The Taliban – the future of Afghanistan or caliphs for an hour?
Are the Taliban in Afghanistan for Real and For the Long Haul?
On the ruins of the DRA
In a recent article, "Iran Between War and Peace, or What Trump Counts on? " I spoke about the lack of plans to return to the topic related to the Islamic Republic, but the US threats against it forced me to return to the confrontation between the two countries. The same applies to the cycle devoted to Afghanistan, which ended with the article "The Overthrow of Mohammed Daoud, or a Step into the Abyss."
However, the suspension by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of the ban on the activities of the Taliban in our country prompted me to return to the conversation about Afghanistan.
Today it is a country with a significant part of the urban population brought up in a secular culture, forced to live according to the norms not so much of Islam as the Taliban's medieval ideas about it.
Side note: I love the Middle Ages, its culture, and I will note that this era, largely thanks to the Persians, became the golden age of Islam - the library of Baghdad contained more books than all of Europe. This was the case until the capture of the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate by the Mongols in 1258 and the destruction of the Muslim cultural heritage - the conquerors threw the books into the Tigris.
The Taliban also dealt with cultural monuments that they did not create. Accordingly, in regard to their domestic policy, especially regarding women, it is appropriate to talk about the dark underside of the Middle Ages, about the triumph of the village over the city, the madrassa over the school and university.
Until relatively recently, historical By any measure, women played a significant role in the socio-economic life of Afghanistan, and turning them, like serfs in the Russian Empire, into a silent majority would hardly benefit the country.
And yet, a subjective assessment of the Taliban's activities is one thing, and a decision by the highest judicial authority is quite another. Thus, within the framework of the current status of the movement and in the context of the stated topic, we will consider a number of issues.
What is the degree of unity of the Taliban? Is there any real resistance to it, and what are the interests of other players in Afghanistan? Let's talk.
In the material "On the Threshold of Afghanistan, or Prelude to the Mission of Lieutenant General N.G. Stoletov"The discussion was about the problem faced by the central government in a mountainous country where elites often have a separatist mentality due to weak interregional ties.
Hence the centuries-long permanent struggle in Afghanistan between two tribal associations: the Durrani, from which the royal dynasty came, including the last king Zahir Shah and his relative, the aforementioned Daud, and the influential Ghilzai association. M. Najibullah, G. Hekmatyar, M. Omar, A. Ghani came from their ranks.
The conflict is aggravated by the lack of internal unity among the ethnic groups living in Afghanistan, some of whom are in neighboring states. The problem is most acute with the Pashtuns, which, due to the Durand Line not being recognized by all ruling Afghan regimes of the second half of the last century, serves as an obstacle to stabilizing relations with Pakistan, which we also discussed, see: "The Durand Line: Kabul and Islamabad on the Path to a Solution or a New Exacerbation."
The country is not united in religious terms either:
The mountain Tajiks of Badakhshan and Parvan, writes orientalist Yu. P. Laletin, (the Pamir peoples), the Kirghiz, and some of the Charaimaks (more than 1 million people in total) are Ismailis; the Hazaras are mainly Shia-Imamites, although individual groups belong to the Ismaili sect. The Qizilbash, Afshar, and Teymuri are also Shiites, and among the Pashtuns are the Turi tribe, some of the Jaji, some clans of the Orakzai tribe of Tiraha, individual clans of the Bangash tribe of Upper Kurram, and the Mani clan of the Afridi tribe. The Indian community is divided into followers of Hinduism and Sikhism. Among part of the population, primarily in the Pashtun tribes, there are also adherents of individual Sufi orders (Qadiri, Naqshbandi).
Pashtunism is Islam, and Islam is Pashtunism or the Taliban's Explosive Mixture
Religious conflicts in the Islamic world are identical to political ones, and in the realities of Afghanistan, they are also interethnic, since the Taliban should be considered as Pashtun nationalists:
Even during the spread of Islam, writes historian E. Arrue, the Pashtuns accepted it, but in the form of “Pashtunism is Islam, and Islam is Pashtunism.” The ideology of the movement was based more on Pashtunwali (the Pashtun code of honor – I.Kh.) than on the interpretation of the Koran.
