Russian nuclear arsenal in 2025

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists journal has published its latest annual report on the state of Russia's nuclear forces in its Nuclear Notebook column, prepared by a group of authors led by Hans Kristensen: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight, Russian Nuclear Weapons 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

"Russia is in the final stages of a multi-year modernization program to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear-capable systems. weapon, to newer versions. However, this program faces significant challenges that will delay the entry into service of these new systems,” experts from FAS assess in this issue of the Nuclear Notebook. “... Russia currently has approximately 4309 nuclear warheads for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Although the number of Russian strategic launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs is not expected to change in the foreseeable future, the number of warheads assigned to them may increase. The significant increase in non-strategic nuclear weapons that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has not yet materialized. Preparations for a nuclear weapons storage site in Belarus appear to be nearing completion.”

Russia is nearing the end of a decade-long effort to replace all of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems with newer versions. Commercial satellite imagery and other open sources indicate that elements of Russia's nuclear modernization are progressing more slowly than planned: upgrading its intercontinental ballistic missiles missiles (ICBMs) and bombers are facing significant delays, and the “significant” increase in Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons that US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) predicted five years ago has yet to materialize (Richard, 2020).

Experts estimate that, as of early 2025, Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4309 nuclear warheads intended for use by strategic ICBMs, SLBMs, and intercontinental-range heavy bombers and intermediate- and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. This is a net decrease of approximately 71 warheads compared to last year, primarily due to a change in the estimate of warheads intended for non-strategic nuclear forces.

Of the stockpiled warheads, approximately 1718 strategic warheads are deployed: approximately 870 on land-based ballistic missiles, approximately 640 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and perhaps just over 200 at heavy bomber bases. An additional approximately 1114 strategic warheads are in storage, along with approximately 1477 non-strategic warheads. In addition to the operational stockpile, a large number of warheads—approximately 1150—that have been retired but are still stored in the 12th GUMO warehouses await dismantlement, bringing the total stockpile to approximately 5459 warheads.

Russia’s nuclear modernization program is motivated in part by what FAS experts call “the Kremlin’s desire to maintain overall parity with the United States and preserve national prestige.” The program also seeks to compensate for conventional weaknesses and the long-standing belief of Russian leaders that the U.S. missile defense system poses a real future risk to Russia’s retaliatory capabilities.

Throughout the SBO in Ukraine, Russia has carried out a series of missile strikes using dual-use, long-range precision-guided weapons such as the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles (the nuclear version is the Kh-102), 3M-54 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, 9-A-7760 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) air-launched cruise missiles, and Iskander land-based missiles (Interfax, 2022; Reuters, 2023). In addition, the UK Ministry of Defence has published several intelligence reports indicating that Russia has used non-nuclear Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) cruise missiles in Ukraine (UK Ministry of Defence, 2022, 2023).

Russia's nuclear modernization programs, experts say, have contributed to "uncertainty about the country's long-term intentions and have generated growing international debate about the nature of its nuclear strategy. These concerns, in turn, have led to increased defense spending, nuclear modernization programs, and political opposition to further nuclear reductions in Europe and the United States."

The New START treaty expires in early February 2026. After that, if Russia decides to go beyond the treaty’s core limits, it could theoretically load hundreds of warheads onto its deployed delivery systems, potentially increasing its deployed nuclear arsenal to 60 percent (Korda and Kristensen 2023). How quickly this can be achieved depends largely on the weapon system: bombers can be armed within hours or days, while fully loading warheads onto submarines can take months, and reconfiguring the warheads on each ICBM can take years.

Research methodology

The analyses and assessments in the Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources:

1. Data of government origin (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budget information, military parades and treaty disclosure data);
2. Data of non-governmental origin (e.g. media reports, think tank analysis and industry publications);
3. Commercial satellite imagery. Because each of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data point using multiple sources and supplement them with private conversations with officials when possible.

Analyzing and assessing Russia’s nuclear forces has become increasingly challenging, in part because of President Vladimir Putin’s decision in 2023 to suspend Russia’s participation in New START, a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia that requires both countries to share data on their respective numbers of deployed strategic warheads and launchers. New START has been a critical hub for transparency and has allowed analysts to work backward from aggregate numbers to assess the distribution of Russia’s deployed strategic forces.

The latest New START data, as of September 1, 2022, listed Russia as having 1549 deployed warheads assigned to 540 strategic launchers (US Department of State, 2022). Russia has not released any data since then, but appears to remain below the limits.

Our current estimates of strategic nuclear forces are relatively close to the 2022 figures. However, the New START figures differ from the estimates presented in this Nuclear Notebook because the treaty’s counting rules artificially assign one warhead to each deployed bomber, even though Russian bombers do not normally carry nuclear weapons. The treaty also does not count weapons stored at bomber bases as “deployed.” The Nuclear Notebook counts these weapons as deployed, however quickly they can be loaded onto an aircraft—uncertainly, the information would provide a more realistic picture of the weapons’ deployment status.

Given that Russia has not provided this data to the United States since September 2022, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Americans to gain a complete picture of Russia’s nuclear force structure. Although President Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia will remain below the overall New START limits, the U.S. Department of State’s January 2025 Treaty Compliance Report noted that “the United States cannot conclude that the Russian Federation remained in compliance through 2024 with its commitment to limit deployed warheads on delivery systems covered by the New START Treaty to 1550 because of Russia’s proximity to the limit at the time of its most recent update and its failure to meet its obligations under the Treaty’s verification regime” (U.S. Department of State, 2025).

The report also notes that “the United States has a high level of confidence that Russia did not engage in any large-scale activities in excess of the Treaty limits in 2024,” but adds that “Russia was likely close to the deployed warhead limit for much of the year and may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit by small numbers during parts of 2024” (US Department of State, 2025).

To maintain confidence in our estimates, we supplement these historical contract details and recent official statements news Russian state and non-state media reports, industry reports, translations of strategic documents, videos published by the Russian Ministry of Defense, and other materials. These types of secondary sources often contain valuable information about the progress of Russian arms procurement programs, such as the schedule for entering into service or decommissioning of various weapons systems, the number of units of each system expected to be purchased, and the technical characteristics of these systems. However, this public data has become increasingly difficult to obtain since the start of the SVO.

In addition to these materials, senior Russian military officials typically give year-end interviews to Russian state media about the current state of their services. In some cases, interviewees will reveal specific details about the number of new units of each weapon system that have entered service during the year, as well as other relevant annual updates. Military leaders will also sometimes share their goals for the following year, which can then be used as a guide for research analysts to assess the progress of Russia’s nuclear modernization programs.

To conduct this analysis, we frequently use a variety of commercial satellite imagery sources to monitor and document highly detailed changes in Russia’s nuclear forces. Satellite imagery allows us to identify air, missile, and naval bases, as well as potential nuclear weapons storage facilities. Satellite imagery has been particularly important in monitoring construction and upgrades at critical nuclear sites, including ICBM silos, air and submarine bases, warhead storage facilities, and others. By analyzing the observed strategic force structure, experts suggest a reasonably reasonable estimate of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, although the relative confidence in these estimates has diminished as time has passed since the suspension of the New START Treaty.

It has become even more difficult to piece together a complete picture of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. Almost every Russian non-strategic nuclear delivery vehicle is dual-capable, meaning it can be used for both a nuclear and a conventional strike. This means that counting every Russian non-strategic delivery vehicle as having a nuclear warhead is likely to overstate the number. Moreover, many of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons are decades old, and it is highly uncertain how many of these weapons remain active and how many are scheduled to be retired and replaced with new versions. The already complex picture is further complicated by the fact that Russia has significantly more non-strategic weapons than any other country, a fact that is compounded by the lack of verifiable public information about these weapons.

The U.S. government has estimated for several years that Russia has between 1000 and 2000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, a significant decrease from the 2000–4000 estimates from a decade and a half ago (Kristensen 2019); however, this still represents a significant margin of error. Our estimate of approximately 1500 non-strategic nuclear weapons falls within this range and attempts to provide a more specific overview of Russia’s non-strategic and defensive forces. However, given that FAS’s expert analysis of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces is limited to an analysis of satellite imagery, current and historical government documents, news sources, and other non-governmental sources in the absence of verifiable publicly available data, they themselves acknowledge that this specific estimate does not have a high degree of confidence.

It is also important to be critical of external assessments, particularly with regard to the risk of citation and confirmation bias, whereby government or non-government reports repeatedly reference each other’s statements and assessments – sometimes without the reader’s knowledge that this is happening. This practice can inadvertently create a cyclical echo chamber effect that does not necessarily match the reality on the ground and can lead to inflated estimates of numbers and capabilities. This is because the information used in the public debate about Russian weapons numbers largely comes from the US military, which tends to favor higher worst-case scenario estimates when assessing threats to inform policy responses.

Despite these challenges, we maintain a higher degree of confidence in our estimates of Russian nuclear forces than we do for other nuclear-armed countries (China, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea) for which official and unofficial information is either sparse, unreliable, or both. However, our estimates of Russian nuclear forces—particularly Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces—have a lower degree of confidence than those of countries with greater nuclear transparency (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France).

Russia's nuclear strategy

Russia last updated its official deterrence policy in 2024 through a decree that clearly outlined the conditions under which it could potentially use nuclear weapons (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2024):

- obtaining reliable data on the launches of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;

- the use by the enemy of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, against facilities and (or) military formations of the Russian Federation located outside its territory;

- enemy actions that affect elements of critical state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disabling of which will lead to the disruption of the response actions of nuclear forces;

- aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the use of conventional weapons, creating a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;

- obtaining reliable data on the massive launch (flight) of air and space attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation.

These conditions were broader and more specific than those included in the 2020 iteration of the doctrine, which described Russia as being able to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack with weapons of mass destruction or when “the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020). This new language can be interpreted as lowering the threshold for the use of Russian nuclear weapons, and is likely a result of the evolving East-West nuclear dynamics during the Russia-Ukraine war. It is unclear whether the Russian military has actually changed its plans for the potential use of nuclear weapons, and if so, to what extent.

The nuclear signals sent by Putin and other Russian officials throughout the war in Ukraine have raised concerns and questions about where, how, and when Russia might use nuclear weapons. In particular, they are unclear about how broadly Russian leaders view the “territories of the Russian Federation” in the country’s nuclear doctrine: does the “territory” extend to the recently annexed parts of the former Ukraine? Or is it limited to the internationally recognized borders of the Russian Federation? They still like to think that the six “new” old regions of Russia are still under their influence and control. Apart from Belarus, which is explicitly named as a participant in the Union State, which countries are included as Russia’s “allies” that would meet the conditions for a nuclear response? In response to Western reactions to Russia’s shift in doctrine, President Putin said: “Let me emphasize once again that no one should accuse us of trying to scare everyone with nuclear weapons: this is a policy of nuclear deterrence” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2024).

Although many Russian officials regularly comment on Russia’s nuclear doctrine, only three individuals—President Putin, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov—are believed to hold the so-called nuclear portfolios that can be used to authorize the use of Russian nuclear weapons. Moreover, Putin’s order must be countersigned by one of these two officials before any nuclear weapons can be launched (Ven Bruusgaard 2023). It is possible, they argue, that President Putin sees strategic advantage in remaining ambiguous in his own views—which, under the current Russian political regime, essentially derive from the official state position—about the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons. At the very least, Russia’s nuclear signals appear primarily aimed at deterring the United States and NATO from aggression by conventional means.

Russia's strategic missiles in silos on land and aboard submarines remain on alert with nuclear warheads, ready to launch within minutes. Warheads for non-strategic nuclear forces, by contrast, were thought to be stored separately from their launchers in central storage facilities. However, in his speech to the Defense Ministry Board in December 2024, President Putin stated:

“It is also important to maintain non-strategic nuclear forces in a state of constant combat readiness and continue to conduct exercises related to their potential use.”

