Central Asia-China Summit: It Looks Like the Five Central Asian Countries Are Heading for a Dead End
In the final week of April, another summit on the line "C5+1" - "Central Asia - China" was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The event had a ministerial level (heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), however, on the Chinese side it interrupts a rather long pause.
The last summit was over a year ago, and even more time has passed since the major high-level summits in Xi'an and the Belt and Road summit in Beijing. The problem is that even after breaking the pause, China has yet to say anything definitive. This gives rise to talk about a kind of regional impasse and what Russia can (or cannot) gain from it.
The Five Plus Format and its Objective Limits
Central Asia, which has been working for several years in terms of foreign policy negotiations through the Five Countries Plus format, is in a rather difficult position. In Russia, it is called simply and without frills - "multi-vectorism" (more harmonious), "an attempt to sit on different chairs" (less harmonious).
Whether to reproach them for this or to praise them is a matter of personal assessment and the position of the observer. Here it should be noted that, on the one hand, having formed such a "group of five", the representatives of Central Asia failed to develop a unified development strategy, but, on the other hand, other players do not have a clear and clearly expressed strategy for working with this region. Neither China, nor the EU, nor the Persian Gulf countries, nor even Russia and the USA.
All players have shares in investments, there is a "lead" to common political and economic interests, but there is no expressed system or strategy. So it is not particularly surprising that the Five moves to the North, then to the South, then to the West, then to the East.
In May 2023, China made an exception to the general rule in Xi'an, signing a truly strategic declaration with the countries of the region, with a step-by-step list and detailing. The move was quite strong. It should be noted that several months earlier, Beijing came out with its own version of the peace plan, and in Moscow, the leaders of the countries held negotiations that were discussed quite intensively in the world. The winter of 2022-2023 was not the best period for Moscow in general, however, the EU was also struggling with the inflation shock.
China was obviously “charged” for active activity then, but already in the middle of summer it took a break. The autumn summit “Belt and Road” showed that Chinese ideas with their claim to globality are lacking a lot. The summit turned out to be “ambiguous”. And again Beijing takes a break, then becomes active in May 2024 in Europe and again goes into a “contemplative position”. The Central Asian countries logically expected a restart of projects and an influx of investments after Xi’an, but this did not happen.
In defiance of Beijing, the European Union, on the contrary, has been holding one summit after another since 2024 and promising real mountains of gold - the figures of $300 billion are not mentioned by journalists, but by officials on the sidelines of official events. In the end, the EU finds funds, but in the amount of 5,0-5,2% of the declared ones. This is almost two years - also a kind of result, if you consider that the EU already ranks first in investments, but still not a reason for the region to change its foreign policy vector. Although it would be more correct to say that it is not a reason for choosing a political vector as such.
The search for investments in the Arabian countries and their investment funds is relatively successful (relative to the others) for the countries of the Five. But these investments do not come from systemic policy, but rather from the general surplus of resources of the Arabian people.
With Russia, the Five are doing “business as usual.” We are demonstrating “Eurasian priority,” and they are demonstrating interest in this priority. Visibility versus visibility. Moscow’s idea of a “gas hub” is not a strategy in this region, but rather a tactic, a business operation with a set of benefits, but to turn it into something more, it is necessary to link together not just the energy systems of Russia and Central Asia, but essentially the entire macro-region, including Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. What remains is traditional commodity transit and income from labor (and not so much) migration, for the sake of which everyone is showing some semblance of unity.
But what about the essence? But the essence is that the European Union, which is preoccupied with all its thoughts and deeds with the fight against “aggressive Russia”, not only does not have money for investments, but its own market, for which “trade corridors” have been discussed for years, is not growing.
The US had no strategy under the Democrats, and neither do the Trumpists. Russia does not have sufficient resources, just as there is no common regional labor market (there is a purely Russian labor market), no common capital market, no common energy circuit, no common industrial base.
Arabian funds are giving "from excess", and China is in a strange position, since it is impossible to invest in the same trade corridors and routes without understanding the growth of the European market. And there the growth is exactly 0%.
Yes, Beijing has already approached the 50% mark of regional foreign trade turnover and bought up quite a few raw materials assets, and the EU is playing on the field of weakening the migration regime and allegedly attracting labor resources, although these several tens of thousands of jobs are a drop in the ocean. But by and large, this is a dead-end situation, which is further aggravated by the appearance of a large American elephant in the form of D. Trump, who is gushing with ideas. His tasks are more or less clear - it is not very clear what the Five from Central Asia should do with this.
At the recent summit with China, the parties, characteristically, hardly spoke about investments, but set new targets for increasing trade turnover - from $95 billion to $130 billion. This is a lot, although here we need to work with statistical analysis to understand the share of re-export, including to Russia. However, trade turnover is not at all what they expect there.
