The New US Administration and Changing Factors of Influence in Transcaucasia

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The New US Administration and Changing Factors of Influence in Transcaucasia

History with the Armenian-Azerbaijani "settlement" seems to have no end in sight. This is largely due to the significant number of external players (individual and group) and their interests. Unlike the two main participants in the process, outside players can shuffle various options and schemes for quite a long time.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty is the point after which it will be very difficult to change the regional balance of power in the foreseeable future, and they are also dragging out this treaty "rubber band" as best they can. The rhetoric actually connected with these processes often hurts Russia, and in general the results for Moscow in this direction look, to put it mildly, not bright. Especially when they promote a topic like the conclusion of a treaty on strategic partnership between Yerevan and Washington or (as in the case of the tragedy with the plane) even before the final conclusions of the commission, demands are addressed to Moscow from Baku.

However, in the complicated Transcaucasian formula, one of the very important arguments – gas for Europe – is gradually being reduced in importance from 2025. Some will perceive this as a minus, but in reality it greatly simplifies Russia’s work in the region and provides an opportunity to reconsider approaches.



Also, from an analytical point of view, it is worth recalling the old principle that “big things are best seen in small things” and looking through the regional alignment of interests and actions at what will have to be dealt with in terms of European and American politics.

Big in small. Through the position of Azerbaijan


Azerbaijan, judging by practical steps, sees the final outcome in the maximum plan as the annexation of the southern Syunik region of Armenia, in the minimum plan - a so-called "Zangezur corridor" completely free of any restrictions and encumbrances and delimitation of the border on Baku's terms.

The presence of some “Western” military representatives-guarantors in Armenia is, with certain reservations, still somehow acceptable for Baku; Western bases are highly undesirable, and specifically French forces or bases are completely excluded.

The Russian military contingent, when implementing both plans, oddly enough, is not a critical factor for Baku in the future. Another thing is that the maximum plan cannot be implemented while Armenia is in the CSTO, even in its current “frozen” state. According to the minimum plan in the 2020 agreement, Baku initially agreed to Russian participation in control over the Zangezur corridor, but Yerevan itself sent this document to the archive, and dreams of leaving the CSTO.

Relations with Brussels and specifically with Paris are, to put it mildly, strained for Azerbaijan. At the heart of these disputes is the struggle for influence in the energy sector of Southern Europe and more broadly in the Mediterranean. Azerbaijan and Turkey are playing along with Italy here, creating their own "energy contour".

France puts a spoke in their wheels wherever it can (from Libya to Armenia). Needless to say, Russia was also involved in these combinations until recently. France is not at all shy about using the Euro-bureaucracy in this matter, but Turkey and Baku also have the resources to respond.

It is extremely important for Azerbaijan to understand the prospects in its main, basic industry - oil and gas. Baku's supplies to Turkey and the EU are de facto at peak capacity. Growth can be achieved either in a traditional and understandable way - through investments in the construction of additional capacities, or through a complex interweaving of Russian, Turkmen and Iranian "swaps".

The media has also been discussing for quite some time the hypothetical possibility of Europeans purchasing Azerbaijani (or “sort of Azerbaijani”) gas on the border with Ukraine – also, in essence, a “swap”.

In general, the leader of Azerbaijan outlined the problem extremely frankly last year.

"On the one hand, Europe is asking us to increase production and transport gas to Europe, because it seriously needs it. On the other hand, they are not financing it. The hypocrisy on this issue must end... We must invest billions there. By the way, I will note that we have not yet recouped our investment costs in the Southern Gas Corridor. Our revenues from gas sales are still used to pay off this debt. They expect us to invest billions there. At the same time, they say that in 10 years the European Union will not need gas."

Where do the “legs” of this contradiction grow from, because if the same European Union wants more gas, but with a minimum of “molecules of aggressive Russia”, then what prevents the EU from investing in Azerbaijani production and another branch to the Adriatic and Hungary? Especially since we are not talking about volumes comparable to previous supplies from Russia.

There is also Iraqi gas, and Iraq now has complete democracy and freedom. This is only partly humorous, since in reality it is economically and politically beneficial for the EU to invest in at least one additional gas pipeline in the south. Who is stopping it? The EU's best friend and ally - the US.

Until very recently, Washington, as if sparing the feelings of the voters of its liberal European clientele, preferred to play the role of “we are together with the EU” in a common position of not taking anything Russian.

