumption here was below the national average. At the same time, differentiation among the peasants led to the fact that the level of consumption of the poorest strata was below the famine line... In the east, beyond the Volga... natural conditions and soils were worse than in the Black Earth Region; droughts were common in the Cis-Urals... Further south, in Little Russia, the situation was better, per capita production reached 30 poods... consumption was relatively high... With all that... in Russia at that time there were real lands of plenty. For example, in the Samara province, state peasants had allotments of an average of 4,1 dessiatines. per capita... in the Kherson province, an average of 29 poods of bread per capita was consumed for food (1898)... The regions that experienced a shortage of bread... became “fortresses of Bolshevism” during the civil war, while the rich outlying regions supported the Whites.”
It was already mentioned above, for example, that the Yenisei peasants (Siberia) lived quite well.
In the photo: wealthy peasants (kulaks)
Agrarian crisis: population growth and land shortage
Most uncommitted economists and historians acknowledge the problem of low living standards in the Central Rada (for a detailed analysis, see “Disputes about Tsarist Russia: An Interrupted Flight or a Path to the Abyss”).
The main factors of poverty in Russia, “which we have lost”:
1) Poor crop yield due to bad climate.
2) Rapid population growth.
3) Land shortage as a consequence of growth.
4) Periodically low harvests (hunger years).
5) Low efficiency of agriculture.
6) Backwardness of technology.
7) A decline in the supply of livestock, creating a cycle of declining agricultural efficiency.
8) Low level of industrial development.
9) Excess of rural population, a huge mass of extra hands on the land.
10) Massive export of grain abroad due to high external debt.
11) Witte’s gold peg, which deprived the population of bread and money due to a high external debt, artificially increased by the “gold reform”.
12) Low level of taxes, concentration of the tax burden on the peasants, belated introduction of income tax in 1916.
13) Drinking establishments that replenished the treasury, but destroyed the foundations of the peasantry by getting the common people drunk.
14) The short-sighted policy of the state, which allowed the state and its people to be milked both from the outside - by the world gold mafia; and from the inside - by landowners, kulaks and factory owners, and this despite the mass unrest of the peasants and the revolutions of 1905.
15) Spiritual and moral crisis in the empire, “fermentation” of society caused by the socio-economic crisis, the lack of bright ideas in the state and the dependence of the Church on the state.
In 1913, grain yields in Russia amounted to 8,7 centners per hectare and were lower than in Canada (15 centners), the USA (11,7 centners) and Denmark (21 centners). Grain yields in Russia fluctuated greatly from year to year. "...The ratio of the maximum yield of such an important food crop for the Russian peasantry as rye to the minimum yield in 1901-1910 was 1,67 in Russia, 1,28 in France, and 1,18 in Germany."
The gross grain harvest per capita by 1, compared to 1914, increased from 1883 poods to 26,7, i.e. by 30,7%, but at the same time the average annual volume of grain exports increased from 15-1890 to 04-1910 by 13%, although during the same period the average annual gross grain harvest increased by only 70%. At the same time, the area under crops increased from 38,6 to 1883 from 1914 to 58,8 million dessiatines.
Rising prices in the agricultural sector stimulated the development of grain production. From the mid-1880s until the beginning of World War I, the annual growth of agricultural production was 2,8%. During approximately the same period, the area of cultivated land increased annually by only 1,3%, the number of workers in the industry by 1,4%, and the volume of agricultural capital by 2,3%. The growth of production factors was about 2,0% per year, and productivity was 0,8% per year.
Russia maintained its global leadership in grain production thanks to extensive methods—large areas and a large number of employees.
Let's add a few more important factors.
Tsarist Russia was destroyed by the years of famine
A complete overview of crop yields is given in the fundamental work of V. M. Obukhov, “The Movement of Grain Crop Yields in European Russia in the Period 1883-1915.”
According to the graph below from this work, on average, the yield per dessiatine in the pre-war decade rose in the European part of Russia by 27% compared to the decade of 1883-1893, from 36,6 to 50 poods/dessiatine.
After the abolition of serfdom and before the start of the First World War, the Russian peasantry experienced unprecedented years of famine, caused, according to a number of researchers, by circumstances of both a socio-political and economic nature. Between 1891 and 1912, famine struck Russia 12 times.
A feature of the hungry years of 1905-1906 was the almost complete absence of feed for livestock. According to A. S. Ermolov, this was "almost a bigger problem compared to the absence of food grain." Peasants plowed all their allotment land, including fields, meadows, and even forests. At the same time, grain was regularly exported abroad.
For the same reason, especially in the harsh winter of 1906-1907, the problem of lack of fuel for peasants' huts became apparent. The crop failure, complicated by the destruction of landowners' estates, led to the lack of need for hiring for agricultural work, which had previously served as a significant support for the local population.
