Why do we need Marine divisions? Some thoughts on...

194 951 265
Why do we need Marine divisions? Some thoughts on...

The Russian President took a step that was quite expected in the conditions of modern international relations - he decided to reorganize the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps brigades will be reformatted into divisions. Discussions about this had been going on for a long time both in the Ministry of Defense and in the General Staff. The situation in the world required such a decision.

In order to understand the logic of the actions of the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense, it is necessary to understand the very essence of the change in the status of the Marines in our army. This is not just an "increase" in the unit, this is a fundamental change in the tasks of the Marines. By the way, I agree that the successful actions of our Marines in the Kursk region played an important role in making this decision.



Work in this direction has been going on for a long time. Since the time of Minister Shoigu. It's just that our memory is short. We quickly forget or do not attach importance to the actions that have already been taken. We remember the dispersal of divisions and their transformation into brigades, but we have forgotten the reverse actions of the Russian Defense Ministry. Let me remind you of the revival of the Tamanskaya (5th Motorized Rifle) and Kantemirovskaya (4th tank) divisions, the 42nd and 152nd motorized rifle divisions and others.

In order to understand the essence of the decision taken, it is necessary to explain the difference between a brigade and a division. For the average person, the differences often come down to a simple difference in the number of personnel, equipment and weapons. In reality, everything is much more complicated.

Is a brigade a shortened division or something else?


I have deliberately put this question in the subtitle of the section. I hear it too often in conversations with people. And I understand where this question comes from. It is the result of those same “reforms” of our army that allowed the West to start “opening its mouth” on Russia. “Reforms”, the results of which we still feel.

So, both division and brigade are large tactical formations designed to solve tactical problems. Modern divisions in the armies of the world have approximately the same number. From 8 to 20 thousand or more rank and file personnel. The division includes units and parts of different branches of the armed forces.

A brigade is a "shortened version" of a division. For example, a division has artillery regiment, while a brigade has only a division, and so on. Accordingly, the number of a brigade varies from 2 to 8 thousand people. Why does the number vary so much? In modern armies, brigades and divisions are different, designed to perform different tasks.

Remember what the Russian government was guided by when reducing divisions? What was officially stated? Divisions are expensive, the number of generals is off the charts, there will be no war like World War II, and brigades are preferable for military conflicts. Theoretically, these words make sense, if you think logically.

But life has shown that humanity has always had, has and probably will have problems with logic. The SVO, which was initially planned as a military conflict, turned into a war between the West and Russia, a war between the old and the new. And the military actions are taking place in the form of a full-scale war, not a conflict.

So what are the fundamental differences between a division and a brigade, why did they appear? The answer, as always, is simple. The differences are hidden in the size of the associations. A division is a huge enterprise. An MSD is 6 regiments (three MSRs, a tank, an artillery, an anti-aircraftmissile). The backbone of the union!

These are separate units (communications battalion, anti-tank division, reconnaissance battalion, engineer-sapper, medical, logistics, repair and restoration battalions) and subdivisions (separate NBC protection companies, EW, BPA, commandant's). Let's add here our own arsenals and warehouses (food and clothing)...

With some stretch, we can say that a division is a mini-army, capable of independently conducting combat operations at the expense of its own resources for some time, necessary for the deployment of the main forces of the army or front. And our ancestors were right when division commanders were awarded general ranks. The volume of work in a division is colossal.

Here another question arises - about the effectiveness of the division and brigade. It seems to be elementary arithmetic. Instead of one division, cover the front with two brigades, adding the necessary units from other formations. Alas, arithmetic has little meaning here. Units and subdivisions will always be more effective already because they undergo combat coordination in the rear. They know each other's capabilities.

Two brigades cannot do this. The coordination takes place at the front line. And this is extra blood, extra losses.

And here is where the fundamental difference between these units emerges. A brigade is more mobile due to its smaller number of personnel. This is its advantage. We often see during the war in Ukraine how brigades transfer both armies from one area to another. Why?

The answer is again not a "terrible secret". To plug holes in the defense or replace a battered attacking unit. Here is the difference. A division is capable of independently conducting combat operations even with superior enemy forces, while a brigade is most often a "rescue team".

And the last difference. The presence of rear units forces the division commander to keep a certain part of the personnel in the rear. The division almost never fights with all personnel. Remember the beautiful episodes from war movies? When the enemy breaks through the defense in some area, and the division commander orders to throw the rear units into battle.

The brigade commander cannot afford this. He does not have this "reserve" in the rear. Incidentally, this is why we often read reports that some of the brigades have been defeated and withdrawn to the rear for replenishment. For a brigade, any losses mean a reduction in combat potential. And losses like those that the Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades are suffering today on the LBS, especially in the Kursk region, mean defeat for any brigade.

Why the Marine Corps?


This question arises among those who did not listen attentively to the president's speech in the submarine's wardroom. More precisely, among those who only heard the message about the reorganization of the brigades, but did not bother to listen about the functions of the new deputy commander of the Navy.

Meanwhile, this is quite important. In addition to the five brigades that General Gudkov will reform into divisions, the existing coastal missile and artillery units will be transferred to his command. In practice, this means that the new deputy commander will be responsible for the entire coastal defense of our coast.

And the second fact that I would like to draw attention to. I will quote from the Supreme's speech:

"All of these units need to be brought up to the level of combat readiness and effectiveness that you have achieved in the 155th Marine Brigade, Pacific fleet».

I think it is quite clear that the Supreme Commander demands that the Marines be made not just troops on high combat readiness, but combat units that will be capable of independently defeating any landing force that lands on our shores.

At the same time, the tasks that were set for the Marines earlier are not cancelled. Marine units and subdivisions must be ready at any moment to land on enemy territory and ensure the meeting of the main forces of the army and navy.

I started the article by saying that it is the international situation that dictates such a decision. The appointment of Major General Gudkov as Deputy Commander of the Russian Navy once again confirms that I am right. Let me digress a little from the main topic. Why from brigade commander to deputy commander, why Gudkov?

In my opinion, the General Staff and the Supreme Command did not take this step without a reason. Unfortunately, there are not many branches of the armed forces in our army that have managed to preserve the "Soviet traditions" and the Soviet training system. Probably, these are only the Airborne Forces and the Marines. That is why these units fight better than others. Even though the reinforcements coming to the fighting units are the same.

A combat general who has created a brigade that has performed well, who has fought in several wars, who has been awarded many military awards and, most importantly, who is not accustomed to behind-the-scenes games in rear headquarters and “court” units, that is what is needed to create truly combat divisions.

Let's return to the international situation. The Black Sea, the Baltic, the Pacific Ocean, the Northern Sea Route. Everywhere today, activity by a potential enemy is observed. Our territory and our coast are a tasty morsel for any Western state. This means that we must be ready for a quick reaction and the rapid destruction of enemy units. Otherwise, a long war of attrition...

Ukraine is neither the first nor the last on the list of potential enemies


Alas, no matter what we say or write about diplomatic schemes for overcoming the crisis in international relations, the probability of a new war is high. Ukraine has simply been chosen as the first victim. For many decades, the idea of ​​victory over Russia has been implanted in the heads of Ukrainians, and other nations. The idea of ​​the complete collapse of our country, the idea of ​​the absence of democracy and everything on which the ideology of the West is based.

Moreover, during this time the West has raised a galaxy of politicians who will make any sacrifice, including the destruction of their own state, for the sake of a mythical victory over Moscow. Zelensky is one of the representatives of this type of sadomasochists. A friend of the same lover Macron and others.

Did anyone believe in Kyiv's military capabilities? Did anyone believe in Ukraine's victory in the fight against Russia? Naturally, except for those who are still running around Ukrainian cities and villages shouting "Glory to Ukraine!", those who have been "processed" over many decades? Who among those Russians who often write critical comments about our army, our generals, our society, believes in Ukraine's victory?

No! Everyone knows that this is impossible, but they are still ready to die for this "victory". I am not talking about politicians and businessmen, I am talking about the "common people" whose hands are elbow-deep in the blood of both Ukrainians and Russians. I am talking about the Balts, Poles, Germans, French and others who do not rule out the start of a new world war. They know that in the best case we will all die, along with the planet, and in the worst case their countries and their peoples will cease to exist, but they still want it, they are still preparing...

Our task is to have time to create an insurmountable shield for the West, a military barrier of such power that fantasies about seizing our territories will not even arise. Five new divisions of marines are one of the steps towards creating such a shield. We do not intend to "turn the left cheek after a blow to the right" any more. Only blow for blow. A crushing blow...
265 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. + 13
    April 3 2025 04: 32
    Did anyone believe in Kyiv's military capabilities? Did anyone believe in Ukraine's victory in the fight against Russia?

    They believed that the Russian economy would collapse and the people would stage a coup. That had already happened in 1917 and 1991. Why not repeat it? But something went wrong.
    1. +8
      April 3 2025 06: 22
      According to the plan, "democratized" Belarus and Kazakhstan were supposed to take part in this, and then the other former republics would have definitely joined the trinity, and then there would have been a completely different situation.
    2. +7
      April 3 2025 10: 33
      Well, as the developments show, the West is in no hurry. It is simply doing everything to destroy Russia. It didn't work once, it didn't work twice, it will work a third time. There are more than enough dissatisfied people in Russia, the cauldron of tension has been boiling for a long time, and it can explode at any moment. The West is setting traps, and the "supreme" constantly falls into them, justifying itself: "we were deceived again." The situation with migrants from Central Asia and Transcaucasia alone is worth something. And as for the marine divisions, they need to find personnel, officers (military schools are closed), equipment, housing, infrastructure somewhere. I'm not even talking about the ships on which these "marines" will have to be based, and the military transport aircraft from which they will parachute.
      1. -5
        April 3 2025 12: 32
        And when will there be UAV divisions? The war of drone operators is already real.
        1. +2
          April 3 2025 13: 40
          Judging by the "efficiency" of our generals and the General Staff, I think we will begin to form around 2050.
          1. AAK
            +8
            April 3 2025 14: 14
            Apparently, either the author of the article, or (God forbid!!!) the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, or maybe I myself, do not fully understand something. 5 divisions are either an army or a reinforced corps for special tasks. Let's take our main "unbrotherly partners" - the United States - as an example. There, the USAMC is a large military formation (about 170 thousand - combat personnel, about 33 thousand - organized reserves) not only with special tasks, but also with a special legal status (it can be used personally by the President of the United States (on and outside the territory of the United States) without the consent of Congress), plus in addition to the regular landing craft to ensure the movement and supply of his expeditionary formations (EBnMP, EBRMP and EDMP), the Sealift Command and squadrons of warehouse ships are involved. Outside the territory of the United States, the Marine Corps is intended for actions in the first echelon of troops. Also, the Marine Corps, unlike the Marine Corps of the Russian Federation, has aviation units in its regular composition. The Marine Corps of the Russian Federation does not have enough regular landing craft even for 1 brigade (with equipment and supplies of the first priority logistics). How will we transport the rest? At what forward bases outside the territory of the Russian Federation will the contingents of these divisions be located. Well, and most importantly - the organizational and staff structure of the Marine Corps is very different from a mechanized division or a coastal defense division (based on the tasks that the author defines as types for the Marine Corps divisions being formed), which are more suitable for this in their structure and especially in their weapons. If it is only a matter of "Soviet traditions", then who is stopping these traditions, courage and high morale of the Marine Corps from being transferred to those units that will be more suitable for performing the tasks that are "matched" for the Marine Corps.
            1. +5
              April 3 2025 14: 38
              Quote: AAK
              Who is preventing these traditions, courage and high fighting spirit of the Marine Corps from being transferred to those units that will be more suitable for carrying out the tasks that are being "matched" for the Marine Corps?
              Indeed, if we need a strong infantry, what prevents us from creating a "beautiful uniform", traditions, high combat training and high morale in motorized rifle units? If there is a war with NATO, do we need new divisions of marines first and foremost? Well, let there be new divisions of marines, but we also need new tank and motorized rifle divisions, in general, a radical increase in the number of our army in the increased risks of a major war.
              1. +6
                April 3 2025 16: 50
                At whose expense will we strengthen it? Who will join the army tomorrow? You see what is happening in Russia - the country is dying. Or are you suggesting that we put "new Russians" from Central Asia and Transcaucasia into service? We urgently need not marine divisions, but operational divisions of the Russian Guard, OMON, SOBR - "Crocus" has clearly shown this.
            2. + 20
              April 3 2025 16: 57
              Quote: AAK
              Apparently either the author of the article, or (God forbid!!!) the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, or maybe I myself, do not fully understand something.

              I'm talking about the author. Yes
              To begin with: he seriously considers both a brigade and a division to be an association(?). Well, I'm not a military man and I don't know everything, so look at the calendar, well, at least in the same WIKI! And then you'll see that "associations" start with a 1st-category CORPS/NAVAL BASE. And the associations themselves are divided into:
              - operational-tactical (army corps, military base);
              - operational (Army, flotilla, squadron);
              - operational-strategic (army group, front, fleet)
              But "division" and "brigade" are units!
              Next. Where did the author get the idea that "combat coordination" of the brigade is carried out at the front line??? They fight at the front line! A unit that has not undergone combat coordination is not sent to the front (except for emergency cases when it is necessary to plug an enemy breakthrough).
              But it is more difficult for two brigades to organize "interaction" between themselves on the LBS than for one division between its regiments and support units... But these are completely different things: coordination and interaction...
              Thirdly, From the speech of the Supreme Commander it becomes clear that the position of Deputy Commander (not Commander) of the Navy (not the Navy) is a replacement for the previous position of Deputy Commander of the Navy for coastal forces. Now (as it was under grandma) the Marine Divisions (DiMP) will be responsible for the defense of the fleet's bases (when repelling an enemy offensive) and for capturing/holding a landing beachhead for the advancing army, for opening another front, capturing important territories and enemy facilities in coastal areas during offensive operations in the coastal area (coastal front).
              Fourth, and this is the most important thing! For these divisions it will be necessary to create Divisions of Marine Landing Forces. The DMDS must have the necessary number of LANDING CAPABILITIES! Landing ships, transport, landing craft, etc. And for the DSBP/DSRP we also need military transport aircraft and helicopters...High-altitude landing craft...
              And this equipment is now hardly enough for one full-fledged brigade...
              And considering that the NK fleet is chronically short of NK, there is practically nothing to provide for the landing of troops. We need: anti-submarine ships, air defense forces, combat defense forces to cover the landing forces during the sea crossing, anti-submarine forces, air defense forces in the landing area, trench defense, obstacle clearance forces, etc.
              Based on this, it is logical to assume that the DMP will "guard and defend" rather than "land and capture." At least at first.
              AHA.
              1. -2
                April 5 2025 08: 30
                It's also interesting - you can create armies, but if there are landing craft in all fleets for 3 battalions at most - then what for? Profanation. Another embezzlement of the military budget.
              2. 0
                April 5 2025 14: 39
                Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
                He is completely serious and considers both the brigade and the division to be a union(?)

                Maybe in the Navy it's different, but in general:
                - a unit is a squad, platoon, company, battalion,
                - part - regiment,
                - unit - brigade (tactical unit), division, corps,
                - association - army, front\district.
                As for the deployment of five Marine Corps brigades in the division, it was announced back in the fall of 2022 - after the announcement of partial mobilization. The same was announced for the Airborne Forces - on the basis of separate brigades and airborne assault brigades. Divisions will be deployed for the Airborne Forces. At the same time, the new number of Marine Corps of the Navy was announced - 50 (against the previous 000 according to the staff and no more than 20 in practice), and the Airborne Forces - up to 000 (against the previous 18). And since only now, during the appointment of the new commander of the Marine Corps of the Navy, it was said that "it is necessary to bring the level of their training to the level of the 000th Marine Corps Brigade", it means that such a formation is still ongoing. Well, the fact that coastal guard units and subdivisions, coastal artillery and coastal missile systems are now being transferred to the Marine Corps is expected and reasonable. Especially since in the Far East we can only organize the defense of the vast coastline, Kamchatka, the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, using the forces of the Marine Corps and the coastal defense forces from its composition. If tomorrow the enemy lands a landing force on the islands of the Kuril Islands, what forces will be needed to drive them out of there? What forces will be needed to quickly strengthen the defense of our island possessions? And the Northern Fleet is in the same situation. Even without the task of capturing foreign shores, the Marine Corps has more than enough tasks on its own shores.

                Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
                For these divisions, it will be necessary to create Divisions of Marine Landing Forces. The DMDS must have the required number of LANDING CAPABILITIES! Landing ships, transport, landing craft, etc. And for the DSBP / DSRP, military transport aircraft and helicopters are needed... KVP...

                Yes. There would be bones (divisions), and the meat (personnel) and armor (weapons, internal combustion engines, other equipment) will "grow". Even if it is VERY slowly for now, two new UDCs/BDKs are being built in Kaliningrad, and two UDC-helicopter carriers in Kerch. The overwhelming majority of the old Soviet-built BDKs were assembled at the World Cup on the eve of the NVO, a few were damaged, but the rest remain there, because the straits are closed, and the time for naval landings and for providing naval logistics may still come ... when the nature of the NVO finally changes.
                Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
                It is logical to assume that the DMP will "guard and defend" rather than "land and capture." At least at first.

                Most likely, that's exactly it. They always dance "from the stove" - ​​i.e. from defense.
            3. -1
              April 4 2025 23: 51
              Here it seems simple to me...these are coastal defense divisions, you are right, these are not marines capable of landing troops or anything else...solving strategic tasks of capturing the enemy coast.
        2. -3
          April 3 2025 15: 18
          Quote: Civil
          And when will there be UAV divisions? The war of drone operators is already real.

          It seems that the formation of UAV troops should begin in the third quarter of 2025.
          And so, it has long been necessary to form separate UAV Air Armies.
          1. 0
            April 3 2025 15: 25
            Quote: Bearded
            Quote: Civil
            And when will there be UAV divisions? The war of drone operators is already real.

            It seems that the formation of UAV troops should begin in the third quarter of 2025.
            And so, it has long been necessary to form separate UAV Air Armies.

            Air forces are air armies. And I'm talking about motorized riflemen. Which are no longer "motorized" or "rifle" - there are statistics of injuries in the public domain - there, in first place, by a huge margin (less than 10% of rifle injuries), are losses from UAVs of all types. The FPV drone should become as standard as the AK. That's what I'm talking about.
            1. -1
              April 3 2025 17: 56
              Quote: Civil
              Quote: Bearded
              Quote: Civil
              And when will there be UAV divisions? The war of drone operators is already real.

              It seems that the formation of UAV troops should begin in the third quarter of 2025.
              And so, it has long been necessary to form separate UAV Air Armies.

              Air forces are air armies. And I'm talking about motorized riflemen. Which are no longer "motorized" or "rifle" - there are statistics of injuries in the public domain - there, in first place, by a huge margin (less than 10% of rifle injuries), are losses from UAVs of all types. The FPV drone should become as standard as the AK. That's what I'm talking about.

              Why only FPV drone?
              There are currently a huge number of modifications of various drones for various purposes. Systematic development of robotic combat systems for all purposes is needed.
          2. +1
            April 3 2025 17: 51
            Not UAV troops - that even sounds stupid!
            And SBRS is the force of unmanned robotic systems.
            1. -2
              April 3 2025 17: 54
              Quote from The Watcher
              Not UAV troops - that even sounds stupid!
              And SBRS is the force of unmanned robotic systems.

              Who cares?
              The creation of regiments, divisions, armies of robotic systems is not a question of some future, but of today and even yesterday.
              Our Ministry of Defense is far behind Ukraine in this matter.
              1. -1
                April 3 2025 18: 05
                What Ukraine are we lagging behind, what nonsense are you writing? I regularly read the Western press and they constantly write that Russia now has the most advanced unmanned systems in the world and that they now also need to create, as you put it, "drone troops" - i.e. based on this, it turns out that the Americans have never had such a separate branch of the military either. And now, taking into account the new military conflict (Russia/Ukraine), they need to create it. In general, the Americans have such an interesting institute for the study of war, which accordingly studies all military conflicts and they are actively observing the conflict in Ukraine and drawing the necessary conclusions for themselves.
                1. Ray
                  +4
                  April 3 2025 20: 47
                  and the Americans have never had such a separate branch of the military either. And now, given the new military conflict (Russia/Ukraine), they need to create it.
                  Nobody had it. That's the problem, the Americans aren't fighting now, but we are, and we should have had it yesterday. Like tanks with some kind of protection from Javelins, which were delivered to the Ukrainians back in 17-18, and they wrote about it openly. But barbecue grills on tanks appeared only when the world was filled with photos and videos of our tanks destroyed by Jawas and Bayraktars, torn off turrets, etc., when the offensive stopped. Digital secure communication on tanks began to appear only at the end of 23, after 2 years of war, when we had already lost one and a half to 2 thousand tanks, according to war correspondents. And only after the world had seen the heroic battle of the Alyosha tank, and they later admitted in an interview that they had no communication in their tank, and they didn't know the number of the enemy.
                  And what the Westerners write about our UAVs - they are scaring their own people so that they don't grumble about the money injections to the Ukrainians. If it comes down to it, they are also making heroes of the Akhmat special forces, scaring their own with hordes of evil Chechens. But everyone understands how things really are with Akhmat. The same is true for the UAVs.
                  1. -1
                    5 July 2025 16: 00
                    How many tanks did Bayraktars destroy?
                2. -2
                  April 4 2025 05: 26
                  So look at the statistics - how many drones Ukraine makes and how many we make. And everything will become clear.
        3. -1
          April 4 2025 01: 04
          Since it was not included in the final communiqué, this means that common sense prevailed, that is, never.
        4. -1
          28 June 2025 12: 29
          Quote: Civil
          War of the drone operators

          War, you see, is not a separate matter for drone operators or anyone else. It is everyone's business. Only balanced troops with sufficient manpower can be successful.
          The same drones owe their effectiveness only to the fact that they were ahead of the deployment of effective means of combating them.
          But the time is not far off when, from the combined impact of electronic warfare and destruction of both small UAVs and their crews, they will fall from the sky like flies from dichlorvos. And what then?
          Then there must be other means of waging armed struggle, both traditional and new.
          Nowadays, the percentage of enemy defeats from small arms is low, however, no one even thinks about taking away a soldier’s machine gun....
          On the contrary, shotguns add even more.
      2. -2
        April 4 2025 05: 17
        Haven't you heard about the program to build 1000 aircraft by 30? That's the program they'll be parachuting into.
      3. -1
        April 6 2025 11: 09
        Quote: fiberboard
        The situation with migrants from Central Asia and Transcaucasia alone is worth something.

        Which your supreme leader created at the instigation of the oligarchy.
    3. -1
      April 4 2025 23: 33
      Quote: malyvalv
      Why not repeat? But something went wrong.

      And it could go wrong. You don't have to go far, in the latest SP articles they started pushing that the Ukrainians would rush to the Rostov NPP (near Volgodonsk) with 120 helicopters, but they are silent about Kursk, although they have already tried to go there, by land, and it is not far from the border. You can't stretch a marine division across all of Russia. But thinking about training the entire army, at a higher, professional level - that's it. The Airborne Forces should prevent breakthroughs on land, the marines should cover the coast. All this is a rapid reaction force, covering critical areas until the main forces arrive.
      Now, unfortunately, they are being pushed as a high-quality replacement for infantry.
    4. -1
      27 May 2025 02: 16
      Neither in 1917 nor in 1991.
      no "people" nothing
      Did NOT suit!!!
      Maidan technology
      in principle does NOT provide for
      participation of the "people" in governance
      mass CONFUSION!!!!!
      Just free cannon fodder,
      destroying each other under
      thunderous applause from the West :-(((
      1. -1
        27 May 2025 12: 53
        1917 and 1991 are revolutions. With a change in social formation and everything that falls under the definition of revolution. Doesn't happen without the support of the people.
        Maidan technologies are different. They promote corruption among the elites and withdraw money to controlled accounts. After which the elite becomes controllable and does what is required of it. The people have minimal influence here.
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. -1
            28 May 2025 22: 25
            What does that have to do with Karla-Marla?
            Of course, the people's support was complete. After centuries of mockery by nobles and landowners and breaking of hats, numerous popular revolts, someone came and said "land to the peasants, factories to the workers" and that's it. Very simple. Without your abstruse philosophies and reasoning (nonsense). And off it went. Who would refuse the land and the factory? That's why Lenin is considered a genius.
            1. The comment was deleted.
              1. -1
                29 May 2025 12: 54
                I observe empty hysterical chatter. I recommend hanging yourself from such emotional disorder.
                1. The comment was deleted.
    5. -1
      28 June 2025 12: 17
      Quote: malyvalv
      They believed that the Russian economy would collapse and the people would stage a coup.

      That's right!
      As for the formation of marine divisions on the basis of brigades, everything is simple here. The SVO has shown with all obviousness that troops are needed for war, infantry is needed, both marine and ordinary. War cannot be won by bombing alone, albeit high-precision, "compact and highly professional" units.
      And on the basis of a division, during the war, it is possible to deploy an army corps, and if there are also personnel units and weapons, then an army.
  2. + 33
    April 3 2025 05: 05
    The five new Marine divisions are one step toward creating such a shield.

    Yeah, take units that are not used for their intended purpose and increase them so that in the future they can also be used for purposes other than their intended purpose. Brilliant...
    1. -12
      April 3 2025 07: 29
      why increase it?
      there was a brigade of 8 thousand
      became a division of 8 thousand
      was a brigadier general
      became a division general soldier
      1. -2
        April 3 2025 11: 25
        Dear Sir, we are not a banana country, we do not have brigade, division and other Papuan generals. There is a major general, etc., no need to talk nonsense here.
        1. -3
          April 3 2025 13: 18
          judging by the war that we can't "start" these generals were brought from your Papuasia
          and whether they are major generals or army generals doesn't matter anymore am
        2. -3
          April 3 2025 13: 44
          Quote: potap6509
          Dear Sir, we are not a banana country, we do not have brigade, division or other Papuan generals.

          Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bagration, etc. - "Papuan generals"? And they were also "brigadier generals"... and personally I think it would be worth introducing a rank so that the distinction would be in the general commanding a brigade and division...
          1. AAK
            0
            April 3 2025 14: 17
            Well, they weren't brigadier generals at the time, but brigadiers (that's a rank, not a position, by the way). There's more similarity in the name with the British army than with the American army.
            1. 0
              April 3 2025 14: 46
              Quote: AAK
              Well, they weren't brigadier generals at the time, but brigadiers.

              I completely agree, thanks for the clarification hi
            2. -1
              April 3 2025 14: 51
              The rank of "Brigadier" was in the Russian army in the period 1722-1796. It could be revived before the rank of major general, and in the navy "Commander", before the rank of rear admiral. In the Polish army, general ranks sound more reasonable, and our naval admiral ranks are more reasonable than the leapfrog from major general, to lieutenant general and further, to colonel general. Many civilians find this logic difficult to understand.
              1. AAK
                -3
                April 3 2025 14: 56
                Captain-commander was a rank in the Russian navy (from Peter and a little later), and in Great Britain and the USA in the navy and in the Air Force there is the rank of "Commodore" (before the rank of "rear admiral junior" and brigadier general of the Air Force). Well, and also "commander" is a degree of distinction in some orders like "commander's cross of the order of such-and-such..."
                1. -2
                  April 3 2025 15: 35
                  If you're not in the know, then don't talk nonsense - a commander is just a major in the naval hierarchy in the US.
                  1. AAK
                    -3
                    April 4 2025 12: 03
                    not a commander, but a commodore... type in the search engine the RN and RAF ranks...
                    1. AAK
                      -3
                      April 4 2025 12: 11
                      The following are in sequence: commander, captain, commodore (in the Air Force - air commodore. In the Army and Marine Corps the equivalent is brigadier)
    2. +5
      April 3 2025 08: 17
      The direct purpose of the Marines is to beat the enemy. And if there is no need or opportunity to conduct landings, they must beat the enemy where it is necessary and possible.
    3. +6
      April 3 2025 08: 50
      I gave a plus, although I don’t agree with the statement.
      The article contains many blunders in definitions and attempts to systematize the essence of future changes. But overall, the semantic component is present.
      So, in formations (and not associations, - as in the article) the tactical calculations include the indicators COMBAT POTENTIAL and FIRE CAPABILITIES. There is no point in presenting specific calculations here, but I will say that if the combat potential during the transition to a divisional composition increases by 2 times, then the fire capabilities by 8 (the figures are rounded). This is what is sorely lacking now for these organizations. And the great ones, in order for the tasks to be carried out by the Marines, have to strengthen these organizations at the expense of others. And the lifting and transport capabilities will change to the required level.
      Another question entirely is the possibility of doing this by means of weapons, materiel and transport. And the most important thing is trained commanders who can reach the level of command of units (including artillery, engineering, communications, intelligence, etc.)
    4. -1
      April 3 2025 21: 02
      Dear "Puncher"! And the ingenious has always been simple, or almost simple... That's why it's ingenious...
  3. +8
    April 3 2025 05: 15
    Well, the same 155th Pacific Fleet went through many difficult battles since the beginning of the North Military District, the same first assault on Ugledar, and often the mention of the Marines surfaced in a variety of directions, so the guys' combat path was not easy, but they proved that they are a combat-ready unit in life, and not on paper. Unfortunately, our implementation is often lame, remember the first Chechen, when an order came to half-collapsed units to expand the number according to the wartime staff, and literally from all over the country they gathered people to increase the number, without even paying attention to specialties. It is easy to issue an order, but you need to find people, you need to find equipment, you need to deploy all this somewhere, it is easy to reduce, difficult to recreate ....
  4. + 15
    April 3 2025 05: 27
    Divisions numbering 8-20 thousand exist only in the papers of headquarters and combat units, permanent deployment points (like the same Tamanskaya) and even in exercises from the USSR era, when almost every platoon was given arrows showing how to move along the road, invisible from the stands.
    As soon as a real war breaks out, such units instantly turn into an uncontrollable horde. Therefore, in reality, according to the LIST composition, they always fought in brigades (i.e. tactical units, numbering 4000-6000), including in the Great Patriotic War. 1941 taught us.
    For example, during the storming of Königsberg, Vasilevsky had 27 so-called "divisions" with a total of 106. Each such "division" had 000, including the rear. And the strike group itself was about 4000.
    The assault lasted 4 days, losses were 2 times less than in Bakhmut. And Koenig is not Bakhmut. wink
    1. +6
      April 3 2025 05: 54
      We just need to copy the composition and numbers of the mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht of 41; humanity has not invented anything more effective.
      1. + 10
        April 3 2025 06: 25
        We just need to copy the composition and numbers of the mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht of 41; humanity has not invented anything more effective.

        The Germans also decreased throughout the war, by the end of the war there were 18000 left from 10000. This is according to the staff wink .

        And it’s not a matter of a lack of horsepower, but of optimal control and mobility.
        Nothing prevented the same Vasilevsky from uniting 27 divisions of 4000 each into 9 regular divisions of 12000 each near Königsberg. But he was already a seasoned veteran and understood that in this case his army would turn into a herd. Yes
        1. -1
          April 3 2025 07: 39
          What does this mean?
          People don't reach for the stars
          It is easier to find 30 colonels than ten generals
          real generals to complete the task and not ruin the personnel
      2. +5
        April 3 2025 08: 25
        Quote: Clever man
        We just need to copy the composition and number of mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht of 41,

        What standards do you live by? Maybe we should revive the cavalry?
        In general, the entire structure of the Ministry of Defense needs to be shaken up. The tactics of warfare need to be changed in principle. The staff needs to be changed, the attitude towards drones, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and communications needs to change radically!!!
        1. -13
          April 3 2025 10: 22
          Glory to the Russian soldier! Glory to Russian weapons!! Glory to our president!!!

