Towards the escalation of military tensions by NATO countries in the Baltics
The Norwegian frigate Otto Sverdrup (HNoMS Otto Sverdrup F312). This ship is participating in NATO's Operation Baltic Sentinel, which should be seen as a prelude to a military operation against our shipping. Photo: NATO
The winter of 2024–2025 was marked by a sharp escalation of military and political tensions in the Baltic Sea, the key content of which was the creation of a threat by European countries to Russian shipping traffic under neutral flags, through which Russia exports oil.
In this case, it is necessary to clearly understand two things.
First, the US is not participating in these provocations, although it is interested in their success, for the same reason that the US was recently interested in continuing the war in Ukraine - within the framework of the so-called "Wolfowitz Doctrine", which gave rise, among other things, to the Ukrainian war, the European Union is a competitor of the US, which must be weakened and subordinated to the American empire, preferably at someone else's expense and by someone else's hands. But at the same time, the US itself is standing aside and, in fact, is not ready to get involved in a large regional war, although it would be dangerous to underestimate the level of combat readiness of its Armed Forces.
The second is that Europeans are to some extent (an important caveat!) irrational; for them, their animalistic Russophobia and the synergistic effect of the narrative of “invasion of Europe” (and our march on Kyiv was perceived in this way from an emotional point of view in the EU) are more important than economic growth and development, and the actions of European politicians, as well as the support of these actions by the EU population, are quite indicative.
On the other hand, irrationality is precisely limited - wanting to cause us as much harm as possible, these people are not yet ready to sacrifice themselves for this.
This is where the situation of balancing on the brink of war comes from, when Europe comes very close to it, but does not take the final step.
And ships carrying our oil are still freely moving through the Baltic and the Danish Straits.
Will it always be like this?
Photo from a Russian research vessel. In the foreground is a Finnish missile a Hamina-type boat shows the unarmed Russians who is the boss in the Baltic, but what is interesting is not this, but the density of ship traffic in the background - all these ships work on our shipping lines, Finnish and Estonian ports are to the west. Russia's independence from sea communications is clear. The picture below shows the place where it happened. Photo: telegram channel https://t.me/supperborna.
The question is open, irrational goal-setting presupposes irrational decisions, and the worst thing we can do is decide for the enemy what he will do.
It is necessary to recognize the dangerous situation and analyze it carefully.
It is correct to proceed from the maximum degree of the enemy’s detachment from reality—from the fact that they can very well turn a demonstration of force into its use.
Before we move on to the questions of how tensions in the Baltic have been building and where things might go, a brief excursion into geography is needed, for the record.
Some remarks on the Baltic naval theatre of operations
The specificity of the Baltic theater of military operations consists in its extreme geographical unfavorability for Russia. All Russian ports, except for the ports of the Kaliningrad enclave, are located at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, which is long and narrow.
The Gulf of Finland is completely covered by fire even with small-sized anti-ship missiles from any shore; its shores are cut by skerries in which minelayers and missile boats can hide.
The length of the Gulf of Finland, in contrast to its width, is large, approximately 420 kilometers.
This configuration makes it very easy to block the Gulf with mines, as the Germans and Finns demonstrated in 1941. At the same time, if it is impossible to quickly neutralize the minefields, Kaliningrad will be completely isolated from any supplies and military aid.
The geography of the Gulf of Finland makes its legal regime specific.
The boundaries of the territorial waters of Estonia and Finland, due to the presence of islands in the Gulf of Finland belonging to these countries, overlap each other in part of the Gulf of Finland, leaving not a single meter of neutral waters.
From the point of view of international law, it is still possible to pass through them using the so-called “right of innocent passage.”
In addition, in 1994, Finland and Estonia decided to “sacrifice” their territorial waters and create a six-mile neutral corridor.
It would be better to quote from another article by the author, posted in another media outlet, but dedicated to the same issue:
In 1994, Estonia and Finland agreed to reduce their territorial waters and leave a six-mile neutral corridor between them. The worsening relations between Russia and the West and Finland's entry into NATO give these countries the opportunity, in accordance with international law, to cut off St. Petersburg and all Russian ports on the Baltic from the outside world with their territorial waters. This decision has not been made, but is already being discussed under the guise of creating a certain "contiguous zone."
This does not mean that our ships or even warships will not be able to go to sea, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees us such opportunities. But – on other grounds. For example, the Estonians will have the opportunity to detain merchant ships in their territorial waters, interfering with our foreign trade, preventing the export of oil, almost all of which goes through the Baltic.
They will be able to prohibit Oboronlogistics ferries from sailing to Kaliningrad, and this is our important communication with the region. The expansion of the borders of Estonia and Finland will lead to the redrawing of the skies over the Baltic. As a consequence, there is a possibility of a ban on the flight of Russian passenger planes over the Gulf of Finland and an air blockade of Kaliningrad.