But until very recently, did Washington have any clear step-by-step strategy, other than this very general position of “there should be nothing Russian in Europe” and “reduce purchases as much as possible”? No, there wasn’t one.

But there was a lot of absurdity, like the taboo on resuscitation and operation of Nord Stream and simultaneous restrictions on the sale of American LNG to the EU. There are a lot of nuances there, but these issues are being resolved by a step-by-step strategy that did not exist. And since there was none, other players (including Russia) tried to fill these gaps.

Liberal politicians in the EU suppressed resource purchases from the Russian Federation as best they could, industrialists in turn fought back as best they could, the reduction continued and continues, but with the fundamental decision to refuse, everything else moved not according to plan, but according to the situation.

D. Trump and his team are already saying outright that the EU is their market, their fiefdom, and only the US itself will be involved in resource trade, pricing, etc., without the usual “we are with the EU for democracy.”

This planned specificity is now expected with the full arrival of D. Trump. Here fleet NATO has entered the Baltic, what to do with oil ships, inspect, detain, let through? But for EU politicians, this is no longer their oil, not even Russian, but like in the famous old film: "This is not your tooth, this is not even my tooth - it is theirs."

"Their tooth" from the point of view of Brussels means that oil and gas are not European or Russian goods, they are US assets. So how should they deal with a US asset in their understanding: detain, inspect, let through? Previously, you could ask, but who should you ask now, I. Musk?

The old administration has left, the new one has not yet given any orders. The general trend is clear, but there are no specific instructions. This position put and puts European officials in a position where they puffed out their cheeks and pointed here and there, but could not make systemic decisions. And, in fact, I. Aliyev openly said exactly this, that the EU is not a subject in the gas issue. But everyone understood something else - the EU oil and gas market is the "teeth" of the USA.

No one can say what the oil and gas strategy of D. Trump's cabinet will look like now, except for the stated basic principle - the US will continue to strive to regulate the process of buying, selling and transit "from and to", but now openly and with maximum assertiveness.

That is why the same A. Vucic, the Serbian president, does not exclude that the US will try to “take away” the European infrastructure of the “Nord Stream” and will try to dictate the terms, similarly with the “shadow fleet”. How it will look, what proposals will be presented, what demands, carrots and threats, all this is a natural “quest” of 2025. And this basis was understood and felt by everyone: from Turkey and Azerbaijan to Poland and Hungary.

But we have a question about Transcaucasia, and here, despite all the general uncertainty for Baku, the basic condition remains - there will be no various "swaps" with Russian-Iranian or similar gas for Europe without the participation of the United States in the purchase and sale. And this is the very conclusion from the large formula for the settlement along the Armenia-Azerbaijan line, a very significant argument, which was mentioned at the beginning of the material.

Yes, Baku has relations with Moscow will be much more formal, but, on the other hand, the general range of issues is also reduced - mutual trade and the North-South corridor. There is no need to think through and agree on complex exchange schemes, offsets, price formulas, etc., if there is a main customer in the EU - the USA, with which Moscow either negotiates directly or does not negotiate.

Azerbaijan will also have a separate issue with the US about its own supplies to the EU, but it will be separate from the Russian one. What will the new administration ask for in exchange for not supporting, as before, the "Soros graduates" of N. Pashinyan's team together with Brussels? This is an interesting question, considering that Iran is forced to side with Armenia, but at the same time N. Pashinyan wants to withdraw Russian bases from Armenia and leave the CSTO.

Big in small. Through the position of Armenia


Official Yerevan's throwing itself across the field of the "European choice" for Russia has traditionally turned into a portion of "people's friendly rhetoric". There is no particular practical sense in analyzing this rhetoric in detail, it is repeated over and over again and equally equally for each audience: European, American, domestic Armenian, Russian. N. Pashinyan has his own model, and he pushes and implements it quite consistently (just not always successfully). As best he can and as best he can.

The political steps taken by N. Pashinyan and his cabinet have long been not ambiguous, but quite transparent.
The best option is considered to be the conclusion of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, where the main guarantor (including in military terms) will be “at least something Western” (NATO, some collective European forces, the USA or some other mixture of forces), and Russia will be an indirect, additional guarantor, but without the CSTO and Russian military presence.

