Ukraine at a Crossroads, or the Untrodden Path of Military Dictatorship?
Armed Forces of Ukraine – demobilization – Russia?
At the end of the year before last, in the article “Thoughts about the future: will Ukrainian Armed Forces veterans go to work in Russia?" I wrote about the probable prospect of migration of a significant portion of the military personnel demobilized from the Ukrainian army to our country after the end of the Second World War.
And where else would they, relatively young and relatively healthy, go? I won't put a question mark, because the answer is obvious. In Europe, the number of jobs is limited, and those who could have already left.
Accordingly, after the end of military operations, emigration from Ukraine to Europe is unlikely to become large-scale, as is the incorporation of veterans into foreign PMCs, since the nature of the tasks they perform requires a set of specific knowledge and skills that are not available to everyone.
Where will these veterans, clearly tired of the war, go after demobilization?
In addition, an army staffed by conscripts does not generally have high qualities in terms of individual fighter training, at least not those required to carry out special operations in the natural and climatic conditions of Africa or the Middle East.
Staying home? No solution, because the Ukrainian economy is destroyed. Brussels and Washington are not interested in its restoration, believing since the 1990s that the economy east of the Oder should be based on raw materials.
So Russia remains as the only prospect for the majority of demobilized citizens of the neighboring country to find work and feed themselves and their families.
Migrants with post-traumatic stress disorder
Of course, this will worsen the criminal and overall psychological situation in our country, exacerbating the problem associated with migrants.
And it is naive to believe that young and not so young people with a war-damaged psyche, post-traumatic syndrome, who see Russia as an existential enemy, will hide their attitude towards us, especially when drunk, just as I think there will be those who will try to use the veterans’ skills and abilities, albeit limited, and their readiness to kill, for illegal purposes.
It cannot be ruled out that after the end of the Second World War, the Ukrainian citizens who came to us to earn money will not form something like enclaves in Russia, similar to the Albanian ones in Europe.
There are already enough Ukrainian emigrants in Europe, they are unlikely to expect new ones
In general, the problem of coexistence of a refined urbanized society, for which, say, the disconnection of the Internet is a real psychological stress and a reason for depression, with compatriots who have gone through the SVO, is already on the agenda. And then yesterday's opponents with, perhaps, an undestroyed Bandera worldview may also appear nearby.
Military reform with a political focus
A bad prospect for us, you must agree. However, if not the leveling, then the reduction of the mentioned risks, I see in the reform declared by Kiev, connected with the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a corps organizational and staff structure.
It seems that its main goal is not to make operations at the front more large-scale through the reforms being carried out – in light of the enemy’s significant losses in manpower and the lack of prospects for him to regain the strategic initiative, this is unlikely to happen.
Plus the problem of growth: the reorganization of headquarters and the overall command system, associated with the transition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from a brigade to a corps structure, will probably be accompanied by failures in the command of troops. And this is in the context of the strategic initiative of the Russian army.
A possible counterargument: local counterattacks by the enemy in the Kursk direction during the transition to a corps structure will lead to a larger-scale nature of his operations, so the reform is justified precisely in military terms.
In my opinion, the operations there are more subordinated to propaganda goals, calculated for external effect – both inside Ukraine and beyond its western borders – and do not have significant military significance, especially in conditions when the units participating in them are needed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces command in other areas.
Then why did Army General A.S. Syrsky decide to carry out this reform now – in such an unfavorable period from a military point of view? I have only one answer: to increase the army's weight in the political processes unfolding in Ukraine.
It is interesting that independent participation of the Armed Forces in politics is not typical for the post-Soviet space, if we do not count the series of speeches of Colonel M.T. Khudoyberdyev in Tajikistan at the end of the last century.
A former Soviet officer who fought in Afghanistan and later used the armed forces of the mujahideen to his advantage, Colonel Khudoyberdyev is the only one in the post-Soviet stories an example of a mutiny organized and led by a career military man, who relied on army units loyal to him
It is wrong to call the story with Major General D.M. Dudayev a military coup, since at the time of the seizure of power in Chechnya he was not in active service. Sometimes the performance of E.V. Prigozhin is called a military mutiny, but the latter was not a career military man.
