28 Panfilov's men. Feat or fiction?

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28 Panfilov's men. Feat or fiction?

The article, taking into account the emergence of new documents, is an addition to article, published earlier.

Article, correspondents


The first publication about the feat appeared on November 19, 1941, just two days after the events at the Dubosekovo junction. Izvestia correspondent G. Ivanov in his article “The 8th Guards Division in Battle” describes the battle in the encirclement of one of the companies defending the left flank of the 1075th Rifle Regiment of I.V. Kaprov.



…The German command began an offensive on the left flank of Commander Kaprov. The fascists threw 60 tanks and up to one infantry regiment…. At 10 o’clock, enemy tanks went on the attack in battle formation from the edge of the forest. They moved in a deployed line. Our anti-tank units opened intense fire. In cooperation with artillery our rifle company began to act. Having let the fascists get close, the Red Army soldiers threw grenades at them. A group of German tanks surrounded a unit of Soviet soldiers. The situation was becoming threatening, but none of the Red Army soldiers left their combat positions… There were two options…. Either the fascist tanks would run into our minefield and stop the attack… Or we had to use anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails to break through the path forward and join up with the main forces… And then something happened that cannot be spoken of without delight… As soon as the enemy approached to 25-30 meters, a group of heroes brought down a barrage of anti-tank fire on him. As a result of the heated battle, nine enemy tanks were knocked out, three were burned. And the rest, unable to withstand the stubborn resistance of the daredevils, turned back….

So, a brief summary of the event. In the defensive sector of the regiment, the 1075th Rifle Regiment of Kaprov was surrounded, and a group of heroes (not the entire company) brought down a barrage of AT fire (the actions of the AT platoon are clearly visible). The result was 9 tanks destroyed, 3 burned. The company broke out of the encirclement, joined the regiment, optimistically (but in reality, only 120 out of 140-25 people got out - not reflected). Here is the most truthful reflection of the events of 16.11.41/1075/XNUMX. There is a group of heroes (AT platoon) who were surrounded, brought down anti-tank fire on the tanks, and more real losses, well, and the defensive sector of the XNUMXth Rifle Regiment (Kaprov). Further confusion will follow.


The following message was made on December 20 by the battalion commissar of the 1075th regiment headquarters P.I. Klykov in the divisional newspaper "For the Motherland!" In March 1942, A. Bek was in the Panfilov Division, collecting material for his future book "Volokolamsk Highway". He also looked through the divisional newspaper "For the Motherland". Here is a quote from it, made by the writer:

“In the fierce [most] battles near the village of N [elidovo], Comrade Kaprova's fighters and commanders knocked out 8 tanks. Beats owls flawlessly. n [anti-tank] weapon».

Again, the actions of anti-tank fighters with the result of the Kaprov regiment (1075th Rifle Regiment) are emphasized.

The first information that correspondents Chernyshev and Koroteev received from Yegorov was more like a general list of battles that the division had fought. Here was the battle of Klochkov, Vikhrev and Georgiev. In the circumstances in which they received the information, it was easy to confuse names and the course of events, which is what happened.

On November 26, an article by correspondent Chernyshov appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Glory to the fearless patriots!” It described several battles, but two battles in more detail, with names, and emphasized the actions of the brave fighters who were waiting for the tanks. These two battles are more consistent with the battles at Dubosekovo and Mykanino. Chernyshov’s battle lasted all day and night (and the battle at Mykanino, where Georgiev and Ugryumov distinguished themselves, was at 5–6 a.m.), the enemy had up to 60 tanks and an infantry regiment (304th PP 2 TD). In total, the tank destroyer unit, Lieutenant Bezvremenny and Senior Political Instructor Kolachev destroyed 18 tanks. Then the enemy changed direction, and 54 tanks went after a handful of fighters from this unit under the command of Political Instructor Diev. They destroyed tanks, held them off for 4 hours, but everyone died. In general, a hodgepodge of different battles, including also the battle in Petelino - political instructor Vikhrev. Everything is mixed up, but thanks to this publication and some other materials it became possible to determine who is who and who was where.


So, two important battles are clearly visible. The first one was at Mykanino on 17.11.41 (early in the morning) with Lieutenant Bezvremenny (Ugryumov) and senior political instructor Kolachev. And the second battle was at the Dubosekovo junction on 16.11.41 with political instructor Diev. Let's assume for a start that the political instructors were mixed up in the battles they fought in. Then Diev fights at Mykanino with Lieutenant Bezvremenny, and Kolachev at Dubosekovo. Klochkov and Kolachev are similar-sounding surnames, and this is clearly Klochkov, but mistakenly reproduced by Chernyshev in another battle and with a distorted surname. And his rank is higher than Diev's, as it really was. But Georgiev also gives off the name Diev.

But that's not all, the main confirmation is provided by a participant in the battle at Mykanino, Sergeant Melnikov. A year later (fall 1942), while talking about the battle (stenogram), he calls Georgiev Yegor Diev (printed as the last name - Yegordiyev, and corrected to Georgiev). Well, such coincidences do not happen. Political instructor Diev - this is definitely about Georgiev. Why did the sergeant not know the last name of one of the platoon leaders? Because the commander Lieutenant Ugryumy and Junior Political Instructor Georgiev were introduced to them a few hours before the battle. And Georgiev had only been in the 1073rd Rifle Regiment for a few days, he arrived with reinforcements from the reserve of the 16th Army. And just as Melnikov caught the political instructor's last name by ear (when they were introduced to the formation), so he gave it out when he left the battle (and only three people survived).

And he told about the battle. Here is another nuance: Lieutenant Ugryumov with his unit went from Shishkino to Goryuny to the battalion commander of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment Momysh-Uly. Ugryumov's unit was of divisional subordination (part of the reconnaissance battalion) and was the first AT platoon in the division. And Ugryumov was the chief instructor and was responsible for training AT units in the division's units.
A. Beck's "Volokolamsk Highway".

Panfilov: So... Ugryumov came to see you?

Momysh-Uly: Not yet.
Panfilov: Tell him: let him go to Yadrovo to Major Yurasov (Major Elin, commander of the 1073rd SP).

But Melnikov's unit is a tank destroyer platoon of the 2nd battalion of the 1073rd rifle regiment. It was removed from the forward area of ​​the 1073rd rifle regiment (near Volokolamsk) and sent to the regiment's command post in Yadrovo when the Germans entered our rear. Since the commander of this tank destroyer platoon, Lieutenant Dikarev, was killed (a few days before 16.11/2), it is unclear who led the tank destroyer platoon. And upon arrival in Mykanino (Yadrovo was already behind the Germans), the tank destroyer platoon was most likely combined with the scouts (and this was Ugryumov with his team). And then the tank destroyer platoon of the 1073/2rd rifle regiment (and Melnikov) were introduced to their superiors. Moreover, it seems that both the tank destroyer platoon (divisional) of Lieutenant Ugryumov and the tank destroyer platoon of the 1073/2rd rifle regiment fought in the battle near Mykanino. But later Logvinenko (the regiment commissar) attributed everything to his own (Ugryumov in the background, the junior political instructor Georgiev and the PT platoon of the 1073nd battalion of the XNUMXrd rifle regiment became the main ones), and they forgot about the PT platoon (divisional). I will not confirm, but, according to Melnikov, they and scouts (Ugryumov's team) were sent to the positions near Mykanino. Well, they should participate in the battle together. Well, that happens.

The next report about the battle was in the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" on November 27, 1941 in the article by correspondent V. Koroteev "Panfilov's Guardsmen in the Battles for Moscow". But there is no precise information here.

No place "...on the Western Front...", no exact time - “…at the grave of Major General Panfilov…they swore…Over the last few days of fighting, the guardsmen…brought glory to the division with new feats…”.

But 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. The division is not yet a guards division, and Panfilov is alive.

Further - “…A group of fighters (several dozen guardsmen) of the 5th company of the Nth regiment… political instructor Diev…”.

We have already figured out about Diev, but again a group (not the whole company), without an exact indication of the number of fighters, but a PT platoon is clearly visible. 54 tanks were advancing, first 7 tanks were knocked out with PT rifles, then 6 tanks with grenades and Molotov cocktails, then 3 more (i.e. 16 were knocked out by this group in total), the regiment approached and knocked out two more (18 in total). But the battle lasted 4 hours and there were two attacks. Why is the 5th company mentioned, it was also surrounded, and some of the fighters saw the battle at the Dubosekovo junction, which they testified to. Well, in that confusion, this battle was attributed to them, although they also fought heroically.

Krivitsky's next article (a day later - "November 28") in "Krasnaya Zvezda" - "The Testament of 28 Fallen Heroes". Also a repeat, only a handful of fighters, but already 28 people (again, not the entire company), and all 18 tanks are already attributed to them. And so basically a carbon copy of Koroteev's article. And here we note that when Krivitsky was already in the division in December 1941, he could (according to the original data) have been sent to any distinguished unit of any part of the formation. And there was also political instructor Georgiev, and companies of the 1/1073 Rifle Regiment of Senior Lieutenant Momysh-Uly. And 11 sappers of the 1077th rifle regiment (under the command of junior lieutenant Firstov and political instructor of the sapper company Pavlov), who withstood an unequal battle for five hours, destroying seven tanks and dozens of enemy soldiers near the village of Strokovo (7,5 km northeast of Volokolamsk). And political instructor Vikhrev (1075th rifle regiment). Just a little correction (it had to be corrected anyway). And Georgiev was nominated for the GSS. Moreover, he performed his feat in front of the higher command (also an important point).

Unfortunately, Lieutenant Ugryumov remained in the shadows, although Panfilov (according to Momysh-Ula) singled him out in this battle. But in terms of the nature of the battle, all the reflected information corresponded to the battle at the Dubosekovo junction. Klochkov (according to order 044 for the Western Front) was nominated for the Order of the Red Banner (again, although there are some ambiguities here too). The subtlety here is that there was no one to confirm Klochkov's death. Although Captain Gundilovich claimed in a letter to Klochkov's widow (most likely, to his superiors as well) that he died before his eyes. But here it was more likely a desire (he did not know that the feat would acquire such a scale) for the widow to at least receive a monetary certificate. The option of "missing in action" somehow did not suit Gundilovich.

And Gundilovich saw the platoon's feat. He saw it first-hand. And the destroyed tanks, and the enemy's retreat first from the platoon's positions, and only then the regrouping at Petelino. And how the commander grasped the connection between these events. And when the remnants of the company withdrew, he brought it to the attention of his superiors. The division started talking about the battle. And then in the division newspaper, and then they told the capital's correspondents. Yegorov reported on all the feats, but at the same time singling out two and confusing the perpetrators. And therefore (later) the division commanders and political workers (and specifically they), based on the nature and importance of the battle, sent Krivitsky to Kaprov. And he to Gundilovich. And Krivitsky drew all the subsequent information from the most accurate source. And, lo and behold, as we have already shown from the documents, an EVENT occurred there, which is reflected in the German documents. An interesting coincidence, or is it still natural? And it should be noted that it was not the correspondent who chose Klochkov, but the commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division. Who, in a calm environment, could soberly assess those events, and their choice was not accidental. The point is that, as it turned out in the battles of November 16, only the 2nd tank platoon of the 1075th rifle regiment (and the 4th company with it) was able to repel and disrupt the German tank attack, and not just stop it. There really were the most suitable events for the described: a delay of 1,5-2 hours for the Germans, destroyed tanks, and most importantly, there was a platoon led by a political instructor. In the first attack, the platoon did not let the tanks through, and the tanks in this attack never reached the other units of the 4th company.

And already in the third article (22.01.42, "Krasnaya Zvezda", "About 28 fallen heroes") Krivitsky describes more precisely. He indicates the time - November 16, and the division is still the 316th (not guards), the exact place (the regiment's section and the positions of the company and platoon), names. The political instructor's surname appears - Klochkov, and the version is played out (Krivitsky wriggles out of it), why it was Diev earlier (they say, he was active - DIEVY in Ukrainian). Well, and the nature of the battle with details, after all, he talked with the company commander.
Let's analyze the second article, "About 28 Fallen Heroes," to eliminate any insinuations about 54 tanks attacking the platoon and 18 destroyed tanks.

