"Washington" cruisers in light of the experience of the cruiser war of 1914-1918
Let us compare the theses of Ya. Podgorny with the results of clashes between German raiders and the opposing English forces in World War I. In order not to turn the work into a long series of articles, I will not, for the most part, give detailed descriptions of these battles - I will limit myself to providing the esteemed readers with some conclusions on the results of cruiser clashes.
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
These two armored cruisers were the best armored, largest, most powerful ships among all the specially built "Kaiser's corsairs" that operated on British communications during the First World War. But at the same time, they were relatively slow.
As is known, Great Britain entered the war with Germany on August 4, 1914, and the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were lost on December 8, 1914. Accordingly, von Spee, who commanded these cruisers, had just over 4 months at his disposal.
As raiders, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau showed more than modest results, having sunk, according to Ya. Podgorny, 2 sailing ships and 1 steamship off the South American coast. I would also add two transport ships, which the French, in order to avoid capture, sank themselves when German armored cruisers attacked their colony on the island of Papeete (near Tahiti). But this does not change the essence of the matter - the number of intercepted transports turned out to be insignificant. Admiral von Spee still considered his ships more as a "Fleet in being", which would draw off the cruisers of the French and English, shifting to the western shores of South America, where it would operate on communications. Before that, von Spee believed it was possible to strike where and when it would be possible to achieve a great result: for example, he seriously planned to deal with the battlecruiser Australia by suddenly attacking it in the harbor and launching torpedoes.
It is well known that von Spee's squadron fought in two major naval battles. At Coronel it was intercepted by Cradock's British detachment and routed. The German admiral's victory was due to his global superiority in heavy guns - having 12*210-mm guns in a broadside against only 2*234-mm "Good Hope", he also significantly surpassed the British in the level of training of artillerymen. Undoubtedly, this success was not achieved by guns alone. Here, von Spee's correct maneuvering worked, and Lady Luck turned to face him, allowing him to knock out the bow turret of the 234-mm gun of the English flagship at the beginning of the battle.
But still, it is precisely the superiority in artillery became the key factor in the German victory at Coronel. In essence, von Spee destroyed the enemy ships at a distance of about 50-60 cables, where effective shooting with six-inch guns is difficult, and only then closed in to finish off the enemy.
But the good armor of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did not seem to be of much use in this battle. According to Corbett, the Scharnhorst was hit by only 2 shells, and the Gneisenau by 4, although only one of these hits was serious: the shell hit the barbette of the aft turret of the Gneisenau. True, V. Muzhenikov mentions that the Scharnhorst had armor plates that were displaced in three places, which is why he assumes that von Spee's flagship was hit by 2 shells, not 5. But, unfortunately, V. Muzhenikov does not report the places where the armor plates were displaced, which makes it impossible to assess the damage that the Scharnhorst could have received if it had no protection at all. It should be assumed, however, that these hits were at best from 152 mm shells, and they could hardly have caused damage that would have prevented the ship from cruising. The auxiliary cruiser Mewe, which will be discussed below, received damage during one of her campaigns that could be described as extremely severe, but this did not prevent her from being repaired and continuing her cruising.
The second battle took place near the Falkland Islands, where the armor was of no help to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Of course, they held out longer than any unarmored ship of similar displacement could have in their place, but everything was decided by the advantage in speed and the main caliber of the British battlecruisers. Having taken up an advantageous combat distance, at which the British admiral did not have to worry too much about the enemy’s 210 mm shells, he destroyed both German armored cruisers, albeit at the cost of a huge expenditure of ammunition. Only speed could have saved von Spee’s ships, but that was something they did not have.
Light cruisers
There were six of them in the British ocean communications. The cruisers Leipzig and Nuremberg, which were part of Admiral Spee's squadron, were too slow to escape the British ships, which was their death sentence. But the fifth cruiser of the German squadron, Dresden, had an advantage in speed: that is why it managed to survive. Later, the cruiser experienced constant problems with its engines, as a result of which it did not conduct active operations and tried to repair it off the coast of Chile. Where it was eventually caught in the bay of the island of Mas-a-Tierra (now Robinson Crusoe) by British cruisers and after a short exchange of fire, it was sunk.
