Chronicles of the Kabul Operation. The Last Frontier of the Landing

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Chronicles of the Kabul Operation. The Last Frontier of the Landing
The area of ​​operations of the 3rd parachute battalion "Poltinnik"


The paratroopers repulsed the attack of the units of the Amin security brigade on the General Staff. The division commander, Major General Ryabchenko, orders the battalion commander, Captain Frolandin, to advance with the battalion to the area of ​​the Taj-Bek Palace, to the brigade barracks, with the task of suppressing the mutiny of the Afghan dictator's guards and disarming or destroying those who refuse to lay down their arms. weapon.



At this moment, a message comes in that Afghan forces are advancing in our direction. Tanks.

The General Staff building is at a fork in the road, in front of us is the Dar-ul-Aman palace, behind it, about two kilometers away, is the Taj-Bek palace. It is unclear where the tanks will go, but in any case, they must pass through us. In order to hold off these tanks, our first platoon remains, basically. The second platoon, by order of the battalion commander, was previously sent to guard the Soviet embassy. Three BMDs of the platoon moved to the designated area.

A crowd of over a hundred people gathered in front of the embassy building, single shots were heard, vehicles and nearby stores were burning. One combat vehicle was left in the most dangerous area, two "boxes" left for women and children in the microdistrict where Soviet specialists lived. By morning, paratroopers evacuated them inside combat vehicles to the territory of the USSR embassy. And two vehicles of the third platoon left for Taj-Bek, reinforcing the eighth company of the battalion.

We gather, load up with "flies" ("Fly" - disposable anti-tank grenade launchers RPG-18. Author's note). Deputy Political Officer Sergei Druzhinin went through the offices to see if there was anyone left who could still be used - our platoon was already ready, and we left only a couple of people with the prisoners. Druzhinin walked around the entire building, and it turned out that the fighters of the "Zenit" group were in one of the offices at that moment, just lying on the floor, resting. He says to them: "Guys, tanks are moving in our direction, it is quite possible that we will have to accept the fight." But they flatly refused to "duel with tanks." They say it is none of our business. Seryoga Druzhinin says: "How so?" "Well, so be it. No one gave us such a task." And now 45 years have passed since then, and Druzhinin is still angry with them. They position themselves as such specialists, but they abandoned young guys... Oh well, God be with them.

The platoon commander divided us into two groups. I lead one group, the platoon commander himself leads the other. We need to block two roads, they flow around the General Staff from both sides. The platoon commander and his men will stand on the road along which the battalion entered the headquarters. And I and my guys will block the fork that goes to Amin's palace.

We leave the building and part ways with the platoon commander. Kuish with his group of fighters, I with mine. The platoon commander says: “We don’t know which road the tanks will take. So we’ll do it this way: if shooting starts on my side, you see that we’ve entered the battle – you and yours will dismount and come to my aid. If it starts on your side, then I’ll dismount and come to your aid.” I say, I understand everything. We part ways.

Although we were informed that the tanks had begun to move, we did not know that the division’s self-propelled guns had already blocked their path.

Self-propelled vehicle commanderartillery Guards Lieutenant Colonel Baranovsky of the 103rd Airborne Division:

"The people were in a tense state: there was little chance of surviving the battle. Although the 85-mm cannon of our self-propelled gun pierced the side armor of the tanks through and through, I understood that we would not be able to hold out for long against 150 combat vehicles... Having arrived at the scene, I positioned the self-propelled guns, grenade launchers, and attached guns so that they could support each other with a flank attack. One self-propelled gun was placed in the middle of the road - if the tanks crashed into it at full speed, a traffic jam would form for some time.

The bridge was mined, with a powerful land mine. Then the soldiers dragged a stack of straw and a canister of diesel fuel there, so that if they had to accept a fight at night, they could illuminate the targets. Three self-propelled guns went to the neighboring height, from where the devices could see the location of the Afghan tank regiment. And they began to wait.

