How the battleship Oslyabya perished
Historiography of the death of the Oslyabya
The Russian public learned about the fate of the Oslyabya from a telegram published in the press by the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Armed Forces of the Far East, N. P. Linevich:
One of the shells hit the Oslyabya on the left in the living deck near the forward bulkhead... Because of the waves and the speed, it was impossible to patch the hole... Another shell, which hit the 10th coal pit from the left side, penetrated the armor and flooded the spare powder chamber. The list and trim to the bow increased... About 3 o'clock, due to the increase in the list, water began to flow through the ports of the lower battery... The Oslyabya was out of action and about 3 o'clock sank to the bottom, turning upside down.
This fragmentary information then became food for numerous versions of the battleship's death.
In the July 1905 issue of the “Morskoy Sbornik” an article was published artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet V. N. Cherkasov "Under what circumstances can a battleship be sunk by artillery fire?" The author concluded that the Oslyabya capsized as a result of just one large hole through which water penetrated onto the living deck. The loss of stability occurred due to significant construction overload, design errors, and lifting of cargo to the upper decks during the battle.
In July 1905, Novoye Vremya published a letter from M. P. Sablin, in which he attributed a fatal role to the hole in the bow compartment.
In the September 1905 issue of the Naval Collection, the flagship navigation officer of the cruiser detachment, S. R. de Livron, explained the rapid demise of the battleship by its insufficient stability due to the large overload:
The Oslyabya was heavily overloaded and generally considered a wobbly vessel. It capsized after a second 12-inch shell hit it near the waterline.
The commander of the cruiser Oleg, L. F. Dobrotvorsky, did not believe in the possibility of the Oslyabya being sunk by artillery fire and claimed that it was torpedoed by a submarine.
Flagship navigator V. I. Semenov in historical The novel "Battle of Tsushima" (1906) put into the mouth of one of the officers of the "Oslyabya" an explanation that the ship was destroyed by three successive hits by Japanese shells in almost the same place - under the bow turret. A hole the size of a gate formed, and then the internal bulkheads could not withstand the pressure of the gushing water.
The naval engineer of the battleship Oryol, V.P. Kostenko, in his work “Borodino-type battleships in the Battle of Tsushima” (1906) indicated that the cause of the fatal increase in trim and list was the ingress of water through large holes in the unarmored bow.
Professor of the Imperial Moscow Technical School P.K. Khudyakov in his book “The Road to Tsushima” (1907) hinted at the poor quality of the ship’s manufacture:
The battleship Oslyabya, hit by the second 12-inch shell that hit it near the waterline... and pierced its armor, was the first to capsize in the battle on May 14 and... forever hid under water the shameful results of many years of construction by our naval department.
In his article “The Current State of Shipbuilding Technology” (1909), shipbuilder N. N. Kuteinikov explained the death of the Oslyabya by the loss of stability from the flooding of the bow through the destroyed unarmored side.
The death of the Oslyabya was also reflected in the works of foreign experts.
The famous Danish engineer W. Hovgaard in his article “The Fate of Russian Ships in Tsushima from the Point of View of a Naval Shipbuilder”, published in F. Jane’s collection “Fighting Ships” in 1906, concluded that the Oslyabya perished due to low structural stability, high overload and lack of armor at the ends.
Chief Engineer of the French fleet In his article "Combat Accidents in the Russo-Japanese War" in 1906, C. Ferrand named the loss of stability from extensive flooding as the cause of the Oslyabya's demise. First, water entered the bow through a hole, and then spread across the living deck and hold spaces through decks, bulkheads, doors, and manholes that were found to be leaky.
Many years have passed since then, but the issue of the death of the Oslyabya has not lost its relevance even in our time.
A leading specialist in the field of unsinkability, N. P. Muru, in his brochure “Lessons of the Battle of Tsushima for a Shipbuilder” (1990) drew attention to the fact that the Russian battleships entered the battle with a large overload, which greatly reduced the design reserve of buoyancy and stability. He compared the circumstances of the loss of the Oslyabya with the disasters of the Victoria, Empress Maria, Shokaku and Novorossiysk, in which the occurrence of a large trim led to a loss of stability.