The most successful German raider of the First World War, the cruiser Emden, fought in naval battles twice. The first time, it managed to destroy the Russian cruiser Zhemchug, which was not at all hindered by the weak armor of the Emden, since it managed to catch our crew by surprise. The second time, the Emden was forced to fight the British Sydney, and this encounter turned out to be fatal for the German ship. Again, it was not the armor protection that decided everything, which was frankly weak on both light cruisers, but the superiority in speed and artillery. The advantage in speed allowed the Sydney to catch up and not miss the Emden, and in the battle - to take a convenient distance for its 152-mm guns, from which it could inflict serious damage to the German cruiser, without suffering too much from the fire of its 105-mm guns.
In his report on the battle, Sydney's commander, Captain 1st Rank John S. T. Glossop, reported that he had managed to quickly suppress the German artillery:
"The enemy's fire, at first very accurate and frequent, soon began to slacken, as almost all the damage they had received had been inflicted in the first moment of the action." Glossop noted that the Sydney had been "probably hit ten times," but this may have included shrapnel. In any case, the crew's losses were three killed and thirteen wounded (one of whom subsequently died of his wounds), and the damage to the ship, according to her commander, was "surprisingly small."
The light cruiser Königsberg, unlike the Emden, did not achieve any noticeable results in the cruiser war, having sunk only one merchant ship. The reason for this was the lack of coal for its operations - the British tried to buy up all the coal in the area, and even detained the collier Königsberg, which was supposed to provide Königsberg with fuel. As a result, Königsberg, as a result of a surprise attack, destroyed the old British cruiser Pegasus and got stuck in the mouth of the river, tying down the superior British forces for 8 months, after which it was finally destroyed.
I have already written about the cruiser Karlsruhe in the previous article, so I will repeat briefly: it was precisely its speed that allowed it to avoid combat with both the armored cruiser Suffolk and the light Bristol. A short fire contact with the latter remained without consequences for both opponents. And then Karlsruhe, pirating on communications, sank 17 ships with a tonnage of 72 register tons and perished by a tragic (for it) accident from a magazine explosion.
Auxiliary cruisers
Let's look at the most interesting clashes. Perhaps the most epic was the battle between the auxiliary cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, armed with as many as 6*105-mm guns, and the armored deck cruiser Highflyer with 11*152-mm guns on board. Highflyer managed to catch the German cruiser loading coal, when it, standing at anchor, had only a small number of boilers under steam and could not escape.
The battle lasted for an hour and a half, and the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse remained at anchor the entire time. The Highflyer, having started firing at 9000 m (yards?), did not try to get closer, so as not to fall within the effective range of the German guns. Having spent 500 six-inch shells on a huge stationary target, it only managed to hit about 10 times. How significant they were is shown by the fact that the Germans suffered two wounded, although of the entire crew, 7 officers and 74 sailors took part in the battle, and the rest were transported to the shore. In the end, the Germans sank their own ship.
The outcome of the battle here was also decided by the advantage in artillery, which was realized even in spite of the extremely poor training of the British gunners. At the same time, if the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse had been on the move, it could have avoided the battle with the Highflyer and fled, since it was superior in speed. Considering the quality of the British ship's gunners, even if it accepted the battle while retreating, the auxiliary cruiser risked little.
The battle between the German auxiliary cruiser Cap Trafalgar and the British auxiliary cruiser Carmania. In this case, the overwhelming superiority in artillery was also on the side of the English ship - 8*120-mm guns against 2*105-mm. Cap Trafalgar could not leave, since it was inferior in speed to Carmania, and was forced to fight, and the result was close to a draw. Cap Trafalgar was lost, but Carmania also received such critical damage that it was brought to the nearest port with difficulty.
Newspaper report of the sinking of the "Cap Trafalgar"
The British auxiliary cruiser Alcantra was not so lucky. It engaged its German counterpart Greif and, with the help of other British ships that approached the battlefield, managed to sink it. But it itself perished – the damage received from the German raider was too severe.
The auxiliary cruiser of the "second wave" "Mewe" achieved the most brilliant victory among all the Kaiser's corsairs - the battleship "King Edward VII" was destroyed by the mines it laid. It had a displacement of 15 tons, a speed of 600 knots, and armament of 18,5*4 mm, 305*4 mm and 234*10 mm, not counting smaller calibers. "Mewe" participated in battles with armed British steamers three times - in all cases, the superiority in artillery allowed the enemy's fire to be quickly suppressed. And if in the first battle there was nothing to suppress - the transport "Clan Mackintosh" heroically tried to shoot back from its only signal gun, then in the second battle "Mewe" received considerable damage.