This kind of pressure can be continued for a very long time, and any military provocation committed later will be presented as revenge on the part of Russia. And then you can start laying mines. And the Finns and the Balts regularly practice laying them. For the Finns, mine warfare is the basis of their naval doctrine.
This does not mean that our ships or even warships will not be able to go to sea, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees us such opportunities. But – on other grounds. For example, the Estonians will have the opportunity to detain merchant ships in their territorial waters, interfering with our foreign trade, preventing the export of oil, almost all of which goes through the Baltic.
They will be able to prohibit Oboronlogistics ferries from sailing to Kaliningrad, and this is our important communication with the region. The expansion of the borders of Estonia and Finland will lead to the redrawing of the skies over the Baltic. As a consequence, there is a possibility of a ban on the flight of Russian passenger planes over the Gulf of Finland and an air blockade of Kaliningrad.
This kind of pressure can be continued for a very long time, and any military provocation committed later will be presented as revenge on the part of Russia. And then you can start laying mines. And the Finns and the Balts regularly practice laying them. For the Finns, mine warfare is the basis of their naval doctrine.
It is also worth remembering that the Baltic is mostly shallow, and in most of its area submarines of the size of our Projects 877 and 636 (and even 677) will be “cramped”, and we have small torpedo submarines in navy long gone. Hypothetical versions of the Amur could have been discussed in 2013–2014, but now it’s simply too late, the time for warming up is over, and we probably won’t build or repair anything new before a potential big war, except for a few options, which are discussed below.
Closing the issue with geography, it should be noted that Russia is not able to provide air cover for its ships on the route to Kaliningrad - the length of any shipping line from the throat of the Gulf of Finland to Kaliningrad is about 1000 kilometers, without the Kuznetsov at the exit from the Gulf of Finland nothing will work, but with it we know what, and the same thing for Russia with the ship aviation and, in principle, the ability of the fleet to conduct complex naval operations.
By the way, we would have scraped together escort ships from two (Northern and Baltic) fleets. But there would have been obvious questions about their combat training, traditional for the Navy.
So no way.
Stages of escalation
NATO countries have begun working to close the Baltics to Russia before the North Atlantic War. In 2021, Estonia ordered a batch of Blue Spear 5G anti-ship missiles from Israel. About the potential of these anti-ship missiles and the degree of readiness of the Baltic Fleet to repel attacks by such missiles on its ships at sea The author previously wrote in the newspaper "Vzglyad".
Since then, nothing has changed in Russia’s favor; Russia has not taken the necessary actions to counter the threat, and Estonia has already received the missiles.
Here it is necessary to make a clear reservation - Estonia has a common border with Russia, and absolutely any possible scenario of Russia's attack on this country will imply an invasion by land.
Does this make Estonian anti-ship missiles a thing in themselves? Yes, except for one situation - if small Estonia has offensive plans. Naturally, not alone, but in a coalition, preferably with militarily strong countries. Then, within the framework of a large pan-European offensive operation, breaking the connection between "big Russia" and Kaliningrad looks logical, and preparation for it too, since only in this scenario Russia will not have time for Estonian territory.
Joint mine laying with Finland has already been mentioned above.
The total potential of the Baltic ground forces today can be estimated as three mechanized and five infantry brigades, supported by special forces and cyber troops, with a total number of ground troops of approximately 80000 people. Armament - light armored vehicles, portable missiles weapon, a small number artillery, from 2025 - HIMARS missile systems, first in Estonia (6 units, with ATACMS missiles), and from next year in Latvia.
The total number of Balt militias is approximately 32000 people; they have small arms and transport.
The formation of the first division for the three countries is ahead in Lithuania.
There are also contingents of other NATO countries permanently stationed on the territory of these countries, and Finland, which is capable of quickly putting hundreds of thousands of people with the highest level of combat training under arms, is on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland.
But NATO is taking escalatory steps at sea, not on land.
The following are the main stages to highlight:
From 2021 to summer 2024 - various provocative political statements, calls for mining of the Baltic waters (summer 2024), purchase of anti-ship missiles by Estonia, etc.
At the same time, there was an intense discussion in NATO about where Russia’s “red lines” really are and how to put pressure on us so as not to cross them prematurely.
The goal of all this collective thinking was to find a way to blockade Russia's ports without getting involved in a war, even though a blockade is an act of war.
From the side, it resembled the attempts of a small wolf to approach an elk - a dangerous, though not predatory animal. The wolf makes a lunge, but, seeing the risk of a blow with its horns, jumps back. And then again and again.
