Potential of the USSR Air Defense Against Ukrainian Kamikaze UAVs
We recently talked about the fact that The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have significantly increased the number of kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used to carry out strikes deep into the territory of our country.
In this regard, the author has repeatedly heard the opinion that, supposedly, the unified air defense system has been destroyed (Defense) countries – during the Soviet era this simply could not have happened.
Of course, it is not entirely correct to compare the limited technical capabilities of the Soviet Union at that time and modern offensive weapons, on the other hand, because kamikaze UAVs are not hypersonic missiles, not sixth-generation fighters equipped with onboard self-defense systems, and they can be shot down weapons the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, which is fully confirmed the use by both sides of Maxim machine guns of the 1883 model to destroy the kamikaze UAVs.
So, technically, the USSR air defense could well fight against kamikaze UAVs, which means we can theoretically consider such a possibility. Let's choose 1975 as a conditional point - at that time, the Soviet Union already had colossal scientific and industrial potential, and the degradation processes that subsequently led to its collapse were then still in a relatively early stage.
To begin with, let us consider what potential the USSR air defense forces had at that time in terms of combating air targets at high and low altitudes.
High heights
It is unlikely that anyone in their right mind would deny that the Soviet Union had a truly powerful air defense system, unmatched by any other country in the world.
The creation of the USSR air defense was largely a consequence of the emergence of nuclear weapons in the United States, for the delivery of which, at the initial stage, thousands of bombers were to be used. In turn, the development of bombers at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century followed the path of increasing the altitude and speed of their flight.
Accordingly, it was precisely for the destruction of high-altitude targets that air defense systems such as the S-25 Berkut and S-75 Desna were created, which are extremely effective, as the US was able to verify from its own experience.
Launch of the S-75 Desna anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM)
The destruction of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flying at an altitude of over 20 kilometers over the Sverdlovsk region, as well as significant losses of bombers, including the newest B-52s, in the skies over Vietnam showed that air defense systems had largely seized dominance at high altitudes, which is why both the US and the USSR curtailed their projects for supersonic high-altitude bombers.
Despite the shift to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as the means of delivering nuclear warheads, the need for a highly effective air defense system has not diminished as the United States has Aviation the basis of its conventional military power. At the same time, the main method of overcoming the USSR's air defense began to be considered a breakthrough at low altitudes and high flight speeds.
The above-mentioned S-25 and S-75 systems could not operate against low-flying targets, since their minimum engagement altitude was about three kilometers; the S-1967 Angara long-range air defense system, which appeared in 200, could also only operate against targets flying at an altitude of over 300 meters, and the effectiveness and range of the anti-aircraft artillery against high-speed, low-flying targets, they are quite limited.
The same applies to the air defense missile system – the 2K11 Krug air defense missile system had a minimum target engagement altitude of 3000 meters, although in subsequent modifications it was reduced to 250 meters, and then to 150 meters.
The Krug air defense missile system, with its monstrous missiles, looks more like a “doomsday machine” capable of razing cities to dust than an air defense system.
Low altitudes
To counter low-flying air attack weapons (LAAW), the S-125 Neva air defense missile system was developed in the USSR, capable of operating at targets at altitudes of 200 meters, and in a modified version, at altitudes of 20 meters.
By the way, it was with the S-125 Neva SAM system that the Americans fought in the so-called “Iran” in the film “Top Gun: Maverick”; it is clear that this system is very “cinematic”, not like modern SAM systems with their cylindrical transport and launch containers (TLC) of SAMs.
SAM in the film "Top Gun: Maverick" (left) and S-125 "Neva" SAM (right)
The USSR Air Defense Forces had slightly more means to destroy low-flying airborne weapons. This capability was available in the Kub SAM system, whose minimum altitude for destroying air targets was 100 meters for early versions and up to 20 meters for the modified Kub-M3 version, as well as combat vehicles designed to intercept low-flying targets, such as the Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU) and the Strela-10 SAM system.
Launcher 2P25 SAM "Kub"
And, of course, the troops also had a significant number of portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft mounts, as well as other small arms and cannon weapons capable of operating against low-flying air defense systems.
The above-mentioned SAMs and ZSUs, designed to hit targets at high and low altitudes, were produced in quantities amounting to many hundreds and even thousands of units. The author does not know the volumes of ammunition produced for them, but given that during the special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine we are actively using stockpiles created back in the USSR, it can be assumed that in terms of ammunition for the SAMs and ZSUs, the stockpiles were also created accordingly.