Naval researcher S. V. Suliga in his article “Why the Oslyabya Perished” emphasized the high operational overload, due to which the ship’s waterline had only weak protection in the central part.
Blogger Naval_manual in the article “Five questions about the death of the Oslyabya” expressed the opinion that the cause of the catastrophic list was the 10th coal pit and, possibly, other holes not recorded by the Oslyabya crew.
Andrey from Chelyabinsk, the author of the articles "On the Causes of the Death of the Battleship Oslyabya" and "Two Bogatyrs. Why the Oslyabya Perished in Tsushima and the Peresvet Survived at Shantung" published on the website "Military Review", came to the conclusion that the Oslyabya lost stability as a result of uncontrolled flooding in the bow on the left side through faulty ventilation.
Schemes of the battleship "Oslyabya"
To visually perceive the information about the damage to the Oslyabya, the spread of water and the actions of the crew, the author has prepared several diagrams.
Scheme #1. Battleship Oslyabya. Holes received on the left side near the waterline
Scheme #2. Battleship Oslyabya. 1st and 2nd compartments of the living deck
Scheme #3. Battleship Oslyabya. Longitudinal section of the bow
Scheme #4. Battleship Oslyabya. Living deck
Scheme #5. Battleship Oslyabya. Lower deck
Scheme #6. Battleship Oslyabya. Hold
A hole in the 1st compartment of the living deck
At the very beginning of the battle, a large-caliber shell hit the 1st compartment of the living deck.
Information about this event is available to us from the following sources:
• Testimony of M.P. Sablin, who arrived shortly after entering the 1st compartment of the living deck to eliminate damage to the electrical wiring;
• Testimony of V.N. Zavarin, who climbed from the underwater mine apparatus room to the living deck to close the hatch;
• Memories of senior topman F.S. Lebedev, who supervised the sealing of the hole.
According to M. N. Sablin, this was "one of the first shots" (the Japanese opened fire on the Oslyabya at 13:52). V. N. Zavarin reported that the shell hit "no more than ten minutes after the start of the battle" (the Oslyabya began the battle at 13:49). Thus, the first hole near the waterline was received at about 13:55.
The location of the hole was most accurately indicated by M. P. Sablin: "near the 1st bow bulkhead", which ran along the 20th frame. Moreover, the hit was so close to the bulkhead that it was deformed, and thick smoke filled both the 1st and 2nd compartments of the living deck.
The position of the hole relative to the cargo waterline differs slightly in different sources. M. P. Sablin called it semi-submerged, V. N. Zavarin – above-water. F. S. Lebedev mentioned that the lower edge of the hole was at the waterline itself, when the water level on the living deck was “knee-deep”.
The dimensions of the hole were reported by F. S. Lebedev: it was “no less than two and a half meters in size” (approximately two spaces), which corresponds to the action of a 12-inch high-explosive shell (see diagram No. 1).
At the beginning of the Battle of Tsushima, the sea state reached 5 points, and waves rolled into the hole, which was on the windward side right at the waterline.
To seal the hole, a fire-holding division headed by F. S. Lebedev was called in. Standing knee-deep in water, the sailors began to install shields and mats. The work was slow, the water had already reached their waists when they finally managed to limit the flow of water.
While the hole was not yet completely sealed, water began to spill over the 305 mm edge of the coaming of the open hatch into the compartment of underwater mine apparatuses. V. N. Zavarin, who was below, went up to the deck, apparently entered the 1st compartment (otherwise, how would he have known the location of the hole and that it was sealed?), closed the hatch, went back down and battened down the neck behind him.
A little later, M.P. Sablin appeared in the 2nd compartment:
I wanted to go to the underwater vehicle compartment, but the hatch there was sealed and there were about two feet (about 60 cm) of water above it.
Returning to the underwater mine apparatus room, V. N. Zavarin noticed water coming through the ventilation pipes, the damage to which he associated with the hit in the 1st compartment. In the author's opinion, the ventilation pipes passing through the underwater mine apparatus room were damaged by another large projectile, since they were too far from the point of impact in the 1st compartment.
Thanks to the memories of sailors and officers that have come down to us, it is possible to recreate with high accuracy the picture of the destruction and flooding that resulted from the hit in the 1st compartment of the living deck (see diagrams No. 2 and 3).
