Tsushima tragedy
I. V. Slavinsky. The Last Hour of the Battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima
Home
On the morning of May 25, 1905, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron headed for the Tsushima Strait (120 years since the Battle of Tsushima). The ships sailed in two columns with the transports in the middle. On the night of May 27, the Russian squadron passed the Japanese guard chain. The ships sailed without lights and were not noticed by the Japanese. But the two hospital ships following the squadron were illuminated.
At 2:25 a.m. they were spotted by a Japanese cruiser, which itself remained undetected. At dawn, first one and then several enemy cruisers approached the Russian squadron, following at a distance and sometimes disappearing in the morning fog. Around 10 a.m. Rozhestvensky's squadron reformed into a single wake column. Behind them moved transports and auxiliary vessels under the cover of three cruisers.
In 11 hour. 10 min. Japanese cruisers appeared from behind the fog, some Russian ships opened fire on them. Rozhestvensky ordered to stop firing. At noon, the squadron headed north-east 23 ° - to Vladivostok. Then the Russian admiral tried to rebuild the right column of the squadron in front of the system, but, again seeing the enemy, refused this idea. As a result, the armadillos were in two columns.
A. Kalantayev. The squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" fires at Japanese ships in the Tsushima Strait
Togo, having received a message in the morning about the appearance of a Russian fleet, immediately moved from Mozampo to the eastern side of the Korean Strait (Okinoshima Island). From intelligence reports, the Japanese admiral knew the location of the Russian squadron very well. When around midday the distance between the fleets was reduced to 30 miles, Togo moved towards the Russians with the main armored forces (12 squadron battleships and armored cruisers) plus 4 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. The main forces of the Japanese fleet were to attack the head of the Russian column, and Togo sent the cruiser forces around the Russian rear to capture the transports.
At 13:30 the right column of Russian battleships increased speed to 11 knots and began to turn left in order to come to the head of the left column and form a common column. Cruisers and transports were ordered to move to the right. At this moment Togo's ships appeared from the northeast. The Japanese ships, with a speed of 15 knots, were heading towards the Russian squadron and, finding themselves ahead and slightly to the left of our ships, began to turn in the opposite direction one after the other at one point - the so-called "Togo loop". With this maneuver Togo took a position ahead of the Russian squadron.
The moment of turning was very risky for the Japanese. Rozhestvensky got a good chance to turn the situation in his favor. Having accelerated the 1st detachment to the maximum, having approached to the usual distance of 15 cables for Russian gunners and having concentrated fire on the turning point of Togo's squadron, the Russian squadron battleships could have shot the enemy. According to a number of military researchers, such a maneuver could have caused serious damage to the armored core of the Japanese fleet and allowed the 2nd Pacific Squadron, if not to win this battle, then at least to fulfill the task of breaking through the main forces to Vladivostok.
Also, the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type could have tried to "squeeze" the Japanese ships towards the column of older Russian battleships, slow but with powerful guns. Rozhestvensky either did not notice this or did not dare to take such a step, not believing in the capabilities of his squadron. And he had very little time to make such a decision.
The inset shows a photograph of Admiral Togo Heihachiro above a photograph of his flagship Mikasa leading the battle line of the Imperial Japanese Navy into battle with the Russian squadron.
The Japanese fleet moves towards the enemy
Daytime battle
At the moment of the Japanese squadron's turn at 13:49, the Russian ships opened fire from a distance of about 8 km (45 cables). Only the lead battleships could effectively hit the enemy; for the others, the distance was too great, and the ships ahead interfered.
The Japanese responded immediately, concentrating their fire on the two flagships, the Knyaz Suvorov and the Oslyaba. The Russian commander turned the squadron to the right to take up a position parallel to the course of the Japanese fleet, but the enemy, taking advantage of its greater speed, continued to encircle the head of the Russian squadron, blocking the route to Vladivostok.
About 10 minutes later, the Japanese gunners got their aim, and their powerful high-explosive shells began to cause great destruction on the Russian ships, causing large fires. The fire and heavy smoke also made it difficult for the Russians to shoot and disrupted the control of the ships. The Oslyabya was badly damaged and at about 14:30 p.m., buried up to the hawse holes, it rolled out of formation to the right; about 10 minutes later, the battleship capsized and sank. The commander, Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Baer, was wounded at the beginning of the battle and refused to abandon ship; more than 500 people died with him. The destroyers and the tugboat raised 376 people from the water.