FAS experts never determined whether he was referring to non-strategic BM and CR launchers or their warheads. Maintaining even a portion of Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces on alert with nuclear warheads would be a significant change in Russia's nuclear readiness strategy, something I have been pushing for years.

In February 2024, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner requested declassification of information regarding an unspecified “serious national security threat” (House Intelligence Committee, 2024). The following day, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby publicly confirmed that the threat involved a “worrying” anti-satellite weapon being developed by Russia (White House, 2024).

At a House Armed Services Committee hearing in May 2024, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John F. Plumb stated that the Pentagon was concerned that Russia was developing the capability to “launch nuclear weapons in space,” which would put the U.S.’s highly vulnerable satellite constellation and other space infrastructure at risk (Harpley, 2024). If Russia were to place nuclear weapons in orbit, it would not only violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but would also be a highly destabilizing and unprecedented act.

Possible return to nuclear testing?

In November 2023, Putin signed a bill formally revoking Russia's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2023).

Russia’s “deratification” follows reports that Russia may be preparing to resume testing nuclear explosive devices at its former test site on Novaya Zemlya. Recent satellite images indicate increased activity at the site, including large trucks, construction cranes, shipping containers, and new construction at several administrative and residential sites on the site (Lewis, 2023).

Rear Admiral Andrei Sinitsyn, head of Russia’s Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site, said in an interview with the state-run Rossiyskaya Gazeta in September 2024 that the site was “fully ready” to resume “full-scale testing activities” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024). However, Russian officials have previously said that they would not resume nuclear testing unless the United States did so (Isachenkov, 2023; Osborne, 2023).

Russian nuclear potential in Belarus

Between 2022 and 2024, President Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appear to have already created the infrastructure for the forward deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, according to FAS experts. Whether nuclear warheads are currently in Belarus is not yet known to American experts.

In a March 2023 statement, President Putin also indicated that Russia had converted 10 Belarusian Su-25 aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons and had transferred dual-use, short-range mobile Iskander (SS-26) ballistic missile launchers to Belarus (Smotrim, 2023). The Belarusian brigade base for the Iskander launchers is believed to be located on the southern outskirts of Osipovichi, approximately seven miles west of where satellite imagery showed the construction of a double security perimeter fence around the weapons depot, a feature also commonly seen at Russian nuclear depots (Kristensen and Korda, 2023). Several open source reports indicate that Lida Air Base, located just 40 kilometers from the Lithuanian border and home to the only Belarusian Air Force wing equipped with Su-25 aircraft, is the most likely candidate for Russia's new "nuclear mission" in Belarus (Korda, Reynolds, and Christensen 2023).

In late December 2023, Lukashenko announced that Russia had completed deliveries of nuclear weapons to Belarus, and in early January 2024, Belarus updated its military doctrine, which reportedly describes nuclear weapons “as an important component of preventive deterrence of a potential adversary from unleashing armed aggression” (Associated Press, 2023; Belta, 2024; Buzin, 2024; Knight and Lau, 2024).

There are still several unknowns regarding the status and logistical challenges of deploying Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. For example, nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia have historically taken much longer to build than the tight deadlines that Presidents Putin and Lukashenko have announced for building nuclear storage facilities in Belarus. In addition, personnel from the 12th GUMO, the Russian Defense Ministry department responsible for servicing and transporting Russian nuclear weapons, would need to be deployed to Belarus to staff the storage facility, regardless of whether there were any nuclear weapons there. Such a significant deployment of personnel—possibly as many as 100 people—would likely require separate living quarters from those housing Belarusian soldiers, as well as other infrastructure that could take many months to build and would be visible on satellite imagery. Moreover, the storage facility would not be able to receive warheads until all the specialized equipment and personnel were in place and along the transport route.

So far, US experts have not seen any compelling visual evidence to pinpoint where Russian nuclear warheads are stored or where the 12th GUMO personnel are stationed in Belarus, if they are in the country at all. The upgraded Cold War-era nuclear weapons storage facility at Osipovichi appears to be the most likely candidate. However, in December 2024, Lukashenko stated that “dozens” of Russian nuclear warheads are currently stationed in Belarus (Associated Press, 2024). President Putin noted that Russia’s new Oreshek medium-range ballistic missile, first used in Ukraine in November 2024, could be deployed in Belarus in the second half of 2025 and that Belarus would play an important role in nuclear deterrence (Associated Press, 2024).

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Currently, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces deploy several variants of silo-based and mobile ICBMs. Silo-based ICBMs include the RS-20V (R-36M2) Voevoda (also known by its NATO designation SS-18 Mod 5/6), RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1), RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2), and Avangard (SS-19 Mod 4), while mobile ICBMs include the RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) and RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2). The Topol (SS-25) ICBM was retired from service last year.

Comparing satellite imagery observations with information from official Russian statements and previous New START exchanges, U.S. experts estimate that Russia may have about 330 deployed nuclear ICBMs, which they estimate could carry up to 1254 warheads. The modernization of the ICBM force also includes equipping upgraded silos with new systems Defense and perimeter air defense, and the new Peresvet laser has been deployed in at least five mobile ICBM battalions to “cover their maneuver operations” (Hendrickx 2020; Russian Ministry of Defense 2019), possibly implying that one of Peresvet’s functions is to blind spy satellites.

Russia’s ICBMs are organized within the Strategic Missile Forces into three missile armies with a total of 12 divisions, comprising approximately 40 missile regiments. One regiment in the 8th Missile Division at Yurye operates the Sirena-M, a system based on the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM that is believed to serve as a backup launch code transmitter and is therefore not nuclear armed. The Sirena-M recently replaced the older Sirena command module.

Russia’s ICBM force has been shrinking in size for three decades, and the Russian Strategic Missile Forces are 88 percent complete in their modernization program to replace all Soviet-era missiles with newer types on a less than one-for-one basis (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2024). This publicly stated rate of modernization has not changed since 2023, suggesting that ICBM modernization has potentially slowed as a result of industrial capacity prioritization to support Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023).

To implement the ICBM modernization program, Russia is expanding its capacity to produce solid-fuel engines (Hinz 2024), according to American experts. After the RS-12M Topol (SS-25) mobile ICBM was withdrawn from active service in 2023, experts estimate that the last remaining active Soviet-era ICBM in the Russian arsenal is the silo-based SS-18. (Some obsolete SS-19s, 12 UR-100N UTTKh units, were refitted to carry the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.)

Unlike the silo-based ICBMs, all of Russia’s mobile ICBM divisions have completed their upgrades from Soviet-era missiles. However, not all upgraded garrisons have been expanded to accommodate all of the vehicles needed to support the new launchers. As a result, some support vehicles must be stored outdoors under camouflage nets until the garrisons can accommodate them. While several garrisons have completed their upgrades and have expanded significantly in size, satellite imagery shows that construction on others appears to have slowed or even stopped in recent years, forcing entire brigades to be temporarily stored on temporary concrete pads.

In addition to the missiles and silos themselves, the modernization of Russia’s ICBM force also includes extensive modifications to the external security fences, internal roads, and support facilities. Each silo complex is also receiving a new perimeter defense system, the Dym-2, which includes automatic grenade launchers, small arms, and remotely controlled machine guns (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2021; Russia Insight, 2018). Likewise, the Launch Control Centers that control each missile regiment are also receiving significant upgrades.

The RS-20V (R-36M2) Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 5) is a silo-based heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. In 2022, Russian state media showed a video of the RS-20V platform, indicating that it could carry up to 14 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on a two-tier platform of seven warheads (Kornev 2022); however, the Russian Ministry of Defense website states that the RS-20V Voevoda will carry up to 10 warheads, the number Russia has declared for the missile under the START Treaty (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, no date provided). It is assumed that the remaining four cells of the dispensing unit platform will be used to accommodate decoys.

The RS-20 Voevoda is reaching the end of its service life, leaving 13 SS-62 Mod 34 (R-18M5) ICBMs, which can carry up to 36 warheads, in the 2th Missile Division in Dombarovsky and the 340nd Missile Division in Uzhur. FAS experts estimate that the number of warheads on each RS-20V has been reduced to comply with the START-3 limit on deployed strategic warheads. Formally, the RS-20V began to be decommissioned in 2021 in preparation for the introduction of new RS-28 Sarmat (SS-29) ICBMs in the 62nd Missile Division in Uzhur, the first regiment to receive the new missiles will be the 302nd Missile Regiment.

Hans and his team continue to provide data on the old Soviet 15F174 (AA-88) 750 kt warheads (the table says 500-800 kt), which are long outdated, and new missiles have more advanced warheads. Just watch the video of President V.V. Putin's now historic speech to the Federal Assembly on March 1, 2018. Russia is close to completing the decades-long effort to replace all of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems with more modern versions. For the last 30-odd years, Los Alamos and Livermore have been frankly fooling around, while our nuclear physicists from RFNC-VNIIEF, KB-11 (Arzamas-16) in Sarov and RFNC-VNIITF, KB-1011 (Chelyabinsk-70) in Snezhinsk continued to improve their products. And this despite the dire economic situation in our country in the 1990s, with months-long delays in already microscopic salaries.

In the 2000s and 2010s, we created new generation nuclear weapons of small, medium and high power classes, with a specific power approaching the theoretical limit of 6 kt/kg – 150 kt, 500 kt and 2 Mt, respectively. The Americans remained at the level of 3 kt/kg, achieved in the W-88 “physical package” in 1989, and it is not a fact that they will be able to repeat even this level.

The silo-based, six-warhead UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19) ICBM, which entered service in 1980, was previously removed from combat duty, but a small number have been refitted and are deployed in two regiments of the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky as SS-19 Mod 4 with the new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. The first regiment, the 621st, completed its rearmament in December 2021 (Russian Federation 2021), and the second regiment, the 368th, reportedly completed its rearmament in December 2023 (Krasnaya Zvezda 2023). However, construction related to the regiment's infrastructure, including the laying of new cable lines, was still ongoing as of late 2024, and the regiment may not yet have reached full combat readiness. The service life of the UR-100N UTTKh ICBM continues to be extended, and it will eventually be replaced by the SS-29 Sarmat missile (TASS 2025).

The RS-12M1 and RS-12M2 Topol-M (both known by the NATO designation SS-27 Mod 1) are single-warhead ICBMs that are produced in road-mobile (M1) or silo-based (M2) variants. Deployment of the SS-27 Mod 1 was completed in 2012 with a total of 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo and 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teikovo.

In December 2024, the commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei Karakayev, said that his priority for 2025 would be to begin upgrading one mobile regiment (in Teikovo) and one silo regiment (in Tatishchevo) to the RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) ICBM (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2024). The remaining Topol-M regiments will be upgraded to the RS-24 Yars over the second half of the decade. However, based on the time it took to upgrade other ICBM battalions, it may take longer to complete the upgrade of Teikovo and Tatishchevo.

Satellite imagery from June 2024 indicates the presence of ICBM reloaders in at least one silo in Tatishchevo, possibly for the purpose of removing Topol-Ms from their silos in preparation for the regiment's rearmament. The possible replacement of single-warhead Topol-Ms with MIRVed Yars could potentially add several hundred warheads to Russia's ICBM force.

"Sarmat" will replace all current SS-18, it will be installed in at least 46 silos of three regiments at the Dombarovsky missile range and four regiments at the Uzhur missile range (six regiments of six missiles and one regiment of 10 missiles). It is known from open sources that the RS-28 "Sarmat" will be very close to the "Voevoda" in terms of tactical and technical characteristics. The first modification of "Satan" R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1) is equipped with a single-block warhead 15B86 with a capacity of 24 megatons and a throw weight of 7 kilograms. The latest single-block modification R-500M36 "Voevoda" (SS-2 Mod 18) has a slightly reduced capacity and weight of the warhead - to 6 megatons and 20 kilograms, respectively.

