Satellite images of US ballistic missile submarines and their bases

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Satellite images of US ballistic missile submarines and their bases

In the early 1970s, most of the U.S. strategic nuclear warheads were deployed on long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. rockets silo-based, which were at the disposal of the Strategic aviation US Air Force Command. However, by that time the accuracy of ICBM warheads had improved so much that a surprise strike became possible, in which one side could try to win a global conflict by destroying the stationary missile silos whose coordinates were known.

In order to guarantee “nuclear retaliation” in any eventuality, the parties, in addition to increasing the resistance of silo launchers to the damaging effects of a nuclear explosion, rapidly developed mobile platforms.



The Soviet Union, in parallel with strategic missile submarines, built mobile ground-based and rail-based missile systems, while the United States placed its bets on missile submarines, and already in the early 1980s, the basis of the American strategic nuclear forces became SSBNs armed with intercontinental-range missiles with thermonuclear warheads of individual guidance.

In 1985, several types of American missile carriers were on combat patrol in the world's oceans. These were the first-generation George Washington and Ethan Allen-class submarines with UGM-27C Polaris A-3 SLBMs, the Lafayette-class submarines with UGM-73 Poseidon missiles, the second-generation James Madison and Benjamin Franklin-class SSBNs with UGM-73 Poseidon and UGM-96 Trident I missiles, and six new third-generation Ohio-class submarines with UGM-96 Trident I SLBMs.

It was very expensive and troublesome to operate three generations of boats. In addition, the presence of fleet SSBNs armed with different types of missiles gave trump cards to the proponents of creating mobile ground and rail missile systems, which, according to the developers, required less capital investment than submarine missile carriers. In this regard, the US Navy command in the mid-1980s decided to reduce the types of submarine strategic missile carriers and standardize their weapons. However, the Americans kept this secret, using the refusal of old boats as an argument in negotiations with the USSR.

Unlike the USSR, which held on to the last for its outdated, noisy nuclear submarines, American admirals placed their bets on the new Ohio-class submarines, which were significantly superior to other SSBNs in key parameters – stealth, diving depth, service life between overhauls, and striking power. Against the backdrop of the imminent write-off of the hopelessly outdated and worn-out first-generation missile submarines and the abandonment of the second-generation submarines in the next decade, it was concluded that Ohio-class submarines should become the backbone of the naval component of the American strategic nuclear forces in the long term. The high modernization potential and large reserve of operational life of the third-generation submarines allowed them to be used for several decades, which was later confirmed in practice.

As part of the unification, it was decided to create a new SLBM that would meet the highest requirements and be capable of becoming the basis of American strategic nuclear forces for a long time.

Initially, the characteristics of the UGM-96A Trident I SLBM were limited by the need to fit into the dimensions of the missile silos of second-generation SSBNs, previously armed with UGM-73 Poseidon C-3 missiles.

During the design of the third-generation submarine, a missile silo diameter of 2,4 m and a length of 14,8 m were adopted, and the width of the hull of the Ohio-class missile carriers made it possible to arm already built and newly built submarines with new, much heavier and longer missiles with a firing range of more than 10 km, which made it possible to conduct combat patrols in areas directly adjacent to American territorial waters, outside the zone of action of the Soviet fleet and anti-submarine aviation. This increased the combat stability of submarine missile carriers and made it possible to abandon the use of forward basing points abroad.

The UGM-96A Trident I SLBM had a longer launch range than the UGM-73 Poseidon C-3 and UGM-27C Polaris A-3, but was still inferior to the silo-based LGM-30G Minuteman III and LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBMs. To close the gap with the ballistic missiles available to the US Air Force SAC, in the late 1970s, Lockheed began developing an SLBM weighing about 60 tons, designated UGM-133A Trident II. The goal was also to increase the throw weight, which would allow the missile to be equipped with a larger number of warheads with individual guidance and means of overcoming anti-missile defenses.

When designing the Trident-2 SLBM, new technical solutions were successfully combined with existing, well-proven developments. This made it possible to create a highly sophisticated missile with high service, operational and combat characteristics, which continues to remain relevant even after 35 years have passed since its adoption into service.

Compared to Trident 1, the new SLBM has become much larger and heavier. The length has increased from 10,3 to 13,53 m, the diameter – from 1,8 to 2,3 m. The weight has increased by about 70% – to 59,08 tons. Throw-in weight is 2800 kg. The launch range with a minimum combat load (three Mk.5 warheads) is more than 11 km. With a maximum load (eight Mk.000 warheads) – 5 km.

The UGM-133A Trident II (D5) missile is capable of carrying up to 8 Mk.5 independently targetable warheads equipped with W88 thermonuclear warheads with a yield of 475 kt or up to 14 Mk.4 warheads with W76 warheads with a yield of 100 kt. The CEP for Mk.5 warheads is 130 m. If a satellite navigation system is used in the guidance process, more than half of the warheads fall within a circle with a diameter of 90 m, which makes it possible to destroy “hardened” (in American terminology) targets, such as silo launchers and underground command posts, with a high probability. When firing at ICBM silos, the so-called “two by one” method is provided for - in this case, two warheads from different missiles are guided to one target. According to American data, the probability of destroying a “hardened” target with Mk.5 warheads is at least 0,95. In total, the US Navy received approximately 400 warheads with W88 warheads, but most of the Trident II missiles carried Mk.2 warheads, which were previously used on the UGM-4A Trident I SLBM. In this version, the probability of destroying the silo using the "two by one" method is estimated to be no higher than 96, which is due to the lower power of the charge.

As with other American SLBMs, the Trident 2 is launched using a "dry" launch method - from a missile silo, without filling it with water. The missiles can be launched at intervals of 15-20 seconds from a depth of no more than 30 m, at a submarine speed of about 5 knots and sea state up to 6 points. Theoretically, all the missiles on board the Ohio-class SSBN can be launched in one salvo, but in reality such firings have never been carried out.

Lockheed Martin delivered 1989 missiles to the US Navy and 2007 missiles to the Royal Navy between 425 and 58. The Trident 2 missile is the backbone of the US naval component of the strategic nuclear forces and will remain so for the next decade.

From 2007 to 2012, a comprehensive modernization program was implemented. In particular, previously built rockets were equipped with new control and astrocorrection equipment, built using high-speed radiation-resistant microprocessors. In addition, solid fuel was replaced.

Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $559 million contract to upgrade existing missiles to the Trident II D5LE standard, which will extend their service life until the Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarines are decommissioned. The upgraded Trident II missiles are already loaded into the missile silos of SSBNs on combat patrol. The upgraded missiles are expected to gradually replace all older SLBMs on American and British boats.

Test infrastructure for UGM-133A Trident II missiles


The first launch of the Trident 2 rocket was made from the Eastern Missile Range at Cape Canaveral in 1987.


Google Earth Satellite Image: Cape Canaveral Missile Range East

The missile range is primarily known for its space research programs, but prior to the UGM-133A Trident II SLBM, other submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles were also tested here.

The Trident 2 SLBM tests were carried out from the LC25C and LC25D launch complexes.