In addition to the radar stations (RLS) included in the SAM system, the airspace over the USSR was controlled by a huge number of radars of different types and ranges of wavelengths used, ranging from millimeter to meter.
The USSR Air Defense Forces also had their own aviation - in 1973, it included thousands of fighters and interceptors of all classes - Su-9, Su-15, Tu-128, MiG-23 and MiG-25, as well as Tu-126 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft. The USSR Air Force also had over four thousand combat aircraft.
Su-15 Interceptor Fighter
It would seem that the USSR air defense had all the capabilities to effectively repel attacks similar to those carried out by Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs?
In reality, everything is much more complicated, because, as always, “the devil is in the details.”
Radar and low visibility
When the US began the program to create aircraft using low-visibility technology "Stealth", they took into account the characteristics of existing and prospective Soviet radars. As has been said many times, the "Stealth" technology does not make the aircraft invisible to radars, much less invulnerable, it only allows for a reduction in the detection range of the aircraft using radar, allowing it to fire first, get within the range of the radar, or slip between the enemy's radars to strike somewhere deep in its territory.
So, kamikaze UAVs also have very low visibility, which significantly complicates their detection and tracking. When flying at low altitude, this is compounded by the curvature of the earth's surface and the presence of shadow zones from natural and artificial obstacles.
Yes, the USSR air defense systems controlled all or a significant part of our country's territory, but only at high altitudes. At low altitudes, there were and still are a huge number of gaps that can only be closed by placing powerful, modern, highly effective radars on airborne carriers, such as airships.
At that time in the USSR, the Tu-126 AWACS aircraft could detect targets from the air, but there were only six of them, and their ability to detect low-visibility targets against the background of the earth's surface can be questioned.
AWACS aircraft Tu-126
Missiles
Anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) are another problem. The fact is that most SAMs at that time were very large, with powerful warheads that had to compensate for errors in targeting. No matter how many of these SAMs were produced in the USSR, they still had to be enough to combat thousands - several tens of thousands of NATO aircraft, but not hundreds of thousands of kamikaze UAVs. In fact, the same problem exists today.
Using such SAMs over cities and populated areas is extremely risky, because a kamikaze UAV with its warhead weighing about 50 kilograms can damage one apartment or a small house, and a SAM of that time with its powerful warhead, equipped with several hundred kilograms of explosives, can destroy the entrance of a multi-story building, again, the same applies to modern long-range SAMs such as the S-300/S-400.
The SAMs used by the Strela-10 SAM system are most likely comparable in cost to the kamikaze UAVs, but this system has a very limited range, and the photocontrast homing heads (GSN) of the SAMs of the Strela-10 SAM system are only capable of capturing targets against the background of the sky, and the infrared homing heads (IR) of that time would hardly have been able to capture the weakly heating, low-power internal combustion engine of the kamikaze UAV.
LAW "Strela-10"
So it is unlikely that the Strela-10 SAM system would be effective against small, low-flying kamikaze UAVs, and the number of missiles on the launcher of this system is only four units.
The next question is the channel capacity of the SAM system, since almost all SAMs of that time required the SAM system to track the target until it was destroyed, and only one target could be attacked at a time, that is, the SAM systems of that time were single-channel. This means that during a massive raid, the SAM system simply would not have time to shoot down the attacking kamikaze UAVs even if they had ammunition.
Fighter-interceptors
As for fighter-interceptors, the problems are similar here: the radars of aircraft of that time had poor visibility of air targets against the background of the earth's surface, especially such low-visibility ones as kamikaze UAVs.
As for armament, the aircraft of that time carried significantly fewer air-to-air missiles compared to modern aircraft, especially generation 4++. The characteristics of the air-to-air missiles themselves were also inferior to modern models - missiles with radar seekers required target illumination until the moment of its destruction, and the characteristics of the IR seeker would hardly have ensured the capture of relatively cold kamikaze UAVs with piston engines.
The MiG-23 fighter could carry only 6 air-to-air missiles
Interception using rapid-fire aircraft cannons?
The problems would be the same as now - aircraft losses from being hit by the wreckage of a downed UAV, here the difference in speed works in favor of the one who is slower.
It turns out that the USSR's air defense would not have been able to cope with massive attacks by kamikaze UAVs?
Yes, but only if we consider the air defense system as a “player”, the advantages of that time were not only in the number of radars, air defense systems and combat aircraft, but also in the state’s ability to mobilize and maintain order, and this turns everything upside down.