In total, according to expert Robert Johnston, from 18 to 20 single-block modifications of the SS-60 were deployed during the entire period of operation. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces received 4th generation missiles, the most powerful of which were the "heavy" R-36M UTTKh (SS-18 Mod 3/4), deployed in super-protected 15P718 silos; in total, the Strategic Missile Forces had 308 such missiles. In 1988, rearmament began with new R-36M2 missiles (SS-18 Mod 5/6) and more advanced 15P718M silos. But by the collapse of the USSR in 1991, they had managed to produce only 58 R-36M2 Voevoda missiles and upgrade 58 15P718M silos for them.

The deployment of Avangard hypersonic pods (object 4202, product 15U71), as well as the Sarmat heavy ICBM, will most likely be limited to 46 units due to the limited number of 15P718M silos. Of the 58 silos, 12 are already occupied by other Avangard launch vehicles - UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19 mod 3/4). According to the State Armament Program 2018-2027, the Avangard hypersonic UBB is in service in two regiments of six missiles each in the 13th Missile Division (Dombarovsky, Yasnaya), a total of 12 carriers in a single-block version. The first Avangards were carried by UR-100N UTTKh (15A35) ICBMs. The missiles are deployed not in their native 15P716 silos, but in foreign 15P718M ones.

The Avangard hypersonic glider is a fairly large object. It is 5,4 meters long and weighs, according to various estimates, between 2 and 000 kilograms. The UR-2N UTTKh can only accommodate one glider, while the Sarmat can accommodate two. Some media outlets have dubbed the Sarmat missile the “Son of Satan,” as it is a development of the SS-700, which the US and NATO designated “Satan,” presumably to reflect its exceptional destructive capability. The operational configuration is likely to be close to the SS-100 payload (up to 18 warheads) plus missile defense penetration capabilities. A small number of Sarmat ICBMs could likely be equipped to carry the Avangard hypersonic glider warheads, which are currently installed on a limited number of SS-18 Mod 10 ICBMs at Dombarovsky. In December 19, Karakayev noted that the Avangard command posts were named "Bugai" (Red Star 4).

The Sarmat is believed to have a significantly longer range than other Russian ICBMs. Colonel General Karakayev stated that the Sarmat can fly over both the North and South Poles (Lenta 2023), and in 2023, a Russian company involved in Sarmat testing published an environmental study indicating that Russia planned to test the missile at a range of about 15 kilometers (000), so Russia is building a new test site at Severo-Yeniseyskoye to test the Sarmat and other ICBMs at shorter ranges, a decision announced in December 2023 (2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023).

The main construction at the test site could be completed by the end of 2024, although it does not appear to have been used yet. It is possible that the creation of the new test complex was also motivated by the fact that Kazakhstan, where Russia has historically tested its missiles at the Sary Shagan test site, is a state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which requires “the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities” (United Nations, 2017).

Russia also appears to be in the early stages of developing at least two new ICBM programs, as well as various hypersonic glide vehicles that could be mounted on modified ICBMs. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the various designations and capabilities of these systems. In December 2021, Karakayev stated that a “new mobile land-based missile system” was being developed, and in December 2022 noted that the system would have “greater mobility” than the Yars and would formally begin technical design development in 2023 (Krasnaya Zvezda 2021, 2022). In December 2023, Karakayev indicated that the system would emphasize stealth and could eventually replace the RS-24 Yars in the long term (Krasnaya Zvezda 2023). However, Karakayev’s December 2024 remarks made no mention of these systems.

It is unclear to experts which missile system Karakayev was referring to in his annual reports, as there are several possible candidates. Russia is reportedly developing a new ICBM, the Yars-M, which is equipped with multiple warheads with individual propulsion systems (Kornev 2023; Kornev and Ramm 2021). In this configuration, warhead separation would occur earlier in flight, theoretically providing greater survivability against missile defenses.

Although the Yars-M will reportedly share a launcher and first stage with the Yars and Yars-S, the Yars-M missile system is a relatively new missile system, has a much higher GRAU index than the Yars and Yars-S missile systems, and is likely still years away from development (Kornev, 2023). (The GRAU index is a naming system used by the Russian Ministry of Defense to catalog various weapons, equipment, and ammunition. The last digits of each GRAU index indicate a specific model of the system; therefore, GRAU indexes that differ greatly from one another may indicate that they were developed independently of one another, rather than in tandem or immediately after one another.)

The Yars-M follows a similar—and somewhat confusing—naming scheme for Russian ICBMs, in which some ICBMs are given similar names (Yars and Yars-M, or Topol and Topol-M) despite not having many technological similarities. Russia is believed to have already tested a Yars-M ICBM.

The second ICBM in development is called Osina-RV, can be launched from both mobile and silo launchers, and is reportedly intended to be an upgraded version of the Yars-M system (M51.4ever 2023; Ryabkov 2023; War Bolts 2021). Flight tests of the Osina-RV were supposed to take place in 2021 and 2022; however, experts do not know if they took place (M51.4ever 2023).

Russia is also developing another ICBM system, called Kedr, which is expected to begin replacing the currently deployed Yars ICBMs in both mobile and silo-based configurations by 2030 (TASS 2021). Kedr is the only new Russian ICBM system known to have been publicly acknowledged by the commander of US Strategic Command since 2022 (Richard 2022).

Russia also appears to be developing a series of hypersonic glide vehicles to deploy on its new ICBMs, similar to the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle currently deployed on the aging SS-19 Mod 4 (UR-100N UTTKh) ICBM. While public Russian industry documents have revealed some of their names—Gradient-RV and Anchar-RV—as of late 2024, the programs remain highly classified and their respective capabilities unknown. Neither these programs nor new ICBM development programs were mentioned by Karakayev in his late 2024 reports.

In addition to ballistic missiles, Russia is also developing a land-based nuclear-capable cruise missile with intercontinental range known as the 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO reporting name SSC-X-9 Skyfall). However, this missile has suffered serious setbacks, including nearly a dozen failed tests, one of which resulted in the missile being lost at sea and required a salvage operation, killing five scientists and two military personnel at Nyonoksa (DiNanno 2019; Panda 2019). Following a New York Times analysis of satellite imagery in October 2023 that indicated that a Burevestnik test might be imminent, President Vladimir Putin subsequently claimed that a successful test of the system had been conducted, although he provided no further details (Mellen 2023; RIA Novosti 2023).

In 2024, a potential deployment site for Burevestnik was identified by Decker Eveleth of CNA Corporation as being located directly adjacent to a known nuclear storage site (Landay 2024). The deployment site, adjacent to the Vologda-20 national-level storage facility near Cherepovets, approximately 360 kilometers (230 miles) north of Moscow, includes nine launch pads in three groups, with roads connecting the site to support buildings and nearby nuclear bunkers. This would be a highly unusual deployment site, given that Russia does not typically locate its missile launchers directly adjacent to nuclear warhead storage sites. Satellite imagery shows that construction on the site began in 2021, and many facilities were likely completed by the end of 2024, although many support buildings were still under construction. It is unlikely that any missile system would have been deployed there by then.
Submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Russian Navy operates 12 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of two classes: five Delta IV (Project 667BRDM Delfin)-class SSBNs and seven Borei-class (Project 955/A) SSBNs, four of which are improved Borei-A (Project 955A) submarines. Each submarine can carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and each SLBM can carry up to six MIRVs, for an estimated maximum total loadout of approximately 992 warheads across the 12 submarines. However, not all of these submarines are fully combat-capable, and the warhead loadout on some missiles may have been reduced to ensure that Russia does not exceed the New START limit on deployed warheads. One or two SSBNs are typically undergoing maintenance, repairs, or reactor refueling at any given time and are not armed. As a result, the total number of warheads deployed on Russian SSBNs is likely around 3.

Russia's five aging Delta IV SSBNs, all built between 1985 and 1992, are part of the Northern Fleet. fleet and are based at Yagelnaya Bay (Gadzhiyevo) on the Kola Peninsula. The Delta IVs carry 16 Sineva (SS-N-23) SLBMs, each carrying up to four warheads, or a modified version known as the Layner (or Liner) (Podvig 2021). The Layner can be fitted with the same warhead as the Bulava SLBM, and is believed by some to potentially carry up to 10 low-yield warheads, but more likely carries four (Podvig 2011). The SS-N-23 missiles and warheads are likely stored at submarine bases. Typically, three or four of the five Delta IVs are operational at any given time, with the other one or two in various stages of maintenance.

Russia previously possessed seven Delta IV SSBNs, but one of the Russian submarines, Yekaterinburg (K-84), was decommissioned in 2022 after 36 years of service, and another, Podmoskovye (formerly K-64, now BS-64), was deactivated in 1999 for conversion into a “special purpose” submarine (TASS, 2016, 2021). In October 2024, one of the five operational Delta IV SSBNs, Novomoskovsk (K-407), took part in Russia’s annual nuclear weapons exercise, launching a Sineva SLBM from the Barents Sea (Russian Federation, 2024).

Each Borei-class SSBN (Project 955/A) is armed with 16 SS-N-32 Bulava SLBMs, which can carry up to six warheads each. However, the missile’s payload could be reduced to three or four warheads each to comply with the New START limit on deployed strategic warheads. There are currently seven Borei-class submarines in service, with five more at various stages of construction, for a total of 3 Borei-class SSBNs planned. Six Borei-class SSBNs are expected to be assigned to the Northern Fleet (in the Arctic Ocean) and six to the Pacific Fleet, replacing all remaining Delta IV SSBNs (TASS, 12). Knyaz Oleg (K-2024) also took part in the annual Russian nuclear exercise in October 552, launching a Bulava SLBM in the Barents Sea (Russian Federation, 2024).

Typically, there is an average of seven years between the laying of each new Borey-class keel and the boat’s delivery to the Russian Navy, although some ships have been delayed. The newest Borey-class SSBN, Imperator Aleksandr III, was launched in December 2022, began sea trials in mid-2023, and test-fired a Bulava SLBM from the White Sea in November 2023 before being commissioned into the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet in December 2023 (Russian Federation 2023; TASS 2021, 2022, 2023). The next SSBN, Knyaz Pozharsky, was scheduled to be commissioned in late 2024 but appears to have been delayed (TASS 2024, 2024). TASS reported that the keels for the last two Borei-class submarines were planned to be laid in 2024, but it appears to have been postponed again (TASS 2024). Two more Borei-class SSBNs may be ordered.

A possible next-generation Russian strategic nuclear submarine concept, known as the Arctur, was unveiled at the Army-2022 International Military-Technical Forum and would potentially begin replacing the Borei class sometime after 2037 (RIA Novosti 2023). The Arctur-class design is expected to be smaller than the current Borei class and have a reduced number of missiles (RIA Novosti 2022). It could also potentially function as a carrier for the Surrogat unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), or autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), suggesting an expanded role compared to traditional SSBNs (Dempsey 2022; RIA Novosti 2024). In an interview with the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, Igor Vilnit, CEO of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, which designs Russia’s nuclear and diesel-electric submarines, said the fifth-generation Arctur will focus on “robotics” and will feature “even greater stealth, as well as the ability to disorient enemy forces” (RIA Novosti 2024). At this stage, it is unclear what this future class of submarines will ultimately look like.

In addition to ballistic missiles, the Russian Navy is also developing a nuclear-armed intercontinental-range torpedo called Poseidon. Underwater tests of the Poseidon began in December 2018. The weapon will be mounted on specially prepared submarines and is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 2027 (TASS 2018). The first of these special submarines, Project 09852 Belgorod (K-329), was launched in April 2019 and delivered to the Russian Navy in July 2022 (Naval News 2022; Sutton 2021). Russian defense sources indicated that the “first batch” of Poseidon torpedoes had been produced and would soon be delivered to the Belgorod submarine, despite an apparently aborted torpedo test in November 2022 (TASS 2023).

