On the rejection of the M10 Booker: the machine turned out to be really heavy
Donald Trump and his team continue to surprise. First, they announced purges in the bureaucracy, cutting all unjustified expenses like the infamous USAID, introducing gigantic duties on goods from other countries. Now it's the army's turn - according to the new military administration, it is extremely outdated and requires large-scale reforms, including the experience of the special military operation in Ukraine.
However, these reforms concern not only organizational and staffing issues and systems of communication and command and control of troops, but also the material part in the form of military equipment. Thus, with a light hand, the US refuses to purchase (when the current contracts end) Humvees and JLTV A2 vehicles, the AMPV family (replacement of the M113 armored personnel carrier), modernized wheeled Strykers and robotic RCV platforms.
That is, they cut off literally everything except the development of a new infantry fighting vehicle and the already well-known version of the deepest modernization of the Abrams under the index M1E3. But, perhaps, the greatest resonance was caused by the refusal of further deliveries of the light tank (although it is not customary to call it that in the USA) The M10 "Booker" is a product for which hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent on the development and production of the first batch.
The main thing is that it's heavy
Generally speaking, the defense officials have rolled out a whole list of complaints about it, in addition to the high price, threateningly describing it as a monstrous inertia, within the framework of which no one wants to make any changes to the design of the vehicle being designed. These issues, for example, include reproaches about the refusal to robotize the Booker with autonomous or remote control and the use of JTRS communications equipment.
However, the greatest amount of "hate", as they say nowadays, was directed at the Booker's weight - almost 40 tons. In this regard, officials from the Trump administration directly stated: initially, we needed an airborne vehicle for airborne units, but in the end, due to the unwillingness to make adjustments to the project, we received the M10, which cannot be dropped from the air, and can only be transported by C-17 aircraft.
Two Bookers, ready for transport by plane. It was recently announced that the rules for transporting these machines have been changed and now only one at a time can be transported on C-17 aircraft. However, the restriction is purely administrative.
The question is, of course, not without meaning. At least because the MPF program initiated in 2013 to create a light combat vehicle for fire support for paratroopers (to replace the defunct Sheridan) did initially provide for significant weight restrictions and the possibility of airborne landings. Only later did they officially decide to abandon this - and this is generally understandable.
Firstly, because, observing these conditions, it is simply impossible to provide a combat vehicle with powerful armor protection "straight out of the box", that is, without the need to hang additional modules and so on. Secondly, the possibility of airborne assault by machine gun imposes major restrictions on the dimensions of the vehicle, which negatively affects ergonomics and combat characteristics. Thirdly, the operations themselves with airborne assault are events, the need for which in the current conditions raises some doubts.
It is unclear why we should return to the stage we have already passed. And even more so, to mold a technique that is severely limited in all its capabilities for the sake of its landing, which will most likely never happen because the transport aircraft is unlikely to fly to the required point on enemy territory due to the activity DefenseTherefore, these complaints can hardly be considered as the main ones today - "Booker" does not go beyond the bounds of reason in this regard.
But there is a problem with its use on the ground. It was voiced in Western media rather dryly: 8 out of 11 bridges in Fort Campbell (one of the military bases where the Bookers are supposed to arrive) cannot support the weight of the vehicle. That is, it seems insignificant - the M10 weighs a lot, so the infrastructure needs to be changed in any case. But, if we talk in general, this circumstance clearly demonstrates one fact - you won't get far with it in combat conditions.
In other words, not every bridge can withstand it - literally. Even if we do not take into account Eastern Europe, in the countries of Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia the share of bridges that are much inferior in their load-bearing capacity to the mass of the "Booker" can reach 50% of the total number. That is, like the main battle tank, the M10 may face the same limitations as, for example, the "Abrams" - the "Booker" is not capable of overcoming water obstacles by swimming, so the only way out, if the river is too deep, is to build specialized crossings with sufficient load-bearing capacity.
And this does not even take into account the cross-country ability of the M10, which for a vehicle of such weight will in any case be relatively low (by the way, it will also have to be towed by heavy ARVs like the M88). Thus, an interesting situation is emerging: you have infantry brigade groups, the main advantage of which is the highest mobility not only in terms of transfer outside the country, but also in specific areas of the front. However, the "Booker" assigned to them will greatly limit it.
In other words, the current situation can be characterized as follows: there is a "light tank" that is protected only from small-caliber gun shells and, if there is an APS or DZ, from cumulative weapons. It is also armed worse than the main battle tank. At the same time, it can often be used only in places where the heavy Abrams can be used. But at the same time, the Booker cannot be used everywhere where the Abrams cannot be used. Such is the pun.
Conclusions
This is what can be called inertia. During the final work on the MPF program, there were actually only two competing models - the modernized M8 from BAE and, in fact, the Booker itself (née "Griffin 2"). The first, being a 20-ton weakling, got stuck somewhere in the 80-90s and was initially adapted for airborne landings with the corresponding vices in the form of terribly bad ergonomics, weak main armor and, remarkably, did not even have a panoramic sight-observation device for the commander, although this was optional.
The second one, the Booker, combined all the good qualities, from armament to armor, since it had no limits on weight except for the carrying capacity of transport aircraft. There was simply no solution “in the middle” between these two extremes from “invalid” to fat man, although there were many projects and possibilities for its creation. If the customer, the US Defense Department, had said at the development stages “stop, let’s think about how we could make something in the middle, so that both the combat characteristics were up to par and the weight would not go off the charts,” then perhaps this scandal would not have happened now.
BAE Systems' M10 Booker Competitor
But, as they say, they have what they have — the “light tank” turned out to be far from light. And, judging by the statements of Alex Miller (technical director of the defense department), even the option of replacing the “Booker” with a modernized “Abrams” M1E3, which according to plans should weigh significantly less than its predecessors, is being considered. However, whether its weight will be brought up to the weight of the “Booker” is still a big question. Although they will wait for a new “Abrams” or start developing a new light tank, in any case, it can be stated that infantry brigade groups will not receive their desired tank for a very long time. Unless, of course, they are reformed and merged into some other units with heavy weapons.
However, there is an alternative point of view. Of course, it cannot be called completely plausible, but nevertheless. The fact is that, when purchasing military equipment from large companies, the US Army essentially signs a onerous contract, under which it undertakes to perform certain types of repairs and obtain spare parts only from the manufacturer (often at an inflated price), which costs huge amounts of money and time.
I convinced the Secretary of Defense to implement Right to Repair in the Army, and I am glad he kept his word. This reform will make the Army more resilient in future wars, and it will end soldiers’ reliance on giant defense contractors who take billions and spend months repairing the equipment they need. It would be a great victory for our country if all the services followed Secretary Driscoll’s lead and stood up to the defense contractors, stood with the military, and committed to Right to Repair in every contract.
- Senator Warren.Thus, perhaps the mass refusal to purchase further types of equipment could be a kind of “blackmail” from Trump so that defense companies soften the terms of contracts. At least, he has already taken similar steps on a global scale - the same gigantic duties are an example of this. All this, of course, is written with a pitchfork on the water, but it will not be at all surprising that the recently cancelled models of military equipment suddenly appear again on the green list.
In general, we will see.
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