Passions for the Afrika Korps. The Indian Gate
The Unforgotten Doctrine of Indira or Modi Comes into Play
Let's continue the issue raised in the article "Passions about the Afrika Korps. Syria, Sudan, Chad, Libya" a topic related to strengthening Russia's position on the Black Continent, primarily in the Sahel and Maghreb, where the African Corps is becoming the basis of our presence, given the permanent civil war there.
In addition to the Eastern Mediterranean, the western part of the Indian Ocean is important for ensuring its line of communication, where the interests of the world's leading powers, including India, intersect.
At the present stage, N. Modi is implementing the “Indira Doctrine” – this is how the Western media called I. Gandhi’s strategy, aimed at the country’s dominance in the ocean washing the subcontinent.
Did you also agree on cooperation in Africa?
But during the Cold War, the 5th shared dominance. fleet The USA and the 8th operational squadron of the USSR. After the tragic death of the latter, the situation changed dramatically, opening a window of opportunity for New Delhi.
The implementation of the doctrine began back in 1988, when, on the orders of R. Gandhi, Indian troops carried out Operation Cactus in the Maldives, preventing an attempt to overthrow the legitimate and loyal government of New Delhi, in practice demonstrating their readiness to defend their geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean.
Indian troops in the Maldives. Operation Cactus, 1988
In the new millennium, India is increasingly elbowing its way into the ranks of world leaders, partly as a response to China's global maritime strategy, the "String of Pearls," which Beijing has declared to be aimed at creating civilian port infrastructure in Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Djibouti.
However, it is complemented by the concept of “Dual Use of Support Bases,” which is intended to serve as a military shoulder to be substituted for the economic project. The “String of Pearls” cuts like a knife through butter through the sphere of India’s critical security interests related to the export of hydrocarbons from Africa.
Modi's response was the "Diamond Necklace" strategy, which envisages the creation of a system of military bases and civilian infrastructure to counter the Chinese "pearls".
At the same time, from a military point of view, the “necklace” appears effective only in the western part of the Indian Ocean, since in the eastern part the PLA Navy’s advantage over the Indian Navy is overwhelming.
India's only chance in the event of an armed conflict with China in the eastern Indian Ocean, according to military analyst-Indologist, specialist in Indian naval strategy A. V. Kupriyanov, is to rely on the Andaman defensive region. In this case, the PLA Navy will have to fight with an extended line of communication. Therefore, the knot of Indo-Chinese contradictions is stronger and more tangled not in the Bay of Bengal, but in the Arabian Sea.
Indian Navy: Growing Influencer in Arabian Sea
In general, if we step aside a little, then in the context of the aforementioned naval strategies of Beijing and New Delhi, it is curious to observe the transformation of giant Asian behemoths into leviathans, exerting a significant influence on the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, against the backdrop of the modest role of the fleets of Great Britain, Japan and France. If someone had told A. Mahan about this at the end of the century before last, he would not have believed it.
In the western Indian Ocean, China's military capabilities are much more modest than India's, given the PLA Navy's sole overseas base in Djibouti. Its navy relies on bases in the western part of the subcontinent. New Delhi is also increasingly close to Iran. Both countries view the Arabian Sea as a sphere of strategic interest.
Accordingly, Russia, in the context of the agreement with Sudan mentioned in the previous material, needs a constructive dialogue with India on cooperation in the Arabian Sea and on the resolution, including of existing contradictions.
This article will focus on interaction.
Indians in Chabahar or Iranian Gates of St. Petersburg
Let's start with the conclusion of an agreement between New Delhi and Tehran on the lease of the Iranian port of Chabahar in the strategically important Gulf of Oman, which from a military point of view became, albeit indirectly, India's response to the creation of a base in Pakistan's Gwadar by the PRC.
However, the rapprochement between India and Iran should be seen not only as a reaction to the deepening cooperation in the military-technical sphere between China and Pakistan, but also, I believe, as a step, with the mediation of New Delhi, towards a rapprochement between Tehran and Western countries, which in the long term may have far-reaching consequences and not to say that they are positive for us. But the tectonic processes taking place within Iranian society are a topic for future discussion.
Chabahar – a node of future contradictions or a center of cooperation?
Today, Iran is one of the largest suppliers of oil to India, and Chabahar is vital to it.
