Little secrets of economic victories

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Little secrets of economic victories


In the comments below previous article about assault missile a curious fact has come to light. Quite a few people do not have a clear idea of ​​the comparative cost of various industrial products, which of course include weapon and ammunition. This was manifested in the ridiculous, in my opinion, assertion that a product made of dozens or even hundreds of parts, produced by enterprises of various ministries using very complex technology and with manual assembly, is cheap.



One might think so if one knows nothing about industrial production, especially mass production. However, in this very industrial production, each processing operation, each detail has its own economic value, that is, it costs money and the expenditure of resources. And this can be shown using a conditional example, which, by the way, has educational value for understanding some aspects of the rear economy during the war.

Number of machines


Here is a hypothetical example. There is one very simple operation - turning some product, say, a shell, on a lathe. The operation lasts 1 minute. It would seem, what could be simpler? But do not hurry.

The production volume is 100 million units per year. This figure was chosen so that the impact of the scale of production on the amount of required costs could be seen more clearly.

During wartime, there was a six-day work week with one day off, that is, 312 working days with a 12-hour shift.
To make 100 million pieces in a working year, you need to make 320512 pieces per day, that is, turning operations.


Mass production is when simple things become incredibly numerous

Of the 720 minutes of a 12-hour shift, approximately 10% of the time spent on preparing the workplace and the personal needs of the worker must be excluded. This is 72 minutes, leaving 648 minutes of pure working time per day, during which operations are performed. But here too, approximately 7% of the time spent on initial and final operations must be excluded: inserting the part, securing it, turning on the machine; and in reverse order: turning off the machine, removing the part, placing it on the rack. For different types of machines, these time costs vary somewhat, and the method for calculating the standard time for machine processing is very complex. A simplified and rough calculation is used here. So, this is another 45 minutes of time, and thus 603 minutes remain per working day, when the machine turns the part. Since the operation lasts 1 minute, then one machine processes 603 parts per shift.


How many machines are needed? 320 pieces per day divided by 512 pieces per machine - that's 603 lathes. Half a machine is, for example, a machine that periodically works on this operation.

Each lathe requires 43 square meters of production space. Therefore, 22 square meters of production space are required to accommodate these machines.

Material costs


That's not all. The DIP-40 lathe has a motor power of 18,5 kW and consumes electricity during operation. 603 minutes is 10,05 hours, and thus one machine consumes 185,9 kW h of electricity per day. All 531,5 machines - 98 kW h per day. All machines during the year - 819,1 kW h.

30,8 million kWh is a decent amount.

If we take the typical for that time rate of thermal power plant production of 4500 hours per year, then to generate this amount of electricity, 6,8 thousand kW of installed capacity will be required, roughly two turbines of 3000 kW or four of 1500 kW. Accordingly, boilers for them.

Now we throw coal into the firebox. According to wartime standards, 1 kg of good coal was consumed per 0,8 kWh. Accordingly, 24 tons of coal will be needed to generate electricity.

The railway would need 1541,5 wagons to transport this amount of coal. But for one 16-ton wagon, 2000 kg of coal in a locomotive was spent on a 516 km journey, so the railways would need to have 795,4 tons of coal for locomotives to transport this amount of coal, the delivery of which by rail costs another 25,6 tons of coal. In total, 25 tons of coal.

With an average production of 38 tons per month per miner, it would take 55 miners to mine this coal.


It's a killer job in the mine, I must say.

They also need ore support, that is, logs that support the roof of the workings in the longwall. For 1000 tons of production, 51,1 cubic meters of ore support were used, that is, a total of 1297,9 cubic meters of timber will be needed. It needs to be prepared and delivered.


Here it is, the ore stand, supporting the roof of the adit, in which a mechanical conveyor is installed for rolling coal from the face to the mine cars.


And here's how this ore is obtained. "You, me and the party. You, me and the party" - a well-known matter.

The total consumption was 30,8 million kWh of electricity, the production of which required the consumption of 25,4 thousand tons of coal and 1,29 thousand cubic meters of wood.

Financial expenses


If we assume that electricity was produced at factory power plants with a cost price of 5,5 kopecks per kW h, then the monetary cost of electricity consumption is 1 rubles 695 kopecks.

Including transport operations, the transportation of 2000 tons of coal over 24 km corresponds to transport work of 665,2 ton-kilometers, which at a rate of 49 kopecks per ton-kilometer amounts to 330 rubles 400 kopecks.


Every ton-kilometer was bought with the hard work of the locomotive crew

Labor costs. 532 machine operators are required with a salary of 450 rubles per month, and an additional 40% of their number of auxiliary workers, that is, another 212 people in round numbers, with the same salary. Also, it is necessary to take into account 55 miners engaged in supplying this operation with fuel, each at 800 rubles per month. A total of 744 workers in metalworking with an annual wage fund of 4 rubles, and 017 workers in the coal industry with an annual wage fund of 600 rubles. A total of 55 rubles is the cost of labor.

Total financial costs: 6 rubles 241 kopecks.

From this we can deduce the cost of one operation - 6,24 kopecks.

This, it must be said, is far from a complete and comprehensive calculation, since there are also expenses for lubricants, spare parts, machine repair costs, lighting and heating of workshops, there are capital costs for building workshops, constructing and installing machines, their depreciation, and so on. But in general, the calculations provided cover the main factors of the economic cost of this operation.

And this is just one operation - turning on a lathe!

The Little Secret of Economic Victories


The same story with all the parts and components of weapons, military equipment and ammunition. Each of them requires the consumption of materials and energy, labor, transportation work, as well as equipment installed in pre-built production facilities.

Already on this basis, a comparison can be made. A product of 80 parts will be cheaper, with the same processing of the parts, than a product of 100 parts. A product of the same number of parts will be cheaper if the processing is simpler, for example, stamping instead of milling, or casting without processing instead of casting and turning on a machine.

This, by the way, makes it clear why military-issue weapons and equipment are crude and unfinished. Because finishing operations are an expenditure of energy, labor, and equipment, and there was a shortage of all of these. Eliminating unnecessary processing operations that did not affect the combat and technical qualities of the manufactured model of military equipment could provide very significant savings.

Now the economic significance of the Stakhanovites and their overfulfillment of the plan. Fulfilling the norm by 200%, 300% and more was possible only with the help of some technical improvement. If one of the turners figured out how to perform the same operation not in 1 minute, but in 30 seconds, this, in our example, gives a saving of 266 lathes that can be transferred to other processing operations, 372 workers who are transferred to other jobs, 28 miners who will provide coal for other industries, 15,4 million kWh of electricity transmitted to supply other enterprises, 770 cars that can be transferred to other loads. Well, and 3,1 million rubles in saved costs. In other words, any technical improvement in the processing of the final product entails the release of resources along the chain in all related sectors of the national economy, which are immediately redirected to other, equally urgent needs.

And if someone has figured out how to do without this processing operation altogether, then the entire volume of resources and labor described above is freed up and directed to other needs.

This is how the USSR survived the war years, having lost a significant part of its industry from evacuation, occupation and destruction. The most comprehensive simplification, reduction in cost, and rationalization of all production processes without exception allowed for much more efficient use of the remaining resources and the production of much more equipment and weapons than the enemy expected.

Hence the indisputable conclusion: any simplification and reduction in the cost of production of weapons, equipment and ammunition is an absolutely useful and positive thing for the military economy.
214 comments
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  1. +1
    13 March 2025 05: 47
    A product of 80 parts will be cheaper than a product of 100 parts, if the parts are processed in the same way. A product of the same number of parts will be cheaper if the processing is simpler, for example, stamping instead of milling, or casting without processing instead of casting and turning on a machine.

    The race for cheapness has a negative side - a drop in reliability and quality. Issuing an over-plan "Stakhanovite" does not know that the end user died because at the wrong moment the engine failed, the wing fell off, the gun jammed... In addition, a type of weapon that is superior to the enemy's similar one cannot be cheaper than its predecessor a priori. This is unrealistic. Therefore, in the pursuit of "cheapness" you can lose the war.
    This is how the USSR survived the war years, having lost a significant part of its industry from evacuation, occupation and destruction. The most comprehensive simplification, reduction in cost, rationalization of all production processes without exception

    And the best simplification and reduction in cost is the supply by an ally of a ready-made product, for the production of which there is no need to mine additional coal, generate additional electricity and all that the car described in the article.
    1. +12
      13 March 2025 07: 31
      Quote: Puncher
      And the best simplification and reduction in cost is the supply by an ally of a ready-made product, for the production of which there is no need to mine additional coal, generate additional electricity and all that the car described in the article.

      "We'll buy everything"?
      That's why SVO has been going on for four years now - and there's no end in sight?
      1. +5
        13 March 2025 08: 24
        Quote: Vladimir-TTT
        "We'll buy everything"?
        That's why SVO has been going on for four years now - and there's no end in sight?

        No, this is a hint at Lend-Lease, under which the US economy covered all the holes and problems of the USSR economy with its own supplies.
        1. -4
          13 March 2025 08: 48
          Since Perestroika, the enemies of the USSR and the Soviet people have been trying to discredit the Victory of the Soviet people with this Lend-Lease, but during all this time, none of you have presented figures on what percentage Lend-Lease made up in relation to the production of Soviet weapons during the Great Patriotic War.
          1. +13
            13 March 2025 09: 24
            Quote: tatra
            Since Perestroika, the enemies of the USSR and the Soviet people have been trying to discredit the Victory of the Soviet people with this Lend-Lease, but during all this time, none of you have presented figures on what percentage Lend-Lease made up in relation to the production of Soviet weapons during the Great Patriotic War.

            You, enemies of the USSR, are trying to slander and hush up the great achievements of Soviet diplomats, politicians and technical specialists, who were able to correctly identify the bottlenecks of Soviet industry, especially during the mass evacuation, and to obtain millions of tons of much-needed materials and finished products from yesterday’s enemies.
            And the percentage has long been calculated. But it is derived from the entire military production of the USSR and correlated with the aid received from the allies.
          2. +3
            13 March 2025 09: 58
            What perestroika? Stalin even said that without American engines we would have lost the war.

            but during all this time, none of you have presented figures on what percentage Lend-Lease was in relation to the production of Soviet weapons during the Great Patriotic War.


            So, it is still there, even in Soviet textbooks, and yes, most likely Stalin was right, without Lend-Lease it would have been very difficult and there would have been no large-scale offensives after 43, look for yourself how much gunpowder/explosives were supplied relative to production in the USSR, cars, additives for aviation gasoline, food products, etc.
            1. -1
              13 March 2025 12: 17
              Quote: Oldrover
              Stalin was right, without Lend-Lease it would have been very difficult

              It’s not just hard, we would have to repeat Brest 1918.
              Quote: Oldrover
              food products, etc.

              Provision of provisions for the army is the most important part of Lend-Lease. A hungry army is not capable of fighting. Since the second half of 1942, the USSR has lost the ability to feed the army, this is easily proven: domestic production of provisions + provisions received under Lend-Lease = a well-fed army and hunger in the rear.
              1. +5
                13 March 2025 18: 06
                Quote: Puncher
                It’s not just hard, we would have to repeat Brest 1918.

                And how did they manage to defeat the Germans in Moscow and Stalingrad, when the volumes coming in under Lend-Lease were at the level of statistical error...
                1. +4
                  14 March 2025 00: 22
                  The Germans themselves at that time lived as if in peacetime. They came to the idea of ​​"total war" much later.
                  1. +1
                    14 March 2025 08: 49
                    Quote from solar
                    The Germans themselves at that time lived as if in peacetime. They came to the idea of ​​"total war" much later.

                    That's right. However, the transition to total war did not give them anywhere near the level of military equipment they had at the beginning of WWII.
                    1. +3
                      14 March 2025 09: 26
                      The amount of military equipment produced in Germany increased very strongly during the war. From 1700 medium tanks, with which they began the attack on the USSR, it increased significantly. In parallel with this, and even faster, lend-lease grew.
                2. +1
                  14 March 2025 05: 30
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  And how did they manage to defeat the Germans in Moscow?

                  You are exaggerating a bit about the defeat. They were stopped and driven back, it was not the Stalingrad rout and certainly not Operation Bagration. The Wehrmacht was on its last legs due to the lack of reserves.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  and Stalingrad

                  From the second half of 1942, serious deliveries began, which made it possible to accumulate resources for the offensive at Stalingrad and the Rzhev operation.
                  1. -1
                    14 March 2025 09: 00
                    Quote: Puncher
                    You're exaggerating a bit about breaking them. They were stopped and driven away.