So.

1. The enemy forces and resources that attacked the regiment. In the article: “…they concentrated over 80 tanks, two infantry regiments, 6 mortar and four artillery batteries, strong groups of machine gunners and motorcyclists…” That's right. And there's even a shortage in artillery and tanks. The attacking forces of the 1075th rifle regiment: BG2 - a separate motorcycle battalion, a tank battalion (without a tank company), an artillery division (3 batteries) and other units (smaller ones - companies, platoons) of reinforcement. BG1 - the 2nd rifle regiment with its regular artillery, a tank battalion, an artillery division and other reinforcement units. BG3 - 304th infantry regiment carried out a demonstrative offensive, and supported BG2 with firepower (an attached artillery division) and regimental artillery. Krivitsky (in this article) showed that those conditional 54 tanks are NOT for a platoon, but for a regiment.

2. In the article "Tanks! Twenty armored monsters are moving towards the line defended by twenty-eight guardsmen.". 20, not 54. That's right, a tank company went to the platoon's positions. And that's 15-17 tanks. And if you take into account the artillery observers on the T-2 base and the T-B control tanks (on the second line). By the way, the commander of the tank battalion, Mr. Hoheisel (attached to Hoppe), "finishes commanding", having received a bullet or shrapnel in the head, but already on 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. So it fits in, and everything here corresponds to reality.

3. The second attack, in the article "...Klochkov counted thirty new vehicles. There was no doubt - they were heading towards the railway siding, towards the trench of the daredevils..." It was at the moment of the second attack that there were even more tanks that could be observed at the positions of the AT platoon and the 4th company. The first echelon company (which had already been "thinned out") 10-12 tanks, and which would directly attack the positions of the 4th company and the AT platoon. Near Petelino, the right flank-rear of the 4th company, the second echelon is deployed: a company of tanks (20 tanks) and two companies of infantry. Near B. Nikolsky there is also a tank company and two companies of infantry of BG 2, and near (in) Nelidovo their reserve: a company of tanks (20 tanks) with infantry. Well, to complete the picture, already behind Shiryaevo there is the reserve of PG Hoppe (a tank company of 19-17 tanks) with infantry. It is clear that not all of these tanks attacked the encircled 4th and 5th companies with a PT platoon, but they were in direct line of sight and did not add any “pleasant” sensations. And it is difficult to estimate later how many tanks actually took part in the second attack.

4. In the article “The battle lasted more than four hours, and the armored fist of the fascists could not break through the line defended by the guards.”.

Naturally, the battle did not last forever, the Germans in the first attack, having lost several vehicles destroyed (up to 3) and knocked out, stopped the attack on the platoon's positions (and, accordingly, the company). But if we consider the beginning of the battle (the first battle) at about 9.00 (Moscow time), and Kelitsa at 11.30 is given the task of "dealing with" the enemy 1 km south of Petelino (yes, this is not only the platoon, but also the remnants of the 4th and 5th companies). Then the second attack, taking into account the preparation and the time of disassembly - these forces (including the platoon) held out for about 4 hours. So the article roughly corresponds to reality.

5. In the article: "...The brave men shot down enemy vehicles with anti-tank rifles and set them on fire with bottles of fuel. Fourteen tanks were already motionless on the battlefield...." In Krivitsky's first article there were 14 mangled tanks. Now they are simply frozen.

And here is the result: “…About ten tanks were destroyed and are burning….” About ten, and that's it. Yes, Krivitsky cleverly plays up the German losses and, albeit implicitly (it is necessary to somehow reconcile with the first article), brings the result to reality. Well, and he wriggles out of it as best he can. So where are the 18 destroyed tanks? By the way, a burning tank is not even a knocked-out one (the only damage is charred paint). While the engine is running, excess pressure in the power compartment does not allow flammable liquid to get in (of course, unless two dozen bottles are thrown into it). But one or two bottles - the tank burns brightly, but the only damage is paint. And frozen tanks (not knocked out, not destroyed) - this is a technique to reconcile reality with the first articles. The correction made by the commanders of the 1075th Rifle Regiment is immediately noticeable. And upon careful reading of the second article, it is clear: "THE STURGEON WAS CUT OFF." And this is consistent with Ivanov's very first article in the central press "Izvestia". Wow!!

From the description of the battle, it is clear that the correspondents in the first articles exceeded the enemy's losses. 16 for Koroteev, 18 for Krivitsky, and this is excessive. Already in the second article, Krivitsky veiledly showed that the Germans' losses were lower. In reality, as shown above, in the first attack at Dubosekovo, 6-7 tanks were destroyed, and at Petelino, 1-2. And in the second, one can only assume that our soldiers could have damaged another 1-2 vehicles (by the way, the statement about the destruction concerns only three tanks). Hence, about 9 tanks could have been destroyed at Dubosekovo, and this was done with wretched and primitive AT weapons. So there was a FEAT, and this is also clear.

Delaying the enemy (the 2nd TD offensive) for 1,5-2 hours is definitely according to the documents. And for the platoon, the start of the first battle is around 9.00:12.30 Moscow time and the second attack is 13.00:4-XNUMX:XNUMX, so it takes about XNUMX hours.

What words! "Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat" there were some too. "Our great Motherland", "the mighty Soviet Union has entered the battle...", "a huge country is waging a holy war", "we cannot retreat", "not a step back", "Moscow is behind us" — this is a mandatory and routine set of phrases of any political worker. And he repeats them dozens of times a day, and this is also unambiguous. And Klochkov constantly spoke about this — unambiguous. And some rearrangement of phrases does not change the essence.

Hence, Krivitsky (in the second article) basically did not invent anything (he even reduced the enemy's losses). Gundilovich, who observed the battle from his command post 300-500 m from the platoon's positions, gave him information about the course of the battle in all its details. And Gundilovich could have been informed of the details by a liaison officer with a report (during the relative calm between the first and second battles). This could have been Kuzhebergenov, who accompanied the wounded with a group of fighters (all of them were also not mute).

Vasiliev and Shemyakin were most likely wounded in the first battle. Well, they, wounded (and seriously), could not have avoided capture or death, being surrounded. And then the company medics transferred the wounded to the battalion collection point, and so on. It was later (a few months later), relying on the article, that they had to say that they participated in the second battle as well.

Here is the messenger and the escorts and reported the details of the first battle. Kuzhebergenov is a real participant in the battle. After all, he delivered the report from Klochkov (in addition to Gundilovich) not to Mekhlis in Moscow. But only to the battalion commissar (and this is only 0,7-0,9 km in the Petelino area). He would have managed to return three times for the second battle. And when he was with Dovator, he admitted that he was not captured right away, most likely much later. During the raid, apparently, after 100 grams of "People's Commissar's".

Well, and... In such a situation they didn't want to make a hero out of him. After all, the main theme was self-sacrifice. And here he was alive, not wounded, and even in captivity. But battalion commander Reshetnikov didn't see exactly how the events developed near Dubosekovo. There was no time for that in that battle. In Petelino, where the battalion's command post was located in the vicinity, "guests" with tanks appeared. They had to retreat, leaving political instructor Vikhrev to fight back. And regiment commander Kaprov (from his command post) could only observe part of Petelino. His main attention was focused on the position of the 3rd battalion.

So Krivitsky received the details described (in his second article) from Gundilovich. And he is the main witness of the battle. And that is why Krivitsky behaved somehow strangely in the prosecutor's office.

Prosecutor's office


The strangest thing is that this topic was raised at such a level. The reason for the investigation was the arrest in November 1947 by the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Kharkov garrison of the Panfilov hero I. E. Dobrobabin, suspected of treason. Dobrobabin's guilt was fully established, and he himself confessed to committing the crimes. When Dobrobabin was arrested, a book about the "28 Panfilov heroes" was found on him, and it turned out that he was listed as one of the main participants in this heroic battle, for which he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

So what? In fact, Zhdanov simply has nothing better to do than debunk supposed myths. Well, just a month of fighting for historical the truth. Let's imagine Zhdanov coming to Stalin with a statement about some inaccuracies in the short course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which indicated the role of the leader in the revolution. And no one would debunk the feat, which is already a symbol of the resilience of our people, even if one of the heroes was a policeman. Dobrobabin would have disappeared in the camps, they would have changed his last name (Dobrobaba) and advised him to keep his mouth shut. And that's all.

Further, during the investigation of the criminal case, it was established that, in addition to Dobrobabin, 4 more people remained alive, listed as 28 Panfilovites who died in battle with German tanks. And how unexpected was all this (for the prosecutor's office)? And the fact that 1947 received the title of GSS Shadrin (who was in captivity until 1945), and this also turned out news for the prosecutor's office?

But that's not all:

TO THE CHIEF OF THE MAIN DEPARTMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SMERSH

SPECIAL MESSAGE

In December 1944, in the 5th rifle regiment of the 297th rifle division, which was part of the front, we identified one of the 28 Panfilov heroes, Sergeant Dobrobabin Ivan Evstafievich, born in 1913, native of the village of Perekop, Valkovsky district, Kharkov region, Ukrainian, non-party member, 3rd grade education, who was still alive. From Dobrobabin's report, a conversation with him by an operative worker and his stories, it became known that on November 16, 1941, on the instructions of political instructor Klochkov, leading, as a squad commander, one of the groups of fighters among the 28 Panfilov men, he accepted the battle with the Germans.

Head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front
Lieutenant General KOROLEV
22th of January 1945

It turns out that the competent authorities had known about Dobrobabin for a long time and, as I understand it, advised him (for certain reasons) to keep a low profile, which is what he did. He continued to fight and managed to become a Knight of the Order of Glory. After the war, he made no attempt to receive an award for that battle. And suddenly, in 1947, the Prosecutor General's Office decided to investigate the reality of the feat of 28 Panfilov's men, which became a symbol of the Battle of Moscow. Dobrobabin's interrogation established that he was indeed slightly wounded and captured by the Germans in the Dubosekovo area, but he did not perform any feats, and everything written about him in the book about the Panfilov heroes does not correspond to reality (well, that's what he said while under investigation). Well, they would have punished Dobrobabin, but why destroy such a symbol of the Battle of Moscow? No, even the Prosecutor General's Office would not have taken such responsibility.

And if we also look at how one-sidedly and purposefully they conducted the investigation, the selection of witnesses, etc., then certain doubts arise about the sincerity of the search for truth. At the same time, purposeful work was in full swing to fulfill the task, the answer to which is already known. It is immediately obvious that this is a legally imperfect and contradictory document. For the assertion in the conclusion that the source of the fabrication is Koroteyev and ESPECIALLY Krivitsky is refuted by Chernyshev's article in Komsomolskaya Pravda. The conclusion clearly contradicts the facts. And it is FALSE, because the priority in the presentation of the feat of the Panfilovites is given by Chernyshev, who wrote a day before Koroteyev's article and especially Krivitsky's first article.

In Chernyshev's article:
- a group of Red Army soldiers
- tank destroyers
- with anti-tank guns
- battle with 54 tanks (two waves)
- only 18 tanks were destroyed
- fight more than 4 hours.
- commander DIEV
- everyone died
Koroteev:
- a group of fighters from the 5th company (i.e. not the entire company)
- anti-tank
- with PTR
- a battle with 54 tanks (also two attacks)
- 18 tanks (3 with the help of the regiment)
- fight 4 hours
- commander DIEV
- everyone died.

Did they have a vision at the same time, with similar details? And Krivitsky only added the number 28. And the version (how this number appeared) where Ortenber and Krivitsky find out how many fighters there were in the company, supposedly the company is incomplete. What company? Koroteyev clearly wrote: a group of fighters from the 5th company (and not the entire company) and anti-tank gunners. But in Krivitsky's article (the first) there is only a handful of fighters or daredevils, and nothing about the company. Even in this the prosecutor's office screwed up and was unable to construct a logical version.

