Chronicle of special operation and losses

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Chronicle of special operation and losses
Units of the 103rd Airborne Division at the Kabul airfield. Late December 1979.


Late December 1979. A change of power took place in the capital of Afghanistan as a result of the special operation "Baikal-79". During the night of December 27-28, 1979, key objects in Kabul were captured: the Taj-Bek Palace, the General Staff, the headquarters of the Central Army Corps, the Dar-ul-Aman Palace, the intelligence and counterintelligence service, the Air Force headquarters, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Tsarandoy), the Pul-i-Charkhi prison for political prisoners, the radio and television center, as well as a number of other objects.



Hafizullah Amin (object No. 1) was killed in the Taj Beg Palace, which was officially registered as a decision of the "revolutionary court" to execute him. His loyal comrade and relative, Chief of the General Staff Mohammed Yaqub (object No. 2), was killed in the General Staff. Members of the Afghan government were arrested.

What losses did the Soviet troops suffer on the night of December 27-28, 1979? All publications on this topic only mention a few fighters who died at the Taj Beg Palace. That's all. Could such a large-scale operation to capture the capital of Afghanistan, storm facilities in the city and block the Kabul garrison have taken place with such minimal losses?

Even before the start of Operation Baikal-79, seven Il-7 crew members and 76 paratroopers of the 37th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 350rd Guards Airborne Division were listed as dead; they died in a plane crash on December 103, 25, during the airlift of troops to the Kabul and Bagram airfields.

The duty officer at the operation control point, Colonel E. V. Chernyshev, makes an entry in his diary:

“The rate of aircraft arrivals is high. That is why at first we did not notice that the next, seventh in a row, aircraft had not been reported from the airfield. When there was a short pause, we asked the airfield for information on the IL-76D, the seventh in a row. After clarifying, they replied that it had not yet arrived. This should not be. The aircraft were flying in a chain, one after another, and their tail numbers were known in advance. We asked the task force in Moscow. They scolded us for our inattentive work. We tried to clarify again at the airport. Nothing new. They only reported that the duty dispatcher had observed a bright flash in the sky, away from the course of the arriving aircraft.

At about two o'clock in the morning, a report was requested from Moscow: where did the Il-76D disappear to?

The city of Mary, where the planes were refueling, reported that the plane had left for Kabul on schedule. The crew of the eighth plane reported that they had seen a bright flash, like an explosion, on the left as they approached Kabul. It became clear that the transport had crashed. It was found that there were 44 people (a platoon) on board, along with the crew, a vehicle with ammunition, and a vehicle with fuel.

Throughout the day, planes continue to arrive. The number of troops and cargo at the airfields increases. The population gets used to the roar of planes. In the evening, Moscow requests the names of those killed on the IL-76D. It turns out that the lists for the entire regiment were on the plane that crashed. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the names."


The regiment’s clerk, Guard Senior Sergeant Antonina Zaitseva, recalls:

"Nevertheless, the names were determined. Guards Major Vladimir Ivanovich Reznik opened the sealed combat unit at the regiment headquarters in Borovukha-1, the safe with personal files and the UPK card index (registration and service cards of conscripts). The sad work of drawing up documents for the dead began. Thus, through tears, I became the clerk of the combat unit."

But this tragedy occurred on December 25, 1979, before the start of the special operation. And what irretrievable and sanitary losses did the troops suffer on the night of December 27-28, 1979 as a result of combat operations during the capture of objects in the capital of Afghanistan? The exact figures of irretrievable (killed) and sanitary (wounded) losses in those battles are unknown; they vary depending on the sources, since this data was often classified or distorted.

The participants in the operation themselves in those days knew only about what was happening in their units. Probably, the headquarters had information about the total losses, at least approximate. But no one in the companies or battalions had such information.

Colonel E.V. Chernyshev:

“December 28.12.79, XNUMX, Friday. By midnight, everything was basically over. The shooting had died down. The job was done. However, reports of killed and wounded were coming in from everywhere. This was a clear miscalculation in the long-prepared operation. Medical support was not deployed, there were no medical forces and resources. Now we are forced to go around the houses where the advisers’ families lived, to gather their wives, who were involved in medicine. We gathered everyone in the clinic. The wounded and killed were taken there. There were more than a hundred of them. Some were wrapped in sheets soaked in blood. They were given first aid and taken to the hospital.”
Sergeant of "Poltinnik" Sergei Odinets took part in the capture of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Tsarandoi. He said that during the storming of the ministry building, a captain from the "Zenit" group was killed from their combined detachment, and three paratroopers from the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment were wounded. Sergei recalled that they were brought to the hospital at the embassy; he called the medical institution that, but it was probably an embassy hospital, not a hospital. According to Sergei, when they were taken to the surgical department, they noticed that there were many wounded soldiers lying on couches in the corridors. He concluded that all the beds in the wards were occupied and there was not enough space. This is in relation to the question of the number of wounded.