                    Let us dwell on the fact that the Germans suffered such a defeat near Moscow that Army Group Center no longer dreamed of offensive operations.
                    Quote: Puncher
                    The Wehrmacht was on its last legs due to a lack of reserves.

                    By the end of 1942, the same situation had developed on the southern flank.
                    Quote: Puncher
                    From the second half of 1942, serious deliveries began, which made it possible to accumulate resources for the offensive at Stalingrad and the Rzhev operation.

                    Can you somehow translate this thesis into numbers?
                    1. 0
                      14 March 2025 09: 08
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      after which Army Group Center no longer dreamed of offensive operations.

                      Yes, the scarcity of resources did not allow the Wehrmacht to attack both Moscow and the Caucasus at the same time. The only reason for this was Hitler's short-sightedness.
                      BUT! Let's remember the Red Army offensive of 1942 and how it ended. The offensive of 1942 was carried out almost entirely on its own resources, which were especially lacking in ammunition and provisions.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Can you somehow translate this thesis into numbers?

                      I can provide statistics on deliveries by period.
          3. +8
            13 March 2025 10: 26
            Quote: tatra
            but during all this time none of you have presented figures - what percentage did Lend-Lease make up in relation to the production of Soviet weapons during the Great Patriotic War

            Are we tactfully omitting deliveries of machines and materials? How was it in the USSR with its own high-octane? Not with a mixture of imported ones, but with its own? And with additives for it?
            Or what to do with gunpowder (26% of the total volume of supplies - domestic and foreign)? And with the components for their production?


            What to do with all-wheel drive trucks that solved the problem of traction for divisional artillery and provided rifle units with the ability to act as advanced mechanized units - like the Germans in 1941? It was the Studers that won the race to the Oder in 1945 - the infantry reached the river faster than the tankers.

            And if you compare them directly, by cost, then a million files will be more valuable than a unique machine.
            1. +3
              13 March 2025 14: 38
              Alcohol and glycerin - most likely their production was located in the western regions of the USSR and was lost. This should be looked at, it may be an interesting thing.
              1. +4
                13 March 2025 19: 37
                Hydrolytic industrial alcohol is produced from non-scarce waste from the forest industry. But it was probably difficult to deliver it to the necessary chemical plants.
                1. +1
                  13 March 2025 20: 07
                  No need to guess, just find the materials and look.
                  1. 0
                    13 March 2025 22: 04
                    Most likely, the difficulty of transportation has nothing to do with it. One publication indicated that already during the industrialization period, the bulk of hydrolytic alcohol was exported, and equipment for industrial enterprises was purchased with foreign currency. If alcohol was sent abroad, then it was possible to transport it within the country.
          4. +4
            13 March 2025 17: 06
            Quote: tatra
            none of you presented figures - what percentage did Lend-Lease make up in relation to the production of Soviet weapons during the Great Patriotic War

            Here were 4 of my articles with all the Lend-Lease figures and % of how much of what and how. If you know how to use a computer, type in VO FIO and "Lend-Lease" and everything will be revealed to you. There will also be links to the most reliable sources - documents of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
        2. -1
          14 March 2025 19: 57
          Lend-Lease did not close any holes or problems. And without it, the Red Army would have won. Only a year later and with two million more losses. 4% in monetary terms of war expenses, that's what Lend-Lease is. Let's be honest, not liberal!
          1. 0
            Yesterday, 15: 24
            Quote: stankow
            Lend-Lease did not cover any holes or problems.

            All-wheel drive vehicles. High-octane. Aluminum and copper. And copper is not electrics, but shell casings. L-L copper closed the question that tormented the USSR during the entire pre-war period: where to get brass to avoid shots from "three-inch" guns.
            Sleeve 76mm guns arr. 1902/1930 (as well as subsequent divisions of this caliber) weighed 830-850 grams.
            But the anti-aircraft gun sleeve of the 1931 3-K model weighed 2 kg 760 grams already.
            Those. 3,1 times more copper.
            The 85mm anti-aircraft gun barrel weighed 2,85-2,92kg and was slightly thicker, but in geometric terms it was almost identical to the 1931 3-K gun barrel.

            Quote: stankow
            And without him, the KA would have won. Only a year later and with two million more losses.

            And the USSR would have ended the war on completely different lines.
            And yes, I would really like to know - where would the USSR find a couple of million extra conscripts in the final period of the war? If in the current reality, rifle divisions numbering 4,5-5 thousand people, or three times less than the regular one, had to be thrown into the assault on Berlin in the direction of the main attack. And the 1945 conscription had to be fattened up in the army, as in tsarist times.
    2. +7
      13 March 2025 08: 48
      Quote: Puncher
      Therefore, in pursuit of "cheapness" you can lose the war.

      But the cheap, simple and therefore mass-produced T34 and Yaks, assembled into fist armies, won over the expensive, technologically advanced and therefore less mass-produced Panzers and Mes.

      Reliability should be enough for a short life in battle and on campaign, excess is not needed, but expensive.

      Soviet designers and manufacturers have found this fine line...
      1. 0
        13 March 2025 11: 02
        Quote: Petrovich
        But the cheap, simple and therefore mass-produced T34 and Yaks, assembled into fist armies, won over the expensive, technologically advanced and therefore less mass-produced Panzers and Mes.

        Why did you think that the same T-34 was cheap?
        Quote: Petrovich
        Reliability should be enough for a short life in battle and on campaign, excess is not needed, but expensive.

        Well, fly on a plane where reliability is not taken into account. Do you really think that by increasing tolerances you will simply shorten the service life? It doesn't work that way.
        Quote: Petrovich
        Soviet designers and manufacturers have found this fine line...

        How pompous... Is this the very line that the manufacturers in Sormovo have found?
        1. +7
          13 March 2025 11: 43
          At one time, Guderian wrote that the rational solution after the collapse of the Barbarossa plan would have been a policy of mass production of cheap equipment. And not rushing around in search of super weapons.
          But the Germans did not find the "boundary". They felt and found something else: how to rip off more money from their state. And they continued business even after the collapse of the Reich.
          Doesn't it suggest any thoughts? hi
          1. -1
            13 March 2025 11: 53
            Quote: sidorov
            there would be a policy of mass production of cheap equipment. And not rushing around in search of super weapons.

            By "wunderwaffe" he clearly meant rocket and jet madness, and not the production of Tigers and the like.
            1. +3
              13 March 2025 17: 46
              I read his book to pieces. He wrote there that it would be better if we (the Germans) did something like the T-34 like the Soviets, and not experiment with Mauzes and Tigers. He even called the Elefans a mistake of nature, saying that 90 of them were put on the Kursk Bulge because they had to be deployed somewhere.
              While the rivals were "chucking out T-34s". He highly praised the T-34s and criticized them - the German approach. And it's not about the FAU of all sorts.
              But he condemned all sorts of Gustavs as a separate point as the idiocy of armchair strategists. That is, the truth is partially there and there.
              1. +1
                14 March 2025 05: 23
                Quote: EpIvIaK
                He wrote there that it would be better if we (the Germans) did something like the T-34 like the Soviets, and not experiment with Mauzes and Tigers.

                This is because the German industry allocated few resources to the production of Tigers. Example. The German industry was able to churn out 118 U-Boot-Klasse XXI submarines under bombing. This is a highly complex and very expensive product. Much more complex than the Tiger, which is full of expensive systems and requires approximately 1500 tons of high-quality steel. Thousands of highly skilled workers and engineers, thousands of highly complex machine tools and welding units were involved in their production. Tons of scarce non-ferrous metals. In pure terms of weight, this is more than 3000 Tiger tanks. How many of the 118 U-Boot-Klasse XXI that were built fought? Two, neither did anything useful. And this is only the U-Boot-Klasse XXI, and before it there were 1000 submarines of other models. Most of them were of no use to Germany, and were sunk along with their crews. If Germany had transferred at least half of its shipbuilding capacity to the construction of armored vehicles and tanks, then Guderian would have had to look for other reasons for the defeat...
            2. -1
              14 March 2025 08: 46
              The Tiger was created in haste in response to more advanced Soviet tanks, as was the Panther.
              1. +2
                14 March 2025 09: 31
                The creation of the Tiger began back in 1939.
          2. +3
            13 March 2025 14: 22
            Quote: sidorov
            there would be a policy of mass production of cheap equipment.

            If my memory serves me right, in 45 the Germans had equipment reserves - no tank crews. Having started mass production of equipment, it was then necessary to close the issue of providing people.
            One can only be glad that this was not done in full.
        2. Fat
          +6
          13 March 2025 18: 29
          Quote: Puncher
          How pompous... Is this the very line that the manufacturers in Sormovo have found?

          The price of the T-34 during the Great Patriotic War was as follows:
          in 1941 - 269 thousand rubles per piece;
          in a year - 193 thousand rubles;
          by the end of the war - 135 thousand rubles.
          Il 4 at the beginning of the war - 800 thousand rubles
          In the middle - 468 t.
          In 1945 - 380 thousand.
          Shpagin submachine gun (PPSh)
          In 1941 - 500 rubles.
          In 1942 - 400
          Later, until the end of the war - 148 rubles.
          The reasons for the total reduction in the cost of production are the rationalization of technologies, mass production and high labor productivity of workers.
          1. +3
            14 March 2025 00: 28
            All these prices in the USSR are conditional figures. There was no market.
          2. -1
            14 March 2025 05: 41
            Quote: Thick
            The reasons for the total reduction in the cost of production are the rationalization of technologies, mass production and high labor productivity of workers.

            Well, the same can be said about the Tiger tank and any other serial equipment.
            Regarding the T-34. Its cost at the beginning of production, according to the report of Plant 183, was 596 rubles, which is clearly more than twice as expensive as the T-373. So it was not a cheap tank at all.
            1. Fat
              0
              14 March 2025 07: 53
              The figures for T 34 that I cited are data for Plant 183 (UVZ, Nizhny Tagil). 1941 price by November. This is not the very beginning of production. In 1941, Plant 183 received powerful reinforcements with qualified personnel. If I remember correctly, 11 enterprises were evacuated to Nizhny Tagil. About 5000 workers from Kharkov alone.
              At the 112th plant (Krasnoye Sormovo), even at the end of the war, the price of the T 34 did not fall below 170 thousand rubles. I think because the main products of the Sormovo workers were not tanks, but submarines, if I am not mistaken, they made 22 units during the war.
              With respect.
            2. +1
              14 March 2025 08: 50
              When the T-28 was compared, the T-34 was still an experimental model. With a corresponding price. But! The combat value of the cardboard, huge and metal-intensive gasoline T-28 is much lower than the T-34 with anti-shell armor
              1. +1
                14 March 2025 09: 25
                Quote: Jager
                When the T-28 was compared, the T-34 was still an experimental model. With a corresponding price.

                The T-34 was mass-produced in 1939. It was normal that it was expensive, because it couldn't be any other way. The T-54 was more expensive than the T-34, and the T-62 was more expensive than the T-54, and so on. There is no such thing as cheap equipment.
                1. +2
                  14 March 2025 09: 50
                  Since 1940. And in every possible way it was made cheaper and simpler during the production process. T-34 mod. 40 and T-34/85 are completely different machines in terms of complexity/cost ratio.
        3. +2
          14 March 2025 11: 25
          . [/ Quote]
          Why did you think that the same T-34 was cheap?
          [quote=Petrovich]Reliability should be enough for a short life in battle and on the march, excess is not needed, but it is expensive.[/quote]
          Well, fly on a plane where reliability is not taken into account. [/quote]
          Has no one read that the Yak losses after the BD stopped remained at the same level? M. Solonin wrote that the planes' wings fell off in the air
      2. +2
        14 March 2025 00: 26
        Do you think that the production of the T-34 took place without the Americans?
        Reliability should be enough for a short life in battle and on campaign, excess is not needed

        Excess is not needed, necessary is needed, for example, to carry out marches along the front line without losing tanks along the way due to breakdowns, and to ensure the concentration of forces in the necessary direction. Otherwise, to ensure the same tasks, many more tanks are needed.
        1. +1
          14 March 2025 09: 55
          And what do the Americans and the T-34 have to do with it?) The T-34 is a machine of evolutionary development. Moreover, it is far from ideal.
          1. +3
            14 March 2025 10: 19
            American supplies under Lend-Lease allowed to set up and restore production quite quickly. Finished armor plates, machines and tools, individual components that were difficult to produce, which the Soviet industry for some reason could not provide, such as brake bands.
            And what do the Americans and the T-34 have to do with it?) The T-34 is a machine of evolutionary development.

