The New US Administration and Changing Factors of Influence in Transcaucasia

History with the Armenian-Azerbaijani "settlement" seems to have no end in sight. This is largely due to the significant number of external players (individual and group) and their interests. Unlike the two main participants in the process, outside players can shuffle various options and schemes for quite a long time.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty is the point after which it will be very difficult to change the regional balance of power in the foreseeable future, and they are also dragging out this treaty "rubber band" as best they can. The rhetoric actually connected with these processes often hurts Russia, and in general the results for Moscow in this direction look, to put it mildly, not bright. Especially when they promote a topic like the conclusion of a treaty on strategic partnership between Yerevan and Washington or (as in the case of the tragedy with the plane) even before the final conclusions of the commission, demands are addressed to Moscow from Baku.
However, in the complicated Transcaucasian formula, one of the very important arguments – gas for Europe – is gradually being reduced in importance from 2025. Some will perceive this as a minus, but in reality it greatly simplifies Russia’s work in the region and provides an opportunity to reconsider approaches.
Also, from an analytical point of view, it is worth recalling the old principle that “big things are best seen in small things” and looking through the regional alignment of interests and actions at what will have to be dealt with in terms of European and American politics.
Big in small. Through the position of Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan, judging by practical steps, sees the final outcome in the maximum plan as the annexation of the southern Syunik region of Armenia, in the minimum plan - a so-called "Zangezur corridor" completely free of any restrictions and encumbrances and delimitation of the border on Baku's terms.
The presence of some “Western” military representatives-guarantors in Armenia is, with certain reservations, still somehow acceptable for Baku; Western bases are highly undesirable, and specifically French forces or bases are completely excluded.
The Russian military contingent, when implementing both plans, oddly enough, is not a critical factor for Baku in the future. Another thing is that the maximum plan cannot be implemented while Armenia is in the CSTO, even in its current “frozen” state. According to the minimum plan in the 2020 agreement, Baku initially agreed to Russian participation in control over the Zangezur corridor, but Yerevan itself sent this document to the archive, and dreams of leaving the CSTO.
Relations with Brussels and specifically with Paris are, to put it mildly, strained for Azerbaijan. At the heart of these disputes is the struggle for influence in the energy sector of Southern Europe and more broadly in the Mediterranean. Azerbaijan and Turkey are playing along with Italy here, creating their own "energy contour".
France puts a spoke in their wheels wherever it can (from Libya to Armenia). Needless to say, Russia was also involved in these combinations until recently. France is not at all shy about using the Euro-bureaucracy in this matter, but Turkey and Baku also have the resources to respond.
It is extremely important for Azerbaijan to understand the prospects in its main, basic industry - oil and gas. Baku's supplies to Turkey and the EU are de facto at peak capacity. Growth can be achieved either in a traditional and understandable way - through investments in the construction of additional capacities, or through a complex interweaving of Russian, Turkmen and Iranian "swaps".
The media has also been discussing for quite some time the hypothetical possibility of Europeans purchasing Azerbaijani (or “sort of Azerbaijani”) gas on the border with Ukraine – also, in essence, a “swap”.
In general, the leader of Azerbaijan outlined the problem extremely frankly last year.
Where do the “legs” of this contradiction grow from, because if the same European Union wants more gas, but with a minimum of “molecules of aggressive Russia”, then what prevents the EU from investing in Azerbaijani production and another branch to the Adriatic and Hungary? Especially since we are not talking about volumes comparable to previous supplies from Russia.
There is also Iraqi gas, and Iraq now has complete democracy and freedom. This is only partly humorous, since in reality it is economically and politically beneficial for the EU to invest in at least one additional gas pipeline in the south. Who is stopping it? The EU's best friend and ally - the US.
Until very recently, Washington, as if sparing the feelings of the voters of its liberal European clientele, preferred to play the role of “we are together with the EU” in a common position of not taking anything Russian.
But until very recently, did Washington have any clear step-by-step strategy, other than this very general position of “there should be nothing Russian in Europe” and “reduce purchases as much as possible”? No, there wasn’t one.
But there was a lot of absurdity, like the taboo on resuscitation and operation of Nord Stream and simultaneous restrictions on the sale of American LNG to the EU. There are a lot of nuances there, but these issues are being resolved by a step-by-step strategy that did not exist. And since there was none, other players (including Russia) tried to fill these gaps.
Liberal politicians in the EU suppressed resource purchases from the Russian Federation as best they could, industrialists in turn fought back as best they could, the reduction continued and continues, but with the fundamental decision to refuse, everything else moved not according to plan, but according to the situation.
D. Trump and his team are already saying outright that the EU is their market, their fiefdom, and only the US itself will be involved in resource trade, pricing, etc., without the usual “we are with the EU for democracy.”
This planned specificity is now expected with the full arrival of D. Trump. Here fleet NATO has entered the Baltic, what to do with oil ships, inspect, detain, let through? But for EU politicians, this is no longer their oil, not even Russian, but like in the famous old film: "This is not your tooth, this is not even my tooth - it is theirs."
"Their tooth" from the point of view of Brussels means that oil and gas are not European or Russian goods, they are US assets. So how should they deal with a US asset in their understanding: detain, inspect, let through? Previously, you could ask, but who should you ask now, I. Musk?
The old administration has left, the new one has not yet given any orders. The general trend is clear, but there are no specific instructions. This position put and puts European officials in a position where they puffed out their cheeks and pointed here and there, but could not make systemic decisions. And, in fact, I. Aliyev openly said exactly this, that the EU is not a subject in the gas issue. But everyone understood something else - the EU oil and gas market is the "teeth" of the USA.
