28 Panfilov's men. Feat or fiction?

The article, taking into account the emergence of new documents, is an addition to article, published earlier.
Article, correspondents
The first publication about the feat appeared on November 19, 1941, just two days after the events at the Dubosekovo junction. Izvestia correspondent G. Ivanov in his article “The 8th Guards Division in Battle” describes the battle in the encirclement of one of the companies defending the left flank of the 1075th Rifle Regiment of I.V. Kaprov.
So, a brief summary of the event. In the defensive sector of the regiment, the 1075th Rifle Regiment of Kaprov was surrounded, and a group of heroes (not the entire company) brought down a barrage of AT fire (the actions of the AT platoon are clearly visible). The result was 9 tanks destroyed, 3 burned. The company broke out of the encirclement, joined the regiment, optimistically (but in reality, only 120 out of 140-25 people got out - not reflected). Here is the most truthful reflection of the events of 16.11.41/1075/XNUMX. There is a group of heroes (AT platoon) who were surrounded, brought down anti-tank fire on the tanks, and more real losses, well, and the defensive sector of the XNUMXth Rifle Regiment (Kaprov). Further confusion will follow.

The following message was made on December 20 by the battalion commissar of the 1075th regiment headquarters P.I. Klykov in the divisional newspaper "For the Motherland!" In March 1942, A. Bek was in the Panfilov Division, collecting material for his future book "Volokolamsk Highway". He also looked through the divisional newspaper "For the Motherland". Here is a quote from it, made by the writer:
Again, the actions of anti-tank fighters with the result of the Kaprov regiment (1075th Rifle Regiment) are emphasized.
The first information that correspondents Chernyshev and Koroteev received from Yegorov was more like a general list of battles that the division had fought. Here was the battle of Klochkov, Vikhrev and Georgiev. In the circumstances in which they received the information, it was easy to confuse names and the course of events, which is what happened.
On November 26, an article by correspondent Chernyshov appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Glory to the fearless patriots!” It described several battles, but two battles in more detail, with names, and emphasized the actions of the brave fighters who were waiting for the tanks. These two battles are more consistent with the battles at Dubosekovo and Mykanino. Chernyshov’s battle lasted all day and night (and the battle at Mykanino, where Georgiev and Ugryumov distinguished themselves, was at 5–6 a.m.), the enemy had up to 60 tanks and an infantry regiment (304th PP 2 TD). In total, the tank destroyer unit, Lieutenant Bezvremenny and Senior Political Instructor Kolachev destroyed 18 tanks. Then the enemy changed direction, and 54 tanks went after a handful of fighters from this unit under the command of Political Instructor Diev. They destroyed tanks, held them off for 4 hours, but everyone died. In general, a hodgepodge of different battles, including also the battle in Petelino - political instructor Vikhrev. Everything is mixed up, but thanks to this publication and some other materials it became possible to determine who is who and who was where.

So, two important battles are clearly visible. The first one was at Mykanino on 17.11.41 (early in the morning) with Lieutenant Bezvremenny (Ugryumov) and senior political instructor Kolachev. And the second battle was at the Dubosekovo junction on 16.11.41 with political instructor Diev. Let's assume for a start that the political instructors were mixed up in the battles they fought in. Then Diev fights at Mykanino with Lieutenant Bezvremenny, and Kolachev at Dubosekovo. Klochkov and Kolachev are similar-sounding surnames, and this is clearly Klochkov, but mistakenly reproduced by Chernyshev in another battle and with a distorted surname. And his rank is higher than Diev's, as it really was. But Georgiev also gives off the name Diev.
But that's not all, the main confirmation is provided by a participant in the battle at Mykanino, Sergeant Melnikov. A year later (fall 1942), while talking about the battle (stenogram), he calls Georgiev Yegor Diev (printed as the last name - Yegordiyev, and corrected to Georgiev). Well, such coincidences do not happen. Political instructor Diev - this is definitely about Georgiev. Why did the sergeant not know the last name of one of the platoon leaders? Because the commander Lieutenant Ugryumy and Junior Political Instructor Georgiev were introduced to them a few hours before the battle. And Georgiev had only been in the 1073rd Rifle Regiment for a few days, he arrived with reinforcements from the reserve of the 16th Army. And just as Melnikov caught the political instructor's last name by ear (when they were introduced to the formation), so he gave it out when he left the battle (and only three people survived).
And he told about the battle. Here is another nuance: Lieutenant Ugryumov with his unit went from Shishkino to Goryuny to the battalion commander of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment Momysh-Uly. Ugryumov's unit was of divisional subordination (part of the reconnaissance battalion) and was the first AT platoon in the division. And Ugryumov was the chief instructor and was responsible for training AT units in the division's units.
A. Beck's "Volokolamsk Highway".
Momysh-Uly: Not yet.
Panfilov: Tell him: let him go to Yadrovo to Major Yurasov (Major Elin, commander of the 1073rd SP).