            Yeah. And at the beginning of the evolutionary branch - some Christie. It's a joke.
      3. -1
        15 March 2025 11: 47
        "won over the expensive, technologically advanced and therefore less mass-produced Panzers and Mes" - exactly the opposite - technologically advanced means cheap and easy to produce.
    3. +6
      13 March 2025 09: 02
      Today he's an ally, and tomorrow he's giving a speech in Fulton. And you have zero weapons. And then what?
      There is no need to pray for "German quality". German industry did not want and ultimately could not carry out a real mobilization at the level of the USSR. The Germans were able to do something only in 44, but it was already too late.
      How can tanks be produced in commercial quantities if the Tiger's semi-automatic gearbox alone required more man-hours than the entire T-34? And compare the welded bent sheets of the Pz. VI turret with the cast IS-2 turret? While the Germans weld one Tiger turret, the USSR casts 10 IS turrets. As a result, they got a sea of ​​useless, from an economic point of view, armed junk in the form of some kind of "wunderwaffe".
      What 140-ton "Maus" does Goebbels need when Soviet factories produce thousands of tanks? The only one who really understood this was the father of the Panzerwaffe, Guderian. It was he who insisted on maintaining the relatively well-established production of the Pz.IV instead of completely switching to the production of "Panthers". Because this switch would have completely collapsed the production of armored vehicles. That is why the obsolete T-34, which had a huge number of shortcomings, was never replaced with a more advanced machine during the war.
      As for quality, literally within a year after the evacuation (into the open field) the factories had improved it, and by 44 this issue was no longer an issue.
      1. +4
        13 March 2025 10: 38
        Quote: Jager
        And compare the welded bent sheets of the Pz. VI turret and the cast IS-2 turret? While the Germans weld one Tiger turret, the USSR casts 10 IS turrets.

        So for the Germans, welding was simpler than casting. They could afford to use skilled welders, not a shop of newbies with a couple of masters above them.
        Quote: Jager
        The only one who really understood this was the father of the Panzerwaffe, Guderian. It was he who insisted on maintaining the relatively well-established production of the Pz.IV instead of completely switching to the production of "Panthers".

        Guderian, if my memory serves me right, was against the Panthers, for some reason believing that the "four" was easier to manufacture. Not understanding that for the factories that produced the "threes" it was easier to switch to their own "Panther" than to someone else's "four".
        The Germans had exactly the same situation as later in the USSR, with Kharkov and Tagil. It is easier for the plant to do what was developed for the plant than to switch to someone else's products. For it, making a "four" after a "three" is like putting the T-64 into production at UVZ. smile
        1. +4
          13 March 2025 18: 04
          For the Germans, welding was easier than casting

          while the highly skilled German welder welded manually, the Soviet "fabzayets" welded twice as much on a welding machine
        2. +2
          14 March 2025 08: 57
          The "Troika" was completely obsolete in 42 and would have been taken out of production anyway. The problem is not what Guderian thought, but the real combat and economic value of the new "Panthers". This is an extremely crude middle-class machine with a heavy weight. And the issue is not in replacing the "Troika" with the "Panther", but in taking the "Four" out of production. Which was only slightly inferior in armor to the "Panther", but was much simpler and more convenient.
          1. +1
            14 March 2025 16: 03
            Quote: Jager
            The "Troika" became completely obsolete in 42 and would have been taken out of production in any case.

            True. And that's why they made the "Panther" to replace it.
            Quote: Jager
            The problem is not what Guderian thought, but the real combat and economic value of the new "Panthers". This is an extremely crude middle-class machine with a lot of heavy stuff.

            This is a vehicle with a powerful gun, which is not hit in the front by standard infantry anti-tank guns and medium tank guns. It is the best for working against the T-34 as a tank destroyer. The main thing is not to expose the sides.
            Quote: Jager
            Which was only slightly inferior in armor to the Panther, but was much simpler and more convenient.

            And it had a 48-caliber gun + fully exhausted reserves for modernization. "Schmalturm" remained a dream.
        3. +1
          14 March 2025 11: 30
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Quote: Jager
          And compare the welded bent sheets of the Pz. VI turret and the cast IS-2 turret? While the Germans weld one Tiger turret, the USSR casts 10 IS turrets.

          So for the Germans, welding was simpler than casting. They could afford to use skilled welders, not a workshop of novices with a couple of masters:

          It was at this time that Academician Paton invented a welding machine that did not require crowds of qualified welders.
      2. 0
        13 March 2025 11: 09
        Quote: Jager
        Today he's an ally, tomorrow he's giving a speech in Fulton.

        Oh, how... And stupid Stalin asked him for help... He should have proudly sent him to hell.
        Quote: Jager
        German industry did not want and ultimately could not carry out a real mobilization at the level of the USSR

        Absolutely right.
        Quote: Jager
        How can you produce tanks in commercial quantities if

        Having mobilized industry, as you indicated above. That's all. If your industry is not mobilized, then regardless of the technological advancement of the product, its quantity will be in small quantities.
        Quote: Jager
        This is precisely why the outdated T-34, which had a huge number of shortcomings, was never replaced by a more advanced machine during the war.

        The T-34-76 and T-34-85 are different machines. So they were replaced. And work on the T-44 was in full swing. Soviet designers never stopped working, especially in the line of heavy tanks, from the KV-1 to the IS-3. No one was afraid to break the production process by moving from the KV-1 to the KV-1S, KV-85, IS-1, IS-2 and IS-3.
        1. +6
          13 March 2025 16: 12
          Quote: Puncher
          T-34-76 and T-34-85 are different machines. So they were replaced.

          Nope. The T-34-85 is a T-34-76 hull with a T-43 turret.
          Yes, reinforced turret armor, dedicated commander, turret commander and 2 ventilators.
          But at the same time, the 45-mm armor of the frontal hull (considered insufficient even in 1941), the driver's hatch in the upper glacis, the fuel tanks in the BO, and the spark plugs on the sides with cutouts in the sides remained.
          The modern machine for the second half of the war is the T-44. Or at least the T-43.
          Quote: Puncher
          Nobody was afraid to break the production process by moving from the KV-1 to the KV-1S, KV-85, IS-1, IS-2 and IS-3.

          The TT had one change in the production process: during the transition from the KV to the IS (the IS only retained the rollers from the KV). Because of the delay, the swan song of the Voroshilov line, the KV-85, had to be put into production for a while.
          But the T-34 was supposed to be replaced by the fundamentally new T-1943 in 43. And they couldn't - even stopping one plant was unacceptable. So they drove the chimera T-34-85.
          1. -2
            14 March 2025 05: 11
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Nope. The T-34-85 is a T-34-76 hull with a T-43 turret.

            All this required changes to the technological process with all the consequences. If in 1942 they had figured out how to turn the B-2 by 90 degrees, then the T-44 would have been produced already in 1943.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            But the T-34 was supposed to be replaced in 1943 by the fundamentally new T-43.

            The T-43 got too fat without gaining any special advantages over the T-34. That is, switching to it would not have given any special advantages except for the armor, which was already insufficient. Only the T-44 gained a noticeable advantage, but it was too late.
            1. +2
              14 March 2025 09: 15
              Nobody would have launched a T-44 in 43! At the beginning of 43, they were only able to master the 5th gear in the gearbox and install a relatively more spacious turret. The industry had only just begun to improve the quality of the "Sormovo freaks".
            2. 0
              14 March 2025 16: 10
              Quote: Puncher
              All this required changes to the technological process with all the consequences.

              The only changes to the T-34-85 hull compared to the T-34-76 were the roof and the upper part of the sides in the area of ​​the new turret ring.
              And the turret had to be expanded anyway - the GABTU had been demanding a dedicated commander since pre-war times. A commander-gunner in 1943 was like death to a tank.
              Plus, the design documentation and technical documentation for the new turret were made by the manufacturing plants, “for themselves.”
              Quote: Puncher
              If in 1942 they had figured out how to turn the B-2 90 degrees, then the T-44 would have started to be produced already in 1943.

              Yeah... with a four-speed, leaky turret and no driver's observation devices. So we would have to make a hatch or a booth in the upper frontal area.
              And yes, the rolled armor of this T-44 would have been 45 mm. Because the shortage of rolled steel thicker than 45 mm before 1944 was such that the new heavy tank had to be made as cast as possible.
              1. 0
                Yesterday, 05: 27
                Quote: Alexey RA
                The GABTU had been demanding a dedicated commander since pre-war times.

                Quote: Alexey RA
                Yeah... with a four-speed, leaky turret and no driver's observation devices. So we would have to make a hatch or a booth in the upper frontal area.

                You yourself confirm that the reason for the lack of fundamental changes was of a technical nature, and not the desire to maintain the established technological process. That is, the thesis "for the sake of the established technological process they turned a blind eye to combat capabilities, steering at the expense of mass production" is incorrect.
                1. 0
                  Yesterday, 15: 16
                  Quote: Puncher
                  You yourself confirm that the reason for the lack of fundamental changes was of a technical nature, and not a desire to maintain the established technical process.

                  Well, here's the T-43. There are no major technical changes (except for the torsion bars) - it was made with the preservation of the serial units and mechanisms of the T-34. According to the test results:
                  [quote...]the reliability of the T-43 was recognized as equivalent to the T-34, after the defects were eliminated it was recommended to launch the tank into production.[/quote] © Yu. Pasholok
                  Even an 85mm gun fit into the turret.
                  But the NKTP, represented by Zaltsman and his successor Malyshev, opposed the tank. Even the intervention of the IVS and LPB did not help: the proms delayed the T-43 tests as much as possible and rolled out a decoy to the Customer in the form of the T-44.
                  The reason is simple:
                  ... Malyshev chose a compromise option, without any window dressing. The tanks were shown in Moscow, but later, in September 1943. In the meantime, it was necessary to obtain a tank that would definitely replace the T-34. And Malyshev had his own truth. He had already been removed from his post as People's Commissar for disrupting the T-34's production; he was not eager to risk the well-established production of the T-34.
                  © Y. Pasholok.
        2. 0
          14 March 2025 09: 11
          The T34/76 and T-34/85 differ only in the gun and turret. They retain completely insufficient armor and an outdated heavy suspension.
          The KV series evolved gradually and at one point became obsolete with the advent of the Tigers and other long-barreled tanks. The Kvass was generally a palliative machine - they reduced the weight and armor, because the gearbox simply could not cope with the weight of the vehicle. As a result, with great difficulty, they gave birth to the "transitional" KV-85 and IS-1. The losses at Kursk and in the fall of 43 were due, among other things, to our military-technical lag. Even the modernized "four" was stronger than the T-34/76 due to stronger armor and a much more powerful gun.
          The T-44 is also a transitional "cadaver" for testing a new chassis.
          1. 0
            14 March 2025 09: 28
            Quote: Jager
            even the modernized "four" was stronger

            What does this have to do with it? I mean that despite the country's situation, they were not afraid to break the technological process and rebuilt production for the sake of better technology. How much better it turned out to be is a third question...
            1. 0
              14 March 2025 09: 53
              I basically don't understand the Germans' approach to producing armored vehicles. It was a complete mess.
              1. +1
                14 March 2025 11: 37
                Quote: Jager
                I basically don't understand the Germans' approach to producing armored vehicles. It was a complete mess.

                Well, why do that? The Germans were never fools. They were prevented from increasing production by the shortage of alloy steels and additives. They did not have lend-lease. In addition, they were heavily bombed by the Allies, wiping out entire factories. In addition, they fought on two fronts. I just wonder how long the USSR would have lasted without lend-lease and on two fronts.
                1. 0
                  Yesterday, 05: 21
                  Quote from Kartograph
                  They were prevented from increasing production by the shortage of alloy steels and additives. They did not have a lend-lease.

