US DIA on new Russian air-to-air missile

40 479 39
US DIA on new Russian air-to-air missile
MiG-31 interceptor with rockets R-33. Photo: Wikimedia Commons


The United States closely monitors the activities of the Russian defense industry in the field of nuclear weapons. Various reports and forecasts on this topic are regularly published, and various concerns are expressed. For example, one of the Pentagon structures recently reported the creation of a new air-to-air missile with nuclear warheads in Russia. Thanks to this arms, fighter aviation will receive new combat capabilities.



According to intelligence


On May 11, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released its annual Worldwide Threat Assessment. The document lists and discusses the main threats to U.S. national security and various issues related to them. As usual, it focuses on the military and political activities of China and Russia.

The chapter of the report devoted to Russia has a large section on weapons of mass destruction. It provides an assessment of the current state of nuclear forces and other special means, cites some figures and makes forecasts. However, the open version of the report includes only the most general points.

The Russian Defense Ministry reports that Russia is currently expanding its nuclear forces and acquiring new capabilities in this area. New types of weapons are being developed, including air-based ones. In particular, a new air-to-air missile with special equipment has been created.


MiG-31 and its weapons at the exhibition. In the foreground are R-33 missiles. Photo Wikimedia Commons

In the open version of the report, the Pentagon Intelligence Agency does not provide the type of this product, the time of its appearance, or other details. There is also no specific data on other mentioned programs and models. It is possible that such information is present in other documents of the DIA that are not subject to publication.

The mention of a certain Russian air-to-air missile with a nuclear warhead is of some interest. The fact is that information about such developments in Russian industry has not been received before. There are no official mentions of such projects, and foreign intelligence services have not reported on them.

In non-nuclear equipment


It should be recalled that all serial air-to-air missiles of Soviet and Russian design were and are equipped with conventional warheads only. In the past, the possibility of creating similar weapons with special warheads was studied, but such proposals did not reach full implementation.

However, other versions are circulating abroad. According to a number of foreign sources, at least one Soviet project of a nuclear air-to-air missile was developed and reached full implementation. Allegedly, there was a special modification of the long-range R-33 missile.


R-37 missiles of the first version. Photo MilitaryRussia.ru

Like other R-33 variants, this missile was intended for the MiG-31 interceptor fighter. It allowed attacking targets at ranges of up to 150-160 km. The parameters of the nuclear warhead are not specified. It is assumed that such a missile could destroy or damage group air targets - several aircraft at once within a radius of hundreds of meters.

It is now believed that the concept of a long-range air-to-air nuclear missile has been developed and is now being implemented at a modern technical level. The nuclear weapon mentioned in the DIA report could have been created on the basis of one of the modern missiles.

The American publication The War Zone offers a version about the use of the R-37M product. This missile could have undergone the necessary modifications and received a compact special warhead. As a result of such modernization, the product retains its basic flight and technical characteristics, but receives fundamentally new combat capabilities.

Air-to-air missile


Let us recall that the first version of the R-37 missile was developed at the Moscow State Design Bureau Vympel from the early XNUMXs. Testing began by the end of the decade, but was delayed due to the collapse of the USSR and other events. They were completed only in the second half of the XNUMXs.


A modern version of the R-37M / RVV-BD missile. Photo Vitalykuzmin.su

At this stage, a decision was made to develop an updated version of the missile with a different composition of components and improved characteristics. The R-37M or RVV-BD ("Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile") was tested in the XNUMXs, and preparations for serial production began in the early XNUMXs.

In 2014, the R-37M missile was officially accepted into service by the Russian Air Force. Its first carrier was the MiG-31BM interceptor. Later, other modern fighters, such as the Su-30SM, Su-35S and Su-57, also received the missile. According to known data, it is the Su-35S that uses this weapon in the Special Operation to protect Donbass. At the same time, the high characteristics of the product are confirmed.

The R-37M missile is made in a cylindrical body with an ogive nose fairing. In the central part there is an X-shaped wing of low aspect ratio with a long chord, in the tail - rudders. The total length of the product reaches 4,06 m, the fuselage diameter is 380 mm. The launch weight reaches 600 kg.

