Vietnamese Special Forces vs. Americans. Battle for Lima Site-85 in Laos
A Dak Kong unit soldier during training, present day. During the war with the US, these units had almost the same uniform and comparable training.
In March 1968, a battle took place in northeastern Laos that became history as, on the one hand, one of the most striking examples of the combat capabilities of the Special Operations Forces of the Vietnamese People's Army - the "Dak Kong" units, and on the other hand, it became the bloodiest for the ground personnel of the US Navy during the entire American war in Indochina. This story was classified from US citizens until 1998.
The Russian reader is not familiar with this story at all.
It's time to change that.
The Laotian Civil War and Mount Phu Pha Thi
The preconditions for the civil war in Laos were formed in the mid-forties of the twentieth century, and the involvement of the United States in it to contain communism became a fact back in 1955. In fact, the Americans appeared in Laos long before their soldiers set foot on the soil of South Vietnam.
By the early 1960s, the situation for the United States was as follows: The Pathet Lao Front could, with the help of the Vietnamese, hold its mountainous border provinces with Vietnam, but it could not effectively advance further.
The Vietnamese, in turn, actively armed and trained Pathet Lao battalions, increasing their numbers, although without significant results.
The Lao Royal Army was completely disorganized and unwilling to fight, due to other divisions in Lao society that were also reflected in the army.
While the royalists sometimes fought against the Pathet Lao, and even relatively successfully (albeit rarely), they mostly ran away from the Vietnamese, often abandoning weapon.
The Vietnamese were quite different - highly motivated and combat-ready, but they were hampered by logistical factors - during the rainy season the terrain in Laos was impassable even for their infantry, and the lack of roads affected combat in the dry season.
Typical road conditions in Laos in the 60s, with Vietnamese infantry operating in these conditions, 1966. Photo: Lê Minh Trường
By that time, the Americans had switched to training units mainly made up of representatives of the Hmong people, from whom Vang Pao, the future famous general of this war, was receiving more and more responsibility for this “secret army” and more and more power.
The Hmong were organized into so-called “Special Guerrilla Units” (SGU), numbering a reinforced company (about a hundred people).
As a "trump card" the Americans could put forward, firstly, the Air America "group" present in the country, the CIA air detachment, which had completely taken over all the logistics in this country without roads, and secondly, small air units of the Royal Laotian Air Force, armed with light attack aircraft AT-6 Texan of American manufacture transferred from the Royal Thai Air Force. Often they were piloted by Thai pilots, although not only.
The goals of the parties were simple: for the US, to keep Laos outside of communist influence and so that the American public would not learn about the American presence in the country (that is why the war in Laos went down in US history as the "Secret War" - no one knew about it). For Vietnam, the key task was to maintain the communications network with South Vietnam, through which the rebels in the south received weapons - the famous "Ho Chi Minh Trail". And if the trail itself went through southern Laos, where there was almost no population, then the key to controlling it lay in central Laos - whoever controlled this region also controlled the entrance from North Vietnam to the "Trail". From the center of Laos, the famous Plain of Jars, to the beginning of Vietnamese communications in the south was about a hundred kilometers, and Vietnam would not have been able to defend itself there due to poor communications.
And in the center he could, but he had to fight, including with the USA.
Since 1964, the scale of American involvement has grown, with A-1 Skyraiders and converted B-26 bombers appearing over Laos, the 1st Air Commando Wing (the future 1st Airborne Special Operations Group) targeting Laos, and, a little later, US Air Force line units starting bombing Laos.
They were later joined by Raven Forward Air Controllers in light aircraft with target marking equipment to prevent incendiary weapons missiles to smoke bombs, which made it easier for pilots to strike aviation aiming at targets hidden in the jungle.
Beginning in 1964, the US Air Force launched Operation Barrel Roll, which aimed to bomb both the Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao front throughout eastern Laos.
Even later in the war, there appeared trained personnel SRU – Special requirement units Thai volunteers, as well as units of the Thai border police.
Specially trained Hmong units were to be dropped into the Pathet Lao rear and wage guerrilla warfare against them with air logistical support from Air America.
In order to ensure this, since 1961 the Americans began to deploy secret mini-bases (sites in English) throughout Laos, where, as a rule, there could be some premises for personnel and transit personnel, unpaved runways and radio stations.