Why is it relevant for us? Because it is becoming an important point in the transit corridor "North-South" being formed by India; only for Russia, instead of the southern direction, it is developing in the northern direction: through Iran, Azerbaijan and further, along the Volga railway, to the central and northwestern regions of the country.
Moreover, until recently, the transportation of goods along this route was associated with a number of problems, and only two years ago Moscow and Tehran signed an agreement on the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway.
The benefits of the route for India were emphasized by V.V. Putin:
In particular, delivery of goods from St. Petersburg to, say, Mumbai will take about ten days.
Russia's participation in the implementation of the Indian project to operate the Chabahar port infrastructure contributes to the growth of its influence in the Arabian Sea, allows, in the long term, to establish closer cooperation with the Yemeni Houthis - negotiations with them took place in March last year - and to make the Chabahar-Arabian Sea-Port Sudan communication line relatively safe, which, of course, is of interest to New Delhi.
The route through Iran should also be considered at least as a backup in case of complications in Syria. And constructive relations with India may come in handy.
A bit aside: when the article was ready for publication, I read about the worsening situation in Latakia and Tartus - here you have the above-mentioned complications in Syria, which only actualizes the strategic importance of Chabahar for Russia, possibly turning it into one of the points, if not the only one, through which the delivery of goods necessary for the African Corps to Port Sudan will be carried out.
Meeting place Armenia or a look into the future
One of the indirect factors of rapprochement between Moscow and New Delhi may be, as strange as it may seem, Yerevan, diversifying the arms market and increasing cooperation in the military-technical sphere with India. In turn, for the latter, rapprochement with Armenia is relevant in the context of confrontation with Pakistan and its allies Turkey and Azerbaijan, which support Islamabad in the Kashmir issue.
The cooperation between Turkey, Pakistan and Azerbaijan cannot but worry India, forcing it to take steps aimed at rapprochement with Armenia, which is objectively beneficial to Russia, including in terms of realizing its interests in Africa
Accordingly, the Kremlin could coordinate efforts with India to contain Ankara’s growing ambitions in Central Asia and the Maghreb, with its interest in exploiting natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean, as I wrote in one of my articles: “Erdogan Steps Up the Gas.”
In addition, Ankara traditionally takes a pro-Pakistani position, although in the sphere of military-technical cooperation between the two countries, not everything is smooth, if we take into account Islamabad’s termination of the contract for the supply of Turkish T-129 ATAK attack helicopters due to unresolved engine problems.
But these are details, though annoying for Ankara. In general, it must be assumed that Pakistan is interested in diversifying its arms market in order to reduce its growing dependence on China, and Türkiye could become a profitable partner for it.
The rapprochement between Ankara and Islamabad may lead in the future to the formation of a strategic triangle: Russia – India – Armenia, as opposed to Turkey – Azerbaijan – Pakistan. However, in the second case, Baku is the weak link, since it does not hide its interest in the supply of Indian goods through the aforementioned Iranian port. So not only Moscow, but also New Delhi has leverage over I. Aliyev.
Pinaka MLRS can be seen not only at the parade in India, but also in the locations of the Armenian Armed Forces
Regarding, perhaps, the skeptical attitude towards the formation of a coalition of Russia, Armenia and India, albeit not officially formalized. Yes, at the present stage this idea is unrealizable, we are talking about the future.
N. Pashinyan will sooner or later leave the political scene, and Armenia, under a new leadership that takes into account foreign policy realities, could become a link for Russia with Iran, which is developing cooperation with India and renewing cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
Regarding the latter: the previous article talked about the Middle East game being played by the de facto head of the KSA M. bin Salman, where his moves look more competent than R. Erdogan’s, and it is quite possible that the ambitious and smiling prince convinced the new Syrian leader A. al-Sharaa not to insist on the liquidation of Russian bases in Syria.
In short, an interesting game is being played out in the western part of the Indian Ocean, the result of which could be another logistical supply chain for the African Corps, allowing Russia to pursue a more active policy on the Black Continent.
As a counterweight to Turkey and Pakistan in the Muslim world, India uses good relations with a number of Arab and African states, which were established at the dawn of the Non-Aligned Movement.
