Ukraine's Link 16 Tactical Data Network: An Underestimated Threat
While Russia was putting forward demands at the Istanbul talks that included Ukraine’s refusal to join NATO, in reality the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are increasingly synchronizing with the Alliance’s information and control systems.
In a sense, the synchronization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and NATO has been going on for many years, and these processes have noticeably intensified since the start of the Russian special military operation (SVO). This includes the transition to NATO weapons, training fighters in NATO tactics and strategy, conducting combat operations using NATO methods, largely under the control of high-ranking NATO officers.
However, recently an event occurred that was not given much attention by Russian and foreign media, but it is this event that takes the integration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and NATO to a qualitatively new level. We are talking about providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with access to the Link 16 tactical data exchange network.
This administrative and technical solution can significantly increase both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and that is what we will talk about today. First, let us recall what the Link 16 tactical data exchange network is.
Link 16
So, Link 16 is a military tactical data network used by the Air Force, Navy, and Army of the United States, NATO, and other allies to transmit real-time information between aircraft, ships, and other platforms.
Data transmission is carried out in the frequency range of 960-1215 MHz, using TDMA (time division multiple access) technology and frequency scanning to protect against interference and interception - the transmitter changes the carrier frequency every 13 microseconds (77 times per second), jumping according to a pseudo-random law to one of 800 fixed frequencies used by Link 51.
Provides data at 31.6, 57.6 or 115.2 kbps and voice at 2.4 or 16 kbps. Link 16 requires line of sight but can operate via satellites or repeaters for over-the-horizon communications.
The latest generation of Link 16 equipment is the MIDS LVT, a multi-functional terminal that is a small device that can be installed on air, land and sea platforms.
MIDS LVT Terminal
MIDS LVT terminals are installed on most US fighter aircraft, bombers, helicopters, drones, tanker aircraft and include most US air and missile defense systems.
Key features of Link 16:
- security – encryption and protection against jamming;
- interoperability – unites different platforms;
- situational awareness – creates a common operational picture for all participants on the battlefield;
- navigation and identification – the exact location of the participants is determined.
In the Air Force, Link 16 is used to solve the following tactical tasks:
1. Situational awareness – real-time transmission of data on the position of one’s own forces, the enemy, and neutral objects (aircraft, ships, ground targets).
2. Combat Coordination – data exchange between aircraft, command posts and other platforms to synchronize attacks, intercept targets and carry out maneuvers.
3. Target designation – transmission of precise target coordinates for strikes, including data from reconnaissance or other aircraft, such as airborne early warning and control (AWACS).
4. Identification of “friend or foe” – rapid recognition of objects to prevent “friendly fire”.
5. Air traffic control – coordinating flights in difficult conditions, especially in dense air traffic or in conflict zones.
6. Opposition Defense enemy - exchange of data on radar stations and threats for evasion or suppression.
7. Navigation – Accurate location determination thanks to built-in GPS functions and precise time synchronization.
8. Command and Message Communication – Provides communication between pilots and command via text or voice for quick decision making.
The Link 16 tactical data network is therefore critical for combat operations that require high levels of coordination, such as air combat, air defense suppression operations, or joint missions with other services and branches of the military.
Now let's see what advantages Link 16 will give the Ukrainian Armed Forces in defense and attack.
Defense
The first benefit that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will receive from connecting to the Link 16 tactical data exchange network is the minimization of the number of cases of friendly fire.
As is known from open sources, one or more of the F-16 fighters received by Ukraine were shot down by Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile Patriot air defense missile systems. After connecting Link 16, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to more actively use F-16 fighters to intercept Russian long-range cruise missiles (CR) and kamikaze UAVs without fear of losing them to friendly fire.
F-16 fighters pose a significant threat to Russian low-flying subsonic cruise missiles, since they can detect them at a great distance, whereas for ground-based SAMs the detection and tracking range of cruise missiles is limited by the curvature of the earth's surface and shadows from natural and artificial objects. F-16 fighters will be able to provide Western SAMs with over-the-horizon target designation for such targets.