Yerevan would prefer, if not a direct association with the EU, then some kind of political and economic formula that would be its (albeit indirect) analogue, like the special relations between the EU and Turkey. The pinnacle of such a game could be Armenia's simultaneous presence in the EAEU. Another part of the pinnacle of this interesting Armenian political construction would be a Western military base while maintaining the current level of relations with Iran.

Yerevan is afraid to leave the CSTO and withdraw Russian forces without documentary guarantees from the EU and the US, as well as without signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. Brussels and France do not provide documentary guarantees without leaving the CSTO and with a Russian military presence, making the situation vicious for N. Pashinyan. Who can break this circle for Yerevan? The US. This is why they signed an agreement with the US on "strategic partnership".

At first glance, it seems that such a political scheme originates somewhere in astrology. Even representatives of N. Pashinyan's team cannot help but understand the strangeness of the given construction, and yet we see that Yerevan is trying to assemble exactly this. But on what grounds?

There are essentially two reasons. The first is the need to have a deterrent in Transcaucasia, so as not to concede 100% to Azerbaijan and Turkey in those same large transit and gas schemes. The second is trade turnover under sanctions.

The second reason does not seem to be the most significant at first glance, but this is only at first glance. The total trade turnover already reaches $13,5 billion, where $10 billion is not import to Russia, but, remarkably, export. It is clear that 3 million of Armenia's population consume something from this flow, but it is also clear that a significant part of it is re-export to third countries.

For now, exports to Armenia are 4,0-4,2% of the total in Russia, but Armenian astrologers can try to push the figures up to 6-7%, and that is already serious. This is a good mutually beneficial service, when we can say that not only the EAEU "feeds Armenia", but still the gate opens in both directions.

The trick here is that for Brussels these are not deliveries of "sanctioned goods" to Russia, but in terms of trade with Russia this is a significant factor. They say, why are you reproaching us in the media for "hot breakfasts" worth $69 million, if we are giving Moscow the opportunity to export $10 billion?

As can be seen from the above, the first basis for the Armenian strategy in terms of the Russian position is actually half understood. The main dialogue will now proceed along the "North-South" corridor, but it has not only a route through Azerbaijan, but also a sea route, as well as an eastern one. Yerevan will, of course, strengthen the second basis - foreign trade, but whether Russia should agree to this strengthening, the answer is rather negative.

Brief summary


The fact that trading on the European market, not only on the gas market, but also on the market as such, is now completely transferred to the jurisdiction of the "main shareholder of Europe" is, by and large, a positive factor. In the public space, many media lances will still be broken, but everything significant and substantive will already be decided within the framework of the "one-stop shop policy" and purely bilateral negotiations with the United States.

There is no need for multilateral, complex and ambiguous games, and this makes concessions, to which (alas, but it is true) our domestic foreign policy is inclined, unnecessary. Transcaucasia is the region from which Russia, following historical logic, does not dare to distance itself. Yes, this logic has its basis, but de facto it has gradually turned into a practice of concessions. If one of the pillars of such a concessive policy is leaving us, then this is more of a blessing than the opposite.
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  1. +1
    21 January 2025 06: 04
    That's why they signed it
    agreement with the US on "strategic partnership"
    And what is the agreement on "strategic partnership"? Is it another carrot under the nose? The same agreement was signed with Ukraine, but they get nothing but money and weapons. And with the election of a new president in the US, they will not get anything at all. Of course, one would like to hope
    1. -1
      21 January 2025 06: 14
      The agreement is simply a marker of a political position. And as for
      And with the election of a new president, the US will not receive anything at all.

      Well, it's not a fact. It all depends on the final scheme.
  2. +3
    21 January 2025 07: 29
    Azerbaijan's relations with Brussels and, more specifically, Paris are, to put it mildly, strained. At the heart of these disputes is the struggle for influence in the energy sector of Southern Europe and, more broadly, the Mediterranean.

    There is a strong Armenian diaspora in France, it is second only to the Jewish one in political strength. But the French have never interfered in the affairs of Transcaucasia.
    But until very recently, did Washington have any clear step-by-step strategy?