Around the same time, the Suvorov was seriously damaged. Shell fragments hit the conning tower, killing and wounding almost everyone there. Rozhestvensky was wounded. Having lost control, the battleship rolled to the right, and then dangled between the squadrons, trying to regain control. During the ensuing battle, the battleship was repeatedly fired upon and attacked with torpedoes. At the beginning of the 18th hour, the destroyer Buyny took part of the staff from the ship, led by the seriously wounded Rozhestvensky. Soon, Japanese cruisers and destroyers finished off the crippled flagship. The entire crew perished. When the battleship Suvorov perished, Admiral Nebogatov, who was holding the flag on the squadron battleship Emperor Nikolai I, assumed command.
I. A. Vladimirov. The heroic death of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima
The squadron was headed by the next battleship, the Emperor Alexander III. But it soon received heavy damage and moved to the center of the squadron, giving up its place as the lead to Borodino. The battleship Alexander was finished off at 18:50 by concentrated fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. None of the crew (857 people) survived.
The Russian squadron continued moving in relative order, trying to break out of the Japanese pincers. But the Japanese ships, without serious damage, continued to block the way. Around 15:XNUMX, the Japanese cruisers came to the rear of the Russian squadron, captured two hospital ships, and engaged the cruisers, knocking the cruisers and transports into one pile.
After 15:23 the sea was suddenly covered by fog. Under its protection the Russian ships turned south-east and parted ways with the enemy. The battle was interrupted, and the Russian squadron again set course north-east XNUMX°, towards Vladivostok. However, the enemy cruisers discovered the Russian squadron, and the battle continued.
An hour later, when fog returned, the Russian squadron turned south and drove off the Japanese cruisers. At 17:XNUMX, obeying the instructions of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, Borodino again led the column to the northeast, toward Vladivostok. Then Togo's main forces approached again, and after a short exchange of fire, fog separated the main forces.
Around 18:19, Togo caught up with the main Russian forces again, concentrating his fire on Borodino and Orel. Borodino was heavily damaged and was on fire. At the beginning of XNUMX:XNUMX, Borodino received its last critical damage and was completely ablaze. The battleship capsized and sank with the entire crew. Only one sailor (Semyon Yushchin) was saved. Alexander III had perished a little earlier.
With the sunset, the Japanese commander took the ships out of battle. By the morning of May 28 all the detachments were to gather north of the Dagelet Island (in the northern part of the Korea Strait). The miners received the task of continuing the battle, encircling the Russian squadron and completing the rout by night attacks.
Thus, 27 in May 1905, the Russian squadron suffered a heavy defeat. 2-I Pacific squadron lost 4 best squadron battleship of 5-ti. The newest battleship Eagle, which remained afloat, was badly damaged. Other ships of the squadron were also heavily damaged. Many Japanese ships received several holes, but retained their combat capability.
The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not wage a decisive and furious battle. If the captains had fought decisively, maneuvered, tried to get closer to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese would have suffered much more serious losses.
The apathy of the leadership paralyzed almost all the commanders; the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly broke through towards Vladivostok, not trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships.
Source: Soviet historical encyclopedia. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ed. by E. M. Zhukov. 1973-1982.
Completion of the rout
During the night, numerous Japanese destroyers surrounded the Russian fleet from the north, east and south. Nebogatov on his flagship overtook the squadron, took the lead and moved to Vladivostok. The cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving transports, found themselves without leadership and headed in different directions.
The four battleships remaining with Nebogatov (Nikolai, Orel, Admiral Senyavin, General-Admiral Apraksin) were surrounded by superior enemy forces in the morning and capitulated. The crews were ready to accept the last battle and die with honor, but they carried out the admiral's order.
Only the encircled cruiser Izumrud, the only cruiser remaining in the squadron after the battle and protecting the remnants of the 2nd Pacific Squadron from destroyer attacks at night, did not obey the order to surrender to the Japanese. Izumrud broke through the encirclement at full speed and went to Vladivostok. The ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Ferzen, who showed himself excellently during this tragic battle and the breakthrough of the encirclement, made a number of serious mistakes during the journey to Vladivostok. Apparently, the psychological stress of the battle had an effect. When entering Vladimir Bay, the ship ran aground and was blown up by the crew, fearing the appearance of the enemy. Although during high tide it was possible to lift the ship off the sandbank.
The battleship Navarin did not receive any serious damage in the daytime battle, and the losses were small. But at night, it gave itself away with the light of searchlights, and the attack of Japanese destroyers led to the ship's destruction. Of the 681 crew members, only three managed to escape.