But Melnikov's unit is a tank destroyer platoon of the 2nd battalion of the 1073rd rifle regiment. It was removed from the forward area of the 1073rd rifle regiment (near Volokolamsk) and sent to the regiment's command post in Yadrovo when the Germans entered our rear. Since the commander of this tank destroyer platoon, Lieutenant Dikarev, was killed (a few days before 16.11/2), it is unclear who led the tank destroyer platoon. And upon arrival in Mykanino (Yadrovo was already behind the Germans), the tank destroyer platoon was most likely combined with the scouts (and this was Ugryumov with his team). And then the tank destroyer platoon of the 1073/2rd rifle regiment (and Melnikov) were introduced to their superiors. Moreover, it seems that both the tank destroyer platoon (divisional) of Lieutenant Ugryumov and the tank destroyer platoon of the 1073/2rd rifle regiment fought in the battle near Mykanino. But later Logvinenko (the regiment commissar) attributed everything to his own (Ugryumov in the background, the junior political instructor Georgiev and the PT platoon of the 1073nd battalion of the XNUMXrd rifle regiment became the main ones), and they forgot about the PT platoon (divisional). I will not confirm, but, according to Melnikov, they and scouts (Ugryumov's team) were sent to the positions near Mykanino. Well, they should participate in the battle together. Well, that happens.
The next report about the battle was in the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" on November 27, 1941 in the article by correspondent V. Koroteev "Panfilov's Guardsmen in the Battles for Moscow". But there is no precise information here.
No place "...on the Western Front...", no exact time - “…at the grave of Major General Panfilov…they swore…Over the last few days of fighting, the guardsmen…brought glory to the division with new feats…”.
But 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. The division is not yet a guards division, and Panfilov is alive.
Further - “…A group of fighters (several dozen guardsmen) of the 5th company of the Nth regiment… political instructor Diev…”.
We have already figured out about Diev, but again a group (not the whole company), without an exact indication of the number of fighters, but a PT platoon is clearly visible. 54 tanks were advancing, first 7 tanks were knocked out with PT rifles, then 6 tanks with grenades and Molotov cocktails, then 3 more (i.e. 16 were knocked out by this group in total), the regiment approached and knocked out two more (18 in total). But the battle lasted 4 hours and there were two attacks. Why is the 5th company mentioned, it was also surrounded, and some of the fighters saw the battle at the Dubosekovo junction, which they testified to. Well, in that confusion, this battle was attributed to them, although they also fought heroically.
Krivitsky's next article (a day later - "November 28") in "Krasnaya Zvezda" - "The Testament of 28 Fallen Heroes". Also a repeat, only a handful of fighters, but already 28 people (again, not the entire company), and all 18 tanks are already attributed to them. And so basically a carbon copy of Koroteev's article. And here we note that when Krivitsky was already in the division in December 1941, he could (according to the original data) have been sent to any distinguished unit of any part of the formation. And there was also political instructor Georgiev, and companies of the 1/1073 Rifle Regiment of Senior Lieutenant Momysh-Uly. And 11 sappers of the 1077th rifle regiment (under the command of junior lieutenant Firstov and political instructor of the sapper company Pavlov), who withstood an unequal battle for five hours, destroying seven tanks and dozens of enemy soldiers near the village of Strokovo (7,5 km northeast of Volokolamsk). And political instructor Vikhrev (1075th rifle regiment). Just a little correction (it had to be corrected anyway). And Georgiev was nominated for the GSS. Moreover, he performed his feat in front of the higher command (also an important point).
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Ugryumov remained in the shadows, although Panfilov (according to Momysh-Ula) singled him out in this battle. But in terms of the nature of the battle, all the reflected information corresponded to the battle at the Dubosekovo junction. Klochkov (according to order 044 for the Western Front) was nominated for the Order of the Red Banner (again, although there are some ambiguities here too). The subtlety here is that there was no one to confirm Klochkov's death. Although Captain Gundilovich claimed in a letter to Klochkov's widow (most likely, to his superiors as well) that he died before his eyes. But here it was more likely a desire (he did not know that the feat would acquire such a scale) for the widow to at least receive a monetary certificate. The option of "missing in action" somehow did not suit Gundilovich.
And Gundilovich saw the platoon's feat. He saw it first-hand. And the destroyed tanks, and the enemy's retreat first from the platoon's positions, and only then the regrouping at Petelino. And how the commander grasped the connection between these events. And when the remnants of the company withdrew, he brought it to the attention of his superiors. The division started talking about the battle. And then in the division newspaper, and then they told the capital's correspondents. Yegorov reported on all the feats, but at the same time singling out two and confusing the perpetrators. And therefore (later) the division commanders and political workers (and specifically they), based on the nature and importance of the battle, sent Krivitsky to Kaprov. And he to Gundilovich. And Krivitsky drew all the subsequent information from the most accurate source. And, lo and behold, as we have already shown from the documents, an EVENT occurred there, which is reflected in the German documents. An interesting coincidence, or is it still natural? And it should be noted that it was not the correspondent who chose Klochkov, but the commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division. Who, in a calm environment, could soberly assess those events, and their choice was not accidental. The point is that, as it turned out in the battles of November 16, only the 2nd tank platoon of the 1075th rifle regiment (and the 4th company with it) was able to repel and disrupt the German tank attack, and not just stop it. There really were the most suitable events for the described: a delay of 1,5-2 hours for the Germans, destroyed tanks, and most importantly, there was a platoon led by a political instructor. In the first attack, the platoon did not let the tanks through, and the tanks in this attack never reached the other units of the 4th company.