So, from a formal point of view, both the conclusion and the entire investigation cannot be considered a final legal document. And here it is necessary to conduct an additional investigation due to the new facts that have emerged that refute the conclusion. And any lawyer will definitely confirm this. But even earlier there was an article by Ivanov with approximately the same content, only there were twice as few tanks destroyed, and Kaprov's regiment, and anti-tank gunners. And how did the investigators miss this? Well, that would have been if they had approached the investigation objectively, and not based on a known result. But this is the formal side.

But it is logically clear: there was one common source of information, and he was already in the 8th Guards Rifle Division. And why wasn't he found? What if it was a special order? And they began to carry out the order with the zeal inherent in this department. Then the bias of the investigators and the strange selection of witnesses become clear. This is when direct witnesses of the battle, except for the extremely dependent Dobrobabin, were not called. Kaprov did not see the battle and could not have seen it. The 1,5 km of the regiment's command post from the positions of the 4th company that he claimed were in fact from the 6th company (and even then this was behind the roadbed, forest, pits, embankment). Moreover, he spoke about the heroism of the 4th company, thereby failing the task of the Prosecutor's Office. And how it was there, he himself did not know. Or maybe he did know? But he did not dare to tell. Well, this was when he was persistently advised not to do so.

And what about Krivitsky’s statements in the 1970s about how the prosecutor’s office investigation proceeded in 1947–1948?... “I was told that if I refused to testify that I had completely made up the description of the battle at Dubosekovo, I would soon end up in Pechora or Kolyma.”... And this can be believed. The strange thing is that when asked about the authenticity, he spoke about the far-fetchedness of the feat, when in such a situation it would be three times more natural to refer to the same Gundilovich (and Krivitsky knew perfectly well that he was no longer alive). In addition, he wrote the second article, where he covertly reduced the number of destroyed tanks (if you read the article carefully), after he visited the division and talked to Gundilovich. Well, he should have admitted that he slightly artistically embellished the article, and the rest is all exclusively from Gundilovich's words. And that's all. The company commander is much more accurate. And this is clear, anyone would have done the same. So what? But the prosecutor's office did not need such an answer.

If we develop this theme further, the overwhelming majority knows against whom this order was organized. At the height of Zhukov's disgrace (1947), they dragged out the Dobrobabin case and began a biased investigation into the feat of the 28 Panfilov soldiers. As one of the accusations (of which they tried to collect as many as possible), where Zhukov misled the party and the government. A well-known feat, a symbol of the Battle of Moscow, would only emphasize the depth of the deception. We have always had "truth-lovers" who draw far-reaching conclusions based on dubious documents. Moreover, the same documents (from the same office), but on other people, are considered to be clearly fabricated. And some of them even went so far as to say that Zhukov's disgrace was lifted by the time the investigation was completed. And therefore, supposedly, it is stupid to refer to the commissioned nature of the investigation. Yeah, "lifted" by the time it was completed. In 1948, the marshal was indeed removed from his post as commander of the Odessa Military District and sent to command the third-rate Ural Military District. But ultimately, it was recognized that the investigation had been crudely conducted and was a hoax. This was Zhdanov's conclusion.

Conclusion


Those who like to throw dirt at heroes (under the guise of fighting for truthfulness) are not a new category. And I do not intend to delve into the reasons for such an attitude towards the history of their country. And Medinsky has clearly characterized them, there is nothing to add. But I will try to dispel some misconceptions regarding doubts about the reality of the feat among people researching this topic. Not every researcher, even if he is a historian three times over (I am not even talking about philologists), without certain training is able to calculate and digest the relevant information, as well as understand professional subtleties. And then they draw conclusions that blatantly contradict common sense.

So, the statement that the Germans did not notice how they passed the defense sector of the 1075 regiment is not considered at all. Stupidity is not worth refuting.

It is also stupid to claim that the correspondents (Krivitsky, in particular) made up the feat. Well, as was shown earlier, Ivanov and Chernyshev had already written about this feat. The depiction (at that time) of the combat actions of the 316th Rifle Division (and then the 8th Guards Rifle Division) in the press was focused, to a greater extent, on the anti-tank battle. Did the correspondents all conspire? Or did the information come from one source? Then the commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division should be blamed for this. Why did they choose Klochkov's platoon, and not Georgiev or Vikhrev (and there were many other options)? It is strange, well, that is if you insist on the fictitiousness of the feat.

The statement that the platoon was not able to stop 50 enemy tanks is true. The entire 1075th Rifle Regiment was also not able to do this. But 50 tanks is an attack by the Germans, and on a regiment at that (while the 2th Rifle Regiment's battalion battalions were in the offensive zone of BG 1075). But in the second attack there were even fewer attacking tanks on the 1075th Rifle Regiment. But there were already more on the 316th Rifle Division, since BG 2 was already mainly crashing into the positions of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment, and only partially on the 1075th Rifle Regiment's sector. But, as shown above, the offensive of PG Hoppe in the first attack (1 tank company with infantry - more than 20 tanks, taking into account the battalion command tanks) mainly fell on the positions of the AT platoon.

But the main temple of the adherents of the sect "YOU ARE ALL LYING" in this matter is built on the fact that the Germans simply bypassed the positions of the 2nd platoon (and the 4th company). And only later the entire company was routed, although it fought heroically. And therefore there was no feat of tank destroyers at the Dubosekovo junction. Their main claim is that THERE WAS NO FIRST BATTLE. And the testimonies of both the surviving Klochkovites, fighters of the 4th company, and from other units of the battalion (mainly the 5th company) that there were two battles are fictitious. And this is logical, because if we only assume that at 9.00:13.00 Moscow time the Germans attacked the platoon, we must immediately admit that the attack was unsuccessful. Because they cannot deny the attack at around 16.11.41:13.30, when the company and platoon were destroyed, there is information about this in German documents – Interim summary to the V Army Corps 14.30. XNUMX:XNUMX (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time):

. Combat group 1 is fighting the enemy, who is stubbornly defending himself on the forest edges south of the highway, along the line north of Shiryaevo - 1,5 km south of Petelinka...

And for some reason, the previously unnoticed platoon (and the 4th company too), which was bypassed, suddenly began to interfere with the Germans (as explained above)? And why not do this at the beginning of the offensive? There is tactical expediency here, two battalions are advancing as a united front (covering each other's adjacent flank), everything is according to science. But to admit this is to admit the feat of the PT platoon. But their faith does not allow it.

Here the positions of the 5th company were in the woods between the Dubosekovo junction and Shiryaevo, and in front of the positions there was a deep ravine. All this taken together made this direction inaccessible to tanks for the offensive of PG Hoppe. And later Kelits will deal with the 5th company (without tanks). And the Germans really did bypass the 5th company initially. And the positions of the 4th company, where the AT platoon covered the left flank, are located on an open field (edge ​​of the forest), it will not be possible to attack without tanks. And, having the order "...attack east of Nelidovo..." For PG Hoppe, all positions of the PT platoon and the 4th company fell within its offensive zone.

Therefore, Hoppe was obliged to "pour" into the defense of the main position of the 1075th Rifle Regiment's defense sector in the area of ​​the PT platoon's stronghold. He did this, but he DID NOT PASS. That is the main point. If Hoppe did not pass with a bunch of tanks, it was probably not because he was afraid of the shots. But the reason was LOSSES. That is why the dogmas of the said sect do not recognize the first battle, relying on the 2nd TD's ZBD, where the actions of BG 1 are shown only in the direction of Morozovo-Shiryaevo-Petelino. And the adherents do not take into account the statements of the battle's witnesses, accusing them of lying. And then the feat can be refuted, accusing the correspondents of far-fetched fantasies. At the same time, they argue that it is necessary to honor the true heroes, and not those invented by the lying Soviet propaganda. But now it does not work.

The ZhBD of BG 1 (ZhBD of the 2nd rifle regiment of the Wehrmacht) shows that in this direction (bypassing the Dubosekovo siding area) only PG Kelitsa was moving in the morning. And this document reflects the actions of the subgroups of Kelitsa and Hoppe specifically, and not BG 1 in general, as the ZhBD of the 2nd TD. And the actions of PG Hoppe miraculously disappear altogether. And this is about the PG, which at that time was the only one of all to crash into the main position of the defensive sector of the 1075th rifle regiment, which should have been the main event of BG 1. How so? And this could only have happened when in the evening, when filling out the ZhBD, all the reports of PG Hoppe were ignored. And only one entry was left, where both he and his PG miraculously teleported to Petelino.

Why, it has already been stated, and this happens everywhere. So, it was definitely the first battle, and the Germans did not pass, having received significant losses. Moreover, as it turned out, the platoon was the only unit that the German tanks could not pass the first time on 16.11.41/1/1073. Yes, the units of Kraev and Filimonov (2/231,5rd Rifle Regiment Momysh-Uly) also ultimately held their positions (Filimonov restored the previous position with a second attack). But there were almost no German tanks there (15.11.41 T-II tanks of the reconnaissance platoon) and that's it. True, it should be noted that their positions were imperfect and poorly prepared. Momysh-Uly received an order to occupy the area (Goryuny - Matryonino station - elevation XNUMX) on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. So they only had time, these were single cells and knee-deep trenches. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Germans squeezed Filimonov's company out of the station. Matryonino only with mortar fire. But the heroism of the Momysh-Ula fighters is beyond doubt.

Well, in the first attack (as mentioned above), the flank of the 4th company, from where the tanks attacked, was covered by a PT platoon. And given the direction of the attack, the platoon's positions were no longer a flank, but the first line of defense. And, naturally, in the offensive zone, without passing the platoon, the Germans were unable to reach other units of the 4th company. Well, the left flank (as an option) of Hoppe's PG in the area of ​​the gap in the trenches and embankment (1 km from Nelidovo) passed far from the front of the 4th company and then struck Petelino (at the 6th company of the 2/1075th Rifle Regiment). And therefore, the 4th company practically did not participate in the first battle.

The Germans, as we see (even if indirectly), confirm the first battle with their documents:

The first is that they must attack the positions of the 2/1075th Infantry Regiment on the left flank behind the railway tracks (PG Hoppe’s task); “…Hoppe’s subgroup attacks across the Lama River east of Nelidovo…”.

The second thing they attacked is the summary in 5 AK: “…By 8.00:XNUMX the railway was crossed near Nelidovo and to the east…”.

Thirdly, a rather suspiciously murky reflection in the BG-1 ZHBD shows how PG Hoppe ended up in Petelino.

Teutonic pride did not allow them to directly confirm the failure at the Dubosekovo junction, so it was better to remain silent. They did not even dare to lie about it, as in the case of the Matrenino station.

And the second battle also needs some clarification. There is a statement that the 4th company and the AT platoon were cleared by units of BG 3. Well, firstly, BG 3 was not supposed to be introduced into the battle on 16.11.41 to attack the prepared defense, but only to provide fire support (possibly a demonstrative deployment for an attack) and clear the area of ​​the enemy behind BG 2. And breaking through the prepared defense was in no way part of the task of BG 3. They were interested in living space in Nelidovo and B. Nikolskoye, they needed to take care of themselves. According to the order and the ZhBD, BG 3 only clears the area behind BG 2 (especially since BRO 2 is not in the zone of this group). Then (after the 2nd TD reaches the planned lines (task of the day)) BG 3 should replace BG 2 and prepare for the general offensive of the 4th TG on 18.11.41/3/17.11.41, being in the first echelon. The fact that BG 1 (XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX) then had to complete the division's task of the day is the merit of the Panfilovites. But here there is a very clear entry in the German documents confirming that this is the business of BG XNUMX.

ZhBD 2-y TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX

..(11.30) 10.30 Report from the 74th Artillery Regiment (AR74): The forward line of battle group 1 is on the edge of the forest 300 m north of Shiryaevo. There is an enemy in the forest. Patrols are reconnoitering the road.