In this sense, the Taliban's vision of the caliphate as an ideal state structure based on Sharia looks paradoxical, since its very idea is supranational. ISIS, banned in Russia, sees the caliphate as such, which is why it has conflictual relations with the Taliban.
The Pashtuns, who make up about 50% of the population, have always tried and are still trying to act from a pan-Afghanist position under the banner of the Taliban. This has not been very successful, since they cannot overcome the tense relations within the aforementioned tribal associations, nor establish a constructive dialogue with the leaders of other ethnic groups – especially with the Tajiks, who make up about 40% of Afghanistan.
Let's take a history of half a century ago, connected with the experience of building a socialist state in Afghanistan. Even the groups within the PDPA were divided by nationality: "Khalq" consisted of Pashtuns, "Parcham" - mainly of Tajiks. The latter became the core of the resistance in the DRA: B. Rabbani and A.Sh. Masud, who fought not so much with the "infidels" as against the Pashtuns in power.
In this regard, it is not surprising that in 1992 the commander of one of the most combat-ready divisions, the 53rd, the Uzbek M. Dostum, went over to the side of the opposition; his betrayal largely predetermined the fall of the Najibullah government.
Once upon a time, Dostum was a truly good military commander, as noted by Army General M.A. Gareev, who knew him personally, but the political career of the once ambitious divisional commander ended in emigration.
The ethnic factor almost immediately provoked a new round of civil war between President Rabbani and the Pashtun Prime Minister Hekmatyar – an example of the parochial psychology of a mountain-born elite with an extremely narrow political horizon.
Therefore, power fell into the hands of the Taliban in 1996 not so much because of their strength, but because of the disunity of their opponents, who needed outside help to recapture Kabul in 2001. But in twenty years, the secular regime had become so rotten that neither the Americans nor anyone else could help it. This applies to both H. Karzai and his successor Ghani.
Sources close to the former Afghan president, notes orientalist I.Z. Farkhutdinov, described him as an arrogant paranoid, unable to find a common language with the country's government. In the last months of his presidency, Ghani, who sought to subordinate the Afghan government as much as possible, staged a real administrative reshuffle. He fired the ministers of defense and internal affairs, chaotically removed governors and local police chiefs. In the conditions of widespread corruption, delays in salaries and administrative chaos, many military personnel simply resigned or even went over to the Taliban for a small sum. People began to leave the security forces en masse. Those who were fired were replaced by people who had no local connections, which brought additional chaos into the administrative apparatus. Afghans believed that the country was effectively run by a “gang of three”: Ghani, his national security adviser Hamidullah Mohib, and the head of the presidential office, Mahmud Fazil. All of them had lived abroad for a long time and were citizens of foreign countries, which did not add to their popularity.
Side note: in the person of Ghani, Afghanistan stepped on the same rake as a number of post-Soviet republics, which were headed by scientists like the aforementioned figure, who had no experience in public administration: A. Akayev, A. Elchibey, S. Shushkevich.
When Being Determines Consciousness
Have the Taliban learned lessons from 2001? On a declarative level, yes. But in terms of the lack of internal unity, they are repeating the history of any Afghan party or clan, because, I will emphasize again, mountain existence often determines consciousness - parochial and narrow clan.
The Taliban's policy itself is least conducive to the integration of ethno-religious groups into a consolidated state, as it was, albeit with a number of reservations, under Daoud, who tried to form unity through industrialization and the fight against illiteracy. In general, the DRA leadership continued this course. But the blind opposition, financed from overseas, pushed the country into the abyss, clearing the way for the Taliban, who were even more ignorant than it.