The shell completely destroyed the pharmacy, destroyed two light cabin bulkheads and deformed the watertight bulkhead between the 1st and 2nd compartments of the living deck.
M. P. Sablin mentioned that through the open hatch, broken ventilation pipes and cracks in the deck, water penetrated into the forward ammunition magazine of the 6-inch guns and the Whitehead mine room (which he and V. N. Zavarin called the "under-turret compartment"). In addition, P. P. Durnovo, citing M. P. Sablin, reported that the explosion deformed the first watertight bulkhead, which is why the door in it could not be closed.
The "open hatch" refers to the armored cover over the companionway from the 2nd compartment of the living deck to the Whitehead mine room. It was most likely closed immediately after the water appeared.
One and a half meters from the impact site there was a 203 mm ventilation pipe for the ammunition magazine of the 6-inch guns, which was probably torn off by the explosion. Water gushed into the magazine through the hole formed in the deck, but the sailors who were there most likely sealed the pipe with improvised means.
About two meters from the impact site there was a pipe for the manual delivery of 6-inch and 47-mm shells to the battery deck. The explosion probably tore off this pipe as well, and the water rushed down and flooded the lantern enclosure, which had a door to the ammunition cellar.
No more than five meters from the impact site was an elevator for feeding 6-inch shells to the battery deck. Perhaps the shrapnel pierced its thin walls, and then water flooded the elevator shaft.
Water could have penetrated into the ammunition cellar of the 6-inch guns from the lantern enclosure and the elevator through leaks in the doors, but M.P. Sablin did not report this.
The "gaps in the deck" mentioned by M. P. Sablin apparently refer to the gaps that formed between the flooring of the living deck and the pipes that passed through it as a result of the deformation of the latter. The flooring of the living deck itself was made of two layers of steel with a total thickness of 63,5 mm, so the appearance of a through crack in it is extremely doubtful. The volume of water that penetrated through these gaps into the Whitehead mine room was apparently small, because V. N. Zavarin reported only one flooding path - through the ventilation system.
On the carapace deck, two chain lockers were guaranteed to be flooded; their hawse holes rose only 127 mm above the level of the living deck and did not have watertight covers.
Now we can summarize the consequences of the hit in the 1st compartment of the living deck. A huge, partially filled with water "bucket" formed on the living deck, more than 30 meters long (from the stem to the 30th frame) and up to 17 meters wide. Due to the large area of the free surface of the incoming water, the metacentric height and, accordingly, the stability of the battleship were significantly reduced. A noticeable trim by the bow arose.
The hole was patched, but it was impossible to quickly drain this "bucket" due to the lack of effective standard means. Below the living deck, water completely flooded two chain lockers, penetrated into the Whitehead mine room and the ammunition cellar of the 6-inch guns.
Hole in the 2nd upper coal pit
The hole in the 2nd upper coal pit is mentioned in two sources.
Captain 1st Rank M. V. Ozerov, who commanded the battleship Sisoj Veliky, reported in his testimony to the Investigative Commission:
I believe that the armor plates on the left side of the Oslyaba opposite the command bridge fell off, since I clearly saw the burning side, and the list... formed quickly.
Galvaner K. S. Boltyshev conveyed the words of the hold sailors in his memoirs:
After several hits to the armor of the side opposite the conning tower, the plates began to fall off like damp plaster, and two new large shells hit the exposed unprotected side at the waterline and immediately broke through the entire gate. Water rushed in and quickly spread along the slope of the armored deck. A work division led by engineer Zmachinsky was called in to seal the hole, and they tried to close the hole with wooden shields, propping them up with stops. However, the wave knocks out the beams, and they have to work waist-deep in water. The spare coal pit on the slope has already been flooded, causing the ship to list.
Opposite the forward bridge and the conning tower there was the 2nd upper coal pit, which was not covered by the upper belt. Accordingly, no plates could fall off. The hole formed in the unarmored side.
The position of the hole relative to the cargo waterline is indicated as “at the waterline itself”, i.e. it is possible that its lower edge reached the main belt.