The "hungry" years were a consequence of this fluctuation. But there were also good harvests in 1904 and 1913 (18,9% and 17,1% above the norm, respectively). There were good harvests in 1899, 1902, 1909, 1910 and 1912 with yields above the norm by 10,0%, 15,3%, 15,7%, 6,4% and 7,9%, respectively. On average, the yield per dessiatine in the pre-war decade in the European part of Russia increased by 27% compared to the decade of 1883–1893.
The 1913 harvest was the highest in the three preceding decades — 92,5 million tons, which was half of the world's rye harvest and second place in the wheat harvest. So when looking at the data for 1914 (how good everything was), we need to take this "outlier" into account.
Decline in livestock supply
Livestock breeding issues are studied in detail in the work of the same A. V. Ostrovsky, “LAVEL BREEDING IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA AT THE END OF THE 2014TH – BEGINNING OF THE XNUMXTH CENTURY” (Piter, XNUMX).
As Ostrovsky writes: “Based on the existing official data, it turns out that from 1842/1850 to 1911/1914 the provision of the population with cattle per 100 people decreased, at a minimum, from 41,2 to 25,0 heads, by 39%, horses - from 29,4 to 17,6 heads, by 40%, pigs - from 18,2 to 10,5 heads, by 42%, sheep - from 71,3 to 32,3 heads, by 55%, in general, translated into cattle - from 94,0 to 54,3 heads, by 42%.”
The crisis in livestock farming began to develop after the reform of 1861. The main reason for the decline in livestock supply was the lack of a forage base and the depletion of the reserve of free land.
"Throughout the entire post-reform period, there was a reduction in the forage base: both the area of pastures and the area of hayfields. Livestock and agricultural production could not be provided with forage, as evidenced by the shortage of feed grain." And in addition to this, there was a colossal export of grain to the border.
During the famine, many peasants were forced to sell their livestock, including work horses, and in the hungry years, to slaughter them. From 1888 to 1893, the share of horseless households increased in Tambov province from 22 to 31%, in Voronezh province - from 26 to 41%. Then came the "domino" effect: horseless peasants were unable to repay the food loans received during the crop failure. The amount of these loans at the beginning of 1892 was 128 million rubles, and in 1894 the government wrote off half of this debt.
"Since the peasants did not have enough cattle to fertilize the fields, they could not switch from the three-field system to the more intensive and productive grass-field system. Over half a century, the number of cattle per capita and unit of area decreased by 2,53 times and became 3,4 times lower than in Western European countries. At the end of the 1th century, due to population growth, pastures had to be ploughed. The optimal ratio of pasture to arable land for the three-field system is considered to be 2:1, but in central Russia by the middle of the 5th century it had decreased to less than XNUMX:XNUMX. The lack of production of mineral fertilizers did not allow for an increase in crop yields, which led to even greater ploughing of pastures: a vicious circle was closed."
Conclusions
In the Central Rural Republic there was a large income inequality, which can be estimated at approximately 15. In the second part of the article we established that the minimum expenses for food for an adult in the Central Rural Republic were approximately 10-11 rubles, and the subsistence minimum was approximately 22-27 rubles. The cost of the modern minimum monthly food set in Tsarist Russia was 9.98 rubles, and the subsistence minimum was approximately 22-27 rubles.
An estimate of the GDP per capita and the average wage of 101 rubles, or 8,4 rubles per month (11 rubles per month in today's money), shows the catastrophic economic situation of the bulk of the people in Tsarist Russia, as this is only slightly higher than the annual income of cooks - 000 rubles and the cost of maintaining a prisoner of 96 rubles. At the same time, the poverty threshold according to Mironov was almost the same - 70 rubles, or 95 rubles per month, 7,9 rubles in our money. It is here, and not in subversive activities, that we should look for the objective causes of the revolution. For "there is no smoke without fire", what is the social foundation, such is the stability of the state.
The West skillfully sucked all the juices out of the state, as it does now, but under the conditions of the capitalist system, as it does now, the government could not do anything against it (and cannot now). For this reason, it is impossible to build a stable model of capitalism in Russia. The first attempt at construction with the reforms of Alexander II ended with the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 and the collapse of the system, the current 40-year "walk" since 1985 ends with a demographic crisis. And the Central Bank rate of 21% is also a crisis.
The opinions of former leaders of the White movement (P.N. Wrangel, A.I. Denikin, A.P. Budberg), who had monarchist views, are interesting. A.I. Denikin: "The revolution was inevitable, it is called nationwide... the revolution was the result of dissatisfaction with the old government of absolutely all strata of the population." This is where the main reason lies - all strata.
For this reason, there was a "conspiracy" of generals, and the leadership of the State Duma worked to remove the emperor. Was the food shortage created artificially? Yes, just like in the USSR. Yes, foreign intelligence services participated in the conspiracy. But why during the Great Patriotic War did the population of the rear of the USSR also live in hunger on ration cards, but the whole country supported I.V. Stalin? Then there was a binding idea, but in 1917 - no. The government lost the trust of the people.