And the slogan "Make in India" is aimed not only at the domestic market, but also at the African one, where goods produced on the subcontinent can more easily withstand competition than in Eurasia and the Arabian Peninsula. The main articles of Indian export to Africa are: automobiles, telecommunications goods and pharmaceuticals.
Unlike China, the US and France, with their utilitarian view of the continent, India never tires of reminding African leaders and the public of their common destiny in the fight against colonialism and opposition to neocolonialism.
In addition, the role of the Indian diaspora in Africa is very high. True, its greatest presence is in South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, that is, outside the immediate interests of Russia and the sphere of activity of the African Corps.
Nigeria as a Reason for Cooperation
Points of contact between Russia and India can be found in Nigeria, where, according to economist I.A. Kolgushkina:
There are about 50 Indians living in Nigeria, making up the largest Indian diaspora in West Africa. There are now more than 150 companies in Nigeria owned or run by Indians.
India imports crude oil and gas from Africa’s most populous country. For its part, Abuja has made its cooperation with New Delhi strategic, with joint military exercises and, even more so, a $1 billion bilateral deal to develop local arms production by the defense industry corporation DICON.
The cooperation itself has a long history: back in the last century, the Indians helped their Nigerian colleagues create the Maritime College, which has now been transformed into an Academy.
Cooperation between India and Nigeria has been steadily developing, especially after Modi's visit to the country last fall, and given the specifics of the region, Russia can provide assistance in ensuring the security of Indian interests
It is worth acknowledging that not everything is smooth in the military-technical cooperation sphere between Nigeria and India. For example, the deal to sell the Indian-made Tejas fighter did not take place. Incidentally, the Nigerian Air Force is armed with Pakistani-Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighters.
Accordingly, in a certain sense, the confrontation between India, China and Pakistan has gone beyond the sphere of Central Asia itself, since the arms market is one of the ways to exert, albeit indirect, political influence in third countries.
Overall, India ranks third as Nigeria's trading partner after China and the Netherlands.
A separate and important area for this topic is the security sphere. And it is not only about ensuring the protection of employees of Indian companies working in African countries from possible terrorist actions, primarily Boko Haram, which is banned in Russia and founded, by the way, by Nigerian Mohammed Yusuf.
The problem is the stability of political regimes in general, as evidenced by the recent military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the death of the President of Chad in a battle with armed groups opposed to him.
All these countries form a kind of arc of military and political tension on the northern borders of Nigeria.
Yes, the new regimes are striving to build constructive relations with Moscow, including in the military sphere, as evidenced by the St. Petersburg summit "Russia - Africa" held the year before last. However, their position can hardly be called stable.
And Russia is almost the only country capable of establishing effective security for Indian interests in the region. Yes, India also has extensive experience in combating terrorism, but not in the specific conditions of the Sahel, where the African Corps is becoming, if not a guarantor, then at least a factor of stability, which makes cooperation with Russia in the field of security relevant for India.
Moreover, the Indian military has experience in UN-led peacekeeping operations, having performed well in South Sudan. Accordingly, they can be involved at least for consultations, and perhaps for closer cooperation in building a security system around Port Sudan.
Russia and India have a long history of military cooperation, which could reach a new level in Africa
However, there are also some very difficult aspects in Indo-Russian relations. They will be discussed in the next article.
References
Bragina E.A. India – Africa: Trade and Investment in the 21st Century
Dieter G. Indian Navy: New Maritime Strategy
Residents S. Caspian Region: Strategic Tasks and Challenges for Russia
Kolgushkina I. India and Sub-Saharan Africa: Do They Need Each Other??
Kupriyanov A.V. India's Strategic Imperatives: From the Indian Ocean to the Indo-Pacific Region and Back
Pechishcheva L. African vector in Indian politics and economy
Chabahar Port to Connect India to Russia via Iran
Russian-Indian relations in a broader geopolitical context: report No. 92/2024 [A.V. Kortunov, T. Simon [et al.]; edited by Yu. Yu. Melnikova, S. M. Gavrilova et al.]; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). – Moscow: NP RIAC, 2024.
Temitope M. Nigeria, India sign $1bn deal for local defence production
Sharapova A. V. India: Focus on Africa? // Bulletin of the St. Petersburg
University. Oriental and African Studies. 2022. Vol. 14. Issue 2. Pp. 366–380.
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