                  So why the hell did they stamp out hundreds of submarines that never returned from their cruises after 1943? To skimp on steel for armored vehicles and churn out 118 useless submarines of the 21st series that never even went to sea. Each one is 1500 tons of high-quality steel and tons of non-ferrous metals.
          2. 0
            Yesterday, 15: 27
            Quote: Jager
            "Kvass" is generally a palliative vehicle - they reduced the weight and armor, because the gearbox simply could not cope with the weight of the vehicle.

            The KV-1S is a natural result of a design error in 1939: the suspension and transmission of the new heavy tank were designed for a vehicle weight of 40 tons. Moreover, the GABTU knew about this, but had no choice.
            In 1942, the most popular response from the GABTU to all projects of new self-propelled guns based on the KV was “reduce the weight - the chassis is only designed for 40 tons.”
      3. +1
        14 March 2025 06: 35
        German industry did not want and ultimately was unable to carry out a real mobilization at the level of the USSR.

        They may have wanted to, but there were no people, and they themselves destroyed 7 million potential workers aged 20 to 30 (prisoners of war, Jews, other nationalities). The breakthrough to 1944 turned out to be that they brought in a lot of foreign labor.
    4. +1
      13 March 2025 09: 08
      Quote: Puncher
      The race for cheapness has a negative side - a drop in reliability and quality.

      You do not understand the difference between making a condom cheaper in peacetime and making a tank cheaper in wartime. In peacetime, your arguments are significant. In wartime, the highest quality tank will be destroyed, despite its excellent performance characteristics and increased reliability. And statistically, this destruction will occur much earlier than its short service life is exhausted. Therefore, the primary consideration regarding its release is not the service life, but the number of shells and machine gun bursts that the tank will have time to fire before its destruction. And I have only begun to explain this. The approach to the quality of military products in wartime is not at all similar to peacetime.
      1. +2
        13 March 2025 11: 20
        Quote: Mikhail3
        You don't understand the difference between making a condom cheaper in peacetime and making a tank cheaper in wartime.

        I said that this parameter has a negative side, and therefore one should not get carried away with it, so that later "Sormovsky Ur-s" do not appear.
        Quote: Mikhail3
        is not the resource, but the number of shells and machine gun bursts that the tank will manage to fire before its destruction

        And how many shells will a tank fire before it reaches the battlefield?
        Quote: Mikhail3
        And I've only just begun to explain.

        Well, go ahead.
        1. +1
          14 March 2025 09: 19
          The "Sormovo freaks" were not the result of "cheapening quality during wartime", but the result of the fact that the plant could, in principle, produce at least something.
    5. +6
      13 March 2025 09: 20
      Quote: Puncher
      The race for cheapness has a negative side - a drop in reliability and quality.

      In a real war, the life of weapons is short. I agree that they should be reliable, but in such a situation, there is no need to make them "for centuries". This means that some kind of boundary is needed that will provide the minimum necessary quality and at the same time produce the maximum quantity. It seems that in the Great Patriotic War we found this boundary.
      1. 0
        13 March 2025 11: 22
        Quote: Trapper7
        It seems that we found this line in WWII.

        Do you know the statistics on non-combat losses in aviation?
        1. +1
          13 March 2025 14: 23
          Quote: Puncher
          Do you know the statistics on non-combat losses in aviation?

          Unfortunately no
          1. +1
            14 March 2025 04: 59
            Quote: Trapper7
            Unfortunately no

            More than 50%. These are the machines that killed trained pilots without causing any harm to the enemy.
            1. 0
              14 March 2025 09: 58
              And it turns out that in most cases the fault lies with the maintenance personnel and the undertrained green pilots, and not with the equipment as such.
              1. 0
                Yesterday, 05: 23
                Quote: Jager
                And it turns out that in most cases the fault lies with the maintenance personnel and the undertrained green pilots, and not with the equipment as such.

                Wow, you got out of it. But it's a 100% lie. There are many memories left about the quality of the equipment.
          2. -1
            14 March 2025 07: 18
            Quote: Trapper7
            Quote: Puncher
            Do you know the statistics on non-combat losses in aviation?

            Unfortunately no

            Every third IL-2 is a non-combat loss
        2. Fat
          +1
          13 March 2025 21: 38
          Quote: Puncher
          Quote: Trapper7
          It seems that we found this line in WWII.

          Do you know the statistics on non-combat losses in aviation?

          Overall, out of 106,4 thousand aircraft lost by the Soviet Air Force, non-combat losses amounted to 60,3 thousand. According to V.N. Sokerin's assessment,
          https://topwar.ru/14182-neboevye-poteri.html
    6. -1
      13 March 2025 10: 33
      Quote: Puncher
      Moreover, a type of weapon that is superior to the enemy’s similar one cannot a priori be cheaper than its predecessor.

      The same categorical nonsense as Verkhoturov’s about the absolute benefit of simplification and cheapness.
  2. +9
    13 March 2025 05: 54
    This is how the USSR survived the war years, having lost a significant part of its industry due to evacuation, occupation and destruction.

    The USSR survived the war years because the socialist path of development presupposes a different attitude to the ownership of the means of production and to the distribution of the resulting labor. It was precisely the revived capitalism in Russia that showed that, given such a scenario, the outcome in WWII could have been different...
    * * *
    I can assume that in socialist Russia this SVO would have ended long ago... And, most likely, it never began. It was the Gorbachev-Yeltsin liberals who began to convince us that there is nothing sweeter than horseradish from the West. They convinced us...
    Today, the majority is convinced of the correctness of socialist ideology... But it is too late...
    And there was also a different morality and different principles of existence.
    1. +7
      13 March 2025 07: 18
      I can assume that in socialist Russia this SVO would have ended long ago...

      The post-war USSR was characterized by the maintenance of a large land army, so to speak, the experience of the Great Patriotic War, most likely there would simply have been no conflict in the form of the Central Military District, they would have mobilized 5-6 combined arms armies and crushed the enemy, as happened with Georgia.
      1. +1
        13 March 2025 19: 43
        Quote: strannik1985
        I can assume that in socialist Russia this SVO would have ended long ago...

        The post-war USSR was characterized by the maintenance of a large land army, so to speak, the experience of the Great Patriotic War, most likely there would simply have been no conflict in the form of the Central Military District, they would have mobilized 5-6 combined arms armies and crushed the enemy, as happened with Georgia.

        Georgia has a smaller army and there was no such support. And they still managed to lose 6 planes
        1. +1
          13 March 2025 20: 24
          Georgia has a smaller army and there was no such support. And they still managed to lose 6 planes

          Combined arms army of the Soviet model - 65 people x 000 = 6. But there many units belonged to the front (district), 390 combined arms armies on the model of the 000th army in Afghanistan = 6 people.
          Moreover, the USSR could provide these troops with the latest equipment; for example, such interesting devices appeared in anti-tank batteries of military units back in the 80s.
          1. +1
            14 March 2025 00: 39
            Moreover, the USSR could provide these troops in step with the times.

            Served in the late 80s in the Air Force communications. The "leg of time" was very lame. We had R-104 and R-105 in service. One was from 1949, the other from 1967. There was no TAI-43, but TA-57 was common. :((
            1. +1
              14 March 2025 06: 31
              Served in the late 80s in the Air Force communications. The "leg of time" was very lame.

              The level of equipment was different, according to the organization chart A, the Ground Forces had 17 tank and 17 motorized rifle divisions, one in the 39th Army, the rest in Europe. The problem is not that you had a Ta-57, the problem is that the 57s were the norm in warring Chechnya, and are not uncommon at the front even now.
              1. 0
                14 March 2025 09: 38
                The problem is not that you had a Ta-57

                How to say. The Air Force of the Odessa Military District stood on the front lines of the NATO confrontation. And we were running around with cable reels. The equipment in the regiment was ancient, with rare exceptions.
                1. +1
                  14 March 2025 13: 19
                  How to say.

                  If with NATO, then first the Southern Group of Forces - 2 tank, 2 motorized rifle divisions, other units, by 1989 70 thousand people, 950 tanks, 600 infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers, 120 aircraft and 123 helicopters, in the mid-80s there were more.
                  Regarding the Ta-57, the next model is the Ta-88, which has been in production since 1988.
                  1. 0
                    14 March 2025 14: 49
                    We were constantly reminded that our potential adversaries were Greece and Türkiye.
    2. 0
      14 March 2025 19: 22
      Quote: yuriy55
      I can assume that in socialist Russia this SVO would have ended long ago...

      There are direct analogs of the SVO in Stalin's time: Primakov's invasion of Afghanistan, the Finnish War, the USSR's intervention in East Turkestan, the battles at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. At that time, the USSR's opponents were not supported by all of Europe, Japan, and the USA. Taking this into account, Putin looks advantageous against Stalin.
      1. 0
        15 March 2025 14: 38
        Quote: gsev
        Taking this into account, Putin looks good compared to Stalin.

        Stalin looks more advantageous in terms of industrial development.
        Well, to get into a long-term conflict, to lose the already small population of the most working age, such an achievement
  3. BAI
    +2
    13 March 2025 06: 08
    Any simplification and reduction in the cost of production of weapons, equipment and ammunition is something absolutely useful and positive for the military economy.

    This could have been given as the first paragraph and the article could have ended there.
    An axiom that requires no proof
  4. +3
    13 March 2025 06: 23
    In addition to simplification, an increase in labor productivity has no less of an effect.
    80 years ago, labor productivity was low. Because all operations used low-productivity manual labor. And often low-skilled. A modern plant can produce 20 times more products per hour than a plant 80 years ago.
    Computers and the Internet were introduced. Automation and robotics reduced the need for manual labor and increased the speed of task completion.
    The development of artificial intelligence and machine learning allows us to optimize processes and make decisions faster.
    Today the winner will be the one with the highest labor productivity.
    1. +7
      13 March 2025 07: 29
      Quote: Stas157
      Computers and the Internet were introduced. Automation and robotics reduced the need for manual labor and increased the speed of task completion.
      The development of artificial intelligence and machine learning allows us to optimize processes and make decisions faster.

      Is this why our space industry has degraded and our civil aviation industry has collapsed?
      Or other reasons?
      1. 0
        14 March 2025 07: 23
        Quote: Vladimir-TTT
        Quote: Stas157
        Computers and the Internet were introduced. Automation and robotics reduced the need for manual labor and increased the speed of task completion.
        The development of artificial intelligence and machine learning allows us to optimize processes and make decisions faster.

        Is this why our space industry has degraded and our civil aviation industry has collapsed?
        Or other reasons?

        Including.
        In our country, the electronics industry has always been in the corner of individual production, which has not allowed the industry to develop.
        1. -2
          14 March 2025 08: 02
          Computers are evil, but not in themselves, but because of the people who implement them. They are trying to replace human brains with computers. As a result, there are no brains and the computer is too dumb for such tasks.
        2. 0
          14 March 2025 19: 29
          Quote: your1970
          Is this why our space industry has degraded and our civil aviation industry has collapsed?
          Or other reasons?
          Including.
          In our country, the electronics industry has always been in the corner of individual production, which has not allowed the industry to develop.

          The results of using CNC machines instead of Soviet aggregate ones at Moscow aircraft factories revealed an interesting feature. For CNC machines, it is necessary to develop a new design or put up with lower machine accuracy. The collapse of some CNC factories in Russia occurred around 2015. CNC is not mass production. All the needs of the Russian machine tool industry in the field of CNC for electrical discharge machining are covered by one person who produces both CNC and a generator for electrical discharge machining of his own production. It seems that Stankin simply does not know where to buy CNC for electrical discharge machining separately from the machine.
    2. +2
      13 March 2025 09: 03
      Quote: Stas157
      Increased labor productivity has no less of an effect.

      Yes. But such an increase requires reconstruction of production, introduction of new machines and other machinery. In the military conditions of that time, this was almost impossible. Of course, many things were successfully introduced even then, despite everything. But these introductions did not become decisive.
      Increased productivity was achieved mainly through "storming mode", workers burned themselves out, unable to increase the productivity of machines.
    3. +7
      13 March 2025 09: 13
      The one with a more balanced and stress-resistant economy. What's the point of being able to assemble hundreds of thousands of drones if they lack, for example, optics and electronics?
      The motto "we will buy everything" has clearly demonstrated its inconsistency in an example.
      1. 0
        14 March 2025 20: 36
        Quote: Jager
        The motto "we will buy everything" has clearly demonstrated its inconsistency in an example.