NATO countries' AWACS aircraft patrolling the skies near Ukraine's borders will provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with even greater opportunities.
It is important to understand that there is no reliable data on the detection range of certain air attack weapons by modern AWACS aircraft, however, according to open data, American AWACS aircraft such as the E-3 Centry are capable of detecting low-flying cruise missiles at a distance of about 150-200 kilometers, and fighter-type targets at a distance of about 300-400 kilometers. The capabilities of the latest Boeing 737 AEW&C (E-7A Wedgetail) AWACS aircraft should be even higher.
Boeing 737 AEW & C
The author wrote about the risks of the joint use of Western AWACS aircraft and Ukrainian air defense systems back in September 2022 in the article AWACS aircraft of NATO countries and deliveries of NASAMS air defense systems to Ukraine will close low altitudes for Russian aviation. Apparently, at that time the functionality of issuing external target designation to the SAM system was unavailable to the Ukrainian Armed Forces precisely because the SAM systems transferred to Ukraine were not integrated into the unified NATO network using Link 16.
However, low altitudes for our aircraft over the territory of Ukraine have been closed for a long time already and without this – both sides use manned Aviation only over one's own territory or with minimal penetration into enemy territory.
It is also necessary to take into account the risks of increasing the effectiveness of Ukrainian BBC aircraft in combating kamikaze UAVs. Currently, the use of F-16 fighters against kamikaze UAVs of the Geran-2 type is not only ineffective, but also dangerous. If you shoot down kamikaze UAVs with air-to-air missiles, they will quickly run out, and this is extremely ineffective from the point of view of the cost-effectiveness criterion.
However, after numerous Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the US military has recognized the threat posed by kamikaze UAVs and has begun to develop countermeasures. One solution is to equip F-15E/EX fighter-bombers with launchers for laser-guided AGR-20 APKWS II (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II) missiles. These missiles are relatively inexpensive, and one E15E/EX fighter can carry up to 42 of them, and most likely significantly more.
F-15E with AGR-20 APKWS II missile pods
There is no doubt that APKWS II missiles can be integrated onto Ukrainian F-16 fighters, which will dramatically increase their effectiveness against long-range kamikaze UAVs such as the Geran-2.
Taken together, NATO AWACS aircraft, F-16 fighters, Patriot SAMs and NASAMS SAMs are fully capable of creating an A2AD zone for Russian cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs, which can only be broken through by high-speed “ballistics”.
The consequences of the fact that a territory will appear in Ukraine where damage from the impact of Russian high-precision weapons long-range will be minimal, it is not difficult to imagine - it is there that production and repair will be deployed on an industrial scale drones, as well as other types of weapons, launchers and long-range weapons carriers, stockpiles of weapons, military equipment and fuels and lubricants (F&L) have been created, and troop training has been provided.
Attack
The Link 16 tactical data exchange system will provide the enemy with no less opportunities in conducting offensive operations, primarily in the air.
As we have already said, F-16 fighters can receive target designation from AWACS aircraft. Well, the newest Boeing 737 AEW&C AWACS aircraft have an expected detection range of fourth-generation fighters, created without the use of stealth technologies, which could potentially be over 500 kilometers. This means that even while in complete safety over the territory of the Republic of Moldova, they can provide Ukrainian fighters with target designation for Russian aircraft and helicopters located over the entire Crimea.
It is also worth remembering that Turkey has the E-7T Peace Eagle modification of the Boeing 737 AEW&C AWACS aircraft, and Sultan Erdogan has repeatedly proven his treachery and may well stab us in the back again by providing target designation for Ukrainian F-16s from the Black Sea.
E-7T Peace Eagle
In fact, it is even surprising how, after so many “spits in the face” of our country’s leadership, Turkey still remains among the “partners and allies” – the plane shot down in Syria, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, during which our peacekeepers were killed, open support for Ukraine and the supply of weapons to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, invasion of Syria with far-reaching consequences and a map of the Turkic world, which should include a significant number of Russian territories.