And already in the third article (22.01.42, "Krasnaya Zvezda", "About 28 fallen heroes") Krivitsky describes more precisely. He indicates the time - November 16, and the division is still the 316th (not guards), the exact place (the regiment's section and the positions of the company and platoon), names. The political instructor's surname appears - Klochkov, and the version is played out (Krivitsky wriggles out of it), why it was Diev earlier (they say, he was active - DIEVY in Ukrainian). Well, and the nature of the battle with details, after all, he talked with the company commander.
Let's analyze the second article, "About 28 Fallen Heroes," to eliminate any insinuations about 54 tanks attacking the platoon and 18 destroyed tanks.
So.
1. The enemy forces and resources that attacked the regiment. In the article: “…they concentrated over 80 tanks, two infantry regiments, 6 mortar and four artillery batteries, strong groups of machine gunners and motorcyclists…” That's right. And there's even a shortage in artillery and tanks. The attacking forces of the 1075th rifle regiment: BG2 - a separate motorcycle battalion, a tank battalion (without a tank company), an artillery division (3 batteries) and other units (smaller ones - companies, platoons) of reinforcement. BG1 - the 2nd rifle regiment with its regular artillery, a tank battalion, an artillery division and other reinforcement units. BG3 - 304th infantry regiment carried out a demonstrative offensive, and supported BG2 with firepower (an attached artillery division) and regimental artillery. Krivitsky (in this article) showed that those conditional 54 tanks are NOT for a platoon, but for a regiment.
2. In the article "Tanks! Twenty armored monsters are moving towards the line defended by twenty-eight guardsmen.". 20, not 54. That's right, a tank company went to the platoon's positions. And that's 15-17 tanks. And if you take into account the artillery observers on the T-2 base and the T-B control tanks (on the second line). By the way, the commander of the tank battalion, Mr. Hoheisel (attached to Hoppe), "finishes commanding", having received a bullet or shrapnel in the head, but already on 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. So it fits in, and everything here corresponds to reality.
3. The second attack, in the article "...Klochkov counted thirty new vehicles. There was no doubt - they were heading towards the railway siding, towards the trench of the daredevils..." It was at the moment of the second attack that there were even more tanks that could be observed at the positions of the AT platoon and the 4th company. The first echelon company (which had already been "thinned out") 10-12 tanks, and which would directly attack the positions of the 4th company and the AT platoon. Near Petelino, the right flank-rear of the 4th company, the second echelon is deployed: a company of tanks (20 tanks) and two companies of infantry. Near B. Nikolsky there is also a tank company and two companies of infantry of BG 2, and near (in) Nelidovo their reserve: a company of tanks (20 tanks) with infantry. Well, to complete the picture, already behind Shiryaevo there is the reserve of PG Hoppe (a tank company of 19-17 tanks) with infantry. It is clear that not all of these tanks attacked the encircled 4th and 5th companies with a PT platoon, but they were in direct line of sight and did not add any “pleasant” sensations. And it is difficult to estimate later how many tanks actually took part in the second attack.
4. In the article “The battle lasted more than four hours, and the armored fist of the fascists could not break through the line defended by the guards.”.
Naturally, the battle did not last forever, the Germans in the first attack, having lost several vehicles destroyed (up to 3) and knocked out, stopped the attack on the platoon's positions (and, accordingly, the company). But if we consider the beginning of the battle (the first battle) at about 9.00 (Moscow time), and Kelitsa at 11.30 is given the task of "dealing with" the enemy 1 km south of Petelino (yes, this is not only the platoon, but also the remnants of the 4th and 5th companies). Then the second attack, taking into account the preparation and the time of disassembly - these forces (including the platoon) held out for about 4 hours. So the article roughly corresponds to reality.
5. In the article: "...The brave men shot down enemy vehicles with anti-tank rifles and set them on fire with bottles of fuel. Fourteen tanks were already motionless on the battlefield...." In Krivitsky's first article there were 14 mangled tanks. Now they are simply frozen.
And here is the result: “…About ten tanks were destroyed and are burning….” About ten, and that's it. Yes, Krivitsky cleverly plays up the German losses and, albeit implicitly (it is necessary to somehow reconcile with the first article), brings the result to reality. Well, and he wriggles out of it as best he can. So where are the 18 destroyed tanks? By the way, a burning tank is not even a knocked-out one (the only damage is charred paint). While the engine is running, excess pressure in the power compartment does not allow flammable liquid to get in (of course, unless two dozen bottles are thrown into it). But one or two bottles - the tank burns brightly, but the only damage is paint. And frozen tanks (not knocked out, not destroyed) - this is a technique to reconcile reality with the first articles. The correction made by the commanders of the 1075th Rifle Regiment is immediately noticeable. And upon careful reading of the second article, it is clear: "THE STURGEON WAS CUT OFF." And this is consistent with Ivanov's very first article in the central press "Izvestia". Wow!!