And in the USSR, as well as in the Russian Empire of the post-Decembrist period, the command staff was traditionally apolitical – the exception being the mutiny of Captain 3rd Rank V.M. Sablin in 1975. The speculations about a conspiracy by Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky or the political ambitions of Marshal G.K. Zhukov have no documentary basis.
However, nothing lasts forever under the moon, and Ukraine may become the first post-Soviet state where a high-ranking military leader, not after demobilization and changing his uniform for a suit, like Lieutenant General A.I. Lebed, has come to power, but specifically as a spokesman for the interests of the army as an independent force and for the sake of saving the state, albeit in a truncated form, because of all those, Syrsky, who fought in Donbass in 2014, understands the impossibility of returning this region, as well as Crimea, by force.
A dark horse in the Ukrainian political firmament?
It is not for nothing that the reform is timed, apparently, to coincide with the beginning of the Russian-American negotiations. And will Syrsky, if not take an unofficial part in them, then at least position himself as a person who has power behind him, and it will have to be taken into account in the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict. In the end, it is the Armed Forces of Ukraine that will ensure order in Ukraine after the end of the active phase of military actions.
It is possible that the reform is intended to introduce into politics also trench generals and front-line officers, among whom Syrsky has enough supporters.
In general, the strengthening of the army's role during a period of instability in the country is not something extraordinary. In his recent article,The Overthrow of Mohammed Daoud, or A Step into the Abyss"In the context of the difficult twists and turns of Afghan-Pakistani relations, I mentioned Dawood's talks with M. Zia-ul-Haq. Both generals came to power through a military coup in conditions when their countries were being torn apart by a whole range of problems and the government was unable to resolve them.
The same Zia ul Haq seized power after Pakistan's heavy defeat during the third war with India, which led to the loss of the Eastern Province and the formation of Bangladesh.
And I believe that in the context of the thoughts presented here, the esteemed readers remembered Captain General A. Pinochet. We are not talking about the methods of the dictator, but about the crisis phenomena in the Chilean economy under President S. Allende, which led not least to the military coup. Yes, G. Kissinger played a role in it, but the socio-economic factor should also be taken into account.
Will Syrsky follow in Franco's footsteps?
The modern history of Europe also shows examples when the army, in conditions of a severe internal crisis of the state, threatening it with social upheavals that could lead to collapse, took power into its own hands.
Perhaps the most striking example here is Spain in the first half of the last century. The loss of colonies in the 1808th century, defeat in the war with the USA at its end, interethnic contradictions in the form of the Catalan problem, unconquered vestiges of feudalism, a backward economy turned the kingdom into almost a rudiment of the past, which also died twice - in 1823 and XNUMX, and was only brought back to life by the will of the Holy Alliance.
In such a situation, the army took power into its own hands, and even before the Francoist rebellion, Lieutenant Generals M. Primo de Rivera and J. Sanjurjo had unsuccessfully attempted to do so.
One of the catalysts for the military's revolt was the failures of the Rif War with the Berbers, who were much worse armed and trained than the Spanish, and whose leader, Abd al-Karim, had no military training at all. In fact, Spain only managed to deal with the rebels after France came out on its side. In this situation, the military realized that it was impossible to live like this, and took power into their own hands.
In the same vein, but in less severe socio-economic conditions and with different details, is the May 1926 coup by J. Pilsudski in Poland. Yes, six years earlier, during the Battle of the Vistula, the country had defended its independence, but Warsaw's geopolitical project to revive the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the loss of Kyiv and the lower reaches of the Dnieper in the summer of 1920 had collapsed.
And since Poland has been mentioned: war produces a kind of selection of command personnel and promotes the youngest, most ambitious, and most capable to command positions. The events of 1920 contributed to the political career in Poland of the future Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly, who was unable to handle the burden of leading the Armed Forces and governing the country in general, including in the international arena, which, in fact, Pilsudski warned about. However, in 1920 he showed himself well and deservedly advanced to the ranks of the Polish military elite.