Interim summary to the V Army Corps 16.11.41

(14.30) 13.30 Battle Group 1 is fighting the enemy, who is stubbornly defending himself on the forest edges south of the highway, along the line north of Shiryaevo - 1,5 km south of Petelinka. (interim report to the V Army Corps).

And it couldn't be any other way. The 4th company with the PT platoon prevented the advance of BG 1, and only them. A situation is created where, in order to continue the offensive of the 2nd TD, a regrouping of BG 1 (PG Hoppe) is necessary - the introduction of the second echelon. We rely on the entry in the BG 1 ZBD (extract from the order).

… - 1st goal: Chapel line (in the area of ​​height 231,5) – Petelinki (Petelino)….

Let's assume that this is the immediate task (and our AT platoon "plucked" the tank company of the first echelon). It is not possible to drag the column along the closest route (to the north) to Petelino (the AT platoon and the 4th company are in the way). And in order to continue the offensive, the second echelon with reserves has to bypass through Morozovo-Shiryaevo (castling to the long side). And the subsequent passage of the rear of BG 1 is also difficult. Therefore, as indicated earlier, castling to the long side, through Morozovo, Shiryaevo. With a subsequent new attack from B. Nikolskoye and Petelino to the north. Which began at about 13:00 (Moscow time), having conducted a new (more effective) fire preparation (on targets identified by fire impact), with the involvement of larger forces. And to solve the problem of advancing the rear of BG 1 later, almost simultaneously with the continuation of the offensive of the 2nd TD to the north, a second, repeated attack on the 4th company and the anti-tank platoon follows. And then, on the 5th company. And already with the second attack the Germans routed the 4th company with the anti-tank platoon, which was pinned down on all sides.

Well, we also need to sort out the reflection of the feat in the press. The assertion that the feat was fictitious based on the investigation by the Prosecutor General's Office does not correspond to the fact that the description of this feat was repeated many times by other correspondents, before Koroteev and Krivitsky. The conclusion of the Prosecutor General's Office is a worthless piece of paper. Legally, it is refuted immediately.

Correspondents who visited the 8th Guards Rifle Division at that time, as a rule, describe the same battle with approximately similar details. And why is the description of this particular battle (the anti-tank battle) particularly highlighted? Did everyone conspire? Or was there a real basis? And why was information about this particular battle poured into the journalists' ears in the first place? And by whom? And the result of the battle agrees with the reports of both battalion commissar Galushko and the military commissar of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (mentioned above).

And either good artillery could destroy the tanks, and it doesn't matter who is on the battlefield. Or anti-tank gunners with incendiaries, grenades and mines, already knocked out tanks, stalled in our positions. But in this case, the Germans should call off the attack and leave the battlefield. Yes, Chernyshov and Koroteyev (and then Krivitsky) exaggerated, and, most likely, included knocked out tanks in all the battles that Commissar Egorov told about. They already confused everything. But this still does not diminish the feat accomplished by Klochkov's men, they knocked out up to 9 tanks and burned three of them. And they are the only ones who immediately repelled the tank attack on November 16. The Germans, after breaking through our defense north of Petelino and B. Nikolskoye (and on the first try), quickly reached Rozhdestveno (BG 1 Hoppe). And the 2nd TD "stalled". So they were singled out.

Well, and as an argument against the unreliability, the debunkers cite the assertion that Gundilovich presented the names, taking information from some list or register. So this only confirms the veracity of the information. The only document that contains the full list of the platoon is the "Journal of Combat and Political Training", and the personal list of the platoon in the notebook of its commander (an informal document). The commander of the PT platoon, Junior Lieutenant Sherpatov, was wounded the day before, before 16.11.41. So the company commander did not have a document with a full list of the platoon. It must be remembered that the PT platoon is a non-staff and separate unit, and even if on rations, is assigned to the 4th company. Even if it was built on the basis of a regular platoon of the company (although it has already been shown that in the 2nd battalion the PT platoon was formed by selecting fighters from different companies). And therefore, simply using the "Book of registration of personnel of the unit (company)" is difficult and inconvenient (well, who knows). It is necessary to pull out names where a bunch of dropped outs, killed, and transfers within the company by units, changes in positions, etc. are noted. And the most convenient is, naturally, any statement, from a payroll to a soap distribution list. Here is the full list of the platoon.

In short, it would be advisable for geological-philosophical historians Alexander Statiev, Nikita Petrov and others like them to apologize. Refer to the lack of experience in working with the relevant documents and the inability to correctly perceive the relevant information in these documents. Well, that's better than remaining in the category of individuals clearly designated by Medinsky.

So, as was shown above, the actions of the Klochkovites, or rather, the feat, led to the following results:
- inflicted losses on the enemy in terms of men and equipment;
- delayed the enemy, forcing him to call off the attack, regroup and conduct new fire training, which significantly contributed to the 2nd TD not completing the task of the day.

I wanted to.

…receives the task on day X-2 to seize the heights at Rozhdestveno, Lyscovo, Golubtsovo, Avdotino. — (Division order 030 2nd TD)

Happened.

(19.00)17.00 Battle Group 1: Golubtsovo and Avdotino cannot be reached before dark. 2nd Rifle Brigade command post – Rozhdestveno
(ZhBD 2 TD)

- The Germans were initially forced to use reserves, which they planned to use later, into battle. Part of their forces, which were supposed to be used later, had to be thrown into battle much earlier.

- The loss of daylight did not allow the Germans to consolidate their position at Matrenino station, and were ultimately driven out by Filimonov's company of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment. And our units (tank company - 6 tanks of Senior Lieutenant Burda and a combined NKVD battalion) that arrived (to restore the situation) were used to solve other problems. And also units of the 690th Rifle Regiment and the remnants of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (3rd battalion) were able to organize a defense near the village of Shishkino. Naturally, this is the merit of not only the 2 platoons of the 4th company, but also the entire 1075th Rifle Regiment. And the entire 316th Rifle Division. And especially note the actions of the 1st battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (Senior Lieutenant Momysh-Uly), which did not let the Germans through their positions at all. Which forced the 2nd TD to pass the problem on to the 11th TD. Let the neighbors deal with the Momysh-Uly fighters, it's too expensive for us.

ZhBD 2 TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX

……On the eastern flank, south of the highway, there are still combat-ready units; to neutralize them, help from the neighbor on the right is required…
.
And the station Matrenino became the calmest place in the three-day confrontation of the 1st Battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment. No one left their positions without a fight. And yet, which battle was more significant, I repeat once again, was chosen by the commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division, the 1075th Rifle Regiment and specifically the 2nd Battalion. Moreover, already in a calm environment, and reported to the correspondent Krivitsky. And then, taking into account the level of self-sacrifice, 28 Panfilovites were chosen as the most distinguished. Rightfully taking their place in our pantheon of heroes. There was a FEAT at the Dubosekovo junction. The commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division knew about it and reported it to the correspondents. And the latter reported it to all our people. Which later became a symbol of the Battle of Moscow.

DOT.

Sources of
Reference-report of the Chief Military Prosecutor N. Afanasyev "On 28 Panfilov's Men" - GA RF. F. R-8131
Documents of the formations of the Red Army
Aerial photography
Wehrmacht documents 35 PD, 11 TD, 2 TD
A.Bek "Volokolamsk highway".
Melnikov's memories - political instructor Egordiev (Georgiev).
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  1. +11
    3 February 2025 05: 36
    The heroism and fortitude of Soviet soldiers stopped the advance of the fascists near Moscow. Including 28 Panfilovites. This is the reason for attempts to denigrate their feat.
    "There was a FEAT at the Dubosekovo junction. The commanders and political workers of the 8th Guards Rifle Division knew about it and reported it to the correspondents. And the latter reported it to all our people. Which later became the symbol of the Battle of Moscow."

    Well said!
    I am proud that two of my uncles were among Panfilov's men. They are buried near Kryukovo.
  2. BAI
    +2
    3 February 2025 06: 18
    In the early 70s, a front-line soldier was introduced on TV:
    One of the 4 surviving 28 Panfilov heroes Ivan Shadrins
  3. -3
    3 February 2025 07: 19
    The point of this article, what was it for? Now for every battle or event of the Great Patriotic War they will publish similar articles on the topic of believe or not believe?
    1. Fat
      +6
      3 February 2025 07: 40
      Quote from: mad-max78
      The point of this article, what was it for? Now for every battle or event of the Great Patriotic War they will publish similar articles on the topic of believe or not believe?

      "You guys are fucking amazing" (C)
      Establishing the truth is a very important matter. And the article is very good, and in the year of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Military District it is in the right place.
  4. +9
    3 February 2025 09: 35
    The author's desire to understand what happened is respectable. But what a difficult form of narration! This article is beyond the young man's capabilities. While you struggle through all the events, facts and logic of the story, you will lose all interest. So /as it seems to me personally/ the article is more than necessary and at the same time has little benefit. It is unlikely that it will be read and understood carefully. It is necessary to look for other, more accessible forms to convey the truth to the reader.
  5. +2
    3 February 2025 09: 44
    The statement that the platoon was not able to stop 50 enemy tanks is true. The entire 1075th Rifle Regiment was also not able to do this. But 50 tanks is an attack by the Germans, and on a regiment at that (while the 2th Rifle Regiment's battalion battalions were in the offensive zone of BG 1075). But in the second attack, there were even fewer attacking tanks on the 1075th Rifle Regiment.

    Behind the positions of Panfilov's division, about 10 kilometers away, was Katukov's brigade, and if there had been such a number of tanks, then Army Commander Rokossovsky would have given Katukov the order to counterattack, but he did not give such an order...
    1. 0
      3 February 2025 11: 33
      Quote: Konnick
      Behind the positions of Panfilov's division, about 10 kilometers away, was Katukov's brigade.

      In the upcoming offensive zone (on 16.11.41 at the Dovator group) three tank brigades from army reserves were concentrated (1st Guards Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade), this is from 100 to 130 tanks. Well, and probably (I did not specify) there was also reinforcement by army artillery, this is in addition to our own. And indeed, if the command of the 16th Army assessed the danger of the situation, it could have taken more active actions. Especially when the regrouping began (11.00-11.30 Moscow time). and the German columns in a roundabout way from Morozovo to Shtryaevo were moving to Peteleno (this already showed the intentions of the Germans). To carry out shelling of the column, and the deployment of up to 50 tanks by ours (even demonstratively) would have forced the 2nd TD to abandon the offensive on 16.11.41. And they would have waited until the 11th TD began to act, so that it would cover their flank. And this was not earlier than 17.11.41. But alas, it did not work out. The failures of the 58th TD are visible, which unsuccessfully attacked the Germans (to the right of the 316th SD, completely took the attention of the command of the 16th Army.
      1. +1
        3 February 2025 13: 35
        Quote: chenia
        The failures of the 58th TD are visible, which unsuccessfully attacked the Germans (to the right of the 316th SD, completely absorbing the attention of the 16th Army command.
        Well, it depends. It could be the other way around. Something like this: "... the failure of the 58th TD forced the command of the 16th Army to pay attention to other directions, where the Germans, inspired by the failure of the Russian 58th TD, could try to break through with a large number of tanks."
  6. +1
    3 February 2025 10: 16
    Those who like to throw dirt at heroes (under the guise of fighting for truthfulness) are not a new category. And I do not intend to delve into the reasons for their attitude to the history of their country. And Medinsky has clearly characterized them, there is nothing to add.


    Am I imagining it? Medinsky is being presented as a defender of history?
    1. Fat
      +2
      3 February 2025 11: 07
      It didn't seem so. I also think that Medinsky does a lot to protect Russian and Soviet history, especially military history, from various falsifiers and revisionists. An excellent journalist, Meditsinsky is far from being a communist, but this, forgive me, is already a matter of taste and political preferences. It is Medinsky's own views that are being criticized - his conviction in the need for a positive interpretation of Russian history and his readiness to interpret discrepancies in sources in favor of national interests.
      1. +1
        3 February 2025 11: 45
        It didn't seem so. I also think that Medinsky does a lot to protect Russian and Soviet history, especially military history, from all sorts of falsifiers and revisionists.