          Quote: APASUS
          What standards do you live by?

          It seems that Smart Guy thinks that we lost WWII, since he suggests that we follow their example...

          Quote: APASUS
          In general, the entire structure of the Moscow Region needs to be shaken up

          We started and what do we hear on the forum? Diarrhea of ​​words, with constipation of thoughts (not for everyone).... The experience of units that have proven their effectiveness in combat must be multiplied.
          1. -1
            April 3 2025 16: 13
            Quote: Boris55
            It seems that Smart Guy thinks that we lost WWII, since he suggests that we follow their example...

            Who are you going to follow as an example? At that time the Wehrmacht did not have:
            1 Space reconnaissance
            2 UAVs
            3 EW, REP
            4 High-precision weapons
            Each point brings with it a change not only in the staffing level, but also in the combat tactics. The tactics of using weapons.
            Quote: Boris55
            We started and what do we hear on the forum? Diarrhea of ​​words, with constipation of thoughts (not for everyone)....

            Open house day at the mental hospital again
            1. -1
              April 3 2025 16: 22
              I agree with you, but if we had started with a group equal in size to one Wehrmacht army group, aimed at Ukraine in 1941, the result would have been different.
            2. -1
              April 4 2025 08: 55
              Glory to the Russian soldier! Glory to Russian weapons!! Glory to our president!!!

              Quote: APASUS
              Who are you going to follow as an example?

              I AM?!

              My brain hasn't been knocked out yet. It was we who defeated the fascists, not they who defeated us.
              You say something else about weapons... But we have defeated them with all kinds of weapons and will continue to defeat them for one simple reason - they fight for the right to rob, and we fight for the right to live.

              To follow the example of the vanquished means to doom yourself to defeat in the future war. hi

              ps
              "Smart guy" is the one you responded to in your first post.
              1. 0
                April 4 2025 09: 53
                I hope you are writing from the trenches on the front line? Or are you just dragging yourself into the victories of our grandfathers?
                1. -1
                  April 4 2025 10: 01
                  [right]The essence of Russian civilization is Bolshevism.[/right
                  Quote: Clever man
                  Or are you just dragging yourself into the victories of our grandfathers?

                  I do not separate myself from my ancestors. You are of no interest to me. hi
                  1. -1
                    April 4 2025 11: 12
                    So you didn't win the Great Patriotic War? You haven't been there? Are you just wagging your tongue? What is your relationship to the victory and what is your contribution? Tell me?
                  2. -1
                    April 4 2025 18: 12
                    Do you want me to explain to you why you are a coward and a dummy? You are rooting for Bolshevism, but why didn't you go and lie down under the tanks near the White House? When did your regime fall? And I will answer you, you are either a coward or a traitor, choose
              2. -1
                April 4 2025 13: 22
                Quote: Boris55
                My brain hasn't been knocked out yet. It was we who defeated the fascists, not they who defeated us.

                I don’t understand what you’re getting at. Where did I doubt the victory over the fascists?
                Quote: Boris55
                Weapons, you say, are different.

                Yes, it's different and technologies have stepped forward and therefore the tactics are completely different and the formations, the staff, everything is new. The Wehrmacht is the last century.
                Quote: Boris55
                "Smart guy" is the one you responded to in your first post.

                Now, in Russian, what did you mean by this?
          2. -2
            April 3 2025 16: 23
            The orderly didn't find your smartphone during the search?
      3. +1
        April 3 2025 08: 46
        However, the Wehrmacht lacked mechanized divisions. The Germans had the name motorized infantry and motorized divisions. There were no mechanized divisions, either numbered or named. Moreover, not in any wave of formation.
        1. -2
          April 3 2025 16: 30
          I agree with you, let it be a tank
          1. -1
            April 4 2025 17: 03
            But the thing is that in 1941 the staff of the Wehrmacht tank divisions were different. And sometimes they were very different, for example, the divisions that had Czech tanks had more vehicles in the battalions. The number of battalions also varied, and the reorganization of light divisions into new ones also had nuances.
      4. -1
        April 3 2025 10: 41
        Why copy? We need to proceed from today's weapons and capabilities, tactics of action. The tactics of the Wehrmacht in 1941 had already changed by 1945. Due to the saturation of the Soviet troops with a large number of tanks, the Germans stopped creating large tank units, and also began to distribute tanks among infantry units. Now tanks are used mainly as self-propelled guns. Tactics are constantly changing.
      5. -1
        April 4 2025 01: 28
        Invented. Soviet tank/mechanized corps, Russian tank/motorized rifle division. And thank God, no one thought of copying the German six-battalion cadavers.
    2. + 13
      April 3 2025 07: 20
      Soviet wartime divisions were undermanned primarily due to the disproportionate growth of the general staff.
      In 1941, new divisions were created to replace the broken ones, and the generals most often survived and needed to be placed somewhere, just like the new generals. During the war, the number of generals and admirals increased by 5.3 times (from 1056 to 5599), while the army's size increased by 2.8 times (from 3.9 to 11 million).

      The Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army never decided to reduce the bloated general staff, and this issue was not within the competence of the commanders and they did not have time for it.
      I am afraid that after the end of the Central Military District our army will again be distinguished by the largest proportion of generals and everything will be adjusted to the need to create staff positions for the generals.
      1. +3
        April 3 2025 07: 24
        During the war years, the number of generals and admirals increased by 5.3 times (from 1056 to 5599), while the size of the army increased by 2.8 times (from 3.9 to 11 million).

        Doesn't it bother you at all that the first number is the peacetime army, and the second is the wartime army?
        1. +4
          April 3 2025 08: 06
          Quote: strannik1985
          During the war years, the number of generals and admirals increased by 5.3 times (from 1056 to 5599), while the size of the army increased by 2.8 times (from 3.9 to 11 million).

          Doesn't it bother you at all that the first number is the peacetime army, and the second is the wartime army?


          During mobilization, the peacetime division's staff strength is increased to the wartime division's strength. The proportion of generals in the army should decrease, but here, on the contrary, it doubled.
          In the Anglo-Saxon system, temporary ranks allow for painless optimization of the number of command personnel after the war, but this did not happen with us.
          1. -1
            April 3 2025 08: 40
            The proportion of generals in the army should be decreasing, but here, on the contrary, it has doubled.

            Why should it decrease? There was a rifle division 4/120 - it became 04/400, the staff line of the division commander did not change, moreover, on 22.06 there were 177 divisions, according to the mobilization plan there should have been 198, in reality by December 1, 1941 there were 314, by the end of the war there were 520 rifle divisions alone.
      2. 0
        April 3 2025 08: 55
        Soviet wartime divisions were undermanned primarily due to the disproportionate growth of the general staff.
        In 1941, new divisions were created to replace the broken ones, and the generals most often survived and needed to be placed somewhere, just like the new generals. During the war, the number of generals and admirals increased by 5.3 times (from 1056 to 5599), while the army's size increased by 2.8 times (from 3.9 to 11 million).

        The Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army never decided to reduce the bloated general staff, and this issue was not within the competence of the commanders and they did not have time for it.
        I am afraid that after the end of the Central Military District our army will again be distinguished by the largest proportion of generals and everything will be adjusted to the need to create staff positions for the generals.

        That's right. However, the list size after being trained experimentally came to 4000-6000. Still manageable, but already for carrying out a combat mission. Sometimes, though, just barely. wink

        The most curious thing is that it was defined back in the days of the Roman legions. And it remained so despite the change in weapons, communications, etc. I think it's a matter of the anatomical dimensions of the human body. If we were hobbits, we would probably fight in units of 12000. laughing
        1. -1
          April 3 2025 09: 50
          All roads lead to Rome, definitely.
          1. -1
            April 3 2025 15: 41
            Their hats are not in accordance with Feng Shui, they don’t have horns, but they should!
          2. -1
            27 May 2025 02: 31
            In the clearing of the enemy of the Romans
            we were mowing at noon... :-)))
        2. +8
          April 3 2025 11: 33
          Quote: Arzt
          That's right. However, the list size after being staffed empirically came to 4000-6000.

          It was not the numbers that came through experience, but the reserve for mobilization was exhausted. 4000-6000 in a division and less than a hundred in a company - this is "cut your legs according to your clothes". As well as only 30 reinforcements for Zhukov before the Berlin operation.
          It was not because life was good that we had to support rifle regiments with artillery divisions.
          If divisions of 6000 people were effective, this would have been fixed in the staffing. Fortunately, their changes in the Red Army were regular. But no, the staffing of a rifle division had to be three times larger.
          1. -3
            April 3 2025 12: 10
            It was not the numbers that came through experience, but the reserve for mobilization was exhausted. 4000-6000 in a division and less than a hundred in a company - this is "cut your legs according to your clothes". As well as only 30 reinforcements for Zhukov before the Berlin operation.
            It was not because life was good that we had to support rifle regiments with artillery divisions.
            If divisions of 6000 people were effective, this would have been fixed in the staffing. Fortunately, their changes in the Red Army were regular. But no, the staffing of a rifle division had to be three times larger.

            Alexey, the army is like a cake, 16 can be cut into 000, 4,3 or 2 pieces. Another thing is whether you can manage half of the cake. wink If 6000 is ineffective, they would have combined 2 and that's it. But they just DISCONNECTED.

            Zhukov, in the 1st Belorussian, before the Berlin operation had the highest staffing of divisions 5000 - 6000 people (the rest - even less). And he counted it sufficient to begin with, because of experience. what

            How to consolidate the States, cut colonels and generals? This is not in our traditions! laughing
            1. 0
              April 3 2025 15: 29
              Quote: Arzt
              If 6000 is ineffective, they would have combined 2 and that's it.

              Only with such a unification the firepower will increase insignificantly - the main shortage was in active bayonets. But the defensive/offensive zone of the united division will double.
              Or it would be necessary to build super-divisions with a doubled artillery component, which would pull along with them both the super-headquarters and the rear.
              Quote: Arzt
              Zhukov, in the 1st Belorussian, before the Berlin operation had the largest staffing of divisions 5000 - 6000 people (the rest - even less). And he considered it sufficient for the beginning, because of experience.

              He considered it the maximum possible under the current conditions - they won't give more, we'll have to fight with it. And it was because of this shortage that Zhukov and Konev had such a bias towards NPP tanks and artillery.
              Quote: Arzt
              How to consolidate the States, cut colonels and generals?

              Yes, exactly the same as before - when in 1941 they reduced the pre-war wartime staffing levels. In the BTV they abandoned divisions and corps altogether.
          2. 0
            April 3 2025 16: 02
            If divisions of 6000 people were effective, this would have been fixed in the staffing. Fortunately, their changes in the Red Army were regular. But no, the staffing of a rifle division had to be three times larger.


            Before the First World War, the division structure was different: A division had two brigades; a brigade had two regiments; a regiment had four battalions; a battalion had four companies; a company had two half-companies; a half-company had two platoons.
            During the war, brigades were abolished as an intermediate link between division and regiment and they switched to the three-member system of organization known to us, which was preserved in the future.
            This confirms your thesis that effective innovations become entrenched.
      3. 0
        April 3 2025 10: 46
        No, not because of this, not because of the "disproportionate growth of the generals". But because of the difficulties of managing a large number of personnel and equipment. The Germans had the same thing. That's why they began to create tank and artillery regiments of 20-30 tanks instead of 90-100 at the beginning of the war. This gives more mobility.
        1. -2
          April 3 2025 16: 32
          No, not because of this, not because of the "disproportionate growth of the generals". But because of the difficulties of managing a large number of personnel and equipment. The Germans had the same thing. That's why they began to create tank and artillery regiments of 20-30 tanks instead of 90-100 at the beginning of the war. This gives more mobility.


          During the Blitzkrieg, the Wehrmacht tank regiment consisted of 120 tanks; by May 1945, the staffing level had been reduced to 40.
          In the summer of 1942, the Red Army tank brigade consisted of 7 to 27 tanks according to different staffing levels (there were 56 options). From the end of 1943, they switched to a single staffing level of 65 tanks.
          Thus, it is clear that 20-30 tanks are only out of desperation. Full-blooded tank units won.
          1. -4
            April 3 2025 16: 55
            Somewhere it was written that the IS-2 tank regiment consisted of 21 tanks. In theory, this is a battalion, but in order to compete on equal terms with infantry commanders, they considered it a regiment. After all, we have always had "military leaders" who were ready to send both people and equipment to slaughter.
            1. +2
              April 3 2025 18: 08
              Quote: fiberboard
              Somewhere they wrote that the IS-2 tank regiment consisted of 21 tanks.

              The OGVTPP had 21 tanks from the very beginning - since 1942.
              On October 8, 1942, the GABTU KA received an order from I. Stalin "to create separate breakthrough regiments from the KV and Churchill tanks, consisting of 21 tanks each, and to have them in the Headquarters reserve, assigning them the name of Guards." Following this, the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 1104913ss appeared, according to which the formation of such units began, which received the name of separate guards tank breakthrough regiments.
              © Tankfront
              Note that the IVS immediately ordered the formation of not just regiments, but Guards regiments of the Headquarters Reserve. Apparently, he also had a good idea of ​​the level of training of infantry commanders and did not want to give them free rein to dispose of precious heavy tank units.
              Quote: fiberboard
              In theory, it was a battalion, but in order to compete on equal terms with infantry commanders, it was considered a regiment.

              The same thing happened with the linear units and formations of the BTV. Mr. Shein wrote that this entire brigade-corps structure of tank and mechanized troops appeared for two reasons:
              Firstly, the tank crews needed to be given strong headquarters in order to operate not only their own diverse forces, but also those assigned to them.
              Secondly, tankers needed to be raised up a level so that infantry commanders who did not know and did not want to know the tactics of tank troops could not repeat 1941. When a general, who met a tank battalion on the road, which according to the plan was bypassing an enemy defense node, could send it into a frontal attack on the anti-tank defense (a real case, which ended up in documents at the GABTU level).
        2. 0
          April 3 2025 20: 10
          Well, probably not quite like that.
          Quote: fiberboard
          No, not because of this, not because of the "disproportionate growth of the generals". But because of the difficulties of managing a large number of personnel and equipment.

          A certain Manstein, commanding a tank corps in 1941, complained that the volume of decisions per unit of time in the TC corresponded to that in a rifle army. And the corps headquarters, staffed according to the staff of the corps headquarters, due to its small number, could not cope (or coped with an enormous strain of forces) with conveying orders to the troops. Of course, these are not "general" positions, but all the same - "staff rats" laughing
          Quote: fiberboard
          That is why they began to create tank and artillery regiments of 20-30 tanks instead of 90-100 at the beginning of the war.

