Battleship Oslyabya in the Battle of Tsushima

Meeting of opponents

Early in the morning of May 14, 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky entered the Tsushima Strait. The main forces were formed into two columns. There was fog, visibility did not exceed 6-7 miles (11,1-13 km), a west-southwest wind of force 4-5 was blowing, creating waves of force 3.

At approximately 6:30, the enemy cruiser Izumi was spotted on the starboard beam. Later, Japanese ships from the 3rd, 5th, and 6th detachments approached and took up positions on both sides of the Russian squadron.

Commander of the Japanese fleet Admiral H. Togo, having received a message about the enemy's location and course, left Mozampo with the main forces. The 1st battle detachment under his command included the battleships Mikasa, Shikishi-Ma, Fuji, Asahi, and the cruisers Kasuga and Nissin. The 2nd battle detachment of Vice-Admiral H. Kamimura included the cruisers Izumo, Azuma, Tokiwa, Yakumo, Asama, and Iwate.

Around 11:15, Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered the squadron to reorganize into a single column. At the same time, the gunner accidentally fired a shot from the 6-inch gun of the Orel at the cruisers of the 40rd combat detachment, which were approximately 7,4 cables (3 km) to the left, which many Russian ships took for the beginning of the battle and opened fire. The enemy fired several return shots, increased speed, and abruptly turned in the opposite direction. About 5 minutes later, the exchange of fire ended without result.

The main forces of the Russian squadron, having completed the reorganization into one column, turned to course NO12 at 00:23.

At 12:30, the 1st armored detachment: "Prince Suvorov", "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino" and "Orel" reorganized to the right, into a separate column. The 2nd armored detachment remained in the left column: "Oslyabya", "Sisoy Veliky", "Navarin", "Nakhimov", and the 3rd armored detachment: "Emperor Nikolai I", "Admiral Senyavin", "Admiral Ushakov", "General-Admiral Apraksin".

At 13:21, H. Togo established visual contact with the Russian squadron and a minute later turned to the right to take the best windward position for firing from the casemates.

Almost simultaneously, Z. P. Rozhestvensky discovered Japanese battleships ahead, somewhat to the right of his own course. However, the enemy soon disappeared into the fog. The Russian squadron did not undertake any maneuvers, continuing to move on course NO23 at a speed of 9 knots. At this time, the 1st armored detachment moved forward so that the Oryol was approximately abeam of the Oslyabya, and the distance between the columns was about 12...15 cables (2,2...2,8 km).

The Japanese fleet intercepted the enemy's course and increased speed to 13 knots at 32:15. A signal was raised on the Mikasa: "The greatness and fall of the Empire depends on this one battle, let everyone try to make even more energetic efforts!"

"Oslyabya" is preparing for battle

The Oslyabya crew took up their positions at combat posts. In the conning tower were: ship commander V. I. Baer, ​​senior officer D. B. Pokhvistnev, senior artillery officer S. E. Genke, senior navigation officer I. V. Dyachenkov, flag officer F. M. Kosinsky, flagship navigator A. I. Osipov, helmsman I. Sprogis. Junior navigator V. P. Paletsky stood on the compass platform near the rangefinder.

The upper bow casemates housed: on the starboard side - the commander of the 1st group of guns, junior artillery officer P. A. Kolokoltsev, on the port side - the commander of the 2nd group of guns S. V. Gorchakov. The bow turret was commanded by V. V. Maikov, the stern turret - by B. P. Kazmichev.

Senior mine officer M.P. Sablin monitored the generation and transmission of electricity.

The ship's survivability was ensured by the hold mechanic P. F. Uspensky. The fire-hold division was commanded by the senior topman F. S. Lebedev.

Only those sailors whose presence was required for combat remained at open or unarmored posts; the rest were sent to the living deck.

Two dressing and surgical stations were ready to receive the wounded. Senior doctor G. S. Vasiliev was in the permanent stationary station. Junior doctor G. R. Bunting was in the temporary station, set up in the bathhouse.

The beginning of the battle (13:41-13-49)

Maneuvering scheme in the Battle of Tsushima 13:41-13:49

At about 13:41, the main forces of the Japanese fleet again emerged from the fog, this time to the left of the course. Having decided that the enemy was going to attack his left column, Z. P. Rozhestvensky at about 13:42 ordered the 1st armored detachment to increase speed to 11 knots and turn "all at once" 4 rhumbs (45 degrees) to the left.

H. Togo planned to take an advantageous position before the battle, envelop the enemy's head and open fire from a distance of 6 meters (000 cables). To do this, it was necessary to approach the Russian squadron at a head-on course to 32 m (8 cables), and then turn sharply and lie on a passing converging course.

At 13:44, Mikasa turned towards the enemy. At 13:47, senior artillery officer A. Kiyokazu, who was standing at the rangefinder, reported that the distance to Knyaz Suvorov had reached 8000 m (43 cables). H. Togo immediately ordered a sharp turn to the left – his famous “loop”.

Togo loop performed by Japanese battleships. Still from the film "Clouds over the Hills"

At this time, the reorganization of the Russian squadron was still far from complete. The Borodino-class battleships were approaching the left column in a bearing formation. Z. P. Rozhestvensky, noticing the maneuver of the Japanese flagship, immediately turned the Knyaz Suvorov to the right, and then gave the order to the 2nd armored detachment to enter the wake of the 1st armored detachment.

At 13:49, Mikasa had already completed the "loop" and set course NO67. At that very moment, the first shots were fired in its direction: first by Oslyabya, then by Knyaz Suvorov. Z. P. Rozhestvensky immediately gave the order to the entire squadron to concentrate fire on the first enemy ship.

Russian battleships open fire on the enemy. Still from the film "Clouds over the Hills"

Beginning of the battle. Formation of battle lines. (13:49-14:04)

Maneuvering scheme in the Battle of Tsushima 13:49-14:04

With each passing minute, the Russian shells fell closer and denser, forcing the enemy to open fire before the battle line was formed. At 13:52, Mikasa began sighting in on Knyaz Suvorov from a distance of 6400 m (35 cables). For all the other ships of the 1st detachment, the closest and most convenient target was the high-sided three-funnel battleship under the flag of Felkersam, which led the left column. After completing the "loop", fire on Oslyaba was opened sequentially by: Shikishima at 13:52, Fuji at 13:53, Asahi and Kasuga at 13:54, and Nissin at 13:57.

The battleship Mikasa fires. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

Already in the first minutes of the battle, Shikishima observed continuous hits from its shells on Oslyabya and numerous fires breaking out on it.

At 13:56, Fuji noted the target being hit by one or more 12-inch shells, the foremast being knocked down, and a large fire.

Many cruisers of H. Kamimura's detachment also chose Oslyabyu as a target at the beginning of the battle. Iwate fired at it from its left side from 13:54 until it turned at 14:01. After completing the turn, they opened fire on the lead ship of the left column in sequence: Izumo at 13:57, Tokiwa at 13:59, Azuma at 14:00, and Yakumo at 14:04.

During the first minutes of the battle, Oslyabya, without changing course, led the left column forward. On the right, 5-6 cab. (0,9-1,1 km) the 1st armored detachment slowly moved forward.

The distance to the enemy was rapidly decreasing and reached 13 m (59 cables) to the Asahi at 5100:28, and 14 (00 cables) to the Fuji and 4800 (26 cables) to the Kasuga at 4700:25. With each passing minute, the Japanese fire became more intense and accurate. Almost every 30 seconds, a new salvo hit the Oslyabya, mainly in the bow. Splashes of water and smoke from the explosions rose so often that the Japanese gunners had great difficulty catching their target in their sights.

In order to carry out Z. P. Rozhestvensky's order and take its place in the line, at 14:00 Oslyabya turned sharply to the right and sharply reduced speed, letting Orel go ahead. The ships of the 2nd armored detachment following it, avoiding a collision, left the line. At 14:04 Oslyabya turned into Orel's wake and increased speed.

As a result of the reorganization, Oslyabya moved away from the Japanese ships of Togo's detachment, as a result of which at 14:01 Asahi, and at 14:03 Fuji, transferred fire to other targets.

At the same time, the Prince Suvorov began to approach the Mikasa, but came under a hail of shells, turned away and took a course parallel to the enemy, approximately abeam of the Asahi.

The Russian squadron concentrated its fire on Mikasa, which received 15 hits in the first 19 minutes of the battle. Apparently, the greatest contribution to this achievement was made by Knyaz Suvorov, which was able to find the correct distance. The gunners of the other ships could not distinguish the fall of their shells among the wall of splashes and fired inaccurately, relying on the rangefinder.

The battleship Mikasa fires. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

First damage to Oslyabya

"Oslyabya" was the closest to the enemy and was the first to start sighting, so it was possible that it managed to hit "Mikasa" several times with 6-inch shells. However, three minutes after the start of the battle, the Japanese ships opened return fire...

The first shell fired at the Oslyaba fell short by about 30 m. The second shell fell slightly overshooting. The third shell, apparently a 12-inch shell, completely tore out the left hawse and damaged the chain stopper. The anchor flew overboard with a clang, released the chain and hung on the tack-grip until the sailors riveted the chain. Immediately after hitting the hawse, several 6-inch shells simultaneously exploded in the bow.

The Japanese ships' targeting of the Oslyaba from the Orel's stern turret was described by midshipman O. A. Shcherbachev:

First, a shortfall of about 1/2…1 cable (93…185 m), then the same overshoot, again a shortfall of 1/2 cable (93 m) and then — hits. The hit shell burst against the side in a cloud of black smoke. Following the hit shell, a salvo followed from the enemy side, and several shells hit the ship or burst at its waterline. … Again 3…4 sighting shots, a hit and a salvo.

The increasing enemy fire and its consequences were observed from the lower bridge of the Oslyabya by galvanizer K. S. Boltyshev:

The shells began to rain down, continuously exploding at the waterline in the bow... Each new ship, making a turn, sent us its first greeting without fail. And we obediently exposed our sides and did nothing, trying only to maintain the formation. When the "Eagle" passed under our bow, the "Oslyabya" already had several holes in the bow, which was not protected by armor, and began to quickly sit down with its bow.

Only the most memorable hits remained in the memory of the battle participants.

One of the first shells hit the right wing of the forward bridge, wounding F. M. Kosinsky and concussing A. I. Osipov.

Another shell knocked off the gaff, after which the stern flag was hoisted on the port end of the main yard.

A large shell exploded on the canopy deck, knocked down the rostra and caused the first large fire. The second large fire broke out on the battery deck near the bakery. Then a huge flame flared up on the poop deck. The fire-hold division selflessly entered the fight against the fire and extinguished these fires.

A 12-inch shell exploded on the battery deck near the capstan drives. The entire forward compartment was filled with thick and suffocating smoke, and a large fire broke out around the feed pipe. The electrical wiring was shorted to the hull, which temporarily de-energized the forward part of the ship. By this time, the forward turret had only fired three shots.

Another 12-inch shell hit just below the previous one and tore open the side of the ship on the living deck near the first bulkhead. Water began to flow into the hole and spread to the adjacent compartments.

D. B. Pokhvistnev and P. F. Uspensky arrived at the site of the hit and called the fire-hold division to seal the hole.

Mine-machine conductor V.N. Zavarin, who was in the underwater mine apparatus room, closed the armored hatch and ordered that the ventilation pipes, through which water was penetrating from the living deck, be plugged.

Two 12-inch shells hit the 2nd coal pit on the living deck in one go. A hole the size of a gate was formed, which the emergency party, led by the ship's engineer K. A. Zmachinsky, tried unsuccessfully to close with shields.

Two other shells penetrated the armour near the waterline, one causing the 10th coal pit to flood, the other the 16th.

A noticeable list to the left side arose, to combat which the turbines of the water drainage system were turned on and counter-flooding began.