        Are you serious? Did I hear right? Scumbag Medinsky is defending Soviet history?
        1. Fat
          +1
          3 February 2025 11: 57
          I didn't shout. Italian "historians" call Medinsky a Stalinist and a homophobe. Do you have any compelling arguments to say that this is not so?
          Don't try to troll me with "rhetorical" questions. Just provide undeniable facts to support your words about Medinsky's "filthiness".
          1. +2
            3 February 2025 12: 16
            I didn't shout. Italian "historians" call Medinsky a Stalinist and a homophobe. Do you have any compelling arguments to say that this is not so?
            Don't try to troll me with "rhetorical" questions. Just provide undeniable facts to support your words about Medinsky's "filthiness".


            What are you saying? Not trying to "troll with rhetorical questions" is like not providing indisputable facts? lol
            But the appearance of such films as the series "Fighters", "Indestructible", in the department of this figure, is this like a defense of Soviet history?
      2. +1
        4 February 2025 08: 38
        Excellent journalist Medical
        And where did he demonstrate such qualities? At the opening of the memorial plaque to Mannerheim?
        1. Fat
          -2
          4 February 2025 09: 21
          Greetings. The memorial plaque to Mannerheim was installed on the initiative of the Russian Military Historical Society. The board of trustees was then headed by Rogozin. He who dines with the girl, dances with her. Medinsky, as the chairman of the Russian Military Historical Society, allowed himself to be convinced and this is his only "main" fault.
          Sincerely hi
          1. +1
            4 February 2025 18: 48
            He could have refused, so as not to get dirty. But he didn't refuse, hence the corresponding attitude towards him.
    2. +1
      3 February 2025 11: 35
      Quote: vovochkarzhevsky
      Medinsky is being presented as a defender of history?

      No, as a person who defined the term (M.R.A.Z.I.), for a certain category of people. And that's all.
      1. +1
        3 February 2025 11: 54

        No, as a person who defined the term (M.R.A.Z.I.), for a certain category of people. And that's all.


        First of all, he himself falls into this category.
        Here is one of his chicks.
  7. +1
    3 February 2025 10: 34
    There was a FEAT at the Dubosekovo junction.
    There were no doubts and there still are none.
    1. 0
      4 February 2025 08: 40
      There were no doubts and there still are none.
      This is for one generation. And there is another - the Kol generation from Urengoy. They are the ones who are brainwashed.
      1. +1
        4 February 2025 12: 31
        hi And apparently, Kolya from Urengoy gave me a minus smile
  8. 0
    3 February 2025 11: 03
    Quote from: mad-max78
    The point of this article, what was it for? Now for every battle or event of the Great Patriotic War they will publish similar articles on the topic of believe or not believe?

    In my opinion, if all your articles about the heroism of that time were even half true, then by September the Germans would have lost all their equipment and would be packing their suitcases to send to Berlin. However... history shows otherwise.
    If each of your units had performed as successfully as the 41st Rifle Division did between June 22 and 26, you would have been doing a little better.
  9. +2
    3 February 2025 11: 07
    Quote: Thick
    Quote from: mad-max78
    The point of this article, what was it for? Now for every battle or event of the Great Patriotic War they will publish similar articles on the topic of believe or not believe?

    "You guys are fucking amazing" (C)
    Establishing the truth is a very important matter. And the article is very good, and in the year of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Military District it is in the right place.

    Did I understand you correctly that now all the heroic events in which the USSR participated during the Great Patriotic War need to be checked for the veracity of the events? Then as a result it may turn out that these heroic events are confirmed and these events are heroic whistles and not heroism, is this the truth you need?
    This is exactly what Ukraine has been doing since 2014, under the pretext that it is all historical propaganda, it has completely revised all the events of the Great Patriotic War, as a result of which it turned out that in their opinion there were not really any heroic events there, and those heroes who were traitors in the Soviet period became heroes. With such an approach, history can be rewritten endlessly.
    1. Fat
      +3
      3 February 2025 12: 13
      You misunderstood because you didn't read the article, or read it every other paragraph. The article is directed against historical revisionists. And the conclusions you outlined are more likely to be characteristic of Ukrainian specialists.
      in the field of struggle against the Russian and Soviet past of Ukraine
      Ukraine has been denigrating Russia since 1991, not 2014
  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. +2
    3 February 2025 11: 23
    It turns out that the competent authorities had known about Dobrobabin for a long time and, as I understand it, advised him (for certain reasons) to keep a low profile, which is what the latter did. He continued to fight and managed to become a Knight of the Order of Glory. After the war, he made no attempt to receive an award for that battle.

    I made such an attempt during the war.
    In August 1944, he accidentally learned from a letter from his brother that he had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and soon submitted a report to the division’s political department on the issuance of the awards due to him.

    And after the war in 1949
    stripped of the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
    1. 0
      3 February 2025 12: 13
      Quote from solar
      I made such an attempt during the war.
      In August 1944, he accidentally learned from a letter from his brother that he had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and soon submitted a report to the division’s political department on the issuance of the awards due to him.

      Strange. From the article.
      TO THE CHIEF OF THE MAIN DEPARTMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SMERSH

      SPECIAL MESSAGE

      In December 1944, in the 5th rifle regiment of the 297th rifle division, which was part of the front, we identified one of the 28 Panfilov heroes, Sergeant Dobrobabin Ivan Evstafievich, born in 1913, native of the village of Perekop, Valkovsky district, Kharkov region, Ukrainian, non-party member, 3rd grade education, who was still alive. From Dobrobabin's report, a conversation with him by an operative worker and his stories, it became known that on November 16, 1941, on the instructions of political instructor Klochkov, leading, as a squad commander, one of the groups of fighters among the 28 Panfilov men, he accepted the battle with the Germans.

      SMERSH works somehow slowly. Well, and the article says that he was offered 9 apparently asked certain questions..
      I submitted it in August and they asked in December.
      1. +2
        3 February 2025 12: 27
        The political department would probably have sent a request for an award to the top in advance based on his report (few people would write anything in a report); there were no computers before, and the correspondence took quite a long time.
        And when they received the answer, they reported it to SMERSH. And the case was not unique - the man was considered dead, but he turned out to be alive. Not such a novelty in war. SMERSH checked whether he really was this man or someone was hiding behind the identity of the deceased.
        1. 0
          3 February 2025 12: 57
          Quote from solar
          SMERSH checked whether this person was real or someone was using the deceased's identity as a cover.

          It's interesting why Shadrin (who was captured in that battle and freed by the Americans) was given the GSS in 1947, while Dobrobabin didn't even show up. And at the end of the year, he was arrested and presented as a Panfilov survivor who had been accidentally discovered, with a book about himself. As if nothing had happened before. Strange.
          1. +3
            3 February 2025 13: 09
            It was as if nothing had happened before. Strange.

            This is understandable. In 1944, they conducted an investigation to see if he was who he claimed to be and that was it. There was a war going on, no time for that.
            But Shadrin was checked after the war, and accordingly they treated him differently. There were no computer databases back then to consolidate information into a single whole. When Dobrobabin surfaced after the war on a completely different matter, then they ordered an inspection by the military prosecutor's office.
            The fact that Dobrobabin did not apply for an award after the war is also understandable - after the war there were massive trials of policemen, and he understood what this could threaten him with.
            1. -1
              4 February 2025 00: 47
              The fact that Dobrobabin did not apply for an award after the war
              Apparently he did, since the award was presented to him.
              Maybe if he hadn't applied, his service in the police wouldn't have been revealed.
              1. +1
                4 February 2025 01: 29
                It is not entirely clear when he received it. He applied in 1944, and after the war he also tried to obtain official Hero status, but after the war, when checking his application, his service in the police came up. Are you sure that he received the award? Somehow, I couldn't find anything about it anywhere.
                1. -1
                  4 February 2025 18: 41
                  Reference-report of the Chief Military Prosecutor N. Afanasyev "On the 28 Panfilovites"
                  Of the living, who were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title.

                  1) Dobrobabin - awarded
                  1. +1
                    4 February 2025 20: 04
                    Quote: Lewww
                    Reference report of the Chief Military Prosecutor N. Afanasyev

                    A filthy literacy. And in the article he wrote that a click is enough for the conclusion to fall apart. It does not correspond to reality.
                    1. -1
                      4 February 2025 20: 07
                      Filkina letter.
                      Well, as I stated earlier:

                      Your entire version is based ONLY ON YOUR INVENTIONS, and the stories of people from the 1075th Rifle Regiment, who declare themselves to have taken part in the battle and conscientiously retell Krivitsky’s article.
                      And also on those who do not declare themselves participants, but also assure that this fight definitely took place laughing

                      And you simply brush away inconvenient documents like annoying flies.
                2. 0
                  4 February 2025 20: 01
                  Quote from solar
                  and after the war he also tried to obtain the official status of Hero,

                  And where did you get this information from, I don't know about it. The fact that later (in the 60s) they wanted to rehabilitate him, it happened. But it didn't work out.
          2. +1
            3 February 2025 13: 23
            The military prosecutor's office inspection was not the only one. There were others.
            In August 1942, the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Kalinin Front conducted an investigation into Illarion Romanovich VASILIEV, Grigory Melentyevich SHEMYAKIN and Ivan Demidovich SHADRIN, who were candidates for an award and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union as participants in the heroic battle of 28 Panfilov Guardsmen with German tanks. At the same time, an investigation into this battle was conducted by the senior instructor of the 4th department of GlavPURKKA, senior battalion commissar MININ, who in August 1942 reported to the Chief of the Organizational Inspectorate Department of GlavPURKKA, divisional commissar comrade PRONIN...
            1. +1
              3 February 2025 17: 02
              Quote from solar
              SHADRIN Ivan Demidovich, who applied for the award and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union,

              Your link is murky. Shadrin will be in German captivity for another 2,5 years, and he is laying claim to the GSS?
              1. +3
                3 February 2025 17: 21
                You have too narrow an understanding of "claims". Applicants do not write applications to receive the State Social Insurance Fund.
                As for the inspection, there were grounds for it.
                In May 1942, the Special Department of the Western Front arrested for voluntary surrender to the Germans a Red Army soldier from the 4th company of the 2nd battalion of the 1075th rifle regiment of the 8th Guards Panfilov Division, KUZHEBERGENOV Daniil Aleksandrovich, who during the first interrogations revealed that he was the same KUZHEBERGENOV Daniil Aleksandrovich, who is considered to have died among the 28 Panfilov heroes.

                It turned out later that he had not participated in the battle. Instead, another Kuzhebergenov was added to the already prepared list of Heroes, who was not even on the lists of the 4th and 5th companies (he had not even been called up at the time of the battle). After that, the special department of the Western Front checked several more people.
                1. +2
                  4 February 2025 00: 07
                  After this, the special department of the Western Front checked several more people.
                  as far as I remember, of the 28 people listed as participants in the newspaper fight and killed and buried in the grave near Nelidovo, in this fight 7 people did not die, and two more died 2 days before the battle.
                  There was chaos in the regiment considering the number of dead
                  1. +3
                    4 February 2025 01: 31
                    One of the 28 who received the title of Hero, at the time of the battle he had not even been drafted into the army.
                    1. +1
                      4 February 2025 18: 42
                      I know - I've been studying the circumstances of the battle of 2/16.11.41/XNUMX for XNUMX years now.
                    2. +1
                      4 February 2025 20: 10
                      Quote from solar
                      One of the 28 who received the title of Hero had not even been drafted into the army at the time of the battle.