Who did not warn Emperor Nicholas II that the country was heading for the abyss: philosophers, economists, members of the Duma, generals, diplomats, ambassadors, and even members of the royal family. "To avoid a catastrophe, it was necessary to change the principle of governing the country, calling to power those who enjoyed the people's trust... As terrible as it is, the government... is preparing a revolution,... is using all possible measures to make as many dissatisfied people as possible..." Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, from an address to Emperor Nicholas II (4.02.1917). Well, what in response?
Why did the Orthodox people follow the Communists, although the Church called on them to be patient and loyal to the authorities? Patience had reached its limit, and under catastrophic circumstances on the eve of the revolution, the system collapsed like a house of cards. And the idea of socialism corresponded to the Orthodox notions of justice, which did not exist in the old society.
Here is the opinion of the philosopher Vasily Vasilyevich Rozanov: "Rus disappeared in two, three days at the most. There was no kingdom left, no church left, no army left, and no workers left. What was left? Strangely, literally nothing."
The widely hyped theories about external causes of the revolution, conspiracies, betrayals, although they did take place, by their weight appear tendentious, biased and one-sided, not providing an objective complex analysis and, in fact, being a way to distract society from the true causes of the revolution. This is due to the fact that today's Russia is a continuation of Tsarist Russia and was created precisely as an antipode of the USSR, although based on its achievements.
Only the USSR, the world's first social state, was able to pull people out of the greyness of life and poverty, to give everyone light, work and education. Under the leadership of I.V. Stalin, the USSR gained the most powerful force, crushing the fascist hordes in World War II, becoming the second most powerful state in the world after 1945.
But no one needs competitors, and in the Gorbachev era, in collusion with our liberal elite, the USSR was dismantled. All current problems: the demographic catastrophe, the war in Ukraine, Kursk, Belgorod, the problems of the army, industry and science - are just a direct consequence of the dismantling of the USSR and the return of the country to the pre-revolutionary period.
The income distribution picture that existed in the Central Rada still exists today (although the standard of living has increased many times over since then) due to the destruction of domestic industry in the 90s and the focus on imports.
Now, the economy is still based on raw materials, as in the Central Rada, the low level of income of the bulk of the population of Russia compared to the costs of maintaining a family, absolutely artificially inflated cost of housing and building materials; absolutely artificially inflated interest rates on loans; the use of food products created with Western food additives and at enterprises with foreign participation, inevitable military losses create the preconditions for aggravating the demographic catastrophe. In place of the departing Russian population, Asians are being brought in quite consciously, and now also Africans. Consequently, a change in the economic system, as in 1917, is inevitable.
Conceptually, nothing has changed in the last 100 years. The government is building an alliance between the ruling party and the Orthodox. There is no national idea, as before the revolution — capital does not need them. But the force that will turn the country around, as before the revolution, will be the socialist idea. It is not difficult to guess who the people will support. For, as our great philosopher N. Berdyaev warned: "And you need to lose your conscience to consider capitalism more in line with Christianity."
And the same N. Berdyaev, who was a contemporary of the events of 1917, pointed out the true reasons for the collapse of the system: “Revolution is a punishment sent from above for the sins of the past… Revolution always says that those in power did not fulfill their purpose, that they brought about the revolution, allowed its possibility. There was illness and rot in society, which made the revolution inevitable.” And, apparently, the lessons of our bitter history are still being ignored by the elites in every possible way.
Russia will build a new, synthetic model of economy that will allow us to have a competitive advantage and achieve great success. They know this, that's why they are trying to take us out of the game.
The author will be grateful for any inaccuracies and typos found.
Links:
Solovieva E.I. I. The economic situation of Western Siberian settlers at the end of the 1893th and beginning of the 1905th centuries (XNUMX-XNUMX)
LIBERMAN L. In the Land of Black Gold. Essay on the Development of Wages and the Revolutionary Movement of Donbass Miners. Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p. 4042.
A. V. Ostrovsky "On the Degree of Social Stratification in Pre-Revolutionary Russia"
Simonova M. S. The problem of “impoverishment”... P. 236-237.
Materials of the Commission of 1901....
An experiment in calculating national income in 50 provinces of European Russia in 1900-1913. Moscow, 1918. P. 66.
Compared average wages and GDP per capita in Russia and the G7 countries. Who is underpaid and who is overpaid?
Mironov B.N. Social history of Russia. St. Petersburg, 1999, Table 3233. P. 404405.
V.M. Obukhov Movement of grain crops in European Russia…
"And in comparison with 1913..."
Allen R.S., From Farm to Factory: A New Interpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution
And compared to 1913...
V. M. Obukhov Movement of grain crop yields in European Russia in the period 1883-1915.
"And in comparison with 1913..."
Materials of the Commission of 1901... P. 201-214. Table XVIII. Quoted from Nefedov Demographic-structural analysis
STOLYPIN'S MISTAKE The Prime Minister who turned Russia upside down.
Denikin, A. I. Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles
V.V.Rozanov, APOCALYPSE OF OUR TIME
Berdyaev, N. Philosophy of inequality / N.A. Berdyaev. Moscow: AST MOSCOW: KHRANITEL, 2006.
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