From the description of the battle, it is clear that the correspondents in the first articles exceeded the enemy's losses. 16 for Koroteev, 18 for Krivitsky, and this is excessive. Already in the second article, Krivitsky veiledly showed that the Germans' losses were lower. In reality, as shown above, in the first attack at Dubosekovo, 6-7 tanks were destroyed, and at Petelino, 1-2. And in the second, one can only assume that our soldiers could have damaged another 1-2 vehicles (by the way, the statement about the destruction concerns only three tanks). Hence, about 9 tanks could have been destroyed at Dubosekovo, and this was done with wretched and primitive AT weapons. So there was a FEAT, and this is also clear.
Delaying the enemy (the 2nd TD offensive) for 1,5-2 hours is definitely according to the documents. And for the platoon, the start of the first battle is around 9.00:12.30 Moscow time and the second attack is 13.00:4-XNUMX:XNUMX, so it takes about XNUMX hours.
What words! "Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat" there were some too. "Our great Motherland", "the mighty Soviet Union has entered the battle...", "a huge country is waging a holy war", "we cannot retreat", "not a step back", "Moscow is behind us" — this is a mandatory and routine set of phrases of any political worker. And he repeats them dozens of times a day, and this is also unambiguous. And Klochkov constantly spoke about this — unambiguous. And some rearrangement of phrases does not change the essence.
Hence, Krivitsky (in the second article) basically did not invent anything (he even reduced the enemy's losses). Gundilovich, who observed the battle from his command post 300-500 m from the platoon's positions, gave him information about the course of the battle in all its details. And Gundilovich could have been informed of the details by a liaison officer with a report (during the relative calm between the first and second battles). This could have been Kuzhebergenov, who accompanied the wounded with a group of fighters (all of them were also not mute).
Vasiliev and Shemyakin were most likely wounded in the first battle. Well, they, wounded (and seriously), could not have avoided capture or death, being surrounded. And then the company medics transferred the wounded to the battalion collection point, and so on. It was later (a few months later), relying on the article, that they had to say that they participated in the second battle as well.
Here is the messenger and the escorts and reported the details of the first battle. Kuzhebergenov is a real participant in the battle. After all, he delivered the report from Klochkov (in addition to Gundilovich) not to Mekhlis in Moscow. But only to the battalion commissar (and this is only 0,7-0,9 km in the Petelino area). He would have managed to return three times for the second battle. And when he was with Dovator, he admitted that he was not captured right away, most likely much later. During the raid, apparently, after 100 grams of "People's Commissar's".
Well, and... In such a situation they didn't want to make a hero out of him. After all, the main theme was self-sacrifice. And here he was alive, not wounded, and even in captivity. But battalion commander Reshetnikov didn't see exactly how the events developed near Dubosekovo. There was no time for that in that battle. In Petelino, where the battalion's command post was located in the vicinity, "guests" with tanks appeared. They had to retreat, leaving political instructor Vikhrev to fight back. And regiment commander Kaprov (from his command post) could only observe part of Petelino. His main attention was focused on the position of the 3rd battalion.
So Krivitsky received the details described (in his second article) from Gundilovich. And he is the main witness of the battle. And that is why Krivitsky behaved somehow strangely in the prosecutor's office.
Prosecutor's office
The strangest thing is that this topic was raised at such a level. The reason for the investigation was the arrest in November 1947 by the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Kharkov garrison of the Panfilov hero I. E. Dobrobabin, suspected of treason. Dobrobabin's guilt was fully established, and he himself confessed to committing the crimes. When Dobrobabin was arrested, a book about the "28 Panfilov heroes" was found on him, and it turned out that he was listed as one of the main participants in this heroic battle, for which he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
So what? In fact, Zhdanov simply has nothing better to do than debunk supposed myths. Well, just a month of fighting for historical the truth. Let's imagine Zhdanov coming to Stalin with a statement about some inaccuracies in the short course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which indicated the role of the leader in the revolution. And no one would debunk the feat, which is already a symbol of the resilience of our people, even if one of the heroes was a policeman. Dobrobabin would have disappeared in the camps, they would have changed his last name (Dobrobaba) and advised him to keep his mouth shut. And that's all.
Further, during the investigation of the criminal case, it was established that, in addition to Dobrobabin, 4 more people remained alive, listed as 28 Panfilovites who died in battle with German tanks. And how unexpected was all this (for the prosecutor's office)? And the fact that 1947 received the title of GSS Shadrin (who was in captivity until 1945), and this also turned out news for the prosecutor's office?
But that's not all:
SPECIAL MESSAGE
In December 1944, in the 5th rifle regiment of the 297th rifle division, which was part of the front, we identified one of the 28 Panfilov heroes, Sergeant Dobrobabin Ivan Evstafievich, born in 1913, native of the village of Perekop, Valkovsky district, Kharkov region, Ukrainian, non-party member, 3rd grade education, who was still alive. From Dobrobabin's report, a conversation with him by an operative worker and his stories, it became known that on November 16, 1941, on the instructions of political instructor Klochkov, leading, as a squad commander, one of the groups of fighters among the 28 Panfilov men, he accepted the battle with the Germans.