You can read about what the typical NATO functionary had in his head here, the motivation is clear, as is what is holding them back for now.
They didn't want to start a war.
But since the fall of 2024, everything has changed.
In October 2024, NATO began deploying a command structure, presumably for future action against Russia. It is worth quoting here from another article:
Even before the series of provocations with damaged cables, a naval command center with an extremely vague status and purpose was opened in Germany, in Rostock. Officially, it is called the Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic, or CTFB). It is a very strange command body.
Firstly, it is not a NATO member, but is intended to assist NATO and may be subordinated to NATO's Baltic Maritime Command. Secondly, it is not purely German, and foreign military personnel also work there, but Germany provides this command structure with political cover, taking responsibility for its existence and activities. For now, it is subordinate to the German Navy, and in 2028, the structure is to be relocated to Poland.
The existence of such a headquarters contradicts Germany's commitment not to deploy military structures with foreign participation in East Germany.
...
Thus, in parallel with the provocations and build-up of forces in the Gulf of Finland, NATO countries are creating command structures with great capabilities but an unclear political status.
For a war with Russia, Rostock, by the way, is much better suited as a location for command structures than some cities in Poland or Finland. According to the official Bundeswehr report, this command center in December "took over tactical command of two NATO units in the Baltic Sea.
Firstly, it is not a NATO member, but is intended to assist NATO and may be subordinated to NATO's Baltic Maritime Command. Secondly, it is not purely German, and foreign military personnel also work there, but Germany provides this command structure with political cover, taking responsibility for its existence and activities. For now, it is subordinate to the German Navy, and in 2028, the structure is to be relocated to Poland.
The existence of such a headquarters contradicts Germany's commitment not to deploy military structures with foreign participation in East Germany.
...
Thus, in parallel with the provocations and build-up of forces in the Gulf of Finland, NATO countries are creating command structures with great capabilities but an unclear political status.
For a war with Russia, Rostock, by the way, is much better suited as a location for command structures than some cities in Poland or Finland. According to the official Bundeswehr report, this command center in December "took over tactical command of two NATO units in the Baltic Sea.
Two months after the deployment of the command center, the Yi Peng 3 vessel was detained, accused of intentionally damaging the seabed cable, and already in early 2025, the Eagle S vessel was detained, which was subsequently accused of damaging the Estlink 2 cable and having Russian “spy equipment” on board.
This incident became the reason for the launch of Operation Baltic Sentinel.
NATO announced the start of Operation Baltic Sentinel on January 14 and immediately began forming a naval group.
On 22 January, the hydrographic survey vessel Luymes (HNLMS Luymes) of the Netherlands Navy, the German mine countermeasures ship Datteln (Datteln M1068), the French mine countermeasures ship Croix du sud M646 and the Dutch frigate Tromp (HNLMS Tromp F803) arrived in Tallinn. The Norwegian frigate Otto Sverdrup (HnoMS Otto Sverdrup F312), the Latvian mine countermeasures ship Tālivaldis M-06 and the Swedish auxiliary vessel Belos (HSwMS Belos A214) are reportedly on their way.
All ships were deployed from Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) and Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group 1 (SNMCMG1).
The NATO group is constantly growing, for example, since February 8, the Swedish ship HMS Carlscrona P04 has joined it. And this is also an interesting unit - now it is classified as an "Ocean Patrol Ship", but it was built as a minelayer, and if you look at the photo from the stern, the hatch ports for mass minelaying are still in place. There is no need to explain how mines and the Baltic are connected to each other.
HMS Carlscrona. Photo: Swedish Navy
NATO has not announced a separate command body or commander, leading to speculation that the group could be controlled from Rostock.
In parallel, NATO has deployed aviation: the French patrol/anti-submarine aircraft Atlantique II and the French reconnaissance aircraft King Air B2 from the Air Force. The latter is an interesting choice, since this aircraft is not for maritime reconnaissance, but for reconnaissance of targets on the ground, and these machines are not in naval aviation. Clearly, the "esteemed partners" are interested in strengthening reconnaissance against our land targets.
The most interesting thing, however, was the presence of the ship "Belos" in the group. Quote from the article linked above:
The latter should be of particular interest to Russian intelligence. After all, this is a submarine rescuer.
The Gulf of Finland is very shallow, normal-sized submarines have nothing to do there. But a super-small submarine for delivering combat swimmers is quite comfortable there. Such a boat can operate in our territorial waters.
But the Gulf of Finland is also a real paradise for an underwater sabotage group or a specially equipped submarine – it can cut cables every day, thus justifying the build-up of the naval group. Also, the involvement of this vessel may indicate NATO plans to use unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) or saboteurs together with UUV. Coincidentally or not, on Sunday, January 26, another such incident was announced: this time, it is alleged, an underwater fiber-optic cable between Latvia and Sweden was damaged.