The manually controlled forward turret did not have time to fire a single shot. Soon, two 12-inch shells hit it simultaneously. One tore off the left barrel, the second penetrated the roof above the embrasure and exploded inside. V. V. Maikov and most of the crew were killed, the turret was out of action.

One Japanese shell smashed the main topmast, which fell overboard. Another tore a 3-meter hole in the stern and started a large fire.

The compartments not protected by armor seemed to be hell. One after another, Japanese shells tore apart the sides and decks, filling the rooms with suffocating smoke. Fires broke out here and there. It was almost impossible to remain unharmed in this hell. The dressing stations quickly filled with the wounded.

The gunners and crews of the 75mm guns on the left side suffered heavy losses, but continued to fire. The crews of the guns on the right side came to replace the killed and wounded.

The appearance of the Oslyabya at the moment of entering the wake of the Orel was etched into the memory of O. A. Shcherbachev:

Some 10-15 minutes after the battle began, the Oslyabya had no main topmast, the funnels were so riddled with shrapnel that they looked black, not yellow. The wings of the bridge hung down like the wings of a lowered semaphore. The bunks hung out as protection were burning. There were at least 10-15 huge holes in the bow. The deck was pierced in several places.

Fight on parallel courses (14:04-14:22)

Maneuvering scheme in the Battle of Tsushima 14:04-14:22

At 14:04, Oslyabya entered the wake of Orel at a considerable distance, and the Russian squadron formed a battle line. Oslyabya increased speed and soon joined the group of lead ships, but the other ships of the 2nd and especially the 3rd detachments lagged far behind.

By this time, the Prince Suvorov had already suffered extensive damage and was engulfed in numerous fires. The rangefinders, artillery control devices, and communications equipment were smashed. The gunfire weakened. It was impossible to observe or direct the battle from the conning tower because of the smoke and shrapnel from the constantly exploding shells. Z. P. Rozhestvensky could no longer transmit orders to the squadron. He could only lead it in the wake of the Prince Suvorov.

Hitting the battleship Prince Suvorov. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

The Japanese battle line formed almost simultaneously with the Russian one, when at 14:02 the Iwate completed the loop and opened fire with its starboard side. H. Togo's detachment, thanks to its speed advantage over the enemy (15 knots against 11 knots), began to move forward. At 14:07 the Kasuga transferred fire from the Oslyabya, which at that moment was already far beyond its beam.

H. Kamimura's flagship followed the Nissin, but not in its wake, but slightly to the left and at some distance. Iduzo, Azuma, Tokiwa and Yakumo continued firing at Oslyaba, which at that time was sailing almost on a parallel course opposite them. The distance changed slowly, so Azuma and Tokiwa noted the high accuracy of their artillery and numerous hits on target.

At 14:09, a Russian shell damaged the Asama's steering, causing the ship to be disabled, but within 6 minutes it had repaired the damage and was heading at full speed after its detachment.

"Mikasa", having found itself ahead of the enemy, began to envelop its head with small turns to the right and at 14:18 was already heading east. Some Japanese ships transferred fire from "Oslyabya" to the lead ships of the Russian squadron: at 14:17 - "Izumo", at 14:20 - "Yakumo", at 14:22 - "Nissin" and "Tokiwa". "Shikishima" and "Azuma" did not change their target.

"Oslyabya" on the way to disaster

At 14:04, when Oslyabya entered the wake of Orel, almost all of its artillery, with the exception of the bow turret, was still operational. The rangefinder reported the distance to the target, which was successively the cruisers Kasuga, Nissin, and Izumo, which were passing abeam. The guns fired frequently, but with little effect. According to Japanese data, of the three ships listed above, only Izumo was hit by a 14-inch shell at 09:6.

Due to the fact that most of the ships of H. Togo's detachment transferred fire from Oslyabya, the intensity of hits, especially in the bow, decreased. Now the main damage was inflicted by the ships of H. Kamimura's detachment, whose shells predominantly hit the central part of the ship.

By 14:20 all 75mm guns of the upper and lower batteries on the left side were out of action, the semi-ports were smashed, and numerous holes gaped in the unarmored side. The handful of surviving gunners took cover behind the armor on the living deck. On the battery deck, D. B. Pokhvistnev was seriously wounded by shrapnel in the legs.

Both dressing stations were overcrowded with wounded. Doctors did not even have time to examine the wounds. The victims were laid on tarpaulins on the living deck near the mine apparatus.

Three of the five 6-inch guns on the left side were damaged and put out of action. Two shells hit the armor of the upper bow casemate above the embrasure in succession. The first weakened and the second tore off the armor mount. The heavy plate slid down and pinched the gun barrel. The lower bow casemate was also destroyed. The gun and crew of the middle casemate were put out of action by a shell that flew through the embrasure and exploded inside.

An 8-12-inch shell completely demolished the upper bridge and scattered the bodies of the rangefinders and V.P. Paletsky who were there. The rangefinder was destroyed, and the gunners had to independently feel out the distance to the target. The Oslyabya's fire became rare and inaccurate.

At approximately 14:25…14:30, a 12-inch shell hit the side at the waterline opposite the bow turret. A large hole was formed, through which water flooded the 1st and 2nd compartments of the living deck. The bow sank to the level of the hawse holes. The list reached 12 degrees, which caused the last functioning guns to fall silent.

By 14:30, the Oslyabya was a pitiful sight. Both masts were knocked down. The smoke stacks were riddled with shells and shrapnel. The forecastle looked like a shapeless, burning heap of metal. The forward turret was torn from its moorings and tilted to one side. The barrels, one intact and the other broken off, were pointing at the sky at different angles. The upper deck was an impassable ruin. Large fires had engulfed the entire ship. Bunks were burning around the wreckage of the forward bridge, boats and wood supplies were on the rostra, and trim and furniture were burning in the aft wheelhouse and officers' cabins. Flames were shooting up through hatches and holes in the interior, and thick smoke was pouring out. No one was putting out the fires: the water supply was broken, all the hoses were torn, and there were almost no people left in the fire-hold division. Neither the telephone nor the speaking tubes worked.

The teams from the combat cabin had great difficulty reaching the vehicles. Therefore, the Oslyabya sometimes lagged behind the Orel, sometimes approached it to within 50 meters.

The battleship had already lost its combat value, but steadfastly held its place in the line, taking on more and more blows.

The decisive moment of the battle (14:22-14:37)

Maneuvering scheme in the Battle of Tsushima 14:22-14:37

Half an hour after the battle began, the Japanese fleet achieved an overwhelming positional advantage. The lead ships of the Russian squadron found themselves under crossfire from two directions. H. Togo's detachment cut the course and struck from the front with longitudinal fire. H. Kamimura's detachment approached from the beam to the opening range of fire from 3-inch guns.

The battleship Mikasa fires. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

Some ships of the Russian squadron were still trying to carry out Z. P. Rozhestvensky's order and fired their bow guns at the Mikasa, with little effect. But most had already realized the futility of concentrating fire on the Japanese flagship, which had gone far ahead, and had chosen a more convenient target. The Russian squadron's formation had stretched so far that the rear ships found themselves at a huge distance from the enemy and practically dropped out of the battle.

The fire of the majority of the Japanese fleet was concentrated on the Prince Suvorov. The battleship was surrounded by fountains of falling shells, shrouded in thick smoke from fires and endless hits. Often, the Japanese gunners could not discern the contours of the ship, so they either paused or shifted fire to other targets.

Under a continuous hail of shells, the Prince Suvorov was reduced to a pitiful sight. The bow and stern bridges were destroyed, the forecastle was completely consumed by fire. Only the two stern turrets could fire occasionally.

The Alexander III suffered heavy damage. It was engulfed in numerous fires, the bow turret fell silent, and other artillery only occasionally responded to the enemy.

At 14:23 or 14:24, Borodino, which had not yet shown any significant damage, broke down and within a few minutes found itself on the starboard side of Orel, just a few dozen meters away.

The battleship Borodino is out of action. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

Around 14:25, Z. P. Rozhestvensky decided to turn 4 points (45 degrees) to the right to escape the concentrated fire. But at that moment, a large Japanese shell damaged the connection between the steering wheel and the steering mechanism. The Prince Suvorov rolled to the right in a wide arc.

"Emperor Alexander III" initially followed the flagship, but, realizing that it had lost control, at approximately 14:29 it set a course to the east. It was followed first by "Borodino" and then by "Orel", forming a new wake column to the right of the line of ships of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments.

H. Togo noticed the confusion among the enemy ships and at 14:25 and 14:29 turned right twice with the aim of putting a "stick over the T" for them.

Due to smoke or increasing distance to the lead ships, at 14:28 Izumo and Yakumo transferred fire to Oslyabya, which was turning right at that time and dangerously close to Orel. At 14:32 a large shell hit the conning tower, smashed the steering wheel, killed the helmsman I. Sprogis, and wounded V. I. Baer, ​​A. I. Osipov, S. E. Genke and F. M. Kosinsky. The ship, left without control, rolled to the right.

The battleship Oslyabya is out of action. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

"Oslyabya" described a circle, returned to the previous course and tried to return to the formation. A few minutes later it turned again on the starboard side, headed for the end ships of the squadron, slowed down and stopped.

The battleship Oslyabya sails out of formation. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

Around 14:33, Knyaz Suvorov cut through and mixed up the formation of the 2nd armored detachment. Avoiding a collision, Sisoj Velikiy gave full speed and left the flagship astern, while Navarin, letting it pass, left the formation to the left. Knyaz Suvorov completed its circulation and, with difficulty controlling its engines, moved north.

"Emperor Alexander III", leading the squadron, immediately came under concentrated enemy fire and was out of action at about 14:35. The battleship was engulfed in large fires. In many places the black paint had completely burned out and red spots of red lead were visible. The sides, masts and pipes were all riddled with shells. A huge hole gaped under the bow turret.

After the Emperor Alexander III was disabled, the lead ship was Borodino, which almost immediately turned sharply north in order to break through behind the enemy's stern in the direction of Vladivostok.

By this time, three of the five new Russian battleships – Knyaz Suvorov, Imperator Aleksandr III and Oslyabya – had already suffered severe damage and were out of action. The battle line had broken up into separate groups of ships of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armored detachments.

The squadron commander Z. P. Rozhestvensky was seriously wounded and periodically lost consciousness. The flagship lost all means of communication: telegraph, signal lines, signal lights. Access to the open decks for sending signals was closed due to extensive destruction and fires. The order to transfer command to N. I. Nebogatov was not transmitted in time, and the Russian squadron was left without leadership.

The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had already been decided.

The death of "Oslyaby"

At 14:32, the Oslyabya began to gyrate to the right, and soon its list increased so much that water began to flow into the battery through the gun ports. It was not possible to close the doors of the semi-ports - they were broken. Then the crew tried to stop the flow with suitcases, beds and boards, but to no avail - the waves knocked them out again and again.

The list to port and the trim by the bow increased with each passing minute.

Battleship Oslyabya sinks. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

V. I. Baer gave the command to “save yourself,” and decided to share his fate with the battleship and said goodbye to the officers.

At this time, people from the lower rooms rushed up. They ran, grabbing lifebuoys, bibs, beds and simply any floating objects. They pushed in the passages, on the ladders, tripped and knocked each other down, fell, got up and ran on. A terrible howl arose at the dressing stations: the wounded begged to be carried up and clung to the legs of those running past. The engine room crew found themselves locked under heavy armored hatches, which they could not lift. Having climbed out onto the upper deck, some jumped into the water and tried to swim as far away from the doomed ship as possible. Others remained on board until the very end.

The ship's commander, with a bloody bandage on his head and a cigarette in his teeth, stood on the wreckage of the bridge and gave orders. Now he thought only about saving people.

Team save yourself! Take apart the bunks! Save yourself quickly!