Initially called "Site XX" (XX is a two-digit number), then "VS XX" (Victor site XX), these mini-bases became known as "L XX" for bases with concrete runways and strips, and "LS XX" for bases with unpaved ones. L in the NATO phonetic alphabet corresponds to the word Lima.
Unlike Vietnam, where the military had been in charge since 1964, the operation in Laos was led by the CIA, with overall control exercised by the US Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan.
The words Victor and Lima are taken from the NATO phonetic alphabet and were chosen randomly.
We are interested in "LS-85, aka "Lima site-85".
In 1967, when the Americans were already bombing North Vietnam in full swing as part of Operation Rolling Thunder, the CIA needed a command post in Huaphanh Province from which radio communications could extend to the maximum range.
Huaphan Province
Since the province is located in a mountainous area, it would be logical to use some convenient mountain for this.
The second American need was to equip a ground navigation station for the TACAN (Tactical air navigation) system, a radio beacon that would allow American strike aircraft to navigate in space – there was no satellite navigation in those days, and inertial systems still do not have the necessary accuracy. In Laos, with its fogs, rains and mountains, beacons were vital.
It would also make sense to place such an object on a mountain and higher up.
And there was such a mountain there, in different years it was used by both the French and the Vietnamese.
The subject was the steep and high mountain Phu Pha Thi in the Annam Mountains in northeastern Laos, located just 25 kilometers from Vietnamese territory. The mountain had extremely difficult approaches, and it was assumed that it could be successfully defended against fairly large forces.
Phu Pha Thi, the very peak where it all happened, photo: Wikipedia
The height of the mountain at its peak is 1785 meters? You can get to its top only by several ridges, each of which is located at an altitude of more than 1000 meters, or by climbing very steep, in places almost vertical slopes.
In 1966, construction began on a dirt runway on the mountain, and later on a radio point and a radio beacon.
In 1966, the Americans dropped an AN/TRN-47 radio beacon, generators, a container-type radio center combined with a radio and electrical workshop, a residential trailer, and auxiliary equipment onto the mountain using CH-17 Chinook helicopters.
That same year, the facility began functioning as a radio hub and beacon for strike aircraft.
But soon its purpose was expanded.
Lima site-85 and the bombing of North Vietnam
In 1965, the US Air Force tested the so-called Reeves AN/MSQ-77 Bomb Directing Central Radar, or AN/MSQ-77 Bomb Directing Central Radar.
The system was created on the basis of the Reeves AN/MSQ-35 training complex, which was intended for training bomber crews in the United States.
Briefly, the essence of the system was as follows: the radar “guided” its aircraft, and the predicted points of bomb fall from it were marked on the tablet, if it were to drop them at that moment.
The ongoing war and the need to ensure the combat use of aircraft at night and in difficult weather conditions required the Americans to create a combat version of the system - AN/MSQ-77.
In this complex, the radar worked in tandem with a vacuum tube computer, which continuously calculated the point at which bombs would fall from the aircraft.
This system allowed the pilot to give a command by voice to release weapons, simply by using a stopwatch.
But the Americans wouldn’t be themselves if they didn’t automate this too, and now the pilot just had to fly over the target, the system automatically calculated the point of impact of the bombs and gave the command to release them remotely.
Of course, such a drop was not very accurate, but when carrying out a massive air strike on a dispersed target, it worked - you just had to raise the system higher, on a mountain, for example.
Based on experience in 1967, the circular error of probability for dropping bombs on command from such a post was 90 meters when adjusting from a range of 180 kilometers and at the speed and altitude typical for fighter-bombers of that time when operating on targets over North Vietnam.
F-105 fighter-bombers were used in the strikes against North Vietnam
As part of the ongoing war, the United States launched Operation Combat Skyspot to deploy ground-based radar homing stations for aircraft.
For strikes against North Vietnam, Lima site-85 was simply the perfect location.
In 1967, Reeves Instrument Corporation created the AN/TSQ-77 system based on the AN/MSQ-81, which was distinguished by the absence of a chassis with wheels and was air transportable.
At the same time, a group of American military personnel conducted reconnaissance, assessed the suitability of the LS-85 object for ground guidance, prepared the rocky ground for the installation of a radar center, and built a bunker for peripheral equipment, such as transformers.
In September 1967, the Americans calibrated the radar, October was spent training technical personnel, debugging logistics, communications and security, and from November, the Lima site, among other things, began to be used for guiding strike aircraft.