Head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front
Lieutenant General KOROLEV
22th of January 1945
It turns out that the competent authorities had known about Dobrobabin for a long time and, as I understand it, advised him (for certain reasons) to keep a low profile, which is what he did. He continued to fight and managed to become a Knight of the Order of Glory. After the war, he made no attempt to receive an award for that battle. And suddenly, in 1947, the Prosecutor General's Office decided to investigate the reality of the feat of 28 Panfilov's men, which became a symbol of the Battle of Moscow. Dobrobabin's interrogation established that he was indeed slightly wounded and captured by the Germans in the Dubosekovo area, but he did not perform any feats, and everything written about him in the book about the Panfilov heroes does not correspond to reality (well, that's what he said while under investigation). Well, they would have punished Dobrobabin, but why destroy such a symbol of the Battle of Moscow? No, even the Prosecutor General's Office would not have taken such responsibility.
And if we also look at how one-sidedly and purposefully they conducted the investigation, the selection of witnesses, etc., then certain doubts arise about the sincerity of the search for truth. At the same time, purposeful work was in full swing to fulfill the task, the answer to which is already known. It is immediately obvious that this is a legally imperfect and contradictory document. For the assertion in the conclusion that the source of the fabrication is Koroteyev and ESPECIALLY Krivitsky is refuted by Chernyshev's article in Komsomolskaya Pravda. The conclusion clearly contradicts the facts. And it is FALSE, because the priority in the presentation of the feat of the Panfilovites is given by Chernyshev, who wrote a day before Koroteyev's article and especially Krivitsky's first article.
In Chernyshev's article:
- a group of Red Army soldiers
- tank destroyers
- with anti-tank guns
- battle with 54 tanks (two waves)
- only 18 tanks were destroyed
- fight more than 4 hours.
- commander DIEV
- everyone died
Koroteev:
- a group of fighters from the 5th company (i.e. not the entire company)
- anti-tank
- with PTR
- a battle with 54 tanks (also two attacks)
- 18 tanks (3 with the help of the regiment)
- fight 4 hours
- commander DIEV
- everyone died.
Did they have a vision at the same time, with similar details? And Krivitsky only added the number 28. And the version (how this number appeared) where Ortenber and Krivitsky find out how many fighters there were in the company, supposedly the company is incomplete. What company? Koroteyev clearly wrote: a group of fighters from the 5th company (and not the entire company) and anti-tank gunners. But in Krivitsky's article (the first) there is only a handful of fighters or daredevils, and nothing about the company. Even in this the prosecutor's office screwed up and was unable to construct a logical version.
So, from a formal point of view, both the conclusion and the entire investigation cannot be considered a final legal document. And here it is necessary to conduct an additional investigation due to the new facts that have emerged that refute the conclusion. And any lawyer will definitely confirm this. But even earlier there was an article by Ivanov with approximately the same content, only there were twice as few tanks destroyed, and Kaprov's regiment, and anti-tank gunners. And how did the investigators miss this? Well, that would have been if they had approached the investigation objectively, and not based on a known result. But this is the formal side.
But it is logically clear: there was one common source of information, and he was already in the 8th Guards Rifle Division. And why wasn't he found? What if it was a special order? And they began to carry out the order with the zeal inherent in this department. Then the bias of the investigators and the strange selection of witnesses become clear. This is when direct witnesses of the battle, except for the extremely dependent Dobrobabin, were not called. Kaprov did not see the battle and could not have seen it. The 1,5 km of the regiment's command post from the positions of the 4th company that he claimed were in fact from the 6th company (and even then this was behind the roadbed, forest, pits, embankment). Moreover, he spoke about the heroism of the 4th company, thereby failing the task of the Prosecutor's Office. And how it was there, he himself did not know. Or maybe he did know? But he did not dare to tell. Well, this was when he was persistently advised not to do so.
And what about Krivitsky’s statements in the 1970s about how the prosecutor’s office investigation proceeded in 1947–1948?... “I was told that if I refused to testify that I had completely made up the description of the battle at Dubosekovo, I would soon end up in Pechora or Kolyma.”... And this can be believed. The strange thing is that when asked about the authenticity, he spoke about the far-fetchedness of the feat, when in such a situation it would be three times more natural to refer to the same Gundilovich (and Krivitsky knew perfectly well that he was no longer alive). In addition, he wrote the second article, where he covertly reduced the number of destroyed tanks (if you read the article carefully), after he visited the division and talked to Gundilovich. Well, he should have admitted that he slightly artistically embellished the article, and the rest is all exclusively from Gundilovich's words. And that's all. The company commander is much more accurate. And this is clear, anyone would have done the same. So what? But the prosecutor's office did not need such an answer.
If we develop this theme further, the overwhelming majority knows against whom this order was organized. At the height of Zhukov's disgrace (1947), they dragged out the Dobrobabin case and began a biased investigation into the feat of the 28 Panfilov soldiers. As one of the accusations (of which they tried to collect as many as possible), where Zhukov misled the party and the government. A well-known feat, a symbol of the Battle of Moscow, would only emphasize the depth of the deception. We have always had "truth-lovers" who draw far-reaching conclusions based on dubious documents. Moreover, the same documents (from the same office), but on other people, are considered to be clearly fabricated. And some of them even went so far as to say that Zhukov's disgrace was lifted by the time the investigation was completed. And therefore, supposedly, it is stupid to refer to the commissioned nature of the investigation. Yeah, "lifted" by the time it was completed. In 1948, the marshal was indeed removed from his post as commander of the Odessa Military District and sent to command the third-rate Ural Military District. But ultimately, it was recognized that the investigation had been crudely conducted and was a hoax. This was Zhdanov's conclusion.