          This is probably not true. They just ran out of tanks. request. I don't think that the Wehrmacht commanders would have simply given up the "extra" 7-8 dozen tanks. laughing
          In general, it seems that the consolidation of units is not based on the need to increase the number of "general" positions (if there's one thing we're very good at, it's generating positions for the "right" people), but on the unwillingness (inability) to wage a "mobile war". God, as we've known since Napoleon, is on the side of the "big battalions". There's more meat, and less thinking and decision-making is needed. laughing request
    3. 0
      April 3 2025 08: 20
      The assault lasted 4 days, the losses were 2 times less than in Bakhmut. And Koenig is not Bakhmut

      Well, Vasilevsky is not Gerasimov, and Stalin did not look back at the opinions of his “respected partners.”
      And the Great Patriotic War is not a military conflict, but a full-fledged war.
      1. -4
        April 3 2025 10: 51
        Who are you, what are you writing? Now they'll come running screaming "State Department agent! Csposhnik!" How can you compare some Vasilevsky and the great voivode Gerasimov?
    4. +2
      April 3 2025 12: 00
      Therefore, in reality, according to the LIST composition, they always fought in brigades (i.e. tactical units, numbering 4000-6000)

      The problem is that if a division is capable of fielding at least one fully combat-ready brigade for combat operations, or at worst a regimental tactical group, and providing it with everything it needs, including the required replenishment of equipment and people, then the maximum capabilities of a brigade are a battalion tactical group with all the ensuing limitations in capabilities, combat radius, and separation depth from the brigade supplying the battalion, which will be many times less than those of a regimental tactical group hanging on the division's supply. But there is one nuance - both divisions and brigades can be combined into an army corps, and then a corps formed from brigades may be more effective in solving local problems (for example, breaking through a specific direction) than a corps based on divisions, because, in fact, it will be a division at its maximum, but to which units of other branches of the armed forces are also attached.
      1. -1
        April 3 2025 12: 42
        The problem is that if a division is capable of fielding at least one fully combat-ready brigade for combat operations, or at worst a regimental tactical group, and providing it with everything it needs, including the required replenishment of equipment and people, then the maximum capabilities of a brigade are a battalion tactical group with all the ensuing limitations in capabilities, combat radius, and separation depth from the brigade supplying the battalion, which will be many times less than those of a regimental tactical group hanging on the division's supply. But there is one nuance - both divisions and brigades can be combined into an army corps, and then a corps formed from brigades may be more effective in solving local problems (for example, breaking through a specific direction) than a corps based on divisions, because, in fact, it will be a division at its maximum, but to which units of other branches of the armed forces are also attached.

        A brigade should not be compared with a division, but with a regiment, to be fair. At the lower level, there are still battalions in both places, another matter is what will better ensure their work - a regiment or a brigade.
        Experience shows that the optimal tactical formation is 1000-1500 directly in combat formations and 3000-3500 support. That is, a brigade.
        1. +1
          April 3 2025 13: 30
          Experience shows that the optimal tactical formation is 1000-1500 directly in combat formations and 3000-3500 support. That is, a brigade.

          Experience showed already during the exercises in 2011, after the formation of the new-look brigades, that they cannot act independently. The SVO was convinced that this is indeed the case.
          Both the airborne and marine brigades already have a real strength of over 10 people. That is, in essence, the real state of affairs is being consolidated in the staff. Support units are being added.
          1. -2
            April 3 2025 13: 42
            Experience showed already during the exercises in 2011, after the formation of the new-look brigades, that they cannot act independently. The SVO was convinced that this is indeed the case.
            Both the airborne and marine brigades already have a real strength of over 10 people. That is, in essence, the real state of affairs is being consolidated in the staff. Support units are being added.

            What 10, if 000 is collected, then that's good. And in 3000, there are generally about 155 bayonets according to open data, and nothing, it works quite effectively.
            But this is not enough of course, they will make it a "division" and bring it up to 5000. laughing

            "Each Marine Brigade has three battalions of fighters, with a total of 500 men each. Of these three battalions, one is an assault battalion and another is a reconnaissance battalion.
            Also, each brigade has a tank company with 11 MBT units, an anti-aircraft missile and artillery division, a separate self-propelled artillery division (usually 18 units) with a 122-mm Gvozdika self-propelled gun, a MLRS rocket battery (6 units), as well as engineering and sapper units, electronic warfare and repair companies.
            The total number of the brigade reaches 3 thousand fighters."


            https://amalantra.ru/chislenost-brigad-morskoy-pekhoty-uvelichat-do-diviziy/
            1. -1
              April 3 2025 13: 48
              The link to the staffing level is not relevant at the moment.
              In reality, non-staff rifle battalions have been additionally formed in the brigades. That is why I am writing about non-staff numbers.
          2. -2
            April 3 2025 18: 53
            What kind of exercises in 2011 when the brigade fought terrorists? And you don't want to try to take Kharkov with the help of the brigade?
            1. -1
              April 4 2025 12: 12
              What terrorists? In the military, training is always conducted with an equal opponent. Terrorists are for the press.
              And who suggests taking the city with one team? There was only one precedent, and then the person involved apologized for a long time that he was misunderstood.
        2. -1
          April 3 2025 21: 31
          A brigade should not be compared with a division, but with a regiment, to be more precise.

          Excuse me, but where did I compare a brigade with a division? I was talking about what a division and a brigade are really capable of fielding. In one case, it is a regiment, in the other, a battalion. And then I emphasized that a corps formed from brigades is essentially a division, but one with significantly greater firepower, coherence, and is significantly more mobile.

          In general, if you are interested in my opinion, I would divide the entire Armed Forces into two large and approximately equal parts (elements). The first is the rapid reaction forces (RRF), which would include all special forces, airborne forces, marines, guards tank, artillery and motorized infantry units, all aviation without exception, the navy, electronic warfare and half of the air defense. The second is actually the rest of the army (I propose to call it that, simply and without fuss - the Russian Army or RA), which would include all the national guard, conscripts, as well as regular (not guards) tank, artillery and motorized infantry units and the second half of the air defense. I believe there is no need to explain what functions and tasks will be assigned to each of these elements of the armed forces, since they follow from the very names of these structures. In addition to them, another, third element should also be formed within the RF Armed Forces, the purpose of which is to take on the logistical and technical support for the needs of both the RA and the RRF. Let's call it the Engineering Corps. It is from here that it is proposed to recruit technical personnel for servicing airfields, naval sailors, vehicle drivers, NBC, sappers, etc. Also, the Strategic Missile Forces, missile defense systems and missile attack detection radars and the 12th Directorate remain separate, which, I think, is understandable.

          The rapid reaction forces will be formed exclusively on a contract basis, but the troops of the Russian Army and the Engineering Corps - on a mixed basis: officers, warrant officers and sergeants - contract soldiers, privates - conscripts. I would make the approximate ratio of the number of rapid reaction forces and the RA approximately the same 40 to 45-50%, leaving 10-15% of the number of the Armed Forces for the engineering corps. For the ground forces of the RRF, the main structural unit would be rapid reaction brigades, consolidated into corps, and for the RA - reduced divisions, consolidated into armies. Moreover, the main idea is not just to create two separate structures within the armed forces, but to create a system of communicating vessels, where the RA serves as a forge of personnel for the RRF, and the Engineering Corps - for the Ministry of Emergency Situations. To do this, it is necessary to create a system of filters that allow finding the most suitable candidates for service in the RRF, as well as a system of material incentives that spur applicants. However, the main thing is not to overdo it and not to hypertrophy one part of the armed forces to the detriment of another. For example, the pay of officers and contract soldiers of the RRF should not be higher than 10-15% than that of officers and contract soldiers in similar positions and with identical ranks in the RA, but this difference is due to higher workloads and life in a constant state of readiness, as well as increased risk (more on this below). In addition, the time between receiving an extraordinary rank in the RRF should also be accelerated by the same 10-15% compared to the RA, which again follows from the more intensive training that the fighters and officers of the rapid reaction forces will undergo.

          Thus, we make service in the RRF more attractive and honorable. However, the difference is not so colossal as to be decisive when choosing a place of service, since service in the RA is more gentle and calm, because, in fact, these are reserve units that perform the role of internal troops in peacetime.

          Another basic condition that will preserve the proportion we have established will be the mandatory condition of service in the RA before submitting an application or being sent to serve in the ranks of the RBR. Moreover, this rule should apply to both officers and privates. No person will be able to sign a contract for service in a private position in the RBR without having served a compulsory term in the RBR, no officer will be able to transfer or be transferred to the RBR without having served 3 years in the RBR (the exception is pilots, as well as other "valuable specialists", whose list will be strictly limited). But even after serving the required time, enrollment in the ranks of the RBR will be possible after the applicant has passed an exam for the right to transfer, which includes passing increased physical standards, checking knowledge of the charter and materiel. The exam must be administered by 5 examiners from among the applicant's future colleagues: officers - if the applicant has officer's shoulder boards and 4 representatives of the junior command staff and 1 officer - if we are talking about a private, corporal or sergeant. In order to avoid corruption and regionalism, any applicant/applicant will have the opportunity to appeal and re-prove their right to serve in the rapid reaction forces. The appeal must be considered by higher-ranking officers. If, even after passing the appeal procedure, the applicant could not confirm that he has the necessary skills, he will be able to take the next exams for enrollment in the RRF no earlier than a year or two after the previous attempt (the period may vary depending on the type of troops to which the applicant is applying for transfer). A return transfer from the RRF to the RA is also possible due to the health of the serviceman or family circumstances. As a result, although we have allowed the condition that service in the RA will be simpler and easier, we nevertheless maintain the incentive for people serving there to improve, improve their skills and personal indicators in order to have the opportunity to transfer to the RSF, where salaries are higher and career growth is faster. Approximately the same story is with the Engineering Corps and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, which will also be in direct collaboration with each other.

          Now a little about who all this economy should be subordinate to. It is clear that the general management, as today, should be carried out by the General Staff, 50% of which will be from the RSF, and 50% from the RA. However, the RSF, unlike the RA, will also have its own immediate commander, subordinate directly to the Minister of Defense and the President of the country. Thus, the RSF will be able to most accurately correspond to its name and will be able to quickly respond to incoming threats without the approval of the parliament, which, I remind you, albeit formally, is still necessary in order to use the armed forces both inside the country and abroad. Now this will concern only the RA, the RSF, like the US Marine Corps, is now, as it were, removed from this scheme. At the same time, the division into military districts, as well as the general principles of command of the armed forces as a single organism, are preserved.

          It is clear that everything I have outlined is just a general outline and military people will certainly find something to correct in it, and where to simply add color, but a certain experience of public administration for some reason tells me that the proposed concept is not so fantastic, and most importantly, it is quite viable, because it includes the principles of functioning of very real armed forces of the armies of the peoples of the world, trying to take from them only the best.
          1. -1
            April 4 2025 01: 57
            What are these SBRs supposed to "react" to inside the country? Is there no faith in the 300t of the Russian Guard anymore? Do we need more Praetorians?
      2. +1
        April 3 2025 22: 43
        Quote: Dante
        But there is one nuance - both divisions and brigades can be combined into an army corps, and then a corps formed from brigades can be more effective in solving local problems (for example, breaking through a specific direction) than a corps based on divisions, because, in essence, it will be a division at its maximum, but to which units of other branches of the armed forces are also attached.

        Can you explain to me, a dumb person, what the "battle" between divisions and brigades is?
        Is it really true that "experience, the son of mistakes", even if it is enemy experience, is not for us? The Wehrmacht, if my sclerosis does not fail me, since 1942 switched to the formation of corps commands, including both control means (communications) and reinforcement means (reconnaissance, artillery, sappers, air defense, medical service, transport). In modern conditions, it is necessary to add electronic warfare, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, chemists (not those in colonies-settlements, but those with gas masks-TOS), and of course UAVs.
        This command structure can be strung with at least two brigades = division, at least 4-6 = corps. As long as the means of the command structure correspond to the "servicing" of the attracted "capacities". In my opinion, this is exactly what the Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently striving for.
        Why can't we follow the evolutionary method? Our destiny is another revolution, albeit small scale (to the foundation, and then)?
        1. -1
          April 4 2025 09: 17
          Can you explain to me, a dumb person, what the "battle" between divisions and brigades is?
          Is it really true that "experience, the son of mistakes", even if it is enemy experience, is not for us? The Wehrmacht, if my sclerosis does not fail me, since 1942 switched to the formation of corps commands, including both control means (communications) and reinforcement means (reconnaissance, artillery, sappers, air defense, medical service, transport). In modern conditions, it is necessary to add electronic warfare, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, chemists (not those in colonies-settlements, but those with gas masks-TOS), and of course UAVs.
          This command structure can be strung with at least two brigades = division, at least 4-6 = corps. As long as the means of the command structure correspond to the "servicing" of the attracted "capacities". In my opinion, this is exactly what the Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently striving for.
          Why can't we follow the evolutionary method? Our destiny is another revolution, albeit small scale (to the foundation, and then)?

          You see, you are stringing together BRIGADS. 6000. And they are suggesting stringing together divisions. 12.

          The question is about the number of tactical units. Historically, it is about 3500-6000, whether it was the Romans, Kutuzov, Rokossovsky, or now.

          At Borodino they fought in corps. 9000 - 11000 people. Each corps had 2 "divisions".
          It is easy to count how many people there are in one such division. wink
    5. -1
      April 3 2025 18: 44
      In general, it would be good to create both divisions and brigades as separate units. In the same Pacific Fleet, revive the 55th division - as an airborne assault division.
      Do the same in the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic.
      Deploy a full-fledged separate airborne assault brigade in the north, because now the 61st separate marine brigade is there - it is essentially a regiment, and not a brigade at all.
      And it would also be good to deploy another brigade in the Northern Fleet, somewhere in Arkhangelsk.
      Return the 77th brigade to the Caspian Sea, otherwise it was also castrated to a separate regiment under Comrade Serdyukov.
      And it would not be bad to create another ODShB MP in Novorossiysk. By the way, a similar reform should be carried out in the major troops, there it is also necessary to create not only divisions, but also OMSBs. Completely abandoning brigades is, of course, a dead end, a brigade is always more mobile than a division. And accordingly, their number should exceed the number of divisions in the troops. And yes, the Red Army fought in WWII mainly with brigades, and after the war, all brigades were disbanded and merged into divisions.
    6. -1
      April 4 2025 01: 51
      Incomparable situations. Koenigsberg was thrashed by thousands of artillery guns and bombed by aircraft for a long time. And during the assault, attack aircraft entered each identified firing point, at the first request of forward air controllers.
      1. -1
        April 4 2025 09: 03
        Incomparable situations. Koenigsberg was thrashed by thousands of artillery guns and bombed by aircraft for a long time. And during the assault, attack aircraft entered each identified firing point, at the first request of forward air controllers.

        We are talking about the number of personnel in the "division".
        1. 0
          April 4 2025 10: 34
          You compared it to Bakhmut. It is not correct. I do not argue with the better maneuverability and controllability of smaller units. hi
  5. + 19
    April 3 2025 05: 49
    It seems to be written cleverly but...
    A squad, platoon, company, battalion (division) is a unit;
    A separate battalion (division) and regiment is a unit;
    A brigade, division, corps, this is a UNIT;
    Army, front is UNIFICATION.
    Or am I missing something?
  6. + 20
    April 3 2025 06: 03
    Everything is written well. And correctly.
    But at one time, the reformatting of divisions into brigades was justified in exactly the same way with arguments of no less order. And the arguments then were no less convincing.
    That is, once again I see that literally everything can be justified.
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 07: 05
      So during that abomination, for some reason attributed to Serdyukov, it was postulated that a large-scale war against more or less equal opponents would definitely never happen again. And therefore - heavy divisions are definitely not needed, it is much more convenient to drive the Papuans with noticeably lighter and more mobile brigades. And the main tactical unit - in general will be the BTG, remember how at the beginning of the war everyone counted in them? That's how our inexpressibly wise leadership saw the future of the country then...
      1. +6
        April 3 2025 08: 03
        Even before Serdyukov, in all the Marine brigades, the 61st, 336th, 810th and 55th divisions, there were reductions (staff organizational measures) from three-battalion to two-battalion. In the 55th division, the tank regiment became a battalion. Then Serdyukov added it.
      2. +3
        April 3 2025 11: 37
        Quote: paul3390
        So, during that abomination, for some reason attributed to Serdyukov, it was postulated that a type of large-scale war against more or less equal opponents would definitely never happen again.

        Sudden there will be no large-scale war. The Serdyukov-Makarov reform usually forgets about the second part - those same one-year conscripts, from whom it was planned to prepare a reserve in case of that very big war. In the event of which, the personnel brigades were supposed to give time for the mobilization of the assigned personnel and the deployment of the BHVT into full-fledged units.
        By the way, the year of service for conscripts was calculated based on the fact that they would not be in combat units in peacetime - they were only planned to be trained, and not to be used to fill "combat" brigades.
        1. 0
          April 3 2025 11: 45
          There will be no sudden large-scale war.