...Desperate shooting began nearby - our paratroopers were storming the prison. The building, it must be said, was serious - the walls were so thick that you could easily roll a car over them. The gates were armored, and the light combat vehicles of the airborne troops could do nothing with them. Then their commander asked me for a couple of self-propelled guns. Why not help the guys while it was quiet here? I only advised the gunners to hit the bolts and hinges - the guys were experienced, they could put a shell into a hat with earflaps from half a kilometer away... The first thing they did was put out the English searchlights with machine guns, knocked the gates off their hinges, rammed them and rushed inside. And then the paratroopers themselves dealt with it..."

We block the fork, I put the 571st BMD in the ditch on the right. We landed it - one turret sticking out. And a grenade launcher took up a position on the left side of the road. We hope for the best, but prepare for the worst - stopping the tanks with the available forces is practically an impossible task.

But it must be said that the tank column did not appear - the self-propelled guns of the 103rd Airborne Division did an excellent job.

Guard Lieutenant Colonel Igor Mikhailovich Baranovsky:

“…Their tanks were heading towards us. When they appeared, I turned on the searchlight on my vehicle. At that signal, our guns fired, and the machine gunners lit the stack. The first tank that crawled onto the bridge was literally blown to pieces by the explosion. Another one sent shrapnel flying in all directions. Then a thick smoke screen of dust rose. Three of our self-propelled guns came out on their flank and hit the tanks from the side. It must be said that the Afghans also snapped back, but the most amazing thing is that we did not lose a single man in that battle. Only one self-propelled gun had its muzzle brake cut off by a shell, and another had its hatch and antenna blown off. Then their tanks began to back away and retreat...”

Something happened in the area of ​​the palace that no one could have predicted: a clash between the 3rd battalion of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment and the so-called Muslim battalion.

How exactly it happened, who fired the first shot - this is still being debated. If you read the memoirs of the fighters of the Muslim battalion, then, from their words, you can draw the following conclusion: the paratroopers arrived in the area of ​​the Taj-Bek palace unexpectedly for them, and immediately began shooting at their battalion.

The Vitebsk paratroopers say the opposite. The divisional artillery and the third battalion of the 350th Guards Parachute Battalion fought with Amin's guards and at some point were fired upon by a Muslim battalion.

Each side blames the other. But over the past forty-five years, no one has asked the question: why was our battalion sent to the palace at all? For what purpose? Each unit, each company, each battalion was given its own task. When we left the airfield, we had one goal - the General Staff. And no other tasks were envisaged. The paratroopers could not independently, on a whim, leave their positions and go to the palace to support the units operating in that area.

In Rashid Abdullaev's book "Time Has Chosen Us," the fighters of the Muslim battalion recall that their command promised them paratroopers from the Vitebsk division to help them. "V. Kolesnik assured us that we only needed to hold out until the morning, and that by dawn the Vitebsk paratroopers should come to our aid."

That is, the decision to send paratroopers to help the units that were operating near the palace was made at the top at the request of the Muslim battalion command? And it was not made initially. This means that the situation did not develop according to plan, and it had to be adjusted during the operation.

Although, judging by the numerous recollections and stories of the participants in the storming of the palace, they never mention any problems, on the contrary, they constantly emphasize their ideal, clear, competent work. Then why was additional help from paratroopers needed already in the second half of the night, closer to the morning of December 28? What kind of problems arose in the area of ​​the palace? And why was it the 3rd battalion of the "fifty" that was involved? After all, we had our own, no less responsible than the palace, task - the General Staff of Afghanistan. Its capture, neutralization of Yakub and destruction of the communications center created favorable conditions for the successful completion of the entire Kabul operation.

In addition, a message came about Afghan tanks advancing in our direction. Yes, our self-propelled guns met them. But at that moment we did not even suspect this and were preparing for a possible battle. And at such a time, the division commander removes most of the battalion and sends it to help someone. Not even his own troops, not units of the 103rd Airborne Division, but third-party units.

General Ryabchenko could only have received such an order from the command post of Operation Baikal-79. He could not have made the decision to provide assistance to the troops at the palace on his own, while exposing his own direction and leaving very small forces in the area of ​​the General Staff.

From the diary of the duty officer at the command post, Colonel E. V. Chernyshov: “In the next room, at the radio station, a colonel from the Airborne Forces headquarters was receiving reports from commanders operating in the palace area…”

"Received reports from commanders operating in the palace area..." Perhaps this is the reason why our battalion was sent to the palace - we were closer than other units? The palace was about two kilometers behind us.