    I don’t know about strategies, but Aliyev is called a “dictator” in the Western/American press, and this label is applied to potential victims (M. Gaddafi, S. Hussein, etc.).
    Aliyev's position towards Russia is interesting. Since Moscow took the side of the Armenians in the conflict in NK (for example, the idea of ​​bombing Azerbaijani oil fields at sea was voiced in the media), the Azerbaijanis began to have a negative (media) attitude towards Russia, and sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. But everything magically changed because of France, which took the side of Armenia. As is known, the West acts in a pack, unlike the Moscow wise men. Aliyev began to seek support from Moscow and Muslim states, for example, the purchase of Chinese-Pakistani JF-17. Not that he became a "political prostitute", but rather a Caucasian brother of Lukashenko.
    1. +1
      21 January 2025 07: 46
      In the Russian top media, the Armenian party and the Azerbaijani party have been "fighting" each other for years. Whatever they voiced, although they did not voice even 15% of the versions and options that circulated in the Armenian and Azerbaijani media, Aliyev, unlike them, understood perfectly well that no one would ever "bomb the oil fields", especially since he did not enter Armenian territory in full during the military campaigns (both the first and the second). And what oil fields to "bomb"? Where Lukoil shares, shares in the ports of Uzbekistan already, and in general when the Turkish Stream goes along the Black Sea, and oil and grain traffic through the Bosphorus? Of course, he could not and cannot fail to take into account the CSTO factor and military bases in the recognized Armenia itself, but in terms of Karabakh, what oil fields and anything like that could be discussed.
      1. -1
        21 January 2025 08: 02
        In the Russian top media, the Armenian party and the Azerbaijani party have been “fighting” with each other for years.

        I even know some of them: Zatulin is for Armenians, and Korotchenko is for Azerbaijanis.
        but in terms of Karabakh, what kind of oil fields or anything like that could we talk about?

        Maybe it can't, but ideas were thrown around. The first option: transfer of the Russian army or at least weapons to Armenia via Georgia, and the second oil fields on the Caspian Sea. It is clear that both options were not viable, it was more of a moral support.
  3. +1
    21 January 2025 08: 05
    "big things are seen better in small things"

    "It seems big to us
    Sometimes everything is small.
    That's how it seems to us sometimes
    A pea is a mountain.
    It seems like a huge garden
    A bouquet of modest roses,
    It seems like a dense forest
    A thick head of hair.
    A leaf is floating down the stream,
    We look - a steamship.
    A dragonfly flies in the sky -
    We see an airplane.
    Mustard tastes like fire,
    The wasp is an evil she-wolf.
    And a grain of salt is so white,
    What seems like a sheep."(c)
    Walter de la Mare
  4. +2
    21 January 2025 11: 41
    but everything significant and substantive will be decided within the framework of the “one-window policy” and purely bilateral negotiations with the United States.
    There is no need for multi-faceted, complex and ambiguous games, ... this is rather a blessing than a curse.


    That's it! A little more, and we will "suddenly" understand that the "unipolar world" and the presence of a specific center for making global decisions is clearer and more convenient for us (NOT a fact that it is more profitable at the moment) than the vague "multipolarity" ))
    Well, all this "network structures, horizontal connections, consensus of informal elites, multilateral complex agreements" is not our thing! ))
    We have everything different: “each mistake has a specific name”, “achievement of GDP - built a vertical and returned control over the country”.

    Therefore, since we ourselves are not up to the task of being a "hegemon", and China is not really eager, then perhaps the USA (conditionally Trumpist, of course) is much more acceptable to us than the "British way" (with the aforementioned "network horizontals") and the conditionally EU way (with vague "values-principles" and boundless bureaucracy). And Russia is more like Trumpamerica than the EU (which is funny, the USSR was more similar to the EU in some ways, with its messianism, which degenerated in its decline into cynicism and contempt for the "ideology" of its own population).

    with the US we have essentially one problem. and no, not "permanent hostility towards Russia", but the lack of continuity of obligations during the change of power. all agreements every 4 years (and taking into account the re-elections in parliament, almost every 2 years) can be thrown into the trash and started over. And how can we build long-cycle facilities like "streams" and nuclear power plants here? if during their service life of 50 years, they will be blown up, banned, restored, sanctioned and declared a symbol of positive cooperation 10 times? ))
    1. -1
      21 January 2025 19: 26
      Well, yes, the dancing around the inauguration and the intensity of passions (and here, not somewhere “over there”) shows well who in reality makes the world agenda, and who cares more about it influences. Let's see, now Trump, as is the law of the genre, will add drama, emotions, and statements. Of course, we must wait until he starts to get tired of the make-up under the spotlights of fame. Then the theater and the media will give way to planned work and that's when the most difficult part will begin. For us first and foremost.
      1. 0
        21 January 2025 21: 12
        Quote: nikolaevskiy78
        Then the theater and the media will give way to planned work and that's when the most difficult part will begin. For us first and foremost.

