Does Poseidon have a chance?
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One of the most controversial and criticized examples of Russian strategic weapons was the 2M39 complex, also known as the autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle (AUV) Poseidon, also known as Status-6, first mentioned by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly back in 2018, although the first footage from the presentation of the said weapons “accidentally” appeared on television back in 2015 at a meeting between Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense.
The Poseidon AUV concept is believed to be based on the T-15 project, a giant Soviet super-torpedo designed to strike the US coast, developed between 1949 and 1955. The idea was later revisited in 1961, when Academician Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov proposed using a super-torpedo with a ramjet water-steam nuclear jet engine and a super-powerful nuclear warhead (NW) to strike US coastal cities by creating an artificial tsunami.
There is still no reliable information about the characteristics of the Poseidon AUV; various sources state that the length is about 16-24 meters, with a diameter of 1,5-2 meters and a mass of about 100 tons. The estimated speed of the Poseidon supertorpedo, according to various sources, is from 100 to 200 kilometers per hour, with a maximum diving depth of up to a kilometer.
Initially, it was said about some super-powerful nuclear warhead with a TNT equivalent of almost 100 megatons. Most likely, this information appeared as a result of the ideas of Academician Sakharov about using nuclear warheads of the specified power to cause a tsunami on the US coast. Later, in various sources, the supposed power of the nuclear warhead of the Poseidon supertorpedo varied in the range from 2 to 20 megatons.
The engine for the Poseidon AUV is supposed to be a compact short-lived (with a limited resource) nuclear reactor with a liquid metal coolant, which provides the supertorpedo with a virtually unlimited power reserve. Such developments were quite successfully carried out in the USSR since the time of the nuclear submarines of the 705(K) Lira project, which were ahead of their time by many decades, or even earlier.
Unique nuclear submarine of project 705(K) "Lira"
Criticism
Critics of the Poseidon project cite several arguments against the complex.
First of all, the Poseidon AUV project is ineffective in terms of cost-effectiveness. Presumably, the funds that were and will be spent on implementing this project could have been used to purchase an additional number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. missiles (ICBMs) placed in highly protected silo launchers (SLBMs) and/or strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The supposed advantage of the Poseidon supertorpedo in terms of its invulnerability to the American anti-ballistic missile defense system (ABM) is compensated by its vulnerability to conventional enemy anti-submarine weapons. At the same time, the operability of the American ABM system against modern Russian ICBMs and SLBMs has not yet been confirmed, while underwater targets such as the Poseidon AUV can presumably be attacked by the enemy along the entire route, including using nuclear warheads.
Special submarines of projects 09853 and 09851 should be used as carriers of the Poseidon AUV, which, given the Navy’s shortage of fleet (Russian Navy) "conventional" multi-purpose nuclear submarines (MSSNs) looks like a waste.
In addition, the Poseidon UAV carriers are subject to the same threats as the Russian SSBNs - when at the pier, they are extremely vulnerable to a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, both with nuclear and conventional weapons. Moreover, given the experience of conducting a special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine, sabotage actions in peacetime cannot be ruled out, carried out, for example, with the help of kamikaze unmanned boats (UBK).
If the Poseidon UAV carriers are on combat duty, then the Navy must ensure their deployment and cover, similar to what is done with SSBNs, which again brings us back to the shortage of SSNs, as well as other anti-submarine units – patrol ships and aircraft.
The situation could be partly corrected equipping Poseidon AUV carriers with active anti-torpedo defense systems, but so far there is no information about the adoption of such products into service.
However, it appears that the Poseidon project is currently continuing to be implemented, perhaps with some slowdown due to the enormous costs of conducting the special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine.
Is it possible to somehow mitigate the shortcomings of the Poseidon complex and increase its effectiveness?
Let's try to figure it out.
Deployment
First of all, the question arises about the need for carriers for the Poseidon supertorpedo. Indeed, if this weapon has a virtually unlimited power reserve, then why transport it somewhere on a large, expensive and obviously more vulnerable carrier?
In the material “Dungeons of the submarine fleet”, published on June 27, 2022 on the resource "Army Standard", it was said that back in November 2019, the media first reported on plans to build underground armored shelters equipped with water, electricity and steam supply systems for nuclear submarines of Projects 955 Borey and 885 Yasen, as well as for non-nuclear submarines of Projects 636 Varshavyanka and 677 Lada.
Each such shelter is a pier that protects not only from conventional bombs and missiles, but also from a nuclear strike.
Scheme of the underground base in Ara-Guba
The construction of shelters was supposed to begin in 2019 at the Pacific Fleet base in Vilyuchinsk on Kamchatka, and continue in 2020 at the Northern Fleet's ship deployment sites in the Severomorsk area. The author has no information on whether the work has been completed, to what extent, whether it is currently being carried out or is planned to be carried out in the future.