Google Earth satellite image of the launch pad from which the Trident 2 SLBM test launches were carried out

Before being accepted into service, 19 launches were made from a land-based test site. In the spring of 1989, the new SLBM was launched from the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734). This ninth Ohio-class submarine, delivered to the US Navy in December 1988, was originally built for the Trident II missile. In 2, the UGM-1990A Trident II SLBM (also designated Trident D133) officially entered service.

Construction and modernization of Ohio-class SSBNs


The first boat USS Ohio (SSGN-726) entered service in late 1981. The newest American strategic submarine USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) entered service in September 1997.

The boats were assembled at General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation's Groton, Connecticut, shipyard from 13-foot-long sections shipped from the company's Quonset Point, Rhode Island, plant.


Google Earth satellite image of General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation shipyards in Groton

At the design stage, the service life of the Ohio-class submarines was calculated at 20 years with one reactor recharge. However, a large margin of safety and significant modernization potential allowed for a significant extension of the operational life. In the second half of the 1990s, a phased modernization began, carried out during two-year major repairs combined with the replacement of nuclear fuel.

After examining the submarines placed for major repairs, specialists came to the conclusion that the SSBNs in service can be used for approximately 45 years. At the same time, the nuclear fuel must be replaced every 20 years.

The lead submarine, USS Ohio (SSGN-726), which currently carries cruise missiles, is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2026. Of the submarines armed with ballistic missiles, the first in line to be decommissioned in 2027 is USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN-730) (formerly Rhode Island).

Operation and deployment locations of the Ohio-class SSBNs


Currently, nuclear deterrence missions are assigned to 16 Ohio-class SSBNs. Another four nuclear submarines, previously armed with Trident-1 missiles, have been converted into carriers of UGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles and combat swimmer delivery vehicles.

Of the fourteen SSBNs in service, two are undergoing scheduled major repairs. According to publicly available information, the US Navy has 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each of which can carry 4 warheads. Combat duty in the world's oceans can be carried out simultaneously by 8-9 submarines with 160-180 missiles on board, carrying 640-720 warheads.

The US says that the missiles on board the patrol boats do not have flight missions loaded into them, and that target designation is issued after receiving an order to use them. Combat control signals are received via radio, including ultra-long-wave communications, and are transmitted from Boeing E-6B Mercury aircraft (more details here).

Strategic Command, headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, operates two very long wave radio stations located on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.


Google Earth satellite image of the US Navy's Coast Guard Very Long Wave Radio Station at Cutler

The US Navy radio station at Cutler, Maine, operates on 24 kHz and has a power of 1,8 megawatts.

The US Navy's Jim Creek Radio Station, located near Oso, Washington, transmits on 24,8 kHz with a power of 1,2 megawatts.


Google Earth satellite image of the US Navy's Jim Creek Very Long Wave Radio Transmitter Center and Antennas

When the international situation is calm and there is no high probability of a global crisis developing, American missile submarines conduct combat patrols off their shores, under the close protection of their ships and aircraft in areas for which precise hydrological maps exist. Thanks to this, the navigation systems of the submarines in a submerged position receive all the necessary data from the onboard hydroacoustic complex to correct the error in tracking their coordinates. However, approximately 25-30% of the time, American SSBNs spend in remote areas of the world's oceans. In the past, American boats were on duty in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic.

According to statistics, Ohio-class submarines perform an average of 3-4 combat missions per year. Each American strategic nuclear submarine in service spends more than 200 days on combat patrol each year.

The permanent home of American SSBNs on the West Coast is the Bangor Naval Base, and on the East Coast is the Kings Bay Naval Base. Both American bases are located in areas with a mild climate, which significantly facilitates service and reduces the cost of operating the boats.


Ohio-class SSBN permanent basing locations in the United States

There are currently eight Ohio-class SSBNs based at Bangor, Washington, in the Pacific Ocean.


Google Earth satellite image shows US submarines moored at Bangor Naval Base

The Bangor Pacific Naval Base has a highly developed infrastructure necessary for the long-term operation and maintenance of nuclear submarines.


Google Earth satellite image of Ohio-class SSBN in dry dock at Bangor Naval Base, with some missile silo covers open

The presence of a dry dock and high-capacity cranes at the naval base allows for routine maintenance and prompt repairs of Ohio-class SSBNs.

Atlantic Base Kings Bay, Georgia, is home to six more strategic submarines.


Google Earth satellite image of Naval Air Station Kings Bay

The infrastructure of each naval base is designed to service 10 SSBNs.


Google Earth satellite image of Ohio-class SSBN at Kings Bay Naval Base

During combat patrols, American nuclear submarines visit the Guam and Pearl Harbor naval bases to replenish supplies, perform minor repairs, and give their crews a short rest.


Google Earth satellite image of Ohio-class SSBN and supply vessel at Naval Base Guam

The Guam naval base has rotational supply vessels that load supplies onto American nuclear submarines and, if necessary, replenish ammunition.

While Guam is only capable of replenishing supplies and carrying out minor repairs, Pearl Harbor Naval Base, located in Hawaii, provides full-fledged long-term basing and servicing for ships of all classes.


Google Earth satellite image: US submarines and warships at Pearl Harbor naval base

A full-fledged arsenal with hangars for maintaining missile combat readiness, as well as underground fortified storage facilities for mine-torpedo and missile weapons with adjacent piers, were built at Pearl Harbor.


Google Earth satellite image: American nuclear submarine moored to a pier located next to mine-torpedo and missile storage facilities

Nuclear arsenals of the American Ohio-class SSBNs


Under the START-3 treaty, the number of silos loaded with SLBMs on American SSBNs is limited to 20, and the total salvo of missiles from one submarine must not exceed 80 thermonuclear warheads.

Currently, the American UGM-133A Trident II SLBMs carry 4 Mk.5 warheads with W88 and Mk.4A warheads with W76-1 warheads, which have undergone a life extension program. In 2021, production of modernized W88 ALT 370 warheads began, the service life of which should be at least 20 years. Since 2019, some Trident 2 missiles have been equipped with warheads of improved accuracy with W76-2 warheads with a yield of 5-6 kt (only plutonium charges without a thermonuclear stage). It is stated that these high-precision warheads of lower power, capable of deepening into the ground, are intended to some extent to compensate for the US lag in tactical nuclear weaponsSuch warheads are quite suitable for “surgical” strikes on intercontinental ballistic missile silos, chemical and bacteriological weapons storage facilities, and for destroying underground command posts.

The boats returning from combat patrol to the base are moored to a specially designated pier with heavy-duty cranes, where the SLBMs are unloaded from the missile silos over the course of several days. The missiles are then sent for diagnostics and maintenance.


Google Earth satellite image of the SLBM loading and unloading pier at Naval Base Bangor

Thus, American submarine “strategists”, unlike Russian SSBNs, do not carry out combat duty at their berths in their permanent bases.

At the Kings Bay naval base, special covered structures have been built into which boats enter to unload and load ammunition.


Google Earth satellite image of the facilities for unloading and loading SLBMs into SSBN missile silos at Kings Bay Naval Base

Buildings have been erected near the berths with loading equipment, where the technical condition of the Trident-2 missiles is monitored and prepared for further operation.