Conclusion
Those who like to throw dirt at heroes (under the guise of fighting for truthfulness) are not a new category. And I do not intend to delve into the reasons for such an attitude towards the history of their country. And Medinsky has clearly characterized them, there is nothing to add. But I will try to dispel some misconceptions regarding doubts about the reality of the feat among people researching this topic. Not every researcher, even if he is a historian three times over (I am not even talking about philologists), without certain training is able to calculate and digest the relevant information, as well as understand professional subtleties. And then they draw conclusions that blatantly contradict common sense.
So, the statement that the Germans did not notice how they passed the defense sector of the 1075 regiment is not considered at all. Stupidity is not worth refuting.
It is also stupid to claim that the correspondents (Krivitsky, in particular) made up the feat. Well, as was shown earlier, Ivanov and Chernyshev had already written about this feat. The depiction (at that time) of the combat actions of the 316th Rifle Division (and then the 8th Guards Rifle Division) in the press was focused, to a greater extent, on the anti-tank battle. Did the correspondents all conspire? Or did the information come from one source? Then the commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division should be blamed for this. Why did they choose Klochkov's platoon, and not Georgiev or Vikhrev (and there were many other options)? It is strange, well, that is if you insist on the fictitiousness of the feat.
The statement that the platoon was not able to stop 50 enemy tanks is true. The entire 1075th Rifle Regiment was also not able to do this. But 50 tanks is an attack by the Germans, and on a regiment at that (while the 2th Rifle Regiment's battalion battalions were in the offensive zone of BG 1075). But in the second attack there were even fewer attacking tanks on the 1075th Rifle Regiment. But there were already more on the 316th Rifle Division, since BG 2 was already mainly crashing into the positions of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment, and only partially on the 1075th Rifle Regiment's sector. But, as shown above, the offensive of PG Hoppe in the first attack (1 tank company with infantry - more than 20 tanks, taking into account the battalion command tanks) mainly fell on the positions of the AT platoon.
But the main temple of the adherents of the sect "YOU ARE ALL LYING" in this matter is built on the fact that the Germans simply bypassed the positions of the 2nd platoon (and the 4th company). And only later the entire company was routed, although it fought heroically. And therefore there was no feat of tank destroyers at the Dubosekovo junction. Their main claim is that THERE WAS NO FIRST BATTLE. And the testimonies of both the surviving Klochkovites, fighters of the 4th company, and from other units of the battalion (mainly the 5th company) that there were two battles are fictitious. And this is logical, because if we only assume that at 9.00:13.00 Moscow time the Germans attacked the platoon, we must immediately admit that the attack was unsuccessful. Because they cannot deny the attack at around 16.11.41:13.30, when the company and platoon were destroyed, there is information about this in German documents – Interim summary to the V Army Corps 14.30. XNUMX:XNUMX (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time):
And for some reason, the previously unnoticed platoon (and the 4th company too), which was bypassed, suddenly began to interfere with the Germans (as explained above)? And why not do this at the beginning of the offensive? There is tactical expediency here, two battalions are advancing as a united front (covering each other's adjacent flank), everything is according to science. But to admit this is to admit the feat of the PT platoon. But their faith does not allow it.
Here the positions of the 5th company were in the woods between the Dubosekovo junction and Shiryaevo, and in front of the positions there was a deep ravine. All this taken together made this direction inaccessible to tanks for the offensive of PG Hoppe. And later Kelits will deal with the 5th company (without tanks). And the Germans really did bypass the 5th company initially. And the positions of the 4th company, where the AT platoon covered the left flank, are located on an open field (edge of the forest), it will not be possible to attack without tanks. And, having the order "...attack east of Nelidovo..." For PG Hoppe, all positions of the PT platoon and the 4th company fell within its offensive zone.
Therefore, Hoppe was obliged to "pour" into the defense of the main position of the 1075th Rifle Regiment's defense sector in the area of the PT platoon's stronghold. He did this, but he DID NOT PASS. That is the main point. If Hoppe did not pass with a bunch of tanks, it was probably not because he was afraid of the shots. But the reason was LOSSES. That is why the dogmas of the said sect do not recognize the first battle, relying on the 2nd TD's ZBD, where the actions of BG 1 are shown only in the direction of Morozovo-Shiryaevo-Petelino. And the adherents do not take into account the statements of the battle's witnesses, accusing them of lying. And then the feat can be refuted, accusing the correspondents of far-fetched fantasies. At the same time, they argue that it is necessary to honor the true heroes, and not those invented by the lying Soviet propaganda. But now it does not work.