To protect the mountain from a potential Vietnamese attack, the CIA moved additional Hmong forces there, organizing their massive presence practically on the Vietnamese border.
Hmong, 1961, with M1 Garand and BAR for now. Soon they will be replaced by M14 and M16, and the popular small-sized M79 grenade launcher will be added
According to US statistics, Lima Site-85 was used to guide US aircraft during Operation Rolling Thunder strikes against North Vietnam in the following percentage of strikes:
- November 1967 - 13%
- December - 21%
- January 1968 - 55%
- February 1968 - 55%
Speaking about airstrikes during Operation Barrel Roll on Vietnamese positions and communications in Laos itself, in November 1967 the post directed only one airstrike out of 268, but then in the vicinity of Phu Pha Thi in December, January and March the share of strikes directed from the LS-85 was 20, 10 and 38 percent of all attacks, respectively.
The F-100 was used en masse against targets in Laos. The photo shows one of the attacks of this aircraft in Vietnam.
It is not difficult to understand how nervously the Vietnamese reacted to everything that was happening.
Since the autumn of 1967, their troops operating in Laos began attempts to search for and destroy TACAN beacons.
But there was a difficulty with the LS-85 object - the terrain.
Since the end of 1967, the Vietnamese have been trying to bring down artillery to the range of shooting at the mountain. And they succeeded, but at the limit of the range, so they could not cause any significant damage. But the US with its aviation began a literal hunt for the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao in the vicinity of Phu Pha Thi.
The worst thing is that the Lima-85 was used to direct strike aircraft to Vietnamese transport columns, which had nowhere to hide or disperse in the roadless conditions of Laos.
This moment turned out to be very painful for the Vietnamese.
Meanwhile, losses in the vicinity of Phu Pha Thi were growing, and their actions were not producing any results.
It was necessary to resolve the issue with Lima-85 once and for all.
Air strike - first attempt.
According to Vietnamese sources, the first attack on the facility was planned by the command of the 919th Infantry Regiment.
A group of officers from the headquarters of this military unit, led by the chief of staff and deputy regiment commander Nguyen Van Ba, conducted a study of the area, the facility, its defenses and Vietnamese capabilities and presented their plan.
Interestingly, the staff officers of this regiment came to the conclusion that it was impossible to suddenly destroy the object with army forces and recommended... an airstrike.
The Vietnamese had few strike aircraft capable of operating in the mountains.
In December 1967, however, the Vietnamese air strike plan was ready.
Since the attack was on an airborne radar station that was operating continuously and routinely to illuminate the air situation, and due to the power of the American Air Force, it was necessary to fly very low between the mountains, which was impossible to do on Soviet jet aircraft of that time, and the Vietnamese did not have attack helicopters.
The decision was unexpected: to use armed An-2 transport aircraft.
According to the plan, four An-2s with 57-mm unguided rockets and 120-mm mortar shells in their cargo compartments were supposed to suddenly gain altitude in front of the mountain, fire a rocket salvo at targets on the mountain, and then, while flying over the target, drop mortar shells on it instead of bombs.
Each plane carried 32 missiles and 12 mines inside.
The characteristics of the An-2, according to the Vietnamese, allowed it to fly at low altitude in narrow gorges, following their curves, and this should have ensured surprise.
Vietnamese sources have preserved the names of the pilots for history.
An-2, tail number 664, commander Phan Nhu Can, squadron commander of the entire transport squadron, second pilot Pham Thanh Tam, crew member (responsible for dropping mines) Tran Si Tieu; An-2, tail number 665, commander Tran Huu Quy, second pilot Pham Van Phan, crew member Le Xuan Kiech; An-2, tail number 666, commander Nguyen Van Ngo, second pilot Nguyen Manh Kieu, crew member Tran Trinh; An-2, tail number 671, commander Dinh Cong Gieng, second pilot Dinh Van Niem, crew member Nguyen Huu Hung.
The pilots were well aware of the risk they were taking.
The planes took off on January 12, 1968 at 11:43 am, almost noon, to ensure that they were flying in acceptable visibility conditions.
Half an hour after taking off from the airfield in Gia Lâm, the crews went into radio silence.
The planes were in the target area in just over an hour, where the group commander contacted the ground observation group, consisting of the same officers of the 919th regiment who had been at the origins of the operation, and, having received information about the enemy, led the group into attack.