        But there is a nuance - Ukraine NOT produces UAVs and we end up NOT we can destroy their production - it simply doesn’t exist....
    4. +2
      13 March 2025 09: 55
      Today the winner will be the one who has inhigher labor productivity.

      Yes, the topic is very interesting...
      what it consists of, how it is defined, how it is compared...
  5. -4
    13 March 2025 08: 08
    I find it funny when the enemies of the USSR talk and write about some kind of development with their highly paid jobs and businesses. Everything is the opposite, they not only failed to preserve what they got for free from socialism, but they completely ruined all industries.
    But still, with a complete lack of conscience, for all 33 years they have not stopped criticizing socialism and praising their capitalism, their “market economy”.
    1. +5
      13 March 2025 17: 13
      Quote: tatra
      but they generally ruined all industries.

      I walk around Penza, look around and... no comparison with the past. If they "ruined" all industries like that, then I am for them to continue to ruin them and more!
      1. 0
        14 March 2025 19: 35
        Quote: kalibr
        Quote: tatra
        but they generally ruined all industries.

        I walk around Penza,
        There was a PLC production in Penza, now there is nothing like that. It's like in China before the Opium Wars. Everything seemed fine, but the country did not survive a real conflict against Western countries.
        1. +2
          14 March 2025 21: 06
          Quote: gsev
          Everything seems to be fine, but the country has not experienced a real conflict against Western countries.

          We already had this: factories all around and a radar production facility in Penza, but there were no stores... and everything that we have now. And where is that country with its factories? It died without any opium wars, right?! What conflict and with whom did it not survive with all its factories, but without a sufficient number of stores of all sorts?
      2. 0
        15 March 2025 14: 51
        Quote: kalibr
        I walk around Penza, look around and... no comparison with the past

        Yes, you can look at shopping centers and green areas, but you can't make your own car.
        1. 0
          15 March 2025 15: 36
          Quote from Kartograph
          but making your own car - no

          Did the USSR have its own cars? GAZ-A, AA and AAA are Fords. Zhiguli is a Fiat. And other models are rip-offs. Even the engines were called M because "Motor" (not by the name of the designer), because they were also rip-offs. And YUMO is a trophy, Derwent and NIN were bought from England.
          1. 0
            Yesterday, 07: 10
            Quote: kalibr
            Quote from Kartograph
            but making your own car - no

            Did the USSR have its own cars? GAZ-A, AA and AAA are Fords. Zhiguli is a Fiat. And other models are rip-offs. Even the engines were called M because "Motor" (not by the name of the designer), because they were also rip-offs. And YUMO is a trophy, Derwent and NIN were bought from England.

            It's not about what they were ripped off from, but about the ability to produce. VAZ had its own design bureau and they developed and made new engines. Kraz, Zil, Kamaz all had their own engines. And now the market is flooded with Chinese cars. The same with airplanes, machine tools and hardware.
  6. +1
    13 March 2025 08: 40
    Thanks to the author for the excellent material.
    This should be taught in school, including industrial practice for students, so that they know what productive work is.
    Glory to the Soviet engineers, workers, and peasants who, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, were able to solve the most complex technological problems, creating modern models of technology with minimal resources. Without a doubt, this is a great labor and creative feat of the Soviet people, which has proven the advantages of socialism.
    It is interesting that the Germans also appreciated the technological achievements of the USSR - they copied the PPS, RS-82, many solutions of the T-34 and even the GAZ-AA - the German generals were delighted.
    1. +5
      13 March 2025 08: 59
      Quote: Dozorny_ severa
      This should be taught in school.

      They teach it at school. It's elementary arithmetic, actually, it's accessible from the first grade)
      1. +1
        13 March 2025 10: 12
        They teach at school.

        where and in which one?
        1. +1
          13 March 2025 10: 41
          In what school do they teach arithmetic? Addition, division and multiplication? You don't know?!
          1. +1
            13 March 2025 10: 46
            In which school do they teach arithmetic?

            the article is not about arithmetic, the article is about cost and productivity, what does "add and divide" have to do with it?
            no need to exaggerate...
            1. +2
              13 March 2025 10: 48
              Oh my God... The article about cost price and productivity looks completely different) Such plaintive alphabet in a serious article does not exist, it would be an insult to the specialists for whom articles about cost price are written. This presentation is at the level of "mama washed the frame" for those who have never thought about cost price in their lives.
              1. -1
                13 March 2025 10: 50
                This presentation is at the level of "mom washed the frame"

                this presentation is for the absolute majority of those reading and writing comments
                and there is no need to do:
                an insult to specialists
                1. +2
                  13 March 2025 10: 54
                  What, did you declare yourself a cost specialist?! Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...
                  And how do you know what the "absolute majority" is here - are you a clairvoyant? The curator of the electronic intelligence project, receiving data on all visitors? Or are you just irresponsibly chatting? Why should I spare the feelings of someone who is talking absolute nonsense?
                  I write posts after thinking them through. Or I have to respond to the arrogant statements of demigods who assess the data of the absolute majority of visitors with one glance, using some kind of divine foresight...
                  1. -1
                    13 March 2025 10: 55
                    What, did you declare yourself a cost specialist?!

                    you will fall from your Olympus...
                    "Take off the laurel wreath" from your head...
                    or are you here on a salary?
                  2. +1
                    13 March 2025 11: 05
                    I write posts after thinking them through thoroughly.

                    and do you put minuses too?
                    If you are an expert in economics/cost accounting, here is a task for you:
                    Sudoplatov's NSU 2.0 costs more than 1 million rubles (purchased by the Ministry of Defense), and the civilian, private alternative "Kuznechik" costs about 60 thousand rubles - the efficiency is the same.

                    Explain to us why, with the same technical characteristics, Sudoplatov's goods cost more than an order of magnitude more than what private companies make...
                    with all the arithmetic, i.e. addition and multiplication...
            2. +1
              14 March 2025 19: 38
              Quote: Dedok
              an article about cost and productivity, what does "add and divide" have to do with it?

              In economics and accounting, calculating costs does not require mathematics beyond the 4th grade. You just need to take into account all the costs and evaluate them correctly.
              1. 0
                15 March 2025 16: 25

                In economics and accounting, calculating costs does not require mathematics beyond the 4th grade. You just need to take into account all the costs and evaluate them correctly.


                look at my post above (your post) and answer the question posed there, if everything is that simple...
    2. +3
      13 March 2025 10: 11
      Even the German generals were delighted with GAZ-AA.

      Yes, there are evaluations of this machine in von Brauchitsch's memoirs for 1941, and the evaluations are positive
      1. -1
        14 March 2025 07: 35
        Quote: Dedok
        Even the German generals were delighted with GAZ-AA.

        Yes, there are evaluations of this machine in von Brauchitsch's memoirs for 1941, and the evaluations are positive

        A ersatz machine? With a lifting capacity of 1,5 tons? He could admire it for only one reason - it was mass-produced - the only one, there were practically no others.
        And in the Wehrmacht there was a car zoo - there were many different cars.
        1. 0
          14 March 2025 09: 26
          And in the Wehrmacht there was... a zoo - there were many different machines.

          Which ultimately destroyed Germany. Gasoline tanks and diesel trucks - that's exactly what the Germans had.
      2. +1
        14 March 2025 10: 12
        Even the German generals were delighted with GAZ-AA.
        Yes, there are evaluations of this machine in von Brauchitsch's memoirs for 1941, and the evaluations are positive

        Henry Ford knew how to make cars, like the 1930 Ford Model AA. Even adapting it to the capabilities of Soviet industry did not spoil the car.
        1. 0
          14 March 2025 10: 30
          Henry Ford knew how to make cars, like the 1930 Ford Model AA. Even adapting to the capabilities of Soviet industry did not spoil the car.

          This is exactly what I remember von Brauchitsch noted: the absence of a battery, a fuel pump, a water pump, full-fledged electrical equipment, the absence of a grease filter in the engine lubrication system, the crankshaft worked without liners - on a babbitt filler, the absence of a filter in the fuel system, as well as a soft frame, a low loading height, low overall weight of the vehicle... and all this, for the conditions of combat operations, was "just right".
          remember the problems of American technology: what it means to change the oil filter on time - drivers did not understand, as a result the bearings were scuffed and the engine was in for repair, and so on down the list...
          1. +2
            14 March 2025 11: 30
            Automobile manufacturing was developing rapidly at that time, and for both Americans and Germans, a car created in 1927 had a deeply archaic design. For the 20s, yes, the car was advanced.
      3. 0
        14 March 2025 11: 43
        There are assessments of this machine in von Brauchitsch's memoirs for 1941

        What kind of memoirs are these? I can’t find them.
        1. +1
          14 March 2025 15: 35
          What kind of memoirs are these? I can’t find them.

          I'm wrong: the devil must have made me do it...
          I read these assessments from Halder, in his diaries, by dates - somewhere around July 1941 - the Bialystok cauldron.
          A lot of our equipment was captured there and the Wehrmacht engineering units assessed it for further use, which he reflected in his notes...
          that was a long time ago
          1. 0
            16 March 2025 16: 15
            I haven't found it yet, I'll look later. But the Germans actually had their own one-and-a-half-ton truck, the Opel Blitz 2,5–32, which was mass-produced and technically noticeably more advanced than the Soviet one. The Germans were quite happy with it.
    3. -3
      14 March 2025 07: 29
      Quote: Dozorny_ severa
      copied PPS, RS-82, many solutions of T-34 and even GAZ-AA belay The German generals were delighted.

      A tasty propaganda piece from the times of the mossy Main Political Directorate of the USSR SA.
      The delight of the German generals is especially touching American lol by car....
      1. +1
        14 March 2025 09: 29
        Ford AA was greatly simplified and made cheaper. Unlike German cars.
  7. -1
    13 March 2025 08: 42
    Quote: Stas157
    A modern factory can produce 20 times more products in an hour than a factory could 80 years ago.

    Well, what kind of products? The production of fuel, electricity, and automobiles has not changed at all over the last 70 years:) In fact, technical progress has long since stopped.
    1. +5
      13 March 2025 09: 08
      Technical has slowed down, but technological has become more advanced.
      1. -6
        13 March 2025 15: 40
        In what place? if specifically?
    2. +2
      13 March 2025 09: 34
      Quote: Dozorny_ severa
      Well, what kind of products?

      Yes, almost any. Today, CNC machines turn a blank into a finished product in a few minutes, and one operator can easily work on 2 machines.
      The production of fuel, electricity, and cars has not changed at all over the last 70 years:)

      You were probably just joking?
      1. +4
        13 March 2025 10: 13
        Today CNC machines

        This is how these machines have been working since the mid-70s...
        1. Fat
          +4
          13 March 2025 19: 41
          Quote: Dedok
          Today CNC machines

          This is how these machines have been working since the mid-70s...

          CNC machines have become much more advanced.
          In addition to metal-cutting machines, electrical discharge machines also came into use at the same time.
          Additive technologies also appeared not the day before yesterday, but in the last century. Without these technologies, it is impossible to obtain complex products from refractory metals.
          As a result, there has been a transition from cutting metals to 3D printing, including metal products.
          In general, there is no stagnation in the field of metal processing.
          1. +1
            14 March 2025 19: 45
            Quote: Thick
            In addition to metal-cutting machines, electrical discharge machines also came into use at the same time.

            Electrical discharge machines first appeared in the USSR under Stalin. The most reliable CNC system for electrical discharge was created in the USSR around 1970. Then, until 1992, effective managers at the military-industrial complex could only experiment with moving from one room to another within the same building. During one move, an archive employee took all the documentation for this CNC to the waste department around 1993.
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    3. +2
      13 March 2025 11: 10
      The production of fuel, electricity, and cars has not changed at all over the last 70 years:)


      What a chatterbox. Just compare a modern car manufacturing plant with the same plant 70 years ago to understand what nonsense you are talking.
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    4. 0
      13 March 2025 19: 41
      Quote: Dozorny_ severa
      Quote: Stas157
      A modern factory can produce 20 times more products in an hour than a factory could 80 years ago.

      Well, what kind of products? The production of fuel, electricity, and automobiles has not changed at all over the last 70 years:) In fact, technical progress has long since stopped.

      Just compare the engine of the Victory and some Hyundai
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      2. +1
        14 March 2025 09: 31
        Fundamentally, nothing has changed. The technique is basically the same. But technology has advanced a lot.
        1. +2
          14 March 2025 11: 18
          Quote: Jager
          Fundamentally, nothing has changed. The technique is basically the same. But technology has advanced a lot.