Google Earth satellite image of the berthing facilities and missile maintenance buildings at Bangor Naval Base

The naval bases where US SSBNs are based have arsenals and hardened storage facilities for servicing, repairing and housing the missiles.


Google Earth satellite image of nuclear storage facility at Bangor Naval Base

At the Bangor naval base, the nuclear storage facilities were recently reconstructed, with the area cleared of vegetation.


Google Earth satellite image of mothballed nuclear storage facility at Bangor Naval Base

Close to the perimeter of this facility there are mothballed underground storage facilities built in the 1960s.


Google Earth satellite image of nuclear storage facility at Kings Bay naval base

The storage facility at Naval Base Kings Bay is divided into two isolated areas. The "hot" area, a highly secure area with 42 hardened bunkers, is located in the southern part.

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  1. +9
    April 11 2025 04: 59
    Wonderful satellite images...you can see everything.
    Based on the accompanying infrastructure, it is even possible to conduct a small analysis of the object.
    Heh heh... I was able to find my car on last year's Google satellite map... request It is impossible to hide from the all-seeing eye of satellite reconnaissance without cover...the enemy sees everything.
    1. -1
      April 11 2025 05: 27
      Quote: Lech from Android.
      It is impossible to hide from the all-seeing eye of satellite reconnaissance without cover...the enemy sees everything.

      Decides on mobility and cover from observation.
    2. +6
      April 11 2025 10: 49
      Quote: Lech from Android.
      Wonderful satellite images...you can see everything.
      Based on the accompanying infrastructure, it is even possible to conduct a small analysis of the object.

      These are publicly available images, not in very good resolution, from a commercial satellite. For a narrow circle of users, there are higher quality images that are updated frequently.
    3. -1
      April 12 2025 08: 13
      Americans live across the sea - the ocean,
      They watch TV series and eat burgers.
      And they believe that they are God's chosen nation,
      Although outwardly Americans resemble us.
      And all Americans are sure of one thing
      That the most important person for their country
      Located in the Capitol Hill location,
      Where he occupies the main office in the White House.
      But somewhere in the endless snowy Siberia
      The mobile complex carries ballistic missiles,
      And behind the wheel of the complex sits Sergeant Vasily,
      Here Vasya is the most important person for America...(c)
  2. +3
    April 11 2025 05: 37
    The shelters in Kings Bay allow a couple of SSBNs to be brought there demonstratively and secretly taken out to sea. Fortunately, there is no continuous surveillance of the base.
  3. +6
    April 11 2025 06: 07
    hi
    As always, an interesting article and excellent illustrations!

    I remembered about the protection of SSBN bases in the USA during the Cold War, "when everything was real": "The base - or rather two bases - was located on the banks of the Thames River, about six miles north of Long Island Sound.
    The upper facility contained the usual naval amenities—officer quarters, logistics, a movie theater, a military supply depot, and barracks—as well as communications and command centers for both bases. More importantly, it housed the ordnance arsenal, where tactical weapons like torpedoes and, more clandestinely, nuclear weapons were stored. Downriver was the shelter where the Ohio-class submarines were moored (the Tridents were too big to fit under the I-1 bridge and were moored elsewhere).
    .... The base, as it soon became clear, was wide open. How wide? It had no real gates, just an entrance. laughing There were railroad tracks running along the north-south axis between the upper and lower bases. Wire mesh fences to keep people from wandering in. belay on the right side of the road to the base, rotted and rusted. Along the easternmost perimeter of the upper base there was no fence at all - just a 100-foot shale cliff dotted with brush, allspice and thistles. At its base was the armory building, surrounded by a single row of eight-foot-high chain-link fencing.
    ...
    ...rented a small plane and Race flew us under the 1-95 bridge, soaking the tires in the Thames River as we swooped low. We buzzed over the submarine docks. No one waved. fellow We rented a boat and raised the Soviet flag. soldier on its bow, then sailed past the base while openly videotaping the submarines in their dry docks, capturing secret details of their construction. The dry docks were open and unprotected - if we had decided to ram one of the submarines, nothing would have stopped us.
    Then Minkster - who had the best Arabic accent - called with the first threat. He dialed the New London central switchboard.
    - Naval submarine base, what can I do? lol can I help you?
    - Yeah, said Minkster, it's the Free Social Movement. lol ey/////yu Palestine. Free all our prisoners, or you, Zionist infidels, will suffer.
    Then he hung up just as the poor operator was about to say, "Whaaat?"
    That night, the base was on high alert. Marines patrolled the fence line at the main entrance. Naval guards stood guard at the side gate, where the only road led to the base hospital. Motion sensors around the armory building were turned on. But the sensors only protected two sides of the building. After all, who would be so rude? No. , to give two stomps and three claps from behind?
    ...
    After the quartet of SEALs had breached the secure area, we dropped a camera crew who were positioned to capture the action.
    Insert tape. Larry and Frank ducked under a chain-link fence and crept around one side of the armory; Pyzhik and Snake went the other way. A guard with a shotgun that had no round chambered told them to stop. Before he could react, Snake shot him with a silenced pistol and he fell. The middleman presumed him dead. And then the fun began. Pyzhik rigged a couple of propane tanks. Then he and Snake picked the side door and set a timer near the staging area. belay nuclear weapons. Among the torpedoes were also hidden IEDs - improvised explosive devices.
    To top it all off, Larry and Frank hung a huge poster on the armory building. good , made from a bed sheet. The inscription read: "BA-BAH! We love and kiss love , Movement for Free ///eruption feel Palestine." Then everyone climbed up the rock, we jumped into cars parked in the most visible place on the side of the road, and drove away.
    After successfully completing the night's work, we set off for a more serious terrorist mission. feel party. In one of the bars we visited, we picked up a couple of the prettiest employees laughing General Dynamics While They Were Dirty Dancing laughing with Pyzhik and Gold-Dust Frank, I stole feel their IDs.
    Death to you, ladies. fellow
    We reached the upper base without any problems. On the second day we struck the hospital, the communications center and the headquarters building, all without resistance. The reason was obvious from the start: submariners are very organized people.
    They work on checklists. Once something has been checked, it is crossed off the list and is not checked again. Terrorists do not work on checklists, they hit targets of opportunity. So we will wait until the place is checked by security, and then we will hit it, confident that no one will be waiting for us.
    The same thing turned out to be true for the submarine moorings. So on Day Two I sent Minkster, Little Rich, Jumpy, and Smart Artie about a quarter mile upriver to a yacht harbor. There they changed into wetsuits, put their clothes in waterproof bags, and swam to the submarine moorings. They climbed the pilings, changed again, hung their bags on the pier, and got to work. First, they found the sentries, who were quietly drinking coffee. drinks in their booths and silenced them. They then hid explosives behind the rudders of a nuclear submarine. They boarded belay another Ohio-class submarine and placed explosive charges in the control room, in the nuclear reactor belay compartment and torpedo compartment. When they were stopped request , they got out of the situation by calling themselves service personnel request from General Dynamics. No one asked them for identification, and if they had, they would have shown stolen IDs. feel me last night. They would wave them - thumbs conveniently covering the photo - and no one would suspect a thing."
    (c) "The Rogue Warrior", Richard Marcinko
    1. 0
      April 11 2025 07: 12
      Quote: Wildcat
      "The Rogue Warrior" by Richard Marcinko

      smile The robber was lucky... he didn't run into a soldier... he could have easily gotten a bullet.
      1. +5
        April 11 2025 08: 19
        Judging by the context, there were still exercises going on... and no one was preparing to shoot straight away, the intermediaries were running around...
        request