A dual-mode solid-fuel engine is used, which allows it to reach speeds of up to 6 M. The maximum launch range is declared at 300 km. It is capable of intercepting aerodynamic air targets flying at speeds of up to 2500 km/h.


Active radar homing head 9B-1388. Photo Vitalykuzmin.su

The missile is equipped with a combined control and guidance system. Flight to the target area is carried out using inertial navigation. At distances of 25-30 km from the target, the active radar homing head of the 9B-1388 type is activated. It ensures target detection and subsequent guidance to it with high accuracy.

A 60 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead is used to hit the target. The warhead fuse has a non-contact target sensor, presumably a laser one.

Delivery vehicle


According to foreign estimates, the R-37M missile can carry not only a high-explosive fragmentation warhead. Instead, a nuclear warhead can be installed, giving the missile special combat capabilities. Whether such estimates and forecasts correspond to reality is unknown. However, the version itself seems plausible in technical terms.

The R-37M differs from other missile weapons not only in its range, but also in its larger dimensions and payload. Inside the hull there is a fairly long compartment with a diameter of about 380 mm, which can accommodate a 60-kg warhead. In theory, such a compartment is suitable for installing low-yield tactical-class nuclear warheads.


R-37M missiles are used during the Special Operation. In this case, the carrier was the Su-35S - the missile is placed under the fuselage. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense

The R-37M missile modified in this way can carry a nuclear charge with a power of up to several kilotons in TNT equivalent. Such a power of explosion allows to destroy entire air units - some aircraft will be destroyed immediately, while others will receive serious damage or lose the ability to fly under control. In some situations, such an air-to-air missile is capable of causing damage not only to enemy aircraft, but also to their ground forces and facilities.

However, such ammunition faces a number of obvious limitations and difficulties. It will be more difficult to operate and requires special measures. In addition, the use of a nuclear missile is far from possible in every military-political situation, and may also have negative consequences of various kinds.

Opportunities and projects


Foreign intelligence services are trying to monitor the development of Russian nuclear forces and react to any events in this area. This time, the US Department of Defense spoke about the possible creation of a nuclear air-to-air missile to arm fighters and interceptors. The details of the information obtained are not disclosed, but it is expected that the Pentagon will draw conclusions.

It should be remembered that the information from the RMO has not yet been confirmed, and the forecasts and estimates of specialized publications may be far from reality. Nevertheless, the Russian industry really has the ability to modernize one of the existing aircraft missiles and make it a means of delivering a special warhead. Whether the Aerospace Forces and the Ministry of Defense want to take advantage of this opportunity is still unknown.
39 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +3
    23 May 2025 05: 01
    Missiles with a special warhead have long been created for the SAM. For example, in the S-75 divisions, two missiles with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 100 kt were stored (if my memory serves me right). They were intended to destroy group and especially important targets. So it is not surprising that air-to-air missiles with a nuclear filling appeared.
    1. +1
      23 May 2025 08: 46
      Such things cannot be stored in divisions, they were to be delivered there only when necessary. They require a special storage regime, so there are special units that deal with this.
      1. +3
        23 May 2025 10: 47
        I don't know how it is now, but in Soviet times in the 80s of the last century they were stored. The warehouse was guarded by a XNUMX-hour post. There was barbed wire around it in several rows. I saw this post and the warehouse with my own eyes. They were necessary to repel the first strike of NATO aviation, there was no point in storing them far from the SAM, they wouldn't have had time to deliver them.
        1. +2
          23 May 2025 12: 37
          There is barbed wire in several rows around
          And a ditch with water between the rows of barbed wire. We were in such a place (Polessk S-75) during the "war" training camp after the fifth year of the institute.
        2. -1
          23 May 2025 12: 54
          Quote from Andy_nsk
          The warehouse was guarded by a 24-hour post. There was barbed wire in several rows around. I saw this post and the warehouse with my own eyes.

          I think that even if you had only theoretical possibilities to see something from a special one, you would have written a bunch of obligations and would not have publicly declared it here. This is not just an ordinary warehouse of RAV property, this is a special object with all the consequences. This was so, and I am sure it is so now.
          1. +5
            23 May 2025 14: 12
            I think that even if you only had theoretical opportunities to see something special, you would write a bunch of commitments and would not publicly announce it here.