          Fundamentally, nothing has changed since the invention of the wheel and the diesel engine. But we are talking about technical progress.
  8. +7
    13 March 2025 08: 58
    Hmm) Sad article. The author is obviously aware that people with a technical mindset don't need such an article. And humanities students are not able to comprehend and accept its arguments, because their brains don't work that way) The cry of one crying in the wilderness, directed to the heavens...
    1. +7
      13 March 2025 09: 31
      Quote: Mikhail3
      And humanities students are not able to understand and accept her arguments, because their brains do not work that way) The cry of one crying in the wilderness, directed to the heavens...

      hey, don't generalize)))
      I'm a humanities student and I really liked the article)))
      it's true that I work at a factory and many work issues and technical processes are discussed)))
      1. -1
        13 March 2025 10: 45
        Humanities is not so much an education, it is a way of organizing thinking. Yours is close to technical. Since the article "went over". But not technical, since all this needs to be explained at all. There is mathematics at the level of the first grade of high school and considerations that are the very basis of organizing production. Literally the level of the baseboard.
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  9. +1
    13 March 2025 09: 05
    The DIP-40 lathe has a motor power of 18,5 kW and consumes electricity during operation. 603 minutes is 10,05 hours, and thus one machine consumes 185,9 kW h of electricity per day.

    The machine's engine does not work at full capacity the entire shift. Not to mention that to change a finished part to a blank, the machine needs to be turned off; they are not changed on the go.
    1. 0
      14 March 2025 19: 58
      Quote from solar
      The machine's engine does not operate at full power throughout the entire shift.

      At idle, the engine consumes about a quarter of its rated power. For wartime, 18 kW is too much for a lathe. 16K20 is like 10 kW, although 4 would have been enough.
      1. 0
        14 March 2025 21: 31
        DiP-40 - power 10,4 kW. Lathe and screw-cutting machine.
        https://stanki-katalog.ru/info2/spr_dip40_sx_b.jpg
        18,5 kW - for 16K40.
        https://stanki-katalog.ru/sprav_dip40.htm
  10. +7
    13 March 2025 09: 14
    One of the inverse problems of reducing the cost of production may be a decrease in quality. And the connection is not always direct with the reduction of costs. For example, if someone suggested using one stamp not for 1000, but for 2000 hours, the working time for making the stamp is saved. But the quality of the product drops, and a dozen or two mechanics need to be assigned to one stamping machine with such a stamp, who will somehow finish it with a file, making an individual adjustment of the parts, reducing the reliability of the product and violating the unification - parts from different products will not be interchangeable, which is inconvenient in combat conditions - you can't take a magazine from a comrade, for example, but you can only use your own. Or it will be impossible to assemble one working one from two faulty ones.
  11. -3
    13 March 2025 09: 42
    During their Perestroika, the enemies of the USSR sold the people the idea that under the “market” (they were afraid to scare the people with the word capitalism), everything would be cheap because there would be competition, that everything would be high-quality because “effective owners” would only think about their business reputation.
    But in reality, the enemies of the USSR did everything exactly the opposite.
  12. +4
    13 March 2025 11: 03
    Hence the indisputable conclusion: any simplification and reduction in the cost of production of weapons, equipment and ammunition is an absolutely useful and positive thing for the military economy.

    We're running away! Bam! We're running away again! Bang!
    Hey! The gate is open!
    Forgive me generously, but this is about you. For everything good, against everything bad, the principle is of course wonderful, but in life, alas, it does not work, because two fundamental conditions are not met:
    1. The proposed solution must be technically feasible (at least not contradict the law of conservation of matter wink)
    2. The proposed solution should not lead to the loss of combat and operational properties of the weapon.
    What you propose in your articles does not correspond to these two parameters.
    By the way, you forgot to add that specialized machines are needed to turn the projectile cup. This cannot be done on ordinary lathes. Not working in the entire range of sizes of the processed parts, the machine very quickly loses accuracy.
  13. 0
    13 March 2025 11: 06
    Quote: Dozorny_ severa
    many T-3 solutions

    For example? Except for the sloped armor, and that's not good.
    1. -3
      13 March 2025 15: 49
      What do you mean unsuccessful? The shape of the tower, for example, on the Tiger-6, the shape of the tower on the Tiger 4 is a Porsche variant.
      And there was also a concept from Daimler Benz.
  14. -3
    13 March 2025 11: 24
    One lathe requires 43 square meters of production space.
    - It's you, where did you find such a machine?
    Of the 720 minutes of a 12-hour shift, approximately 10% of the time spent on preparing the workplace and the employee's personal needs must be excluded. This is 72 minutes, leaving 648 minutes of pure working time per day during which operations are performed. But here too, approximately 7% of the time spent on initial and final operations must be excluded.
    - calculations of a "spherical horse in a vacuum".
    There are many more nuances, because of them the "masters" usually did "excessive norms". Optimization of the process changes a lot.
    For such "processes" (to improve) a complex work of a team of specialists (from the worker to the supplier) is needed and a miracle will happen. Mathematics alone is not enough in this process.
    for example stamping instead of milling
    - by this you reveal your complete ignorance of the processes, and try to make calculations. Similar specialists did "perestroika" in the 80s.
    1. +2
      13 March 2025 14: 42
      Calm down. I have already revealed everything and I am not even embarrassed about it. laughing
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        2. +1
          13 March 2025 23: 41
          You can continue to "ripen", and maybe you'll be ready.
          Stamping pays for itself (it is cheaper) only with mass (large quantities) production.
          the only advantage is that highly qualified specialists are not needed (unlike machine operators)
          learn the basics, kiddo.
  15. +5
    13 March 2025 16: 57
    But in general, the calculations given cover the main factors of the economic cost of this operation.

    They don't cover it by a long shot. A process engineer would give you many operations on metalworking a shell blank that you probably don't even know about. I'll describe some of them to you as a former turner who had to process similar cylindrical parts.
    First of all, the blank must be of normal hardness, otherwise the cutter will not take it. Hard - in a heat treatment room for annealing using a special heating and cooling mode. Then, on a machine (lathe or drilling), the ends are processed to obtain the center of the blank and so that the turner can fix it on the hydraulics and perform rough metal removal from the sides and ends, and possibly inside. Next, the blank is finished and the threads are cut for the detonator. Well, then there is the quality control department, installation of copper belts, quality control department, pouring explosives, quality control department, painting and applying inscriptions, quality control department, packaging. Sorry if I forgot something.
    And all this is labor, metal, machines, cutters... ... and money, naturally.
  16. +3
    13 March 2025 18: 10
    What perestroika? Stalin even said that without American engines we would have lost the war.

    Stalin never said this. There was nothing in Lend-Lease without which the USSR could have lost the war.
    The evidence is obvious - the USSR not only did not lose the war, but also achieved a radical turning point (until the end of February 1943) practically without Lend-Lease.
    Without Lend-Lease the war could have dragged on longer and further to the East. Since the ratio of losses was changing steadily in favor of the Soviet army, even without Lend-Lease the war ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany about a year later. This meant heavier losses for the two warring parties, but relatively much heavier for the German army.
    1. 0
      13 March 2025 19: 38
      Quote: Kostadinov
      What perestroika? Stalin even said that without American engines we would have lost the war.

      Stalin never said this. There was nothing in Lend-Lease without which the USSR could have lost the war.
      The evidence is obvious - the USSR not only did not lose the war, but also achieved a radical turning point (until the end of February 1943) practically without Lend-Lease.
      Without Lend-Lease the war could have dragged on longer and further to the East. Since the ratio of losses was changing steadily in favor of the Soviet army, even without Lend-Lease the war ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany about a year later. This meant heavier losses for the two warring parties, but relatively much heavier for the German army.

      American trucks alone made up half of the Red Army's motor transport fleet. I don't know about the engines, I find it difficult to say which of our fighters they were used on. All of our engines traced their lineage back to the 30s - from Gnomrons and Rolls-Royces. By the way, the Americans never passed on the supercharger technology.
      1. +5
        13 March 2025 20: 25
        I don’t know about the engines, it’s hard to say which of our fighters they were used on.
        And all because they were only installed on American fighters (Airacobra), ours made do with their own.
        1. +1
          13 March 2025 22: 30
          Quote: Aviator_
          only on American fighters (Airacobra)

          And also on Kitty Hawks, and Thunderbolts, Bostons... Douglases
          1. +1
            14 March 2025 07: 32
            Well, yes, but initially we were talking about fighters.
        2. 0
          14 March 2025 05: 59
          Quote: Aviator_
          I don’t know about the engines, it’s hard to say which of our fighters they were used on.
          And all because they were only installed on American fighters (Airacobra), ours made do with their own.

          But they also supplied spare parts. American engines broke down quite quickly because of our gasoline and oil.
          1. +1
            14 March 2025 07: 35
            they quickly broke down because of our gasoline and oil
            Gasoline and oil have nothing to do with it, especially since they were also being supplied. The "Airacobra" itself was considered a not very successful aircraft in America, they simply did not fly in extreme modes, they saved their resources. But here they started flying, and got good characteristics, but with a reduced engine resource. For the front, this is not critical.
            1. +3
              14 March 2025 10: 50
              And we started flying and got good characteristics, but with a reduced engine life.

              Yes, that's true. If anyone has read Pokryshkin's memoirs, they know that the air regiment engineers constantly fought with the pilots so that they would not fly at maximum power levels without great need.
      2. +3
        13 March 2025 22: 31
        Quote from Kartograph
        American trucks alone made up half of the Red Army's vehicle fleet.

        Three quarters... Look at the message of the Soviet government in Pravda from June 11, 1944.
        1. +1
          14 March 2025 10: 39
          Three quarters... Look at the message of the Soviet government in Pravda from June 11, 1944.

          if there were no "Americans" - then logistics (as they say today) - would have fallen apart...
      3. +2
        14 March 2025 00: 08
        American trucks alone made up half of the Red Army's vehicle fleet.
        They did not, but the Red Army received many more imported cargo vehicles than domestic ones.
        The maximum number of imported vehicles by the end of the war was 218, almost 000% of the entire Red Army vehicle fleet.
        But there are a few "buts": imported ones were significantly better in quality than domestic ones; many domestic ones were only listed, awaiting write-off; the domestic auto industry did not produce all-wheel drive trucks during the war - this gap was plugged by Lend Lease
        Well, and also under the Lend Lease a huge quantity of tires and tubes for them arrived, which is also important.
        1. 0
          14 March 2025 13: 42
          Quote: Lewww
          also important

          And a million pairs of boots! on June 11, 1944.
          1. 0
            14 March 2025 15: 28
            I can't say anything about the boots, but a lot of industrial equipment arrived, they even sent a turnkey tire plant, they launched it in Moscow
            1. 0
              14 March 2025 18: 54
              Quote: Lewww
              I won't say anything about the boots,

              In Pravda for June 11, 1844 there is something about tires and gasoline...
              1. 0
                14 March 2025 19: 43
                I don’t take it from newspapers, there is the Statistical Handbook of 1946, there are all import deliveries in tables - 543 sheets
                1. 0
                  14 March 2025 21: 08
                  Quote: Lewww
                  I don’t take it from newspapers, there is the Statistical Handbook of 1946, there are all import deliveries in tables - 543 sheets

                  But in Pravda there was a MESSAGE from the Holy Government, which is valuable as of June 11, 1944. The Stat. Collection supplements it. You can compare the total and intermediate deliveries from 41 to 44.
      4. 0
        14 March 2025 09: 38
        Only instead of trucks, our factories produced tanks and self-propelled guns. Take the same GAZ. Or the locomotive factories where they were assembled.
        1. +1
          14 March 2025 10: 58
          By the way, steam locomotives were also supplied, as well as many other things. Barrel artillery fired half of its shots using American gunpowder, almost all the aluminum for aviation was imported. Many machine tools were supplied. The famous diesel engine for the T-34 was modified with the help of the Americans, since at the beginning of the war its service life was only 50 engine hours, and at the end of the war 300-400, taking into account American oil.
        2. 0
          14 March 2025 19: 39
          Only instead of trucks, our factories produced tanks and self-propelled guns.
          Not instead of, but together - both.
          Their premises also saw the assembly of imported vehicles from kits that arrived in boxes.
    2. +2
      13 March 2025 20: 14
      Quote: Kostadinov
      The evidence is obvious - the USSR not only did not lose the war, but also achieved a radical turning point (until the end of February 1943) practically without Lend-Lease.

      just for example. "The mass deliveries of communications equipment that began in 1942 were of great importance for the communications troops of the USSR Armed Forces. The need for charging units, primarily for high- and medium-power radio communications equipment, almost were covered by imports under Lend-Lease. The number of supplied charging units was 24,51 times greater than the number produced by domestic industry."
      yes - without communication you can win... but it's very difficult..
    3. +2
      13 March 2025 20: 17
      Stalin never said this. There was nothing in Lend-Lease without which the USSR could have lost the war.