                      Bureaucratic insanity. Replaced Kuzhebergenov. By the way, he participated in the battle, but he was stupid, he admitted that he was a prisoner. Ah, everything was fine. He received a hero's title together with Vasiliev and Shimyakin.
                      1. +2
                        5 February 2025 11: 35
                        This is not bureaucratic insanity, but myth-making. "Sort it out properly and reward whoever." Kuzhebergenov was a liaison and, according to his testimony, he was sent to headquarters with a report on the day of the battle.
                      2. +1
                        5 February 2025 20: 02
                        Quote from solar
                        Kuzhebergenov was a liaison officer and, according to his testimony, on the day of the battle he was sent with a report to headquarters.

                        Where? To Mekhlis? Only to Petelino to the battalion commissar, and no further. And he was captured not there, but near Nelidovo. NOT OKAY.. By the way, he is not a platoon fighter, and was with Klochkov in the first battle. And only later (after the first battle) could he be sent with a report. But where? Petelino under the Germans. OPS. He was "persuaded" so to speak. He did not admit that he was captured (well, he could have), he would have been a hero.
                      3. +1
                        5 February 2025 20: 48
                        You so easily manipulate a hodgepodge of assumptions, passing them off as fact. Just your transformation of Diev into Klochkov is worth something!
                        Daniil Kozhubergenov was a liaison for the 4th Company political instructor Vasily Klochkov. He did not participate in the battle in question, because at the very beginning he was sent by Klochkov with a report to the regiment headquarters (1,5 km from the front line). He was there until the German tanks broke through, after which he surrendered. But he did not stay there long, according to his further explanations, 7 hours. In the complete confusion of the battle, the prisoners were practically unguarded, and, seizing the moment, Daniil fled into the nearest forest. A few weeks later, he was discovered by General Dovator's cavalrymen, who were raiding the German rear. In the special department of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, he was interrogated and sent back to duty.
                      4. +1
                        5 February 2025 21: 06
                        Quote from solar
                        Your transformation of Diev into Klochkov alone is worth something!

                        In order to understand. You need to know the details of the battle at Mykanino and Dubosekovo. And read the transcript of Sergeant Melnikov, and that's it! If you have gray matter in your head, you'll understand right away.
                        Quote from solar
                        A few weeks later he was discovered by General Dovator's cavalrymen,

                        The nearest forest, Yes, two companies went out through the trenches, 3 km. (where Kaprov with the command post and the remnants of the companies of the 1st battalion went) Matrenino station. And they got there. Three weeks? Again, you are suggesting something murky.
                      5. +1
                        5 February 2025 22: 18
                        And read the transcript of Sergeant Melnikov, and that’s it!

                        Which one did you finish writing?
                        recounting the battle (transcript), he calls Georgiev Egor Diev (printed as a surname - Yegordiyev, and corrected to Georgiev)

                        In fact, the typist mistakenly types Melnikov’s surname Georgiev as Yegordiyev (which is immediately corrected).
                      6. +1
                        5 February 2025 23: 31
                        Quote from solar
                        In fact, the typist mistakenly types Melnikov’s surname Georgiev as Yegordiyev (which is immediately corrected).

                        Were you present? She herself changed the CORRECT toponym Mykanino to the INCORRECT Matrenino?
                        Well, even if, as you say, the typist two meters away from Melnikov perceived Georgiev as Yegordieva DOESN'T SUGGEST ANYTHING TO YOU, NO?
                        A. I imagine a platoon in the dark (16.30 sunset), Logvinenko imagines two commanders - Ugryumy and Georgiev. Once and that's it, and in 13-15 hours they will die. Melnikov could have been in the ranks, perceived the name Georgiev as the name Yegor with the surname Diev. And then, after the battle, declare Diev. And for some time it held out (but managed to get into the newspapers), until they sorted it out. And you just rearrange the political instructors in the described battles - Dieev at Mykanino, Kolachev at Dubosekovo. And the puzzle is all assembled. What, you didn't guess?
                      7. +1
                        6 February 2025 09: 27
                        Were you present?

                        You definitely weren't there, but you imagined a whole mountain.
                  2. +1
                    4 February 2025 20: 06
                    Quote: Lewww
                    7 people did not die in this battle, and two more died 2 days before the battle.

                    I have already written several times, and the article notes: At Krivitsky’s request, the platoon was pulled up to 28 people, and Gundilovich included those who distinguished themselves, not in battle, on 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
                    1. +2
                      4 February 2025 20: 09
                      At Krivitsky's request, the platoon was pulled up to 28 people
                      Well, yes - they had to somehow try to tie the fairy tale to living people, so they tied it in haste.
                      The end result was nonsense. laughing
  12. +2
    3 February 2025 11: 58
    I would like to highlight the following points.
    first - the most truthful reflection is in the article by Ivanov 19.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, where the actions are highlighted anti-tank on the common field. Well, the German losses are more plausible.
    Second- thanks to Chernyshev's article, we will find out where it comes from DIEV. He described two battles near Mykanino and one near Dubosekovo. Where the political officers were mixed up (it is unclear who did this, the journalists Chernyshev and Koroteyev, or the commissar Yegorov). There should be one near Dubosekovo. Kolachev (Klochkov) at Mykanino Diev (Giorgiev). Under the article there is a document, a transcript of the stenogram of Col. Melnikov from November 1942. Where he describes the history of the anti-tank platoon of the 2nd battalion of the 1073rd rifle regiment, and names junior political instructor Georgiev as EGOR DIEVWhy and how this was described in the article. And this completely explains why the political officers were confused.
    And already in the second article Krivitsky got out of it.
  13. +1
    3 February 2025 12: 44
    Also, it is important to pay attention to the second Krivitsky's article. THERE:
    First - there are no 58 tanks. And the first attack is -20 tanks (which is approximately correct, taking into account the control tankettes and artillery observers. In the second attack, 30 tanks. Well, by the second attack, it was possible to see all 80 tanks (the article describes what kind of tanks they are), directly in the attack also took part no more than 20. But in battle, tunnel vision. and tactical myopia (there is no way to see what is kilometers around, you can imagine that all the surrounding tanks rushed at you at the same time. But at the same time, Krivitsky limits himself to 30.
    Well, what losses.
    No longer a dozen and a half twisted monsters, as it was in the first article, but simply frozen tanks (well, Krivitsky does what he can to avoid going overboard, but there was also a correspondence with the first article. Well, and ultimately, Up to ten tanks were damaged and destroyed.You just have to read the second article carefully. And there you can see how Krivitsky is twisting to reduce losses. The troops already told him this.
    And then the second article already begins to correspond with both the documents (Galushko and the war correspondent) and Ivanov’s article.
  14. -1
    3 February 2025 16: 35
    Dobrobabin's testimony in 1947 could have been exactly what the investigators needed. The methods of obtaining testimony were such that the defendants wrote obvious lies, since the alternative was death.
  15. +4
    3 February 2025 23: 55
    The first publication about the feat appeared on November 19, 1941, just two days after the events at the Dubosekovo junction.
    The author decided to fill the resource with his fiction.
    The author has one invention riding on top of another, and a third invention driving it along.

    The first article, which included the name "Dubosekovo Junction" and the names of the participants in the battle, was published on January 22, 1942.
    Before this, there was not a single publication from which it was clear that it was the battle that was described that took place on 16.11.41 in the area of ​​Dubosekovo.
    And in the division, no one had heard about this battle before Krivitsky’s publication.
    How the legend of the 28 Panfilov heroes was created in the Soviet press can be read here
    https://topwar.ru/210027-kak-v-sovetskoj-presse-sozdavalas-legenda-o-28-gerojah-panfilovcah.html

    I didn’t read any further; again, it was just pure fantasy and constant distortion of the texts of various documents.

    As for the information about the losses that the 1075th Rifle Regiment inflicted on the enemy in tanks, I have already provided it earlier - on 16.11.41/316/XNUMX, according to the data of the headquarters of the XNUMXth Rifle Division, the Kaprva Regiment did NOT inflict any losses on the Germans in tanks.
    During 3 days of fighting on November 16, 17 and 18, the losses inflicted on the enemy were THREE tanks in the battle on November 18 near the village of Gusenevo
    So let the believers believe
    1. 0
      4 February 2025 16: 45
      During 3 days of fighting on November 16, 17 and 18, the losses inflicted on the enemy were THREE tanks in the battle on November 18 near the village of Gusenevo
      Sorry, I made a mistake - FOUR tanks
    2. -1
      4 February 2025 20: 15
      Quote: Lewww
      The author has one invention riding on top of another, and a third invention driving it along.

      If you don't have enough brains to compare the articles of Ivanov, Chernyshev and Koroteev, and not see their similarities (regarding the battle at Dubosekovo), then that's your problem. But for some reason you identify Ivanov's article with the battle of a month ago. Why not the Battle of Kulikovo. Eh, researcher?
      1. +1
        4 February 2025 20: 18
        If you don't have enough brains to compare the articles of Ivanov, Chernyshev and Koroteev, and not see their similarities
        Gunner, spare me the discussion of your fantasies.
        There is not a single word in their articles that would allow one to know the EXACT DATE of the BATTLE and the PLACE of the BATTLE described in the article.

        Step on the throat of your wild imagination
        1. -1
          5 February 2025 20: 16
          Quote: Lewww
          There is not a single word in their articles that would allow one to know the EXACT DATE of the BATTLE and the PLACE of the BATTLE described in the article.

          Researcher and Anonymous, "not everyone can see". In Ivanov's article about Kaprov's regiment, ANTI-TANKERS are highlighted, and the plot is similar to the subsequent articles. In Chernyshev's article describing two battles, the names of political instructors are Kolachev (Klochkov, after all) and Diev (Georgiyev). Knowing the details of the battles at the still unknown Mykanino and Dubosekovo) one can understand (well, this is not for you) that the names of the political instructors are mixed up. And in 1942, Sergeant Melnikov will call the political instructor with whom he fought at Mykanino, Yegor Diev. So, in these articles, if you think about it (well, this does not concern you), you can understand what they are talking about. Boring LEFF, your arguments are bullshit and BLA-BLAH-BLAH.
          1. +1
            5 February 2025 20: 17
            Gunner, don't write to me anymore - I don't hold discussions with science fiction writers.
    3. 0
      4 February 2025 20: 26
      Quote: Lewww
      During 3 days of fighting on November 16, 17 and 18, the losses inflicted on the enemy were THREE tanks in the battle on November 18 near the village of Gusenevo

      At Gusenevo they were knocked out, and destroyed in three days. Why did you cut it so cleverly? And below it is written by artillerymen 8 were shot down, 4 of them were burned , i.e. shot down and destroyed are counted under different columns.. I already caught you red-handed, and you're cheating again. HEH, you don't change.
      1. 0
        4 February 2025 21: 02
        Gunner, I see no point in discussing your demagogic fantasies.
        I gave a fragment of the report document of the 316th SD, wrote down the document number, the information is provided there ABOUT TOTAL LOSSES INJURED TO THE ENEMY

        And how you personally explain the TRUE MEANING of the document’s content, which seems to you, is of no interest to me.
        By the way, you again distorted the contents of the document - it says that infantry destroyed, and the information about tanks is given without explanation (knocked out or burned), just the number 4 separated by a comma after the infantry destroyed
        This DB does not use the phrase "destroyed tanks" at all.
        1. 0
          5 February 2025 20: 31
          Quote: Lewww
          By the way, you have again distorted the contents of the document - it says that the infantry was destroyed, but the information about tanks is given without explanation (knocked out or burned), just the number 4 after the infantry destroyed, separated by a comma.

          It is you who are lying - in the document-"...destroyed to 1200, (ZPT) four tanks.... Well, how do you speak Russian (or is it not your native language?) That four tanks -without a word - "destroyed"? LEFF, I know your tricks, you're fooling someone else.
          And who constantly lies.
          1. 0
            5 February 2025 20: 35
            Gunner, once again: I am not having a discussion with science fiction writers - don't write to me anymore
            1. 0
              8 February 2025 23: 21
              Well, 4 years ago, German losses in people were more or less established, there weren’t many of them and tanks, apparently, were only destroyed near Petelino https://mordig81.livejournal.com/158319.html
  16. +1
    4 February 2025 00: 18
    Quote: Lewww
    And in the division, no one had heard about this battle before Krivitsky’s publication.

    and not only in the division, even the commander of the 1941th sr. Gundilovich, who was occupying the defensive position at the Dubosekovo raz, knew nothing about this battle in 4.
    And the regiment commander Kaprov did not hear anything, which he testified about to the military prosecutor’s office:
    ...There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo junction on November 15, 1941 - this is a complete fabrication.