The Gulf of Finland is very shallow, normal-sized submarines have nothing to do there. But a super-small submarine for delivering combat swimmers is quite comfortable there. Such a boat can operate in our territorial waters.
But the Gulf of Finland is also a real paradise for an underwater sabotage group or a specially equipped submarine – it can cut cables every day, thus justifying the build-up of the naval group. Also, the involvement of this vessel may indicate NATO plans to use unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) or saboteurs together with UUV. Coincidentally or not, on Sunday, January 26, another such incident was announced: this time, it is alleged, an underwater fiber-optic cable between Latvia and Sweden was damaged.
The cable turned out to be a false trail, and the real purpose of the submarine rescuer became clear on February 9, 2025, when an explosion occurred in the engine room of the tanker Koala in Ust-Luga.
Tanker "Koala" after the sabotage, view from the stern. Photo by a subscriber of the telegram channel @mornovosti.
The explosion was such that the engine room was flooded.
According to a number of Telegram channels, before the explosion, gunfire was heard near the tanker, allegedly from coast guard boats.
In addition, other authors point out that the nature of the damage to the tanker indicates the use of magnetic mines.
In principle, there is no need to guess anything about what the anonymous people are saying - diesel engines do not explode, especially those that are not working at the time of the explosion (and it was not working on the tanker), and an explosive device carried into the engine room by one person will not be able to destroy the hull before the entire compartment is flooded.
It became clear why NATO brought in a submarine rescuer: they were using it as insurance in case of some failure with combat swimmers or UUVs in neutral waters. It also became clear that they had erased another “red line” again, this time with a direct attack on Russian territory, for which, apparently, no one had anything to do again.
The political confusion that arose as a result of the actions of Donald Trump and his team temporarily slowed down the Europeans, and there have been no new military provocations from their side since then, but the political onslaught on our shadow fleet has not stopped - on February 24, the EU adopted the 16th package of sanctions against Russia, and it includes sanctions against another 74 vessels of the "shadow fleet", which brought the number of sanctioned vessels to 153.
Denmark has announced a tightening of the regime for tankers at anchorages and in ports, but in general the Europeans have “put on hold” for now – they need to decide on the US position.
At the moment, the escalation has been stopped, but no one should have any doubt that it has been stopped temporarily.
In this regard, we need to figure out what we should actually do now.
Shadow Fleet and Potential War
Russia is reaping the fruits of the fact that in the 80s and later the West was allowed to rebuild the world according to its own rules and subordinate it administratively.
Our citizens don’t realize it, but the planet has long been functioning as a collective vassal of the US and the EU.
For example, you want to sell pipes from Turkey, manufactured in Turkey, to Egypt.
No problem, but they must comply with American SAE standards, payment will be in American currency, the vessel for transportation will need to be insured strictly in London, and the vessel will go through the Mediterranean Sea, where the US Navy is on duty. At the same time, the spoken language for the crew both on board and during radio exchange will be English.
We live in an American world or an American-English world.
This is expressed in everything, not just in the example above.
Aircraft crews of all countries are forced to use such units of measurement of altitude as feet and speed as knots in flights.
There are only 27 countries in the world with a visa regime for US citizens, of which less than ten are normal countries where you can walk the streets and visit tourist attractions. The rest are free in one form or another. For them. You can compare this with us.
One of the peculiarities of the American world, Pax Americana, is the shipping traffic under so-called convenient flags - merchant ships are not registered in the country of the actual owner, but fly the flags of countries like Liberia and the like, which simply make money on this, essentially selling air.
On the one hand, “flags of convenience” initially proved useful, as they helped avoid sanctions – in the American-English world, everyone is forced to comply with American-English sanctions, and a ship flying the Russian flag simply would not be able to unload in foreign ports.
But then the hunt for our ships began, and flags of convenience began to work against us.
By and large, NATO can simply stop and turn away everyone in a row, and reject any claims from Russia, citing the fact that the ships are not Russian.
This will be true. And they will not be held liable for the cargo if they do this with ships not coming from our ports, but to them, without cargo.
Of course, this is also a blockade, but if NATO allows ships under the Russian flag to pass, then there will be nothing to be said for the blockade either.
Did we touch your ships? No.
Let them pass unhindered? Yes.
What questions do you have for us?
This is precisely why Russia did not give any clear response to the capture of the Eagle S by the Finns – the ship is not ours, and it is not our business either.
Legally, we are at a disadvantage.
The idea of having some kind of PMCs guarding traffic immediately reveals people who are very far from the topic - according to maritime law, there are many reasons why a military ship can stop and inspect a civilian vessel.