The aborted test was reportedly followed by a drop test of a Poseidon mock-up using Belgorod in January 2023, with further reports suggesting another test could take place in June 2023 (Cook 2023; Sciutto 2022; Sutton 2023; TASS 2023).

Belgorod will be the largest Russian submarine and will reportedly be able to carry up to six Poseidon torpedoes, each rumoured to have a high-yield warhead, possibly in the multi-megaton range (Hruby 2019; TASS 2019). The submarine was spotted operating in the Barents Sea during September 2022 (Sutton 2022), although it is unlikely that Poseidon is already operational.

Subsequent Poseidon-equipped submarines will be of a new class (Project 09851 Khabarovsk), the first of which was due to be delivered to the Navy in the fall of 2021, but the delivery has apparently been delayed and the boat may still be in the final stages of construction at the Sevmash shipyard (Starchak 2023; TASS 2021, 2023). Khabarovsk will also reportedly be able to carry up to six Poseidon torpedoes (TASS 2020). Another submarine is planned to be delivered to the Russian Navy by 2027, bringing the total number of Poseidon-equipped submarines to at least three (TASS 2023).

The Pacific Fleet's Kamchatka naval base is reportedly set to be upgraded by 2025 to eventually become a base for Belgorod and Khabarovsk (TASS, 2023). The base is also actively working to upgrade its warhead storage facilities. In August 2024, Russian presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev called Sweden and Finland's accession to NATO "exacerbating the situation" in the Arctic and said that "increasing the combat readiness of the Northern Fleet, an important base of which is the Kola Bay" is one of Russia's priorities to ensure its interests in the region (TASS, 2024).

Over the years, there have been occasional reports of Russian submarines appearing off the US coast and in the Mediterranean (Brugen 2023). UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said in April 2023 that the UK was also tracking Russian submarines “in the North Atlantic, Irish Sea and North Sea, following some strange routes that they don’t normally take” (Cook 2023).

Strategic bombers

Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160 (known in NATO as the “Blackjack”) and the Tu-95MS (“Bear-H”). Experts estimate that there are approximately 67 bombers in the active inventory, of which perhaps only 58 are considered deployed under New START. This number was determined by cross-referencing satellite imagery of various strategic bomber locations and maintenance facilities in 2023. However, this estimate is subject to significant uncertainty following unconfirmed open-source reports suggesting that Russia may have changed the unique identification numbers (UIDs) used to designate each strategic bomber under New START (Podvig 2023).

Both types of bombers can carry the AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) nuclear air-launched cruise missile, with upgraded versions being equipped with the new AS-23B (Kh-102) nuclear cruise missile. Several versions of the Tu-95 are believed to have entered service over the years: the legacy Tu-95MS6 and Tu-95MS16 versions, and the upgraded Tu-95MSM version. The 1 START I treaty differentiated the two legacy versions based on their different missile loadouts: the Tu-1991MS95 can carry up to six missiles internally in the bomb bay, while the Tu-6MS95 can carry up to six missiles internally and up to 16 missiles on wing-mounted pylons, for a total of 10 missiles.

It is possible, but unconfirmed, that the MS16 version lost its external hardpoints at some point, effectively becoming the Variant 6. The hardpoints are being restored as part of the Tu-95MSM upgrade program, which equips aging Tu-95s to carry eight AS-23B missiles externally, for a maximum of 14 missiles per aircraft, including six AS-15 missiles internally in the bomb bay. Tu-160s are also being upgraded to carry up to 12 AS-23B missiles internally in the bomb bay. The AS-23Bs added as part of the bomber upgrade may eventually replace the AS-15s.

During North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's visit to Russia's Knevichi airfield in September 2023, the commander of the long-range aviation Russia has displayed a Tu-160 aircraft purportedly armed with the “new” Kh-BD cruise missile, which may be based on the existing AS-23B. The commander said the new missile has a range of over 6500 kilometers, potentially indicating a nuclear role, given that nuclear warheads weigh much less than heavy conventional munitions, saving weight on fuel. The Russian defense minister added that the Tu-160 would be able to carry 12 missiles, although some experts doubt this claim (Cook 2023; TASS 2023). No further information about the missile has emerged.

It is not known how many nuclear weapons are assigned to the heavy bombers. Each Tu-160 can carry up to 40 tons of ordnance, including 12 air-launched cruise missiles, while the Tu-95MS can carry six to 14 cruise missiles, depending on configuration. Collectively, the bombers can potentially carry more than 650 weapons, but experts estimate that the weapons are only available to deployed bombers, for a total of about 580 bomber weapons. Of these, experts estimate that about 200 may be stored at Engels Air Base in the Saratov Region and Ukrainka Air Base in the Amur Region; the rest are believed to be in a central storage facility. Modernization of the nuclear weapons storage bunker at Engels Air Base was ongoing through 2022.

STRATCOM Commander General Cotton recently stated that both the Tu-95 and Tu-160 are “capable of carrying nuclear gravity bombs” (Cotton 2025). But the old, slow Tu-95 bomber would not stand much of a chance against modern air defenses, the Tu-160 is not a stealth bomber, and while both were used to launch cruise missiles during the Ukraine SBO, neither is believed to have carried out gravity bomb attacks. Consequently, experts do not consider gravity bombs for the heavy bombers. Some of the Russian bombers have been damaged by Ukrainian retaliatory attacks. Following the probable Ukrainian airstrike on Engels Air Base in December 2022, Russian officials reported that two aircraft were damaged, one of which was a Tu-95 bomber, as seen in satellite imagery (Kramer, Schwirtz, and Santora 2022; Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds 2023; Röpcke 2022).

Russia has conducted several heavy bomber exercises in 2024, including in October, when some Tu-95MS bombers took part in what the Kremlin called “strategic deterrence force exercises,” during which the aircraft fired air-launched cruise missiles (Russian Federation, 2024).

Russia has historically based all of its strategic bombers at Engels Air Base and Ukrainka Air Base, but satellite imagery shows that Russia began to base some of its bombers at Belaya Air Base in the Irkutsk Region as early as October 2022 and at Olenya Air Base in the Murmansk Region as early as August 2022. This is likely aimed at reducing the number of bombers operating from Engels Air Base, where they are now vulnerable to attack by Ukrainian drones. Corroborating this assessment, the number of Tu-160 bombers deployed to Belaya Air Base increased after December 2022, and as of March 2025, Russia continues to station a squadron of 8 Blackjacks from Belaya. Satellite imagery of Engels Air Base from March 2025 shows only two Tu-160 bombers. As of March 2025, Russia also appears to operate approximately 11 Tu-95 "Bear" aircraft from Olenya Air Base. These bombers, in particular, are deployed in a forward-facing role and are less than 20 kilometers from the Olenegorsk-2 nuclear warhead storage facility.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has reportedly considered deploying a new Tu-160 regiment to Ukrainka Air Base to conduct missions in the Russian Far East region, but the Blackjacks are not typically visible in satellite imagery of the base. On December 14, 2023, Tu-95 bombers conducted a joint strategic air patrol with Chinese H-6 bombers over the Sea of ​​Japan and the East China Sea, the second such exercise in 2023 (Mahadzir 2023). A small number of Tu-160s occasionally conduct patrol missions in the Arctic and Russian Far East from Ugolny Airport near Anadyr. Most recently, on January 25, two Blackjacks conducted an 11-hour patrol flight in the Arctic, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 2025).

In addition to upgrading existing strategic bombers, Russia is also producing additional Tu-160 bombers, apparently planning up to 50 aircraft. There is considerable confusion over the designations of the various upgraded models: Tu-160M, Tu-160M1, and Tu-160M2. It appears that all upgraded Tu-160s fall under the Tu-160M ​​designation, with the M1 and M2 suffixes indicating successive stages of upgrade. The first stage reportedly includes a new engine, the NK-32-02, which is said to increase the aircraft’s range by around 1000 kilometers (TASS, 2017), as well as a new autopilot system and the removal of obsolete components, while the second stage includes a new radar, cockpit, communications, and avionics (TASS, 2020). Some Tu-160s have completely new airframes, while others are rebuilt or upgraded.

The first flight of the Tu-160M ​​with the old engine took place in February 2020, and the first flight of the aircraft with the next-generation engine took place in November 2020. Russia's United Aircraft Corporation declined to show photos of the November test flight due to classification issues, instead choosing to link its announcement to photos of the older version of the aircraft (United Aircraft Corporation, 2020).

The first newly manufactured Tu-160M ​​bomber made its maiden flight in January 2022 (United Aircraft Corporation, 2022). The Russian state technology corporation Rostec announced in July 2023 that the aircraft had entered joint testing by the Ministry of Defense and the United Aircraft Corporation.

In February 2024, President Putin visited the Gorbunov plant to inspect four new Tu-160Ms and take a roughly 30-minute flight on one of the upgraded Ilya Muromets bombers (Russian Ministry of Defense, 2024). In an interview after the flight, Putin stated that the upgraded Tu-160s “could be accepted into the Armed Forces” (Associated Press, 2024). The Russian Air Force may have received its first upgraded Blackjacks, although there has been no official confirmation. According to Russian media, the Ministry of Defense is expected to receive 2027 Tu-10Ms by 160 (Redstar, 2018).

Delays associated with the Tu-160M ​​program have been so severe that the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade has filed a lawsuit against the aircraft's manufacturer (Interfax, 2022). It is possible that the ultimate goal of 50 new Tu-160M ​​bombers will not be reached, but if it is, it will likely lead to the retirement of most, if not all, of the remaining Tu-95MS, which are expected to be retired by 2035.

The Tu-160 modernization program, meanwhile, is only a temporary bridge to the next-generation bomber known as the PAK DA, which has been in development for several years. The subsonic aircraft will reportedly have a reduced radar signature and be able to carry long-range cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles (Tsukanov, 2023).

The Russian government signed a contract with manufacturer Tupolev in 2013 to build the PAK DA at the Kazan plant. Research and development work on the PAK DA has reportedly been completed, and the aircraft is expected to share many systems with the Tu-160M ​​(TASS, 2019). Construction of the first aircraft's cockpit reportedly began in the spring of 2020, with final assembly delayed from 2021 to 2023 ahead of flight tests (TASS, 2020, 2021).

In December 2023, Rostec announced that specialists had completed the development of a test complex and test rigs for the PAK DA (TASS, 2023). State flight tests (which are usually conducted after flight tests by the aircraft manufacturer) of the PAK DA are scheduled for February 2026, with initial production expected to begin in 2027 and serial production in 2028 or 2029 (Izvestia, 2020; TASS, 2019). However, it is unclear whether the Russian aviation industry has enough capacity to develop and produce two strategic bombers simultaneously, suggesting that this development schedule may face delays.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Russia is modernizing many of its so-called “non-strategic” shorter-range dual-use weapons and introducing new types. The effort is less clear and comprehensive than the strategic force modernization plan, but also involves phasing out Soviet-era weapons and replacing them with newer, but likely fewer, weapons. While the number of non-strategic dual-use launchers is increasing, that does not necessarily mean that Russia is also increasing the number of nuclear warheads assigned to those launchers.

Although Trump administration officials claimed in 2018 that Russia had increased its non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile over the previous decade, in fact the stockpile had declined significantly—by about a third—over that period (Kristensen 2019).

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2021 Worldwide Threat Assessment and the State Department’s 2023 New START Implementation Report both said that Russia likely possesses “approximately 1000 to 2000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads”—the lowest number since the 1950s—and the State Department made the same estimate again in 2024 (DIA 2021; State Department 2023, 2025). The range reflects varying estimates within the U.S. intelligence community, with the military generally using the higher number for its threat assessments.

STRATCOM predicted in 2020 that “Russia’s overall nuclear arsenal is likely to grow significantly over the next decade—an increase driven primarily by the projected increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons” (Richard 2020). And in early 2022, rumors resurfaced that some in the intelligence community believed that Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile could increase significantly—potentially doubling—by 2030 (Bender 2022; Christensen 2022).