The memoirs of the head of intelligence of the USSR Airborne Forces and at the same time the chief of staff of the operational group of the Airborne Forces in Afghanistan, Guard Colonel A. V. Kukushkin, helped shed light on these events. Alexei Vasilyevich said that a battle broke out between Amin's guards, who tried to recapture the General Staff complex from the paratroopers, and the latter. After the attack was successfully repelled, the paratrooper battalion was sent to the barracks of the security brigade, located in the area of ​​the Taj-Bek Palace. The goal was to completely suppress the resistance of Amin's guard and disarm or destroy the enemy.

Perhaps these actions were supposed to be the result of joint efforts of paratroopers and fighters of the Muslim battalion. But from the stories of the Muslim battalion fighters, it turns out that they knew absolutely nothing about the actions of the units of the 103rd Airborne Division.

While the battalion's column was being formed to be sent to the palace, BMD No. 500, having received the order, moved out alone to establish contacts with units operating in the Taj Beg area.

Pavel Vopilin:

"The division commander ordered the 500th BMD to go to the palace and establish contact with the units operating in that area. Stanislav Lagovskiy (Chief of Physical Training and Sports of the 103rd Airborne Division. — Author's note) came up and sat in the commander's seat, and I was in the turret as the gunner-operator. This was when the regimental Urals arrived, and the guys from the 7th company started loading the killed General Staff officers into them in the backyard. We didn't drive very far, and from the barracks located between the headquarters and the palace, they opened heavy machine gun and automatic fire on us.

I loaded the gun with a fragmentation round, hit the barracks and started to spray from the twin machine gun, Slava Lagovskiy fired from the bow machine gun. After a while they showed: we surrender, raised their hands up. There is a ditch and a fence near it. Here the Afghan fighters crawled under this fence and are walking with their hands raised. They took the prisoners to the General Staff, Lagovskiy drove them with an antenna from a BMD. They handed them over to guard near the headquarters, turned around and drove to the palace."

At this time, units of the Muslim battalion near the barracks of the security brigade tried to disarm and take prisoner the command of Amin's guards.

Abdullaev: "The task of moving the groups was set by the battalion chief of staff. It consisted of capturing the brigade headquarters and arresting the brigade command headed by Major Dzhandad."

The 8th company of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment approached the palace. The company commander was Guards Captain Alexander Panasyuk, the deputy company commander was Guards Lieutenant Turchenko. The commander of the 580th BMD (company commander's vehicle) Sergeant Sergei Stavisky was in the turret as the gunner-operator.

Sergey Stavisky: "We moved towards the palace. Battalion commander Frolandin and division commander Ryabchenko were already there. After reporting to the division commander, Panasyuk ordered us to move towards the barracks and figure out what was going on there and what those tanks were in front of us."

Kholbaev: "...We saw how a column of "Vitebsk" soldiers approached and began to deploy into a battle line. When they deployed, a battle began with our units that were closest to them - Alym Abdullaev's group and two BMPs from the 3rd company. One vehicle from the 1st company was hit by a grenade launcher."

Abdullaev: "We were unexpectedly attacked by paratroopers from the 350th regiment of the 103rd airborne division. It was a company-sized GPZ. They opened fire to kill with all types of weapons in a moving attack...".

But the soldiers of the third parachute battalion say otherwise: the division's artillerymen and the 3rd battalion of the fifty-man unit fought with Amin's guard, and not with the Muslim battalion at all.

Gunner-operator of the 7th company of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment Andrei Efimov: "We quickly approached the barracks in the BMD. It was very close to the General Staff, everything was in sight: the headquarters, the palace, the barracks. The howitzers were already there and were firing at the building. We lined up our vehicles in a single line with the guns and also opened fire on Amin's guards."

Kukushkin: "The division's artillery entered the battle. 122-mm howitzers and guns of combat vehicles fired directly at the guardsmen who had taken up positions in the barracks. After 1,5-2 hours, the mutiny was broken and the remnants of the rebels were disarmed." (A. V. Kukushkin. Paratroopers' Jump into Afghanistan.)