            I've been under a written undertaking since I was 19, I've seen a lot of special stuff, I had access to both "Secret" and "Sov.secret", and later I worked at a post office. Now all these written undertakings are no longer valid, and I haven't revealed anything interesting for spies. Do you think it's a secret that the S-75 complex had missiles with nuclear warheads? The complex has long been decommissioned.
            1. +4
              23 May 2025 14: 21
              By the way, I once came across an instruction manual for the S-75 complex on the Internet with its detailed description. It is clear that forty years ago this was classified documentation. Now it is an open secret.
        3. 0
          23 May 2025 13: 18
          Andrey, with all due respect, you are confusing something. For example, training ones could have been stored, we also stored those, though shells, and they were guarded as you describe. Combat ones require special storage conditions and routine maintenance. Combat ones, for example, were delivered to us when a certain level of combat readiness was introduced. I only encountered this once in real life and the column was guarded by a motorized rifle company. I was responsible for this work in the brigade. At the same time, I do not know either the design of the ammunition or the internal structure of the container (and it was very complex and expensive, even the commander of the GSVG could not write it off). We only received the package and knew how to bring the shot to readiness, thank God we did this only with training ones.
          1. +3
            23 May 2025 14: 26
            There were combat ones. Routine work and training in the division were naturally carried out according to a special schedule. Well, and the divisions went on combat duty in turns according to a certain schedule - during duty, of course, routine work is prohibited.
          2. 0
            7 September 2025 20: 14
            Quote: Vladimir 290
            Andrey, with all due respect, you are confusing something. For example, training ones could have been stored, we also stored those, though shells, and they were guarded as you describe. Combat ones require special storage conditions and routine maintenance. Combat ones, for example, were delivered to us when a certain level of combat readiness was introduced. I only encountered this once in real life and the column was guarded by a motorized rifle company. I was responsible for this work in the brigade. At the same time, I do not know either the design of the ammunition or the internal structure of the container (and it was very complex and expensive, even the commander of the GSVG could not write it off). We only received the package and knew how to bring the shot to readiness, thank God we did this only with training ones.

            I don't know how things were with air defense, but I dealt with long-range naval aviation. Special warheads were stored separately not far from the airfield (the so-called zone "B"), there were hangars for storage, there were workshops for maintenance and a temporary storage for high-level waste (as I understand it, it was possible to replace the neutron fuses in the warheads right on the spot).
            To equip the missiles, these warheads were transported to zone "A", where the missiles were refueled and equipped. This was practically at the airfield, literally 200-300 m from the nearest missile carrier parking lot.
            At that time, we had a pair of large ones from Ukrainka or ours in the air on combat duty almost constantly, and we had ready and equipped pairs of Tu22M3s parked at all times. So, the presence of special warheads, so to speak, "at hand" by the air defense units at that time does not seem impossible to me.
            1. 0
              14 September 2025 08: 37
              Quote: faridg7
              At that time, we had a pair of large ones from Ukrainka or ours in the air on combat duty almost constantly, and we had ready and equipped pairs of Tu22M3s parked at our place.

              This is not quite true. In peacetime, long-range aircraft do not carry out combat duty, like fighters, for example. And flights with nuclear weapons are not carried out; they can only be on the carrier immediately before use.
              1. 0
                14 September 2025 14: 13
                Quote: Lozovik
                This is not quite true. In peacetime, long-range aircraft do not carry out combat duty, like fighters, for example. And flights with nuclear weapons are not carried out; they can only be on the carrier immediately before use.

                Well, at that time, having an American aircraft carrier in the Sea of ​​Japan, and another one behind the Kuril ridge, could you afford to have "unloaded" Tu-22M3s at the airfield? At that time, from takeoff to use, about 30-40 minutes could pass.
                1. 0
                  15 September 2025 10: 16
                  Quote: faridg7
                  Well, at that time, having an American aircraft carrier in the Sea of ​​Japan, and another one beyond the Kuril Islands, could one afford to have “unloaded” Tu-22M3s at the airfield?