The size of the hole is described as "the entire gate". In theory, two close explosions from a salvo of Japanese 12-inch high-explosive shells could destroy an unarmored side the height of the interdeck space, i.e. 2,4 m, and the width of three or four frames, i.e. 3,7...4,9 m, which is quite consistent with the size of the gate (see diagram No. 1).
The sources do not indicate the time of impact, but it can be determined by indirect signs. Firstly, M. V. Ozerov saw a "burning side", and the fire could have started on the living deck only when it had not yet gone under water, i.e. in the first minutes of the battle. Secondly, both M. V. Ozerov and the hold sailors associated the occurrence of the list with the consequences of the hole in the 2nd coal pit.
"Oslyabya" had already started listing by 14:00 (below in the text the author examines this issue in more detail), so the hole in the 2nd coal pit was received at the very beginning of the battle, at approximately 13:55...14:00.
Hole in the 10th upper coal pit
We know about the 10th coal pit from the report of M.P. Sablin:
The shell hit the 10th coal pit on the left side, penetrating the armor.
M. P. Sablin did not indicate the exact time of the hit, but in the sequence of events he placed it “shortly after” the hole in the 1st compartment of the living deck, but before the failure of the bow turret.
In turn, the moment of damage to the bow turret can be clarified based on the recollections of K. S. Boltyshev – 10 minutes after the start of the battle, and O. A. Shcherbachev – no later than 10…15 minutes after the start of the battle.
The combat report of the Kasuga's commander at 14:00 recorded a large smoke column rising above the Oslyabya from an explosion. Most likely, it arose as a result of a hit to the bow turret.
Thus, the hole in the 10th coal pit was received at about 14:00, just a few minutes after the hole in the 1st compartment of the living deck.
Unfortunately, M.P. Sablin did not record either the exact location of the shell’s impact or the damage it caused.
The main belt of the Oslyabya was under water and had a thickness that practically excluded its perforation at the combat distance, which at that time did not exceed 4700 m. Therefore, in the author’s opinion, the Japanese shell penetrated the 102-mm plate of the upper belt.
Soon it became necessary to pump out water from the hold of the 2nd boiler room, so it can be assumed that the hole was of significant size and was located at the waterline, and water penetrated into the 10th and/or 12th lower coal pits through open hatches, damaged coal supply pipes or ventilation ducts (see diagrams No. 4, 5 and 6).
There is no information in the memoirs about attempts to seal the hole in the 10th coal pit. It is possible that all available emergency parties were already busy eliminating the consequences of the hits in the 1st compartment of the living deck and in the 2nd coal pit.
Hole in the 16th upper coal pit
The hole in the 16th coal pit is known to us from the memoirs of S. V. Gorchakov:
…I began to notice an increasing list, which was initially caused by underwater holes, the largest of which, as far as I remember, was in the rear 16th coal pit, from which the pit filled with water...
M. P. Sablin mentioned that water appeared in the spare magazine (spare powder chamber) of the 10-inch guns, which was located next to the 16th lower coal pit. Therefore, it can be assumed that both officers described the consequences of the same hit.
In the author's opinion, it is most likely that a Japanese armor-piercing shell penetrated the upper belt plate and exploded in the 16th upper coal pit near frame 61. The blast wave damaged the bulkhead between the coal pit and the living deck. Gases or fragments penetrated down through the hole in the slope of the armored deck for supplying coal and damaged the bulkhead between the 16th lower coal pit and the reserve ammunition magazine of the 10-inch guns (see diagrams No. 4, 5 and 6).
As a result of the damage received, water filled the 16th coal pit and penetrated into the reserve ammunition cellar of the 10-inch guns.
The approximate time of hitting the 16th coal pit can be determined from the report of M.P. Sablin: after the hole in the 10th coal pit, but before the damage to the bow turret, i.e. between 14:00 and 14:05.
The emergence of a list and the struggle for survivability
Numerous witnesses noticed the Oslyabya listing in the first minutes of the battle, around 14:00.
P. P. Durnovo observed the emergence of a list “after the very first shots.”
O. A. Shcherbachev recorded that already at approximately 14:00 the Oslyabya “listed to the left side and settled down with its bow.”