        But one day Marcinko and Co. ran into a campaigner soldier .... on the servant soldier - soldier general during counter-terrorism exercises in Italy... and the general got away with a broken wassat with your nose...
        crying
    2. 0
      April 11 2025 13: 03
      Quote: Wildcat
      hi
      Reminded me of the protection of SSBN bases in the US during the Cold War


      As far as I remember reading earlier, in Soviet times in the USSR, such tasks were performed by KUOS upon requests. It allocated people for inspections.
      1. +3
        April 11 2025 16: 03
        I have come across such stories several times in several memoir books (and humorous ones as well).
        The tricks, I remember, were the funniest:
        - they literally carried their man in uniform "with big shoulder straps" through the forest in their arms, and at the site he already "made a splash"
        - received a pass to a closed area under the pretext of giving a lecture
        - an officer "with high epaulettes" "cut out observation sectors"...
        - an officer "with high epaulettes" found "a kettle and an illegal electrical outlet" in the guardhouse and "gave the guard a lecturing talk"...
        etc.
        In general, the same situation: the weakest part of the security is the person and the "unwritten rules of bureaucracy". request
  4. -6
    April 11 2025 06: 12
    The history of the creation of the Trident 2 missiles and the Ohio submarines begins with the fact that after a comprehensive check in the 70s, the Americans discovered that 80 percent of ballistic missiles of various basings were not operational. They exploded during launch or at the beginning of the flight. They were on solid fuel and cavities formed in them, which led to an explosion. In order to get out of this situation and eliminate the problem, and to some extent calm the USSR so that it would not take advantage of this, the United States proposed and went to the SALT-1 treaty. By the 2000s, they had rearmed with the Trident 2 and Ohio and began to refuse various treaties limiting their military potential. soldier
    1. +9
      April 11 2025 10: 57
      Hello!
      Quote: V.
      The history of the creation of the Trident 2 missiles and the Ohio submarines begins with the fact that after a comprehensive check in the 70s, the Americans discovered that 80 percent of ballistic missiles of various basings were not operational. They exploded during launch or at the beginning of the flight. They were on solid fuel and cavities formed in them, which led to an explosion.

      I would be very grateful if you shared the source of information about where the information about 80% of non-functional American missiles came from.
      Some time ago I did a series on American SLBMs. According to publicly available data, no more than 15% of missiles failed during test launches, and this was not always related to the propulsion system.
      1. 0
        April 11 2025 11: 00
        You can't expect an answer to a question from a chatterbox) there's just something to blurt out, it doesn't matter what
        1. +2
          April 11 2025 11: 04
          Quote: Polyssenator
          You can't expect an answer to a question from a chatterbox) there's just something to blurt out, it doesn't matter what

          I believe that every adult and capable person should be responsible for their words. But, perhaps, about the 80% - it passed me by, and regarding the state of the American strategic nuclear forces during the "cold war" I do not know anything. request
          1. 0
            April 11 2025 11: 08
            I think so too, but it's not the case that if you don't ask, you'll immediately be labeled as a Jew)
            1. 0
              April 11 2025 11: 11
              Quote: Polyssenator
              I think so too, but it's not the case that if you don't ask, you'll immediately be labeled as a Jew)

              In this case, just understand and forgive! smile
              1. osp
                +1
                April 11 2025 13: 52
                Hello Sergey!
                The USA, unlike the USSR and Russia, has always been able to create good solid-fuel IRBMs.
                With the parameters that the Customer set. Here.
                In the case of the Tridents, the experience of creating solid fuel, shell composites and other things that were used in the Space Shuttle program came into play.
                That is, the US has always been at the forefront of solid-fuel rockets.

                In our country, before the advent of the "Akuly" (a huge and heavy IRLP on solid fuel), all IRLPs on submarines were liquid-fueled.
                And now it is the liquid "Sineva"/"Liner" that is the basis of the nuclear forces.
                1. +2
                  April 11 2025 19: 33
                  Sineva and Layner are on BDRMs, and judging by everything, the basis is already BOREI, and there are completely different missiles, which are solid-fuel, although their range and payload are smaller. That's how it is.
                  1. osp
                    +1
                    April 11 2025 19: 39
                    I know about this, that "Dolphins" are still the basis of the NSNF at least in the Northern Fleet. Although these are not young submarines, they are being written off little by little.
                    And the Bulava has the worst indicators for reliability, throw weight and range.
                    1. +1
                      April 11 2025 19: 44
                      And how do you like today's statement by our President? In this regard, of course, I want to note that now the share of modern weapons and equipment in the naval strategic nuclear forces in Russia is already 100 percent. The BDRMs of the SED do not fit together at all.
                      1. osp
                        +2
                        April 11 2025 19: 57
                        It seems there are no more "Kalmars" left in the Pacific Fleet.
                        The Dolphins don't want to blame everything on the SF.
                        The missiles for them are new and only they can be their carriers.
                        Although all "Dolphins" are of Soviet production.
                      2. 0
                        April 12 2025 14: 59
                        Quote from Barracuda 148
                        The BDRMs of the SED do not fit together at all.

                        So, the "Liners" are considered quite modern. They were tested already in the 00s, and they were rearmed almost yesterday. Well, the BDRMs themselves are the same age as the American "Ohio" of recent years of production, so the resource will be enough for another 5-10 years. For the sake of such missiles, they can hold back. And the START Treaty is about to end, and there is no need to comply with anything.
                      3. osp
                        +1
                        April 13 2025 01: 27
                        The Dolphin missiles, which are produced in Krasnoyarsk, although liquid, still have quite acceptable characteristics.
                        And fresh by year of production. They are again NSNF of the North-West direction.
                        But their carriers are already very old submarines, more than 30 years old.
                        It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain them in the current conditions, when a considerable part of the submarine equipment has not been produced for a long time and there is simply nothing to replace the worn-out systems with.

                        As the Dolphins are decommissioned, their missiles will have to be fired to launch small satellites (see Shtil), as previously planned, or Sevmash would have to build 2-3 new SSBNs for these missiles.
                        Because abandoning these missiles (their range and throw weight are significantly higher than the Bulava) will significantly reduce the combat capabilities of the NSNF.
                      4. -1
                        April 13 2025 10: 08
                        Quote from osp
                        Their carriers are already very old submarines, more than 30 years old.