The battleship Sisoj Velikiy received heavy damage during the daytime battle. At night it was attacked by destroyers and received fatal damage. In the morning the battleship reached Tsushima Island, where it collided with Japanese cruisers and a destroyer. The ship's commander M. V. Ozerov, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, agreed to capitulate. The Japanese evacuated the crew, and the ship sank.
The armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was seriously damaged during the day, torpedoed at night, and sunk in the morning to avoid surrender to the enemy. The armored cruiser Admiral Ushakov was seriously damaged in the daytime battle. The ship's speed dropped, and it fell behind the main forces. On May 28, the ship refused to capitulate and accepted an unequal battle with the Japanese armored cruisers Iwate and Yakumo. Having received severe damage, the ship was scuttled by its crew.
The heavily damaged cruiser Vladimir Monomakh was sunk by its crew in a hopeless situation. Of all the 1st rank ships, the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy was the closest to Vladivostok. The cruiser was overtaken by the Japanese. Donskoy accepted the battle with superior Japanese forces. The cruiser perished without lowering its flag. The crew was saved and transported to Ulleungdo Island.
Only a second-class cruiser Almaz, the destroyers Bravy and Grozny, could leave for Vladivostok. In addition, the transport "Anadyr" went to Madagascar, and then to the Baltic. Three cruisers (“Pearls”, “Oleg” and “Aurora”) went to Manila in the Philippines and were interned there. The destroyer "Bedovy", carrying the wounded Rozhestvensky, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and surrendered.
Dmitry Donskoy
Losses
Russian losses: more than 5 thousand people killed, about 800 wounded, more than 7 thousand captured, more than 2 thousand interned in neutral ports.
Of the 38 ships and vessels participating on the Russian side, 21 sank as a result of enemy combat action, were scuttled or blown up by their crews (7 battleships, 3 armored cruisers, 2 armored deck cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 transports), 7 surrendered or were captured (4 battleships, 1 destroyer, 2 hospital ships), of which the hospital ship Kostroma was subsequently released. Six ships (6 armored deck cruisers, 3 destroyer, 1 transports) were interned in neutral ports until the end of the war.
Japanese losses - more than 600 people killed and wounded. Three destroyers were lost. Many ships were damaged, but all remained in service.
Value
From the very beginning, the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was adventurous. The ships had to be sent to the Pacific Ocean before the war. The meaning of the campaign was finally lost after the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron. The squadron had to be returned from Madagascar. However, due to political ambitions, the desire to somehow raise the prestige of Russia, the fleet was actually sent to perish. In the hope of a miracle (maybe).
The voyage from Libau to Tsushima itself became an unparalleled feat of Russian sailors in overcoming enormous difficulties. But the battle at Tsushima showed the advanced stage of the Romanov Empire's disintegration. The problems of shipbuilding and armament of the Russian fleet in comparison with the leading powers (the Japanese fleet was created by the efforts of the leading world powers, especially England).
Russian naval power in the Far East was crushed. Tsushima became the decisive prerequisite for concluding peace with Japan, although in military-strategic terms the outcome of the war was decided on land.
Petersburg was shocked by the tragedy, they were sure to the end that the Russian fleet would crush the "Asians". The revolution was growing in the country. And the society started talking about the constitution.
Tsushima became a kind of terrible landmark event for the Russian Empire, showing the need for fundamental changes in the country, the disastrous nature of the war for Russia in its current state. Unfortunately, it was not understood, and the Russian Empire perished, like the 2nd Pacific Squadron, bloodily and horribly.
V. S. Ermyshev. Battleship "Admiral Ushakov"
Reasons for the pogrom
One of the main reasons for the death of the squadron was the lack of initiative and indecisiveness of the Russian command (the scourge of the Russian army and navy during the Russo-Japanese War). Rozhestvensky did not dare to raise the issue of sending the squadron back after the fall of Port Arthur. The admiral led the squadron without hope of success and remained passive, giving the initiative to the enemy. There was no specific battle plan. Long-range reconnaissance was not organized, and the opportunity to defeat the Japanese cruisers, which were separated from the main forces for a significant time, was not used.
At the beginning of the battle, they did not use the chance to deliver a strong blow to the enemy's main forces. The squadron did not complete its battle formation and fought under unfavorable conditions; only the lead ships could fire normally. The unsuccessful formation of the squadron allowed the Japanese to concentrate their fire on the best battleships of the Russian squadron and quickly disable them, after which the outcome of the battle was decided.
During the battle, when the lead battleships were out of action, the squadron actually fought without command. Nebogatov took command only in the evening and surrendered the ships to the Japanese in the morning.