Rabbani, Hekmatyar and Massoud should not have overthrown Najibullah, who was ready to negotiate with them, but should have created a coalition government with him and attracted to their side the engineering and management personnel that had been formed with great difficulty over the decade of the DRA’s existence, and even earlier, under Daoud.
Kabul in the 1960s or Daoud's Unfulfilled Dream
This would allow the continuation of the course towards industrialization, overcoming illiteracy and building a secular society, albeit under an Islamic guise, but without imposing a medieval dress code and infringing on the rights of women, who occupied an important niche in school education and the medical field.
However, the narrow horizon of political thinking of these figures led to disaster.
And where is the opposition now? The defeated Marshal Dostum, who changed his political camp several times, is meeting his old age in Turkey, Ghani is in the UAE, A.Sh. Masud Jr., who, unlike his father, did not receive real military aid from the West, fled from Panjshir, and Hekmatyar, who is of no use to anyone, is whiling away his days in God knows where.
The only, perhaps, promising figure in the opposition movement to the Taliban is Vice President A. Saleh, who, after Ghani’s flight, proclaimed himself head of the country and took over leadership of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan.
Saleh: The Last Hope for Secular Afghanistan?
Saleh once headed intelligence and may have maintained a network of agents in the country. Will he, who probably lives in Tajikistan, be able to gain the support of the Pashtuns and, most importantly, receive financial assistance to continue the struggle? Will there be external forces ready to back him? Maybe in the future.
At the present stage, there is no opposition in Afghanistan that poses a real threat to the Taliban.
What is the likelihood of the Taliban forming a stable government in the long term? History provides an indirect answer: starting in the 18th century, that is, essentially, from the very beginning of the formation of Afghan statehood, power in the country was seized primarily through military coups initiated either by intertribal struggle, or by external forces, or by intra-clan intrigues.
The latter did not pass by the Taliban either. The same Saleh in one of his interviews drew attention to the contradictions between the Durrani Emir Haibatullah and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs S. Haqqani - his biography is vague, but he is considered to be a conductor of the interests of the Gilzais. The first, if I am not mistaken, sits in Kandahar - the de facto capital of the Taliban, the second - in Kabul.
Taliban Interior Minister Haqqani - is the real power concentrated in his hands or in Haibatullah's?
However, the complex format of relations between them has not yet resulted in open conflict and armed confrontation.
The Taliban's triumph as a village's victory over the city
In short, the tradition of a legitimate transition of power in Afghanistan is practically non-existent, not to mention the lack of legal awareness in the largely illiterate, if not completely illiterate, Afghan society.
According to UNESCO data for 2016, this figure is 60%. With the Taliban coming to power, this figure will only increase, given the desire of educated Afghans, especially women, to leave the country after 2021.
In fact, the success of the Taliban is not the first victory of a village over a city in the history of Afghanistan. Both Omar and Haibatullah came from poor families. And this is what distinguishes them from the previous leaders of the country – the same Karzai and Ghani.
Are the Taliban on the Path to International Recognition?
Now, a few words about the Taliban’s relationship with its neighbors.
China may become, writes political scientist A.M. Serebrova, one of the key partners of Afghanistan, led by the Taliban, in order to strengthen Beijing's economic influence in South and Central Asia. Among China's strategic goals in this direction is the opening of the Beijing-Pakistan-Afghanistan transport corridor within the framework of the One Belt - One Road initiative.
Beijing has a practical interest in the Taliban and, most importantly, open gates to enter the country – not only the narrow border separating the two states, but also Islamabad, which is complimentary to the Taliban:
Pakistan, the author cited above notes, was one of three countries that recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan led by the Taliban regime during their first rise to power. During the civil war in Afghanistan, Islamabad strongly sympathized with the Taliban and their struggle. Almost immediately after the evacuation of American forces, the Pakistani government declared the liberation of Afghanistan from foreign invaders. Pakistan's goal is to gain access to Central Asian resources, and one of the possible mechanisms for achieving this is the implementation of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project.