                        In fact, their age is the same as that of the youngest Ohio missiles, and we really wouldn't want to lose such missiles. I think the best option (if repairs and service life extension are impossible) would be to turn these SSBNs into floating batteries, placing them in remote bays with external connections to the grid. The START Treaty is ending, there definitely won't be a new one, so the number of Borey missiles should be increased to 12-16 units, and the Dolphins should be kept as floating batteries in readiness for a retaliatory strike until the Liner and Sineva IRBMs are completely exhausted.
                        And Sevmash needs to prepare the keels of the Borey-K SSGNs, of which our fleet should preferably have at least 8, and optimally 12. 6 each in both fleets.
                      5. osp
                        0
                        April 13 2025 16: 11
                        The fact that they are the same age as the youngest Ohioans doesn't mean anything.
                        In Russia, production of a whole range of parts and mechanisms for these submarines has been lost.
                        I don't know how it is with the Americans and it doesn't matter. I think it's better than us.

                        The main advantage of SSBNs is to reach pre-optimal combat patrol areas in time and strike from under the water when necessary.
                        Otherwise, there is no point in them, in these so-called floating batteries.
                        They will be covered by flat strikes from enemy SLBMs from a minimum distance.
                        So that they won’t be able to launch even some of the missiles.
                        And that's not to mention underwater drones and self-transporting sea mines that can penetrate bases if something happens.

                        Currently, the Dolphins periodically carry out combat missions and exercises to the North Pole, accompanied by a multi-purpose submarine.
                        But the main area of ​​their combat deployment is the White Sea or the territories further beyond Novaya Zemlya where they can hide from NATO anti-submarine warfare.
                      6. +1
                        April 13 2025 17: 08
                        Quote from osp
                        They will be covered by flat strikes from enemy SLBMs from a minimum distance.

                        So they will cover all other submarines in the bases in the same way. In case of a sudden strike and the absence of a threatening period. Because quickly putting a submarine out to sea is a real hassle if it is not prepared in advance. The only thing that is possible is to have time to fire at least part of the BC from the pier. So why not fire in the same way\\not keep the "Dolphins" on duty for some time after they are unable to go on combat duty?
                        But I will not insist, here it is necessary to know very precisely the technical condition of the SLBMs, the SSNs themselves, the possibilities of dispersing these SSBNs in the river mouths somewhere in the middle part of the NSR, "beyond Novaya Zemlya" or somewhere else. The idea is to extend the combat duty period of the "Sineva" and "Liner" as much as possible in our very difficult times. Receiving new "Bulava" carriers for the Navy, but also leaving "Sineva" and "Liner" on duty at the pier. Because there is a distinct smell of war in the air.
                        These missiles will be especially effective in the case of a preemptive strike. In this case, they will be able to fire off all the missiles, down to the last one. Changes have been made to the doctrine, and the potential for such a strike must be contained. Again, I am not insisting, but I am suggesting that this possibility be considered.
                      7. osp
                        -1
                        April 13 2025 20: 05
                        I will say more, not only is the duty of these submarines in the bases near Murmansk practically ineffective, it will be ineffective even in the White Sea.
                        Due to the deployment of the Aegis naval missile defense system off the coast of Norway. Moreover, with interceptor missiles of the most modern modifications.
                        In theory, they will be able to intercept SLBMs launched from our territorial waters during their boost phase.
                        To strike them over our own territory. Maybe not all, but some part.
                        Therefore, in order to fire, the Dolphins will have to not only turn around in the White Sea, but also go beyond Novaya Zemlya.
                        Which will be very difficult to do due to the presence of NATO hunter submarines in the Barents Sea.

                        When the Sineva with its characteristics began to enter service, the Akula with its giant solid-fuel missiles became largely irrelevant.
                        There were fewer and fewer of these missiles for them; the technology for their production was lost in the post-Soviet era, including due to the breakdown of cooperation with Ukraine.
                        And this missile was outdated.
                        Ultimately, the Sharks' career was short-lived.
                        Modernization for more or less modern missiles was a dubious matter due to the enormous size and displacement of these submarines, which were still relatively young.
                      8. -1
                        April 13 2025 20: 31
                        Quote from osp
                        Due to the deployment of the Aegis naval missile defense system off the coast of Norway. Moreover, with interceptor missiles of the most modern modifications.

                        Well, you are considering the case of a counter-attack. Our doctrine also provides for a preemptive strike, in which the SSBNs at the pier will also take part, if they are unable to go to sea for some reason. After all, the game of preemptive (or first) strike can be played by two people. And in this case, extending the service life of liquid SLBMs takes on a completely different meaning - common sense.
                        It wouldn't hurt to also acquire a new base for the SSBN somewhere in the middle part of the NSR. I understand the high cost and complexity of such a task, but the vulnerability of the Northern Fleet bases makes it desirable and even necessary. Especially since the area there is already being inhabited by our oil and gas workers, so the energy supply issues can be resolved comprehensively. I understand the ice conditions, but we need to think about it.
                      9. osp
                        0
                        April 14 2025 01: 06
                        Now no one will set up new submarine bases there.
                        Their vulnerability will be no less than those that exist today.
                        They will need serious air defense coverage and protection from underwater drones and foreign submarines.
                        Which will be impossible to do.

                        Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk were supposed to serve as some reserves for the deployment of SSBNs in the White Sea.
                        And their cover there was entrusted to the Kuznetsov air group.
                        But that's history now.
                        And in reality, no one has ever worked on this.
                        Without interaction with the A-50 AWACS, the outdated fighter aircraft will not be able to protect even its own aircraft carrier.
                      10. -2
                        April 14 2025 06: 21
                        Quote from osp
                        Now no one will set up new submarine bases there.

                        Well, that means we need to return Norway "to its native harbor" so as not to fool ourselves with anything. Then we will ensure the security of the Northern Fleet, and England will be right next door. I would also return all of Scandinavia, so that things would be really good. And in the Baltics too.
                        And restore the GDR.
                2. +1
                  April 12 2025 01: 00
                  Quote from osp
                  Hello Sergey!

                  Hello, Konstantin!
                  Quote from osp
                  The USA, unlike the USSR and Russia, has always been able to create good solid-fuel IRBMs.
                  With the parameters that the Customer set. Here.
                  In the case of the Tridents, the experience of creating solid fuel, shell composites and other things that were used in the Space Shuttle program came into play.
                  That is, the US has always been at the forefront of solid-fuel rockets.

                  In our country, before the advent of the "Akuly" (a huge and heavy IRLP on solid fuel), all IRLPs on submarines were liquid-fueled.
                  And now it is the liquid "Sineva"/"Liner" that is the basis of the nuclear forces.

                  I know all this. Yes But, in any case, thanks for the knowledgeable comment! good
            2. +3
              April 11 2025 14: 13
              so he immediately writes down that he is a Jew)
              Sergei is used to it! laughing
              1. +2
                April 11 2025 14: 53
                Anton, hello!
                Seryozha has already gone to bed, he's on duty tomorrow.
                Quote: 3x3zsave
                so he immediately writes down that he is a Jew)
                Sergei is used to it!