    The author stubbornly writes thousands of words, trying to defend the historicity of one of the myths created by Soviet propaganda, which serious military historians have long since recognized as fiction, by piling up fantasies.
    1. 0
      4 February 2025 20: 31
      Quote: Lewww
      Even the commander of the defensive position at Dubosekovo 4th Sr. Gundilovich knew nothing.

      Will you present the document? Well, as always. Stained.
      Quote: Lewww
      And the regiment commander Kaprov did not hear anything, which he testified about to the military prosecutor’s office:

      So, he poured shit on the prosecutor's office. The company fought heroically. The prosecutor's office is the place where they can convince.
      Krivitsky, why the hell did he stupidly inject himself (although he's a good guy, some of his confessions later put the prosecutor's office in a stupid position). And then his confession about Kalyma (inspiring).
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. +1
        5 February 2025 11: 39
        Kaprov was removed from command of the regiment following the battle. He was more interested than anyone else in showing the actions of his subordinates in a heroic light.
        1. 0
          5 February 2025 20: 33
          Quote from solar
          Kaprov was removed from command of the regiment following the battle. He was more interested than anyone else in showing the actions of his subordinates in a heroic light.

          For a couple of hours, that's all. You should read Ivanov's article and Krivitsky's second article. Maybe you'll understand something, or maybe you'll be unlucky.
          1. +1
            5 February 2025 21: 17
            They returned it only after the division left the fighting and went to be re-equipped - read Minin's report.
            Or they could have sent him to a tribunal - it was easy as pie then. But who would send the commander of the Panfilov regiment of heroes to a tribunal?
      3. 0
        5 February 2025 21: 03
        The prosecutor's office is the place where they can convince.

        The fact that the article was a fabrication by Krivitsky, and that no one had reported such a battle, was already known in 1942, without any prosecutor’s office.
        The inspection of this battle was carried out by the senior instructor of the 4th department of GlavPURKKA, senior battalion commissar MININ, who in August 1942 reported to the Chief of the Organizational Inspectorate Department of GlavPURKKA, divisional commissar comrade PRONIN:

        The 4th company of the 1075th Infantry Regiment, in which 28 Panfilov Heroes were born, occupied the defense of Nelidovo-Dubosekovo-Petelino.
        On November 16, 1941, the enemy, having forestalled the offensive of our units, around 8 o'clock in the morning, with large forces of tanks and infantry, went over to the offensive.
        As a result of battles under the influence of superior enemy forces 1075, the rifle regiment suffered heavy losses and moved to a new defensive line.
        For this retreat of the regiment, the regiment commander KAPROV and military commissar MUKHOMEDYAROV were removed from their positions and reinstated after the division withdrew from the fighting and was on rest and replenishment.
        No one knew about the feat of the 28 either during the battle or immediately after the battle, and it was not popularized among the masses.
        The legend about the 28 heroes who fought heroically and died began with the article by O. OGNEV /"Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" from 2.4.42/, and then with the articles by KRIVITSKY and others."
        1. 0
          5 February 2025 22: 31
          Quote from solar
          The legend about the 28 heroes who fought heroically and died began with the article by O. OGNEV /"Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" from 2.4.42/, and then with the articles by KRIVITSKY and others."

          Again a murky link, where do you get them?
          began article by O. OGNEV / "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" from 2.4.42/, and then by articles by KRIVITSKY and others."
          Ivanov-19.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
          Chernyshev - 27.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
          Krivitsky -28. 11.41.
          Krivitsky (second article with names) - 22.01.42/XNUMX/XNUMX
          And all this THEN, after 2.4.42?????
          They are already preparing documents for the heroes, and then it turns out that "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" intervened. Wow, they are talking about a time machine.
          What kind of trash are you getting this information from? Second time.
          1. +1
            6 February 2025 09: 29
            Again a murky link, where do you get them?

            You are simply unfamiliar with the material about which you are already writing another article.
            1. 0
              14 February 2025 19: 11
              Quote from solar
              You are simply unfamiliar with the material about which you are already writing another article.

              A. I said in the article that "The conclusion of the GVP" is a worthless piece of paper. Stupid. Zhukov's lying setup. They didn't even select witnesses, and the documents were falsified. And even stupidly drawn up. They were obviously in a hurry.
      4. +1
        7 February 2025 13: 17
        This is how they falsify. See above from LEFF
        ...There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo junction on November 15, 1941 - this is a complete fabrication.
        And the cut. And here is the continuation-
        Kaprov-
        “On this day, at the Dubosekovo junction, the 2th company fought with German tanks as part of the 4nd battalion, and it really fought heroically. More than 100 people perished from the company, and not 28, as they wrote in the newspapers. "

        Kaprov was insistently asked by the prosecutor's office not to mention the platoon, but he cleverly got around it. And Gundilovich could have known how the platoon fought as part of a company, which he told Krivitsky about. The prosecutor's office never understood that confirmation of the battle at Dubosekovo, from Kaprov, occurred...
  17. +2
    4 February 2025 00: 37
    Quote from: mad-max78
    Did I understand you correctly that now all the heroic events in which the USSR participated during the Great Patriotic War need to be checked for the veracity of the events? Then as a result it may turn out that these heroic events are confirmed and these events are heroic whistles and not heroism, is this the truth you need?
    What's the problem? What's wrong with the fact that it will finally be reliably established that such and such events are truly heroic deeds, while such and such are just artistic whistling? Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the process, previously unknown heroic deeds of our soldiers and officers may be revealed, which for some reason were kept silent or unknown at the time. Is that bad?
    Why did you bring Ukraine into this? What does Ukraine have to do with it?
    1. +3
      4 February 2025 01: 49
      Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the process, previously unknown heroic deeds of our soldiers and officers may be revealed, which for some reason were kept silent or unknown at the time. Is that bad?

      Against the background of the story of Panfilov's men, the story of the real battle of Lieutenant Pyotr Shironin was almost lost. 25 people were awarded the title of Hero in the summer of 1943. But the general public was practically unaware of this story of the battle with German armored vehicles, unlike the story of Panfilov's men, and even now it is not very well known against the background of the story of Panfilov's men, despite Bykov's film based on the story of Shironin's men's battle.
    2. +1
      4 February 2025 20: 48
      Quote: Seal
      Moreover, one cannot rule out the possibility that previously unknown heroic deeds of our soldiers and officers may be revealed in the process.

      I touched on this very topic there. Ugryumov came to the location of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (near Mykanino) with a detachment (and this was a former reconnaissance battalion platoon converted by Panfilov into the first tank destroyer. The platoon was going from Shishkino to Momysh-Uly. Then Panfilov redirected it to Yadrovo. (There is this moment in Beck's book). Ugryumov traveled around the units, trained and instructed the created tank destroyer platoons. Near Mykanino, he headed the tank destroyer platoon of the 2nd battalion of the 2/1073rd Rifle Regiment, and junior political instructor Georgiev was also added. Sergeant Melnikov has a moment in his transcript (1942) where he says: " There (near Mykanino) we met our scouts" - and that's it. Two AT platoons met there (the first divisional, the second 2/1073 SP), and here's the question: it looks like all the scouts died, and three were counted from the battalion's AT platoon. And only our own from the 1073 SP were noted, and Georgiev was noted, almost as the main commander. And what happened to the divisional AT platoon (conditional name)?
  18. 0
    4 February 2025 12: 49
    Quote from solar
    Against the backdrop of the story of Panfilov's men, the story of the real battle of Lieutenant Pyotr Shironin was almost lost.
    But even earlier, the battle of the Kuban Cossacks of the 37th Armavir Cavalry Regiment of the 50th Cavalry Division of the Dovator Cavalry Group near the village of Gryada was lost.
    https://dzen.ru/a/ZArGEISSl3Hzc_Hr?ysclid=m6qao6cpy1552630184

    The entire squadron was killed, the tanks did not let us through, O. was awarded.
    1. +1
      5 February 2025 21: 48
      I think such reports should be verified by historians in purely scientific articles. Your link also contains a link to another version of the battle from Armavir historians-compatriots.
      Researcher Nikolai Eremichev, in his article published in 2010, “The 4th Squadron Was Completely Eliminated…” concluded that the squadron fought alone, with a pair of Degtyarev light machine guns, carbines, daggers and sabers, as well as bottles of Molotov cocktails.

      — In our article, we use information from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, according to which, in the battle near Fedyukovo, Soviet cavalrymen, well equipped with anti-tank weapons such as anti-tank rifles, were supported by the fire of the vehicles of the 23rd Tank Brigade. Also, General Dovator's cavalry group (50th and 53rd cavalry divisions) had other means of reinforcement: mortars, anti-tank guns, rocket artillery installations, and even one armored train — says Konstantin Skiba.

      Konstantin Skiba and Vyacheslav Slavko also found evidence of this in German archives. The combat log of the German 46th Tank Corps describes this battle as follows: "... the enemy is defending very tenaciously at Fedyukovo, also with the support of tanks... November 19. The 11th Tank Division attacks Fedyukovo, occupied by a strong enemy with tanks. After taking the village of Sheludkovo, located to the south of it, at 12.00:XNUMX our weak forces broke through to Fedyukovo, but were thrown back by enemy tanks..."
      Source: https://news-armavir.ru/2022/02/14/armavirskiy-istorik-vosstanovil-khod-boya-kazakov-pod-derevney-fedyukovo-v-podmoskove
  19. +1
    4 February 2025 13: 01
    Quote: chenia
    In the upcoming offensive zone (on 16.11.41 at the Dovator group) three tank brigades from the army reserves were concentrated (1st Guards Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade), that is from 100 to 130 tanks.
    Gunner, I'm even curious: can you at least occasionally refrain from fantasizing and see what is written in the documents?
    What the hell 100-130 tanks, from Okudova? belay

    According to the reports of the brigades on November 16.11, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade had 12 tanks, the 27th Tank Brigade had 1 T-34 and either 6 or 8 T-60 (different documents state differently).
    I don’t know exactly how many tanks there were in the 23rd Tank Brigade, but based on the data that the brigade did not participate in battles from November 16-19.11, I can assume that there was not a single combat-ready one.
    This is a "tank fist" laughing

    And then various weirdos write on the Internet: why didn’t Rokossovsky send in tanks on November 16.11 to set up a tank shield and stop the advance of the 2nd TD?
    So what if he had abandoned them? He would have lost his last tanks, just as he later lost a bunch of tanks during the offensive that began on November 16.11.

    Everyone thinks of themselves as strategists while sitting on a plush sofa
    1. 0
      4 February 2025 20: 52
      Quote: Lewww
      I don’t know exactly how many tanks there were in the 23rd Tank Brigade, but based on the data that the brigade did not participate in battles from November 16-19.11, I can assume that there was not a single combat-ready one.
      This is a "tank fist"

      You. to me? It was the command of the 16th Army that allocated the means for the offensive. And it knows better what was there. After all, I, in order to get to the plush sofa, at least wore boots and a sword belt. Ah, you never got off it.
      1. 0
        4 February 2025 20: 59
        It was the 16th Army command that allocated the resources for the offensive. And it knows better what was there.
        In what source did you see the data that:
        In the upcoming offensive zone (on 16.11.41 at the Dovator group) three tank brigades (1st Guards Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade) were concentrated from army reserves, this is from 100 to 130 tanks.
        I understand that this is your next free fantasy?
        1. 0
          5 February 2025 20: 35
          Quote: Lewww
          I understand that this is another of your free fantasy?