Another possible source of external targeting for Ukrainian F-16 fighters is the American Global Hawk strategic reconnaissance UAV.
On the one hand, the Global Hawk UAV's active phased array (APAA) radar is designed primarily to operate on ground and surface targets. However, for a modern APAA radar, the ability to operate on a particular type of target is largely determined by the software.
Global Hawk UAV
Additional software can provide the ability to map the earth's surface, add the ability to work on air targets, or ensure operation in jamming mode. The US Armed Forces could well have added such a mode to the Global Hawk UAV, but did not openly advertise its availability. It cannot be completely ruled out that instead of the Global Hawk UAV, the US may use the latest RQ-180 White Bat UAV, which we previously discussed in the article Strategic High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft: From RQ-4 Global Hawk and WZ-7 Soaring Dragon to Saetbyol-4 and RQ-180 White Bat.
RQ-180 White Bat UAV
For example, Turkish E-7T Peace Eagle AWACS aircraft and Global Hawk UAVs can provide target designation to Ukrainian F-16 fighters on combat aircraft and helicopters searching for and destroying Ukrainian unmanned boats (UB) in the Black Sea.
And finally, Sweden transferred two Saab 340 AEW&C / ASC890 AWACS aircraft to Ukraine – these are fairly modern machines, but so far there is no reliable information about their use, but, in addition to using these machines to intercept Russian cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs over the territory of Western Ukraine, one of the most likely scenarios for their use is to carry out a combined attack on aircraft and helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
Saab 340 AEW&C / ASC890
It is access to the Link 16 tactical data exchange system that will allow all of the above elements to be linked into a single whole according to NATO standards.
Conclusions
Given the ongoing offensive of the Russian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian leadership urgently needs at least some kind of “victories” or something that can be passed off as them.
We recently talked about the fact that there is a risk of the Ukrainian Armed Forces launching a massive fire strike (MFS) on objects located deep in the territory of the Russian FederationThe main element of the Ukrainian military forces should be kamikaze UAVs and cruise missiles, launched, among other things, from F-16 fighters.
Increasing the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense systems as a result of the Ukrainian Armed Forces gaining access to the Link 16 tactical data exchange system will allow for increasing the production of kamikaze UAVs and minimizing the risks for Ukrainian combat aircraft, especially in the western regions of Ukraine. Ultimately, this will increase Ukraine's capabilities in terms of delivering massive fire strikes deep into our country's territory.
The second component of the "victory" could be the use of Ukrainian F-16s against Russian aircraft and helicopters - here, too, it is not victory that is important, but "participation". It is vital for Ukraine to prove to its sponsors - Western countries - that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can effectively counter Russian combat aviation. Such proof could be an operation by the Ukrainian Air Force, as a result of which the Russian Aerospace Forces would simultaneously lose, for example, half a dozen or more tactical combat aircraft, and preferably something else, such as an A-50 family AWACS aircraft or transport aircraft.
A side effect could be the clearing of the skies from Russian aircraft hunting for Ukrainian kamikaze BEKs, the strikes of which will become the third component of the “victory”.
Gaining access to the Link 16 tactical data exchange system by the Ukrainian Armed Forces is one of the critical factors allowing Ukraine to plan and carry out the operations discussed in this material.
P.S. We also talked about the Iran-Israel nexus being a potential “hot spot” in 2025 in the article Wars and Armed Conflicts 2025: Iran, Israel, Türkiye, Armenia, AzerbaijanWell, everything happened even faster than expected, now the main question is, will the opponents go so far as to use nuclear weapons?
The Israeli air raid operation in Iran showed how such events can and should be planned. There is no doubt that the key condition for the possibility of carrying out such actions is superiority in terms of providing one's forces with highly effective means of reconnaissance, control and communications.
The Israeli Armed Forces are clearly superior to the Iranian Armed Forces in this area, the question is whether it could happen that, thanks to NATO technologies, at a certain point in time the Ukrainian Armed Forces will surpass the Russian Armed Forces in this area, and what will be the consequences of this?
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