G. N. Taube observed the terrible scene of the battleship’s destruction from the Admiral Apraksin, which was passing several hundred meters away:

Several hundred people were crowded on the starboard side, not knowing where to expect help, some were completely naked, others were only half-dressed. Japanese shells kept hitting this group of dying people and exploding in them... And suddenly, as if on command, all the people crowded on the starboard side threw themselves down. Some, standing, slid on their feet, others fell and rolled under their feet, others rolled down on their stomachs with their heads down. Most of them crashed against the side keel and fell into the water already crippled, and in the water an unimaginable pile of drowning bodies formed, calling for help and drowning each other, over which enemy shells continued to explode.

Around 14:49, the Oslyabya lay on its left side. The bow quickly sank into the water, the stern rose slightly, revealing the slowly rotating propellers, and quickly disappeared into the depths. The place of death was filled with all sorts of debris, among which people were swimming, clinging to lifebuoys, bunks or any other large objects.

Battleship Oslyabya sinks. Still from the film Clouds Over the Hills

Rescue of the Oslyabya crew

The destroyers Buiny, Bravy, Bedovy, Bystry and the cruiser Izumrud, which were nearby, rushed towards the still sinking battleship.

"Buyny" came very close to "Oslyaba" when it was still on the surface, threw bunks and lifebuoys to the drowning people. Sailors swimming near the side were pulled on board with ropes. A whaleboat was lowered far to collect those who found themselves there. "Buyny" picked up officers: A. I. Osipov, S. V. Gorchakov, B. P. Kazmichev, A. A. Bertenev, K. P. Liven, three conductors and another 196 sailors. The rescue continued until the destroyer came under fire from Japanese cruisers.

"Bravy" appeared near "Oslyabya" almost simultaneously with "Buiny". Its commander, Lieutenant P. P. Durnovo, left a description of what happened:

As soon as the battleship disappeared under the water, I entered its wreckage and began to pull the drowning people right onto my side, throwing them ropes. … The picture was terrible: in a pile of wreckage, beds and the remains of broken boats, a mass of people swarmed, screaming frantically and breaking each other's ropes, which were being handed over from the side. The enemy shells fell thickly in this place and finished off the swimming people.

"Bravy" rescued officers: M. P. Sablin, P. A. Kolokoltsev, P. S. Bachmanov, B. P. Ivanov, two conductors and 163 sailors. The destroyer picked up people until the last opportunity and left only after a Japanese shell hit it.

The "Bedovy" approached the drowning people, stopped the engines for several minutes, but did not begin the rescue, reversed, turned around and moved towards the disabled "Alexander III".

"Fast" arrived later than the others, stopped to the side, picked up only 10 people and quickly retreated.

The "Brilliant" got a hole and, in order to patch it, was forced to stop not far from the drowning people. During this time, 8 people swam up to it and were lifted on board.

The Izumrud passed the site of the death of the Oslyabya without stopping and only dropped the empty whaleboat, bunks and buoys.

Thanks to the timely command given by V. I. Baer to “abandon the ship”, as well as the brave and decisive actions of the commanders and crews of the destroyers nearby, 405 of the almost 900 people on the Oslyabya crew were saved.

A logical continuation of the description of the participation of the Oslyabya in the Battle of Tsushima will be an analysis of the circumstances and reasons for its death, which will be preceded by an article dedicated to the unsinkability of the battleship.

Comments

[navycat777]

Japan tactically outplayed the Russian squadron, both in terms of the timing of the battle and in terms of the tactics of conducting the battle.

[FoBoss_VM]

Well, there were a lot of other things that came together at one point. The result is of course deplorable...

[bayard]

The Russian squadron was doomed from the start - numerically and qualitatively inferior to the enemy, having a much lower squadron speed, completely unsuitable shells for combat and poor training of artillerymen. Tactics in such situations were secondary and Rozhdestvensky understood this. The only hope was to "endure" the enemy's artillery fire and at least partially break through to Vladivostok. Witte's betrayal and sabotage, which did not allow the required number of ships to be built on time and assembled in Arthur, savings on exercises and firing, an extremely unfortunate choice of projects for the main ships (it was necessary to build according to the "Potemkin/Retvizan" project but with Borodin's machines), the lack of effective high-explosive shells for combat at a distance of 30-40 cables and insufficient armor-piercing shells. Everything that could have been done wrong, the leadership of the Russian Empire did and exceeded the plan in stupidity and incompetence. The Russian Empire became the pinnacle of SHAME of the Romanov dynasty and the system of state management and planning of the Russian Empire. Moreover, all reasonable, sound and simply saving decisions for a future war were rejected, and instead such blatant and simply screaming nonsense and rubbish was implemented ... that it is even shameful to delve into it - there is Treason, Sabotage, Stupidity, Incompetence and Stubbornness in all these qualities at every step. This is exactly the system of governance that the traitors who seized power at the end of 1991 chose for the modern Russian Federation. And this is exactly how it was implemented.
The 2nd squadron should not have gone to Tsushima at all. It was worth making Cam Ranh Bay its operational base, cutting off Japan's supply of military supplies and, in general, Japan's supply, and becoming the factor that would have improved the Russian Empire's position in the negotiations. Because the quadrocopters lost the war both on land and at sea. But the infinitely STUPID Tsar Nikola II sent all the remnants of his absurdly constructed fleet to commit suicide. And this order was extremely categorical... and idiotic at the same time.
The Russian Empire lost the war at the planning stage. And even when it became obvious that war could not be avoided, and they did not have time to build a fleet... they continued to fool around:
- in 1903, almost all experienced gunners were discharged from the Pacific Fleet, although in view of the imminent war, the discharge into the reserve could and should have been delayed. Then, perhaps, they would not have missed so much.
- in 1903, the battleships "Sisov Veliky" and "Navarin" from the Pacific Fleet were sent to Kronstadt for modernization, thereby weakening the Pacific Fleet on the very eve of the war by 2 battleships. It was possible to replace the artillery in Artur by sending specialists and new guns, ammunition. In addition to new guns on the battleships, the coastal defense of Artur and Dalniy would have received eight 12" guns for coastal batteries and 14 six-inch guns. This would have been enough to install a battery on Cape Tiger Tail and to form two batteries for the port of Dalniy.
- "Oslyabya" and "Aurora" could also have ended up in Artur in time.
As a result, by the beginning of the Russian Yamal-Nenets Front we could have formed the Vladivostok cruiser detachment of three Peresvetov ships, three armored raiders, Bayan and Bogatyr. Such a detachment could easily go out against Kamimura's detachment. And in Arthur we would have had 7 (seven) full-fledged (although only two could be considered modern) battleships. And if we hadn't turned up our noses, but in the same 1903 we would have bought the Garibaldi ships (the future Nishin and Kasuga) from Italy and added them to the Arthur detachment, we would have had 9 (nine) armored ships there against Togo's 6 battleships. Kamimura's entire detachment would have had to guard our Vladivostok detachment, and Togo with 6 battleships would hardly have dared to attack Arthur.
But even this was not done in 1903 because of the fantastic stupidity of the Tsar and the evil machinations of Witte. Not even money was allocated for the accelerated completion of the "Borodinets". Not even money for shells for training shooting!! Savings!!! Like game with the coveted "Little Army" on the eve of the "SVO". Everything according to the same patterns. "As under Nicholas II".

[avia12005]

In Russia, politicians have often prevented the military from building an army that could win, and they have done so not without success.

[bayard]

Quote: avia12005

In Russia, politicians often prevented the military from building an army

Is it surprising to lose the war when the Minister of Finance, and then the Prime Minister in the Russian Empire at that time, was a representative of the Rothschild clan (according to Grandmother) - Witte.
And in modern Russia, practically all oligarchs of the 90s are only "trusted owners" or simply managers of assets of the same clan. What kind of sovereignty and sound policy can we talk about if the so-called Central Bank of the Russian Federation is just a branch of the IMF?
And we are still surprised why our quadroplanes are not capable of building civilian and transport aircraft. Why the SVO has been fighting for three years "for the forester's hut" and even the complete liberation of the DPR is still far away (how much fuss is still ahead with the Slavyano-Kramatorsk agglomeration). That there are bridges on the Dnieper, and the leaders of the Kyiv fascists are inviolable and under the guarantee of the guarantor of all guarantees.
Even if the Russian Empire authorities had come to their senses in early 1903, a lot could have been corrected. In addition to what I described above, there was the possibility of not only buying two "Garibaldians" from the Italians (which they simply PERSUADED us to buy, offering to add one and a half stocks of shells), but the owner of the shipyard offered to act as an intermediary (if there was interest) to negotiate with the Argentine authorities about selling us four more of these "cruisers" (in fact, 2nd rank battleships), and there, for symmetry, it would have been possible to buy three Chilean "cruisers" of French construction. Because Argentina and Chile had just made peace, and the ships were ordered for a war with each other because of a border conflict. And they were really ready to sell the ships, because maintaining them was burdensome, and war was no longer in sight. These ships could have been purchased and transferred to Kronstadt by the end of 1903, if the authorities had shown responsibility and efficiency. As a result, the Second Squadron of the Pacific Fleet would have included 4 squadron battleships of the Borodino type, 7 armored cruisers/battleships of the 2nd rank, and three armored deck cruisers, the Oleg, Zhemchug, and Izumrud. With such a composition, the 2nd Squadron could have reached Arthur or Vladivostok by the beginning or middle of summer 1904, even in the event of failures at sea for the 1st Squadron. Break through with a fight and strengthen the Pacific Fleet to ensure a turning point in the war at sea.
But instead, the villain Witte continued to "save".
But as soon as the Russian Revolution began, and so unsuccessfully... and where did all his savings go - in about a year he managed to collect debts from French relatives on behalf of the Russian Empire for 11 billion gold rubles! And to squander them all in a lost war, plunging the Russian Empire into unpayable debts. Because of these debts, the stupid tsar was then dragged into the Entente - against Germany... which was the only one who really helped us with its coal miners and transports, and whose population sincerely supported Russia in that war. Remember the famous song "Varyag" - it was written by a German author, we know it only in translation ... And a tenth of that debt would have been enough for the Russian Empire to cover ALL the costs of full-fledged preparation for war, to build a NORMAL fleet, to strengthen and properly equip the naval bases Arthur, Vladivostok and Dalny (the latter was not fortified at all and did not even have a garrison), to prepare, arm and equip a half-million army for the Far East and deploy it there until the end of 1903. Moreover, Russia would not have had to take loans for this, if the Minister of Finance had not been this upstart, but Sharapov (the organizer of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 8 years (!!!) without loans and budget strain).
And how funny and absurd are those who try to prove that "under the tsars we were oh-so-ho". Alexander III was a more sensible tsar... but Nature took a big rest on his son.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

In addition to what I described above, there was the opportunity not only to buy two "Garibaldians" from the Italians (who simply PERSUADED us to buy, offering in addition one and a half stocks of shells), but the owner of the shipyard offered to act as an intermediary (if there was interest) to negotiate with the Argentine authorities on the sale to us of four more such "cruisers" (in fact, 2nd rank battleships), and there, for symmetry, it was possible to buy three Chilean "cruisers" of French construction.

Could you please share the source of this information and who the author is?