B. P. Kazmichev mentioned in his testimony that the ship “received several holes along the waterline and a slight list to the left” even before entering the wake of the 1st armored detachment, which occurred at 14:04.
The list was caused by holes in the 1st compartment of the living deck, in the 2nd, 10th and 16th coal pits and the flooding they caused.
Initially, the fight for survivability was led by senior officer D. B. Pokhvistnev, who personally went down to the holes in the 1st compartment of the living deck and the 2nd coal pit. However, he was soon seriously wounded, and his work was continued by the hold mechanic P. F. Uspensky.
M. P. Sablin turned on the 4th and 6th turbines to remove water coming from the coal pits through the inevitable leaks in the doors into the holds of the 1st and 2nd boiler rooms (see diagrams No. 4, 5 and 6).
To reduce the list, three side corridors on the starboard side were flooded, but these measures proved insufficient.
A hole in the living deck near the mine apparatus
The hole near the left-hand surface mine apparatus was described in the most detail by A.S. Novikov-Priboy in his story about the death of the Oslyabya:
About 20-30 minutes after the start of the battle, we got a second small hole opposite the left mine apparatus, above the waterline, where the armor ends. It was somehow patched up with so-called hawse-sacks.
The hit was received at approximately 14:10...14:20, when the Oslyabya already had a noticeable list, and only the upper edge of the 102-mm belt was above the waterline.
Most likely, the hole was formed as a result of the unsupported upper corner of the plate being pressed inwards and was a narrow but extended gap in the side plating between the 43rd and 44th frames (see diagram No. 1). The hawse bags mentioned in the text, which were used to plug the resulting gap, are canvas bags filled with hemp.
Japanese 8-12-inch shells repeatedly breached the side's tightness when hitting the armor belt and caused flooding of the side corridor located behind the armor. There was no side corridor in the area of the Oslyabya surface mine apparatus. People on the living deck immediately discovered and patched the hole.
A hole in the 2nd compartment of the living deck
The breach in the 2nd compartment of the living deck is mentioned in three sources:
• Memories of F.S. Lebedev, who was in the neighboring 1st compartment at the time of impact;
• Stories of four wounded sailors from the Oslyabya, recorded by Prince S. V. Gorchakov in the Sasebo hospital;
• Notes by V.P. Kostenko, compiled, among other things, based on the recollections of other participants in the campaign and battle.
The location of the shell's impact is indicated in all three sources. In the memoirs of F. S. Lebedev, it is localized "no more than two meters from the first", that is, from the hole in the 1st compartment of the living deck. In the sailors' stories, "near the first bow hole on the left side, opposite the bow tower." In the notes of V. P. Kostenko, not one, but several shells hit "the waterline opposite the bow tower." On the living deck opposite the feed pipe of the bow tower were the conductors' cabins, which were most likely completely destroyed by the explosion.
According to the sailors, the hole was made at about 14:30. The Orel observed hits from 12-inch shells a few minutes before the ship went out of action. The Oslyabya left the formation at 14:32, but by that time the consequences of the hole had already become apparent in the form of a list and trim, so the time of its receipt was somewhere between 14:25 and 14:30.
The enormous size of the hole is emphasized in the sailors’ accounts: “The shell… caused such damage that the mines stored on the battleship fell overboard.”
The position of the hole relative to the load waterline is designated by F. S. Lebedev as "below the waterline". It is possible that its lower edge reached the armor belt, the upper edge of which at that moment was significantly lower than the load waterline (see diagram No. 1).
Through the destroyed side, water gushed into the 2nd and then into the 1st compartments of the living deck. There was a threat of death for the emergency crew working in the 1st compartment, about which F. S. Lebedev reported to P. S. Uspensky and, having received permission, evacuated the people.
It is most likely that it was this shell that damaged the ventilation pipes through which water began to flow into the compartments of the underwater mine apparatuses, dynamos and Whitehead mines (under-turret compartment).
V. N. Zavarin independently organized the fight for survivability. He ordered the ventilation pipes, through which the flooding of the underwater mine apparatus, dynamos and Whitehead mines occurred, to be sealed. He drained the water that had penetrated into the hold and turned on the 1st and 2nd water-drainage turbines to remove it (see diagrams No. 2 and 3).