On Phan Nhu Can's command, the planes climbed to an altitude of 2200 meters and reached the target.
Further on, the Vietnamese and American versions diverge.
According to Vietnamese sources, all aircraft successfully carried out the attack on the target as ordered and flew back to Vietnam.
At 13:07, the first aircraft in the group fired a missile salvo at Lima. Then, as planned, its An-2 flew over the target and dropped mortar shells on it.
Following the commander, three other planes did the same.
And on the way back, due to a piloting error, two of the four planes crashed into a mountain.
The American version points to something else.
The An-2 group was detected visually from the ground, and the Americans at the site, possibly with Hmong or Thai guards, opened fire on the aircraft with small arms.
As a result, one of the An-2s was damaged and subsequently crashed, the crew was killed.
But then, at the start of the attack, fire from the ground simply forced a couple of planes to turn away, while the second pair carried out the strike as planned.
While the facility was under fire, the Americans contacted the nearest Air America helicopter, which was in the air nearby, and immediately came to the aid of the attacked base.
The helicopter pilots did not have time to disrupt the attack, but later, taking advantage of the UH-1's superiority in speed over the An-2, the American helicopter, led by Captain Ted Moore, was able to catch up with one of the planes and approach it from behind and above.
After this, flight mechanic Glenn Woods shot up the cabin of the defenseless biplane, according to some sources, with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, according to others, with an M-16 rifle.
That very moment in the painting by an American artist
The plane crashed into the jungle, the crew died.
Vietnamese sources do not provide a list of losses in this operation, but it is reliably known that the group commander's aircraft with tail number 664 did not return from this sortie.
In any case, both the Americans and the Vietnamese agree that half of the aircraft that took part in the attack were lost.
Later, the Hmong found the crash sites and recovered the bodies—their owners were eager to check if there were any Soviet pilots on board.
Some of the bodies of the dead were later taken to Vietnam, including the body of Phan Nhu Can.
But to the chagrin of the Vietnamese, the losses were in vain. The attack did not lead to any results.
Some equipment at the site was damaged by rocket and mortar shells but remained operational. Four Hmong, two men and two women, were killed, according to the Americans, but no Americans were injured.
Moreover, the remains of one of the Hmong planes were taken in pieces to the capital Vientiane, where they were displayed at a Buddhist temple as evidence of direct Vietnamese participation in the civil war.
It was a failure.
But failure did not mean that the Lima problem did not need to be solved - this post was still very expensive for the Vietnamese.
And after a month and a half they made another attempt.
Special forces enter the action
Initially, faced with the impossibility of destroying the LS-85 from the air, the Vietnamese command decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the facility and capture Mount Phu Pha Thi.
During one of their raids into the Vietnamese rear on February 18, 1968, the Hmong managed to kill several artillery spotters, and an officer from the dead group was found with notes in his notebook about a planned attack on the mountain by three battalions of the Vietnamese army and one battalion of the Pathet Lao.
From February 20 to 29, the Vietnamese apparently tried to implement this plan. They managed to secretly concentrate a certain number of troops near the mountain and even send forward units to the range of aimed fire on the American post on the mountain itself.
The result, however, was 342 attacks by US strike aircraft directed from Lima.
The Vietnamese were unable to overcome such power and retreated back into the forest.
The question arose of what to do next.
And then, instead of a massive attack by infantry and artillery, it was proposed to use a special forces unit of the VNA special operations forces - "Dak Kong".
Vietnam War photos of Dak Kong fighters in their distinctive uniform
By that time, the 41st Special Forces Battalion from Dak Kong was operating in northern and central Laos, and this formation had already distinguished itself with successful attacks on enemy rear facilities in Laos.
Moreover, in case it would be necessary to use special forces against the Lima site-85 facility, a separate unit was formed and trained within the battalion for such an operation from the end of 1967.
The task of destroying the American base was given to a platoon under the command of Senior Lieutenant Truong Muk. Truong Muk himself and his platoon began preparing for special operations in Laos long before Lima was up and running - he and his soldiers completed a nine-month course of intensive combat training and were dropped into Laos in the fall of 1967.
The battalion conducted its first reconnaissance of the positions on Phu Pha Thi on December 18, 1967, by secretly sending a reconnaissance group up the mountain. The Vietnamese did not engage in combat, but hid and observed everything that was happening on Lima for a long time, carefully recording everything that was happening there. The battalion conducted a more thorough reconnaissance on January 22, 1968, carefully reconnoitring all the enemy firing points and defensive positions on the mountain.