          Looking at what is happening, I would not be so sure of it... Remember - before WWI, no one believed that it was possible either.
          1. +2
            April 3 2025 15: 32
            Quote: paul3390
            Looking at what's happening, I wouldn't be so sure about that...

            So Makarov and Serdyukov also did not believe in a peaceful future without major wars. In the phrase
            Quote: Alexey RA
            There will be no sudden large-scale war.

            the main thing - sudden. And this couple believed in the possibility of a large-scale war. Otherwise, given the availability of combat-ready and fully staffed peacetime contract brigades (and according to the initial plan for the reform, the brigades were supposed to be exactly like that), they would not have also run conscripts through a year of training, preparing the contingent for possible mobilization.
        2. 0
          April 3 2025 16: 52
          In this case, the personnel brigades had to provide time for the mobilization of the assigned personnel and the deployment of the BHVT into full-fledged units.

          It is possible, but for this we need regular military training of the assigned personnel, otherwise the period of combat coordination (deployment) of the BHVT into a brigade (division) will be very long. Moreover, such training should be held regularly with the involvement of tens of thousands of people.
          1. +3
            April 3 2025 18: 11
            Quote: strannik1985
            It is possible to do so, but this requires regular military training for the assigned personnel.

            And this was also planned by the reform - and was successfully screwed up, along with the contract brigades of full combat readiness (which were filled with conscripts and partially cut).
            But, having returned to the old practice of staffing combat units with conscripts, one year of conscription service was still left. belay
      3. 0
        April 6 2025 02: 09
        That's the whole point, this is going from one extreme to another. The troops need to have both divisions and brigades, and you can even create a couple of separate regiments as fire brigades that can be quickly transferred to the necessary combat area before the main forces arrive.
  7. +4
    April 3 2025 06: 07
    Yes, everything is clear anyway. The war with Ukraine, if it ends, will not be for long. Well-trained assault units are needed. Without them, serious breakthroughs in the defense will not be seen.
    1. 0
      April 6 2025 02: 17
      It has long been clear that it is now necessary to create a virtually new type of troops: heavy assault infantry and, accordingly, to combine it into heavy infantry (and tank) shock-assault divisions. Which, in essence, can be created on the basis of motorized rifle and tank divisions.
      And the motorized riflemen themselves should be sent to separate motorized rifle brigades.
  8. + 19
    April 3 2025 06: 10
    Maybe not the marines, but coastal defense, no landing ships, no fleet
    1. +4
      April 3 2025 08: 25
      That's true, but it's better not to tell the Marines that.
      , no landing craft, no fleet

      And there is no mission in landing. Although... Odessa was waiting
    2. 0
      April 3 2025 10: 09
      Quote: Aleksey24
      Maybe not the marines, but coastal defense, no landing ships, no fleet

      That's right. That's why they unite both coastal anti-ship missile systems and marine units under a single command...
      1. 0
        April 3 2025 16: 21
        So, since the time of Peter, they have been under a single command.
    3. +3
      April 3 2025 11: 52
      Quote: Aleksey24
      Maybe not the marines, but coastal defense, no landing ships, no fleet

      It is she. It's just that, as I understand it, the navy was deprived of the army units that had been transferred to it earlier - the 14th Army Corps from the Northern Fleet and the 11th Army Corps from the Baltic Fleet. Because the Leningrad Military District was formed, but there were no more ground forces.

      And the fleet remains as before - with marines and coastal defense, cut down to missiles and artillery. And the fleet does not have much faith in the army's ability to maintain the land defense of bases after WWII. wink
      So the fleet is recreating coastal defense divisions, disguising them as "marines".
  9. BAI
    + 11
    April 3 2025 06: 17
    1.
    Let me remind you of the revival of the Taman (5th Motorized Rifle) and Kantemirovskaya (4th Tank) divisions,

    Kantemirova was revived in vain. She was completely disgraced near Kharkov.
    2.
    Modern divisions in the armies of the world have approximately the same number. From 8 to 20 thousand or more rank and file personnel.

    8 and 20 thousand are the same composition?
    3.
    And our ancestors were right when division commanders were awarded the rank of general.

    In the 30s, our ancestors appointed colonels as division commanders. And the division's strength was 12 people. Division commanders became generals during the war, when the actual strength of the division did not exceed 000-5 thousand people. And then, it remained that way
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 07: 31
      Kantemirova was revived in vain. She was completely disgraced near Kharkov.
      It was not revived to fight an external enemy, but to fight “an internal enemy” (Kuprin)
    2. -3
      April 3 2025 07: 42
      Colonels were appointed as division commanders

      And who commanded the regiments?
      majors and captains?
    3. -1
      April 3 2025 08: 24
      Don't say: in the RIA, in the Kaiser's army and in the Wehrmacht, the regular rank of division commander was lieutenant general. As a rule, a full general was appointed to the corps. For the army - a full general (for us, since there were no more field marshals) and a colonel general, or even a field marshal general - for the Germans.
      1. -2
        April 3 2025 10: 56
        The RIA had four infantry regiments, two brigades. A major general was assigned to a brigade. Plus an artillery brigade. The division was larger.
        1. -2
          April 3 2025 22: 18
          It seems that the current MSD is 4 regiments.
          1. -3
            April 4 2025 05: 00
            Three motorized rifle units, a tank unit, an artillery unit, an anti-aircraft unit, and a bunch of different sappers, motorists, signalmen, and chemists in separate companies and battalions.
      2. -1
        April 3 2025 20: 26
        Quote: Metallurg_2
        in RIA, in the Kaiser's army

        The divisions were also composed of two brigades and four regiments.
        Quote: Metallurg_2
        and in the Wehrmacht the regular rank of division commander was lieutenant general

        No, this is too much)
        1. 0
          April 3 2025 21: 56
          No, this is too much)

          Not at all. Google many examples where lieutenant generals commanded divisions at the beginning of WWII. And there were such examples in 1941.
          Corps were commanded by generals of the branch of service, armies by colonel generals or even field marshals, and army groups by field marshals only.
          Somewhere since the end of 1941, a tendency to lower the minimum requirements for military rank for holding a position can be traced. Here, colonel generals are already appearing as commanders of army groups, and generals of the branch of service as commanders of armies, and lieutenant generals as commanders of corps.
          1. -1
            April 3 2025 21: 59
            Quote: Metallurg_2
            By no means.

            I probably didn't express my thoughts very clearly. requestI fully admit that this could have happened, but it was not of a widespread, regulated nature.
            1. -2
              April 3 2025 22: 12
              You are mistaken. Read the list of commanders of tank and motorized divisions that were part of the 41st and 56th motorized corps. There are many commanders with the rank of lieutenant general.
              And the "Dead Head" was commanded exclusively by Gruppenführers and Obergruppenführers (equivalent to a lieutenant general and a general of a branch of the armed forces, respectively).
              1. -1
                April 3 2025 22: 18
                Quote: Metallurg_2
                Wrong.

                I won't argue. Maybe so. 41 and 43 were still very different.
                Quote: Metallurg_2
                And the "Dead Head" was commanded exclusively by Gruppenführers and Obergruppenführers

                Well, the number of personnel there is much greater than in an ordinary MSD
                1. -2
                  April 3 2025 22: 26
                  Well, that's what I'm writing, that since the end of 41, there has been a tendency in the Wehrmacht and SS to lower ranks for the positions held. And in the Red Army, on the contrary, there has been an increase. If in 1941 it was easy to find a major general in the position of army commander, and a lieutenant general in the position of front commander, then since 1944, an army commander is already a colonel general, and a front commander is an army general or marshal. True, there was an apotheosis in the form of Colonel General Cherevichenko, commander of the 7th Guards Rifle Corps. But this general apparently could not be trusted with anything higher than the corps.
                  1. -1
                    April 3 2025 22: 46
                    Quote: Metallurg_2
                    Well, that's what I'm writing, that since the end of 41, there has been a tendency in the Wehrmacht and SS to lower ranks for the positions held. And in the Red Army, on the contrary, there has been an increase. If in 1941 it was easy to find a major general in the position of army commander, and a lieutenant general in the position of front commander

                    I agree. In 41, division commanders were mostly colonels.
                  2. -2
                    April 4 2025 02: 19
                    Why not? Yakov Cherevichenko commanded the Southern Front in 41. He liberated Rostov, then Bryansk in 42, in the Moscow offensive operation, also quite successfully. His 7th Rifle Corps took Berlin. Somewhere a cat ran between him and Zhora the Butcher, he pushed him aside.
                    1. -2
                      April 4 2025 07: 35
                      Yes, he commanded the front twice at the beginning of the war. But both times he was dismissed from his post and received a warning from the Supreme Commander about his incompetence. As for the other heroes of the first cavalry: Timoshenko, Voroshilov - the realization of their real qualifications also came very quickly. Budyonny and Tyulenev held out longer than the others, until the end of 1942, but in the end they were also pushed into decorative positions.
                      1. -1
                        April 4 2025 10: 40
                        That is, the first successful offensive in 41, when there were only failures, and the liberation of the city is a discrepancy? I told you the reason for his disgrace. This reason has a name, surname and rank. The Supreme Commander did not express his own opinion, in this case.
                      2. -2
                        April 4 2025 14: 59
                        So you think that the Supreme Commander was under Zhukov’s influence?
                      3. 0
                        April 4 2025 19: 53
                        In personnel matters, sometimes in terms of strategy, yes. You can't embrace the immensity. Stalin was a genius, but he had no military education and was forced to listen to the opinions of professionals. And to Zhukov, in any case. And then he betrayed his case and him. And what outweighs, merits or this fact, for me personally, is ambiguous. Enough is known about his attitude to the people around him, and the Marshal of Victory had plenty of other "minor" sins.
  10. + 13
    April 3 2025 06: 19
    namely, combat units that will be capable of independently defeating any landing force that will land on our shores.

    It would seem that what does the actions in the Kursk region have to do with this? As part of which landing force did the 810th Marine Brigade land?
    The reasons are much simpler: the infantry is traditionally a stepchild of the Armed Forces, and it cannot be provided with high-quality equipment and training, which is why the Airborne Forces and Marine Corps are being consolidated (both branches of the military are expeditionary, and by definition must be tied to the transport capabilities of the Military Transport Aviation or the Navy).
    1. +5
      April 3 2025 06: 52
      It would seem that what does the actions in the Kursk region have to do with this? As part of which landing force did the 810th Marine Brigade land?
      The reasons are much simpler: the infantry is traditionally a stepchild of the Armed Forces, and it cannot be provided with high-quality equipment and training, which is why the Airborne Forces and Marine Corps are being consolidated (both branches of the military are expeditionary, and by definition must be tied to the transport capabilities of the Military Transport Aviation or the Navy).

      Perhaps, everything is more complicated the other way around. Reorganizing brigades into divisions means increasing the number of colonel and general positions by 3 times. A rollback from Serdyukov's reform, in essence. wink At the same time, the actual number of personnel will most likely remain the same, around 5000.
      This is a reward for Kursk, the battalion commanders there are probably already stuck at lieutenant colonel positions, and everyone else too. They need to grow, but there is nowhere to go. request

      At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdrew from Kursk in a fairly organized manner, albeit with huge losses. So, did they complete the task? wink
      The worst syndrome is different. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have started forming corps. More precisely, corps headquarters - a new command link. Why? Until now, they were controlled by a group of brigades on the front.
      IMHO - they quietly increased the total number by one and a half times, by transferring women to operators, calling up 18-year-olds, etc.
      Perhaps they are preparing for something... winked
      1. +1
        April 3 2025 07: 24
        Quote: Arzt
        The reorganization of brigades into divisions means a threefold increase in the number of colonel and general positions.

        "Commander of the 155th Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, Major General Mikhail Gudkov, has become Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy"
        Now the brigade commander is a general's position, so you are not entirely right hi
        1. +2
          April 3 2025 08: 07
          The Marine Brigade Commander has the rank of Lieutenant Colonel - Colonel, Major General is already the commander of the coastal units of the fleet.
          1. -1
            April 3 2025 09: 45
            Quote: tatarin1972
            The Marine Brigade Commander has the rank of Lieutenant Colonel - Colonel, Major General is already the commander of the coastal units of the fleet.

            but for some reason in the Russian army, half of the brigades have commanders with the rank of major general.
            from the "Procedure for the implementation of legal acts on the issues of appointing military personnel serving under contract to military positions, releasing them from military positions, dismissing them from military service and assigning them military ranks"

            "Commanders connections (brigades), divisions and their equivalents), heads of higher military educational institutions for which military ranks are provided by the staff Maj.-Gen., Rear Admiral, Colonel, Captain 1st Rank"
            those. team definitely compound
            1. 0
              April 3 2025 10: 01
              Look at the fleet's staffing table, the answer is there.
              1. 0
                April 3 2025 10: 17
                Quote: tatarin1972
                Look at the fleet's staffing table, the answer is there.

                Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                Commander of the 155th Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, Major General Mikhail Gudkov

                became a major general while being a brigade commander.
                336th Separate Guards Belostok Orders of Zhukov, Suvorov and Alexander Nevsky Marine Brigade, commander General Kolmykov (BF RF)
                General Vlasov, Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation - 810th Brigade, i.e. in 3 of the 5 brigades of the Marine Corps of the Navy, commanders are generals.. how is that then? Have you heard of a general being given a colonel's rank? I have never.. by the way, where do you look at it (the staffing table) - adopted for today? Are you still serving? Well, it has changed...
                1. 0
                  April 3 2025 10: 33
                  Perhaps it has changed. In the first and second Caucasus, lieutenant colonels and colonels commanded the combined battalions of the marines. It became known last summer that the brigades would be deployed in divisions, perhaps that is why they gave major general to the brigade commanders, and not all of them.
                  1. 0
                    April 3 2025 12: 02
                    Quote: tatarin1972
                    It became known last summer that the brigades would be deployed in divisions, which is probably why the brigade commanders were given the rank of major general, although not all of them.

                    on the ground, today there are enough generals in the brigades too - no one is transferring them to the divisions yet.. speaking about the past, for example, 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, commander, 2004-2007 - Colonel (since June 2005 - Major General) Sudakov Sergei Gennadievich. i.e. even before, brigade commanders were given generals...
      2. -1
        April 3 2025 07: 38
        The reorganization of brigades into divisions means a threefold increase in the number of colonel and general positions.

        General's - abbreviation, the commander of a brigade in which the battalions are separate - major general and the commander of a division - major general, but in a brigade up to 5 thousand people, and in a division from 10-12 thousand.
        So, the task was completed? wink

        Their task was to retreat in an organized manner????
        More precisely, corps headquarters - a new command link. Why?

        But here you need to look at the staffing, if the corps has 2-4 combined arms brigades, an artillery regiment/brigade, a reconnaissance battalion and other units, then this is a formation (division), only the corps commander, in our money, is already a lieutenant general, brigade commanders are colonels (if the battalions are not separate) or lieutenant generals. wink
      3. -1
        April 3 2025 12: 05
        Quote: Arzt
        The Ukrainian Armed Forces have begun forming corps. More precisely, corps headquarters - a new command link. Why? Until now, they were controlled by a group of brigades on the front.

        We encountered the problem of managing a large number of separate brigades. When it was necessary to create headquarters that would manage groups in each direction, from seconded (i.e. temporary) officers sent from the brigades. Now they are trying to create permanent headquarters for corps created from combined brigades. Well, and the opportunity for career advancement for smart officers who have nowhere to grow in the brigade.
        1. -1
          April 3 2025 12: 13
          We encountered the problem of managing a large number of separate brigades. When it was necessary to create headquarters that would manage groups in each direction, from seconded (i.e. temporary) officers sent from the brigades. Now they are trying to create permanent headquarters for corps created from combined brigades. Well, and the opportunity for career advancement for smart officers who have nowhere to grow in the brigade.