The ZhBD of BG 1 (ZhBD of the 2nd rifle regiment of the Wehrmacht) shows that in this direction (bypassing the Dubosekovo siding area) only PG Kelitsa was moving in the morning. And this document reflects the actions of the subgroups of Kelitsa and Hoppe specifically, and not BG 1 in general, as the ZhBD of the 2nd TD. And the actions of PG Hoppe miraculously disappear altogether. And this is about the PG, which at that time was the only one of all to crash into the main position of the defensive sector of the 1075th rifle regiment, which should have been the main event of BG 1. How so? And this could only have happened when in the evening, when filling out the ZhBD, all the reports of PG Hoppe were ignored. And only one entry was left, where both he and his PG miraculously teleported to Petelino.
Why, it has already been stated, and this happens everywhere. So, it was definitely the first battle, and the Germans did not pass, having received significant losses. Moreover, as it turned out, the platoon was the only unit that the German tanks could not pass the first time on 16.11.41/1/1073. Yes, the units of Kraev and Filimonov (2/231,5rd Rifle Regiment Momysh-Uly) also ultimately held their positions (Filimonov restored the previous position with a second attack). But there were almost no German tanks there (15.11.41 T-II tanks of the reconnaissance platoon) and that's it. True, it should be noted that their positions were imperfect and poorly prepared. Momysh-Uly received an order to occupy the area (Goryuny - Matryonino station - elevation XNUMX) on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. So they only had time, these were single cells and knee-deep trenches. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Germans squeezed Filimonov's company out of the station. Matryonino only with mortar fire. But the heroism of the Momysh-Ula fighters is beyond doubt.
Well, in the first attack (as mentioned above), the flank of the 4th company, from where the tanks attacked, was covered by a PT platoon. And given the direction of the attack, the platoon's positions were no longer a flank, but the first line of defense. And, naturally, in the offensive zone, without passing the platoon, the Germans were unable to reach other units of the 4th company. Well, the left flank (as an option) of Hoppe's PG in the area of the gap in the trenches and embankment (1 km from Nelidovo) passed far from the front of the 4th company and then struck Petelino (at the 6th company of the 2/1075th Rifle Regiment). And therefore, the 4th company practically did not participate in the first battle.
The Germans, as we see (even if indirectly), confirm the first battle with their documents:
The first is that they must attack the positions of the 2/1075th Infantry Regiment on the left flank behind the railway tracks (PG Hoppe’s task); “…Hoppe’s subgroup attacks across the Lama River east of Nelidovo…”.
The second thing they attacked is the summary in 5 AK: “…By 8.00:XNUMX the railway was crossed near Nelidovo and to the east…”.
Thirdly, a rather suspiciously murky reflection in the BG-1 ZHBD shows how PG Hoppe ended up in Petelino.
Teutonic pride did not allow them to directly confirm the failure at the Dubosekovo junction, so it was better to remain silent. They did not even dare to lie about it, as in the case of the Matrenino station.
And the second battle also needs some clarification. There is a statement that the 4th company and the AT platoon were cleared by units of BG 3. Well, firstly, BG 3 was not supposed to be introduced into the battle on 16.11.41 to attack the prepared defense, but only to provide fire support (possibly a demonstrative deployment for an attack) and clear the area of the enemy behind BG 2. And breaking through the prepared defense was in no way part of the task of BG 3. They were interested in living space in Nelidovo and B. Nikolskoye, they needed to take care of themselves. According to the order and the ZhBD, BG 3 only clears the area behind BG 2 (especially since BRO 2 is not in the zone of this group). Then (after the 2nd TD reaches the planned lines (task of the day)) BG 3 should replace BG 2 and prepare for the general offensive of the 4th TG on 18.11.41/3/17.11.41, being in the first echelon. The fact that BG 1 (XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX) then had to complete the division's task of the day is the merit of the Panfilovites. But here there is a very clear entry in the German documents confirming that this is the business of BG XNUMX.
ZhBD 2-y TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
Interim summary to the V Army Corps 16.11.41
And it couldn't be any other way. The 4th company with the PT platoon prevented the advance of BG 1, and only them. A situation is created where, in order to continue the offensive of the 2nd TD, a regrouping of BG 1 (PG Hoppe) is necessary - the introduction of the second echelon. We rely on the entry in the BG 1 ZBD (extract from the order).
Let's assume that this is the immediate task (and our AT platoon "plucked" the tank company of the first echelon). It is not possible to drag the column along the closest route (to the north) to Petelino (the AT platoon and the 4th company are in the way). And in order to continue the offensive, the second echelon with reserves has to bypass through Morozovo-Shiryaevo (castling to the long side). And the subsequent passage of the rear of BG 1 is also difficult. Therefore, as indicated earlier, castling to the long side, through Morozovo, Shiryaevo. With a subsequent new attack from B. Nikolskoye and Petelino to the north. Which began at about 13:00 (Moscow time), having conducted a new (more effective) fire preparation (on targets identified by fire impact), with the involvement of larger forces. And to solve the problem of advancing the rear of BG 1 later, almost simultaneously with the continuation of the offensive of the 2nd TD to the north, a second, repeated attack on the 4th company and the anti-tank platoon follows. And then, on the 5th company. And already with the second attack the Germans routed the 4th company with the anti-tank platoon, which was pinned down on all sides.
Well, we also need to sort out the reflection of the feat in the press. The assertion that the feat was fictitious based on the investigation by the Prosecutor General's Office does not correspond to the fact that the description of this feat was repeated many times by other correspondents, before Koroteev and Krivitsky. The conclusion of the Prosecutor General's Office is a worthless piece of paper. Legally, it is refuted immediately.