Thus, the Convention on the High Seas speaks of the following grounds.
The vessel is suspected of:
- piracy;
- slave trade;
- something that has no national affiliation (none);
- has the same nationality as the warship in question, although it flies a foreign flag (or refuses to fly the flag);
- conducting illegal radio broadcasts into the territory of a country other than the flag state (or obstructing radio communications);
- in the exercise of the right of prosecution (Article 23 of the Convention).
The last item on the list is implemented on the basis of a simple suspicion that the vessel is conducting illegal activities in foreign territorial waters - in the Gulf of Finland, this condition is fulfilled "by default" due to the presence of areas without neutral waters.
In turn, a hypothetical PMC on board would definitely classify the ship as pirate, especially considering that in Russia PMCs are illegal - here Russian management principles hit the country "in the gut".
The International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables of 1884 gives a warship the theoretical right to at least stop a vessel suspected of damaging a bottom cable.
NATO will easily and with minimal effort present all actions to stop the vessel in the Gulf of Finland as legal, and any PMC on board will give the Westerners the right to open fire - according to the very norms of international law to which we appeal.
And NATO bears full responsibility for its illegal actions to its flag states, all these Liberias, Virgin Islands and other such God-forsaken places.
A direct forceful response from Russia to these actions is legally impossible - we will be a priori wrong in any case.
The West will be able to run up the “escalation ladder” at the pace it needs, which is what it is actually doing.
Where is the line that separates the West’s harmful blockade actions, to which we cannot be tied from a legal point of view, from war?
I must say that it is very blurry.
But it is absolutely certain that the West will have it until the very end, until the complete stop of traffic, at least in the form of a justification that no one believes, but which can be tried to “stretch” into international law.
Naturally, the Russian Federation will also have counter arguments.
Now, we can repeat, there may be a pause in escalation in the Baltics. The West, in principle, may stop altogether, considering the risks unacceptably high, which, by the way, they are.
But we must be prepared for the worst case scenario and have a worst case plan.
Counter-escalation
The most likely scenario for the West is to outlaw more and more of the "shadow fleet" on the grounds of the environmental threat posed by the old ships and the risks they pose to cables.
At the same time, until the West is ready to go to open war with the Russian Federation, the optimal strategy for it will be to force empty tankers heading to the Russian Federation to turn around and go to another port, with rare episodic arrests of individual ships for allegedly damaging bottom cables.
At the same time, NATO may well allow ships under the Russian flag to pass through and, on this basis, declare that it is not conducting any blockade, since no one is touching Russian ships.
Russia will have to make the same legally ambiguous move and accuse NATO of a de facto blockade (one could even introduce a legal term, such as “incomplete blockade” or “partial blockade,” similar to how the West itself “invented” the so-called “peaceful blockade” in the century before last), and begin to take military countermeasures.
It is further important to understand that the measures taken before the start of open military actions and the measures that will be taken after them are diametrically different. Accordingly, different ships will also be needed (no matter how few of them there are), simply because the conventional "peacetime forces" and the force detachment that will actually fight should not intersect - the former will suffer heavy losses at the start of military actions and will not be able to influence the course of military actions. The latter must survive and fight until the start of military actions, if they begin, winning the necessary time for the Aerospace Forces and Ground Forces.
But first things first.
Having accused the West of a “de facto blockade,” including at the UN, having expressed all concerns and appealed to everything possible, Russia must openly and with wide publicity begin an anti-piracy military operation to protect freedom of navigation.
Radio frequencies for ships requiring protection (the entire "shadow fleet", the Chinese, etc.) must be announced.
However, instead of convoys, other actions must be taken. Convoys will be ineffective from an economic point of view and will significantly increase the cost of transportation.
Another option is preferable.
The number of surface units that the West can deploy for blockade operations is still small.
It is reasonable, by combining aerial reconnaissance and the use of high-speed boats, to monitor them and, if they attempt to approach merchant ships, to take the latter under protection by going on the radio and notifying that the Russian ship has orders to prevent the capture or stopping of ships in a given area.
At the same time, when entering the narrow part of the Gulf of Finland, it is necessary to indicate that the presence of the Russian boat or ship is carried out within a six-mile corridor in accordance with the norms of international law.
If Estonia and Finland suddenly abandon this corridor, then they will still have to go through it, continuing to carry out their tasks, but hiding behind the right of peaceful passage on the radio and in diplomacy - with the provision of constant shake-ups of the UN Security Council, PR in the news all the countries possible, especially those where Russian oil goes, etc.
The Russian tactical unit that will conduct such convoy actions will actually be covered by a flag, but this will be enough until the opening of real military action.