"Combat style" - special forces soldiers using mud smeared on their bodies instead of camouflage, 1967.
It is unclear why the Vietnamese command did not immediately use this opportunity, having ready special forces right on the spot, but one way or another, the final order was received by both the battalion and Truong Muk only on February 28, 1968.
The operation plan envisaged that an entire infantry regiment with artillery would work for the special forces, supporting their attack.
Truong Muc and his men moved toward the target on March 1, 1968, with orders to avoid both detection by local civilians and combat with the enemy.
The platoon consisted of 33 people, and was also reinforced by a sapper squad of 9 people and a communications squad of the same size.
It is necessary to understand what kind of forces this detachment would have to deal with.
The Americans deployed more than a thousand men to defend Mount Phu Pha Thi.
The security forces included about 1000 Hmong, of whom 200 defended Mount Phu Phat Thi itself and the mountain ranges leading to it.
On one of the peaks they had a 105mm howitzer with ammunition and a trained crew.
In addition to them, the Americans could count on a combined detachment of Thai border police numbering 300 people.
At the Udorn airbase in Thailand, strike aircraft - attack aircraft and fighter-bombers - were on standby for immediate combat sortie.
There were dozens of Hmong and Thais on the base itself, and the American personnel, while formally listed as civilians, were actually Air Force personnel and were armed with M-16 automatic rifles and grenades. There were trenches and rifle holes around the base structures, and the Americans could occupy them instantly if necessary.
They had a bunker to protect themselves from artillery.
To say that the enemy had numerical superiority is to say nothing.
In addition, the enemy was not as constrained by the need to conserve ammunition as the Vietnamese, who carried everything on themselves.
Finally, the most important thing is that the fighters would have to overcome the last tens of meters along sheer cliffs - they had no other way up.
It was precisely this complexity that made the American command confident that it was impossible to capture the facility.
Lima site-85. Translation and decoding of names: Path down to LZ — descent to the landing pad, Latrine — toilet, Operations — radar center command post and the equipment itself: radar and computer, Generators — diesel generators, TACAN — TACAN system radio beacon, Living trailer — residential trailer, Maint&Comm — radio center and radio workshop.
After the interest shown by the Vietnamese in the LS-85, the only measure taken by the Americans to strengthen security was to include an air controller in the Lima shift, who could perform tasks of directly guiding aircraft to a target, without complex radars and computers.
The air attaché in Vientiane telegraphed to the American air command in Thailand, which was concerned about Vietnamese activity: the facility was impregnable.
It was to this impregnable object that the Vietnamese special forces unit was heading.
The special forces unit advanced to the target on foot through the mountains, all equipment and ammunition had to be carried on their backs, and this was no more and no less than 42-45 kilograms per person.
It took 9 days to reach the target, and on March 9 the detachment arrived at its target.
On the same day, the operation to finally destroy the facility began.
True, it was not the special forces that made the first move.
The Dak Kong attack was supposed to begin the next day, March 10, 1968. And on the 9th, the infantry had to work.
The battle
Immediately before Truong Muk's detachment reached the concentration point, the 766th Infantry Regiment, supported by Pathet Lao detachments, went on the offensive.
True, unlike the attempts of February 20–29, the infantry was now performing a support task.
By the end of the day, the 766th Regiment was able to outflank the mountain and create serious problems for the Hmong in maneuvering their men.
No matter how trained Truong Muk's men were, they would not have been able to cope with more than a thousand guards with a platoon of 33 fighters.
Most likely, the fighters looked something like this before the attack, although we don’t know for sure.
The infantry, having occupied the approaches to Phu Pha Thi, reduced the number of special forces opponents from thousands to a maximum of a couple of hundred.
Again, encircling something in the Laotian jungle is a big convention, but in any case, the enemy really could not maneuver a large mass of fighters.
Another important achievement was the advancement of artillery to positions from which it was possible to systematically fire at the summit of Phu Pha Thi.
At the range the Vietnamese could do this, they were ineffective, but their plan now took this into account.
The sharp increase in activity by the VNA units around Lima site 85 was reported to Ambassador Sullivan, but he, apparently guided by the opinion of the military, did not give any orders either to strengthen the defense of the American post or to evacuate personnel.
Meanwhile, Dak Kong's squad was making final preparations.