Through a hole in the 2nd compartment of the living deck, the water that flooded the bow of the ship began to freely communicate with the sea, which dealt a terrible blow to the unsinkability of the Oslyabya.
According to the observations of O. A. Shcherbachev, the battleship sank “up to the hawse holes” and received a list of 12-15 degrees to the left side.
"Oslyabya" on the brink of death
Due to the increase in trim and list, the holes received earlier near the waterline were guaranteed to go under water. Now the 1st and 2nd compartments of the living deck, as well as the 2nd, 10th and 16th upper coal pits began to communicate freely with the sea. The area of the cargo waterline was reduced by approximately 18%.
Is this a lot or a little? According to calculations by the famous shipbuilder N. E. Kuteinikov, in order to lose stability, the Borodino-class battleships with an initial metacentric height of 76 cm needed to lose 16% of the area of the cargo waterline near the sides; the Japanese battleships with an initial metacentric height of 91 cm needed to lose about 17%.
In fact, the Oslyabya could have capsized after hitting the 2nd compartment of the living deck, but this did not happen because water through numerous holes also penetrated into the compartments located significantly below the cargo waterline, which prevented a catastrophic decrease in stability.
Due to the large list and increased draft, the broken ports of the lower 75mm battery came very close to the surface of the sea. Oslyabya was on the verge of destruction.
In a critical situation, the crew continued to fight for survivability. To reduce the list, they began to fill the aft ammunition magazines of the 6-inch starboard guns with water, which according to the specifications was allotted 15 minutes. The available technical means did not allow for faster counter-flooding.
The situation developed much more rapidly...
The Agony of Oslyabya
The final point in the fate of the Oslyabya was put by a new large shell, which hit the conning tower at approximately 14:32 and smashed the steering wheel.
The battleship lost control and, moving in a circle, went out of action to the right. The list to the left side increased so much that waves began to roll onto the battery deck through the holes in the side and the broken porticoes of the 75-mm guns. Now the fate of the Oslyabya was already decided.
The list increased with each passing minute. Water from the battery deck entered: through ventilation pipes and ammunition elevators - into the ammunition cellars, through ventilation pipes and coal loading pipes - into the coal pits, through exit shafts - into the boiler rooms. Flooding of compartments located deep below the waterline had a positive effect on stability, so the ship was in no hurry to capsize.
At the moment when Oslyabya leveled the rudder, the roll even decreased a little, but then began to increase again.
The bow section received the most damage during the battle, so the ship sank with a strong trim.
The agony of the Oslyabya lasted 10-15 minutes. When the list exceeded 30 degrees, the forecastle and upper deck began to go under water, which caused the cargo waterline area to shrink sharply, the battleship lost stability and lay on its side. At the same time, some reserve of buoyancy was still preserved, since the ship did not sink immediately, but stayed afloat for several more minutes.
Were the armor belt plates torn off?
A widely accepted version is that Japanese shells tore off one or two plates of the Oslyabya's armor belt, and then a huge hole formed in this place, from which the ship perished. It was most fully described by A. S. Novikov-Priboy in his story about the death of the Oslyabya:
About 30-40 minutes after the battle began, two or three shells hit the side armor between the left mine apparatus and the bathhouse. The blows were strong, but the armor barely held on, and it began to fall off in whole slabs, like plaster from an old building. When this place was completely exposed, another shell hit it, making a huge hole in the side! They didn’t even try to patch the hole. Water rushed noisily into the ship, spilling over the lower deck and getting into the cellars…
The fastening of the armour plates of the Oslyabya, like other pre-Tsushima ships, was far from perfect and suffered greatly from hits by large Japanese shells. According to contemporaries, the version of the armour plate being torn off was quite realistic. K. L. Shvede presented it to the Investigative Commission:
The enemy's high-explosive shells of 8, 10 and 12 inch calibers, when exploding on the armor, acted as a sharp blow. This blow caused a strong concussion: the bolts that fastened the armor to the jacket could not withstand two or three such concussions, the bolts gave way, and the armor came off the jacket, and with further hits the armor could easily be torn off, which is what happened, I believe, on the Oslyaba, where the armor was torn off. Another shell hit and tore a huge hole 7-8 feet (2,1-2,4 meters) in diameter.