Sergeant of the 8th company Sergei Stavisky:

“We noticed two infantry fighting vehicles and two groups of people in Afghan uniforms near the barracks. One group had armbands on their sleeves and they were wearing helmets. The others had neither helmets nor armbands. They were firing at each other. It looked like the fighters with armbands were trying to take those without armbands prisoner. The latter rushed in our direction. They opened fire from a machine gun from the barracks at those with armbands. I hit the machine gunner with a fragmentation shot who was shooting from the barracks at the fighters with white armbands. The “armbandless” ones rushed back to the barracks, resuming shooting at the “armband wearers” and at us. Then I hit the “armbandless” ones near the barracks. In their memoirs, the Musbatovites directly say that during the battle with Amin’s guards, a machine gunner fired at them from the barracks window. But for some reason they forgot to indicate who took out that machine gunner and covered them with fire... Or they didn’t want to.”

At the same time, the command of the Muslim battalion, having requested assistance, for some reason did not bother to establish communication or interaction signals. Did they rely on the operation's leadership? Let me remind you that the paratroopers were trying to do just that, having received an order from their division commander and having left for the palace in the commander's BMD No. 500.

It should also be noted that Abdullaev's book "Time Chose Us" contains inaccuracies. Let's not call them falsifications - let them be random errors. Here is one of them.

Text book:

"Chernyshev E.V.: "In the area of ​​Amin's palace, the guards suddenly rebelled. It was an absurd step on their part. But they apparently wanted to somehow rehabilitate themselves for the loss of the palace. In the next room, at the radio station, a colonel from the Airborne Forces headquarters was receiving reports from commanders operating in the area of ​​the palace."

And here is the actual text from the diary of E. V. Chernyshev:

"The guards suddenly rebelled. They attacked the paratroopers with the aim of recapturing the General Staff building. It was an absurd move on their part. But they apparently wanted to somehow rehabilitate themselves for the loss of the palace. In the next room, at the radio station, Colonel Ryabov from the Airborne Forces headquarters was receiving reports from commanders operating in the palace area."

Chernyshev's diaries do not talk about the palace, but about the General Staff. This is the episode I mentioned earlier - the attack of units from Amin's security brigade on the General Staff. By changing a few words, the author of the book about the Muslim battalion completely changed the meaning of this entry. For what purpose? Why muddy the waters?

There is also another strange episode. Abdullaev writes that the deputy commander of the Muslim battalion, Captain Sakhatov, with a group of twelve people was supposed to capture four tanks that were keeping all approaches to the palace under fire. And then everything is said somehow vaguely and inconspicuously. Whether the tanks were captured or not is unknown.

Why do I say that the episode is strange? Because in Nikolai Kikeshev's book "Get Up and Go" this event is described as follows: "While the battle was going on in the palace, Sakhatov and his group captured one of the tanks and moved towards the General Staff, but the paratroopers had already captured it. Since the special forces were dressed in Afghan uniforms and were riding on an Afghan tank, they fired a "Fly" at the tank without further ado. Sakhatov, cursing mercilessly, shouted: "Ours!!!"

The paratroopers have offended us again. But a reasonable question arises: why did the Muslim battalion fighters go to the General Staff in a tank? What are they doing there? And this is happening while the battle is still going on. Did they abandon their unit? A completely incomprehensible moment that defies explanation.

And what about the statements of the Muslim battalion fighters who accuse us of killing their soldiers and destroying the armored personnel carrier? Colonel Chernyshev writes in his diary about the losses in the Muslim battalion from artillery fire. Lyakhovsky says in his book that when a white flag appeared on the building of the guards brigade headquarters, three fighters of the "Muslim battalion" jumped out of the armored personnel carrier that drove up to it, violating the order not to get out of the vehicles. A burst of machine gun fire rang out from the roof of the building where Amin's personal guard was located, and all three were killed.

Exactly the same text, word for word, is present in the memoirs of General Drozdov.

How did the fighters of the Muslim battalion die and get wounded on the morning of December 28, 1979? From artillery fire, during a clash with the third paratroop battalion of the 350th regiment, or from the actions of Amin's guards, as Lyakhovsky and Drozdov write?