          That's right. Almost. We managed before.
          The total number of brigades is GROWING. But they are still in reserve. wink

          They already have orders going from the air defense to the infantry. And they apparently put the Poles and others there. And maybe the English and the French already.
          Hence Macron's chatter. It prepares public opinion.
  11. +7
    April 3 2025 06: 25
    God willing, it will work out. But as always, "vague doubts" torment us. We currently have 18 large landing ships, 2 air-cushion landing ships and 33 landing craft for all fleets. I couldn't find how many combat-ready ones. There's very little for even that. And there's no word on building new ones. There's no word on the UDCs in Crimea at all. With such support, the marines will become regular infantry.
    1. +5
      April 3 2025 07: 03
      Elite infantry.
      He didn't serve himself, but his younger brother did. So he said that most people from the draft (Red Barracks, Perm. If anything) wanted to go to the Airborne Forces or the Marine Corps. But not everyone was taken there. He himself ended up in Ussuriysk in a motorized rifle brigade.
    2. +1
      April 3 2025 08: 56
      The most important thing is not even the total number of landing ships, but the fact that there is nothing to support the landing. There are no means of working along the shore. There are no helicopter carriers or drone carriers, and it is not worth mentioning aircraft carriers. There are no artillery ships armed with MLRS and long-range howitzers.
      1. 0
        April 3 2025 12: 11
        If we talk about a large-scale landing operation, we should study the experience of the unsuccessful Dunkirk in 1943 and the successful Normandy in 1944. The key difference is in the organization of the rear support and supply of the landing group: towed piers, pontoon bridges, breakwaters.
        1. -3
          April 3 2025 13: 11
          That's it. And the question arises: is the marine infantry needed today, the main purpose of which was initially to land on the coast occupied by the enemy, seize a bridgehead there and hold it until the landing of the main offensive (that is, conventional army) forces?
          Somehow, straining my imagination, I cannot imagine such a scenario in view of modern political realities.
          And where can we get the means to support such a landing in the form of missile and artillery ships, air defense destroyers, helicopter carriers and aircraft carriers?
          The remaining dozen or so large and small landing ships are simply worthless.
  12. 0
    April 3 2025 06: 40
    It can be assumed that the number of assault units that are currently in the SVO will need to be "put to use" somewhere after the end of the conflict. The Marines are an assault, capture and holding of a bridgehead until the arrival of the fortification forces, then another assault. Our assault units are doing exactly that. Experience is priceless and paid for with blood. It needs to be saved.
    1. -1
      April 3 2025 20: 38
      Quote: Emelianenko Igor
      Experience is priceless and paid for with blood. It must be preserved.

      He needs to be buried quickly!
      If we do not take into account Africa and numerous "slipper wearers" like them, NOWHERE in the world is there a focus on destroying the enemy in close, small arms combat! The main defeat is inflicted remotely using high-precision (and not so) weapons, then only the cleansing of the demoralized and disorganized enemy.
  13. + 11
    April 3 2025 06: 57
    The question is interesting. But is it normal for the Airborne Forces and Marines to act as regular motorized infantry? Maybe we should start with the revival of full-fledged ground forces?
    1. -1
      April 3 2025 12: 15
      Quote: avia12005
      Maybe we should start with the revival of full-fledged SV?

      Understanding our practice and mentality, in order to revive the SV we need to create our own elite units, for example, assault units. With their own "tricks": striped shirts, berets, etc., requirements for fighters and training
  14. +7
    April 3 2025 06: 58
    Today, in the armies of other countries, divisions consist of brigades. A brigade is more of a reinforced regiment than a mini-division. To solve control problems and enhance firepower, brigades are consolidated into corps. A corps additionally has corps artillery in the form of artillery brigades or regiments, and an air defense regiment for protection from aviation. Additionally, a corps includes support units or formations. In our conditions, it is better to consolidate brigades into corps, and leave existing divisions as a separate unit subordinate to the Army.
  15. +1
    April 3 2025 07: 08
    The 155th Separate Marine Brigade was created on December 1, 2009 by reorganizing the 55th Marine Division of the Pacific Fleet, which, in turn, was created in 1968.
    Serdyukov's merit is that he began to remake the Russian army according to the American model. In America, there are mainly brigades, so they began to forge brigades from divisions. Now, you see, publicity was needed when discussing the return of divisions.
    1. +4
      April 3 2025 07: 43
      In America, there are mainly brigades, so they started to turn divisions into brigades.

      In the US Army and the National Guard, the divisional level was not removed, it remained as it was, but the brigades could be reduced. The prospective composition is five types of divisions: breakthrough (1st cavalry and 1st armored), heavy (1st through 4th infantry), light (mountain, 25th infantry, NG divisions), airborne (82nd and 11th) and air assault (101st).
      1. -1
        April 3 2025 08: 40
        But US Marine divisions consist of regiments and separate battalions. True, the regiments are very large.)
        1. +3
          April 3 2025 12: 00
          Quote: Sergej1972
          But US Marine Corps divisions consist of regiments and separate battalions.

          On their own territory, this is a purely administrative division. Outside the US, the Marines go in small groups of 2,5-4,5 thousand people in an expeditionary battalion (aka Marine expeditionary unit). smile
          There is also an expeditionary brigade of almost 15 thousand and an expeditionary division (aka the US Marine Expeditionary Force).
  16. +4
    April 3 2025 07: 12
    Tamanskaya is not the 5th, but still the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division.
    1. -1
      April 3 2025 15: 12
      Well, yes... The first one - was wasted! And, it seems, irrevocably...
  17. + 10
    April 3 2025 07: 20
    a rhetorical question from a couch skeptic. And where did they get the people for the new Marine divisions, and the so-called districts? There are no people in the national economy, we are pulling a village from abroad... Maybe then we should recruit newly-minted "Russians" into the Marines to replenish them? The same 155th Far Eastern Brigade is staffed mainly by local troops. I have never heard of the few Far Eastern women becoming precocious and starting to give birth to adult soldiers en masse..... It looks like this Supreme Commander's wish is very reminiscent of our president's previous wishes to become trendsetters in the automotive industry, the mass deployment of high-tech industries with the same 20000 high-tech jobs, the revival of the space industry with the start of operation of the Vostochny Cosmodrome, etc...... Projects not supported by realities on the ground
  18. +5
    April 3 2025 07: 27
    A division and a brigade are not a union, but a formation. It grated on my ears somehow...even.
    1. -6
      April 3 2025 07: 49
      The brigade is generally a unit...
    2. -1
      April 3 2025 12: 50
      The association is a team of plumbers :))
  19. +3
    April 3 2025 07: 37
    The article about social problems got 11 comments overnight, yes, there are no young people here, but about how to continue fighting, wow! They write that our population loss per year is 600 thousand, and here they are going to kill more people. Who will live on this huge territory? More guests from Asia? It's getting scary
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 11: 10
      Yes, it seems that the site is not about social problems and, accordingly, the audience.

      And it's not fashionable these days - it's very much about problems (they can even ban you), and the site has a slight propaganda charm, and the authors who are published are accordingly.

      What did you want during all these SVOs?
  20. -1
    April 3 2025 07: 48
    Why does the author call brigades and divisions associations? A brigade is a subdivision (unit), a division is a combination (of units)...
  21. -1
    April 3 2025 07: 57
    For what tasks are marine divisions needed? Do we have a new VM doctrine? Are we going to transport an entire unit of 10000-12000 somewhere? Do we have enough combat-ready landing ships in the entire fleet to transport them somewhere at once? Again, complete pipe dreaming.
    1. -3
      April 3 2025 11: 33
      We will force the Dnieper and return Odessa to its native harbor.
      1. -1
        April 13 2025 01: 16
        Quote: Ezekiel 25-17
        We will force the Dnieper and return Odessa to its native harbor.

        Nothing but a smile...
        Everyone who proposes this should be put in the forefront of creating a bridgehead on the right bank.
    2. 0
      April 3 2025 12: 01
      Quote: FRoman1984
      For what purposes are Marine divisions needed?

      Under the coastal defense of the fleet after the transfer of the army corps previously given to it back to the land forces. smile
      1. -1
        April 3 2025 21: 05
        For this purpose, the USSR Navy had coastal guard units. Marines are the naval landing force, the assault aircraft.
        1. 0
          April 4 2025 18: 52
          Quote: Ezekiel 25-17
          For this purpose, the USSR Navy had coast guard units.

          But they are no more. First, the coastal defense units were reduced in the 90s. Then, it seemed, they were restored, transferring the 11th and 14th ACs to the Navy. But another reform began with the allocation of the LVO - and the coastal troops corps were taken away from the Baltic Fleet and Northern Fleet. And the fleet was left with only missiles and artillery in the coastal troops.
          So the only way for the fleet to acquire coastal troops with infantry and tanks now is to disguise them as marines. The fleet has nothing to land divisions with anyway - some of the large landing ships have used up the power plant resource in the Syrian Express, and some have been lost in the SVO.
      2. -1
        April 13 2025 01: 13
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Quote: FRoman1984
        For what purposes are Marine divisions needed?

        Under the coastal defense of the fleet after the transfer of the army corps previously given to it back to the land forces. smile

        This is the task of coastal defense divisions/brigades, such as the 126th Gorlovka Brigade in Crimea, but not of marine divisions.
        1. 0
          April 14 2025 10: 44
          Quote: FRoman1984
          This is the task of coastal defense divisions/brigades, such as the 126th Gorlovka Brigade in Crimea, but not of marine divisions.

          It is a было the task of the coastal defense divisions. The Navy even had coastal defense corps - the 11th, 14th and 22nd. But in 2023-2024, these corps were transferred back to the Ground Forces: the 11th and 14th ACs of the corps were taken for the LVO, and the 22th AC was deployed on the basis of the 18nd AC. And the fleet was left with only marines.
          IMHO, the Navy is now simply disguising the re-creation of coastal defense troops under the guise of the Marine Corps. It has practically nothing to land such a mass of Marines with anyway.
    3. -1
      April 3 2025 12: 54
      The Airborne Forces and the MP will be elite ground forces
    4. -2
      April 3 2025 13: 34
      Where did you get the idea that during amphibious operations, the landing must be carried out by units/formations of the brigade/division level at once, and no less?
  22. -9
    April 3 2025 07: 58
    As usual, computer strategists, room generals (in attacks on farted sofas), tsipsota and planted enemies like the Maidan centurion Podolians will come running and explain that the commander-in-chief, the general staff and especially Gerasimov understand nothing about the army and war. And the war and positional dead ends have been going on for the third year, in short, "everything is lost, boss"! How good it is that during the Great Patriotic War there was no Internet and even before the war many enemies and hysterical psychopaths were distributed among the gulags and mental hospitals. Otherwise, we would not have seen the great Victory.
  23. +1
    April 3 2025 08: 11
    Here is an interesting question.
    We have 4 Fleets and a flotilla.
    The most powerful is SF.
    A little weaker than the Pacific Fleet.
    Both have strategic nuclear forces.
    So I think that our entire Russian fleet is needed at the moment only to ensure the exit of these very strategic nuclear forces to sea.
    Because, if you look at it objectively, where are our enemies? It's the Black Sea, it's the Baltic Sea. But neither the Black Sea Fleet nor the Baltic Fleet can be called a full-fledged fleet. Just a name. Everything is quiet in the Pacific Fleet (for now).
    But what is the Northern Fleet, the most powerful? What does it cover? It covers itself and the Northern Sea Route, which will only be needed in the future. Well, and the component of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, of course. It is great that it is powerful. But shouldn't other fleets, where the war is going on here and now, and not in the future of 100 years, be just as powerful?

    We need to recreate the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet. Everyone there is an enemy.
    In my opinion.
    1. +2
      April 3 2025 10: 35
      And the experience of WWII and the SVO convincingly proved that neither the Black Sea Fleet nor the Baltic Fleet are needed in military terms. In limited waters, boats, aircraft, missiles and now back-up ships rule. Anything larger than karakurts should be taken to the Tof. That's where the economy and trade routes are, and things will soon get hot there. And we need to do this now so that we don't have to go the Kronstadt-Tsushima route again later.
    2. +5
      April 3 2025 12: 54
      The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet, in the event of a real war, are suicide bombers locked in their puddles. Which, in fact, is what the Great Patriotic War showed, the Baltic Fleet spent almost the entire war locked in its base and it was lucky that Leningrad was defended, otherwise it would have had to be completely sunk at the piers. The Black Sea Fleet also has no real outlet to the ocean and participated in military operations episodically, mainly as a transport for the transfer of troops, evacuation and as mobile artillery, to support troops on the coast. The fleet's main losses were from aviation even then.
      In today's reality, in these small bodies of water, a normal fleet has nothing to do; if it can still be covered by air defense in its bases, then every exit from the base means clear losses, without any visible result.
  24. -1
    April 3 2025 08: 13
    Our marines fought not only on the Kursk Bulge, in fact, from the beginning of the operation they fought in many directions, including Mariupol.
  25. -6
    April 3 2025 08: 25
    Anyone who criticizes the government in times of trial and does not unite around it, as was the case during the Patriotic War, is an enemy, or, in the newfangled language, an agent of foreign influence.
    1. -1
      April 6 2025 11: 48
      Quote: Ezekiel 25-17
      Anyone who criticizes the government in times of trial and does not unite around it, as was the case during the Patriotic War, is an enemy, or, in the newfangled language, an agent of foreign influence.

      Are you suggesting that we unite with the oligarchy's power? Well, ok. But what benefit do we get from this?
  26. +1
    April 3 2025 08: 36
    The same "reform in reverse" should be done with motorized rifle units! But at the same time, we should NOT completely abandon the concept of a brigade. Everyone has their own goals and objectives!
  27. -1
    April 3 2025 08: 41
    The selection and training of paratroopers has always been different from that of motorized riflemen. They selected the physically strongest, they shot more, had more physical training, and equipment again. It is not surprising that these turned out to be the most trained units of the RF Armed Forces. And the expansion of these troops is only pleasing, maybe they will expand the departments for MP in DVOKU, which is also important. A necessary and good cause. If only all this bureaucracy does not drown and the actual number of personnel and weapons remains at the same level, only high positions are added.
  28. -1
    April 3 2025 08: 41
    a brigade is still a more preferable unit, mobility in modern warfare is a key quality, how can the author compare a division and a brigade? why doesn't he compare a brigade and a regiment? with such a comparison it turns out that a brigade has a lot of advantages over a regiment, although numerically they are close to each other, since a brigade has all the same auxiliary units as a division, albeit in a reduced form, and the fact that someone cannot organize combat coordination of brigades and therefore believes that it is necessary to switch to larger units is just idiocy, I believe that the brigade principle is more preferable, in extreme cases it is possible to increase the number of battalions in a brigade, instead of three motorized rifle battalions make four, instead of a three-company battalion make a four-company battalion, the same thing in tank brigades this will increase the capabilities of the brigade commander and leave the system more flexible and mobile....
    1. -3
      April 3 2025 09: 36
      Why doesn't he compare a brigade and a regiment?