Untold potential
As we have already said above, kamikaze UAVs are not hypersonic missiles, they can be shot down by almost all types of small arms, starting with 7,62x54R machine guns. They fly quite low - from 50 to 4000 meters, and make a lot of noise in flight.
Quadruple anti-aircraft machine gun mount M4 model 1931 (based on Maxim machine guns) - 12 thousand units were produced
Can't detect radar? No thermal imagers?
There is no doubt that acoustic posts would have been set up throughout the country, cities, large industrial facilities and fuel and energy complex facilities, not to mention military facilities, which would have been covered in the shortest possible time by mobile and stationary posts with powerful arc searchlights and machine guns.
Of the above-mentioned air defense systems, one can recall the ZSU Shilka - it is difficult to say how its radar would have performed when working against kamikaze UAVs, but surely it would not have been so difficult to retrofit these machines with the same arc searchlights? Although, most likely, at a distance of one or two kilometers, the ZSU Shilka radar would have been able to see a kamikaze UAV, given that it had to detect the MiG-17 fighter at 12 kilometers - and about 6,5 thousand ZSU Shilkas were produced in the USSR.
ZSU "Shilka"
One can only guess how many machine guns and ammunition for them the defense industry of that time could produce, and given the size of the Soviet Union's army and its enormous mobilization potential, it was possible to strengthen the country's air defense against a new type of threat many times over in the shortest possible time.
A significant amount of barrel artillery from the Great Patriotic War (WWII) and subsequent years remained in storage. In combination with ammunition with a radar fuse Large-caliber anti-aircraft guns could be quite effective against kamikaze UAVs flying at high altitudes.
No ability to hit SAM targets? Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) can be used. For example, the Fagot anti-tank missile systems (ATGMs) were already being mass-produced at that time – how much time would it take to equip them with high-explosive fragmentation warheads and radar fuses? According to the cost-effectiveness criterion, this would be a very effective solution against kamikaze UAVs.
ATGM "Fagot"
The Soviet Union could produce inexpensive piston-engine aircraft in huge quantities, take at least the same An-2, of which, according to various estimates, 10-12 thousand machines were produced. These aircraft could well have been modified, armed with machine guns and cannons and used to intercept low-speed kamikaze UAVs.
"Kukuruznik" An-2
Passive protection
In the USSR, a significant number of shelters for combat aircraft were built; it is difficult to imagine that at that time the enemy would attack aircraft at air bases for years, and they would still be parked in the open air. The same nets and gratings would most likely have been used to cover entire factories.
We shouldn’t forget about the balloons, which were produced during the Great Patriotic War even in besieged Leningrad, but now, for some reason, this ancient technology has apparently been lost, and yet Balloons with nets can cover entire areas from the ground up to a height of several hundred meters.
Examples of the use of barrage balloons and the scale of their use during World War II (WWII)
The country could have set up production of mock-ups and false targets on a cyclopean scale – and not primitive inflatable “products”, but high-quality ones, practically indistinguishable from real equipment, ensure their movement, simulated work with them, the necessary smoke and other measures.
It is also necessary to take into account the advanced security measures, significantly fewer multi-story buildings and, at the same time, a much larger number of green spaces, including trees - a two- or three-story building surrounded by tall trees is much more difficult for a kamikaze UAV to hit.
Conclusions
This is what the “alternative” turns out to be story" Of course, this comparison is speculative, but it shows that the technological lag can be compensated for by competent organizational and technical measures and optimal use of available resources. In our time, Iran and North Korea are showing an example of such an approach.
Yes, the air defense systems of that time would hardly have been able to effectively combat such specific targets as kamikaze UAVs - at high altitudes, massive strikes by kamikaze UAVs would have depleted the SAM reserves, and at low altitudes, gaps in the radar field would have allowed kamikaze UAVs to bypass SAM positions.
But if there is will and determination, it would be possible to ensure the destruction of a significant portion of the enemy's kamikaze UAVs with a much more primitive weapon than the SAM, a weapon from the early to mid-20th century. At the same time, the impact of the surviving enemy kamikaze UAVs could be neutralized with the help of camouflage and passive protection of potential attack targets.
Looking at the attacks of the Ukrainians drones-kamikaze now, in our time, everyone can evaluate for themselves which measures taken are sufficient and which are not. Only one thing can be said with certainty: traditional air defense systems, no matter how modern they are, are not capable of completely solving the problem of long-range kamikaze drones.
Information