At the same time, Sergeant Sergei Stavisky of the 8th company of the "Fifty-Year-Old" claims that it was he who provided cover fire for the Musbatovites and took out the machine gunner who was shooting at them.

Andrey Efimov, a gunner-operator from the 3rd platoon of the 7th company, says the following about the battle with Amin's guards: he fired several fragmentation shots from the BMD cannon, and then fired from a twin machine gun at the barracks. And when Amin's guards threw out a white flag, he stopped shooting. But after they started shooting again, he also resumed firing.

Alexey Vasilyevich Kukushkin says in his memoirs that when the paratroopers were fighting the guards, some of the personnel of the Khalbaev battalion poured out of the barracks located nearby on a hill and watched the battle. At that moment, the fighters of the Muslim battalion came under fire, which was reported to Kukushkin by the battalion's chief of staff, Captain Ashurov. Alexey Vasilyevich ordered Ashurov to shelter all the people behind the walls of the barracks and immediately put up white flags as a sign of non-resistance. Then, through the commander of the 103rd division, he stopped the shooting. Thus, according to Colonel Kukushkin, idle curiosity and confusion ended in tragedy.

These contradictions indicate that, unfortunately, no one was seriously looking for the truth. The fighters of the Muslim battalion should not weave intrigues, but admit that the main reason for this tragedy is the lack of communication between the units. The blame for this lies primarily with the leadership of the operation, and only then with the battalion and company commanders. The lack of coordination of actions led to the deaths of people.

It is strange how such disunity could have occurred if the entire command of the operation was located at one PU (control point). E. V. Chernyshev: “There are two control points at the control point: one is our permanent one — the duty officer’s, the other is in the paratroopers’ room next door. It is the main one. It is used by Colonel General Magomedov, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and Lieutenant General Guskov N. N. (Colonel General Magomedov is the chief military adviser; Lieutenant General Ivanov is the KGB; Lieutenant General Guskov is the Airborne Forces. Author’s note).”

That is, the entire command was in one room. From the control room, information went to General Kirpichenko, who systematized it and sent it to Moscow.

But one question remains open: how did Amin's guards calmly leave the Taj Bek area and attack the General Staff and the paratroopers of the 3rd Battalion of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment? The palace area was the responsibility zone of the "Muslim battalion", and in their memoirs, the Muslim battalion's fighters write that their battalion blocked the guards' barracks. How did the guards manage to calmly leave and why weren't they pursued if they were being watched? Especially since the fighting in the city had already ended, and nothing distracted them from watching the security brigade. There is no answer to this question.

E. V. Chernyshev: "The news that Babrak Karmal had become the new president caused a sharply negative reaction in the Afghan army. Advisors began to send alarming reports about the intentions of some commanders to oppose the new president. Many commanders in the field rebelled. Some of them began to leave their units and go into hiding. There was a turning point in the army's mood"...
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  1. 0
    April 13 2025 05: 47
    About "Zenit". But in reality. Why should elite special forces go into the field and fight tanks? This is not their specificity and task.
    1. +4
      April 13 2025 16: 35
      Quote: STUG III
      About "Zenit". But in reality. Why should elite special forces go into the field and fight tanks? This is not their specificity and task.

      If at that time they had another task, the execution of which would have been disrupted by the fight against tanks, then of course.
      In all other cases, it's something between betrayal and cowardice))
  2. +3
    April 13 2025 07: 44
    The place where they were preparing to meet the tanks.
    1. +1
      April 13 2025 13: 41
      I looked at the Google map - there is nothing suitable within two kilometers, but there is a palace 200 meters away. And in the photo at the beginning of the article, the palace at a distance of two kilometers should not look like this. It looks like the General Staff and the palace were almost at an equal distance from the barracks, and the distance was measured in hundreds of meters. In the photo provided here, the palace area is in the foreground.
      1. +3
        April 13 2025 14: 11
        Yes, the barracks were located approximately in the middle, a little closer to the Taj Beg. In one of the articles I talked about this: “…many years later it turned out that this was indeed the National Museum of Afghanistan. It was converted into the General Staff for security reasons and convenience of location. Amin’s residence was initially not the Taj Beg, as many believe, but the Arg Palace (Ark) in the city center. A week before the coup, on December 20, on the recommendation of our advisers, he moved to the palace on the outskirts of Kabul - the Taj Beg, where both the security system and the internal layout with the location of services were known. The museum was in sight - less than two kilometers away, and between them were the barracks of the Afghan guard, so it was an ideal place to house the military leadership of Afghanistan.” In front of the General Staff was the Dar-ul-Aman Palace, so we could not see these barracks. And the guards themselves did not provide assistance to either Amin or Yakub at the very beginning of the battle, because they did not understand what was happening, there was no communication, and shooting was being conducted from both sides. But when they came to their senses, for some reason they went to the General Staff.
      2. 0
        April 13 2025 15: 10
        Quote from cpls22
        I looked on Google maps - there is nothing suitable within two kilometers.