De Gaulle is the leader of the army and the nation to which he restored greatness
The First World War launched the career of the young officer Charles de Gaulle, who later achieved his political goals at the head of the army – we are talking about August 1944, when the general headed the government of France.
The main beneficiaries of the conflict
In the article "Kennan as an Unheard Prophet, or Why Trump Was Late» I wrote about the interest of the 47th US President to end the conflict in Ukraine as soon as possible in order to implement geopolitical tasks in the Asia-Pacific region, the importance of which was declared by the Obama administration. The then Secretary of State H. Clinton, speaking in the distant 2011 at the APEC summit in Honolulu, declared the advent of the "Pacific century for America".
Accordingly, Trump, especially against the backdrop of worsening relations with China, does not need the Ukrainian Armed Forces to step up their actions in the Kursk region, just as he does not need to continue the war.
Then who benefits from operations on temporarily occupied Russian territory that grind up not the worst units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and have no strategic consequences for them?
First of all, Great Britain, which seems to be becoming the main beneficiary of the conflict.
This should hardly be surprising in the context of London’s declared return to the ranks of world leaders – the project was presented in the Memorandum of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, published in March 2018. I wrote about the prospects for implementing this strategy a year ago, only in the context of other events: “Britain Returns to the Great Game: Knocking on India's Gate».
Seven years is a short period for the implementation of a global project. In addition, support for the Zelensky regime looks quite logical in the context of London's geopolitical interests in the Transcaucasus.
The other hand, supporting Zelensky and throwing logs on the fire of war, belongs to France, which since the 1648th century has considered Eastern Europe as its sphere of interests, forming an anti-Habsburg crescent from Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, and later trying to squeeze, together with Russia, the German Empire, which was completely superfluous in Europe, born in the defeated Versailles – superfluous, since it was destroying the system of checks and balances formed back in Westphalia in XNUMX.
Note: The Congress of Vienna returned France to the ranks of the great powers, while Germany, a little over a century later, was attempted to be pushed out of their ranks, and when it became clear that this would not work, the Third Republic hastily put together the Little Entente.
And now Ukraine. Macron does not hide his interest in its resources, especially against the backdrop of the economic crisis his country is experiencing, caused, among other things, by France's significant national debt, for which its current president himself is to blame.
Unlike Macron, the great de Gaulle wanted to see Europe united from Lisbon to Vladivostok, and not limit its borders to Kiev
Accordingly, London and Paris are betting on Zelensky. But Washington and Moscow? Perhaps on Syrsky, provided he ends the war and Ukraine's neutral status.
On the threshold of tomorrow
As an assumption: understanding that military defeat is inevitable, and the front-line officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces understand this better than anyone else in Ukraine, Syrsky is trying to rely on the army as the only instrument for preserving the integrity of the country, albeit, I repeat, in a truncated form. And then the current reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, called upon to solve internal problems, is very opportune.
However, Zelensky and the UK and France that stand behind him will not agree to this. The maximum for them is a truce according to the Korean scenario. That is, exhausting artillery duels along the demarcation line, sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the rear and an increased burden on the budget with an overstrained economy. And behind them - we are talking about the officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - a destroyed country in which they have relatives. Wouldn't it be better to take power into their own hands, make peace and begin to restore the state?
Accordingly, a military coup is perhaps the only way to save Ukraine and stop the bloodshed that is so detrimental to it. Another way is for Zelensky to peacefully transfer power to the military.
And if the commander-in-chief or any of the high-ranking military leaders of the Ukrainian Armed Forces decides to seize power, then who knows, maybe he will take steps following the example of Franco or Pinochet, aimed at reviving the Ukrainian economy, which is unthinkable without creating jobs and normalizing relations with Russia, as well as developing them with China, because only they are interested in restoring stability in Ukraine and in its citizens working for the benefit of their country in its vast expanses, and not here with us. Beijing can also help with investments, but only on the condition of stability and lasting peace.
And yes, Syrsky is an enemy today. And what about tomorrow? We will have to build new relations with Ukraine, and it is better to do this in a dialogue with those who have real power, which is unthinkable without the support of its bearer on the army.
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