Half a decade later, the dramatic increase in Russia’s projected non-strategic nuclear weapons has yet to materialize. Without evidence to the contrary, experts continue to estimate the total at nearly 1500 non-strategic nuclear warheads, a significant decline from nearly 2000 a decade and a half ago. These warheads are designed to be delivered by air, sea, land, and various defensive forces. Although rumors abound of large stockpiles and additional nuclear systems, authoritative public information is scarce.

This assessment—and the categories of Russian weapons that FAS has been describing for years in the Nuclear Notebook—are consistent with the assessment in the State Department’s 2024 report to Congress, which states:

Russia's stockpile is estimated to be between 1000 and 2000 non-strategic nuclear warheads as of the latest unclassified assessment in 2023. These include, but are not limited to, warheads for air-to-surface missiles, aerial bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-ballistic missile systems, and nuclear mines, as well as nuclear warheads for Russian dual-use land-based missile systems. (U.S. Department of State, 2025)

However, this estimate raises questions about the U.S. government’s assumptions and counting rules regarding Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. Most of these systems are dual-use systems, meaning that not all platforms of a given type can be designated for nuclear missions and not all operations are nuclear. Moreover, even if Russia were to increase the category of dual-use launchers, this does not necessarily mean that the number of nuclear warheads assigned to this category would also increase. Finally, many of the delivery platforms are in various stages of modernization and will not be capable of launching nuclear weapons at any given time.

Despite the uncertainty about the exact number, the Russian military continues to assign a significant role to non-strategic nuclear weapons for use by naval, tactical air, air defense, missile defense, and short-range ballistic missile forces. Part of the rationale for the Russian military's reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons is that many of the potential targets for Russian nuclear strike plans are on Russia's periphery; they do not require intercontinental-range weapons, but can be covered by shorter-range weapons.

Moreover, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons are designed to offset the superior conventional forces of NATO, especially the United States. After Russia’s SVOA in Ukraine, the relative importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons is likely to be further enhanced or even increased. Finally, the possession of a significant stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons helps Moscow maintain overall nuclear parity with the combined nuclear forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France; without non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia’s nuclear arsenal would be significantly smaller, about one-third smaller.

In the summer of 2024, Russia conducted non-strategic nuclear weapons exercises consisting of three phases: (1) readiness and preparation; (2) joint exercises with Belarus; and (3) combat employment and deployment, which included exercises conducted by groups of Iskander (SS-26) missiles (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2024).

Non-strategic sea-based nuclear weapons

FAS experts believe that the largest user of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Russian armed forces is the navy, which they estimate has 704 warheads for use by land-based cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes and depth charges. These weapons can be used by submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes and naval aircraft. The actual number of sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons may be lower than this estimate, since not all ships with dual-use weapons systems can be equipped with nuclear warheads.

The Navy's major modernization programs focus on the next class of nuclear attack submarines, known in Russia as Project 885/M or Yasen-M. The program has been plagued by years of delays. Russia currently operates five Yasen submarines:

— Severodvinsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk and Arkhangelsk — after the fifth submarine was commissioned in December 2024 (TASS 2024).
Four additional Yasen-M nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs) — Perm, Ulyanovsk, Voronezh and Vladivostok — are at various stages of construction. The next boat, Perm, laid down in 2016, has likely begun sea trials.

The Russian news agency TASS reported in 2023 that Perm, which will be the first submarine to carry the Zircon nuclear hypersonic cruise missile, will enter service with the Russian Navy in 2026 (TASS, 2016, 2023). The remaining three boats were laid down in 2017, 2020, and 2020, respectively (TASS, 2020). Russia is reportedly considering building three additional Yasen-M SSGNs, although this has not yet been officially confirmed (TASS, 2023).

The first Yasen submarine was reportedly 10–12 meters longer than the improved Yasen-M submarine and could therefore carry 40 Kalibr missiles, eight more than its successors (Gady 2018). The Yasen-M boats also reportedly have improved reactors and sonar systems that could enhance their ability to avoid detection (Kaushal et al. 2021). The Yasen submarines will replace Soviet-era attack submarines.

In addition to the dual-use Kalibr cruise missiles for hitting land targets, the Yasen-class submarines will also be able to carry the SS-N-26 Strobile (3M55 Onyx) anti-ship cruise missile, which the US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center calls "nuclear", and, starting with the Perm, the SS-N-33 (3M22 Zircon) hypersonic cruise missile. In 2021 and 2022, the Severodvinsk successfully conducted test launches of the Zircon from the surface and underwater positions - the first tests of the new system from a submarine (TASS 2021, 2023). According to the Russian military, the Yasen-M submarines can launch several different types of missiles in salvos using upgraded UKSK-M “universal launchers” that can accommodate multiple systems (Interfax 2021; TASS 2021).

Other upgrades to naval non-strategic nuclear platforms include those planned for the Sierra class (Project 945), Oscar II class (Project 949A), and Akula class (Project 971). While the conventional version of the Kalibr is used on a wide range of submarines and ships, the nuclear version has replaced the SS-N-21 (Sampson) land-attack nuclear cruise missile on some attack submarines. Russia may consider building a new type of cruise missile submarine based on the Borei SSBN design, to be called the Borei-K (TASS, 2019). However, no confirmation or update has been made on such a project; and given that the incoming Yasen-M submarines are also capable of delivering nuclear-armed cruise missiles, there may be no need for a new type of SSGN.

In addition to attack submarines, many surface ships and naval aircraft carry dual-use weapons systems. The most important types are the 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A) land-based cruise missile with a range of 2500 km and the 3M55 Oniks (SS-N-26) anti-ship cruise missile, which are being added to many of Russia's new surface ships and installed on older ships, replacing older weapons.

Non-strategic air-launched nuclear weapons

The Russian Air Force is estimated to have been allocated around 334 non-strategic weapons to be delivered by Tu-22M3 (Backfire) medium-range bombers, Su-24M (Fencer-D) fighter-bombers, Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers, MiG-31Ks, and the new Su-57 aircraft now entering service. Other aircraft, such as the Su-30SM, may also be dual-capable, although this has not been confirmed.

The Tu-22M3 can deliver the Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) air-launched cruise missile, which is being replaced by an upgraded version of the Kh-32. The Tu-22M3 is being upgraded to the new Tu-22M3M, which reportedly contains 80 percent completely new avionics and shares the communications suite with the new Su-57 fighter and made its first flight in December 2018 (TASS 2020; United Aircraft Corporation 2018). The second prototype of the upgraded Tu-22M3M made its first flight in March 2020 and has since conducted four additional flight tests, one of which tested the aircraft's stability at supersonic speeds (TASS 2020). The Tu-22M3M, along with the Tu-160M ​​and future PAK DA strategic bombers, will eventually be equipped with the new Kh-95 hypersonic missile, a prototype of which has reportedly already been tested (RIA Novosti 2021).

Russia conducted conventional attacks using Tu-22M3 medium-range bombers during the SVO in Ukraine. Following the alleged Ukrainian drone strike on Soltsy Air Base in August 2023, which destroyed the Tu-22M3, Russia relocated the remaining Backfires at the base to Olenya Air Base on the Kola Peninsula, which is notably forward deployed and close to NATO borders (Baker 2023; Nilsen 2023).

The Su-34 has played an extensive combat role in the Ukrainian SVO. The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2025 report estimates that Russia has approximately 124 Su-34 fighters (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2025). Russia has purchased an additional 76 upgraded Su-34M units with improved avionics and received several batches during 2023 and 2024, the latest of which was received in late December (Global Center for Analysis of Arms Trade, 2023; Lavrov and Krezul, 2020; TASS, 2023b, 2023c; Rostec, 2024). During a visit to the manufacturer in October 2023, Defense Minister Shoigu demanded an increase in Su-34 production and repairs (TASS, 2023).

Russia has also developed a new long-range, dual-use, air-launched ballistic missile system known as the 9-A-7760 Kinzhal. The missile, which bears similarities to the SS-26 short-range land-based ballistic missile used in the Iskander system, is believed to have a range of up to 2000 kilometers when launched from a specially modified MiG-31K (Foxhound), designated the MiG-31IK, and up to 3000 kilometers when launched from a Tu-22M3 bomber (the range being the combined combat range of the aircraft and the missile).

According to Russian state media, the Tu-22M3M will be able to carry up to four Kinzhals (RIA Novosti, 2018). The MiG-31IK cannot carry both the Kinzhal and its conventional air-to-air missiles and must therefore be deployed with a cover air unit (TASS, 2018). In December 2021, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that in 2021, “a separate aviation regiment armed with MiG-31IK aircraft with the Kinzhal hypersonic missile was formed” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2021), apparently in the area of ​​the Northern Fleet bases on the Kola Peninsula. Plans are reportedly underway to equip the Northern and Central Military Districts with Kinzhal missiles by 2024, and recent satellite images of MiG-31Ks at bases on the Kola Peninsula may indicate that the Kinzhal has been delivered to the region (Izvestia, 2021; TASS, 2021). The Kinzhal has been used several times in the war in Ukraine (TASS, 2022). In February 2023, President Putin announced that Russia would accelerate mass production of the Kinzhal (TASS, 2023).

Additionally, the Russian Aerospace Forces reportedly received the first batch of Su-57 (PAK FA) fighters in late 2020, with deliveries continuing through 2023 and “increasing significantly” throughout 2024, according to the CEO of the United Aircraft Corporation (TASS 2020; United Aircraft Corporation 2022; TASS 2025). The CEO also stated that the company would expand production capacity for the Su-57 in 2025 and that new batches would have new features and improvements, including integration with unmanned aerial vehicles (TASS 2025). The full contract is expected to include 76 aircraft for delivery by the end of 2028 for three regiments (Suciu 2021; TASS 2020). The US Department of Defense says the Su-57 is capable of carrying nuclear weapons (US Department of Defense 2018). They will also reportedly be equipped with hypersonic “missiles with characteristics similar to those of the Kinzhal” (TASS 2018).

Non-strategic nuclear weapons on tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles and air defense missiles

Estimates of the stockpiles of warheads for Russian interceptor missiles and air defense systems are extremely uncertain.

Since 2018, U.S. agencies have repeatedly stated that Russia continues to possess nuclear warheads for defensive weapons. A 2023 State Department assessment found that Russia uses non-strategic nuclear warheads for “anti-aircraft” and “anti-missile systems” (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Coastal defense systems using the 3M55 (SS-N-26) anti-ship missile may also be dual-use.

This includes the A-135 missile defense system around Moscow, equipped with 68 53T6 Gazelle interceptors with nuclear warheads. The system is being upgraded to the A-235 with the Nudol anti-missile and anti-satellite interceptor, which is expected to enter service by the end of 2025 (TASS 2021). It is possible that the A-235 system will not be equipped with nuclear warheads and will instead rely on conventional warheads or kinetic strike-to-destroy technology (Krasnaya Zvezda 2017; Starchak 2023).

Dual-use air defense systems include the mobile S-300 (SA-20) and S-400 (SA-21), which are designed for theater air defense (and some missile defense). US government sources privately indicate that Russia retains nuclear warheads for both systems. Not all air defense units are believed to play a nuclear role, only select units tasked with protecting high-value assets. The S-300 and S-400 systems were used extensively in the war in Ukraine for both air defense and offensive ground strikes (TASS 2023). It is possible, although uncertain, that future and more advanced air defense systems may eliminate the need for such a nuclear capability (Hendricks 2021; TASS 2021).

Given these developments, we estimate that there are approximately 250 nuclear warheads available to air defense forces today, plus an estimated 95 additional warheads for Moscow’s A-135 missile defense system and coastal defense units, for a total stockpile of 345 warheads. However, it should be emphasized that this estimate, due to limited transparency and authoritative sourcing, is subject to significant uncertainty and low confidence in its accuracy.