      Spoke:
      I want to tell you what the President and the United States did to win the war from the Soviet point of view. The most important thing in this war is machines. The United States has proven that it can produce 8.000 to 10.000 airplanes a month. Russia can produce, at most, 3.000 airplanes a month. England produces 3.000 to 3.500 a month, mostly heavy bombers. So the United States is a country of machines. Without these machines, supplied by Lend-Lease, we would have lost the war."

      — Stalin's speech in 1943 at the Tehran Conference

      Without Lend-Lease the war could have dragged on longer and further to the East


      How would the USSR conduct offensive operations without Lend-Lease, how would it feed the army? Without Lend-Lease, it would have been necessary to conclude peace with Germany within the borders of the RSFSR.
      1. +1
        14 March 2025 09: 43
        I had to thank the allies)) England was not threatened by the Wehrmacht. I won't even mention the USA. Yes, Britain produced planes, but the armored vehicles of the allies were absolute junk. Yes, the Matilda was well armored, but with a 47-mm gun without HE shells. Or the Churchill, it was a total nightmare.
        1. 0
          14 March 2025 21: 34
          The allied armored vehicles were complete junk.

          The Sherman was a good tank.
          1. 0
            Yesterday, 01: 10
            As for the "Lee" or "Stuart", perhaps. But they arrived at the front when there was no longer any need for them.
            1. 0
              Yesterday, 09: 06
              In relation to the T-34 it was not inferior. Read Loz's "Tankman in a foreign car". When planning operations, they specifically stipulated the use of Shermans in parallel with the T-34. And they were delivered to the Union from 1942.
    4. +3
      13 March 2025 22: 25
      Quote: Kostadinov
      heavier

      I advise you to read the message of the Soviet government in the newspaper TRUTH from June 11, 1944 and compare the data there with that published in official sources.
    5. +3
      14 March 2025 00: 51
      but also made a radical change (until the end of February 1943) practically without lend-lease

      Until February 1943, Germany lived in peacetime. They switched to war footing after Goebbels' speech about "total war".
      1. 0
        14 March 2025 09: 44
        And by February '43, the polymers had already been completely... lost. This should have been done in the summer of '41.
        1. +1
          14 March 2025 09: 47
          Yes. In 1943 it was already too late - their growth was compensated by deliveries under Lend-Lease, which allowed the work of Soviet industry to be improved, closing problem areas.
    6. +2
      14 March 2025 20: 09
      Quote: Kostadinov
      There was nothing in Lend-Lease without which the USSR could have lost the war.

      Half of the aviation gasoline was from the USA. More or less, the USSR began to fight successfully when the supplies of aviation gasoline from the USA were established. No less important were the supplies of sensors and devices for oil refining, heat treatment control in metallurgy, machine tools, bearings. The line between defeat and victory in that war from 1941 to the end of 1942 was very shaky.
  17. +5
    13 March 2025 18: 21
    Quote: kalibr
    The VO website is a website for polite people.

    Seriously? I've never heard so much abuse directed at me anywhere else as here.
  18. +2
    13 March 2025 18: 28
    It was only possible to meet the standard by 200%, 300% or more with the help of some kind of technical improvement.

    Not anymore. How records of 300% were set has been described for a long time. There, for the most part, the creation of "favorable organizational conditions" than technological improvement. By the way, this is also important. You can also ruin the equipment.
    Comprehensive simplification, reduction in cost, and rationalization of all production processes without exception
    - played its role, yes. Well, and we were also a little lucky that we played on the side of the world's largest economy. As for the rationality of decisions taken within the framework of Soviet military construction - not everything was so rosy, to put it mildly. Weapons should be not only cheap, but also effective. The USSR could afford both expensive and ineffective ones.
    However, the Germans performed much more amazing miracles.
    Any simplification and reduction in the cost of production of weapons, equipment and ammunition is something absolutely useful and positive for the military economy.

    For the economy maybe. For success in war - far away not any., and not detrimental to combat performance.
    1. +2
      13 March 2025 20: 29
      How records of 300% were set has been described long ago.
      Artificially created record holders are a well-known phenomenon. However, Stakhanov gave his record because he was able to discern a stress concentration node in a coal seam and hit there, while the seam itself threw out coal. This is where his and his followers' records for manual work come from. Naturally, such experience is no longer needed when introducing coal combines.
      1. +2
        13 March 2025 22: 20
        This was invented by Nikita Izotov, who worked manually with a hammer.
        But Stakhanov’s method was not about this at all.
        1. 0
          14 March 2025 07: 30
          Stakhanov also worked with a jackhammer. That's why he needed a separate assistant to rake out coal. They worked with a pick in the 18th century.
        2. 0
          14 March 2025 10: 43
          Nikita Izotov came up with this idea,

          his name was Nicephorus...
          and he became Nikita after publication in the newspaper... when the journalists had nowhere to retreat: they changed his passport to Nikita...
    2. 0
      14 March 2025 09: 47
      Name this most Soviet "expensive and ineffective" thing in WWII.
      Unlike the completely crazy Teutonic "genius", ours did not suffer from this.
      1. 0
        14 March 2025 10: 34
        Name this most Soviet "expensive and ineffective" thing in WWII.

        No problem. See the table.
        Compare the cost of a shot from an M-13 and a 152mm howitzer. Then inquire about the effectiveness of Soviet MLRS, but not from Purov's tales, but from documents.
        There have been things that were worse and cooler, when it was not just “expensive” but also practically harmful, but with the consumption of a lot of resources.
        1. 0
          14 March 2025 19: 03
          You don't take into account that in mid-July 1941 the M-13 shell, like the launcher itself, had just appeared and was essentially made "on the knee", primitively. And the first samples, as a rule, are expensive.
        2. 0
          14 March 2025 20: 32
          Quote: Ryazanets87
          Compare the cost of a shot from an M-13 and a 152mm howitzer.

          A 152 mm howitzer cannot be quickly moved to a threatened direction. But a division of guard mortars can be quickly brought up and struck early in the morning at the enemy concentration site. In addition, the accuracy of the calculation in rubles is very conditional. Sometimes, due to technology limitations, it is possible to produce only very expensive things instead of cheap and necessary ones.
  19. +1
    13 March 2025 19: 31
    The author probably forgot that women and children worked at the machines instead of the men who had gone to the front.
    Read the book by People's Commissar Novikov "In the Days of Trials", there is a lot about the production of various weapons. In particular, about automatic rotary lines that allow the production of millions of cartridges.
    And the aerial bombs were generally cast from cast iron, without any processing, they just cut a thread for the fuse
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  22. +4
    13 March 2025 22: 26
    Quote: wehr
    Seriously? I've never heard so much abuse directed at me anywhere else as here.

    This is how it should be. And there is no place for hamams here.
    1. +2
      13 March 2025 22: 56
      Well then don't be surprised by my harsh tone. laughing
  23. 0
    14 March 2025 11: 48
    Hence the indisputable conclusion: any simplification and reduction in the cost of production of weapons, equipment and ammunition is an absolutely useful and positive thing for the military economy.
    Such simplistic conclusions are never correct.

    For example, by eliminating some mandatory technological operation in the production of a complex product (for example, hardening, tempering, etc.), you will simplify and reduce the cost of production.
    But it is unlikely that the result will be "an absolutely useful and positive thing for the military economy." smile
    As for the production of military products during the Great Patriotic War, as a rule, the quality and properties of the products were always inferior to similar products produced in peacetime. And in particular due to the very simplification and reduction in cost of production.
  24. +2
    14 March 2025 12: 11
    Quote from Kartograph
    American trucks alone made up half of the Red Army's motor transport fleet. I don't know about the engines, I find it difficult to say which of our fighters they were used on. All of our engines traced their lineage back to the 30s - from Gnomrons and Rolls-Royces. By the way, the Americans never passed on the supercharger technology.

    Where did you get the illusion that without half the trucks, or 20% of the planes and aviation gasoline, and especially without American cigarettes and coffee, the war would be lost?
    As an example, before February 43, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that even without a significant amount of lend-lease trucks, airplanes, aviation gasoline, TNT, steam locomotives, and whatever else you want, the Red Army learned to beat the enemy and then became better and better.
    The victory of the Red Army was won mainly by its infantry, regimental and divisional artillery with some assistance from tanks, aviation, navy and the like. The victory of the Red Army after Stalingrad was inevitable, and with half of the tanks, aviation, heavy artillery, trucks, ships, aviation gasoline, TNT and everything else. The offensive simply developed more slowly with fewer bombers and heavy bombs but more Po-2, fewer 152 and 122 mm guns, but more mortars and mines, fewer trucks, but more horses and carts and so on.
    For example, if it is not yet clear, the very successful offensive of the KPA and CPV in Korea in the late 1950s was without any aviation, tanks or heavy artillery, against UN troops who had much better aviation, tanks, heavy artillery and naval support than the Wehrmacht did in World War II.
    1. 0
      16 March 2025 04: 59
      Where did you get the illusion that without half the trucks, or 20% of the planes and aviation gasoline, and especially without American cigarettes and coffee, the war would be lost?

      Most people don't say that the war would have been lost, especially with absolute certainty, but the fact that Lend-Lease literally saved the lives of millions of Soviet people by accelerating the war and increasing our capabilities is a fact. For some reason, all those who like to shout about the unimportance of Lend-Lease love to remember the partial payment for these supplies after the war and love to forget that all these supplies literally saved the extra lives of Soviet citizens. How many thousands of rubles do you value a person's life at? By the way, they often forget about the supplies of medicines for the USSR, which, by the way, began literally in the fall of 1941, which directly saved lives and allowed 86% of the wounded to return to duty. Again, this means millions of saved lives.
      The Red Army learned to beat the enemy and then became better and better.

      And also look at the numbers of losses in these operations and their depth - almost all of them are defensive operations, most of the offensive ones ended either in extremely meager successes or even defeats. The fact that the Germans played at peace and literally refused to actively mobilize the state for war does not mean that the Soviet Army of 1942 was at all comparable to the Soviet Army of 1944.
      mainly its infantry, regimental and divisional artillery with some assistance from tanks, aviation, navy and the like.

      What will the soldiers shoot with without gunpowder in the cartridges? What will the artillery cover fire with? Who will carry the artillery shells? By the way, an interesting fact - compare the shell rates per barrel, especially in heavy artillery in the USA, Germany and the USSR. Even with Lend-Lease, the USSR had the least of all until the end of the war. And every unfired shell is extra blood that will be shed by the infantry. This also includes the effectiveness of fire. Communication, the basis of effective artillery support, and in general all interaction, was simply at a terrible level in the Red Army, it was good if there was guidance at the battalion level, one could simply dream of supporting platoons with separate batteries.
      The victory of the Red Army after Stalingrad was inevitable

      It had been inevitable since mid-1942, when the Germans failed to break through to Egypt and Baku, and the Japanese lost at Midway. The Axis economies no longer had any chance of surpassing the Allies, and the only question was how quickly the Allies would finish it.
      The offensive simply developed more slowly, with fewer bombers and heavy bombs but more Po-2s, fewer 152 and 122 mm guns but more mortars and mines, fewer trucks but more horses and carts, and so on.

      After such a victory, there would be no people left in the entire USSR. Go and look at the same daily losses of the USSR in 1942 and 1945. Sitting in defense, the USSR in 1942 lost one and a half (!) times more people than actively attacking huge cities in 1945 (8900 versus 6200). Draw your own conclusions.
      The very successful offensive of the KPA and CPV in Korea in the late 1950s was carried out without any aviation, tanks or heavy artillery, against UN troops who had much better aviation, tanks, heavy artillery and naval support than the Wehrmacht had in World War II.