[bayard]

There were quite a lot of sources, 6-7 years ago I became seriously interested in this topic. Of the names of the materials I remember only one source, I think "Exotic Cruisers" - about the story of an attempt to purchase Chilean and Argentine cruisers already in 1904. But then, according to the laws of war, it was forbidden to sell weapons to the warring party and they tried to buy them through an intermediary. It turned out to be an adventure and a scam, and the British scared the Latins. But it was precisely to meet these seven cruisers that Rozhdestvensky went then with five battleships around Africa. There, in one of the bays or near it, a rendezvous point for the meeting was appointed. The meeting did not take place, our ships blabbed in vain, became overgrown with barnacles and algae and barely made it to Madagascar, where they were listed and recovering. Novikov-Priboy also mentions at the level of ship rumors that it was Argentine and Chilean cruisers that were waiting and even crews for them were taken with them. The extra crews from Madagascar were then sent home on German colliers.
During the Russian Revolution itself, the purchase of these cruisers was, of course, an adventure and "Rozhdestvensky's last hope" to obtain at least a somewhat combat-ready group of warships for the war with the Japanese. But in 1903, such a purchase was entirely possible and would not have been particularly difficult. The owner of the Italian shipyard was building a series of six "Gariboldians" for Argentina and was aware of those twists and turns and was even asked to find buyers. For the Russian Empire, the purchase of these ships was also insurance that they would not be sold to Japan.
Moreover, in 1903 there was even an opportunity to buy two battleships being completed for Chile at an English shipyard. The customer refused them, and then in 1904 the English government decided to purchase them for the English Navy in order to exclude the possibility of their purchase by Russia. But Russia was really interested in these battleships (the speed of both was 20 knots, 2x2 10" main battery guns and 12 170 mm guns), but in 1904 these ships were no longer available to us. In 1903, there was a chance to buy not only the "Garibaldians" and the Chilean cruisers of French construction, but also to buy two English battleships that were being completed for Chile... but with the latter, the probability in 1903 was still 50/50, the English could have prohibited such a sale under some pretext... but they certainly would not have fallen into Japanese hands.
If in 1903 the authorities of the Russian Empire had acted as I described, the war with Japan at the beginning of 1904 might not have happened at all - the Japanese certainly would not have taken the risk.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

But it was precisely to meet these seven cruisers that Rozhdestvensky then sailed with five battleships around Africa.

Neither Chile nor Argentina would have sold these ships to Russia. It is enough to look at the so-called "May Agreements" of 1902, concluded between Argentina and Chile, on the issues of fleet reduction and sale of ships under construction. Argentina's financial dependence on England played a significant role in this issue; Chile's was not as big as Argentina's. But all issues, at that time, were resolved through the mediation of the English. This topic is certainly interesting, but unfortunately it is based mainly on rumors and speculation.

[bayard]

Quote: 27091965i

Neither Chile nor Argentina would have sold these ships to Russia.

Here's how to approach the matter, to whom and when. By the time of reconciliation, both countries were in a financial crisis and the sale of ships, the maintenance of which no longer had much significance, replenishment of the treasury and the removal of the heavy burden of maintaining the fleet... then that was the very moment.

Quote: 27091965i

Argentina's financial dependence on England played a significant role in this issue; Chile's was not as big as Argentina's. But all issues at that time were resolved through the mediation of the English.

Our relations with England were not spoiled at that time, and SUCH money for states (and officials!) in a pre-bankrupt state is not lying around on the road. Especially in cash gold. Especially if the uncle of the Russian Tsar himself came to them on a voyage on a luxury steamship with the ballerina Kshesinskaya (sending them off on such a tour in 1903 would have been useful even without such a significant goal). Do not forget that BEFORE the Russo-Japanese War, the status of the Russian Empire and the Russian Tsar was very high throughout the world. Therefore, in the beginning-middle of 1903, they would have sold out for a sweet soul, and a Carnival would have been held in joy. As if they were thanking the saviors.

Quote: 27091965i

All issues, at that time, were resolved through the mediation of the British.

According to the materials of the British themselves, they were very afraid that Russia could actually buy these cruisers, and even more so those two battleships that were still under construction at its shipyards. But they also claimed that they would not be able to put pressure openly and the most they counted on was that Witte would not give money to the naval department for such a purchase. After all, he gave money for the construction of ships in Russia with such reluctance and with excuses/delays ... and even forced them to save on shells and exercises. So reasonable actions were possible only with the removal of Witte in early 1903, the appointment of Sharapov as Minister of Finance, the allocation of gold (and/or silver) from the reserves for the urgent purchase of ships abroad and the allocation of funds for the preparation of Arthur, Vladivostok and Dalny for defense, and the land army in the Far East for war. Sharapov would have found it even without foreign loans.
And the British only had a reason to hinder and harm us after the Gul Incident.

Quote: 27091965i

This topic is certainly interesting, but unfortunately it is based mainly on rumors and speculation.

Nothing of the sort, reread Novikov-Priboy's "Tsushima" in the place where they were waiting at the rendezvous point for these cruisers. "All they talk about is the Chilean and Argentine cruisers that our agents must drive to the rendezvous point. All hopes are pinned on them alone in the future campaign" - the quote is approximate, from memory.
They didn’t like to remember Witte’s scam in the Russian Empire, because there was already more Shame than Everest, and then the young tsar was taken in like a market sucker by crooked bankers... to whom the Russian Empire, after the Russian Revolution, owed 11 billion rubles in GOLD.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

Nothing of the sort, reread Novikov-Priboy's "Tsushima" in the place where they were waiting at the rendezvous point for these cruisers. "All they talk about is the Chilean and Argentine cruisers that our agents must drive to the rendezvous point. All hopes are pinned on them alone in the future campaign" - the quote is approximate, from memory.

To be honest, I won’t reread “Tsushima”, it’s just a book, and Novikov-Priboy is a writer, not a historian.

According to the materials of the British themselves, they were very afraid that Russia could actually buy these cruisers, and especially those two battleships that were still being built at its shipyards. But they also claimed that they would not be able to put pressure openly and the most they counted on was that Witte would not give money to the naval department for such a purchase.

Where do you get this?
The British were not afraid of anything, I will give you articles from the concluded agreement and I think you will understand who decided the issue of selling ships under construction to Chile and Argentina.

" Article 2. Both High Contracting Parties mutually agree to place immediately the ships now under construction at the disposal of His Britannic Majesty, Arbitrator, appointed by the Treaty of May 28, 1902.
Article 3. The two High Contracting Parties shall immediately inform the shipbuilders of the fact that the ships, by common consent of both Governments, have been placed at the disposal of the arbitrator, appointed in the Treaty of May 28, 1902, without whose express order they may not be transferred to any nation or individual."

The British decided to whom these ships would be sold, not Witte.

[bayard]

Quote: 27091965i

I won’t reread “Tsushima”, it’s just a book, and Novikov-Priboy is a writer, but not a historian.

Novikov-Priboy is not just a writer, he was a participant in that campaign - he was a battaller on the battleship "Orel". So he described this campaign from his diaries, which he kept throughout the campaign, and from the testimony/stories of sailors from other ships during their captivity in Japan. Of course, he did not know any details, but he mentioned that while standing at the rendezvous point, the conversations were only about the cruisers that our agents were supposed to bring. At first, when the sailors learned why they had come to this distant wilderness, there was great inspiration and anticipation ... and then bewilderment began to give way to confusion and awareness of the depth of the approaching ass. And they stood there for quite a long time.

Quote: 27091965i

Article 3. The two High Contracting Parties shall immediately inform the shipbuilders of the fact that the ships, by common consent of both Governments, have been placed at the disposal of the arbitrator appointed in the Treaty of May 28, 1902, without whose express order they cannot be transferred to any nation or private person."

Apparently, in Russia they had no idea about the contents of this treaty. Perhaps its contents were secret for some time... Because it is simply sadistically enslaving, free countries and leaders will never sign such an abomination.

Quote: 27091965i

Where do you get this?

Yes, from the history of those very battleships that the British kept for themselves.
Maybe the agreement only refers to ships built in England?
Don't forget that the "Garibaldi" were built by an Italian shipyard, and Chile had rather unique ships of French construction.

Quote: 27091965i

"Article 2. Both High Contracting Parties mutually agree to place immediately the ships now under construction at the disposal of His Britannic Majesty, the Arbitrator appointed by the Treaty of May 28, 1902.

That's right - we are talking about those two battleships that were built in England for Chile. The other ships were already in service with the navies of these countries.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

That's right - we are talking about those two battleships that were built in England for Chile. The other ships were already in service with the navies of these countries.

I'll write it again, I highlighted it so it's clear;
"Article 2. Both The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to immediately provide the vessels currently under construction , at the disposal of His Britannic Majesty, the Arbitrator appointed by the Treaty of May 28, 1902."

[bayard]

Quote: 27091965i

immediately provide ships currently under construction

Quote: 27091965i

By the Treaty of May 28, 1902."

At that time, two second-rank battleships were being built in England and two second-rank battleships in Italy. THAT'S IT. The remaining ships were in service with both fleets and the letter of the treaty did not apply to them.

Quote: 27091965i

I highlighted it to make it clear;

From this it is clear that England obliged the peacemaking parties to sell the ships UNDER CONSTRUCTION, which they already then intended to abandon, through the mediation of England and only with England’s approval.
But even in this case it is interesting... how then did the Italian shipbuilder offer its "Garibaldians" to Russia? After all, there is no doubt that it did offer them, it was widely known and discussed in the Fleet, in Society, and in the foreign press. The Italian shipbuilder officially offered its ships to the Russian Fleet, offering the option of one and a half ammunition complement of shells.
Moreover, all 7 combat ships did not fall under the terms of this agreement.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

THAT'S IT. The remaining ships were in service with both fleets and the letter of the treaty does not apply to them.

You are mistaken, according to the agreement between the fleets of Chile and Argentina, parity was to be established, the remaining ships were to be disarmed and mothballed. Neither side would sell these ships. Since this weakened the fleet, neither side wanted this. In order to order the construction of a ship to replace an obsolete one, one of the parties had to notify the other party eighteen months in advance and agree on the laying of the keel with it. Therefore, Russia could not buy any armored ships from Chile or Argentina. These countries simply would not sell them.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

But how then did the Italian shipbuilder offer his "Garibaldians" to Russia? After all, there is no doubt that he offered them, it was widely known and discussed in the Fleet, in Society, and in the foreign press. The Italian shipbuilder officially offered his ships to the Russian Fleet, offering the option of one and a half ammunition complement of shells.

You can discuss anything, even a flight to Mars, but you need documentary confirmation of the appeal to the Russian government or to the Naval Department of the shipyard owner, in addition, the shipyard owner builds ships for the customer's money and is not the owner of the ships.

[bayard]

Quote: 27091965i

according to the agreement between the fleets of Chile and Argentina, parity was to be established,

What kind of parity could we talk about if Chile had 3 (three) 2nd-rank cruisers/battleships with artillery arranged in a diamond formation, and Argentina had 4 (four!) 2nd-rank battleships in service with main battery artillery in two twin-gun turrets? The Chileans had a main battery broadside of 9 guns, and the Argentines had a broadside of 16 8" guns. What kind of parity is there? Qualitative parity would only be achieved after both fleets had been supplied with 2 ordered battleships. But they refused them. So parity could only be achieved by selling all their ships and ordering new ones by agreement of the parties. so that there is parity.

Quote: 27091965i

Russia could not buy any armored ships from Chile or Argentina. These countries simply would not sell them.

In 1903 they would have sold it with pleasure - they had already changed their minds about fighting, they would have received a pile of money in GOLD (this with their upset finances), and there would have been no particular hurry to order new ships, and when would they be built anyway... And the money for the ships - here it is. Such a decision would have been very beneficial to both countries. And all the available ships were not included in the terms of the agreement.

Quote: 27091965i

The shipyard owner builds ships for the customer's money and is not the owner of the ships.

No, back then there was a completely different practice (as often happens now) - the customer pays a deposit or an advance, and the shipbuilder builds the ships using his own or credit funds. Full payment is made only after the ship is delivered to the customer. So the owner of the shipyard was vitally interested in the ships not being left hanging after completion. In addition, the Italian shipbuilder claimed that he was acting at the request and on behalf of the Argentine government. So his offer to act as an intermediary in the purchase of another 4 already operational "Garibaldians" for Russia was also quite reasonable - he was counting on a good commission.