No one can say what the oil and gas strategy of D. Trump's cabinet will look like now, except for the stated basic principle - the US will continue to strive to regulate the process of buying, selling and transit "from and to", but now openly and with maximum assertiveness.
That is why the same A. Vucic, the Serbian president, does not exclude that the US will try to “take away” the European infrastructure of the “Nord Stream” and will try to dictate the terms, similarly with the “shadow fleet”. How it will look, what proposals will be presented, what demands, carrots and threats, all this is a natural “quest” of 2025. And this basis was understood and felt by everyone: from Turkey and Azerbaijan to Poland and Hungary.
But we have a question about Transcaucasia, and here, despite all the general uncertainty for Baku, the basic condition remains - there will be no various "swaps" with Russian-Iranian or similar gas for Europe without the participation of the United States in the purchase and sale. And this is the very conclusion from the large formula for the settlement along the Armenia-Azerbaijan line, a very significant argument, which was mentioned at the beginning of the material.
Yes, Baku has relations with Moscow will be much more formal, but, on the other hand, the general range of issues is also reduced - mutual trade and the North-South corridor. There is no need to think through and agree on complex exchange schemes, offsets, price formulas, etc., if there is a main customer in the EU - the USA, with which Moscow either negotiates directly or does not negotiate.
Azerbaijan will also have a separate issue with the US about its own supplies to the EU, but it will be separate from the Russian one. What will the new administration ask for in exchange for not supporting, as before, the "Soros graduates" of N. Pashinyan's team together with Brussels? This is an interesting question, considering that Iran is forced to side with Armenia, but at the same time N. Pashinyan wants to withdraw Russian bases from Armenia and leave the CSTO.
Big in small. Through the position of Armenia
Official Yerevan's throwing itself across the field of the "European choice" for Russia has traditionally turned into a portion of "people's friendly rhetoric". There is no particular practical sense in analyzing this rhetoric in detail, it is repeated over and over again and equally equally for each audience: European, American, domestic Armenian, Russian. N. Pashinyan has his own model, and he pushes and implements it quite consistently (just not always successfully). As best he can and as best he can.
The political steps taken by N. Pashinyan and his cabinet have long been not ambiguous, but quite transparent.
The best option is considered to be the conclusion of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, where the main guarantor (including in military terms) will be “at least something Western” (NATO, some collective European forces, the USA or some other mixture of forces), and Russia will be an indirect, additional guarantor, but without the CSTO and Russian military presence.
Yerevan would prefer, if not a direct association with the EU, then some kind of political and economic formula that would be its (albeit indirect) analogue, like the special relations between the EU and Turkey. The pinnacle of such a game could be Armenia's simultaneous presence in the EAEU. Another part of the pinnacle of this interesting Armenian political construction would be a Western military base while maintaining the current level of relations with Iran.
Yerevan is afraid to leave the CSTO and withdraw Russian forces without documentary guarantees from the EU and the US, as well as without signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. Brussels and France do not provide documentary guarantees without leaving the CSTO and with a Russian military presence, making the situation vicious for N. Pashinyan. Who can break this circle for Yerevan? The US. This is why they signed an agreement with the US on "strategic partnership".
At first glance, it seems that such a political scheme originates somewhere in astrology. Even representatives of N. Pashinyan's team cannot help but understand the strangeness of the given construction, and yet we see that Yerevan is trying to assemble exactly this. But on what grounds?
There are essentially two reasons. The first is the need to have a deterrent in Transcaucasia, so as not to concede 100% to Azerbaijan and Turkey in those same large transit and gas schemes. The second is trade turnover under sanctions.
The second reason does not seem to be the most significant at first glance, but this is only at first glance. The total trade turnover already reaches $13,5 billion, where $10 billion is not import to Russia, but, remarkably, export. It is clear that 3 million of Armenia's population consume something from this flow, but it is also clear that a significant part of it is re-export to third countries.
For now, exports to Armenia are 4,0-4,2% of the total in Russia, but Armenian astrologers can try to push the figures up to 6-7%, and that is already serious. This is a good mutually beneficial service, when we can say that not only the EAEU "feeds Armenia", but still the gate opens in both directions.
The trick here is that for Brussels these are not deliveries of "sanctioned goods" to Russia, but in terms of trade with Russia this is a significant factor. They say, why are you reproaching us in the media for "hot breakfasts" worth $69 million, if we are giving Moscow the opportunity to export $10 billion?
As can be seen from the above, the first basis for the Armenian strategy in terms of the Russian position is actually half understood. The main dialogue will now proceed along the "North-South" corridor, but it has not only a route through Azerbaijan, but also a sea route, as well as an eastern one. Yerevan will, of course, strengthen the second basis - foreign trade, but whether Russia should agree to this strengthening, the answer is rather negative.
Brief summary
The fact that trading on the European market, not only on the gas market, but also on the market as such, is now completely transferred to the jurisdiction of the "main shareholder of Europe" is, by and large, a positive factor. In the public space, many media lances will still be broken, but everything significant and substantive will already be decided within the framework of the "one-stop shop policy" and purely bilateral negotiations with the United States.
There is no need for multilateral, complex and ambiguous games, and this makes concessions, to which (alas, but it is true) our domestic foreign policy is inclined, unnecessary. Transcaucasia is the region from which Russia, following historical logic, does not dare to distance itself. Yes, this logic has its basis, but de facto it has gradually turned into a practice of concessions. If one of the pillars of such a concessive policy is leaving us, then this is more of a blessing than the opposite.
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