          Refute it with documents, first. And so blah-blah-blah.
          1. 0
            5 February 2025 20: 35
            Gunner, once again: I don't hold discussions with science fiction writers - don't write to me anymore
  20. -1
    4 February 2025 21: 13
    Quote: chenia
    And the regiment commander Kaprov did not hear anything, which he testified about to the military prosecutor’s office:

    So, he poured shit on the prosecutor's office. The company fought heroically. The prosecutor's office is the place where they can convince

    Well, I already suggested to you earlier, write what the readings are:
    ..There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo junction on November 16, 1941 - this is pure fiction...
    ...None of the correspondents approached me during this period; I never told anyone about the battle of the 28 Panfilov men, and I could not tell anyone, because... There was no such fight.
    Kaprov gave it to the bloody KGB under torture and in general the military prosecutor's office certificate is fake laughing

    Everything you do is based on fantasies - what's the problem with making up another one? laughing
    1. +1
      5 February 2025 20: 44
      Quote: Lewww
      ..None of the correspondents contacted me during this period;

      Well, yes, Ivanov wrote about the Battle of Kulikovo. He communicated with Dmitry Donskoy. And without him, they wrote an article about anti-tankists. He did not see the battle, that's true. But for some reason, when Krivitsky came to the division, he was sent to Kaprov. And he somehow correctly sent him to Gundilovich. And the political instructor's last name is DIEV. Well, Kaprov didn't hear it, and by what signs did he determine that we should look for Klochkov? And Anal Whiner? As you say about yourself, I analyze and compare.
      If you are not capable of this, take up embroidery.
      1. 0
        5 February 2025 20: 46
        Gunner, I inform you once again: I don't have discussions with science fiction writers.
        Do not text me anymore
  21. 0
    6 February 2025 10: 04
    LEFF you are a falsifier and a liar. You know how to cut in the right place. And always, Objective Researcher.
    P-k Kaprov (I said earlier that he set up the prosecutor's office).
    ....On this day at the Dubosekovo junction The 2th company fought against German tanks as part of the 4nd battalion, and it really did fight heroically. Over 100 people from the company died, not 28, as the newspapers wrote...
    He didn't see the battle, and DO NOT assign him a platoon "earnestly" advised, but Kaprov still set up the prosecutor's office. And they did not question any more witnesses (independent ones) from among combat officers and soldiers.
  22. 0
    6 February 2025 12: 51
    Quote: chenia
    He didn't see the fight.
    and had never seen him or heard of him, which he testified about.

    And no one heard about this battle except the writer Krivitsky, who learned about it from the only survivor of this battle, Natarov, who died in the hospital in Krivitsky’s arms, having managed to tell him the whole truth.
    Kanonir, if they had established a literary prize named after Krivitsky, you would have definitely received it - there is no doubt about it. laughing laughing drinks
  23. 0
    7 February 2025 13: 48
    We draw attention to the conclusion of the prosecutor's office -“...The investigation materials established that the feat of the 28 Panfilov guardsmen, covered in the press, is a fabrication of the correspondent Koroteeva, editor of "Red Star" Ortenberg and especially the literary secretary of the newspaper Krivitsky."
    And as stated in this article, that the first message about Diev, 56 tanks and 18 destroyed and damaged, was from IVANOV.. How can a legal document have such a contradiction, in the CONCLUSIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION. If Ivanov had been recorded, then formally it would have been correct. But as it is, the document is FORMALLY IMPERFECT, and it cannot be relied upon, since it clearly contradicts the facts. It is logically clear that Ivanov and Koroteev received information from one source from the 316th SD. But it is more difficult to accuse combat officers of fabrications. So the guys from the prosecutor's office quickly cobbled it together.
    And here is what Krivitsky himself says about this in his testimony to the military prosecutor’s office: "Having arrived in Moscow, I wrote a basement for the newspaper under the heading "About 28 fallen heroes"; the basement was sent to the PUR for a visa. During a conversation in the PUR with comrade Krapivin, he wanted to know where I got the words of political instructor Klochkov, written in my basement: "Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind us", - I answered him that I made it up myself. The basement was published in the "Red Star" of January 22, 1942. Here I used stories by Gundilovich, Kaprov, Mukhamedyarov, Egorov. As for the feelings and actions of the 28 heroes, this is my literary fiction..
    And indeed, in the second article 56 tanks were removed, and 18 were knocked out. As I noted in the article, there were about ten knocked out and burnt out tanks. And 14 (NOT MAUTATED) but frozen. So, there was a correction. I talked to the commanders. And the artistic addition, THIS IS THE NORM.. And this cannot refute the feat.
    Well, the prosecutor's office needed it. But they didn't manage it, but they did shit in the future.
  24. 0
    8 February 2025 20: 44
    Quote: chenia
    And as stated in this article, the first message about Diev, 56 tanks and 18 destroyed and damaged, was from IVANOV..
    Gunner, I have advised you before and I will repeat it now: take medication to strengthen the remains of your brain and solve crosswords for grannies.
    Your ability to perceive what is written in texts has completely atrophied.

    In IVANOV's article NEVER the surname DIEV is not mentioned;
    it says "60 tanks";
    It is written that in the battle 9 tanks were destroyed and 3 were burned;
    there is not a single word about the losses of the Red Army soldiers, it is written "Having repelled the attack, our rifle company moved forward and, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion, united with its part"
    That is, Ivanov has Red Army soldiers left their positions.

    What made you think that this is a description of the battle of 28 Panfilov's men at Dubosekovo, where they all died, but from my position did not retreat, probably even Allah doesn’t know.

    You have senile dementia in its final stages.
    1. 0
      9 February 2025 09: 33
      Yes, I made a mistake. And in the comment. But in my article it is stated that the FIRST DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE WITH DIEV, 56: TANKS, 18 KNOCKED OUT was in "Komsomolskaya Pravda"
      .[i]".. On November 26, an article by correspondent Chernyshov appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda, "Glory to the fearless patriots!" It describes several battles, but two battles in more detail, with names..."[/i] Yes, that's where DIEV is in the plot.
      You wrote a lot of words, the point is that the Prosecutor's Office presented a lie, you DO NOT DENY it. And you are not able to. You could have written- You are mistaken, but you are consumed with anger.
      This is not your stupid fabrication about the battle at the station MATRENINO, where you showed Momysh-Uly as a liar, and the Germans as truthful. The silversmiths are finished, LEFF can only count on coppers.
      1. 0
        9 February 2025 12: 18
        Yes, I made a mistake. And in the comment. But my article states that FIRST DESCRIPTION FIGHT WITH DIEV, 56: TANKS, 18 KILLED was in "Komsomolskaya Pravda"
        This is not a mistake, this is the last stage of amnesia - you are not even able to retain the content of your article in your memory for a short time.

        In your article it is written that the first description of the battle was made by Diev Ivanov into gas. News
        The first publication about the feat appeared on November 19, 1941, just two days after the events at the Dubosekovo junction. Correspondent "Izvestia» G. Ivanov in his article “The 8th Guards Division in Battle”
        The state of your memory does not even allow you to retain information for comparison with each other.
        Don't write anymore - it's too much of a task for you
        You wrote a lot of words, the point is that the Prosecutor's Office presented a lie, you DO NOT DENY it.
        and you also have hallucinations - you said so, not me
        This is not your stupid fabrication about the battle at the station MATRENINO, where you showed Momysh-Uly as a liar,
        You have memory loss: this is you showed him as a liar, stating that the Germans had captured the Matrenino station, but he was telling this from the command hid, because from Momysh Uly's report of 20.11.41 and the diagram attached to it, it follows quite clearly that the Germans The Germans did not capture the station.

        You constantly lie, but at the same time you stubbornly make me out to be a liar.
    2. 0
      9 February 2025 11: 34
      Quote: Lewww
      IVANOV's article NEVER mentions the name DIEV;

      There is a mistake in the article (you are discussing the article, not the comments) -" is refuted by CHERNYSHEV's article in "News
      Correct-Chernysheva in "Komsomolskaya Pravda"I'll try to fix it through the administrator.
      Quote: Lewww
      That is, Ivanov's Red Army soldiers left their positions.

      You can't even think out of anger. Ivanov's anti-tank gunners were SEPARATED, but the battle was fought by a rifle company. Well, in reality, the 4th and 5th companies were surrounded and got out. Well, it is somehow NOT ACCEPTED to write about large losses in the public press (even now). Well, you are slow-witted (to say the least).
      Quote: Lewww
      where they all died, but did not retreat from their position

      Well, first of all, they didn't retreat, And they always die in battle. Did the company (companies) actually leave? They left. Period!
      And Chernyshev and Koroteev have the theme of SELF-SACRIFICE.
      And you are not at risk of senile dementia; you have been in this state since childhood.
  25. 0
    9 February 2025 12: 28
    Quote: chenia
    You are so angry that you can't even think. Ivanov has anti-tank troops SELECTED, but otherwise the battle was fought by a rifle company.
    spare me from discussing the tales invented by the authors of these notes
    Well, in reality, the 4th and 5th companies were surrounded and left.
    again forgot to write TRUST ME - I KNOW

    Gunner, once again: I am not interested in debating with science fiction writers suffering from amnesia.
    Let's continue with ourselves - good luck on this path! drinks
  26. 0
    13 February 2025 14: 27
    Regarding the Red Army's combat log. Northwestern Front (2nd Baltic), January-March 1944. According to the combat log, the 319th Rifle Division destroyed 2 Ferdinand self-propelled guns (Tver, now Pskov Region, where there were no roads then or now, only swamps). Having post factum knowledge, we can say with great certainty that these were StuG III assault guns, not Ferdinands. And in the confusion of the battles of autumn 1941, the loss of some documents, the death of direct participants, the layering of events, much can no longer be confirmed. There were battles, they held the line, but not only 28 - much more.
    1. 0
      14 February 2025 18: 53
      Quote: border
      Regarding the Red Army's railway transport.

      The ZhBD in both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht is an almanac (collection) of victories and achievements of a given unit, formation. I wrote about this in the first part. Excerpts from orders and instructions, telephone messages, reports. And then they choose the best (if possible). Therefore, exaggerations and inconsistencies are the NORM. And to rely entirely only on the ZhBD is not entirely correct. In addition, you need to know military bureaucracy, and what is important, at least the basics of tactics.
      Quote: border
      There were battles, the defense was held, but not only 28 - much more.

      Ah, who argues. Only this AT platoon, in the first battle DIDN'T LET THE TANKS GO, and the enemy was forced to call off the attack. 16.11/41/2 AT platoon of the 4nd battalion was the only unit that didn't let the tanks go. And having not passed the platoon, the Germans DIDN'T strike the XNUMXth company. And the second battle, yes. This is the rout of both the company and the platoon (the Germans were at the front, and from the rear and on the flanks, and mortars with battalion and regimental artillery were connected).
  27. 0
    13 February 2025 14: 32
    Propaganda has always been and will be. The task of political agencies is to inspire to feats and to fulfill duty with maximum efficiency. A good journalist (correspondent, military blogger) must convey the material "coherently". And the lack of dry facts is supplemented by eloquence.
    1. 0
      14 February 2025 19: 05
      Quote: border
      Propaganda has always been and will be.

      Definitely! And the fact that exaggerating enemy losses is the norm. And both are guilty of this.
      Quote: border
      A good journalist (correspondent, military blogger) must convey the material "coherently". And the lack of dry facts is supplemented by eloquence.

      The thing is, few people read these articles carefully. Krivitsky's second article, with a significant share of artistic fiction (which is allowed), significantly reduced as well as the enemy forces , led to a natural appearance - 20 tanks (company) in the first battle, and 30 in the second (and during the second battle, there were at least 60 tanks in the visible area). And losses - in the article "burning and knocked out up to TEN tanks (in the division they explained that 18 tanks, a clear excess).
      There was a feat, there WAS one! And it was precisely the feat of the PT platoon. THAT'S IT!