Truong Muk divided the platoon into two assault squads. One, which he led himself, was to operate against the facility itself and the personnel on it.
The second, led by Junior Lieutenant Nguyen Viet Hung, was to deal with the Thai units that were located directly on the mountain and neighboring ridges and were used as reinforcements for the Hmong.
Each of the assault squads was divided into smaller groups-cells.
The detachment commanded by Truong Muk was divided as follows:
- Group 1, 3 people, weapons - 1 AK, 1 carbine, one B.40 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher (a Vietnamese copy of the Soviet RPG-2), 19 hand grenades. The task is to capture the communications center.
- Group 2, 3 people, weapons - 3 AK, 21 hand grenades. The task is to help group 1 in capturing a communications center, after capturing it - come to the aid of group 3 and act in its interests.
- Group 3, 5 people, weapons - one RPG B.40, 2 AK, 1 carbine, one K54 pistol (Chinese copy of TT), 26 hand grenades, portable explosive charges. The task is to capture the TACAN station and destroy American personnel, this group was to carry out the main task.
- Group 4, 4 people, weapons - 4 AK, 28 hand grenades. The task is to take fire control of the airstrip, destroy the Americans trying to use it, no matter where they come from - from outside the facility or from inside. A little later, the actions of this group and its commander Le Ba Chom will be decisive for the "score" with which this battle will end for the US.
- Group 5, 3 people, 2 AK, 1 carbine, 18 hand grenades. Reserve, task - to intervene in the battle where it is necessary.
Duck Kong Fighter
Nguyen Viet Hung's detachment was also divided into the same groups, only four.
Until the evening of March 10, the groups were in their initial positions, and on March 10 at 18:00, the artillery of the 766th regiment opened fire on the summit.
Its purpose was not to kill anyone, but to distract the Americans and Hmong and allow the Dak Kong fighters to enter the battle.
Under cover of the shelling, the platoon's assigned sappers approached the Lima border and removed the mines along the path of the special forces' future breakthrough.
The Americans, faced with shelling, left their work stations and took up positions in the trenches and bunker.
Later, at 19:45, when the shelling stopped, they returned back.
This suggests that they did not understand what they were dealing with.
As in previous times when the Vietnamese tried to destroy the facility, the shelling did not result in casualties. The American radar antenna received minor damage, no one was killed or wounded.
But there was also success - a lucky hit destroyed a 105-mm howitzer used by the Hmong.
At 20:20, Ambassador Sullivan gave Lima commander Clarence Blanton unlimited authority to direct aircraft wherever needed.
At 20:40, the main body of Dak Kong Platoon began climbing the cliff, moving towards the mountain's summit.
At 21:15, Sullivan decided that at first light all 19 Americans should be evacuated from the mountain by helicopter.
At 21:21, Vietnamese artillery resumed shelling, and the 766th Regiment began a demonstrative advance toward Phu Pha Thi, as if preparing to attack the mountain.
At 1:00 a.m., the special forces began entering the facility. But the Vietnamese were in no hurry, since both the base and the surrounding area were full of "secrets" exposed by the Hmong, a fight with which could disrupt the execution of the combat mission.
At 2:00 a.m., American Skyraider pilots at Udorn received instructions before the combat sortie to Phu Pha Thi.
It is not known exactly what was happening on the mountain itself at that time. American sources indicate that contact with the Lima was lost.
It is unclear how this could have happened, because the Vietnamese attack itself began later, when groups of fighters had already dispersed throughout the base itself.
At 3:45, Group 1, which was 30 meters from the communications center, encountered a Hmong ambush. Both sides opened fire at each other at point-blank range, and the Hmong were immediately pelted with grenades. There was no longer any point in hiding or trying to take a more advantageous position for the attack; the assault began.
Immediately after the Hmong were eliminated, a soldier from Team 1 opened fire with an RPG at the TACAN beacon.
Using his shot as a signal to begin the fight, one of the fighters from Group 3 also fired an RPG at the beacon.
The groups then moved towards the communications centre, and within 15 minutes it itself was captured, with the Vietnamese from Groups 1 and 2 taking up defensive positions around it.
In parallel with the attack on the communications center and the TACAN beacon, no less dramatic events were taking place nearby.