Also, unlike PMCs, marines can be deployed on merchant ships escorted by Russian boats or ships, with prior notification to NATO that this is being carried out as part of an anti-piracy operation.
With what forces can Russia conduct the first, peaceful part of the operation to protect its shipping?
Those that would be of little use in a real war against modern fleets.
First of all, these are Coast Guard ships, PSKR. And it is desirable that the two Svetlyaks with 76-mm guns, which are in the Baltic, are not included in these forces. With a 76-mm gun and 29 knots of full speed, these Svetlyaks will have to operate together with the Navy as artillery ships.
The remaining PSKR-928 Vasily Gryazev with a 30-mm bow gun, on the contrary, must protect the ships before everything starts, due to its near-zero value in a real battle with an enemy fleet.
PSKR-928 "Vasily Gryazev".
What units can be quickly brought into operation?
From the Coast Guard - two ships, one project 22460 and one project 745, which are in the Baltic, and most importantly - aviation, which will conduct the very same reconnaissance of NATO movements and report them to the ships of the Coast Guard and the Navy.
From the Navy, it makes sense to use all Project 1331-M MPCs, which are listed as combat ready in the amount of 6 units, three Project 21820 Dyugon landing craft (possibly with the Tor SAM system installed on the landing deck, maybe even a simple vehicle on tracks, and not an autonomous module) and the Alexander Shabalin large landing ship. It makes sense to take Project 03160 Raptor boats from the fleet in the amount of 3-4 units and Project 12200 Sobol from the Coast Guard.
The Project 1331-M MPCs are no longer valuable as anti-submarine vessels, and they can be used for demonstrative actions. Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin
Since the boats have little autonomy, it is necessary to deploy improvised floating bases for them at sea, with replacement crews, canned food, drinking water and fuel, for which any relatively large vessel of the auxiliary fleet will do. All that is needed is to ensure the possibility of transferring fuel and food at sea, which is not technically difficult.
As a means of amplification, FPV calculations must be provided for on some units.drones"for knocking out the enemy's targeting radar antennas, this is, in the emerging "police get-together", actually a "non-lethal" anti-ship weapon, which can harm the enemy and undermine his combat capability, but not kill him.
If there is a shortage of forces, should such a shortage arise during real operations, it will be necessary to transfer the Svetlyaks with 76-mm guns to these "peacetime forces". But it would be better to do without this.
Naturally, these forces must prepare for combat - for boats, it is important to be able to maneuver and quickly break away from the enemy, using FPV on them and immediately calling for help, to be able to hide behind civilian traffic so as not to be detected too early, but for ships, it will be necessary to be ready to use weapons, no matter what the outcome.
But these are peacetime forces, their task is to cover merchant ships not so much with weapons as with themselves and the flag, although there is no need to be shy about shooting, you just need to choose the right moment.
But for combat operations the fleet needs a different set of forces.
To battle!
From what the Baltic Fleet has, it would be rational to organize the following detachments.
A detachment of small missile ships consisting of all Project 21631 Buyan-M missile ships and two Project 22800 Karakurt missile ships that do not have the Pantsir air defense missile and missile system.
These ships have 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles, which are valuable for the Navy’s missions, but do not have significant Defense.
It is logical to disperse them on Ladoga to have a "long arm" that can reach any port in the Gulf of Finland or near Kaliningrad. The total missile salvo of the detachment will be 56 (including the Stavropol, which has not yet been accepted into combat) cruise missiles. This is not very many, but not a small amount.
The lead MRK of Project 22800 "Mytishchi" (in the photo it is still "Uragan"). Two such ships do not carry significant air defense systems, and it is not worth exposing them to the risk of a missile strike, it is better to move them to Ladoga and use them as the "long arm" of the Baltic Fleet together with the "Buyan-M".
The goal of all the squad's actions should be its survival, so that when necessary, it could use its full power.
The MRK Odintsovo with the Pantsir-M SAM system remains in combat service in the Baltic Sea and, due to its technical ability to shoot down modern anti-ship missiles with a small EPR, is used as part of the Baltic Fleet combat ship detachments.
We need two or three such units.
Currently the Baltic Fleet has:
- Two Project 11540 frigates. They can be used for any tasks and carry anti-submarine helicopters.
- Three Project 20380 corvettes (the fourth, Steregushchiy, will not have time to leave due to modernization and repairs). They have known problems with air defense, which M. Klimov wrote about in detail earlier, see, for example, "Corvettes that will go into battle"But they can fight submarines and also carry anti-submarine helicopters.
- Three small missile ships of the 1234.1 Ovod project. They cannot strike the shore or they can do it poorly, the functionality of the air defense missile system is questionable, but they have strike capabilities and this is a threat to ships.