        I'm not dressing up as a fucking politician, but it seems to me that Donya is about to make a "cavalry charge" on us. And, most importantly, to withstand this "charge", not only not to break, but even, with your answer, to knock his arrogance down a notch.
        So that he understands - it's not that easy. And then, press and press, do not make any compromises on the Outskirts, and in other matters. Since Russia has become the informal leader of BRICS, then it will behave accordingly on the international arena.
        1. -1
          21 January 2025 21: 50
          I suspect that behind the scenes it will look something like this. "A generous offer from the US to Moscow": you Russians sell us oil for the EU and India to the US and only the US at a conditional $40, gas at $100. We lift some of the sanctions (especially the "personal" ones), freeze Ukraine, and then you yourselves don't get involved in working with Europe (and maybe with India as well). Something like this can be expected, how it will be presented on both sides in the media mouthpieces, it will be interesting to see. Maybe there will also be numerous regional exchanges, after all, the field of interests is large - Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, India - the field of exchanges is wide. But at the root there is a feeling that the bargaining will be around this +-40 and +-100. Let's hope that our Areopagus will find the strength to dig in its horns.
          1. 0
            22 January 2025 11: 50
            Quote: nikolaevskiy78
            Let's hope that our Areopagus will find the strength to dig in its heels.

            This is the only thing left for us.
  5. 0
    21 January 2025 13: 35
    If we continue the theme of the "universal" commentary, then we just need to look at those who are the "players" in this oil and gas market today, and these are large owners and, also large, shareholders of Russian or non-Russian jurisdiction. Then, who are the "fans", and this is a rather small, relative to the entire population of Russia, number of small joint-stock "fish". And, finally, a huge number of "extras" - the Russian poor or frankly impoverished population of Russia, living not in both oligarchic capitals, but in the regional "province". Why do they need this "food for thought"? For the "players" and, perhaps, for the "fans", I admit, it will be interesting, but for all the rest of "US", this is exactly the wheel in the cart, from the conversation of two peasants, which does not belong to them. And, by the way, the number of comments confirms this. Mikhail, nothing personal, it's just "business". Isn't it(?
    1. 0
      21 January 2025 19: 20
      Oleg, why all this dramatic pathos?
      Russian poor or frankly impoverished population of Russia

      which, by the way, you insert into the comments again and again without changes? It (the population) is not rich, but not destitute either. And there is another big question, how and with what (whom) to compare. Destitute in relation to whom-what? Poor in relation to whom-what? This dramaturgy does not bring one iota closer to the analysis of the real problem, because the question is not that the population is not rich in general, but that it does not understand either the ideological or material perspective as such. This is a more serious factor than just poverty or lack of wealth.
      The cart may or may not belong, the question is that everyone rides on it (the cart) one way or another. Well, the fact that there is more interest in the comments on the Russian topic itself is generally normal, rather than the opposite. This means that foreign policy is perceived as it should be - as foreign. This is the opposite of normal, it is abnormal when the external is a priority relative to the internal.
      1. -1
        21 January 2025 19: 51
        The fact that the population, which during the reign of private property does not own any market-valuable property, but only rotates the "squirrel cages" of OTHER businesses, making the owners richer and themselves poorer, is this pathos? And the fact that, as a result of this, it does not understand either the ideological or material perspective, as you write, what is this? In my opinion, this is its poverty, misery and complete lack of prospects in the existing legal relations of the dominance of private property and the state. And the fact that our population is poor "in relation to whom or what?", you just, for example, compare the total tonnage of the yachts of our nouveau riche and the total tonnage of the ships of our Navy (... Do you need an analysis of the real problems? Then calculate how many trillions of dollars over these 30 years were withdrawn from the country to the economies of the West and the East, and how many "investments" were attracted, what total monetary and currency deficit our country received, as a result, over these decades (. Yes, "our" financial and trading oligarchy now has problems with the stability of the exchange rate, the base rate, pricing, export of raw materials and LNG, import substitution and you, in this "substance" are trying to dig, analyze and understand, and I am only writing about what was the cause and what will be the consequences of this "phenomenon". And leave the pathos to "our" nouveau riche, as part of their propaganda.

        P.S. Work, for MY benefit, it unites!
        Cat Matroskin.
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