The radar personnel who were at their posts at the time immediately ran outside, where they came under concentrated fire from Team 3. The base commander and two other USAF technicians were killed, but two managed to escape to the western slope of the mountain and take up defensive positions in the folds of the terrain, firing back at the Vietnamese with M-16 rifles.
The Vietnamese fought them until 4:15, after which they were able to approach the TACAN lighthouse and at 4:30 Groups 3 and 5 took up defensive positions around what was left of it.
Meanwhile, at 4:00 a.m., at another site, Lima site-20A, the Raven Forward Air Controllers were scrambled to provide targeting for the Skyraiders at Udorn.
While Teams 1, 2, 3, and 5 were successfully completing their missions, Team 4 found itself in a difficult situation. It was discovered by Hmong mortar handlers and came under fire from a mortar battery.
The fire cut off Commander Le Ba Chom from his two other soldiers and forced the Vietnamese to take cover. Meanwhile, the Hmong moved two platoons toward the Vietnamese trio with the clear intention of taking at least one prisoner.
The Vietnamese were left with no other option but to try to crawl back to join the rest of the platoon while fighting an enemy force roughly twenty times their size. It took Team 4 a long two hours to reach the rest of the Vietnamese, and in those two hours they found themselves surrounded.
The airstrip remained in enemy hands.
Lima site-85 airstrip
After an hour and a half of gunfire, the Hmong launched a counterattack with the intention of clearing the base.
Meanwhile, the surviving Americans managed to disperse and hide in the bushes and rocks.
At 6:00 a.m. the Hmong attacked Teams 1 and 2 defending the Communications Center, and for the next 25 minutes the Vietnamese had to fight hard for their survival.
But they won - the Hmong retreated, unable to dislodge the special forces from their positions.
Immediately after repelling the attack on the communications center, Group 2 moved closer to Groups 3 and 5, supporting them in a firefight with the Hmong.
By 6:35 a.m., the main area of Lima site 85 was under Vietnamese control.
At sunrise, American planes appeared and subjected the base to air strikes. Under cover of the air strikes, the Hmong and CIA officers providing communications with the American command stormed the facility from the TACAN beacon and began calling for surviving Americans.
By this time, Air America helicopters had begun landing on the airstrip, carrying the surviving Americans, some wounded Hmong, and later the eight bodies of the dead Americans.
All this time, Nguyen Viet Hung's assault force fought the Thais, preventing them from taking part in the Hmong counterattacks.
By mid-March 11, it was all over, the Vietnamese were in complete control of the former base.
At the same time, they managed to shoot down one American Skyraider attack aircraft, which was searching for surviving Americans (who were not there at that time) from the air. The pilot died.
Douglas A-1 Skyraider during the Vietnam War
Now the US is faced with the question of what to do with the equipment and documents left at the base. It has become known that American technicians have dismantled the explosive charges from both the radar and the TACAN beacon - this was done out of fear that they would detonate from Vietnamese artillery fire.
From March 12 to 18, the US Air Force carried out 85 air strikes on Lima 95, destroying all structures on the site. There is no information on Vietnamese casualties from these strikes, but on March 14, the Dak Kong unit left the site, and there was no one on LS-4 for the last four days of bombing. The final strike, on March 85, was again carried out by Skyraiders, and during it, all structures on Phu Pha Thi were completely and finally destroyed.
The losses of all parties other than the United States are unknown.
The Americans lost 11 ground crew members and one pilot. They managed to find some of the bodies in the next century, in the 2000s, after the story was declassified.
The Vietnamese claimed 42 Hmong and/or Thai killed, and claimed one killed and two wounded.
Whether this is true or not, we cannot check today.
But perhaps someday this will become known for sure.
Aftermath
Phu Pha Thi was never recaptured from the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. All attempts by Vang Pao to retake the mountain failed.
The Americans also never regained the ability to accurately guide their aircraft from the ground over North Vietnam in this area, and overall this was a very sensitive loss for them.
For the Vietnamese, this was an important victory, which seriously strengthened their position in the province of Houaphanh and reduced the damage from American bombing, which became less accurate.
And the 41st Dak Kong Battalion continued to fight in Laos - they had plenty of work there.
Today, the Americans claim that Truong Muk was not only not awarded for this operation, but was also put on trial for failing to capture the radar station intact and take its operators alive.
It is unlikely that this is true, but we have not been able to verify this yet.
But be that as it may, both he and his platoon will be remembered as the victors in this unequal battle.
Including far beyond Vietnam.
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