Correspondents who visited the 8th Guards Rifle Division at that time, as a rule, describe the same battle with approximately similar details. And why is the description of this particular battle (the anti-tank battle) particularly highlighted? Did everyone conspire? Or was there a real basis? And why was information about this particular battle poured into the journalists' ears in the first place? And by whom? And the result of the battle agrees with the reports of both battalion commissar Galushko and the military commissar of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (mentioned above).
And either good artillery could destroy the tanks, and it doesn't matter who is on the battlefield. Or anti-tank gunners with incendiaries, grenades and mines, already knocked out tanks, stalled in our positions. But in this case, the Germans should call off the attack and leave the battlefield. Yes, Chernyshov and Koroteyev (and then Krivitsky) exaggerated, and, most likely, included knocked out tanks in all the battles that Commissar Egorov told about. They already confused everything. But this still does not diminish the feat accomplished by Klochkov's men, they knocked out up to 9 tanks and burned three of them. And they are the only ones who immediately repelled the tank attack on November 16. The Germans, after breaking through our defense north of Petelino and B. Nikolskoye (and on the first try), quickly reached Rozhdestveno (BG 1 Hoppe). And the 2nd TD "stalled". So they were singled out.
Well, and as an argument against the unreliability, the debunkers cite the assertion that Gundilovich presented the names, taking information from some list or register. So this only confirms the veracity of the information. The only document that contains the full list of the platoon is the "Journal of Combat and Political Training", and the personal list of the platoon in the notebook of its commander (an informal document). The commander of the PT platoon, Junior Lieutenant Sherpatov, was wounded the day before, before 16.11.41. So the company commander did not have a document with a full list of the platoon. It must be remembered that the PT platoon is a non-staff and separate unit, and even if on rations, is assigned to the 4th company. Even if it was built on the basis of a regular platoon of the company (although it has already been shown that in the 2nd battalion the PT platoon was formed by selecting fighters from different companies). And therefore, simply using the "Book of registration of personnel of the unit (company)" is difficult and inconvenient (well, who knows). It is necessary to pull out names where a bunch of dropped outs, killed, and transfers within the company by units, changes in positions, etc. are noted. And the most convenient is, naturally, any statement, from a payroll to a soap distribution list. Here is the full list of the platoon.
In short, it would be advisable for geological-philosophical historians Alexander Statiev, Nikita Petrov and others like them to apologize. Refer to the lack of experience in working with the relevant documents and the inability to correctly perceive the relevant information in these documents. Well, that's better than remaining in the category of individuals clearly designated by Medinsky.
So, as was shown above, the actions of the Klochkovites, or rather, the feat, led to the following results:
- inflicted losses on the enemy in terms of men and equipment;
- delayed the enemy, forcing him to call off the attack, regroup and conduct new fire training, which significantly contributed to the 2nd TD not completing the task of the day.
I wanted to.
…receives the task on day X-2 to seize the heights at Rozhdestveno, Lyscovo, Golubtsovo, Avdotino. — (Division order 030 2nd TD)
Happened.
- The Germans were initially forced to use reserves, which they planned to use later, into battle. Part of their forces, which were supposed to be used later, had to be thrown into battle much earlier.
- The loss of daylight did not allow the Germans to consolidate their position at Matrenino station, and were ultimately driven out by Filimonov's company of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment. And our units (tank company - 6 tanks of Senior Lieutenant Burda and a combined NKVD battalion) that arrived (to restore the situation) were used to solve other problems. And also units of the 690th Rifle Regiment and the remnants of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (3rd battalion) were able to organize a defense near the village of Shishkino. Naturally, this is the merit of not only the 2 platoons of the 4th company, but also the entire 1075th Rifle Regiment. And the entire 316th Rifle Division. And especially note the actions of the 1st battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (Senior Lieutenant Momysh-Uly), which did not let the Germans through their positions at all. Which forced the 2nd TD to pass the problem on to the 11th TD. Let the neighbors deal with the Momysh-Uly fighters, it's too expensive for us.
ZhBD 2 TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
And the station Matrenino became the calmest place in the three-day confrontation of the 1st Battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment. No one left their positions without a fight. And yet, which battle was more significant, I repeat once again, was chosen by the commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division, the 1075th Rifle Regiment and specifically the 2nd Battalion. Moreover, already in a calm environment, and reported to the correspondent Krivitsky. And then, taking into account the level of self-sacrifice, 28 Panfilovites were chosen as the most distinguished. Rightfully taking their place in our pantheon of heroes. There was a FEAT at the Dubosekovo junction. The commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division knew about it and reported it to the correspondents. And the latter reported it to all our people. Which later became a symbol of the Battle of Moscow.
DOT.
Sources of
Reference-report of the Chief Military Prosecutor N. Afanasyev "On 28 Panfilov's Men" - GA RF. F. R-8131
Documents of the formations of the Red Army
Aerial photography
Wehrmacht documents 35 PD, 11 TD, 2 TD
A.Bek "Volokolamsk highway".
Melnikov's memories - political instructor Egordiev (Georgiev).
Information