- Four Project 12411 Molniya missile boats. The level of their combat readiness is unknown to the general public, but if they can fight, they can deliver a very powerful blow - two such boats will break through the air defense of any ship in the world, except for an AEGIS-like destroyer with SM-6 SAMs, and there is a chance against it.
- The already mentioned small missile ship Odintsovo with Pantsir-M and eight Kalibr missiles.
Here it is necessary to make a reservation: some of the units indicated may be undergoing repairs, which were not reported in the media. Some may go for it in the near future. All further calculations are made on the assumption that this composition of ships is in service and combat-ready. If this is not the case, the composition of the combat groups can be revised or the two detachments can be combined into one.
The Project 11540 frigate Yaroslav Mudry. Its sister ship Neustrashimy does not have anti-ship missiles, but Yaroslav does. Photo: Farsnews, Mohsen Ataei.
Separately, it is necessary to say about the destroyer "Nastoichivy". It is not clear when it will be able to go to sea and in what condition. Therefore, it is excluded from consideration; if it could be counted on, it would join one of the detachments that will be described below.
Also not considered is the hypothetical strengthening of the Baltic Fleet at the expense of the Northern Fleet and the Coast Guard ships from the Northern Theater of Operations.
It may be impossible to remove any forces from there.
It is possible that there will be reinforcements after all, then the number of detachments and their composition may change.
The ships must split into squads.
First detachment: two corvettes, the Neustrashimy missile cruiser, the Project 1234.1 small missile boat, two missile boats, the Svetlyak coastal defense patrol cruiser, the Project 10140 Svetlyak small missile cruiser, and the Odintsovo small missile cruiser.
Second detachment: corvette, frigate Yaroslav Mudry, small missile ship of project 1234.1, two missile boats, coastal defense patrol ship of project 10140 Svetlyak.
Theoretically, this gives the fleet a couple of more or less balanced detachments of surface ships, with limited ability to defend against submarines, small-scale air strikes or aerial reconnaissance, launch missile strikes against surface targets, including massive ones, and attack those at bases.
But it is possible to go the other way and create detachments capable of holding the designated area, from the SCR, corvettes and MRK "Odintsovo" and one PSKR in each, and an unbalanced in terms of the lack of air defense and anti-submarine warfare, but a fast strike detachment of a pair of MRK "Ovod" type and missile boats, the protection of which will be in its speed and which will have a good powerful offensive arsenal.
Everything will depend on the situation, most likely the first approach with units ready for anything should be correct.
Baltic Fleet missile boat R-187
Before the opening of hostilities, these detachments, each with a supply tanker, must hide in the shipping traffic outside the Gulf of Finland, in the open sea, avoiding the establishment of long-term surveillance by the enemy (this is not the same as short-term detection) and doing everything possible to prevent the enemy from developing target designation for missile weapon systems.
It's difficult, but possible.
With the start of military operations, these forces will have to make a forced transition to the Gulf of Finland and, using ship traffic there to prevent a missile strike from the shore against them, attack and destroy those ships that NATO is using there against the Baltic Fleet.
Here the skeptic will start laughing, but that would be a mistake.
You need to understand the following.
1. Each of the described units is stronger than, for example, all the forces that NATO allocated for Operation Baltic Sentinel combined.
2. The permanently deployed forces of Standing Maritime Group 1 at sea are all that NATO can throw into battle “here and now”; the rest of the ships must at least make the transition to combat areas, and even better, prepare in advance.
3. Some NATO countries will avoid attack by withdrawing their forces as soon as there is talk of a military clash.
4. In the Western tradition, the enemy will at least first try to conduct combat operations in a limited area with limited objectives in order to avoid unnecessary escalation.
5. Even if the US decides to take part in the first military clashes (which is not a fact), they have no forces in the region, and they will be able to throw even aircraft into battle at best by the end of the first day of fighting, and even that is not a fact. It is important to understand that the leading force in the Baltic escalation is the EU countries. And there may not be any US forces there in significant numbers.
In a funny way, the “former fleet” – the Baltic Fleet – will have a head start of several days, during which it will have not only the initiative, but also superiority in missile fire.
The combination of anti-ship missile strikes from ships and Kalibr missiles from Ladoga against the Baltic Sentry forces at sea and in bases should give Russia at least two days to gain before NATO drives superior forces into the Gulf of Finland.
By the end of these days, the detachments must be in Kronstadt to replenish their ammunition, and the NATO naval group deployed in the Gulf of Finland must “feed the fish.”
The submarine "Dmitrov" cannot be effectively used in such an operation and is basically superfluous in the Baltic, therefore, when a political decision is made to use force, the submarine must move to the Northern Fleet in advance and prepare to fight there. It will be able to return only after the tension subsides, if that happens.