The British steamship Otaki had a single 120mm gun against 4*150 and 1*105mm guns with two torpedo tubes of the Möwe. But the British opened rapid and surprisingly accurate fire. One British shell hit the bridge of the German raider and penetrated the boiler room, the second hit the coal bunker, causing a fire, and the third exploded under the side, making shrapnel holes in the hull through which water began to penetrate.
As a result, the fire on the Möwe was extinguished only after 5 days (!), and the list immediately after the battle reached 15 degrees. But the damage was repaired, the holes were patched, and the German raider managed to intercept two more British transports, after which it returned to its native land. In the third battle, the Germans, having learned from bitter experience, did not stick their noses into the fire of the British gun with which the transport they were pursuing was armed, and destroyed it from afar.
What conclusions can we draw from the above in relation to the "Washington" cruisers? I would like to draw your attention to the fact that here and below we are not talking about "Washington" cruisers in general, but about the concept of their first series - fast, well-armed and very lightly armored cruisers.
Speed and area of action
These two characteristics were indeed of key importance for cruisers intended for fighting on communications. Not to fight enemy cruiser-hunters, but to avoid them – that was the raider’s motto. And cruisers with a standard displacement of 10 tons, undoubtedly, could and did obtain the necessary qualities. For example, the Japanese heavy cruisers of the Myoko type, possessing a completely extraordinary speed of over 000 knots, could travel 35 miles at 14 knots. The British Washingtons of the Kent type, despite, let’s say, a traditional, if not to say archaic, power plant, generally exceeded the contractual 7 knots per knot and could travel over 000 miles at 31,5 knots, and over 14 miles at 10 knots. The famous German Emden, by the way, had a cruising range of about 000 miles at 12 knots.
Artillery
The battles of the First World War irrefutably demonstrated the advantages of a large caliber, which made it possible to suppress enemy fire from distances at which enemy guns could not or did not have time to cause much damage. And here, the "Washington" cruisers again fit perfectly into the "raider" concept, since high speed and range were organically combined with very powerful 203-mm artillery. It must be said that for a cruiser, an eight-inch caliber is preferable to a six-inch one in most combat situations. The only exceptions are, perhaps, night combat in the absence of artillery radars (but they were still a long way off) and repelling attacks by destroyers. In both cases, the rate of fire came to the fore, which was higher for 152-mm guns for obvious reasons.
But a clash in daylight with an equal enemy is a completely different matter. In the 30s, the level of artillery fire control systems allowed for fire combat at virtually any distance within visual range. However, at long distances, when the projectile flight time greatly exceeds the gun loading speed, the rate of fire of the guns was no longer a determining factor. In addition, due to the particular difficulty of firing at long distances, it was impossible to count on a high percentage of hits. Due to the above, the destructive power was a priority, and of course, it was significantly higher for an eight-inch projectile. If we compare the British guns of the interwar period, we get:
- The mass of a 203 mm projectile is 116,1 kg, the mass of explosives in a semi-armor-piercing and high-explosive projectile is 5,2 and 10 kg, respectively;
- The mass of a 152 mm projectile is 50,8 kg, the mass of explosives in a semi-armor-piercing and high-explosive projectile is 1,7 and 3,6 kg, respectively;
In addition, if the 203 mm gun could effectively hit targets within visual range ("I see the target - I can hit it"), then the 152 mm guns had problems with this. To ensure a similar effective firing range with eight-inch guns, it was necessary to impart an initial velocity of 152-920 m/sec to the 950 mm shells, but not all guns of this caliber had such a speed.
In practice, this meant that there were some distances at which a cruiser armed with 203 mm guns could fight effectively, while a cruiser with 152 mm guns could not. As an example, we can recall the battle in the Java Sea, when the Nati and Haguro with 203 mm guns received a noticeable fire advantage over five allied cruisers under the command of K. Doorman: mainly because three of them were armed with 152 mm guns. And this example is far from the only one.
This does not mean, of course, that light cruisers with six-inch guns had outlived their usefulness, but 203-mm guns were better suited to the tasks of a ship designed to fight on communications. In the event of intercepting an enemy raider in daylight, the battle obviously had to begin at a great distance and turn into pursuit. When running away from the enemy or catching up with him, it is very important to reduce the enemy's speed, and 203-mm guns had a much better chance of coping with this task than 152-mm guns. But even in a night battle, eight-inch guns did not turn into a pumpkin at all, remaining very effective: let us recall the defeat inflicted by Japanese cruisers at Savo Island.