In addition, Islamabad hopes, so far unsuccessfully, to convince the current masters of Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line as a state border.
Since the first days of the Taliban's return to power, they have also been actively supported by Saudi Arabia, which viewed the movement as a deterrent against Iran.
Afghanistan's very long border with Turkmenistan is a cause for concern for the latter. However, Ashgabat is trying to benefit from this, aiming to develop joint economic projects with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI). And the Taliban themselves are striving to implement projects started by the previous government. We are talking about the Lazurite Corridor, designed to connect Afghanistan through Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan, Russia and European countries.
Uzbekistan is also establishing a dialogue with the current masters of Afghanistan, expressing its readiness to invest in its economy, visible evidence of which is the opening of a trading house in Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as an even greater increase in trade turnover between the two countries, which grew by 2025% by January 231 compared to the same period last year.
Uzbekistan and the Taliban began to improve relations even before the latter seized power. The photo shows a meeting between representatives of the Uzbek delegation and the movement, then still recognized as a terrorist movement in Russia, in Doha, where Tashkent acted as one of the mediators in the negotiations between the Taliban and the official Afghan government. 2020
The Taliban have the most difficult relationship with Tajikistan, which does not recognize the legitimacy of their power and advocates the creation of a coalition government in the country with the broad involvement of Tajiks.
It is also noteworthy that Uzbek Dostum has found refuge not in his historical homeland, unlike Saleh. The latter is unlikely to please Kabul, but Dushanbe is not going to expel the head of the Afghan resistance from the country. In a sense, it is a risky but firm policy.
And Tajikistan, as a member of the CSTO, is more interested than any other post-Soviet Central Asian republic in military rapprochement with Russia to ensure its own security. At the same time, the role of mediator in establishing Tajik-Afghan relations is played not only by Moscow, but also by Beijing, which needs stability in the already troubled expanses of Central Asia, in order to implement the concept of "One Belt - One Road".
In general, it makes sense to talk about improving relations between the Taliban and neighboring countries only if the current government in Kabul is serious and here to stay.
"Taliban", or a look into a foggy future
What are the prospects for the Taliban? It may go down the path of radicalization, but it is also likely that a moderate wing will prevail in its leadership, betting on involving all interested ethnopolitical groups that recognize the Taliban's authority in governing the country.
But will the moderate forces be able to cope with the radicals who, undoubtedly, at the grassroots level – the semi-literate and illiterate armed masses are always prone to radicalization – are in the movement? Time will tell.
And yes, we, dear readers, have not yet covered the dialogue between Russia and the Taliban, especially in terms of its prospects. Well, this is a reason to continue the conversation. And the Taliban will make their presence known more than once.
References
Arrue E.R. The Phenomenon of Pashtun Nationalism in the Domestic Policy of the Taliban Movement // Bulletin of the Russian State University for the Humanities. Series “Political Science. History. International Relations”. 2023. No. 4. P. 86–96.
Boltaev H., Gafarov I. Transformation of Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan
Bonesh F. Relations between the Taliban and Tajikistan, challenges and obstacles, prospects
Gusseinov E. Turkmenistan's Policy in Afghanistan: Balance of Risks and Untapped Opportunities
Laletin Yu.P. Ethnic groups in Afghanistan: tension in relations // Ethnic groups and confessions in the East: conflicts and interactions / MGIMO(U) MFA of Russia. – M.: MGIMO-University, 2005. Pp. 353–378.
On the suspension of the terrorist status of the Taliban Movement
Sarantseva A.A. Social leaders and religious views of the Taliban movement
Serebrova A. M. From Taliban to Taliban 2.0: Transformation of a Terrorist Organization into an Institution of State Power in Afghanistan
Farkhutdinov I.Z. The Triumph of the Taliban, or a New Round of Civil War
Uzbekistan to Open Shopping Mall in Northern Afghanistan
Egamov B. The Path to Peace in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan's Contribution
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