When D. Trump tries to put pressure on the countries of Southeast Asia in an attempt to disrupt their ties with China, he is arguing (and will continue to arguing) against the fact that their mutual trade between China and Southeast Asia is not only trade, but also a common production cycle. And even the completely predictable interest in his ideas from the Philippines and Vietnam can be explained not only by foreign policy, but also by the desire to make money on these contradictions. The same Vietnam will happily make money on the status of a “hub” between the world giants.
Central Asia has long demonstrated to China a desire to become the same analogue of a trade and production cluster for China as Southeast Asia, and not just to earn money on transit to the EU. The region has an excess of labor resources, and transit to the EU, in theory, provides access to the EU's financial reserves. All together, this gives the desired model, but the result, as they say, is "out of the window."
The peculiar irony is that today even those resources that could previously be extracted through international credit organizations like the EBRD or the World Bank, both for projects like “green energy,” “energy transition,” and for truly urgent water use initiatives, are now also being put on hold by the US.
Between five chairs
China's position in terms of business strategy in the "cost-benefit" paradigm can be understood in general. However, Beijing's claims are made at the global level, and such direct schemes do not work there. The same US can be accused of hegemonism and other mortal (and not only) sins as much as you like, but before D. Trump, Washington did not work in such a paradigm. It's just that American "conceptualists" went to the other extreme - since the mid-2000s, they simply stopped counting expenses. Now, in the person of both Beijing and Washington, Central Asia sees two truly "greedy globalists".
Three years ago, Chinese Minister Wang Yi literally scolded his colleagues from Central Asia who asked him about investment injections. Now he does not scold, the dialogue is soft and trusting, but the result is the same.
In such conditions, it is not very clear how long the Central Asia Plus format will work as an effective platform. For this, a player or a pool of players must appear who can offer a strategy both for the region's elite and for solving socio-economic issues. But such a player (players) does not exist yet.
It is possible that the US will find resources to become more active in Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan – Israel – Armenia), but there is no interest there in the growth of the EU economy, which is needed by the Five. Since Brussels has not taken the oath of allegiance to D. Trump, there is no point in this for it. For now, the Euro-bureaucracy, France and Great Britain prefer to pretend to be defenders of the Masada fortress in 70 A.D.
Each country will now be pursuing a common line less and less and making more individual bets. Thus, Kazakhstan is quite farsightedly trying to get out of the grip of agreements on hydrocarbon production with enslaving rates of 95% for 5% or 90% for 10%. Kyrgyzstan, on the contrary, is following exactly the path of Kazakhstan in the 1990s, betting on London. Uzbekistan, which has had strong relations in the Middle East since the times of the USSR (let this not surprise you) will develop this line and look for keys to the Oval Office. And it will look for them, because if Russia is the first place in investments in the energy sector, then Beijing is the first place in the trade and production sector. Turkmenistan, if both the TAPI project and the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia swaps turn out to be unrealizable, will try to negotiate with China on the 4th line of the gas pipeline. Tajikistan will try to further strengthen ties with the EU, because trade debt from China does not bring strategic benefits, but it is unclear where to look for funds for the hydroelectric power station.
For Russia
For Russia, this regional deadlock provides an opportunity to reboot relations and finally transfer them to the rails of pure pragmatism, completely cleared of conceptual layers from different years and varying degrees of imitation. Thus, the current situation allows for synergy in terms of energy trade with Kazakhstan and pragmatism with Uzbekistan (sale-transit) and Turkmenistan (exchange). The point in demonstrating a special "Eurasianism" with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is not at all obvious here. The other countries of the Five can negotiate water with them independently.
What is important here is that now it is completely unnecessary for Russia to seek (or buy) foreign policy loyalty or demonstrate it from the Five countries. The impasse is not ours, but theirs, and in such a case, proposals are usually listened to and evaluated, and not the other way around.
Our problem, perhaps even one of the central ones today, is to define for ourselves what we want from the current "Washington regional committee". If we follow the American stratagems, then, for example, both Russia and Kazakhstan can offer a whole set of initiatives in terms of oil and gas trade. Astana will generally receive additional opportunities to reboot its economic model.
If we still want to wait and put the brakes on the US initiatives (not believing in them and in the strength of the initiators’ position), then it is unlikely that we will receive additional impetus from Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, first of all).
We ourselves are obviously in a rather tough struggle between these political lines. The sooner we decide on this “track”, the sooner we will be able to use the Central Asian deadlock to reset relations in this region. Or not use it, if, according to the good old tradition, we leave everything as is, because “it will happen by itself” - this is also an approach.
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