Non-strategic land-based nuclear weapons

Land-based systems with dual capabilities include the 9K720 Iskander (SS-26) short-range ballistic missile and the 9M729 (SSC-8) ground-launched cruise missile. It is possible, but not confirmed, that the 9M728 (SSC-7) short-range ground-launched cruise missile also has dual capabilities.

The SS-26 (Iskander), with a range of 500 km, has now completely replaced the SS-21 in at least 12 brigades: four in the Western Military District, two in the Southern Military District, two in the Central Military District, and at least four in the Eastern Military District. Not all base upgrades are complete; some bases are still under construction, and not all have missile depots. Initially, each brigade had 12 launchers with two missiles each, for a total of 24 missiles (at least one reload is in storage), but sources in the Russian Defense Ministry said that each brigade will receive an additional battalion, so that in the future each brigade will have 16 launchers with 32 missiles (Izvestia, 2019). Experts estimate that there are approximately 75 warheads for short-range ballistic missiles. Unconfirmed rumors suggest that the SSC-7 (9M728 or R-500) land-based cruise missile may also have nuclear capabilities. The weapon was featured in official videos from Russia's summer 2024 non-strategic nuclear weapons exercises.

One of the Iskander bases undergoing significant upgrades is the 3rd Missile Brigade near Gornoye in eastern Russia, close to the borders of Mongolia and China. The upgrades include a new garrison base with nine climate-controlled bays for Iskander launchers and support vehicles, as well as a storage depot for remote missiles. The base is also located near an Air Force nuclear weapons storage site, where satellite imagery in March 2024 showed the presence of Iskander launchers and/or transporters.

In February 2023, Belarusian military officials said they were autonomously operating Russian-supplied SS-26 Iskander nuclear missile systems, and later that month they were seen training at a base near Osipovichi (Kristensen 2023; Reuters 2023). Russia is believed to be upgrading a former Soviet-era Cold War nuclear weapons depot near Osipovichi, Belarus, to store nuclear warheads for the Russian-supplied Iskanders to Belarus (Kristensen 2023). In early 2024, Russia added a four-layer security perimeter and a guarded access point to the depot (Kristensen and Korda 2024). The base has been equipped with an air defense system, and construction of a rail line connecting the interior of the depot to the Belarusian rail system began in August 2024. As of April 2025, the rail line and loading dock inside the depot were still under construction. If Russia did decide to deploy nuclear warheads in Belarus, they would likely be transported by rail.

The United States and NATO have accused Russia of developing, testing, and deploying a dual-capable ground-launched cruise missile identified as the 9M729 (SSC-8) with a range of approximately 2500 kilometers, in violation of the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (US Department of State, 2019). The first two battalions of 9M729s were deployed in late 2017 (Gordon, 2017), and US intelligence sources indicated in December 2018 that Russia had deployed four battalions in the Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern Military Districts with nearly 100 missiles (including spares) (Gordon, 2019). Experts estimate that these four divisions are located together with Iskander facilities in Yelansky, Kapustin Yar (possibly now moved to a permanent base, possibly in the Far East), Mozdok and Shuya.

It is not known whether Russia has added 9M729 battalions beyond the four reported in December 2018. There is no public confirmation of this, but in February 2019, just weeks after Russia acknowledged the existence of the 9M729 but claimed its range was legitimate, the press service of Russia’s Western Military District reported that it had conducted “electronic launches” of 9M279s in the Leningrad region (RIA Novosti, 2019). This could potentially indicate that the 9M729 was added to a fifth brigade (the 26th Missile Brigade near Luga, about 125 kilometers south of St. Petersburg) or that the launchers were sent there for training.

Each Iskander brigade previously consisted of three battalions, each of which was expected to include four launchers; however, in 2019, Russian officials indicated that each Iskander brigade would be supplemented by a fourth battalion, thereby increasing the number of launchers per brigade (Izvestia, 2019).

It is possible that this fourth battalion in some brigades is the 9M729 (which would therefore be deployed alongside other Iskander variants). While this remains unconfirmed, our estimate suggests a total of five 9M729 battalions, each equipped with four launchers. Since each launcher appears to be equipped to carry four missiles, this would mean a total of 80 missiles per battalion (possibly 160 if each battalion has one reloadable missile). However, each launcher is assumed to be equipped with only one nuclear warhead (the rest are equipped with conventional warheads), for a total of 20 warheads per five battalions. The status of the 9M729 missile is unknown, as very little information has been available about this missile in the past couple of years.

Russia also now appears to operate a small number of North Korean Hwasong-11 solid-fuel ballistic missiles, “several dozen” of which U.S. officials have said were recently provided by North Korea (The White House 2024). Russian forces launched a small number of these missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and January 2, 2024, and subsequent open-source analysis has convincingly shown that the systems launched were either Hwasong-11A (U.S. designation KN-23) or Hwasong-11B (KN-24) variants (Lewis 2024). While these systems very likely have a nuclear role in North Korea, experts assess that Russia uses them solely in conventional strike roles.
In November 2024, Russia used a new type of experimental IRBM, known as the Oreshnik, in combat in Ukraine. The Oreshnik can carry at least six multiple warheads; in a typical configuration, each warhead can carry several submunitions (Kullab and Morton 2024). President Putin said the weapon was “not nuclear” (Russia Federation 2024), but the Pentagon said the new missile was based on the Russian RS-26 Rubezh IRBM and that “it can be reconfigured to deliver, of course, different types of… conventional or nuclear warheads” (US Department of Defense 2024).

Comments

[Hunter 2]

I understood two things from the article:
1. The number of our warheads is unknown, if we can somehow estimate the strategic ones, then the tactical ones are like reading tea leaves.
2. In the process of modernization of nuclear weapons, many old carriers are released, why not dispose of them without warheads in the direction of non-brothers? And the tunnel and bridges will come to furry animals.

[Krasnodar]

Hi
A lot of money will have to be spent on a non-nuclear warhead, the result will be relatively modest
It would be better to send more satellites with these rockets.

[Hunter 2]

Quote: Krasnodar

Hi
A lot of money will have to be spent on a non-nuclear warhead, the result will be relatively modest
It would be better to send more satellites with these rockets.

Hi Yes, I'm not against it, the main thing is that they use it and don't saw it into needles.

[Krasnodar]

Quote: Hunter 2

Hi Yes, I'm not against it, the main thing is that they use it and don't saw it into a needle

I really hope so too ))

[alexoff]

We don't have problems with rockets to launch satellites, we have problems with making enough satellites. And a non-nuclear warhead is unlikely to be very expensive and complex relative to the rocket itself.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: Hunter 2

And fur-bearing animals will come to the tunnel and bridges.

You are a naive person. In order to have a "furry animal" you need to hit the target, BB and YABCH are very bad at this because for them plus/minus 50 meters is already super accurate.

[Hunter 2]

Quote: Puncher

To have a "furry animal" you need to hit the target, BB and YABCH are very bad at this because for them plus/minus 50 meters is already super accurate.

Well, I'm not really a "rocket man", okay with bridges... but the Beskid railway tunnel doesn't seem to move, and its dimensions are not small.
In general, the point of my post was that we need to utilize the carriers usefully, for example, launch satellites as comrade Krasnodar suggested.

[Roman Efremov]

A huge plant like Artem, which we regularly hit with many missiles, after a while again. Now if a dozen ICBMs with a conventional charge flew at it - each with several dozen tons of metal, explosives, plus the remains of fuel (the distance is small). Accuracy is not important - plus or minus a hundred meters will do just fine.

[Colonel]

You probably haven't had to study military topography. Otherwise, you would have come across the topic "Changing the terrain in the area of ​​a nuclear explosion" with a formula for calculating the radius of a crater depending on the power of the warhead - 30 times the cube root of q, where q is the power in TNT equivalent (kT). For simplicity of calculation, let's take 100 kT. A crater with a radius of 300 meters. A CEP (circular error probable) of two or three hundred meters is nothing.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: colonel

Otherwise, you would have come across the topic "Changing the terrain in the area of ​​a nuclear explosion" with a formula for calculating the radius of a funnel depending on the power of the warhead

I didn't have to. But my friend talked about a careless warhead.

[Boris55]

The essence of Russian civilization is Bolshevism.

Quote: Hunter 2

... why not dispose of them without warheads...

Already - "Nut".

[Aviator_]

And fur-bearing animals will come to the tunnel and bridges.

Judging by the events of the entire SVO, both are already in someone's possession. That's why they are unharmed.

[Piramidon]

Quote: Hunter 2

Why not dispose of them without warheads towards non-brothers?

Well, why without warheads? Why send empty missiles? After all, there is a non-nuclear BG. You can load a ton of conventional explosives into the Topol, and as many as 8 tons into the Voevoda. It will boom much more effectively than an empty missile.

[Glagol1]

Disposal of old missiles by a combat launch is not such a simple story. The flight path through densely populated areas with an increased probability of failure (old missiles fall more often) is a risk that someone must sanction. A CEP of 150-300 meters is acceptable for a nuclear warhead, but an ordinary head weighing a ton - two TNT with such a CEP may not hit the target. Missile failure over enemy territory is also undesirable. The idea is certainly correct, in war conditions, but practical implementation is not easy. Maybe they will try. The best targets for such launches are large factories, ports and airfields, power plants, and large warehouses. More pinpoint targets, such as bridges, will be more difficult to hit.

[Vladimir_2U]

Very interesting article, much better quality than the article about SM-6.
It is completely unclear how capable our SSBNs are of a retaliatory strike, not to mention a retaliatory strike. After all, the anti-submarine warfare of combat patrol areas is highly questionable, and the submarines are too vulnerable near the wall.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

It is completely unclear how capable our SSBNs are of a retaliatory strike, not to mention a retaliatory strike. After all, the anti-submarine warfare of combat patrol areas is highly questionable, and the submarines are too vulnerable near the wall.

Here we need to understand how many SLBMs are on combat duty. And to measure the number of SLBMs on combat duty with the enemy's ability to stop them. For 12 SSBNs (in total), the US alone has 51 SSNs (in total). The ocean is certainly large, but thanks to satellites, each time our SSBN goes into combat, the enemy records it with all the ensuing consequences.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Puncher

The ocean is certainly large, but thanks to satellites, every time our SSBN goes into combat, it is recorded by the enemy with all the ensuing consequences.

And a dead OVR allows the enemy to meet the SSBN practically at the exit from the base.

[Same lech]

Officials reported that two aircraft were damaged, one of which was a Tu-95 bomber, as seen in satellite images (Kramer, Schwirtz, and Santora 2022; Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds 2023; Röpcke 2022).

It is not good for our enemy to have such an opportunity to assess the damage inflicted on us...it is time to make shelters for strategists.

[Hole puncher]

There are approximately 1718 strategic warheads deployed: about 870 on land-based ballistic missiles, about 640 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and perhaps just over 200 on heavy bomber bases

Very depressing. There are far more strategic targets than deployed nuclear warheads.

[Per se.]

Quote: Puncher

There are far more strategic targets than deployed nuclear warheads.