        There is only a park, similar to a palace, but without a palace. Where it could have been - a flat wasteland. Was that palace really torn down?
        1. +1
          April 13 2025 15: 13
          I can't understand what palace you are talking about?
          1. +1
            April 14 2025 08: 52
            Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
            I can't understand what palace you are talking about?

            Taj Beck
            According to the modern map, it was very close to Dar-ul-Aman, although for some reason the memoirs indicate a distance of two kilometers.
            This difference is significant for the circumstances described in the article.
            When describing the confusion in the eyewitness accounts, one cannot help but wonder: is this the case? It turns out that two groups with different goals were literally on the same patch of land, and only the Dar-ul-Aman building prevented them from seeing each other.
            1. +1
              April 14 2025 09: 04
              Perhaps this is the reason why our battalion was sent to the palace - we were closer than other units? The palace was about two kilometers behind us.

              Here is a direct speech from a participant. If the fighters were sent to help somewhere where they had to go 2 km, and they ran into an object right after the turn, having driven 200 meters, they could have mistaken their own for strangers who came from nowhere. Is that logical?
              1. +2
                April 14 2025 14: 25
                Here we are talking about something a little different. Where the battalion went and what goals it had been given were known: disarmament or destruction of Amin's security brigade if they refused to lay down their arms. In addition, before the battalion went to Taj-Bek, BMD No. 500 had already been sent there, specifically for the purpose of reconnaissance and establishing contacts with those who were there at that time. And these arguments have a different nature. The article partially describes what happened, so it is probably not entirely clear to the reader. These are excerpts from a chapter of the book; the articles do not completely copy the chapters, and this is where some misunderstanding comes from. I think this is not fatal.
            2. +1
              April 14 2025 14: 29
              That's right, the distance between Dar-ul-Aman Palace and Taj-Bek Palace is about two kilometers. Maybe a little less, but not much.
              1. +2
                April 14 2025 14: 44
                Now I looked some more and found it - a little to the west.
                In a straight line it’s one and a half kilometers, and taking into account the road, it’s about two.
                Thank you.
                1. +2
                  April 14 2025 17: 30
                  Yes, visually it looks close. In the photo: in the foreground is Taj Beg, further on is Dar-ul-Aman. However, for some reason there are no barracks here: they may have been demolished or blown up. The mountains seem very close, but in reality they are not two steps away.
                  1. +2
                    April 14 2025 18: 39
                    Yes, this photo is more informative. I was confused by the new building that was built right next to Dar-ul-Aman from the south. It is not in this photo yet.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. +2
      April 13 2025 16: 37
      Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
      , where they were preparing to meet the tanks.

      Was there no air support?
      1. +2
        April 13 2025 17: 03
        I don't know what kind of aviation there was at that time, if any. But what kind of aviation could there be in the city at night?
        1. +1
          April 13 2025 17: 26
          Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
          I don't know what kind of aviation there was at that time, if any. But what kind of aviation could there be in the city at night?