Quote: 27091965i

You can discuss anything, even a flight to Mars, but you need documentary confirmation of the appeal to the Russian government or to the Naval Department of the rope owner.

A very strange premise... I am writing about events that are well known, mentioned in dozens if not hundreds of works, reference books, memoirs, periodicals of that time, scientific works and even in fiction. These are well known facts and do not need additional proof, because they were written about starting with the periodicals of that time and throughout the subsequent period. But about what you cited, for example, I hear for the first time. But I admit that such articles in the 1902 treaty really did exist, but they were secret or non-public in nature and the government of the Republic of Ingushetia did not know about these points. Otherwise, they would not have allocated such colossal funds in gold to ransom these cruisers with an overpayment and through intermediaries. They would not have sent five of their battleships around Africa to meet these cruisers at a rendezvous point near the southwestern coast and would not have carried crews for them. These are again well-known facts, participants of that campaign and those events wrote about them in their memoirs, memoirs and books. Even the steward of the battleship "Orel" and ordinary sailors knew about this during the long wait.
But today this has no meaning - the Russian Empire lost the Russian Empire at the level of its planning and the entire preparatory period. After it began to change anything, it was already too late - it was forbidden to sell weapons to the warring countries. England, of course, supplied Japan with replacement weapons, shells, etc., but this was already contraband.

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

So, it was possible to achieve parity only by selling all of their ships and ordering new ones by agreement of the parties so that there would be parity.

The order of the fleets was determined with the help of the English Admiralty.
"Article 4. In order to establish a fair balance between the two fleets, the Republic of Chile will disarm the battleship "Capitán Prat" and the Argentine Republic will disarm its armored cruisers "Garibaldi" and "Pueyrredón"".

These are again well-known facts, participants of that campaign and those events wrote about them in their memoirs, memoirs and books. Even the steward of the battleship "Orel" and ordinary sailors knew about this during the long wait.

If you are so sure about this, I will ask you a question. The cruiser crew has an average of 500 to 600 people, in total it is 3000 to 4000 people. On which ships of the 2TOE were these crews placed, if a simple butler knew about their presence?

Wouldn't they have sent five of their battleships around Africa to meet these cruisers at a rendezvous point off the southwest coast?

Or maybe Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not want to deepen the Suez Canal?

No, back then there was a completely different practice (as often now) - the customer pays a deposit or advance, and the shipbuilder builds ships using his own or credit funds. Full payment only after the ship is delivered to the customer.

Payment is made in parts according to the signed contracts, in order for the building shipyard to become the owner of the ship, an official refusal of the customer's country is required. There was no such refusal and the ships continued to be built. This was indicated when Chile and Argentina ratified the treaty in January 1903.

[bayard]

Quote: 27091965i

"Article 4. In order to establish a fair balance between the two fleets, the Republic of Chile will disarm the battleship Capitán Prat, and the Argentine Republic will disarm its armored cruisers Garibaldi and Pueyrredón.

Yes, they were tightly taken into circulation. But the potential can be equalized this way.

Quote: 27091965i

If you are so sure about this, I will ask you a question. The cruiser crew has an average of 500 to 600 people, in total it is 3000 to 4000 people. On which ships of the 2TOE were these crews placed, if a simple butler knew about their presence?

Here I can only assume that these crews could have been placed both on the five battleships and on the colliers accompanying the detachment. It was also possible to transport around Africa not full crews, but only ferry crews and specialists for the acceptance of ships. And the rest of the crew members could have gone on other ships of the squadron through Suez and waited at Madagascar. But this is just speculation. I only know that there were crews for the cruisers at the rendezvous point, they stood and waited there for quite a long time, how the mood of the crews and officers changed during this standstill is also described by Novikov-Priboy. Not much of a witness, but a participant in the campaign. I also read about this in other sources. But I do not archive what I read and it was quite a long time ago, I was simply interested in the topic and wanted to understand. And it looks like the Russian Empire's leadership was deliberately led around Africa by the nose while the Japs were finishing off Port Arthur and the 1st squadron. But precisely because the Russian Empire's leadership went for this scam, clutching at a straw like a drowning man, it means that in Russia they didn't know about the contents of this treaty and didn't know about the degree of control the British Admiralty had over the governments of Argentina and Chile.

Quote: 27091965i

Or maybe Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not want to deepen the Suez Canal?

For no other battleships did they have to deepen, and they didn't think of unloading the "Borodinets" to reduce the draft. All these problems with the draft were most likely invented to cover up the reason for such a strange route of the battleships.
And for some time they were accompanied along Africa by all 10 of the newest English armored cruisers, provoking them in every possible way and aiming their guns, arranging reorganizations and other showing off. Thus showing "we know why you went there, we control". After such a demonstration of control and awareness, even if the Chileans and Argentines wanted to quietly sell the ships through an intermediary, they definitely changed their minds. In any case, at the appointed rendezvous point, our ships blabbed in vain. After that, the campaign could not have continued. Especially since, having arrived at Madagascar, news soon arrived of Arthur's fall.
In a word, the military-political leadership of the Republic of Ingushetia, headed by Nikola-2, can be given a solid rating for the preparation and conduct of the Russian Nuclear War.
WITH MINUS.

[Senior seaman]

I only know that there were commands for the cruisers at the rendezvous point

Seriously?

[27091965]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Seriously?

Good afternoon.
Dear Ivan, to be honest, I don't think you take this seriously. Besides, you understand perfectly well that considering the issue of Russia acquiring ships from Chile and Argentina based on Novikov-Priboy is more like a joke.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: 27091965i

Good afternoon.

My regards

Quote: 27091965i

Dear Ivan, to be honest, I don’t think you take this seriously.

Of course not)))

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

Yes, they were tightly taken into circulation. But the potential can be equalized this way.

You can write it like that, but no one took them into circulation. Chile and Argentina signed a treaty in 1836. According to it, all territorial disputes that lead to war must be resolved with the help of an "Arbitrator". Which is a country friendly to both of them. Such a country was England, and one group of English banks "invested" money in the development of Argentina, and the second group of English banks in the development of Chile. London could not allow a war between Chile and Argentina, and as a result, large losses for English banks.

For no other battleships did they have to deepen, and they didn't think of unloading the "Borodinets" to reduce the draft. All these problems with the draft were most likely invented to cover up the reason for such a strange route of the battleships.

All these theories "aren't worth a dime", compare the number of personnel of 2TOE and the required number of personnel for seven cruisers. Everything will become clear, they can be placed on coal carriers only in the holds intended for transporting coal. For personnel, it is necessary to re-equip cargo holds to accommodate personnel.
Do not use Novikov-Priboy as the "ultimate truth" and other theories not supported by documents.
Well, the cruisers under construction in Chile and Argentina would have been sold in any case, but not to Russia. You are missing the treaty concluded between England and Japan on January 30, 1902.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: bayard

Argentina has 4 (four!) second-rank battleships in service with main battery artillery in two twin-gun turrets?

Eh... A little bit wrong))
Only the San Martin had four eight-inch guns, the others had single-gun turrets with 10"

[27091965]

Quote: bayard

But how then did the Italian shipbuilder offer his "Garibaldians" to Russia? After all, there is no doubt that he offered them, it was widely known and discussed in the Fleet, in Society, and in the foreign press. The Italian shipbuilder officially offered his ships to the Russian Fleet, offering the option of one and a half ammunition complement of shells.

You can discuss anything, even a flight to Mars, but you need documentary confirmation of the appeal to the Russian government or to the Naval Department of the shipyard owner, in addition, the shipyard owner builds ships for the customer's money and is not the owner of the ships.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: bayard

The war with Japan in early 1904 might not have happened at all - the Japanese certainly would not have taken the risk.

All those interested in the topic of Russian-Japanese relations at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries agree on the idea of ​​the inevitability of conflict. There is only one question - when.
And for Russia, in fact, the conflict in 1904 was even more beneficial - provided, of course, that they had won)
But they couldn't.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Trapper7

And for Russia, in fact, the conflict in 1904 was even more beneficial

Why?

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Quote: Trapper7

And for Russia, in fact, the conflict in 1904 was even more beneficial

Why?

Because it allowed us to relieve tension on the eastern border of the empire and fully concentrate against Germany. Otherwise, we would have simply had to keep large forces in both the west and the east at the same time, which was already difficult for the empire.

[Senior seaman]

I'm afraid I didn't quite understand your train of thought.
The war had already begun in 1904. The priority units remained on the Western border, and reserves were brought into the army from the Eastern provinces.
Anyway...

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Senior Sailor

I'm afraid I didn't quite understand your train of thought.

Let's just assume that the "peace party" won in Japan, which the "war party" seemed to be very afraid of, and taking into account Russia's proposals, some agreement was concluded between the countries that relieved tension in the Far East in 1904. But will this agreement be durable? The point of tension between the countries will still remain, which means we will have to fortify Port Arthur, build a fleet there, and keep an army. Japan is already building two battleships and two armored cruisers (quite powerful for their time).
England's position in this situation also remains unclear.
Of course, this is an alternative, but how in this case can resources be optimally distributed between strengthening the Baltic and Pacific fleets?
IMHO, was Russia able to maintain two powerful fleets at that time? And if we ignore the "fish factor" (Pacific Fleet) and engage in the Baltic - it means that Japan will soon gain a serious advantage at sea... And what will it do in the case of August 1, 1914? Will it decide that its time has come?
And in order to relieve this tension we had to either inflict a decisive defeat on the Japanese in 1904-5, or lose, because I don’t believe in a final diplomatic solution – there are too many ambitions on both sides.
These thoughts lead me to the conclusion that "the war was optimal in the period 1904-1905."
But I could be wrong and I would be grateful for your opinion.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Trapper7

But will this agreement be durable?

And why not?
The solution was essentially obvious. Agree on spheres of influence. We don't interfere in Korea, they don't interfere in Manchuria.

Quote: Trapper7

This means we will have to fortify Port Arthur.

That's how it was done anyway... They would have completed the line of fortifications, expanded the dock. They would have deepened the passage to the inner roadstead, perhaps dug another one (there were such plans).

Quote: Trapper7

England's position in this situation also remains unclear.

Not really... First they settled relations with the Franks, then with us. Because Germany with its ambitions is much more dangerous for them.

Quote: Trapper7

But I could be wrong.

And me too...

Quote: Trapper7

I will be grateful to you for your opinion.

you have to think about it
But overall, it’s an interesting option.

[faiver]

And for Russia, in fact, the conflict in 1904 was even more beneficial

- this is despite the fact that the Russian Empire was completely unprepared for war?

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: faiver

- this is despite the fact that the Russian Empire was completely unprepared for war?

Why do you think that the state (precisely the state) was not ready?
Yes, the Far East was problematic from a logistical point of view, yes, Japan forestalled our deployment, yes, the surprise attack on the first day allowed the enemy to immediately gain supremacy at sea... But this does not mean that Russia automatically lost this war. The army was replenished, supplies were established, reinforcements for the fleet were being prepared in the Baltic, the state as a state fulfilled its functions on the whole.
The battle near Liaoyang was practically won by Kuropatkin and only an incorrect assessment of the situation led to the adoption of an incorrect decision, which led to catastrophic long-term consequences - the enemy received an excellent base, coal mines (for wintering) and was able to completely occupy Port Arthur.
But a bad commander does not mean that the state itself is not ready for war. At the same time, neither Kuropatkin nor Rozhestvensky were stupid degenerates, on the contrary, in previous years they had proven themselves to be competent specialists. The Tsar, again, had no reason not to trust them.
But that's my personal opinion.

[bayard]

Quote: Trapper7

All those interested in the topic of Russian-Japanese relations at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries agree on the idea of ​​the inevitability of conflict. There is only one question - when.