                  If necessary, they could be transferred to a higher level of combat readiness.
                  1. 0
                    15 September 2025 13: 01
                    Quote: Lozovik
                    If necessary, they could be transferred to a higher level of combat readiness.

                    Yes, of course, the crews could have been transferred from the duty room to duty in the cockpits. At that time, having an aircraft carrier group in the Sea of ​​Japan, they were ready to destroy it. If it is not clear to anyone, from the Zapadnye Knevichi airfield to the Japanese coast is about 700 km, and the aircraft carrier group approached our coast closer than 400 km, that is, the Tu-22M3 could launch KSR5 (in fashionable X22) practically from our coast
                    1. 0
                      15 September 2025 13: 21
                      Quote: faridg7
                      Yes, of course, the crews could well have been transferred from the duty room to duty in the cockpits.
                      However, in the regiments armed with such machines, there were no duty force houses.

                      Quote: faridg7
                      that is, the Tu22M3 could launch the KSR5 (in the fashionable X22)
                      The KSR-5 is a different missile, although it was created on the basis of the Kh-22. The Tu-22M3 did not use such missiles.
                      1. 0
                        15 September 2025 13: 38
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        The KSR-5 is a different missile, although it was created on the basis of the Kh-22. The Tu-22M3 did not use such missiles.

                        It is quite possible that I saw them only from the APA50 or SPO cockpit. Externally, they are impossible to distinguish without knowing the digital designations. Well, and sometimes I drove the "deaf and dumb" to work in zone "B" But they were also suspended on the Tu22M3 and Tu16. Although no, it was possible to understand that a special warhead was installed on the missile - the warhead of such missiles was covered with electric heating mats in the cold season.
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        However, in the regiments armed with such machines, there were no duty force houses.

                        Well, yes, that's why the crews spent their shifts depending on their abilities and relationships with the ground services. Some stayed in the bathhouse at the GZV near Travkin, some broke into the "general's house", and there were those who were on duty right at the tower near the RP.
                      2. 0
                        16 September 2025 10: 54
                        Quote: faridg7
                        It is quite possible that I saw them only from the cockpit of the APA50 or SPO. Externally, they are impossible to distinguish without knowing the digital designations. Well, and sometimes I drove the "deaf and dumb" to work in zone "B" But they were also suspended on the Tu22M3 and Tu16
                        The KSR-5 has the same diameter and the same engine, but is shorter and therefore lighter, so it can be lifted by the Tu-16. The missiles are very similar, but can be easily distinguished by the presence of a ventral ridge on the Kh-22.

                        Quote: faridg7
                        Although no, it was possible to understand that a special warhead was installed on the missile - the warhead of such missiles was covered with electric heating mats in the cold season.
                        The warhead compartment is further away. Special warheads are always in the RTB, they should be assembled with the missile only before use. When training was performed on the suspension of products (naturally conditional), an awning was erected under the aircraft.

                        Quote: faridg7
                        Well, yes, that's why the crews spent their shifts depending on their abilities and relationships with the ground services. Some stayed in the bathhouse at the GZV near Travkin, some broke into the "general's house", and there were those who were on duty right at the tower near the RP.
                        This was not a duty, just certain crews were on duty No. 1. All they were required to do was to be at the unit's location, and the planes had to be in good working order and promptly refueled.
                      3. 0
                        16 September 2025 13: 11
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        The KSR-5 has the same diameter and the same engine, but is shorter and therefore lighter, so it can be lifted by the Tu-16. The missiles are very similar, but can be easily distinguished by the presence of a ventral ridge on the Kh-22.

                        This means that both of them were at the airfield.
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        The warhead compartment is further away. Special warheads are always in the RTB, they should be assembled with the missile only before use. When training was performed on the suspension of products (naturally conditional), an awning was erected under the aircraft.

                        Well, I know where the KSR5 had its radar under the fairing, and where the warhead was, so I don't think there was any point in heating up the simulator or the high-explosive warhead, but for the special warhead at the parking lot it was necessary to provide heating, and that's what they did (by the way, I had a dryer made from such mats for wooden blanks, when I had time to play with wood crafts)
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        Quote: faridg7
                        Well, yes, that's why the crews spent their shifts depending on their abilities and relationships with the ground services. Some stayed in the bathhouse at the GZV near Travkin, some broke into the "general's house", and there were those who were on duty right at the tower near the RP.
                        This was not a duty, just certain crews were on duty No. 1. All they were required to do was to be at the unit's location, and the planes had to be in good working order and promptly refueled.