Among the technical reasons, one can single out the "fatigue" of the ships after a long voyage, when they were separated from a normal repair base for a long time. The ships were overloaded with coal and other cargo, which reduced their seaworthiness.
Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ships in the total number of guns, armor area, speed, rate of fire, weight, and explosive power of the squadron's shot.
All participants in the battle were struck by the difference in damage to Russian and Japanese ships: the consequences of the explosions of Russian shells were small, about a third of the shells did not explode and left only holes equal to their diameter. When Japanese shells exploded, a cloud of small fragments formed. When Russian shells exploded, several large fragments formed, but their force was very weak.
The cruiser and destroyer forces lagged significantly. The squadron's naval composition was varied in armament, protection and maneuverability, which affected its combat capability. The new battleships, as the battle showed, had weak armor and low stability.
The Russian squadron, unlike the Japanese fleet, was not a single combat organism. The personnel, both commanding and enlisted, were diverse. There were only enough career commanders to fill the main responsible positions. The shortage of command personnel was compensated for by early graduation of the Naval Corps, the call-up of "old men" from the reserve (who had no experience of sailing on armored ships) and transfer from the merchant marine (ensigns).
As a result, a strong gap formed between the youth, who did not have the necessary experience and sufficient knowledge, the “old men” who needed to update their knowledge, and the “civilians” who did not have normal military training.
There was also a shortage of conscript sailors, so the crews consisted of reservists and recruits by about a third. There were many "penal" sailors, whom the commanders "sent" on long voyages, which did not improve discipline on the ships. The situation with the non-commissioned officers was no better.
The personnel were mostly assigned to the new ships only in the summer of 1904 and were unable to study the ships well. Because of the urgent need to finish, repair and prepare the ships, the squadron did not sail together in the summer of 1904 and did not train. Only in August was a 10-day voyage completed. During the voyage, due to a number of reasons, the crews were unable to learn how to maneuver the ships and shoot well.
Thus, the 2-I Pacific Squadron was poorly prepared, in fact, did not receive combat training. It is clear that Russian sailors and commanders entered the battle courageously, bravely fought, but their heroism could not rectify the situation.
The situation was well described by Alexey Novikov, a sailor on the Orel (a future Soviet marine writer). He was arrested in 1903 for revolutionary propaganda and transferred to the 2nd Pacific Squadron as an “unreliable” person. Novikov wrote:
Many sailors were called up from the reserve. These elderly men, clearly unaccustomed to naval service, lived with memories of their homeland, grieved at being separated from their home, their children, their wives. The war had fallen upon them unexpectedly, like a terrible disaster, and they, preparing for an unprecedented campaign, did their work with the gloomy look of those hanged. The crew included many recruits. Downtrodden and miserable, they looked at everything with frozen horror in their eyes. They were frightened by the sea, which they had found themselves on for the first time, and even more so by the unknown future. Even among the career sailors who had graduated from various special schools, there was no usual cheerfulness. Only the penal ones, in contrast to the rest, held on more or less cheerfully. The shore command, in order to get rid of them as a harmful element, came up with the easiest way to do this: write them off to ships heading off to war. Thus, to the horror of the senior officer, we had up to seven percent of them.
Another good image explaining the death of the squadron was conveyed by Novikov (under the pseudonym "sailor A. Zaterty"). This is what he saw:
“We were extremely surprised that this ship was not damaged at all by our artillery. It looked as if it had just been taken out of repairs. Even the paint on the guns was not burnt. Our sailors, having inspected the Asahi, were ready to swear that on May 14 we fought not with the Japanese, but ... God knows, with the English. Inside the battleship we were amazed at the cleanliness, tidiness, practicality and expediency of the arrangement. On our new battleships of the Borodino type, half of the ship was allocated for some thirty officers; it was cluttered with cabins, and during the battle they only increased the fires; and in the other half of the ship we had squeezed not only up to 900 sailors, but also artillery and elevators. And on our enemy's ship everything was used mainly for the guns. Then we were suddenly struck by the absence of that discord between the officers and sailors that you encounter at every step with us; there, on the contrary, there was a sense of unity, a kindred spirit and common interests between them. It was only here that we really learned for the first time who we were dealing with in battle and what the Japanese were like."
Japanese Admiral Togo himself did not consider this victory a great miracle. Japanese gunners acted no better than in the battle in the Yellow Sea. But the Japanese fleet was a single fighting mechanism, and the Russian was not.
Battle of Tsushima, painting by Tojo Shotaro
Information