Well, yes, England insisted that Japan start the war immediately after the delivery of the last new ships - in mid-1903. The Japanese were stalling for time, hastily practicing the fusion of crews, maneuvers with reorganizations and shooting a lot. And they decided to go to war only after American banks gave them a loan of 100 million dollars, and the British helped negotiate the buyout of two "Garibaldians" that Russia had previously refused. The Japanese needed such an influential intermediary as England to buy ships from the Italians, and Russia was offered these ships and even persuaded ... at the price of an armored "Bogatyr"! With one and a half sets of shells for all guns!! HOW could such a chance be missed?

Quote: Trapper7

for Russia, in fact, the conflict in 1904 was even more beneficial

What for? Russia got this war in 1904. And it had no chance to win. The quadrobers were not prepared for the war, but they loaded icons to the front in wagons - God help us.
If only they had woken up at the beginning of 1903, overthrown Witte, allocated money for urgent completion of the ships, bought all the ships that were available for purchase (Chilean and Garibaldian), transferred "Oslyabya" and "Aurora" to Arthur... Then the Japanese would have thought 100 times whether it was worth the risk. After all, they finally decided to go to war only after they were helped to buy "Nishin" and "Kasuga", only then. And what if by that time these were already our ships and they arrived in Arthur? And "Oslyabya" is also already in the Pacific Fleet and all three "Peresvetovtsy" together with "Bayan" are part of the "Vladivostok detachment? If "Sisoy" and "Navarin" were not sent to Kronstadt, and the artillery was replaced right in Artur by workers sent on assignment, thanks to which it was immediately possible to sharply strengthen the coastal defense of Artur and Dalniy? Would they have decided?
But what if they had known that the work on completing and preparing the "Borodinets" for the campaign was proceeding at an accelerated pace and that already in the spring of 1904 they would be ready to move to Arthur? What if they had heard even out of the corner of their ear that the Tsar's uncle, the General-Admiral, with his ballerina was not just carousing while traveling on a steamship, but had already bought and driven Chilean and Argentine cruisers to the Mediterranean? And that they were now being hastily repaired and brought to full readiness at Italian and French shipyards (where they were built)? Would they have decided?
If such measures had been taken in 1903, then by the summer the 2nd Pacific Squadron, consisting of four "Borodinets", seven armored cruisers and three armored decks "Oleg", "Izumrud" and "Zhemchug", would have already dropped anchor in Arthur's harbor. And only then - YES, in the second half of 1904 Russia itself could have started a war against Japan and won it with certainty and fairly quickly.

[Khibiny Plastun]

The battleships Swiftsure and Triomphe carried 14 190 mm of auxiliary caliber, not 170 mm. And in your alternative history, with hindsight, only the enemies make mistakes. But this does not happen in reality.

[bayard]

Quote: Khibiny Plastun

The battleships Swiftsure and Triomphe carried 14 190 mm secondary guns instead of 170 mm.

Thanks for correcting me, I wrote from memory without looking at the sources, and I haven't looked at the sources for many years. An unusual caliber for England for auxiliary artillery, possibly the result of a competition for a new auxiliary caliber, for their battleships the British chose 8", but for Chile they could have offered 190 mm caliber guns that did not pass the competition. Such a caliber has never been encountered anywhere else.

Quote: Khibiny Plastun

In your alternative history, with hindsight, only the enemies make mistakes.

So I didn't seem to write about the enemies' mistakes at all, are you sure you got it wrong? I didn't even write about mistakes, but about the squalls of stupidity, tyranny, sabotage and wrecking in the Russian Empire on the eve of the Russian Revolution. And about the possibility of somehow correcting the results of this villainy, if at least in early 1903 the Russian Empire came to its senses, removed the Devil Witte and made a number of reasonable decisions. But even in this case, the Pacific Fleet's chances were 50/50 at best. Because only six Russian battleships could fight at the same speed as the Japanese, even after the arrival of the "Borodinites" - 4 "Borodinites", "Tsesarevich", "Retvizan". THAT'S ALL. Two "Poltavts" had a maximum speed of 17 knots, and the third one - more than 15 knots. "Sisoy" and "Navarin" also in real life no more than 15 knots. And if you take into account the idiotic architecture of the "Borodinets" and their tendency to capsize, their high unarmored sides ... in a stubborn battle they would have a really hard time. So the only thing left would be to crush with mass/numbers, but at lower speeds.
And yes, in the event of our acquisition of the "Garibaldians" and/or Chilean and Argentine cruisers, England would have only had to sell the Japanese two battleships built for Chile... and as it turns out, according to the terms of the peace treaty between Chile and Argentina, the ships that were still under construction could only be sold by the country with the permission and mediation of England. So perhaps the real reason for refusing to purchase the future "Nishin" and "Kasuga" was precisely the terms of this treaty... but they preferred not to talk about it publicly. So even if we had managed to further strengthen the Pacific Fleet by the end of 1903 and even managed to buy 7 cruisers from Chile and Argentina ... we still would not have had time to transfer these cruisers to the Pacific Fleet - the crews had to master the ships, the ships themselves had to be prepared for "battle and campaign", so only as part of the 2nd squadron with the "Borodinites" and not earlier than mid-1904. In response to this, England would have only sold the Japanese two more battleships built for "Chile". And then our Pacific Fleet would have had to face not 14, but 16 armored ships of the Japanese battle line ... and they might not have been able to wait for the "Borodinites". And having waited and joined forces with the 2nd squadron... they also might not have been able to withstand a Japanese battle line of SUCH quality... England had its own aces up its sleeves for this. So if you play "on cards" in staff games, then... the defeat of the Russian Empire and the stupid Tsar Nikola-2 was predetermined at the planning stage of this war. Everything else is just mental gymnastics.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: bayard

The British chose 8" for their battleships , but for Chile they could have offered 190 mm caliber guns that did not pass the competition.

Lord bless you, 8" limeys were used for export and re-equipping really old battleships. They never put them on new ones.

Quote: bayard

Because even after the arrival of the "Borodinets", only six Russian battleships could fight at the same speed as the Japanese - 4 "Borodinets", "Tsarevich", "Retvizan". THAT'S ALL

Where did they put the Peresvets?

[bayard]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Where did they put the Peresvets?

Transferred to Vladivostok together with "Bayan" to counterbalance Kamimura's detachment, to draw all 6 of his cruisers towards himself. But it still doesn't work out very well - the Japanese will always have a higher squadron speed. But still, Arthur's battleships have a chance of success. True, the quality of the shells and the accuracy of fire... But a chance appears, we are not giving up supremacy at sea, it becomes possible to march to the ports of Korea to disrupt the logistics of the land army.

[Khibiny Plastun]

I don't know what would have happened if What? But both Chile and Argentina approached the Russian government, through the same Rothschilds, with an offer to sell ships, and more than once. If the Empire's officials had immediately, without bargaining, laid out the money, then hardly anyone would have replayed the accomplished fact of the purchase. Britain would not have entered into conflict in 1903. And so we have what we have.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: avia12005

In Russia, politicians have often prevented the military from building an army that could win, and they have done so not without success.

Very controversial. The military, without a clearly defined task from politicians, as a rule, do some kind of crazy things or just sleep peacefully until the fried rooster pecks.

[TermNachTer]

The option of "enduring it" is unlikely to work. Rozhestvensky is not a complete layman after all and he received some information from both Arthur and Vladivostok. Unfortunately, he did not give any clear answers on this issue after returning from captivity.

[Non-fighter]

Rozhdestvensky is not a complete layman after all, and he received some information from both Arthur and Vladivostok.

Battle in the Yellow Sea. Our battleships "took the hit" normally, NOT A SINGLE battleship was lost from artillery fire!!! Therefore, he assumed that he would lose some ships but would break through to Vladivostok, the Japanese had limited ammunition.

[TermNachTer]

The duration of the battle is assumed to be very different. After the battle at Cape Shantung, the 1st TO very quickly returned to Arthur, and they did not really chase after it. In the situation of Rozhdestvensky, at a speed of 9 knots, and then even less because of the damaged ships, it was assumed to crawl to Vladik for three days? During this time, some of the damaged ones could have sunk themselves, without the help of the Japanese.

[Non-fighter]

What about the options? You do not dispute the existence of the order "Go to Vladivostok". The raised signal "NO 23" is an order to break through to Vladivostok at all costs. However, as practice has shown, even such a kick did not help some captains :( Furthermore, Rozhdestvensky could not catch up with the Japanese, nor give battle on his own terms. He played with the cards that were dealt to him :( His reorganization at the beginning of the battle was an attempt to improve the position a little. What else can be done? Sit out in Cam Ranh as they suggest here?

[TermNachTer]

There is a saying - "A ram, at the head of a pack of lions))) that's all Rozhdestvensky did. He gave the command to break through to Vladivostok, that's where his leadership of the battle ended. The 2nd TO should have been stopped immediately, as soon as Artur was surrendered. Only the most stupid did not understand that they were going to their deaths at the 2nd TO. The mistake of a sucker, when playing with cheaters, is that he takes the cards in his hands.

[Non-fighter]

The 2nd maintenance should have been stopped immediately after Artur passed.

So Rozhestvensky understood it already in Madagascar. He sat there and waited for the order "back", but he was ORDERED (not "he" but "him"!!!) "forward". Read the same Novikov-Priboy, he has how Rozhestvensky corresponded with Petersburg from Nossi-Bay.
And again, he was able to drag the squadron across half the world to the battle in full force, which is already a lot.

[rytik32]

Quote: Not the fighter

He sat there and waited for the order "back", but he was ORDERED (not "he" but "him"!!!) "forward".

There is such an interesting point.
As is well known, Vladivostok is a freezing port. And if Rozhestvensky had not been delayed in Madagascar, he would have arrived at Vladivostok just when the port froze. Question: how could we do without an icebreaker?
It seems that 2TOE initially took "Ermak" with them just for this case, but they sent it back from the Danish coast. So, it was decided that 2TOE would not go to Vladivostok? That's a very interesting question.

[TermNachTer]

In Vladikavkaz there were icebreaker steamships that took the cruisers out to sea, so there would have been someone to meet them if they had come.

[rytik32]

How can I contact Vladivostok so that they can meet me in advance?
How to prevent an icebreaker from being blown up by mines?
... there are many questions

[TermNachTer]

Vladik is approaching, send ahead whoever has the best speed. Did they plant mines in the ice? This is the first time I've heard of such things.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

Were mines placed in the ice?

More likely just in the sea. Then it froze, but the mines didn't go anywhere.

[TermNachTer]

I think that before it froze, the mines were simply blown away by storms.

[rytik32]

The mines are anchored underwater, with ice on top. There is wind above the ice. The mines will not be torn off.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

the mines were simply blown away by the storms.

Why did it happen?

[TermNachTer]

Because while there is ice - in the fall, there are storms and mines are torn off from the mine hooks.

[TermNachTer]

Quite a common phenomenon, mine reps are thin things and not designed for heavy loads. Read the memoirs, minefields were restored after storms, and after the winter, everything started all over again.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

Because while there is ice - in the fall, there are storms and mines are torn off from the mine hooks.

Yeah. It happens. He'll pick one, two. Ten. God bless him, let it be half. The rest will remain.

Quote: TermNachTER

Read the memories

Was reading.

Quote: TermNachTER

and after the winter, everything started all over again.

Minefields need to be renewed from time to time, that's true. But to expect all the mines to fall off the mine-racks and clear the passage exactly where you need them is the height of arrogance.

[TermNachTer]

You saw a minefield, if sclerosis doesn't change, 1908 model, in Sevastopol, in the Marine Museum. The minefield is a very thin thing, for a thing weighing almost half a ton. So, after a good storm, it's good if there are only a few left.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

So, after a good storm, it’s good if only a few remain.

Yeah. No wonder they were trawling until the end of 1923. There were probably no storms at all))))

[Senior seaman]

Quote: rytik32

And if Rozhestvensky had not lingered in Madagascar, he would have arrived in Vladivostok just as the port froze over.