                        Well, that's how it was, only it was when the aircraft carriers were leaving the vicinity of the Sea of ​​Japan. But when Khramushin and his comrades were wrinkling Kitty Hawk (it was autumn of 99), ours were in "full" gear
                      4. 0
                        17 September 2025 11: 32
                        Quote: faridg7
                        Well, I know where the KSR5 had its radar under the fairing, and where the warhead was, so I don't think there was any point in heating up the simulator or the high-explosive warhead, but for the special warhead at the parking lot it was necessary to provide heating, and that's what they did (by the way, I had a dryer made from such mats for wooden blanks, when I had time to play with wood crafts)
                        Let me repeat, there were no missiles with such payloads at the parking lot and there could not have been any.
                        There's no point in heating the rocket body, as it won't maintain the set temperature. For this purpose, the rocket has a compartment air conditioning system—air and air-evaporative.

                        Quote: faridg7
                        Well, that's how it was, only it was when the aircraft carriers were leaving the vicinity of the Sea of ​​Japan. But when Khramushin and his comrades were wrinkling Kitty Hawk (it was autumn of 99), ours were in "full" gear
                        At one time, the US organized a nuclear weapons patrol, which resulted in the loss of several munitions. We have never had such incidents because such weapons have never been carried on carriers.
                      5. 0
                        17 September 2025 12: 39
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        We have not had such incidents because such weapons have never been placed on carriers.

                        Well, yes, special ammunition was never placed on carriers, nuclear land mines were never installed along the border with China (just as along the borders of Warsaw Pact countries with NATO), and the "deaf-mute" in Zone A trained around the clock with dummies, and poisoned themselves with rocket fuel simply out of a desire for high combat training.
                      6. 0
                        17 September 2025 12: 44
                        Exactly. I know this firsthand, as I've worked my way up from pilot to squadron commander in the Long-Range Air Defense Forces.
                      7. 0
                        17 September 2025 12: 54
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        Exactly. I know this firsthand, as I've worked my way up from pilot to squadron commander in the Long-Range Air Defense Forces.

                        Well, then you must surely know about the SBC incidents in Kamenniy Ruchey and Pristan, and the oxidizer spill at the Zapadnyye Knevichi parking lot. This is precisely because "these weapons were never on carriers."
                      8. 0
                        17 September 2025 13: 49
                        These were all sailors, although the principles of storing and operating nuclear weapons (not counting naval aircraft, ships, and submarines) were the same. And leaks of rocket fuel components were common at the time.
                      9. 0
                        17 September 2025 14: 09
                        Quote: Lozovik
                        These were all sailors, although the principles of storing and operating nuclear weapons (not counting naval aircraft, ships, and submarines) were the same. And leaks of rocket fuel components were common at the time.

                        Yes, this was naval aviation, which, unlike many others at the time, had to have actual contact with the enemy. Weapons storage principles were the same because the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense was in charge of this. However, in the navy and naval aviation, the silent ones had to work on a combat basis—they didn't have time to carry out the necessary transitions from one combat readiness level to another. If a ship goes on a mission, and according to the organization and equipment, it is armed with special warheads, then these weapons are carried on the mission. If a carrier strike group, capable of and carrying nuclear weapons, arrives at your shores, then this group is fully controlled by naval aviation, because the sailors in these conditions don't have time to arm the missiles with warheads. It's no coincidence that I mentioned the distances from our airfield to Japan and that the carrier group arrived at a distance of less than 400 km from our shores. A tomahawk strike from such a distance simply won't give you time to arm your missiles; 400 km is less than half an hour—they should already be on the pylons when an enemy launch is detected.
      2. +3
        24 May 2025 02: 09
        I served my compulsory military service in 62-65 on Sakhalin on the S-75 Desna complex. Missiles with nuclear warheads in the amount of 6 pcs. were stored in the so-called "Product-7" structure literally a hundred meters from the combat position on trailers and filled with fuel. They were guarded and serviced by another "department", but they received food in thermoses three times a day in our kitchen, so we had some information about others. Shooting could be carried out both at air and at ground (sea) targets. We also practiced this tactic on 13D (ADA) missiles.
  2. 0
    23 May 2025 05: 03
    Details of the information obtained are not being disclosed, but it is to be expected that the Pentagon will draw conclusions.

