The rise of Beijing's military power and the new strategic offensive arms ("National Review", USA)

In recent months, a lot has been discussed about a strategic arms reduction (START) treaty between the US and Russia, but one extremely important circumstance was not taken into account to a sufficient degree, and this circumstance is a powerful program for modernizing nuclear forces carried out by China.

It is unclear whether the administration or the Congress thought about the meaning of the following fact: as long as we reduce our strategic nuclear forces (according to the terms of the new START - by 20-30%) and we hope that the rest will follow us on the way to a nuclear-free world, like rats for the rat-catcher, the People’s Republic of China, meanwhile, is doing nothing more than building up its strategic nuclear forces.

Congressional voting on ratification of the treaty may take place in the coming days or weeks, and therefore the ideal (if not critical) moment now is to consider this issue, especially since the adoption of a disarmament pact will force us to comply with its terms in the next ten years old.

What specific form China’s ambitions will take is not completely clear, but few doubt that its future plans are ambitious. Speaking to Congress last year, then-director of the National Intelligence Service Dennis Blair said that the actions performed by Beijing in the international arena are partly driven by "a long-standing intention to turn China into a great power on the scale of the East Asian region and the whole world."

At the same time, China is frantically increasing all the components of its national power: political, economic and, most worryingly, military. The modernization of the Chinese army is proceeding at a hectic pace; In the past two decades, the country's military budget has grown at an average rate of 10% per year.

On the nuclear front, China relies on its strategic missile forces, which are called the “second artillery corps”. The 2 artillery once upon a time was armed with a small amount of oil-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) of mine bases with three- and five-megaton thermonuclear warheads of the Dongfeng-4 and Dongfeng-5 systems. But in recent years, the armament has also become solid-mobile mobile-launched Dunfeng-31А, which reduces the reaction time compared to mine-based rockets, while at the same time increasing the safety of these missiles in battle.

In addition to this, as the Pentagon warned in the latest release of its annual report on the state of China’s armed forces, “the world's most active ground-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world” is being implemented in this country. It is also possible that China “is developing new road-based ICBMs that may be capable of carrying separable warheads (MRLs) with individual-directed warheads,” which makes it possible to strike at several targets with one ICBM. The emergence of China’s MSS technology “may lead to more than double the number of warheads at its disposal in fifteen years, according to our Ministry of Defense. In addition, the Pentagon notes that the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) is developing in the field of production of maneuvering warheads (MPC), decoys, dipole reflectors, signal jamming technologies and protection from light radiation, which will improve the ability of strategic troops to successfully apply strikes against intended targets.

And that’s not the end of the problem. The forces of China's 2 Artillery Corps, reportedly dug a system of tunnels with a total length of over 3 thousands of miles in the north of the country, it is called the "Underground Chinese Wall". It is believed that these tunnels are designed to shelter China’s nuclear arsenal, which will give Beijing the opportunity to retain its ground-based nuclear forces after the first strike of the enemy.

But Beijing is increasing not only the 2 artillery. Beijing also diversifies the structure of its atomic doctrine, moving away from its traditional “monad” of ground-based missiles only and moving on to the more generally accepted “triad” of land, sea and airborne nuclear forces held by other major nuclear powers - Russia and the United States.

Most noticeably this transition occurs at sea. During the Cold War, Soviet and American submarines were considered the most invisible and most enduring component of the atomic triad, especially with regard to the strategy of delivering a second strike. The Chinese understand this very well, and therefore transfer their deterrent potential under the protection of ocean waves.

New strategic submarines 094 class "Jin" replaced the old and problematic submarine 092 class "Xia" (first generation). Jini may have already carried twelve first Chinese sea-based junlan-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles, their range exceeds 4 thousands of miles. It is possible that two or three such submarines have already been commissioned, and another two or three are preparing to enter. In addition, Beijing is already building new 096 class submarines, which are expected to carry twenty-four intercontinental missiles each.

China is developing and aviation component of nuclear forces, mainly in the form of capable of carrying nuclear weapon B-6 bomber survivors from the Cold War. According to analysts, China, which is already capable of dropping free-fall nuclear bombs, is now developing air-to-surface cruise missiles for these aircraft, on which both conventional and nuclear warheads can be deployed.

All these weapons are of great interest, but one must also look at the political context in which all these strategic systems exist. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the US security authorities are stepping up discussions about how Beijing’s new strategic tools fit into its nuclear policy, and this is a very pressing issue, given that PLA specialists often call the US Army the most likely adversary.

China has long adhered to the policy of refusing a first strike, that is, it undertakes not to use nuclear weapons: against a state that does not possess them; in the zone declared nuclear-free; and also the first, that is, to start a nuclear war. In addition, Beijing used the strategy of minimum deterrence, that is, if the deterrent effect does not work, he intends to withstand the first blow, and then inflict a retaliatory response - on strategic goals (that is, on cities), and not on tactical (that is, on nuclear forces of the enemy).

Officially, China adheres to these principles now, but external observers already doubt it. According to some PLA observers, China has long and unofficially debates around nuclear doctrine, in which representatives of a new generation of security strategy specialists are particularly active, wondering what if their older colleagues simply do not understand that their country already occupies a higher position in the world hierarchy than before. It is believed that China is considering the possibility of changing its nuclear strategy by moving to the assumption of delivering a first preemptive strike aimed at destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces before it strikes.

Still more complicated by the fact that China refuses to make its nuclear forces transparent or at least discuss this topic. The PLA leadership has a tendency toward a strategy of deception and denial, which is perhaps best in its reluctance to discuss nuclear weapons issues with the Ministry of Defense. Such secrecy and unwillingness to engage in dialogue is a problem for our intelligence services and authorities, because there is a long series of unanswered questions about China’s strategic doctrine, capabilities and intentions.

And as long as China’s strategic troops are growing in size, diversity, and power, the US nuclear forces are desperately in need of modernization. According to some experts, if there is a country capable of making a "breakthrough to nuclear parity" with the United States, then this is China - the world's third largest nuclear power.

According to some independent groups, Beijing, if desired, could be on an equal footing with Washington in the not-too-distant future, considering how the arms reductions would be imposed on the United States by the new strategic offensive arms.

So the question still remains: have we really thought about the state of the nuclear forces of China at the time while the new START is in effect? If not, you need to think about it immediately.

Therefore, considering the new START, the Senate and the administration should take into account the development trajectory of China’s nuclear forces and the direction of its strategic policy so that the disarmament agreement with Russia does not undermine our security situation.