      Because it is not a separate regiment within a division that can receive forces and resources at the request of a senior commander, but a separate brigade depending on the composition of the group in which it operates. Therefore, a brigade has more rear/combat support (in particular, 2 howitzer battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, etc.), but the same or fewer bayonets.
    2. 0
      April 3 2025 15: 14
      in extreme cases, it is possible to increase the number of battalions in a brigade, instead of three motorized rifle battalions make four, instead of a three-company battalion make a four-company battalion,

      There were such attempts. It didn't work. A person can support 5-7 information channels. Therefore, three divisions are optimal for a military structure.
    3. 0
      April 8 2025 03: 57
      A full-fledged brigade is always about 6 battalions, for example, a motorized rifle brigade: 4 motorized rifle battalions, 2 such, 2 artillery divisions, an anti-aircraft missile division, a reconnaissance battalion, an engineering battalion, a communications battalion, electronic warfare, UAVs, repair and medical battalions.
      And in a regiment there are always no more than three infantry battalions, one tank, one artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions. The remaining auxiliary units are already in the form of companies: reconnaissance company, communications company, repair company, sapper company, medical company, commandant company.
      If we enlarge all this, then it will no longer be a regiment, but a brigade.
      The worst thing is when on paper it is listed as a brigade, but in fact it is a regiment. And today it is the same with virtually all of our brigades - they are supposedly brigades, but in reality, in terms of their numbers and the number of main and auxiliary units, they are just regiments. How long they tormented the famous and unfortunate 56th Airborne Assault Brigade, sometimes reducing it to a regiment, then turning it back into a brigade. But in terms of its numbers and manning, it always essentially remained a regiment. And now it is the 56th Airborne Assault Regiment as part of the 7th Airborne Assault Division.
      Although, ideally, it would be better to create full-fledged airborne assault brigades from the 56th and 247th Airborne Regiments, and reform the 7th Airborne Division back into an airborne division.
  29. 0
    April 3 2025 08: 42
    I wonder when the division became a tactical unit?
    Author, a division is a tactical unit, and a union is an army level. Maybe some changes have occurred in military science, but I don't think so.
  30. -3
    April 3 2025 09: 06
    Why transfer powers from one type (branch) of troops to another?
    Everyone should do what they are meant to do.
    The combat regulations are written by smart people. We just need to make the commanders follow them correctly.
    Reintroduce a combat training course based on the Soviet model.
    Don’t just repeat it stupidly (keep up with the times), but implement the structure and methodology.
    What to do with the ground forces if their functions are to be performed by the Marines.
    Perhaps the training methods (specific) can be extended to the ground forces.
    When the contract army was created, it was probably assumed that it would all become special forces.
    But they forgot to teach her this.
    And in order to fight effectively in modern conditions, we need technical equipment (which we do not yet have in the required volume) and a numerical superiority in the combat army, which we also do not have.
    We have many good commanders who have combat experience. These commanders have deputies who are no less good. Let them engage in combat training of young recruits in a real way. And the emphasis should be on the technical and engineering component. Now there is a war of robotic systems.
    Are we training infantry for this?
    Everyone should do their job and implement the functions assigned to them in full. And we still don't have an unmanned branch of the military. And the Marines won't help with this problem.
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 15: 38
      Quote: 26_Sergey_26
      Why transfer powers from one type (branch) of troops to another?

      Because the navy wants its own ground forces. And, frankly, you can understand it. Because, according to the experience of WWII, the navy regularly had to use its own forces to protect its bases.
      But the Navy will not be allowed to create Coastal Troops divisions as it was before - two corps of coastal troops have already been taken away from it in favor of the Ground Forces. This means that the Navy will have to disguise its ground troops as marines. smile
  31. 0
    April 3 2025 09: 23
    Quote: Arzt
    For example, during the storming of Königsberg, Vasilevsky had 27 so-called "divisions" with a total of 106. Each such "division" had 000, including the rear. And the strike group itself was about 4000.


    I read the following in it:

    If a competent commander has 27 intelligent, independent subordinates, then they will achieve the necessary results even with a smaller number (and what the name of the unit is is a secondary question, and if the name of the unit also includes staffed reinforcement means, then I would call the regiments divisions and go ahead with songs after the divisional artillery preparation). Why lump them together and then sort out the subordination.

    For evidence, see the casualty figures in Königsberg.

    Besides, I read somewhere that towards the end of the war there were real problems with the availability of personnel of draft age.
    1. 0
      April 3 2025 11: 30
      For example, during the storming of Königsberg, Vasilevsky had 27 so-called "divisions" with a total of 106. Each such "division" had 000, including the rear. And the strike group itself was about 4000.


      I read the following in it:

      If a competent commander has 27 intelligent, independent subordinates, then they will achieve the necessary results even with a smaller number (and what the name of the unit is is a secondary question, and if the name of the unit also includes staffed reinforcement means, then I would call the regiments divisions and go ahead with songs after the divisional artillery preparation). Why lump them together and then sort out the subordination.

      For evidence, see the casualty figures in Königsberg.

      Besides, I read somewhere that towards the end of the war there were real problems with the availability of personnel of draft age.

      It didn't work that way. They started the war with divisions fully filled according to the table of organization. The catastrophe of 1941 showed that such units were unmanageable. By trial and error (difficult and bloody), they arrived at the optimal number of tactical units for management and the ability to perform combat missions.
      5 550 people.
      This is the average LIST number of our "divisions" for the entire Great Patriotic War.

      And then, most often, they were immediately brought together into Armies of 8-10 divisions, bypassing the control of corps of 4-6 units.
      So in Konigsberg, under Vasilevsky, 27 “divisions” (in reality, brigades) were combined into 3 armies of 9, each with approximately 36 men.
      It's actually the numbers HOUSING.
      And Vasilevsky was in direct contact first and foremost with army commanders Galitsky, Ozerov and Popov.

      That is, in reality, Vasilevsky took Königsberg with the forces of 3 corps with 9 brigades each.

      P.S. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently conducting approximately the same reform; their brigades of 3000-4000 will be consolidated into corps of 7-10 units. wink
      1. -1
        April 3 2025 13: 54
        their brigades of 3000-4000 will be consolidated into corps of 7-10 units.

        What's the point of an extra command link? We tried to do that. An extra headquarters appeared between the unit and the army, without any reinforcement. We cancelled it.
        1. 0
          April 3 2025 14: 12
          What's the point of an extra command link? We tried to do that. An extra headquarters appeared between the unit and the army, without any reinforcement. We cancelled it.

          Where is the extra link?

          Battalion - regiment - division - army.
          Battalion - brigade - corps - army.

          And considering that our divisions are actually as numerous as brigades, then it can be like this:
          Battalion - brigade - army.

          It is precisely in the regiment/division system that there is an extra link. And this is a regiment. But how many papakhas will have to be cut... laughing
          1. -1
            April 3 2025 15: 09
            We had a battalion-brigade-corps-army.
            Then they did:
            battalion-brigade-army.
            That is, they removed the extra link. And that is right.
            Why do they do it in Ukraine?
            There is no extra link in the division, because it is the regiment that fights, not the battalion. Therefore, the battalion is not taken into account.
      2. -1
        April 3 2025 14: 16
        We started the war with divisions fully staffed.

        It is not true, on June 22 there was not a single rifle division deployed according to the 04/400 organization chart in the army, the war began in peacetime organizations, consisting of three echelons that were not operationally connected, so the enemy had a numerical advantage over each of them. And by autumn they adopted a new organization chart, much poorer, called up a lot of reservists, the quality of the troops dropped sharply. In 1944 they called up 17-year-olds, although they tried not to send them to the front, there were no people to fill all the lists.
        1. +1
          April 3 2025 14: 46
          It is not true, on June 22 there was not a single rifle division deployed according to the 04/400 organization chart in the army, the war began in peacetime organizations, consisting of three echelons that were not operationally connected, so the enemy had a numerical advantage over each of them. And by autumn they adopted a new organization chart, much poorer, called up a lot of reservists, the quality of the troops dropped sharply. In 1944 they called up 17-year-olds, although they tried not to send them to the front, there were no people to fill all the lists.

          It's not about the reservists, but about the states, actually. The entire 11 million army could have been cut into pieces of 12. But they cut it into 000.
          I'm exaggerating of course, the rear, aviation and so on are our own staff.
          Why? The optimal number of tactical units, developed through experience.
          And not only in WWII.
          The storming of Grozny in 1994. It never even occurred to anyone to raise the Taman Division in full and bring it into the city. Smart people understood that just loading the equipment onto the trains would crush 50 people in this chaos.

          4 compact groups from 2200 to 4600, that is, in essence - BRIGADS, of which from 1/3 to half of the active bayonets entered the city.
          For example, in the "North" group, Pulikovsky has 4097 people.
          Approximately 1300 entered Grozny:
          from the 276th motorized rifle regiment - at least 400 people,
          from the 81st regiment - 426 people, including a tank battalion,
          from the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade - 446 people, including the “relief column”.

          Everything is about the same as with Vasilevsky in Königsberg. bully

          Another thing is that these were not seasoned, well-coordinated, well-tested units, but a "hodgepodge" of the Ministry of Defense, OMON, border guards, volunteers of all sorts, etc., who did not even know each other. In essence rabble-rousing Makhnovshchina, not troops, but "army")). wassat
          The result is predictable - defeat.

          P.S. Based on the results of the assault, narrow-minded journalists trumpeted about the "defeat of the entire Maikop brigade." But most of its members didn't even leave the PPD, a motley battalion with the brigade commander at the head went. fellow
          1. -2
            April 3 2025 17: 32
            But they cut it by 5500.

            Because there were no people left of conscription age, in the fall of 1943 700 thousand young men born in 1926 were called up.
            The storming of Grozny in 1994.

            Not a very good example, there was a lack of numbers and training. In particular, the 245th regiment had several dozen officers and warrant officers in 1994, they brought in conscripts from the Far Eastern Military District, gave them 10 days to form and sent them to fight.
          2. 0
            April 12 2025 13: 39
            As far as I remember, the Maykopians had 760 people, the 81st motorized rifle regiment, a tank battalion, and one motorized rifle battalion.
            Of these, 130 people from Maykop and, it seems, 270 from the 81st regiment escaped from encirclement in an ORGANIZED manner.
            Almost all of them are without equipment (isolated cases like "Sokolov's tank" do not count).
            This is not a rout?
            Combined detachments, from divisions and brigades, in the 1st Chechnya fought not because of problems with management, but because of a lack of trained personnel.
            The 336th separate infantry regiment fought with a strength of 580 people, more than the military forces’ authorized strength, and everything worked out.
            And in the "20th Motorized Rifle Division" (in its combined detachment) - 550. That is, the "battalion" was larger than the "division"....
            As one fellow soldier said, "The first Chechnya was a war of combined units of the Russian Federation's security forces against the regular army of General Dudayev"...
            1. -1
              April 14 2025 15: 30
              As far as I remember, the Maykopians had 760 people, the 81st motorized rifle regiment, a tank battalion, and one motorized rifle battalion.
              Of these, 130 people from Maykop and, it seems, 270 from the 81st regiment escaped from encirclement in an ORGANIZED manner.
              Almost all of them are without equipment (isolated cases like "Sokolov's tank" do not count).
              This is not a rout?
              Combined detachments, from divisions and brigades, in the 1st Chechnya fought not because of problems with management, but because of a lack of trained personnel.
              The 336th separate infantry regiment fought with a strength of 580 people, more than the military forces’ authorized strength, and everything worked out.
              And in the "20th Motorized Rifle Division" (in its combined detachment) - 550. That is, the "battalion" was larger than the "division"....
              As one fellow soldier said, "The first Chechnya was a war of combined units of the Russian Federation's security forces against the regular army of General Dudayev"...

              Exactly. Ragged squads.
              If instead of the motley "North" group, numbering about 4000, there had been a regular, well-coordinated, well-coordinated Maikop brigade, the same number in full strength, I am sure the result would have been different. wink

              And such crap is constantly happening, including in Afghanistan. And why? Because a full-fledged division, numbering 12-15 thousand, is an uncontrollable horde.
              Why not take Grozny with the forces of one division of Rokhlin? The total number of personnel is the same. wink
      3. 0
        April 3 2025 23: 37
        The disaster of 1941 showed that such formations are uncontrollable.

        Well, the Germans had a division of up to 16000 people and they almost made it to Moscow with them. So the issue is not in the controllability of the unit, but in the quality of the command staff. Which grew with us as the war progressed, while the Germans, on the contrary, fell.
        1. 0
          April 4 2025 09: 06
          Well, the Germans had a division of up to 16000 people and they almost made it to Moscow with them. So the issue is not in the controllability of the unit, but in the quality of the command staff. Which grew with us as the war progressed, while the Germans, on the contrary, fell.

          This argument is often brought up. It's complicated, but in the end, this is the situation, IMHO.
          The Germans put a slightly different meaning into the concept of "division" than we and others. For them, it is more of a mobile military base, and directly at the LBS they have the same groups of about 1000 people.
          But one needs to read their memoirs thoughtfully. Yes

          By the way, we copied them in the post-war period, our Taman, Kantemirovskaya, Siberian, Far Eastern deployed at full strength, in fact - military bases in which combat groups are formed in case of war.
        2. -1
          19 May 2025 23: 36
          Well, the Germans had a division of up to 16000 people and with them they almost made it to Moscow.

          The German divisions were equal in number to our rifle corps, consisting of three divisions with 5-6 thousand fighters, and the armies were practically equal in number to our fronts.
      4. -1
        April 8 2025 04: 11
        Well, in general, the well-known Arestovich is fiercely advocating for the return of divisions to the army instead of brigades. He considers the brigade principle to be a big mistake. And he considers the fact that Russia has divisions instead of brigades to be the most optimal and one of the reasons for the successful conduct of the SVO for Russia.
        1. 0
          April 8 2025 08: 19
          Well, in general, the well-known Arestovich is fiercely advocating for the return of divisions to the army instead of brigades. He considers the brigade principle to be a big mistake. And he considers the fact that Russia has divisions instead of brigades to be the most optimal and one of the reasons for the successful conduct of the SVO for Russia.

          We don't have full-fledged divisions at the front. 4000-5000 maximum. That is, these are brigades.
          And the effective 155th Marine Brigade, which is given as an example in the article, is at most 2500.
        2. -1
          19 May 2025 23: 39
          Why does the Ukrainian Armed Forces need divisions if they are now forming corps consisting of 3-4 brigades...
  32. -1
    April 3 2025 09: 41
    By the way, it's interesting why no one ever thought of creating breakthrough divisions (units)? Fortunately, there is experience from the Great Patriotic War.
  33. AMG
    -1
    April 3 2025 10: 17
    The author briefly mentioned Soviet traditions and training system, then a bit of history. In the period after the Great Patriotic War, the USSR Marine Corps consisted of: 6 brigades, 2 regiments and 10 separate battalions, which were disbanded or reformed by March 1956. It was believed that motorized rifle units would be suitable for tactical landings. But when at one of the exercises they showed how they could load themselves and load equipment onto landing ships, the realization came that specially trained troops were needed, especially since there was still a landing on the shore and a battle for the capture of the bridgehead. And then, 7 years later, on June 7, 1963, according to the directive of the Ministry of Defense, the 336th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 120th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment was reformed into the 336th Separate Marine Regiment of the Baltic Fleet. And then the process began in the rest of the USSR fleets. At the same time, the development of tactics, training of personnel, etc. began. The weapons were basically the same as in the ground forces. The selection of candidates for service by physical characteristics, as well as in the Airborne Forces, was naturally stricter. And then there were the events of the "cold war", the Chechen campaigns... The author's article is written in the spirit of unconditional support for the decisions of the top leadership, what will actually happen will be shown by the future.
  34. -1
    April 3 2025 10: 20
    There was a column in Literaturnaya Gazeta: “If I were the director.”
    1. Transfer the Russian National Guard (without leadership) to the Ministry of Defense. Leadership - to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
    2. Divisions are formed from three brigades plus support units.
    3. Remove all names with the word "infantry".
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 15: 46
      Quote: atos_kin
      1. Transfer the Russian National Guard (without leadership) to the Ministry of Defense. Leadership - to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

      Yeah... and who should all the RG tasks be transferred to? There immediately arises a very interesting question related to the possibility of using the army in peacetime around the country.
      And no, I'm not talking about dispersing demonstrations. But, for example, about security. If the RG becomes part of the army, then, if my memory serves, its servicemen will immediately lose the right to preventive use of weapons without introducing a counter-terrorist operation and emergency regime. That is, a bastard climbs through a ban on a civilian facility guarded by a "military RG" - and you can't shoot at him. Even if he climbs with a weapon.
      And in general - on what basis will the Ministry of Defense provide services for the protection of civilian facilities on the territory of the Russian Federation? For example, the same bridges and nuclear power plants?
      Do you know how this will end? With the re-formation of "departmental armies" that were just assembled in the RG. Not guards like "grandpa at the turnstile", but full-fledged military units with helicopters, boats, group and heavy weapons - at the same nuclear power plant and the Crimean Bridge.
      1. 0
        April 3 2025 17: 35
        Quote: Alexey RA
        There immediately arises a very interesting question related to the possibility of using the army in peacetime around the country.