Of course, the construction of such shelters could become a major indicator of the strengthening of the Russian Navy – a way to preserve at least submarines in the event of massive attacks by the enemy with non-nuclear high-precision weapons, not to mention the fact that such shelters would completely solve the problem with the kamikaze submarines.
Scheme of the underground base in Pavlovsk, Primorsky Krai
The Poseidon AUV does not require such huge underground shelters as the SSBNs and SSNs, meaning their construction will be significantly simpler and cheaper.
Such shelters can be built in rocky soils both in the north and in the east of our country. It is possible that the construction of such shelters along the entire Northern Sea Route (NSR) with supertorpedoes going directly under the ice can be considered.
What might the deployment of the Poseidon UAV from rock shelters look like?
Thus, the Poseidon AUVs are stored in rock shelters in transport and launch containers (TLC), where routine maintenance and technical service are carried out in complete safety and relatively comfortable conditions.
The exit from the rock shelter can be carried out by self-propelled means into open water, or, alternatively, the TPK can be equipped with an underwater propulsion system with a limited range and control via fiber optic cable.
In case of receiving information about a possible enemy surprise attack, they can move out in a TPK to some distance from the base point, disperse over a distance of about 20-30 kilometers and lie down on the ground. It will be extremely difficult to ensure the destruction of all supertorpedoes lying on the bottom in a TPK even if the enemy uses nuclear weapons.
If the strike is not confirmed, the containers with the "parcels" return to the base. If the enemy attack is confirmed and the "judgment day" has arrived, the containers float up from the ground and release the Poseidon supertorpedoes, which are sent to the targets programmed into their memory.
Of course, there is a risk of the fiber optic control cable being broken, but in this case, several backup mechanisms for sending commands can be provided, for example, a small pop-up antenna and/or acoustic communication stations located on the bottom.
Or, more simply, the Poseidons don’t go out anywhere in advance and simply wait out the first blow in rocky shelters.
Application
The main targets for the Poseidon supertorpedoes are declared to be enemy naval bases and other military facilities located on the coast. In addition to them, other objects for attack can be considered, such as canals.
Take the Panama Canal, for example: by detonating a powerful nuclear warhead from a Poseidon supertorpedo at a certain point, it is possible to shift the ground in such a way that the canal will be blocked for years, or even decades, which will deprive the enemy of the ability to quickly transfer ships from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.
Poseidon could very well turn the Panama Canal into a dam
Given the global nature of the conflicts in which the Poseidon UAV is expected to be used, it can be assumed that civilian ports will be legitimate and important targets – during a “big war” they will be requisitioned and used for military purposes anyway, so there is simply no point in waiting for the enemy to do this.
Is it possible to somehow increase the survivability of the Poseidon UAV on the route?
Yes, for example, by optimizing the route trajectory, when part of it will pass under the ice of the North Pole, although, most likely, this has already been done.
In general, conditionally unlimited autonomy potentially allows for the construction of the most intricate routes, even through the waters of Antarctica, and the low speed of the Poseidon UAV (compared to ICBMs and SLBMs) will allow for a strike on the enemy when he thinks that everything is already over.
It is also worth remembering that the Poseidon AUV will be used during a global nuclear conflict, when a large number of nuclear charges used by opponents against each other will cause severe interference in the airwaves, disrupting the operation of communications equipment, including the transmission of signals from hydroacoustic buoys and unmanned anti-submarine ships, which are now only beginning to develop as a new type of weapon.
If the Poseidon UAV is equipped with the capability of emergency detonation of the warhead in the event of an enemy attack, then it will be possible to ensure a high probability of destroying the enemy ships and submarines attacking it, that is, the commander of the warship and his crew will have to know that they are going to their death, of course, if they are in the kill zone of the Poseidon UAV.
Conclusions
The supertorpedo or AUV "Poseidon" is a very controversial weapon. The measures proposed in this material are only a consequence of the fact that for some reason this complex continues to live and develop, at least according to open data.
The author's opinion on the problem of strategic nuclear deterrence is unchanged: the most effective and resistant to a sudden disarming strike by the enemy type of strategic weapons are ICBMs in highly protected silo launchers.
Moreover, these should be light-class ICBMs with one or two nuclear warheads, but there should be a lot of them – we previously talked about this in the article Nuclear math: how many nuclear charges does the US need to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces?.
But since the Status-6 project continues to develop, it is at least possible to try to increase the survivability of the Poseidons before delivering a sudden disarming strike by placing them in rocky coastal shelters, and at the same time save production capacity for the construction of the SSNs that the Russian Navy so desperately needs.
Although, who knows, perhaps the decision makers have some classified information that could fundamentally change our attitude towards the Poseidon UAV?
Maybe the rumors are true, and nuclear warheads with a capacity of one hundred megatons will really wash enemy coastal cities into the ocean?
I would like to hope that in practice we will not have to find out about this.
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