It is not so much this that is depressing, now we need to evaluate other prospects. Here, the USA, Trump's logic, as commentators in the USA see it, is that the current confrontation is, in fact, a war of Europe. Brilliant, it was the States that started the mess, and now they have become peacekeepers, what is this, if not a desire to have a large-scale or sluggish war in Europe, and to sit it out overseas again. In this regard, we must also remember that bastard Brzezinski, one of his famous statements. "Russia can have as many nuclear suitcases and nuclear buttons as you like, but since 500 billions of dollars of the Russian elite are in our banks, you have to figure it out: is this your elite or is it already ours? I do not see a single situation in which Russia will use its nuclear potential"
The selfish interests of our fat cats and their influence on the SVO also give rise to certain thoughts. If someone keeps their money in foreign banks and foreign currency, if everything is in the West and with the West, these are the main agents of foreign influence, and even our (or not ours anymore) Central Bank is somehow under the IMF/Fed, in fact caring more about foreign economies than the Russian one.
So you start to think about who is the owner of our country, and what kind of “patriots” are these with their billions, who have dual or triple citizenship.
What else can be added to our strange military operation, 8 years late, to the squandered opportunities for victory and within the framework of international law for 2014. Again, the bastard Brzezinski, - "Hitler was never particularly interested in having a lot of personal money. Putin has such an interest, and this provides opportunities for a different development of prospects, in which passions will subside. Putin has almost deliberately made more than 40 million people in a neighboring country his antagonists, who until recently showed no hostility toward Russia."Have a "Russian Spring", pro-Russian regions of the south-east of Ukraine, and not use Yanukovych's appeal for help, which we had with Azarov, not demand an all-Ukrainian referendum, but recognize Poroshenko, and not recognize the referendums in Donbass. As they say, nothing personal, capitalism... We have the SVO, which is in its fourth year, the devastation of warehouses and arsenals, the wear and tear and loss of equipment, the loss of civilians and military personnel, the devastation in the combat zone, the overall ruin of the economy and the bleeding of Russia. All this could have been avoided and defeated. Why do we have what we have? The States are going to sit it out overseas, and Europe with Nazi Ukraine is starting to prepare for a war of attrition for Russia. What next, if it comes to a shameful ultimatum, the transfer of our strategic nuclear forces under international control, in the name of peace and humanism? It seems that in order to win, we need people's power and the revival of a renewed pole of power in socialism.

[alexoff]

Hitler was never particularly interested in having a lot of personal money.

but that's not true. He had a pretty big secret account where he had money transferred to, he bought himself the flashiest Mercedes and posed next to it, being a real narcissist. And his buddies lived in luxury.

[Per se.]

Quote from alexoff

but that's not true. He had a pretty big secret account

Apparently, either Zbigniew Brzezinski was not aware of this secret account of the Fuhrer, or you are not aware of another secret account, where everything is known in comparison, who has a show-off with a "Messer", and who has real billions.

[BSD Fan]

to our strange military operation, 8 years late

How do you find it convenient to use Mir Bay? And to make transfers to friends and relatives?
Well, think about how late the operation is. If we had been imposed with such sanctions in 2014, we would have fallen into the Stone Age on the very first day. All payments, even within the country, went through foreign processing centers, Mir Day as an entity did not exist at all. So no matter how much they scolded Nasibulina, she prepared her area of ​​responsibility for the SVO better than anyone else.

[Per se.]

Quote from BSD-Fan

If we had been subjected to such sanctions in 2014, we would have fallen into the Stone Age on the very first day. All payments, even within the country, went through foreign processing centers,

On what grounds would they have imposed a tax if everything had been within the framework of international law? Was there an unconstitutional coup d'etat in Kyiv? Yes, and the legitimate president Yanukovych appealed to Russia for help, this appeal was also registered in the UN within the framework of international law. We could have not even sent troops, although this would have been legal both for a request for help and within the framework of membership in the CIS, but why was it necessary to recognize the farce with the elections from those who carried out the putsch? Poroshenko's recognition immediately made Yanukovych illegitimate, Crimea an annexation, and the SVO an aggression, in view of the automatic recognition and integrity of Ukraine.
Translations, you say... We have the lion's share of the dough being taken abroad, and the same Central Bank has squandered 300 billion dollars, this is how Elvira Sakhipzadovna brilliantly calculated everything. You also tell us about interest rates for your enterprises, how this henpecked IMF bank helps the Russian economy.
Why didn't you tell the Nazis in Kyiv right away, when Yanukovych was alive and legitimate, that we had you, that you are nobody and have no name, that you didn't support the "Russian Spring", that you didn't demand, quite legally, referendums throughout Ukraine? In the worst case, you could have sent in troops, the Banderites were then inferior to our group deployed at the border and were not ready for war, and at least the entire southeast of Ukraine was waiting for us.
"All payments even within the country went through foreign processing centers", is this not the colonial dependence of the country, incompetent preparation for current and predicted events... What can we talk about here, in front of bad boys, who for a "jar of jam" and "pack of cookies" in the coveted bourgeoisie, will sell not only Russia, but also their own mother. However, what is Russia to them, only a cash cow, from which assets are withdrawn in a convenient way.
How is the SVO conducted, with what self-restraints and simultaneous trade with enemies, so and so in frontal assaults, many of our men can be laid down for each village, and the war can continue for another hundred years. Maybe this is the "cunning plan"?

[WIS]

Quote: Per se.

The Central Bank squandered 300 billion dollars, this is how Elvira Sakhipzadovna brilliantly calculated everything.

even when considering this... not everything is so simple.
It's one thing to send, another to return INSTEAD.
It won't be possible to dot all the I's.

[WIS]

Quote: Per se.

How is the SVO conducted, with what self-restraints and simultaneous trade with enemies, so and so in frontal assaults, many of our men can be laid down for each village, and the war can continue for another hundred years. Maybe this is the "cunning plan"?

This idea has been voiced by many people not today.
In fact, it comes out and fits in with its composition into the background of some kind of its own plan.
Time will tell and judge.
ps: I feel sorry for the people

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

On what basis would they impose a tax if everything was within the framework of international law?

Based on a world based on rules. For which it is possible to recognize the independence of part of one country even without a referendum, but not to recognize the same independence for part of another country, even despite a referendum.
Do you remember the post-Crimean sanctions? There the EU sent package after package since March 17, 2014. In July 2014, for example, they hit the oil and gas industry:

EU:
On July 31, it imposed sanctions against Sberbank of Russia, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank, and Rosselkhozbank. It also imposed an embargo on the import and export of weapons to Russia; a ban on the export of dual-use goods and technologies for military use to Russia or to Russian military end users. It obliged exporters to obtain prior permission from the competent authorities of member states to export certain types of energy equipment and technologies to Russia, and also imposed a ban on the supply of high-tech equipment to Russia for oil production in the Arctic, on the deep-water shelf, and for shale oil.

Well, in an alternative 2014 it would have been even worse. The term "Anschluss" would have been the mildest. And under this information campaign the West would have quickly reached the 14th package.

Quote: Per se.

Translations, you say...

Transfers. Within the country. Which would simply not exist. Welcome to the world of teletypes and cash.

Quote: Per se.

In the worst case, they could have brought in troops; the Banderites were then inferior to our group deployed at the border and were not ready for war, and at least the entire southeast of Ukraine was waiting for us.

The only people who were really waiting for us were those who took up arms to defend themselves against Kyiv. The rest wanted the Russians to come and do good for them, without changing anything. But if the Kievites come, that would also be good, and they will live under them.

[Per se.]

Quote: Alexey RA

Based on a rules-based world.

A world with rules is the destiny of colonies. It wouldn't have worked with the Soviet Union. Do you want to say that everything is right, that's how it should be? Well, well, finding reasons and excuses is also something you need to be able to do. Why you're getting involved in this, obviously being an erudite and intelligent person, is your business.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

A world with rules is the destiny of colonies.

This is the basis of current world politics for all. And the tariff war between WTO member states is an example of this.

Quote: Per se.

Are you trying to say that everything is right, that it should be this way?

No. I just want to say that the SVO in 2014 would have ended faster for us, but alas not in our favor. And we would have returned to damn nineties.

[Per se.]

Quote: Alexey RA

No. I just want to say that the SVO in 2014 would have ended faster for us, but alas not in our favor.

Why "not in ours", if it was not even necessary to start this SVO, just keeping troops on the border, having a legitimate Yanukovych, and, the demand for an all-Ukrainian referendum? Well, after this, at least, it was quite legal to include Crimea and Donbass in the Russian Federation, and, maybe, a number of regions of the south-east of Ukraine. In any case, the recognition of those who were called putschists, the recognition of Poroshenko, is weakness, a mistake that only legitimized Banderaism in Ukraine and deprived the legitimacy of Yanukovych, who was with us. This automatically made Crimea an annexation, since with the recognition of the new government, the integrity of Ukraine was also recognized. Finally, why did they "prepare" for 8 years that they screwed up with the SVO, for which there were already a "million" sanctions, and the recognition of its aggression to the annexation of Crimea. It's all very "brilliant". As for "in the holy nineties", so what now, should we lick their asses for the banking system? We should have thought about how the Central Bank ended up under the IMF/Fed. This is the question and problem now.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

Why “not in ours”, if it was not even necessary to start this SVO, simply keeping troops on the border, having a legitimate Yanukovych, and the demand for an all-Ukrainian referendum?

Because Yanukovych signed the "Agreement on the settlement of the crisis in Ukraine" even before the armed coup. And from the West's point of view, he will be its violator - first of all, point 5.

5. The authorities will not introduce a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from using forceful measures.

And yes, this agreement is a typical example of a world based on rules. Because in reality, after the opposition itself violated point 5 by seizing government buildings by force, the guilty party was declared... that's right - Professor again.

It was Yanukovych who violated the terms of this agreement by leaving Kyiv and then Ukraine.

© US Permanent Representative to the UN Samantha Power

Quote: Per se.

Finally, why did they “prepare” for 8 years so much that they screwed up with the SVO, which already had “a million” sanctions, and recognition of its aggression towards the annexation of Crimea.

And just like that invincible and legendary the entire interbellum was preparing for the Great War. And then it got into trouble with Finland. According to the papers and reports reaching the top - everything is great, the army is ready to carry out the orders of the Party and the government. But in fact it turned out that the USSR does not have a modern army - which was personally admitted by the IVS at the famous Conference.
In general, years pass, the system changes - but nothing changes.

[Per se.]

Quote: Alexey RA

Because Yanukovych signed the "Agreement on the settlement of the crisis in Ukraine" even before the armed coup. And from the West's point of view, he will be its violator - first of all, point 5.

They themselves violated all the agreements, the lousy "guarantors". No need to sprinkle ashes on your head, justify yourself, in any case, the "government in exile" with Yanukovych and Azarov could and should have been created, especially since Yanukovych's request for help to Russia was registered in the UN. In addition, Ukraine was in the CIS, whatever kind of "shady deal" it was, but this would have been a plus for our diplomacy, justifying our position. Naturally, it is too late to "crow" now, but we have found reasons, not opportunities, that is not how victory is created.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

They themselves violated all the agreements, the lousy "guarantors".

Which is what I wrote. But the West blamed Yanukovych.
And in the case of the hypothetical SVO-2014, the same RF and Yanukovych will be appointed as the culprits. And then - sanctions against the RF and military aid to "those subjected to Russian aggression", everything as it is now.
This whole thing was not started in order to end the operation halfway.

Quote: Per se.

In addition, Ukraine was in the CIS

Nope. Ukraine was unique in this regard: being one of the founders of the CIS, it was not formally a member. Because the Rada ratified the Agreement on the creation of the CIS in its own, Ukrainian version, and Ukraine did not sign the CIS Charter at all.

On December 8, 1991, the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, according to which Ukraine became one of the founding states of the CIS. This Agreement was ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on December 10, 1991, with reservations. On December 20, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a statement "On the conclusion by Ukraine of the Treaty on the Commonwealth of Independent States". According to the last paragraph of this Statement, its provisions are the official interpretation of the above Agreement.

Ukraine has neither signed nor ratified the CIS Charter, therefore Ukraine has never been a member of the CIS, having only the status of a founding state of the CIS.

In general, another one Budapest memorandum.

[Sergej1972]

Are you absolutely sure that Brzezinski said this?

[Alexandra]

You quote the fierce enemy Brzezinski as the ultimate truth - he has brainwashed you. And then you sadly agitate for "people's power and socialism"?

Flesh of the people's flesh, Soviet and party leaders of the "country of people's democracy" of the former CMEA gave it to the West, and the USSR was destroyed in 1991 with a joyful anticipation of "peace, friendship, chewing gum" and "a hundred varieties of sausage". The West did not even have to fight for this. Your "people's power" lost everything, including Ukraine, in 1991.

