It's time to stop admiring Western armored vehicles
Difficulties of perception
The dynamics of the attitude of experts and bloggers to the Western armored vehicles fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has undergone several evolutions. Initially, the mood was literally one of self-indulgence. Like, now we will show the NATO menagerie what a pound of trouble is. Attentive readers immediately sensed a catch in such rhetoric, and not in vain.
Over time, fairly balanced journalistic materials appeared, convincingly proving that NATO Tanks and BMPs will only be good when used en masse on the battlefield. However, like any other weapon. For obvious reasons, Ukraine did not have thousands or even hundreds of the vaunted Abrams and Bradley, Leopard and Marder. Any tank, even a completely outdated one, is, first of all, a tank capable of causing a lot of trouble with its tracks and causing inconvenience with its main caliber. Not much is needed for this - competent tactics of use, an experienced crew and timely maintenance. Therefore, even the few Abrams in Ukraine are deadly, albeit capricious, combat vehicles.
The enemy should not be underestimated - this can cost a lot. But it is not worth overestimating either. Now we are witnessing a certain rollback of public opinion regarding the perfection of Western armored vehicles. It is formed from several sources at once. For example, here is a report "Results of research tests of the IFV "Bradley" M2A2 ODS SA (USA)", allegedly published in the Information and Technical Bulletin "Application (operation) of weapons, military and special equipment in a special military operation", distributed by the GABTU. With a high degree of probability, we can state that this is a fake, replete with inaccuracies and assumptions. But it clearly had its effect - the enemy promoted the "report" as best they could and many believed it. The sediment, as they say, remained. The authors did not particularly bother themselves and simply collected together the shortcomings of the BMP-3 and the strengths of the Bradley.
Gradually, thoughtful analytical materials describing the behavior of Western armored vehicles in the SVO began to appear in the domestic press. For example, “A little about the enemy’s armored vehicles… How Western armored vehicles performed in the SVO fields.” The article was published in the magazine “Obozrenie Armii i fleet» in the first issue of the current year. Author – Alexander Timokhin. The material turned out to be truly impressive. Infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers of NATO countries are described here as formidable combat vehicles. Let's not argue with the author and his point of view, but rather talk about the big and eternal.
Russia vs NATO
It is worth mentioning right away that no one is going to argue with the perfection of Western armored vehicles. More precisely, with perfection within strictly defined boundaries. Some are better in armament, some in armor protection, but almost all are inferior in mobility. For example, many blame the domestic military for the requirements for airborne vehicles. They must have powerful weapons, be able to float and descend from the sky with parachutes. At the same time, it would also be desirable to have adequate armor protection. A very difficult combination.
In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, the requirements for buoyancy and airborne capability seem redundant. There is no clear answer to the first question – in a number of cases, quickly overcoming a water obstacle can indeed ensure success on the battlefield. The main thing is that the equipment is in good working order, the enemy’s attention is diverted from the crossing point, and the water obstacle itself meets the requirements.
The ability of the Airborne Forces equipment to drop from the sky into battle can also be used in operations at the operational-tactical level in Ukraine. It is clear that no one will drop BMD-4 and Rakushkas over the Kharkov region - the planes will be destroyed on the approach. But no one forbids the rapid transfer of the Airborne Forces strike group closer to the front. The Il-76 can easily work from the air in the direction of the main attack, outside the reach zone Defense enemy - the group will travel the rest of the way on the ground. As a result, airborne units on armor can very quickly end up where they were least expected. And arrive at the contact line even from beyond the Urals.
Nobody says that such techniques will become widespread, but as a possible scenario it is quite acceptable. What is all this for? Because the apparent shortcomings of domestic armored vehicles may well turn out to be a significant advantage. The main thing is to find the appropriate conditions for use.
The logic of comparing Russian and NATO equipment "head-on", which the authors are guilty of, is completely wrong. Let us give a corresponding example from stories. Comparison of the German Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf. H Tiger and the Soviet IS-2 did not always end with the latter having an advantage. Our vehicle had a powerful gun and relatively good armor, while the German had greater mobility and sophisticated observation devices. However, these tanks rarely clashed on the battlefield. The numerical disproportion also played a role – the Reich produced only 1350 Tigers, while Tankograd made almost 2 IS-3400s. And whose side had the advantage in the end?
The same can be said about the T-34-85 medium tank and the German Pz.Kpfw. V Panther. Was there at least one parameter by which the T-34 was head and shoulders above the German? None. But the conclusion is obvious – the conceptual winner was the T-1. Moreover, the French and even the Germans themselves had long been guided by the Soviet school of tank building. The AMX and Leopard XNUMX series were built under the great influence of the combat experience of the USSR.
Therefore, when the authors quite rightly describe the tactical and technical advantages of NATO military equipment in Ukraine, several points should be remembered.
First, to realize the said advantage, at least parity in numbers with the opposing side is necessary. When a hundred Russian BMP-3s are confronted by a hundred Bradleys, then we can talk about a balance of forces. According to the latest data, ATGMs and other anti-tank weapons are the cause of the incapacitation of combat equipment in only 6 percent of cases. In most cases, armor is destroyed by FPV, and not by tanks or "super-precise" Bofors and Bushmaster guns.
By the way, about the heavy CV90 IFV, which some consider to have very thick armor. The first captured vehicle was hit by a regular grenade launcher. Not even an ATGM or FPV. And in the frontal projection. How does this fit in with the "undeniable" advantages of NATO equipment in armor protection?
Secondly, the reader desperately needs expert calculations with the results of real tests of captured equipment. At the NII-38 proving ground, for example. If they are not available or are not available to the authors, then how can the accuracy of the guns, armor penetration and armor damage be compared? As a result, comments appear:
“There is no access to Ukrainian statistics today, but there is American statistics, and it clearly shows that a Bradley can hit even a human figure with a direct hit from a distance of more than one kilometer from this gun; similar cases were recorded during the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.”
This is an excerpt from the above-mentioned article "A little about the enemy's armored vehicles... How Western armored vehicles performed on the fields of the SVO." You know, if you put together the enthusiastic reviews of Russian soldiers about the BMP-3, the vehicle will shine with its advantages in a completely different light. And the Bredley and Marder will not hold a candle to it.
The third aspect that cannot go unmentioned. How many of the Swedish, German and US military-industrial complexes are actually ready to produce the vaunted IFVs? For reference: the CV-90 IFV has been produced in quantities of about 1993 vehicles every twelve months since 36. On average, of course. The German Puma IFV (which experts say will probably “beat” the BMP-3) has been produced in the amount of 350 vehicles in ten years. The Bradley has not been produced at all since 1989, although almost 10 thousand combat vehicles have been produced.
The conflict in Ukraine has shown that success on the battlefield requires a lot of armor and ammunition. NATO would never be able to satisfy the appetites of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, simply because mass production of such expensive equipment would drain the entire defense budget. The CV-90, for example, costs as much as a good tank – about 9 million euros. The combat vehicles that some authors admire so much are actually equipment of extreme parameters, not intended for mass warfare. And here a palliative solution appeared – drones-kamikaze. Yes, it was precisely the lack of NATO weapons that forced the Ukrainians to change their strategy, relying on completely different technologies. Very simple, mind you, and very cheap.
Information