          I received information about a tank column moving towards my units. I have no way to launch anything into the air to destroy this column?
          From Kabul to Dushanbe is 570 km, in the Tajik SSR there were no air forces capable of operating on the ground? Judging by your photo, there are not many residential buildings nearby, the highways are wide, hit as much as you want, with NURs or FABs
          1. +4
            April 13 2025 18: 04
            I agree. But we don’t know what the command of the operation was guided by. The head of intelligence of the USSR Airborne Forces, Colonel Kukushkin, who at that time was the chief of staff of the Airborne Forces operational group in Kabul, recalls: "The operation was controlled from our command post. The actions of the troops were mainly controlled by Nikolai Nikitovich Guskov. Right next to him, Lieutenant Colonel Markov kept a combat log, in which he literally wrote down all the commands, orders and reports received. The importance of such shorthand was obvious, since it gave us the opportunity to subsequently documentarily confirm or refute any claims and accusations regarding the essence of the decisions taken and the orders given to the troops. Generals Magometov and Ivanov were in the same room with us, but did not interfere with the control. The division units were actually commanded by General Kostylev V.N. (deputy commander of the Airborne Forces for combat training), since Ryabchenko I.F., in connection with the operation in the General Staff, arrived at headquarters only towards the end of the overall operation." If we were to read the combat log kept by Lieutenant Colonel Markov, a lot would become clear. But who has access to such documents?
            1. +2
              April 13 2025 18: 47
              Quote: Vladimir_Kuznetsov
              But we don’t know what the command of the operation was guided by.

              Most likely, they did not want to increase the scope of the operation to a combined arms scale for political reasons.
              1. +5
                April 13 2025 19: 31
                Possibly. The situation was very tense, no one knew how events would develop. The commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, General Achalov, mentions in his book “I Will Tell You the Truth” that in December 1979, when the 103rd Airborne Division was landing in Afghanistan, the command kept two more Airborne Forces units in combat readiness – Tula and Kaunas. Vladislav Alekseevich Achalov commanded the 7th Airborne Division at that time.
                Colonel General Achalov: “Before I went on vacation, the Airborne Forces Commander, Colonel General D. S. Sukhorukov, warned me: “Don’t go further than Moscow until the New Year, you may be needed at any moment.” And such a moment came at eight o’clock in the morning on December 25, when the order was received to immediately report to the Airborne Forces headquarters, in civilian clothes. In Moscow, the head of the personnel department, Colonel I. Klimov, met me and took me to the commander. The Airborne Forces headquarters had a combat control center, they already had information about the Il-76 crash. The situation was difficult, the commander correctly decided to insure himself in case another one or two divisions were needed for the transfer to Afghanistan. The 7th division was put on high combat readiness, at any moment I could fly to Kabul. The situation was similar with the 106th Airborne Division. My stay at the CBU ended after the advance detachments of the ground forces reached Kabul and joined up with the landing force.”
  3. +2
    April 13 2025 07: 59
    [quote]with the task of suppressing the rebellion[/
    From article to article, dear author, against whom did these villains rebel?
    1. +5
      April 13 2025 08: 11
      I suppose they were not delighted with the coup. E. V. Chernyshev: "The news that Babrak Karmal had become the new president caused a sharply negative reaction in the Afghan army. Advisors began to send alarming reports about the intentions of some commanders to oppose the new president. Many commanders on the ground rebelled. Some of them began to leave their units and go into hiding. There was a turning point in the army's mood"...
  4. +2
    April 13 2025 09: 25
    Interesting article. Respect to the author.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +2
      April 14 2025 17: 23
      Thank you! Glory to aviation! Once upon a time, the Airborne Forces were part of the Air Force.
  5. +1
    April 13 2025 11: 48
    "The people were in a tense state: there was little chance of surviving the battle. Although the 85-mm cannon of our self-propelled gun pierced the side armor of the tanks, I understood that against 150 combat vehicles we won't be able to stand for long...
    Just like the German offensive on Moscow in November 41 belay
    But over the past forty-five years, no one has asked the question: why was our battalion sent to the palace at all? For what purpose?
    yes, the usual army chaos: someone misunderstood something, someone for some reason didn’t get the order or they simply forgot to inform, etc., etc.
  6. +1
    April 13 2025 13: 00
    Because in Nikolai Kikeshev's book "Get Up and Go" this event is described as follows: "While the battle was going on in the palace, Sakhatov and his group captured one of the tanks and moved towards the General Staff, but the paratroopers had already captured it. Since the special forces were dressed in Afghan uniforms and were riding on an Afghan tank, they without further ado fired at the tank from the "Fly". Sakhatov, swearing mercilessly, shouted: "Ours!!!"
    The paratroopers have offended again. But a reasonable question arises: why did the Muslim battalion fighters go to the General Staff in a tank? What were they doing there?
    The question arises as to how reliable Kikeshev’s information is.
    According to the recollections of the participants in the events, 3 tanks were captured, then 2 moved to the location of the 154th detachment, and one to the palace.
    I personally have not come across any information in my memoirs about paratroopers shelling these tanks.
    How exactly this happened, who fired the first shot - this is still being debated.
    However, there is no debate about the losses of the 154th detachment from “friendly fire” of paratroopers - 5 killed and more than 10 wounded.
    Only two people died during the storming of the residence building.
  7. +3
    April 14 2025 13: 31
    It is strange how such disunity could have occurred if the entire command of the operation was located at one control center.