In Russia, the people's government is the one that does NOT lose wars. And your government, when it was in power, lost even without a war.

And yes, Russia has NEVER stopped the aggression of the collective West by military means as successfully as in 2022-2025. Your government would never have decided on a preventive war. Your government has always "not given in to provocations", has always been afraid of the West.

[Per se.]

Quote: AlexanderA

In Russia, the people's government is the one that does NOT lose wars. And your government, when it was in power, lost even without a war.

Are you talking about the victory over Hitler? Even the Finnish War, which was considered unsuccessful, ended in victory in a few months, and, one must assume, with fewer losses than in the current SVO, which is already in its fourth year, it may soon, in terms of time, overtake the Great Patriotic War.

Quote: AlexanderA

Your "people's power" lost everything, including Ukraine, in 1991.

It is your government that has lost everything, surrendered, former members of the CPSU, current traitors-renegades, who have changed their shoes and are back in power. I wonder how old you are, where such blissful slogans in understanding events come from... All the best.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Per se.

It is your government that has lost everything.

You have some kind of memory aberration. When your government, your "people's" Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, collectively surrendered everything to the West without a fight, the current President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, was only a KGB lieutenant colonel and did not surrender anything to the West.

The people do not like losers. The people do not like the loser Nicholas II, nicknamed "Bloody" (the priests love him, they even canonized him as a saint). The people do not like the possibly good (I am not in the know here), flesh of the people's flesh, the Stavropol combine operator Gorbachev, who, when he was General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, surrendered everything to the West without a fight. The people do not like Yeltsin, who continued to surrender not the USSR, but Russia, to the West, who lost the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya.

People love winners.

And you, quoting Brzezinski and whining about the prospects (“It’s not so much this that’s depressing; now we need to evaluate other prospects” (C)) are a representative of the camp of the defeated, who wants these same defeated to return to power.

Are you an intellectual or something? As is well known, the domestic intelligentsia has not been satisfied with any current government. Such is the nature of the domestic intelligentsia - to always speak out against the current government and to think that if they had come to power, they would have shown what is right.

But when intellectuals got into power, they always succeeded only in destroying, and never in building. From Alexander Kerensky to Gavriil Popov.

"The intelligentsia is born to be unhappy" Arnold Joseph Toynbee

Keep whining, comrade intellectual.

[Per se.]

Quote: AlexanderA

Keep whining, comrade intellectual.

You are probably a retiree, with a good pension, a foreign car, sausage and beer? And a former member of the CPSU... It's funny if that's the case. To each his own, there's no point in arguing, and it's not for us to decide what will happen in reality.

[Alexandra]

Almost nothing was guessed. The sausage is in the refrigerator. I am not retired, my car is of foreign design, but domestic production, I do not like beer. At one time I only managed to become a former Komsomol member. I observed how the USSR was being destroyed from above by major party and Soviet functionaries fighting for power, while the majority of the population, who had completely lost faith in communist ideals and were finally expecting "a hundred varieties of sausage", did not resist when I was quite conscious.

I repeat, your "people's power" turned out to be anything but people's. "The nomenklatura has become a quasi-class," some experts claim today.



So, your "people's power" surrendered everything to the West without a fight. The people do not need such "people's power".

You think you are a bright representative of the people? In fact, you are a marginal, apparently a "gastro-unsatisfied" loser, since the "down-to-earth" questions of "foreign cars", "good pensions", "beer" and "sausages" have surfaced. A marginal and loser dreaming of the arrival of some "own" government with a Soviet entourage.

"Whoever does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart. And whoever wants to restore it to its former form has no head." V.V. Putin

[Per se.]

Quote: AlexanderA

Almost nothing was guessed correctly.

Likewise, everything is also off base. I can only say that I swore allegiance to the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, and did not change my moral principles, in which the stomach is clearly not in the first place in importance. You quoted the former gentleman at the end, and he talked about galoshes and about a dangerous and harmful fairy tale. Now, you must understand, you are happy with everything. I would not be surprised if this is your job, to justify renegades and oligarchs, scolding what you did not live to see, but on the margin of safety from which the bourgeois power is still going.

[Alexandra]

The type of "one who swore allegiance to the USSR" but did NOT come out in defense of the USSR in 1991, and even today: "I will not go to war for modern Russia, it is NOT my socialist Motherland, to which I swore allegiance" - is quite widespread. Behind all this self-justifying "political philosophy" hides the most vulgar philistine.

I quoted the current Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the current President of the Russian Federation. These words were spoken by him long ago, but they cannot become outdated. Only a brainless philistine can really want to restore the state to its previous form, whose decomposed ruling elite surrendered everything to the West without resistance, and then tore the state itself apart because of the selfish need to "be first in the provinces, and not second in Rome".

Farewell, verbal "fighter against bourgeois power". We really have nothing to argue about.

[silverwolf88]

Are you aware of the number of significant targets according to the plans for using Sphere and Barrier?!
Well, please announce to begin with how many significant goals there are, for example, in France or, for example, in Japan.

[BAI]

1. Well, this is a fucking long article.
2.

The UK Ministry of Defence has published several intelligence reports indicating that Russia has used non-nuclear Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) cruise missiles in Ukraine (UK Ministry of Defence, 2022, 2023).

And why intelligence? No one hid this.
3. Cedar, Hazel, Aspen - a good forest is in the making

[Idle_piston]

I don't understand how you can evaluate the quality of a weapon and its potential if you don't "shoot" it for 40 years for training and testing purposes. And who will guarantee that when it is needed (God forbid) it will "shoot".

[Monster_Fat]

Hmm, the readiness of the arsenal is a real "black cat". Here, at one time, a photo of a funnel was circulating on the Internet, instead of some mine - Photoshop, probably...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Idle_piston

I don’t understand how you can evaluate the quality of a weapon and its potential if you haven’t “shot” it for 40 years for training and testing purposes.

If my memory serves me right, every year there are launches with the following wording:

This launch was carried out as part of state tests of advanced missile systems, as well as confirmation of the stability of the missiles in service

[Idle_piston]

I'm not talking about carriers, I'm talking about warheads.

[Zenn]

the Kremlin's desire to maintain overall parity with the United States

Sounds very true, considering that the American Minuteman has been in service for over 50 years and has not yet been replaced by a newer ICBM. The big question is, in a mass launch, how many Minuteman will simply exit the silos, and how many will simply fail during the flight?

[Vadim S]

It seems to me that it is not only a matter of quantity, we are doing well with that! How about using it? Nothing lasts forever, fortunately, and the government will change one day and then maybe the new one will be ready to use it, I really hope so. But for now, I am almost sure that no one will use anything and does not even plan to in reality. Everyone is afraid of Kim, because he can really do it, give him a reason. And some Euro-dogs are almost laughing at us, saying that no one is afraid of us anymore and we will not use anything.

[staer-62]

Agree.........................

[Alexandra]

Quote: Vadim S

I think it's not just about quantity, we're doing fine with that! How about applying it?

And what is your purpose in asking? Are you in a great hurry to get to heaven? Most of those present would prefer to suffer a little longer in this world.

Nothing lasts forever, fortunately, and the government will change one day and then maybe the new one will be ready to apply it, I really hope.

"To the solar world, no, no, no. To the nuclear explosion, yes, yes, yes!" - is that it?

And some Euro-dogs are almost laughing at us, saying that no one is afraid of us anymore and we won’t use anything.

I don't know which European animals almost laugh at you, but he who laughs last laughs best:

[rocket757]

Nuclear weapons are unnerving to everyone who understands that it's not just a big bang, there are also more than a few other consequences when they are used... and catastrophic consequences at that!

[Cartographer]

At least two points of the doctrine were touched upon during the conflict: aggression and threat to sovereignty as a result of the seizure of the Kursk region and the potential threat of seizure or destruction of the Kursk nuclear power plant and an attack on the base of strategic bombers and early warning radars.
No reaction is observed.

[agond]

I would like to ask the author a question: why are you using a foreign English-language classification for our weapons?
Who are you writing for here - "Tu-22 M3 (Backfire)"?
What country are you a citizen of?

[dragon772]

By the time you finish reading...you'll fall asleep.
If the nuclear warheads were removed, the launch vehicles remained.
Yes, it is outdated, but if a warhead with a high-explosive warhead is installed, what prevents it from being “disposed of” towards Kyiv?

[Bongo]

There are a number of inaccuracies and questionable points in the publication, but overall the work deserves a positive assessment! Well-deserved "+".

[Ana]

As far as I understand, the essence of foreign assessments of domestic nuclear weapons carriers and warheads comes down to the following paradigm: In the face of unprecedented dangers for the Russian Federation, it creates a situation of suspension and uncertainty for the States and other "assessors", this is like the uncertainty of the location of elementary particles forming "clouds" - dear readers - these are fragments of a mirror in the bushes - an anti-sniper, whether there is too much or too little, it is already too late. Doomed to fortune-telling.

[Ana]

Oh, and here I also remembered "Nut" - such a digression into the realm of philological research. Hazel - hazel. It is also a rod. Does it seem to me that we have jokers in the General Staff or the Design Bureau?
With respect!

[Doctor]

Good review. Last year's from the same author for those interested in dynamics.

https://topwar.ru/244120-rossiyskiy-yadernyy-arsenal-v-2024-godu.html

[the same doctor]

Three questions.
Why do we still adhere to the OSV restrictions?
Why are we retiring old missiles instead of extending their service life?
Why aren't decommissioned rockets used to launch satellites into orbit?

[staer-62]

Agree..............

[koramax81]

An interesting article, but the gentlemen did not specify: what is going on with the American nuclear forces? When were the last missiles developed? It would be very interesting to hear, especially about their latest launches? It is even more interesting there...

[guga]

[/quote]And what about American nuclear forces?[quote]

There is an author Sergey Linnik on VO, you probably missed his latest articles on this topic.

https://topwar.ru/261893-jadernye-sily-vvs-ssha-na-sputnikovyh-snimkah-ballisticheskie-rakety-shahtnogo-bazirovanija.html

https://topwar.ru/262208-jadernye-sily-vvs-ssha-na-sputnikovyh-snimkah-dalnjaja-bombardirovochnaja-aviacija.html

[koramax81]

Thank you, I will definitely read it

[koramax81]

I read it, but you didn't understand me. It would be interesting to hear about the state of the missiles, not where the bases are.

[staer-62]

We have very few nuclear weapons and many enemies who want to destroy us. Against us stands a wall of enemies based on racial hatred of the Russian nation with the OST-2 plan of countries bordering us and a flight time of 5 minutes. There are numerous Hitlers, Antonescu and other Nazi clones. And what do we have? 2300 warheads. Look, using London as an example. The area of ​​the city is 1600 km. Destruction of buildings by a warhead with a capacity of 500 kt is 16 sq km. How much is needed to destroy a city? Taking into account that the myths about a nuclear winter are a lie, about thousand-year radiation are a lie. These myths are created in order to convince people and first of all the leaders of our country about a nuclear apocalypse for the planet and to incline them to reduce nuclear weapons. It is like Putin was constantly brainwashed about chemical weapons and he destroyed them, but the enemies did not, they deceived him. Everyone recognized NATO's war against Russia, but they do not take measures to increase truly powerful weapons. Putin has repeatedly made mistakes in strategic issues and now I disagree with him on the non-use of nuclear weapons. We, the people of Russia, are not immortal and Russia can be destroyed without the use of nuclear weapons against us, we will simply put all of us who can fight in the trenches and that's it. This must be understood.

[Colonel]

A fair amount of work. Thanks to the author.

[Kostadinov]

Quote: AlexanderA

"Whoever does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart. And whoever wants to restore it to its former form has no head." V.V. Putin

More precisely, "Whoever does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no head. And whoever does not want it restored to its previous form has neither head nor heart."