    Considering how many senior officers were arrested for corruption, the leak could well have come from among them.
    Such weapons must have the highest level of secrecy. what
  3. +2
    23 May 2025 05: 07
    In the 50s and 60s, air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads were developed and used. For example, the US had the AIM-1A/2 "Dagger" missile, and the USSR had the R-60 missile, which in later modifications received a nuclear warhead. Then they were abandoned in both places. Common sense won out, because no one is stupid enough to detonate an atomic bomb over their own head.
    Now the colonels from the RUMO have found a dusty folder somewhere in the archive and decided to use it as a bogeyman about the "new Russian threat"
    1. +5
      23 May 2025 06: 04
      Quote: Amateur
      somewhere in the archive a dusty folder

      It is not for nothing that they say that everything new is well forgotten old. Therefore, air-to-air missiles with a nuclear warhead can become a fairly effective response not only in the classic repulsion of a massive raid by enemy aircraft, but also in the raid of a swarm of drones or stealth aircraft. Stealth aircraft are quite difficult to capture in the frequency range of radar. But it is quite easy to hit a special warhead with an air-to-air missile using the coordinates of a ground-based meter-range radar and at maximum range.
  4. +3
    23 May 2025 07: 24
    I read an article when I was still a cadet that NATO had a plan for an airstrike on us, a "big spear", when the first wave of a thousand planes was launched simultaneously from all bases in Europe! Ours, of course, knew, so there were anti-aircraft missiles with a special unit in each direction. I am sure that there were such missiles for planes, because conventional means could not have repelled so many.
  5. 0
    23 May 2025 10: 07
    The whole question is how much of all this the Russian Federation can produce. Everything depends on components, the production of which has long been destroyed.
    1. +1
      24 May 2025 11: 54
      You don't need much of this. You can't hang it on every plane.
      And the idea is dubious in general. I can't imagine a situation of practical use. It can't be used before a global war, and during it, group air targets are unlikely.
      1. 0
        17 September 2025 14: 28
        Quote: MooH
        You don't need much of this. You can't hang it on every plane.

        Almost any aircraft can. The Su-30, Su-35S, Su-34, MiG-31, even the Su-25 can carry special warheads, so there are plenty of potential carriers.
        Quote: MooH
        They cannot be used before a global war, and during one, group air targets are unlikely.

        Quote: MooH
        They cannot be used before a global war, and during one, group air targets are unlikely.

        So, using it against a group of low-flying cruise missiles approaching the country's coast is an improbable scenario?
    2. 0
      25 May 2025 21: 25
      It all comes down to components, the production of which has long been destroyed.
      Are you talking about the components of the combat special unit? Because the missile, which is the carrier, is supposedly produced and even used.
      1. -1
        26 May 2025 11: 53
        Are you talking about the components of the combat special unit? Because the missile, which is the carrier, is supposedly produced and even used.


        I'm talking about radio-electronic components. They're a disaster.
        1. 0
          1 June 2025 19: 00
          What's wrong with this? Even in foreign ones, the components are far from high-tech. Foreign analogues of such equipment can easily contain 20-year-old electronic equipment. The military is extremely conservative.
  6. -1
    23 May 2025 20: 12
    "...the creation in Russia of a new air-to-air missile with nuclear warheads..." - this is already beyond my comprehension, I really am too old.
  7. +2
    24 May 2025 00: 12
    Missiles are good. But when the MiG-31s ​​run out, what will we shoot with? The plane does not last forever.
  8. 0
    24 May 2025 11: 04
    I always thought that explosives with nuclear warheads have been in service for a long time.
  9. 0
    28 June 2025 21: 16
    There are vague doubts about the effectiveness of 20-40 kT warheads when detonated in the air.
    Only an electromagnetic pulse would have an effect.