    Strange? I'll tell you how such a strange thing happened at our airfield in 1969.
    At that time, two regiments were based at the airfield in Zavitinsk: ours, the AN 2th, and long-range ones, the TU 12.
    Tensions with China. And the Chinese also had TU 16s at that time.
    Our regiment was dispersed on dirt sites. Each squadron was dispersed as if in a circular defense. We have squadron duty "readiness √1", i.e. all crews in the planes, APA connected their cables and combat order: - Upon the appearance of any target, ground or air, and two green missiles over the control tower, immediately open fire from the guns to destroy this target!
    The end of our shift came, we see buses bringing the shift of another squadron, they will come for us now. The planes are closed, we are slowly approaching the squadron commander's plane, and at this time a TU 16 approaches the airfield at low altitude and two green rockets over the control tower!!!
    Some officers turned white! We have to shoot, but there is no one in the planes! We have already left them, the replacements are not in the planes yet!
    TU 16 lands calmly, everyone breathes a sigh of relief...
    Later we found out. It was a long-range weather reconnaissance aircraft that landed, and the long-range command gave the go-ahead for their regiment to fly with two green rockets!
    And the long-range command and ours are sitting at the same command post!
    1. +1
      April 14 2025 14: 32
      This was probably after the events on Damansky?
      1. +1
        April 14 2025 15: 03
        This was during the events on Damansky.
        We had an additional identification mark on our planes. A black stripe about a meter wide around the fuselage, closer to the tail section. There was no other way to tell the difference. We have stars, and the Chinese have stars.
        Everything I described happened somewhere in March 1969, later we were sent to a reserve unpaved airfield, and two regiments from the west arrived at our airfield, one from Krivoy Rog, and the second I don’t remember exactly, it seems from Seshcha.
        1. +2
          April 14 2025 17: 19
          And in Afghanistan we painted white stripes along the entire vehicle to distinguish ours from the enemy. Although the Afghans did not have BMDs, they had infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Probably, for the company of everyone else, so as not to stand out. This was when we left for Kunar on February 29, 1980. The so-called 1st Kunar operation near the Pakistani border (4 km). There, a mountain infantry regiment rebelled, of course, it was armed with Soviet equipment.
  8. +1
    April 15 2025 00: 01
    This always happens when different departments solve the same problem at the same time.
    As in this case, the Airborne Forces and the GRU (prepared by the Musbat), plus the KGB.
    It would be surprising if it went without any hitches, but that almost never happens, so this operation, in terms of execution, is still considered successful and almost exemplary.
    Moreover, a year ago, American specialists completely screwed up while trying to carry out an operation to free hostages in Iran.
    If this were today, we would be accused of using meldonium.
    In my opinion, the disunity of departments was especially evident during the first Chechen war, when the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the FSB were also in charge there, interacting only with the good wishes of specific commanders and chiefs. And having a motley zoo of radio stations, whose frequencies might not coincide not only between ministries, but the Marines' naval radio stations did not connect with the ground forces'!
    And, unfortunately, friendly fire was quite common.
    During the second Chechen war, the leadership was already structured and organized within the framework of the CTO leadership.
    1. 0
      April 15 2025 07: 20
      My comrade took part in the operation in Pervomayskoye. He said that the bardelero there was something special. He was a SOBR officer himself.
  9. 0
    April 21 2025 03: 21
    The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan turned into a complete disaster