Hmm... they arrived in Madagascar in mid-December. They would have stood around for a while anyway. They reached Cam Ranh in a month. From Indochina to Tsushima another two weeks.

Quote: rytik32

So, it turns out that they decided that 2TOE won't go to Vladivostok? That's a very interesting question.

[TermNachTer]

Novikov - Priboy - a simple sailor. What could he know about the transfers between Rozhestvensky and St. Petersburg? The courage of a commander (naval commander) is not to stupidly follow orders, but to think with your own head and make the right decisions. The fact that Rozhestvensky did not believe in a successful outcome of the battle was said and written by both the staff officers and the officers of the Suvorov. That he would still be made the scapegoat and would be judged, in any case he knew. Why did he lead people to death?

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: TermNachTER

Why did you lead people to their death?

Judging by what is known about his relations with St. Petersburg, he had only one option - to commit suicide.
Then someone else would have led the squadron and little would have changed.

[TermNachTer]

Well, why shoot yourself right away? He went ashore, boarded a French steamship, and went to France. He wouldn't have died of hunger, maybe he would have worked for the French as a moonlighter. In 20 years, there were many like him there.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

The duration of the battle is expected to vary greatly.

You assume. The rest know that she was comparable

[TermNachTer]

Comparable to whom and with what?

[Glory1974]

At Tsushima, our ships received the main damage in the first 30-40 minutes of the battle.
In the Yellow Sea, the first phase of the battle is also about 40 minutes.
The damage is incomparable.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: glory1974

The damage is incomparable.

But the combat distances and the forces involved are also slightly different.

[Glory1974]

And so the fight continued.
But besides shooting, there is also tactics. How they maneuvered, where they moved, how they hit.

[Senior seaman]

The fact that the fight dragged on was not so much Vitgeft’s merit (although there are no complaints against him), but Togo’s mistake.
As soon as he stopped messing around and went into a clinch, the Russian squadron took a lot of hits and only the end of the battle prevented the Japanese from completing the rout.
In Tsushima, Togo did not make such mistakes.

[TermNachTer]

Shantung had 6 Russian battleships, fairly modern, against 4 Japanese, that's the problem.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

Shantung had 6 Russian battleships, fairly modern, against 4 Japanese

Four. The Peresvets are still not considered full-fledged battleships.
In general, approximate parity. Most of the fight is six on six. Unless, of course, you go into some technical details

[TermNachTer]

Well, comparing "Peresvets" with "Garibaldians"? You'll have to excuse me. "Peresvet" is a second-class EBR, but they are BrKR, no matter how you look at it. As well as the periodic fate of "Asama" and "Yakumo".

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

Well, compare "Peresvets" with "Garibaldi"?

And with "Mikasa" or "Shikishima"? The difference is about the same.

Quote: TermNachTER

As well as the periodic fate of "Asama" and "Yakumo".

"Asama" didn't get into the lineup at all, and "Yakumo" in the last half hour. That's why it's 6x6

[TermNachTer]

Well, on "Mikasa" and Co., the armor is designed to withstand hits of 10 and 12 inches, and the "Garibaldi" did not sign up for this. For them, even one hit of 12 inches can be critical. As far as I understand, they were not particularly shot at, because they were not taken seriously.

[rytik32]

I fully share your opinion. They have a 120 mm belt opposite the main battery turrets and a 32 mm slope behind it. Such protection is easily penetrated by a Russian 10 or 12-inch shell. And behind the slope are the ammunition magazines...

[TermNachTer]

It's not clear at all why Togo put the "Garibaldians" in the line, and not the "Assams". The "Assams" have better armor, although not much.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

Well, on Mikasa and Co., the armor is designed to withstand hits of 10 and 12 dm.

And on the "Peresvets" the ends are not armored at all, so what?

Quote: TermNachTER

As far as I understand, they weren't really shot at,

You don't understand correctly. In both battles, the Japanese fleet traditionally received the most hits from "Mikasa". The second, no less traditionally, was always "Nishin".

[TermNachTer]

The extremities of all are weakly armored or not at all - such is life, nothing can be done. But everything important and dangerous is in the center of the hull. And here it should be noted that the "Peresvets" are much better even than the "Aces", especially the first two and especially the "Garibaldians".
Yes, they shot at the Nissin a lot because the admiral's flag was flapping on it. Unfortunately, they hit only a few times and not critically.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: TermNachTER

Everyone's extremities are either weakly armored or not armored at all - that's life, nothing can be done. But everything important and dangerous is located in the center of the building..

Read again the article under which we are flooding))))
How did all this help Oslyaba?

[TermNachTer]

In the Yellow Sea, Vitgeft knew that Arthur was "behind him". And the gunners shot better because they were better trained - hence the result. Rozhdestvensky did not have such an option - to sit it out somewhere.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

And the gunners shot better

But they hit less...

[TermNachTer]

When the number of 305mm and 254mm barrels is greater, the number of hits is not so important. Moreover, only four EBRs were really dangerous. The fact that Togo put BrKr in line is not because of a good life.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

When the number of 305mm and 254mm barrels is greater, the number of hits is not so important.

No need to jump around:)))) You said that the 1TOE gunners shot better:))))) And better shooting means a greater number of hits:))))))

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

And the best shooting is the greater number of hits:))))))

Under comparable shooting conditions!

[TermNachTer]

I didn't count the number of shots and hits, the gunners just had war experience. Well, and a larger number of large-caliber guns. A large number of hits is of course good, but fewer hits, but in vulnerable places, are better.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

I didn't count the number of shots and hits, the gunners just had war experience.

WHAT?!!!!!
From 1903 they first stood in armed reserve, and then for six months in the PA practically without movement and without shooting, with the exception of a short battle after the attack of Japanese destroyers.

[TermNachTer]

Makarov took the squadron out to sea several times, so they shot and were shot at. They had some experience. Unlike,
from the 2nd TO, which were mobilized older ages
and a couple of artillery exercises during the campaign - in general, nothing to write home about.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

Makarov took the squadron out to sea several times, so they shot and were shot at.

MARCH TO LEARN THE MATCH!
Makarov took them out for maneuvering, there was not a single shooting exercise

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

Comparable to whom and with what?

The time of fire contact in the Battle of Tsushima during the daytime battle is comparable to that in the ZhM

[TermNachTer]

And then? After 40 minutes, Togo interrupts the fight and goes to Sasebo?)))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

And then? After 40 minutes, Togo interrupts the fight and goes to Sasebo?)))

In what 40 minutes?:))))) How long do you think the battle in ZhM and at Tsushima lasted?

[TermNachTer]

That's the problem, Vitgeft knew that he had Arthur behind him, there was always the possibility of returning. Rozhestvensky didn't have that possibility. He was going to go to Vladik, as far as he could go and that was it.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: TermNachTER

That's the problem, Vitgeft knew that Arthur was behind him, there was always the possibility of returning.

I won't even ask why this was said. Especially considering that Vitgeft had no intention of returning to PA

[TermNachTer]

He didn't come back - others did.

[TermNachTer]

P.S. Comparing Tsushima and Shantung is not correct. Everything is different, only the participants are the same.

[Dead duck]

Witte's treason and sabotage

- the tsar's relatives made a fortune there. During construction, they stole a huge amount of money.

[TermNachTer]

Many people made a lot of money there, including the "Bezobrazovskaya gang".

[Maxim G]

Rozhdestvensky had the same number of modern and full-fledged squadron battleships as Togo - 4 ships.

[rytik32]

Well, the Fuji with its unarmored ends is closer in strength to the Oslyaba or Sisoei.

[Maxim G]

"Oslyabya", "Sisoy Veliky", "Navarin", "Emperor Nikolai I", "Admiral Nakhimov" - three small battleships could well hold out against armored cruisers.

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: Maxim G

Rozhdestvensky had the same number of modern and full-fledged squadron battleships as Togo - 4 ships.

Did this change the overall situation in any way?

[Maxim G]

This is the main force of the fleet. Of course it changed.

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: Maxim G

This is the main force of the fleet. Of course it changed.

Can you explain how exactly?

[Maxim G]

That's what I wrote - the main force of the fleet. They were the ones who decided the outcome of the battle.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: bayard

The Russian squadron was doomed from the start - it was numerically and qualitatively inferior to the enemy, had a much lower squadron speed, shells that were completely unsuitable for combat, and poorly trained artillerymen.

No. I disagree. In terms of numbers, there were 12 Russian ships in the line against 10 Japanese. The lower speed is a huge exaggeration, Togo began the battle at 15 knots, even the old Russian ships were giving no less. About the shells - did you pick that up from Andrey? Well, as a result of the Russian Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area War, for example, the British completely abandoned high-explosive shells and switched to semi-armor-piercing shells, which were similar in their effect to Russian shells, not Japanese shells.

I agree with the last point. The gunners' poor training was a factor, and the main question here is for Rozhdestvensky, both as the commander of a squadron that had neglected training during a campaign and as the former head of the Baltic Artillery School, which trained most of the squadron's artillery officers.

Regarding the issue of timely concentration, the question is again for the ZPR, since he was the head of the Main Naval Staff since March 1903, and he was responsible for these issues.

[bayard]

Quote: Saxahorse

Numerically, there were 12 Russian ships of the line against 10 Japanese.

?? Firstly, the Japanese had 12 battleships - 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers.
Secondly... Did you include all the ships with armor in Rozhdestvensky's battle line? Different types, old and distributed in three detachments?
In essence, Rozhdestvensky’s battle line could only consist of 4 Borodinets, Oslyabya, Sisoes and Navarin – a total of 7 battleships, some of which were not worth even a Japanese cruiser in terms of the combination of characteristics and combat capabilities.

Quote: Saxahorse

Togo began the battle at 15 knots; even the old Russian ships were doing no less.

New during factory testing. In addition, for the simplest of reasons, they could not give full combat speed - the technical condition of the machines and the need to save coal to reach Vladivostok. Therefore, they essentially went at an economic speed, saving coal. Yes, many of them could not give more than 12 knots at that time.

Quote: Saxahorse

About the shells - did you pick this up from Andrey?

And he too, although many participants of that war wrote about it. Including that the technology and equipment for producing high-quality shells were purchased in France in advance and even a pilot batch was produced. But Witte convinced the fool Nikola that "shells are too expensive and they will ruin the treasury."

Quote: Saxahorse

As a result of the Russian Nuclear War, for example, the British completely abandoned high-explosive shells and switched to semi-armor-piercing shells, which were similar in their type of impact to Russian shells, not Japanese ones.

This was already for completely different guns - with a longer barrel, higher speed and therefore capable of penetrating the armor belt and armor deck from a distance of effective fire. Russian guns did not penetrate the Japanese armor at a combat distance, and the high explosive effect was weak, insufficient.

Quote: Saxahorse

I agree with the last point. The gunners' poor training was a factor, and the main question here is for Rozhdestvensky, both as the commander of a squadron that had neglected training during a campaign and as the former head of the Baltic Artillery School, which trained most of the squadron's artillery officers.

No one is absolving Rozhdestvensky of his share of the blame, but it was not he who determined the issues of financing and even the plans for training shooting, but... Witte, who simply did not give money for this. For those same training shells with which Rozhdestvensky's students had to be able to accurately hit the target. There is a saying among snipers: "To learn to shoot, you need to SHOOT". Without practice in shooting, no ability or skills can be developed.

Quote: Saxahorse

Regarding the issue of timely concentration, the question is again for the ZPR, since he was the head of the Main Naval Staff since March 1903, and he was responsible for these issues.