                I also jokingly call him that. lol
                We earn quite well by Russian standards, but Seryozha periodically develops an unjustified sense of economy, and we have to pull him back.
                1. +3
                  April 11 2025 15: 38
                  but Seryozha periodically develops an unjustified sense of economy,
                  Then Matroskin the cat is also a Jew!
                  "And I won't subscribe to anything. I'll save money!" (C)
                  Hi, Olya!
                  1. +2
                    April 11 2025 15: 51
                    You mentioned Matroskin the cat, and I immediately remembered the Sea Cat. It's a pity he passed away, he was a kind uncle. sad
                    1. +3
                      April 11 2025 16: 08
                      Let him have a good time there!
              2. +5
                April 12 2025 01: 04
                Anton, good morning!
                Quote: 3x3zsave
                so he immediately writes down that he is a Jew)
                Sergei is used to it! laughing

                What do you have against Jews?
                Well, seriously, I don't care what nationality a person is. The main thing is how he behaves. In life, people are not divided into nationalities, they are divided into smart people and fools. But for fools, skin color, nationality, religion, etc. are important.
                1. osp
                  +1
                  April 12 2025 01: 43
                  Skin color and nationality are not important. And religion as a rule.
                  It’s just that within one religion there are different currents, not always peaceful and loyal to other religions.
                  And quite often among those who travel to Russia from Central Asia for work or, moreover, for citizenship, there are such people.
                  Who is being pressured by local security forces at home for their radical Wahhabi views.
                  And once they get to Russia, they feel freedom and begin to create their cells here.
                  You have to be very careful with this.
                  Moreover, Russian Muslims from the Caucasus and the Volga region are horrified by such behavior of these visitors.
                  1. +3
                    April 12 2025 01: 52
                    Quote from osp
                    And once they get to Russia, they feel freedom and begin to create their cells here.

                    Konstantin, if there is a desire, it is possible to create sufficiently reliable filters for those entering from Central Asia. Of course, not 100%, but not like we had until recently.
                    1. osp
                      +1
                      April 12 2025 03: 33
                      Sergey, as strange as it may be, the states of origin of these entrants create their own kind of “filters”.
                      Kazakhstan (and Russian people usually come from there and have no problems integrating into our society), Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan prohibit their citizens from having dual citizenship.
                      If you want a Russian passport, give up yours.
                      Because of this, people from the last two republics only go to work in Russia with a patent.
                      Tajikistan is a completely different matter. There is big politics here - an intergovernmental agreement on recognizing dual citizenship.
                      It is from this republic that the largest number of radicals penetrate into Russia.
                      And their nationality does not matter. It is those who come from there who have the greatest difficulties with integration into Russian society. More precisely, they are trying to build their own society, parallel to ours.
                      When their diasporas begin to build their own shadow justice system and Russian schools force them to live by their rules.
                      Moreover, when a significant part of them do not have official labor income and live on child benefits. Which Russian families do not have. Due to the presence of official labor income.
                      And no one there registers for military service after receiving a Russian passport.
                2. +4
                  April 12 2025 05: 42
                  What do you have against Jews?
                  What can I have against people who don't have nuclear weapons but are ready to use them?
                  Hello, Sergey!
      2. -5
        April 11 2025 12: 02
        When I served in the Strategic Missile Forces in 75-77, the deputy commander for political affairs told me this during classes, comparing our missiles with American ones. Ours are liquid fuel, theirs are solid fuel. After being put on combat duty
        After standing for several years, the Americans discovered voids (caverns) formed in the solid fuel, leading to explosions. That's when Ford came to conclude the SALT-1 agreement, to get time for rearmament. This information was not disseminated in principle, so as not to put the Americans in an awkward position. After 91, I read about this in the free press, where, of course, I don't remember. But you, as a weapons specialist, can find sources for this information. Maybe from historians of the Strategic Missile Forces.
        1. +4
          April 11 2025 12: 19
          Quote: V.
          The political officer told us this during classes, comparing our missiles with American ones.

          Well, if the political officer told us, then, regarding 80%, of course, there can be no doubt! Yes
          After all, the political officers in the Soviet army were people of crystal honesty, had a deep understanding of missile technology and had access to Soviet secret information concerning the current state of the American strategic nuclear forces.
          Quote: V.
          But you, as a weapons specialist, can find sources for this information. Maybe from the historians of the Strategic Missile Forces.

          It is impossible to find what does not exist. No.
          1. -6
            April 11 2025 12: 36
            You shouldn't say that about the political officers of the Strategic Missile Forces, all officers, whether political officers or logistics specialists, were part of the launch crews of duty shifts. They all graduated from higher engineering schools, and before taking up combat duty, they reviewed the military-political situation in the world. So that their hand wouldn't tremble, as they say.
            1. +2
              April 11 2025 13: 22
              Quote: V.
              You shouldn't say that about the political officers of the Strategic Missile Forces. All officers, whether political officers or logistics specialists, were part of the launch crews on duty.

              The political officers were officers who had completed their studies. military-political schools, which emphasized "loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist course of the party," and propaganda for combined arms training. In technical terms, they were mostly illiterate.
              Quote: V.
              Before taking up combat duty, they were briefed on the military-political situation in the world.

              It's the same in the country's air defense forces. But after these divorces, the deputy commander for educational work and I were constantly laughing at the crap he was pouring into the soldiers' ears.
              1. osp
                +1
                April 11 2025 14: 08
                I have a friend who is a retired colonel and is already over 80.
                He served in the country's Air Defense Forces during Soviet times.
                So, he spoke badly about these political officers.
                He says that they only interfered with the work of the personnel.
                After graduating from the Kharkov Air Defense Academy in 1974, he was sent to the Urals. He served there.
                He also said that pilots, as a rule, had good political officers in the sense that they flew.
                They could say something about the political part to people, but mostly it was flight work and preparation for it.
                1. -5
                  April 11 2025 14: 30
                  The deputy political officer gave him a recommendation to the Academy, and now he says that the deputy political officers prevented him from working with the personnel. Almost no one became higher than lieutenant colonel without the Academy, unless it was an exception.
  5. +2
    April 11 2025 06: 27
    In order to guarantee “nuclear retaliation” in any eventuality, the parties, in addition to increasing the resistance of silo launchers to the damaging effects of a nuclear explosion, rapidly developed mobile platforms.
    In parallel with strategic missile submarines, the Soviet Union built mobile ground and rail missile systems
    IMHO, of course, but the development of submarines with ballistic missiles in the USSR was caused not so much by the desire to increase the invulnerability of the platforms, but by the desire to obtain at least some nuclear weapons that could potentially hit the "enemy overseas."
    Unlike the Air Force or the first land-based ballistic missiles, even intercontinental ones, submarines could theoretically approach the launch range of their R11s or even launch R21s...
    1. +5
      April 11 2025 10: 57
      Quote: Wildcat
      IMHO, of course, but the development of submarines with ballistic missiles in the USSR was caused not so much by the desire to increase the invulnerability of the platforms, but by the desire to obtain at least some nuclear weapons that could potentially hit the "enemy overseas."