V. P. Kostenko offered a similar explanation in his notes:
On the Oslyaba... the upper belt plates fell off on the left side between the mine surface apparatus and the bathhouse, and in the exposed place a high-explosive shell made a huge hole. One shell that hit the plate loosened it, another tore it off, a third made a hole in an exposed place.
The weakest point of the version about the slabs being torn off is the lack of any specific information. If there had been a witness who saw this hole with his own eyes, he would have definitely indicated its location, as well as the sections into which the water gushed. However, only fragmentary and contradictory information has reached us, which does not even allow us to localize the hole.
M. V. Ozerov and K. S. Boltyshev reported that the plates opposite the bow bridge had been torn off, but there was never any armor there.
The sailors rescued by the destroyer Bravy reported to P. P. Durnovo that the armor plate had fallen off due to a hit in the 10th coal pit. But we know that this hole was received at the beginning of the battle, and the ship's position began to rapidly deteriorate about half an hour later.
Most likely, the version about the fallen slabs did not arise out of nowhere, but in order to explain the unexpected flow of large volumes of water onto the living deck (which A.S. Novikov-Priboy mistakenly called "lower") in the space between the mine apparatus and the bathhouse, as well as into the ammunition cellars. Is it possible to refute the guesses that linked the water breakthrough with the breaking away of the slabs? Yes!
The first source of flooding of the residential deck was identified on site by M.P. Sablin:
When the list was very great and water began to pour onto the living deck through the hatches and ventilation from the battery, I went up to the battery deck and saw that water was pouring into the gun ports of the battery.
It can hardly be considered a coincidence that the porticoes of the 75-mm guns of the lower battery were located exactly above the space of the living deck from the mine apparatus to the bathhouse, where the water gushed according to A.S. Novikov-Priboy and V.P. Kostenko.
Having appeared on the battery deck, water inevitably began to penetrate into the ammunition cellars.
The second source of flooding of the residential deck was indicated by S. V. Gorchakov. The water, with its pressure, first bent and then broke through the bulkhead between the 16th coal pit and the residential deck.
This happened after the Oslyabya had already been put out of action, since only then could significant pressure on the bulkhead have arisen due to the resulting list. And, apparently, after M. P. Sablin had already climbed up to the battery deck along the ladder past the 16th coal pit, otherwise he would have noticed this breakthrough (see diagram No. 4).
The version about the plates being torn off cannot be applied to the hit in the 16th coal pit, because the catastrophic list did not arise from this hole received at the beginning of the battle, but on the contrary, the breakthrough of water onto the living deck was a consequence of the increase in the list and the increase in pressure on the bulkhead.
If there is no precise and consistent information about the location of the hole, and the consequences attributed to it were caused by completely different reasons, then the version about the torn-off slabs can only be classified as one of the myths about the death of the Oslyabya.
On the loss from two shells and the quality of construction of the Oslyabya
After a detailed examination of the circumstances of the death of the Oslyabya, we can confidently refute two more established myths.
The first is that the ship was destroyed by just two 12-inch shells that hit near the waterline.
This myth was created by publicists who, from N. P. Linevich’s telegram, obtained information about only two hits by 12-inch shells and did not bother to study other sources.
Now, after painstaking work with dozens of memories of the participants of the Tsushima battle, a different picture has emerged. "Oslyabya" found itself under unprecedentedly intense enemy fire and already 10-15 minutes after the start of the battle had at least four large holes near the waterline. Then, right up until its failure, the battleship continuously received new hits, which sent it to the bottom.
The second myth - that the quality of construction of Oslyabya was low - is directly connected with the first.
In order to explain the rapid destruction of a large ship from just two shells, an assumption was made that the bulkheads “could not hold” the water and it gradually flooded more and more compartments… Over time, the assumption turned into a firm belief.
This myth is also not confirmed. The memoirs of the Oslyabtsevs do not record a single case of water penetration through undamaged bulkheads.
Thus, there is no reason to doubt the high quality of the Oslyabya hull. The battleship's rapid demise was due to completely different reasons, which readers will learn about in the 5th, final article of the series.
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