      Now look at their losses. That's not even the most important thing here. The most important thing here is that all this pleasure was provided by the same "lend-lease", only here the Koreans and partly the Chinese were supplied by the USSR. How everything developed without it - you can see perfectly well in the first stage of the war.
  25. +2
    14 March 2025 12: 19
    Quote: Ryazanets87
    Compare the cost of a shot from an M-13 and a 152mm howitzer. Then inquire about the effectiveness of Soviet MLRS, but not from Purov's tales, but from documents.

    Then inquire and compare the effectiveness of German and American heavy and rocket artillery according to documents.
    Or from the effectiveness of creating an air army of heavy bombers, dozens of battleships, heavy tanks, all kinds of super bombs, including the first nuclear ones, and so on.
    1. 0
      14 March 2025 20: 24
      Quote: Kostadinov
      Or with the efficiency of creating an air army of heavy bombers,

      Efficiency is difficult to calculate. It seems that the heavy bomber was ineffective against Germany and Japan in the initial period of the war. But the Doolittle raid, when aircraft carriers took off with aircraft that were too heavy and almost all of them were destroyed in this raid, forced the Japanese to get involved in a devastating battle for them at Midway Atoll. But Japan could have rushed to meet the Germans in the summer of 1942 through India and Siberia. There are very contradictory assessments of the effectiveness of American aviation in China. Some believe that this is what prevented Japan from defeating China and invading the USSR in 1942-1943. Others, that it would have been more profitable to direct the funds spent on supplying Chenault's air group either to supplying the Chinese ground forces or against Japan on other fronts.
  26. +2
    14 March 2025 18: 37
    Are we tactfully cutting off deliveries of machines and materials?

    No need to put it down. When did they get them and what did they do with them that couldn't be replaced?
    How was it in the USSR with its own high-octane? Not with a mixture of imported ones, but with its own? And with additives for it?

    The fact is that a considerable amount of high-octane and R-9 was produced in the USSR even before the Lend-Lease deliveries.
    Lend-lease high-octane went mainly to lend-lease aircraft. If it was not available, the USSR could replace it completely or partially - by increasing its own production of additives (which they did not do because these supplies were made), by injecting water and methanol, using more Charomsky diesel engines, using gasoline with a lower octane number in bomber and attack aircraft, accelerating the development of air-breathing engines, using petroleum gas or methane, producing synthetic fuel and additives from coal, developing additional production of high-octane at Romanian oil refineries after their occupation in August 1944, and so on. As we see, there are many opportunities without the supply of high-octane gasoline under Lend-Lease, and from them they could choose the most technically and economically accessible and effective.
    The same reasoning can be repeated about all the other "irreplaceable" deliveries under Lend-Lease, gunpowder, explosives, glycerin, trucks, machine tools, and everything else you can think of. If they weren't there, they would have found an alternative, and more than one. They just weren't looking for one because there was no need.
    And one more very important remark for all the admirers of Lend-Lease - supplies to the USSR were made not because the USA and Britain loved the USSR and out of pure charity, but because they were afraid of being left without the USSR against the Axis powers. Or an even worse scenario - a separate peace between the USSR and Germany somewhere at the end of 1943.
    The whole point is that two blocs of large countries started a war between themselves before they involved the USSR in the war and for this reason the USSR always had guaranteed allies. If not the USA and Britain, then there will be Germany and Japan.
  27. -1
    15 March 2025 08: 10
    Quote: Puncher
    The race for cheapness has a negative side - a drop in reliability and quality.


    If by quality we mean the quality and service life of the product, its decline is not so critical.
    At the beginning of the war, with the consent of Stalin himself, changes were made to the design of aircraft engines for Yak fighters, which led to a reduction in their engine life, but allowed them to sharply reduce their production time and make the latter cheaper. But this was entirely justified in that situation, since the aircraft were still enough for a dozen or two sorties.

    In short, there are no universal recipes, everything depends on specific conditions. The English on their island could lick the elliptical wings of their "spitfires", for our glorious ancestors such a thing was an unaffordable luxury. Even if it was clumsy and not very reliable, but so that there was something to fight with, and not like in "Russia, which we lost", when the army suffered from a chronic shortage of everything, from machine guns to shells.
  28. 0
    15 March 2025 08: 22
    Quote: BlackMokona
    No, this is a hint at Lend-Lease, under which the US economy covered all the holes and problems of the USSR economy with its own supplies.


    Is that all? Most of the holes in the USSR still had to be closed independently.
    If the Yankees plugged all the holes for anyone, it was the British. Their share of "lend-lease" equipment was many times higher.
    And if the Yankees were covering our holes in the area of ​​armaments, then we were covering our allies' holes in terms of manpower. After all, Soviet soldiers armed with Western weapons were killing Germans, who, under a different scenario, would have had to be killed by American soldiers with the same weapons (while also dying themselves).

    The allies invested money and iron - our people invested their lives in the common cause.
  29. 0
    15 March 2025 08: 28
    Quote: Lewww
    For example, by eliminating some mandatory technological operation in the production of a complex product (for example, hardening, tempering, etc.), you will simplify and reduce the cost of production.



    Quote: Puncher
    BUT! Let's remember the Red Army offensive of 1942 and how it ended. The offensive of 1942 was carried out almost entirely on its own resources, which were especially lacking in ammunition and provisions.


    The failure of that Red Army operation is explained primarily by the fact that the Wehrmacht itself was preparing a large-scale offensive operation in that direction (having, of course, prepared a fair amount of resources for its offensive). It is still unknown how things would have ended if the Soviet side had not started first.
  30. +1
    15 March 2025 08: 54
    Quote: tatra
    Since Perestroika, the enemies of the USSR and the Soviet people have been trying to discredit the Victory of the Soviet people with this Lend-Lease, but during all this time, none of you have presented figures on what percentage Lend-Lease made up in relation to the production of Soviet weapons during the Great Patriotic War.


    Why do you always write about the enemies of the USSR?!
    Wanted as best, but it turned out ...
    The road is lined with good intentions ...
    Enemy action is a deliberate and conscious action by a person or country against us or me personally.
    And what happens every day? Someone tries to do good for everyone in the way he understands. Then the whole village cleans it up WELL.
  31. 0
    15 March 2025 13: 48
    Quote: Puncher
    A product of 80 parts will be cheaper than a product of 100 parts, if the parts are processed in the same way. A product of the same number of parts will be cheaper if the processing is simpler, for example, stamping instead of milling, or casting without processing instead of casting and turning on a machine.

    The race for cheapness has a negative side - a drop in reliability and quality. Issuing an over-plan "Stakhanovite" does not know that the end user died because at the wrong moment the engine failed, the wing fell off, the gun jammed... In addition, a type of weapon that is superior to the enemy's similar one cannot be cheaper than its predecessor a priori. This is unrealistic. Therefore, in the pursuit of "cheapness" you can lose the war.
    This is how the USSR survived the war years, having lost a significant part of its industry from evacuation, occupation and destruction. The most comprehensive simplification, reduction in cost, rationalization of all production processes without exception

    And the best simplification and reduction in cost is the supply by an ally of a ready-made product, for the production of which there is no need to mine additional coal, generate additional electricity and all that the car described in the article.


    And the best thing to simplify and reduce the cost is for an ally to supply a finished product...
    Ally. Or fellow prisoner.
    Once the bonds fall from the prisoners, the confrontation will begin. The confrontation began after the Great Patriotic War. Or after the Second World War.
  32. 0
    15 March 2025 15: 52
    The reduction in cost and quality of military equipment, first of all, depends on the qualifications of engineers and their natural talent. As one professor said in our course: out of 100 people in your course, only one will become a real engineer, and he will pay for the cost of the rest's education with his work. To this we can add that this single engineer still needs to take his rightful place, so as not to vegetate his whole life in secondary positions and jobs!
  33. 0
    15 March 2025 23: 16
    Any statement is not absolute.
    Well, except for those that everyone agrees with, for example, "It's better to be healthy but rich than poor but sick," or "It's better to be longer but fatter" (women's)
    There must be a balance between cost and effectiveness in the production of weapons. A thousand cheap ballistas and onagers with trebuchets will quickly lose to one self-propelled howitzer or tank. Or a squad of snipers with heavy rifles.
    At the same time, no wunderwaffe in any known war played 100% in terms of a clear victory of the war, including "Fat Man" and "Little Boy". The capitulation of Japan occurred after this, but not as a result of this, as the Americans are trying to claim.
    1. 0
      16 March 2025 17: 42
      including "Fat Man" and "Little Boy". Japan's capitulation occurred after this, but not as a result of it, as the Americans are trying to claim.

      This was not stated by the Americans, but by Emperor Hirohito in a radio address to the Japanese nation explaining the reasons for Japan's surrender.
      1. 0
        16 March 2025 22: 14
        A month after the bombing, the Soviet Union entered the war and during that month destroyed the million-strong Kwantung Army on the mainland, at the same time depriving the samurai of any resources to continue the war.
        1. 0
          16 March 2025 23: 39
          A month after the bombings...

          The bombing of Nagasaki took place on August 9, and already on the night of August 10, Japan decided to surrender.
          At a meeting of the Supreme War Council held on the night of August 10, the votes on the question of surrender were divided equally (3 "for", 3 "against"), after which the Emperor intervened in the discussion, speaking in favor of surrender. On August 10, Japan transmitted a proposal for surrender to the Allies

          The Kwantung Army, like other Japanese troops both on the mainland and in Japan itself, surrendered by order of the Emperor and the Japanese General Staff.
          General military and naval order No. 1 dated 14.08.1945/XNUMX/XNUMX

          1. The Imperial General Headquarters, by order of the Emperor and in pursuance of the Emperor's surrender of all Japanese armed forces to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, hereby commands all its commanders in Japan and abroad to order the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities forthwith, lay down their arms, remain in their present positions and surrender unconditionally...

          At the same time, a recording of Hirohito's speech to the Japanese was played
          ...the enemy has used a new bomb of unprecedented destructive power, which has killed many innocent people. If we continue to wage war, it will not only mean the terrible death and destruction of the Japanese people, but will also lead to the destruction of all human civilization. In such a situation, how can we save millions of our subjects or justify ourselves before the sacred spirit of our ancestors? For this reason, we have ordered the acceptance of the terms of our opponents' joint declaration....

          And after that, the surrender of Japanese troops began - as soon as the order reached them and the Allied troops, so that there would be someone to surrender to. Including the Kwantung Army - by the way, it was not the largest on the mainland.
          On August 15, 1945, the Expeditionary Force in China surrendered, the largest continental force with 1,2 million Japanese soldiers. However, the Japanese army retained their weapons to maintain order until the arrival of the Allied forces.

          On August 16, 1945, the Kwantung Army of 700 Japanese soldiers surrendered.

          On August 28, 1945, the First and Second Commands of the Armed Forces of Central Japan, numbering 4 million Japanese soldiers, capitulated. After the surrender, command structures continued to operate until 1 November 1945, maintaining order until the arrival of occupation forces and carrying out the demobilization and dissolution of the Imperial Army.

          On September 12, 1945, the Southern Army Group, numbering 680 Japanese soldiers, surrendered. Other parts of the army surrendered gradually as Allied troops arrived until November 30, 1945.
  34. 0
    16 March 2025 19: 11
    I once stood at a lathe during an operation. The efficient-defective ones solved the problem much more simply. They destroyed production, even industries. But they also stuffed the savings into their pockets.
  35. 0
    Yesterday, 12: 55
    Quote from solar

    This was not stated by the Americans, but by Emperor Hirohito in a radio address to the Japanese nation explaining the reasons for Japan's surrender.


    Hirohito also mentioned the defeat of the Kwantung Army among the reasons for the capitulation.
    And the appeal was addressed not only to ordinary Japanese, it was also a curtsey to the future masters of Japan - the American occupiers. Samurai know how to lick the heels when need forces them, such sycophants are hard to find.
    South Koreans, by the way, are less inclined to this. It is evident that this is a feature of the national character.
  36. 0
    Yesterday, 12: 58
    Quote from solar
    Including the Kwantung Army, which, by the way, was not the largest on the mainland.


    But the most significant, because it controlled a region rich in resources (metal, coal) necessary for conducting military operations. And the defeat of the Kwantung Army had a strong impact on the overall situation of Japanese troops on the mainland.