      Probably not even hitbut just fly over. Because before 1961 the USSR simply did not have serial ICBMs. And the first R-16 required at least half an hour for launch even at the highest readiness. And strategists even with ALCMs had practically no chance against the US air defense (which at that time still had DD SAMs deployed en masse).
      Quote: Wildcat
      Unlike the Air Force or the first land-based ballistic missiles, even intercontinental ones, submarines could theoretically approach the launch range of their R11s or even launch R21s...

      Theoretically, yes. But in practice, see the Cuban Missile Crisis.
      The only submarine that remained conditionally alive was saved only by peacetime. In wartime, at the first detection, it would have been hit with everything possible, not allowing it to escape - instead of knocking impulses on the hull and dropping "firecrackers".
      And the same submarines with R-11FM with their 150 km range would have to approach almost to the shore.
      1. +2
        April 11 2025 16: 10
        IMHO, if we consider the situation “capitalists attacked” - then everything is even worse.
        The very take-off of the Air Force would be questionable, as would the stability of the missile bases of the first missiles.

        But submarines deployed in the ocean still had some chance.
        And the same submarines with R-11FM with their 150 km range would have to approach almost to the shore.
        Oh, okay, approaching the shore - it was necessary to surface... and conduct pre-launch preparations... and all this directly at the target, 150 km...

        In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the conditions for submarines were still very bad and atypical: there was more time for operations against submarines, and the route was clear.
        In the case of BD, even with P11, the situation is still somewhat different.
        1. +4
          April 11 2025 17: 00
          Quote: Wildcat
          IMHO, if we consider the situation “capitalists attacked” - then everything is even worse.
          The very take-off of the Air Force would be questionable, as would the stability of the missile bases of the first missiles.

          Well, yes... even with the early R-16s there was a big question: would the missiles have time to take off before the enemy worked on their open ground launch sites.
          Quote: Wildcat
          Oh, okay, approaching the shore - it was necessary to surface... and conduct pre-launch preparations... and all this directly at the target, 150 km...

          Well, I didn’t describe the entire launch cycle: surface, lift the rocket to the top edge of the silo, turn the launch pad in azimuth, and only then launch.

          Plus weather and travel restrictions.
          Start-up excitement - up to 4-5 points
          Rolling tolerance - up to 12 degrees.
          Pitching - up to 6 degrees.
          Angular pitching velocity - up to 9 deg/s
          Submarine speed - up to 12 knots

          Quote: Wildcat
          In the case of BD, even with P11, the situation is still somewhat different.

          Yes, that's true. On the other hand, in case of BD, or rather before them, all relevant NATO forces will be involved in the PLO, including the RN, which hasn't yet deflated. And the Limeys have a wealth of PLO experience...
  6. -1
    April 11 2025 08: 25
    Quote: Wildcat
    the general got off with a broken nose...


    Sometimes ... smile the higher the rank, the greater the honor.
    1. +2
      April 11 2025 15: 43
      ... judging by the context - the general relaxed in Italy and did not take the training to counteract the capture of him, the general, by terrorists seriously... he tried to calm his wife down... and so he worsened his situation wassat
  7. 0
    April 11 2025 08: 29
    Canada should be the 51st state of the USA, let's see where the Canadian export "Mountain Oil Pipeline" ends. It used to be a quiet place, but now it's a thoroughfare. bullyWe have Severomorsk, but there are no nuclear submarines based there.
  8. osp
    +1
    April 11 2025 14: 02
    Quote: Lech from Android.
    Wonderful satellite images...you can see everything.
    Based on the accompanying infrastructure, it is even possible to conduct a small analysis of the object.
    Heh heh... I was able to find my car on last year's Google satellite map... request It is impossible to hide from the all-seeing eye of satellite reconnaissance without cover...the enemy sees everything.

    But we have a real problem with such satellites.
    Judging even by the fact that in the fourth year, the Ukrainian aviation, which has survived to this day, is throwing Western glide bombs at the Kursk and Belgorod regions.

    And this is a problem for all Russian spacecraft - there are few of them and their active lifespan is also small.
    Because in Russia, a whole range of the most important electronic components necessary for creating spacecraft electronics are not produced at all.
    Particularly resistant to various types of radiation.
  9. +5
    April 11 2025 14: 16
    Sergey. Good day. The article is as always great! But there is one BUT, it is definitely not your fault. The throw weight of the "Trident-2" - 2800 kg - is a misconception.
    This story begins with the SALT-1 Treaty (1973). Few people think about why there were only six years between the SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties, what was wrong with SALT-1?, that after six years they had to conclude a new treaty and denounce the old one. In 1970, the Americans adopted ICBMs and SLBMs with MIRVed warheads and a sharp increase in the number of warheads deployed on them began, but when the USSR began testing such missiles with MIRVed warheads, that's when they started getting completely hysterical, which was even called the "American ICBM Vulnerability Window". The fact is that the SALT-1 Treaty only introduced quantitative restrictions on carriers - ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. This is where the term "throw-in weight" appeared. The Americans calculated that the total throw-in weight of their ICBMs was about 1 tons, while the Soviets had 000 tons. In the Senate and Congress, all this hysteria continued for six years and beyond, that after the deployment of MIRVs, the Russians would have unlimited opportunities to increase their strategic potential. They even attempted to increase the throw-weight of their ICBMs using methods available to them at the time. The deployment of the Minuteman III was exactly this method, where they did not try to increase the total number of warheads on the ICBMs, but to increase the throw-weight. By replacing 4 Minuteman II missiles with Mk-500B warheads, with a throw-weight of 3 kg, with the same number of Minuteman IIIs with Mk-550 warheads, with a throw-weight of 2 kg, they were simply trying to catch up with the Russians. This is where the MX ICBMs come from. So then, in the new treaty (SALT-11), a clause appeared with the throw-weight and launch weight of ICBMs and SLBMs, everything is described in great detail in it. I don't want to quote it now, my articles have it all. So that's where the figure 720 comes from - from the data exchange, already in 3, when the missile existed only in paper form, the Americans themselves did not yet really know how everything would be in "metal". The estimated weight of the W12/Mk1 was 150 pounds (2 kg), in reality it turned out to be 2 kg, when it was brought to "metal" in 800. And then they simply added up the estimated weight of eight warheads and gave us this figure. Since then, it has appeared in official documents. We know that this is not true, the Americans know that we know it. But in the documents, everything is as before. The actual throw-weight of the Trident 1979 SLBM is 88 kg (with a full load of up to 5 W800/Mk360 warheads or up to 330 W1987/Mk2 (4840 won't fit on the platform, so it's a myth). If anyone wants, I'll give a breakdown of the throw-weight. Now, in our time, the Ohio SSBNs are entering service with a standard warhead complement of 8 warheads on 88 missiles. Configuration - the following 5 missiles carry 12 W76/Mk4 warheads, another 14 carry either 90 W20/Mk10, or 5 W76/Mk4, or a mixed configuration of 10 plus 4.
    1. +1
      April 12 2025 01: 07
      Hello, hello!
      Thank you for your insightful and detailed comment!
  10. +2
    April 11 2025 16: 22
    In general, it should be noted that you can't trust the Americans, they always try to deceive you about everything. For example, the same SALT-2 treaty - what figures did they give us: "Minuteman-3" - throw weight - 1 kg, although this weight corresponds only to missiles with the Mk-150 warhead, and there are only 12 of them, though by 250, and 1982 units are missiles with the Mk-300A warhead, and there the throw weight is 12 kg. And in the documents they continue to give - 1 kg. Now SLBMs, according to the "Trident-800" documents they give a throw weight of 1 kg, the real one is 150 kg, at the time of the conclusion (signing) of SALT-1 the missile was already in service, the Americans could not help but know that they are brazenly deceiving us. Ours gave the throw-weight for both ICBMs and SLBMs, calculated according to all the rules, up to a kilogram. And all these figures migrate from treaty to treaty, and in the current START-1 everything is the same.
    1. +2
      April 11 2025 18: 21
      Sorry, there was a mistake. The throw weight of the Trident 1 is not 3 kg, but 520 kg.
      1 kg is the weight of eight W320/Mk76 warheads plus 4 kg is the weight of the dispensing unit, platform, control unit and fuel and oxidizer supply.
    2. +1
      April 12 2025 01: 12
      Quote from sergeyketonov
      In general, it should be noted that you can’t trust the Americans, they always try to deceive you in everything.