Reservation and constructive protection
Of course, the usefulness of armor cannot be denied. But it is difficult to dispute the fact that in World War I, the outcome of clashes between cruisers on communications was determined not by the level of their protection, but by their speed and firepower.
The German armoured cruisers suppressed the fire of the Good Hope and Monmouth before the British gunners managed to score any significant hits on the German ships. In turn, the Bristol did the same in the battle with the Emden. The British battlecruisers were quite effective in destroying von Spee's ships with their twelve-inch guns, not allowing the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to get close enough for their 210 mm guns to be dangerous to the British. The cruisers Leipzig and Nuremberg were intercepted with such superiority in forces that no amount of protection could decide anything - only speed could save them.
At the same time, in a sea battle, as well as on land, the saying "not every bullet hits the forehead" is true. Analyzing certain sea battles, we see that most hits fall on parts of the ship, damage to which does not pose a great threat to it. That is why the priority tactic for a cruiser-raider will be to minimize the time during which it will be under fire, and to avoid by all means a fight at a short distance, where even a short-term fire contact can be accompanied by a large number of hits. Consequently, there is no sense in the raider project to sacrifice artillery, speed or range for the sake of protection - and, in fact, there was nothing else to sacrifice.
Taking into account the above, the cruiser's protection can be strengthened only by increasing the ship's displacement beyond the 10 tons stipulated by international treaties. But the usefulness of such an evolution of a cruiser designed for fighting on communications is highly questionable. We must not forget one important point in the statistics of German specially built raiders. Not one of the 000 cruisers that entered British ocean communications returned home. All of them perished for one reason or another.
It seems to be the armored cruiser "Scharnhorst". At the bottom.
The risks of a cruiser going on a raid are enormous. At the same time, when operating on communications, a cruiser with a displacement of 20 tons, all other things being equal, will intercept no more merchant ships than a cruiser of 000 tons, and certainly fewer than two cruisers of 10 tons, operating separately. The increase in displacement gives the raider a greater chance of remaining the winner in a clash with enemy warships, but will add little to its ability to intercept transports under a hostile flag.
In other words, by producing fewer, more powerful cruisers, we risk that they will still be lost, but the damage to enemy shipping will be noticeably less simply due to their small numbers. There has to be a balance somewhere, and given the relatively high cost of the "Washingtons", building heavier ships that would have the same speed, range and artillery and also have advanced armor protection is unlikely to be optimal.
It is also necessary to take into account that the organization of counteraction to "Washington" cruisers operating on communications will seriously "puzzle" the enemy, because for each such cruiser ready to enter communications, two or three equivalent "hunters" will be needed, but the more - the better. In such conditions, it will be necessary to count every penny and, obviously, build ships similar to potential raiders in strength and protection. If a certain country builds fast, but weakly armored ships with heavy 203-mm artillery for a cruiser war, say, against England, then the answer will be the creation of the same cruiser-hunters - not more powerful, but equivalent, but in significantly greater numbers.
At the same time, the practice of the First World War showed that when two weakly protected but at least relatively equal in firepower ships meet in a decisive battle, as was the case with the "Cap Trafalgar" and the "Greif", the probability of their mutual destruction is high. Well, to go to the communications, "catch" a couple of dozen transports there, and then, if you fail to return home, and a decisive battle cannot be avoided, "exchange" the cruiser-corsair for a cruiser-hunter - not such a bad prospect. It is clear that "the king has plenty", and such a strategy will never lead to victory at sea, but in general, a country defending its communications will divert more forces and resources to defending communications than a power attacking them.
Conclusions
It can be stated that the experience of the First World War fully confirms the calculations of Ya. Podgorny. The "Washington" cruiser, as a well-armed, fast and long-range ship, whose armor protection was sacrificed for the above-mentioned qualities, had its own tactical niche, in which its performance characteristics look optimal. This niche is the fight on communications, both in terms of destroying enemy shipping and in terms of protecting its own communications from the encroachments of enemy cruisers.
But now the next question arises: was it worth filling this niche during the Second World War? Were large specialized surface ships needed at all to fight on the communications, or should priority have been given to other means of fighting at sea?
To be continued ...
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