The duty officer at the control center, Colonel E. V. Chernyshev:

"December 28.12.1979, 14. Around twelve o'clock I spoke on the phone with Army General Varennikov. He was interested in the losses and said to report by fourteen o'clock. I had preliminary data. I coordinated it with the Airborne Forces headquarters. They didn't have final data either, but we came to the same conclusions. At 00:14 I reported by phone to Moscow: as of 00:30 there were 128 killed, including one officer, and XNUMX wounded, including one officer. Data on Ivanov's (KGB) employees was not included here, they were unknown to us.

Our wounded have already been placed in the hospital. The dead were being prepared for shipment to the Union. The lists of those killed in the IL-76D plane on the evening of the 25th have been clarified."


Probably, 30 dead out of almost ten thousand military contingent is really minimal losses, as they officially say. But each of the dead is someone's son, brother, father, relative.

Several years ago it became known that on the IL-25 plane that crashed on December 1979, 76, in addition to 37 paratroopers of the 350th regiment, there were three officers of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District with some secret documents. In addition, the plane's crew consisted of not seven, but ten people. That is, the total losses in the plane crash were not forty-four, but fifty people.

Unfortunately, this topic - the topic of combat losses in the December 1979 operation in Kabul - has not been sufficiently studied and has not been researched to this day. And now it is unlikely that anyone will seriously study it: the times are different, that country is long gone.
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  1. + 16
    29 May 2025 07: 55
    The further we go, the more convinced I become that the military leadership of the SA at all levels was approximately the same by the end of the USSR - the piping and the tag are our everything!! Only with a tag of the right size will we defeat NATO!! A soldier without a tag is like a cap without a hole!!!

    Live examples of this are given in the article:
    - without actual enemy fire resistance, without the use of artillery, tanks, artillery and aviation - at the battalion level they cannot calculate losses.
    - it is not known how many people were on board the crashed plane, it is all a guesswork.
    - medicine - but why? - lucky that they took the capital of the state where there was an embassy. And what if they took some ass of the world - where there are no doctors in nature?
    - connection? And what is this? (c)

    And the worst thing is that then, and in the 1990s, and in the 2000s, and now, the approaches haven’t changed much.
    1. 0
      29 May 2025 10: 51
      svoy1970 (Sergey), respected, I agree with you in many ways. It's clear from the photo: they flew God knows where, God knows why, but not to fight. How far is the distance between the BMDs? They're not expecting any resistance: not with a mortar, not with a tank, not with a howitzer.
      1. +3
        29 May 2025 16: 15
        Oh, great anonymous minusator! Do you remember that the Afghan army was armed with Soviet M-30 howitzers and knew how to use them? Do you know, great anonymous minusator, that from 5-6 km with professional adjustment, a HE shell, with a fragmentation action setting, mowed down infantry not sheltered in field fortifications in a rectangle of 60 by 20 meters? And the Afghan army also had our 120-mm PM-38 mortars. And there were trained crews. A normal crew from 3,5 km would have rolled out the entire cluster of BMDs and tents. A 120-mm mine, falling to the ground almost vertically, unlike an HE shell, mows down infantry evenly in a circle within a radius of 25 meters.
    2. -8
      29 May 2025 10: 59
      It is not known how many people were on board the crashed plane, it is all guesswork.
      Why do you think it is unknown?
      All the data is there, but it is still classified.
      And fortune telling is for those who publish articles on the Internet
      And the worst thing is that then, and in the 1990s, and in the 2000s, and now, the approaches haven’t changed much.
      And why such a strong conclusion?
      1. +5
        29 May 2025 11: 16
        The SVO has been going on for four years! What other proof do you need? Do you know the average level of our losses per day from other sources? They even have a lot of FPV drones and they fly at someone!
        1. -2
          29 May 2025 11: 40
          Why did you decide that the approaches to conducting the 79 SVO and the 22 SVO were the same? what
          1. +7
            29 May 2025 12: 27
            I have not decided, I assert. In our army, the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces has not adopted a single new concept of conducting modern combat operations, even at the tactical level. There is no officially adopted concept of using UAVs. Yes, how can there be one if there is no concept of modern combat. In the SVO, they fight using the concepts of the USSR:
            - the concept of company strong points;
            - the concept of combined arms combat.
            Moreover, the latter cannot be implemented due to lack of resources!
            1. +2
              29 May 2025 12: 53
              I have worked enough in Chechnya and Abkhazia and I can say that the actions of the troops are completely different from how the units behaved in the 2000s.
              Rewrite the Charter, well OK, but tomorrow another Baba Yaga will appear and rewrite the Charter again?
              Or will there be swarms of drones? Rewrite again?
              During the Great Patriotic War, how many times was the Charter rewritten, despite the radical change in the paradigm of actions.
              Exactly ZERO!
              Because the changes must be accumulated and then embodied in the Charter.
              Until then, it is enough to inform the units and train the personnel what and how to do.
              1. +1
                29 May 2025 13: 52
                Your views are outdated. FPV drones are not modern weapons. They are a temporary half-measure due to the lack of advanced military developments, moreover, drones do not meet the criteria of modern warfare, they are a spare weapon. Just don’t say that you should tell this to the soldiers on the front lines. SVO is not modern warfare, and soldiers and officers are not to blame for this. They were not taught, no one created the conditions for waging a modern war. By the way, when waging a modern war without storming and razing your cities to dust, without contact combat, without firing at areas, without attack aircraft, losses are reduced by an order of magnitude. Ask the generals what modern combat operations are!!!
                1. +2
                  29 May 2025 14: 39
                  For God's sake, they're out of date.
                  The soldiers and officers are not to blame - well, ok.
                  Ask the generals what modern military operations are - I think they will answer you better than you yourself.
                  1. +1
                    29 May 2025 17: 58
                    They won't answer. They have no idea and haven't even read the Russian Federation Military Doctrine 2014...
            2. -4
              29 May 2025 12: 59
              I have not decided, I am affirming. In our army, the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces has not adopted a single new concept of conducting modern combat operations, even at the tactical level.
              How do you know that you weren't accepted? Do you serve in the General Staff?