      We also successfully deceived "potential partners". War is the path of deception...
      1. osp
        0
        April 12 2025 01: 31
        Sergey, I'm afraid that we were deceived much more than these "probable partners".
        There is almost no production left in Russia. That's the problem.
        Even those products that Ukraine supplied until 2022 (electromechanical marine and industrial devices, for example) have still not been able to be replaced in Russia in terms of production.
        There are no factories in Moscow anymore, factories in Ryazan and Chelyabinsk cannot do this because it is unprofitable and it is not easy with small bearings.

        But it is impossible to make modern electronic devices using domestic components.
        It is not made in Russia.
  11. osp
    0
    April 11 2025 19: 49
    And to hunt for the Ohio, the USSR Navy began to order new multi-purpose submarines, which were called Shchuka-B.
    The plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur built Project 971 submarines for the Pacific Fleet and built 8 nuclear submarines.
    Of which no more than 1-2 remain in service.
    The Indian sailors have worn out the last one, "Nerpa", so much that after its return they are thinking about writing it off.

    The plant in Severodvinsk built 7 such submarines of the 971st project. Their readiness and condition in the Northern Fleet are somewhat better than in the Pacific Fleet.
    Because the ship repair base is nearby.

    But it is especially worth noting the Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Nizhny Novgorod, which made very good multi-purpose nuclear submarines of its own design. With a titanium hull.
    Now all this is history.
    Nothing like this is being built in Russia.
    All production cooperation on them has been destroyed long ago.
    1. +3
      April 12 2025 01: 10
      Quote from osp
      Because the ship repair base is nearby.

      Konstantin, Bolshoy Kamen also has a very good ship repair facility. It's not about repair capacity, but about priorities. The Pacific Fleet has always been a stepson.
      1. osp
        +1
        April 12 2025 01: 23
        Sergey, I know about this. But submarine repairs there often dragged on for years, if they were done at all, due to budget cuts.
        Nizhny Novgorod and Severodvinsk are in the European part of Russia.
        Most of the supplier factories and design organizations are nearby.
        At Sevmash, even in Soviet times, there was a division that was engaged in the development of welding equipment for TIG welding of titanium and alloy steel, as well as MIG welding of carbon steel.
        Then, it became an independent company and even took on the automated welding direction. Although the company is small, I have been familiar with their products for more than 10 years.
        A very successful company that now holds the entire post-Soviet market for such equipment.

        The Pacific Fleet and the shipbuilding/ship repair yards that ensured its existence had problems not only with money, but also with the geographical remoteness from the main suppliers.
        After all, it only takes a day or two to deliver turbines from the plant in Kaluga to the plant in Nizhny Novgorod or Severodvinsk.
        And to the Far East it all took quite a long time to get there by rail.
        Well, in the post-Soviet era it became like this...
  12. osp
    0
    April 12 2025 03: 47
    Quote: Bongo
    Quote from osp
    Hello Sergey!

    Hello, Konstantin!
    Quote from osp
    The USA, unlike the USSR and Russia, has always been able to create good solid-fuel IRBMs.
    With the parameters that the Customer set. Here.
    In the case of the Tridents, the experience of creating solid fuel, shell composites and other things that were used in the Space Shuttle program came into play.
    That is, the US has always been at the forefront of solid-fuel rockets.

    In our country, before the advent of the "Akuly" (a huge and heavy IRLP on solid fuel), all IRLPs on submarines were liquid-fueled.
    And now it is the liquid "Sineva"/"Liner" that is the basis of the nuclear forces.

    I know all this. Yes But, in any case, thanks for the knowledgeable comment! good

    I will say more - over the decades the USA has accumulated a huge amount of experience in creating radiation-resistant electronic components that have proven themselves excellent in interplanetary space of automatic devices that worked perfectly up to the orbit of Pluto.
    Such microcircuits and, accordingly, the satellites assembled on them can have decades of active existence!
    Russia is a complete failure in this regard, one could say.
    Satellites made on the basis of civilian imported microcircuits from old stocks or from those that after the sanctions still reach Russia by roundabout routes have a very short period of active existence or may not even “wake up” after being launched into orbit.
    And they can only work in low orbits.
    And in interplanetary space, when shot through by solar particles, such electronics fail.
    The crashed lunar station is one example.

    After sanctions rained down on factories in Moscow, Zelenograd and Voronezh working in the field of space electronics/military industrial complex, everything became very difficult there.
    Especially since they cut off supplies of silicon wafers from Europe and materials even for 0.35-0.25 micron lines.
    Almost nothing modern is produced.
    In addition to power electronics from Bryansk and radiation-resistant microcircuits, there are also Soviet-developed ones using the 1.2-3.0 micron process.
  13. -2
    April 12 2025 20: 01
    Why are there satellite images from Google everywhere? And where are the achievements of Russian space?

    Maybe instead of actresses and useless robots like Fyodor we should start sending satellites into space?!
    1. osp
      +1
      April 13 2025 01: 11
      I wrote several comments on this topic above.
      Why does this happen?
      A number of essential electronic components required for building modern avionics systems, and especially for spacecraft equipment, are not manufactured in Russia.
      It requires special microcircuits and optics that operate in harsh conditions of various radiation and extreme temperatures.
      This is if you make a modern satellite.
      That is why most Russian spacecraft have a very short period of active existence.
      Their electronics are made using civilian imported components that can still be purchased in a roundabout way or used from old stocks.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. 0
        April 16 2025 03: 43
        Here's the problem! There will be an order and conditions will do anything! They made a nuclear bomb and it can be done! If only the leadership wanted it!
  14. +3
    April 14 2025 22: 38
    The coordinates of all these bases have been known for 50 years, if not more. The other side knows them too.
    I served in the mid-80s. We knew not only the names of the enemy air bases and what exactly was based there, but even the last name and rank of the regiment commander.
  15. 0
    April 16 2025 03: 42
    I wonder what will happen to the satellite's photographic equipment if its lens is visited by a laser beam?