        Oops... I made a mistake - not around, but specifically inside country.
        1. 0
          April 3 2025 23: 47
          Any law can be changed based on expediency. If necessary, the use of weapons will be permitted within the country and without warning.
          The only question is that there are many people who want to earn the shoulder straps of an army general and their equals. But the Minister of Defense already has enough deputies in these ranks. RG was essentially created under Zolotov's ass.
          1. 0
            April 4 2025 18: 56
            Quote: Metallurg_2
            Any law can be changed for expediency's sake.

            Allowing the army to use weapons inside the country in peacetime outside military installations without warning? Show me that suicidal politician. laughing
            This is carte blanche for rebellion.
            Quote: Metallurg_2
            The only question is that there are many people who want to earn the shoulder straps of an army general and their equals. But the Minister of Defense already has enough deputies in these ranks.

            This is sufficient in the current structure of the Armed Forces. If the RG is transferred to the Armed Forces, then new positions with corresponding ranks will immediately appear in the Armed Forces staff. And there will be even more of them than in a separate RG. smile
        2. -1
          April 4 2025 10: 12
          Can you tell me what nationality the Russian National Guard is to maintain order within the country?
          1. 0
            April 4 2025 18: 58
            Quote: atos_kin
            Can you tell me what nationality the Russian National Guard is to maintain order within the country?

            Our RG is multinational - all nationalities living in Russia are represented in it.
  35. 0
    April 3 2025 10: 29
    The divisions showed themselves badly during the SVO, the same Taman and Kantemirovskaya. Very badly. The brigades, the same 155, showed themselves well. Well, of course it is logical to transform the brigades into divisions, yeah. You can't take away the logic. It remains to understand in which direction and whose logic it is.
    1. 0
      April 3 2025 12: 48
      If divisions had fought in the Northern Military District, and not separate combined regiments, the results would have been different.
      Our army in the North-Eastern Military District fights with "spread fingers" in the form of separate regiments and brigades, and not as full-fledged divisions and combined arms armies under a single COMMAND.
      1. +3
        April 3 2025 15: 48
        Quote: assault
        If divisions had fought in the Northern Military District, and not separate combined regiments, the results would have been different.

        That's how we tried to fight with divisions at first. The result was... in general, the division's march was painfully reminiscent of the 1st MK's march to Luga in 1941: clogged roads and equipment abandoned due to breakdowns and fuel consumption on the march.
        1. -1
          April 3 2025 20: 51
          This is how we initially tried to fight in divisions.

          When did combined battalion tactical groups become divisions?
          And the result of all this bacchanalia that took place at the initial stage of the war is determined only by the disgusting intelligence and command of the troops, as well as the training and education of the unit commanders. And not that divisions are supposedly cumbersome and unwieldy structures.
          1. +1
            April 4 2025 19: 00
            Quote: Sanguinius
            When did combined battalion tactical groups become divisions?

            This was before the tactical groups - when the court division at the very beginning of the SVO tried to pretend to march through enemy territory.
            Quote: Sanguinius
            And the result of all this bacchanalia that took place at the initial stage of the war was due only to the disgusting intelligence and command of the troops, as well as the training and education of the unit commanders.

            Plus the need to leave some personnel within the borders of the Russian Federation and the staffing of the rear. In general, the same situation as in 08.08.08, only without conscripts.
    2. -1
      April 3 2025 19: 50
      The divisions showed themselves poorly during the SVO, the same Taman and Kantemirovskaya. Very poorly.
      Since when have punitive forces shown themselves well in combined arms combat? They only showed themselves in 1993.
      1. +1
        April 4 2025 01: 35
        “Servicemen of the 1st Tank and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiments are valiantly fighting neo-Nazis on Donetsk soil during a special military operation, breaking through the enemy’s defenses and pushing them back,” the telegram from the head of the Russian military department says.

        "Moving forward, repeating the decisive actions of your veterans-frontline soldiers in the battles in Donbass during the Great Patriotic War, you are liberating our land, while demonstrating fortitude and courage. We will always remember the feats of the guardsmen who shed blood for our Motherland," Andrei Belousov noted in his congratulations.

        I think the Minister of Defense knows best.
  36. +1
    April 3 2025 10: 38
    In general, before we start discussing it, it would be good to define what we are talking about. If it is more or less clear with a regiment and a division, then anything can be called a brigade. Both a classic two-regiment one, in the system of battalion, regiment, brigade, division, corps, army, front, and a reinforced regiment, or even a not very reinforced battalion. Like, for example, the tank brigades of 42. I am too lazy to look for the staffing, but if there are 25-25 tanks in a brigade, then it is hardly even considered a battalion.
    And sometimes there is also a team of excavators or plumbers.
  37. -1
    April 3 2025 11: 03
    After the end of the SVO, when the rank and file will have the opportunity to retire or leave the army, there will be even more problems with recruitment for contract service than there were before the beginning of the SVO.
    So all these increases in the army, the creation of new corps and divisions will only lead to an increase in the number of generals and colonels.
  38. -2
    April 3 2025 11: 38
    In addition to desire, we also need opportunities - people, equipment, etc. God willing, it will work out. War is apparently inevitable. Even if we make peace now, the West will only increase its preparations for it.
  39. 0
    April 3 2025 11: 44
    Staver! The government does not reduce or increase the army. The government does not have such functions. Drink mint tea more often, it will do you good.
  40. -1
    April 3 2025 12: 15
    And when did the division become an association????
    And what is the difference between a brigade and a division? This question is in the description of the organizational structure of the Ground Forces.
    It seems like the author has written an article for MURZILKA.
  41. +1
    April 3 2025 12: 20
    Quote: Mitrich73
    Today, in the armies of other countries, divisions consist of brigades.

    Conventionally speaking, their brigade is a combat unit, and the division is support: control, communications, rear, logistics, etc., right down to the "accordionist". And we have accordionists at the regimental level.
  42. 0
    April 3 2025 12: 30
    Quote: a.shlidt
    The selection and training of paratroopers has always been different from that of motorized riflemen. They selected the physically strongest, they shot more, had more physical training, and equipment again.

    There are questions about the MP equipment.
    Whatever happens with the Airborne Forces, there is a danger that, based on the concept, the Marines will be armed with lightly armored floating vehicles, but they will fight as regular motorized infantry.
  43. 0
    April 3 2025 12: 37
    Quote: avia12005
    By the way, it's interesting why no one ever thought of creating breakthrough divisions (units)? Fortunately, there is experience from the Great Patriotic War.

    As the SVO has shown, there is no stable management of such units. Read Murza and you will understand everything about communications.
    1. -1
      April 3 2025 16: 31
      Read Murza

      Here some URA-Patriots have already dubbed him a CIPSO member and an enemy of Russia.
  44. -2
    April 3 2025 12: 41
    If three separate units, a Marine brigade, a missile brigade and a coastal defense brigade, were combined and called Marine divisions, the overall defense potential would not increase.
    Mathematics should have been taught in school that "changing the order of the terms does not change the value of the sum."
    Another PR stunt from the Ministry of Defense with zero emissions.....
  45. -1
    April 3 2025 13: 11
    Does it make sense to create SA-era formations again, what concepts are these decisions based on? I remember how we promoted the BTG a few years ago and the result was, so to speak, everyone knows. Is this another shuffling of military thought or a whisper in the ear of the decision-maker? Maybe it would be better to measure seven times first - generalize the experience of the war (SVO), see what the "partners" offer, and then make a decision.
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 13: 20
      The experience of the SVO shows that they do not fight on the ground in divisions or brigades, they fight in small groups at the squad - platoon level, if one or two companies go into battle, then this is already a significant event. As a rule, a squad also sits at the front in the fortification.
      But what they don't pay attention to is the support units: UAVs, electronic warfare, communications, engineering units, supplies. IMHO, they need to be developed first of all, in particular by reducing the strike units. What is the use of a tank battalion that cannot overcome a minefield, a water obstacle and is destroyed by drones.
      1. +1
        April 3 2025 13: 53
        Battalions in the brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are independent tactical units. They have their own reconnaissance platoon, engineer-sapper platoon, their own fire support company, mortar batteries, and a logistics company. Separately, a UAV battalion per brigade.
      2. 0
        April 3 2025 17: 38
        Quote: Cympak
        But what they don’t pay attention to are the support units: UAVs, electronic warfare, communications, engineering units, supplies.

        Because that is precisely what makes a division strong. The division's job is to provide reinforcement and cover to platoons and squads.
        And they fought in small groups even during the Great Patriotic War. Which did not cancel out the existence of divisions.
  46. -1
    April 3 2025 13: 51
    The topic of brigades-divisions has been discussed since the end of the 80s, and apparently no one understands it, neither the superiors, nor the subordinates. Where is our military thought? Where are the military scientists-historians who will at least conduct a historical excursion?
    1. +1
      April 3 2025 16: 08
      When did anyone care about the opinions of scientists?
      1. -1
        April 4 2025 12: 18
        When did anyone care about the opinions of scientists?

        That's the problem, the generals don't want to listen to anyone. And there are examples of reforms before our eyes, we need to study them so as not to run over the same rake. But that's not our way.
    2. 0
      19 May 2025 23: 29
      The topic of brigades-divisions has been discussed since the end of the 80s,

      According to the logic of application, divisions are needed in the ground forces, and brigades in the mobile MP, Airborne Forces, Spetsnaz..., but as a result of the Serdyukov-Putin reforms, all divisions of the ground forces were transformed into brigades, and divisions were left in the Airborne Forces, some kind of voluntarism...
      1. -1
        20 May 2025 17: 12
        According to the logic of application, divisions are needed in ground forces, and brigades in mobile forces.

        Perhaps there was such a logic. They planned to have land units that were very mobile. But the iron reality shattered the dreams into dust.
  47. RMT
    +2
    April 3 2025 14: 14
    "we managed to preserve the "Soviet traditions", the Soviet training system..."
    The training system has changed everywhere. It is impossible otherwise. The Soviet Union has been gone for more than twenty years, the army has changed
  48. -1
    April 3 2025 15: 48
    Did I understand the gist of the article correctly? Marines will essentially stop sailing (walking) on ​​the sea and their task will become the defense of coastal facilities?
    Seeing how rapidly combat tactics have changed in recent years, perhaps this makes sense.
  49. -1
    April 3 2025 17: 56
    Quote: Gloomy Skeptic
    If you're not in the know, then don't talk nonsense - a commander is just a major in the naval hierarchy in the US.

    Commander, in the English-language system of naval military ranks, is a captain-two. The land equivalent is lieutenant colonel.
    The infidels call a captain a lieutenant commander, and this rank is the equivalent of a major in the army.
    1. -1
      April 4 2025 12: 17
      Commander, in the English-language system of naval military ranks, is a captain-two. The land equivalent is lieutenant colonel.

      I don't think so. In English, colonel is a colonel, lieutenant - colonel is a lieutenant colonel. With commander, judging by logic, it will be the same.
      A lieutenant commander is a commander with two stars, like a lieutenant.
  50. 0
    April 3 2025 18: 12
    Let me explain: the expansion of the Marine Corps will lead to the shrinking of regular motorized riflemen. They did it in the USSR... That is, an even greater division into the elite and the scum. This also relates to the issue of recruitment sources.
  51. 0
    April 3 2025 18: 23
    Where will they get officers? From civilian universities again? When will they restore military schools?
  52. -1
    April 4 2025 07: 07
    For five Marine divisions, at least 500 Serna-type tank landing craft are needed, otherwise it will be a land-based marine infantry. Of course, the marine infantry's success in land battles is obvious, this is a consequence of selection and tradition, but it was created for combat operations on the coasts, islands and remote territories. These are the Arctic coast, the Kuril Islands, Kamchatka, Sakhalin and the Commander Islands, the coastal territories of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
  53. 0
    April 4 2025 09: 52
    The Marine Corps, by definition, is a means of carrying out своих amphibious operations, not repelling foreign ones. For this, at a minimum, an appropriate fleet is needed.
    And using a marine (or paratrooper) in the role of an infantryman is like driving a cavalryman into trenches. This is from unbearable strategic wisdom, well, or - from hopelessness.))
    And the signature arrogant and moralizing tone, and pseudo-polemics with some spherical “ordinary man in the street” (as if there were “not ordinary” men in the street) in a vacuum, from the first paragraphs allows one to unmistakably determine who the author of this opus is.))
  54. -1
    April 4 2025 12: 53
    A division and a brigade are formations, not associations (corps, army). A division, in terms of comprehensive support for combat operations, is very different from a brigade (two, three).
  55. -2
    April 5 2025 10: 01
    The creation of marine divisions is, frankly, a positive moment, which somewhat calms me as an ordinary citizen. It means that we have enough weapons and experienced commanders who have outgrown the brigade and are able to cope with the leadership of divisions in combat conditions. This was already the case during the Great Patriotic War, when corps were deployed on the basis of brigades, which played a decisive role in the victory at Stalingrad.
  56. 0
    April 6 2025 13: 08
    Quote: Arzt
    5 550 people.
    This is the average LIST number of our "divisions" for the entire Great Patriotic War


    May it be so!

    (sarcasm, realizing that minusologists are not asleep):
    at the same time I really want to ask why not 5555 (what is the average level? is it +- 1000 or 10000?) and why is the next level in terms of numbers (army or whatever) already controlled again?
    and after the war, this optimal level was maintained?
    end of sarcasm

    Almost rhetorical questions:
    1. Is there any analysis and evidence base behind this?
    2. Does the level of controllability (and, accordingly, the optimal quantitative composition of a given specific subordinate team for a given specific leader) depend on the means of communication; the experience of the division commander; the skill, level of competence and number of immediate subordinates of the division commander (including at headquarters); the rate of change in the situation; the amount and inconsistency of incoming information (including intelligence)?

    I understand when there is a thesis that with the number of immediate subordinates more than No. +-x it is really impossible to manage effectively.

    You can take this as sophistry and not answer in detail.
    1. 0
      30 July 2025 11: 24
      The author joked about the MP divisions[media=http://]
  57. 0
    April 7 2025 18: 26
    It’s interesting, of course it’s not harmful to want, it’s harmful not to want. The question is where to find so many people, especially, and this is the most important thing, officers and sergeants.
  58. 0
    8 June 2025 15: 34
    Both the Marines and the Airborne Forces are a thing of the past. War tactics are changing. Once upon a time, people learned to shoot at the first airplanes, and it was scary to give up cavalry. All of this is going away.
  59. -1
    8 June 2025 15: 36
    Quote: Grossvater
    Quote: Gloomy Skeptic
    If you're not in the know, then don't talk nonsense - a commander is just a major in the naval hierarchy in the US.

    Commander, in the English-language system of naval military ranks, is a captain-two. The land equivalent is lieutenant colonel.
    The infidels call a captain a lieutenant commander, and this rank is the equivalent of a major in the army.

    This is a captain in the army and a lieutenant commander in the navy.
  60. -1
    30 July 2025 11: 22
    No offense. You are very far from the tasks facing the coastal troops and the marines. And regarding "they showed themselves well in the Kursk region." This is the selection of personnel and the training system of the marines and airborne forces. If we select for the motorized rifle troops and raise their level of training, they will be no worse than the marines and airborne forces. Based on your article, we can conclude: dress everyone in the uniform of the airborne forces and marines and our army will win several times with the same number. It is precisely dress, not train. But for saving Shoigu's plans, you get an "A" ..