              And the question was:
              Why did you decide that the approaches to conducting the 79 SVO and the 22 SVO were the same?
              To make such a conclusion, you first need to know these approaches.
              I can only assume that the approaches are very different and have changed for the worse.
              1. +2
                29 May 2025 13: 43
                You don't even have enough imagination to imagine how the approaches have changed, or rather, how they should have changed! I'll start with the fact that in modern warfare there is no LBS, but there is a conditional LBS. In addition, a contact assault battle is an uncalculated battle and they try to avoid it. Is that enough for a start?
                1. 0
                  29 May 2025 19: 28
                  You can't even imagine how the approaches have changed, or rather, how they should have changed.
                  Colleague, I wrote above my assumption that approaches to conducting military operations have changed since 1979.
      2. +9
        29 May 2025 11: 48
        Quote: Lewww
        Why do you think it is unknown?
        All the data is there, but it is still classified.

        Oh yes!!!! To keep things classified is the most important thing in the army!!
        There is no army, no country, no Afghanistan, the troops have been withdrawn for 36 years already - but "what if Omeriga finds out the number of people killed in 1979 on that plane and immediately defeats us because of this???!!!" (c)
        In 1998, an order came from the Chief of Communications of the Armed Forces to write off communications equipment. The first item was "A two-wheeled cart, on a bicycle drive for transporting carrier pigeons" adopted for service in 1928. Then came all sorts of Baudot devices, telegraphs and similar heresy - to 1934.
        And all this feces were recorded in logbooks marked "Secret" - what if NATO finds out and dies laughing!!!

        In 1989, I was on a conscription trip with UN observers to monitor the withdrawal of troops. The major accompanying them had an urge to report something to the headquarters, so they climbed a hill and fought with the radio for an hour. And then silence...
        We climb down from the hill - and there is a UN officer on a mobile Motorola (they were in their cars, Nissan Patrol) talking to the hotel where their base was. And without any interference or stress.

        Quote: Lewww
        And the worst thing is that then, and in the 1990s, and in the 2000s, and now, the approaches haven’t changed much.
        And why such a strong conclusion?

        Why is Baofeng in the army?
        1. -1
          29 May 2025 12: 50
          And all this feces were recorded in logbooks marked "Secret" - what if NATO finds out and dies laughing!!!
          NATO has nothing to do with it at all, it’s just that orders and instructions on classifying and declassifying were introduced in the SA.
          It was easy to classify, but declassifying was a real pain in the ass, so a lot is still classified - it's just that no one wants to bother with declassifying.
          It's the same in the FSB and SVR
          1. +7
            29 May 2025 13: 08
            Quote: Lewww
            just Nobody wants to bother with declassification.