In fact, the Baltic Fleet units must do the same thing that the Americans did in the Persian Gulf in 1988 during Operation Praying Mantis, just on a larger scale.
And this is quite possible if you act quickly.
Russian diplomacy must use the time it has gained to stop the West from escalating, emphasizing that the losses incurred are only the beginning, and the worst is yet to come.
Further on there is a simple fork.
If a demonstration of determination (that's what it should be called) doesn't work, well, we weakened the enemy before the big war, spurred our morale and saved the fleet, not allowing it to be locked up in Baltiysk.
We declare a general mobilization and, like our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, we go and re-show the results of the Second World War. With all the known problems, right down to the lack of small arms, but with tactical nuclear ammunition. We'll see what happens next.
Few of those reading this text will live to see the end of this stories in that case, but you don't choose the times, you live and die in them. That's just the way it is, and yes, it's better than living to cancer at 69.
More interesting and even more fun in some ways.
At the very least, such an operation will shift the balance of power before the fight in our favor, and significantly.
And it will cheer up the sailors better than anything since the Battle of Sinop.
And you will have a chance to see the Third World War with your own eyes.
But there is another option.
If the use of force in this way makes the Westerners come to their senses, then we will achieve the same effect as the Americans did in 1988. Then they did not have any war with Iran, despite all the feigned fanaticism of Khomeini and his comrades.
The chances that such a blow will be a sobering blow for them are not zero, especially if we clearly convey that we do not want to continue and are ready to disperse, and that if we do not disperse, it will definitely come to nuclear weapons. After the first blood, this threat will have many times more weight than if it is voiced just like that.
Along the way, we must not forget to launch the Caliber missiles from Ladoga as a hint.
It would be very good to combine the flogging with nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, but they need to be prepared for in advance, and for now this preparation is not visible.
Some might say that this is too risky a strategy and that the chances of success are slim.
It's right.
And the risk is huge, and the chances are small.
But there are simply no other options.
Will we be able to avoid losing ships with this course of action?
Fight will show.
This will depend on a lot of factors, some of which are random and cannot be predicted now.
Right down to the weather.
The question of using the Baltic Fleet's naval aviation is best left out of the equation due to the unpredictability of its applicability in such an operation - ships can hide among container ships heading to Finland, aircraft cannot do this, and NATO fighters are in the Baltics.
But it is also wrong to refuse to use it - the chance to get a good "fat" target may or may not present itself.
If it is provided, we must be ready to use it, let's limit ourselves to this.
The last question is targeting in heavy traffic.
It will be necessary to apply Drones on the largest possible scale, at least the same “Orlans”, in order to have more or less accurate data about the enemy.
We must not hesitate to use artillery in order to exclude the destruction of neutral or Russian ships - where we will have an advantage in effective firing range.
We must be able to use anti-aircraft missiles against ships - they are quite accurate. In general, we have all the technical capabilities to work normally while maintaining the initiative, and if the enemy hides in the base, then the "Kalibr" from Ladoga should visit him.
The areas of military operations should be limited to the zone of Operation Baltic Sentinel in the Gulf of Finland - the limited scale of actions will give a small but real chance that escalation will not follow.
Of the forces that can still be obtained for the operation, it is reasonable to consider only the forced delivery of the Karakurts by the Pella plant. There is no time for anything else - either the situation will be relieved, or we will have to fight before something new is laid down. But with the Karakurts, we can manage, and it is better to try to do this.
Now about the sad stuff
Well, a few scoops of fly in the ointment, to the brim. The Baltic Fleet is not prepared for such an operation.
This can be fixed quickly, but it needs to be fixed.
It is necessary to practice the deployment of forces at sea for a long period of time, counter-surveillance, camouflage in civilian traffic, passages hidden from the enemy, shooting while surrounded by neutral or friendly ships, joint work with drones, targeting strike aircraft from the shore, repelling a missile attack on ships and many other things that the fleet currently fundamentally does not want to practice.
The issue of nuclear testing is also long overdue; unfortunately, the highest military-political leadership does not understand this.
And that would help.
On the positive side, the top leadership has developed an understanding that the next big war will be in the Baltics.
The author is, in a sense, a witness to this.
This means that there is a chance that some measures will be taken in advance.
There are no objective obstacles to this.
There are many subjective ones, but once again - you can’t choose the times.
And these subjective obstacles are the main problem - people simply do not understand that in order to be ready for battle, it is necessary to conduct combat training, that in order to conduct complex operations, it is necessary to conduct command and staff exercises with real forces at sea, and see how it goes.
Which must be acknowledged before this.
Our military-political leadership does not want to do all this.
But there is still a little time.
I would like to hope that it will not be “merged” into nowhere.
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