            You forget about the bonus for "Secrecy" and the reduction in rank fork when the volume of classified documents decreases.
            And to declassify the case in 5 minutes - having declassified period of documents in SA. For example since 1920 (and there are secrets there, yeah-yeah belay ) until 1970. Those who served then had already died, everything else is basically no longer a secret...
            And by declassifying each document separately, there would be enough work for 100 years...

            The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB have a more complicated situation with this - agents and so on.
            1. -2
              29 May 2025 19: 19
              And it takes 5 minutes to declassify the case
              What you wrote shows that you have never done this.
              By the way, the bonus for secrecy does not depend on the number of classified documents.
              1. +3
                29 May 2025 20: 20
                Quote: Lewww
                And it takes 5 minutes to declassify the case
                What you wrote shows that you have never done this.
                By the way, the bonus for secrecy does not depend on the number of classified documents.

                We are not talking about real regime documents of military units, design bureaus and other places. We are talking about archives with documents of God knows how old, the classification on which does not make any sense. What is the sense in the classification on a document about the atrocities of Banderites in 1944 or the shooting of German ships with prisoners by English pilots (there was an article recently)?
                Quote: Lewww
                By the way, the bonus for secrecy does not depend on the number of classified documents.
                it depends directly - if you declassify a large part of the archive, it will suddenly turn out that people with shoulder straps are needed there in the amount of 1-2-3 people, and for everything else there will be enough civilian personnel up to the ears.
                And yes, if there are 10 classified cases in the archive, then it’s one song, but if there are 000, then they can be combined in another archive.

                In the current situation - when documents from 1940 are declassified - this will really be enough for 100 years...
                1. 0
                  30 May 2025 11: 49
                  What is the meaning of the stamp on the document about the atrocities of Bandera in 1944
                  You don't know how to do it.
                  First, one of the big generals must come forward with an initiative to declassify something and explain why.
                  Does he need it?
                  Or an order will come from the government.

                  Then, by order, a declassification commission is created from among people who are doing some of their own work, i.e. people are torn away from their immediate work, which means that someone else must do it. That is, people are usually sent on a secondment.
                  Then the main responsible manager is appointed.
                  Then they must study the entire array of documents scheduled for declassification, and the head must take responsibility for the consequences of declassification. And if something unnecessary is declassified, then he is the one to blame. Remember the story of the head of the State Archives of the Russian Federation Mironenko
                  In short, it’s a hassle and no one needs it except ordinary citizens interested in history.
                  it depends directly - if you declassify a large part of the archive, it will suddenly turn out that people with shoulder straps are needed there in the amount of 1-2-3 people,
                  You are out of the loop again, it's simpler: there is a gradation of positions for which a corresponding form of clearance is determined. The form depends on the secrecy classification of the documents they will have to work with. That is, mainly on those that have not yet been compiled.
                  Therefore, the declassification of some ancient documents will not affect their security clearance in any way.
    3. -1
      27 October 2025 18: 41
      Look at the beginning of the SVO - food, clothing and medicine are a complete disaster in the first months.
  2. +3
    29 May 2025 09: 19
    However, these were the best prepared troops for battle, and losses, despite shortcomings in coordination, medicine and communications, were minimal.
    The number of casualties did not even cause a big jump compared to the average annual level that the Soviet army suffered annually as a result of emergencies during numerous exercises, suicides, road accidents and other accidents. Well, unless you consider that here it happened in one day, and half of them in an air crash.
    What I'm getting at is that those soldiers and officers in a non-belligerent country were more than well prepared for combat operations, and that must be given credit.
  3. +2
    29 May 2025 10: 54
    What losses did the Soviet troops suffer on the night of December 27-28, 1979? All publications on this topic only talk about a few fighters who died near the Taj Beg Palace. That's all.
    In all of which ones exactly?
    Even Wikipedia lists more than 30 people killed during the operation to seize the Taj Bek residence, and 5 of them died from "friendly fire" from paratroopers.

    Little data on losses during the capture of other objects
  4. -1
    29 May 2025 11: 36
    Chronicle of special operation and losses

    And where is the chronicle?
    The title is catchy, but when the text of the article doesn’t live up to it, it creates a negative impression, despite all the positive work of the author.
  5. +5
    29 May 2025 14: 54
    and how many people exactly died in Moscow during the events of October 1993? we will never know either