Do you know who kept a detachment of our newest ships in Suez for the entire second half of 1903? Under a variety of pretexts? Demanding in his telegrams that the numbered destroyers be towed, and when their bows were smashed against the stern of the battleships towing them, he demanded that the entire detachment be kept while repairs were underway, because "these destroyers are our main force and hope in the war with the Japanese"? Do you know the author of these heart-rending telegrams? It was him - Witte. And only because the Russian sailors then spat on the cries of this idiot and traitor, in the last days of 0, "Retvizan", "Tsarevich" and "Bayan" managed to break through to Arthur ... And Witte even threatened them with trial and reprisals. But "Oslyabya" and "Aurora" did not dare to undertake such a feat.
So it was Witte who was the evil "genius" of that war. When I studied the history of the Russian Navy from many sources, including descriptions and historiography of the ships of that war... Witte was constantly popping up like the Devil out of a snuffbox, literally there was a jack in every barrel, and a bad and malicious jack at that. All in all, it's a picture of very sophisticated sabotage. Either under the guise of a "patriot" - "Let's support domestic producers, not a penny for foreign shipyards", and then - "we need to save money on ship construction, let's move the deadlines for the readiness of ships for the Pacific Fleet to 1905." , then constant delays in the transfer of new ships to the Far East, then "savings" on shells, target practice, dredging in the Arthur fairways, on the construction of fortifications and the supply of coastal artillery to our Far Eastern naval bases, creating obstacles to sending the required number of troops to the Far East by sea and all the necessary equipment and ammunition on the eve of the war .... yes, you can't list everything and everywhere one key name - Witte. It is not for nothing that after the Russian Yamal-Nikolai II even the infinitely stupid Tsar Nikolai II realized the role of Witte in all the disasters of the Empire (after all, the Revolution of 2 happened, which almost broke the Empire) ... and even the fool Nikolai II called Witte after this nothing other than "my personal Enemy". So Rozhdestvensky could not do anything against the will of the all-powerful Witte from the Rothschild clan. That is why I wrote that if the realization of Witte's role had happened in early 1905 and he had been gotten rid of, the Russian Empire would still have had a chance to concentrate the minimum necessary number of ships in the Pacific Fleet in order not to completely lose supremacy at sea and to continue to contest it until the arrival of the "Borodinites". And even the arrival of the "Borodinites" in the Pacific Fleet by the summer of 2 did not guarantee victory because ... all the ships built under Witte during his tenure as Minister of Finance and Prime Minister were just too RIDICULOUS. High-sided and prone to capsizing, with low-lying anti-mine artillery ports that could scoop up water even during circulation - this is what happened to the "Alexander-1903" during sea trials when it almost capsized while undergoing tests. But in response to the sailors' demands to seal the lower ports tightly ... the order was given to "leave them as is". "Peresvetich" and "Borodintsy" were fantastically stupid ships. To fight with such self-propelled guns against the best ships of that time, built in England... it could not end in anything but shame. And again, Witte's role is that instead of the "Prince Potemkin/Retvizan" project, they decided to build the project of the extremely difficult to build and expensive "Tsarevich", mutilated by "improvements". Such a monster as "Borodintsy" could not even be dreamed of in a nightmare by any sane shipbuilder or sailor... But they were built - late, expensive and absurd.
In the historiography of the Cramp shipyard (USA) there is a description of Witte's intrigues in choosing the project and contractor for the battleships for the Pacific Fleet - he was in St. Petersburg at the time, spent about a year there coordinating future orders, participated in the design of the Potemkin and, based on the unfinished project of this battleship, built the Retvizan - the optimal type of battleship for that war. Moreover, the finished project of the Potemkin in terms of armor and the architecture of the casemates of the auxiliary artillery turned out to be noticeably better than the Retvizan itself. These are the kind of battleships with Borodinets machines that should have been built for the Pacific Fleet, and not high-sided self-propelled guns, which with their UNARMORED sides caught enemy shells like a net.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: bayard

- "Oslyabya" and "Aurora" could also have ended up in Artur in time.

Say thank you to the state-owned shipbuilding industry, which built one EBR (Oslyabya) more slowly than the Baltic Shipyard, which was recently accepted into the treasury (and retained some of the "commercial" procedures for doing business) and built two of the same EBR (which made it to the 1st TOE).
Moreover, "Oslyabya" was considered the lead ship of the series.

Quote: bayard

- in 1903, almost all experienced gunners were discharged from the Pacific Fleet, although in view of the imminent war, the discharge into the reserve could and should have been delayed. Then, perhaps, they would not have missed so much.

If I remember correctly, at that time one of the RIF officers proposed to raise the pay for long-term servicemen in order to retain experienced personnel leaving for civilian life. As a result, he was reprimanded for a proposal that would lead to unnecessary spending of state funds.

Quote: bayard

As a result, by the beginning of the Russian Yamal-Nazi War we could have formed the Vladivostok cruiser detachment of three Peresvetov ships, three armored raiders, the Bayan and the Bogatyr.

The Vladivostok port will hang itself in its entirety. You remember how its condition was described in 1905.

Quote: bayard

And if they hadn’t turned up their noses, but in the same 1903 had bought the “Garibaldi” (the future “Nishin” and “Kasuga”) from Italy and added them to the Arthur detachment, they would have had 9 (nine) armored ships there against Togo’s 6 battleships.

You should also remember the other "exotic cruisers". The second Vladivostok squadron could have been equipped there. True, where to base it...

Quote: bayard

Like game with the coveted "Little Army" on the eve of the "SVO".

The wild thing there was not in the "small army", but in the fact that they decided to save money on it in exactly the same way. As a result, instead of combat-ready, fully staffed and well-coordinated contract brigades, they got an amorphous mass, half filled with one-year-old conscripts, and even with a cadre rear. And the second echelon of the reform - the BHVT and the mobilization reserve - could not be raised normally due to the legal absence of war.

[bayard]

Quote: Alexey RA

Say thank you to state-owned shipbuilding

There "thank you" had to be handed out with a firing squad. But then it was exactly the same as now - impunity and embezzlement.
But nevertheless, "Oslyabya" was delivered to the customer in 1903 and was in Suez together with "Bayan", "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan". So, together with them, she could have made it to Arthur, just like "Aurora" (there was little use from this one, but still, three "goddesses" are better than two).

Quote: Alexey RA

As a result, he was reprimanded for a proposal that would lead to unnecessary waste of public funds.

How wonderful and almost modern it sounds... In the Russian Federation before the SVO it was exactly the same.

Quote: Alexey RA

The Vladivostok port will hang itself in its entirety. You remember how its condition was described in 1905.

Of course I remember. But it was precisely this port that the entire Arthur squadron was breaking into on the eve of the fall of Port Arthur, and Rozhdestvensky was breaking through there too.
I was still considering the spherical horse in a vacuum, when in early 1903 a Miracle happened and an epiphany occurred in the leadership of the Russian Empire - Witte was shackled and sent to hard labor, Sharapov became the Minister of Finance (I happened to vote for the establishment of the All-Russian Economic Society named after him) and there was immediately enough money for everything. As a result, everything necessary for equipping and strengthening the Far Eastern ports was urgently purchased, workers from St. Petersburg factories were sent to Artur and Vladivostok to replace the Sisoya and Navarin guns on the spot with new ones, and the old ones were used to strengthen the coastal defense of Artur and Dalniy, Dalniy became another base for the Pacific Fleet. Two dredges were urgently purchased and sent to Artur to deepen the fairways, so as not to depend on the tides and to be able to take out ships at any time. And there is already money for urgent purchase of ships abroad... but it's too late... I was loaded with quotes from the 1902 peace treaty between Argentina and Chiti under English arbitration. So, according to this treaty, all ships under construction and available could be sold to anyone by these countries only with English approval. And most likely, England would not have approved this. And if the Russian Empire had pushed through the purchase of several of them, then England would have organized the sale of the rest to Japan using funds from the American loan. And it would have turned out even worse. Alas, I did not know about such circumstances, so even the purchase of two "Garibaldians" was unlikely for us. Alas.
So, having collected everything we can in Arthur, we still find ourselves in the minority. But with a better layout. We have 10 battleships in Arthur (Retvizan, Tsarevich, three Poltavets, three Peresvetovets, updated Sisoes and Navarin), as well as the armored Bayan. A total of 11 armored ships, which is not bad. If we leave everything as it was in Vladivostok, then the Japanese send three armored cruisers and dogs against the raiders, and against Arthur they have ... also 11 armored ships. But they have an advantage in speed and in the quality of ships, while we have some advantage in main caliber guns. It is already possible to fight, but with worse quality of shells and training of gunners... However, in 1903 it is possible to produce some quantity of high-quality shells using new technology (all equipment and technology were bought in France, but not used). Sharapov finds money and the shells are launched into production, some of them are delivered to Arthur, and money for increasing the salaries of long-term servicemen allows to keep experienced artillerymen in service... The chances are evened out.
Exhaustive financing of the completion of the "Borodinets" leads to the fact that at the beginning of 1904 they are all ready for battle and a campaign ... but there are only 4 of them and with them the armored deck "Oleg", "Izumrud" and "Zhemchug". This is not enough for a breakthrough, but the Arthur squadron has not given up supremacy at sea, it is disputing it. And it can go out to meet ... not the 2nd squadron, but a detachment of the newest battleships, which by the end of spring - beginning of summer are already approaching Arthur. If they also have new, more effective shells, then the war at sea begins to play with new colors. There are already 14 battleships and "Bayan" in Arthur (if there were no losses) and we can already confidently go to the Korean shores. With armored decks, we are also more cheerful and now much will depend on successes on land. This is another topic, but in a year our ground forces in the Far East can also be built up, supplies can be accumulated and at least one more fresh division can be brought to Kwantung. Or better yet, two. And the mountain passes in Korea can be closed in a timely manner, organizing a strong line of defense there. And now, with difficulty, but it is possible to win. Even without exotic cruisers, for which, of course, we can apply ... and England will block our deal ... but in response we can demand that they not be sold to Japan. And then, having fussed around for the entire 1904, we can already in 1905 throw the Japanese into the sea from Korea by land. In 1905, Slava, Potemkin (if we can negotiate with the Turks about passage) and a small herd of shamanized old men and coastal guards are pulled up, as well as a dozen auxiliary cruisers to organize a blockade. So it's a long shot, but there are chances in this scenario. But there was definitely no one to do it - quad bikes are the same everywhere and in everything.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: bayard

Nevertheless, Oslyabya was delivered to the customer in 1903 and stood in Suez together with Bayan, Tsarevich and Retvizan.

In La Spezia it stood, in the dock - after in Gibraltar it almost went the way of the "Gangut". As a result, three months were lost - September, October and November.

Quote: bayard

Witte is shackled and sent to hard labor, Sharapov becomes the Minister of Finance (I happened to vote for the establishment of the All-Russian Economic Society named after him) and there is immediately enough money for everything.

Yeah... and RIF finds itself in a very familiar situation: you can’t go to sea on budget rubles, and the process of approval, ordering abroad or manufacturing at home drags on for years, because the industry is weak, and the Customer himself doesn’t know what he wants and changes the technical specifications almost monthly.

Quote: bayard

As a result, everything necessary for equipping and strengthening the Far Eastern ports is urgently purchased, workers from St. Petersburg factories are sent to Artur and Vladivostok to replace the Sisoya and Navarin guns on the spot with new ones.

For this, it is not the Ministry of Finance that needs to be cleaned, but Morved. Because there the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing. You remember the wonderful story of the assembly of "Sokoly" in the Far East, when Morved first informed Vladivostok about the assembly of MM in Port Arthur, and a week and a half later the same Vladivostok asked:

...the size and number of slipways for the upcoming assembly of four 190-foot-long destroyers, are there any devices for boring brackets, what size and how many covered lockable sheds can you provide for the work

Chukhnin's answer was worth it cast in granite ©:

There are no boathouses, workshops, or sheds, and no loans for their construction either!

And then the Viceroy also got involved, saying that he had only learned of Morved's plans from a notice about the imminent arrival of a steamship with MM kits in Port Arthur. And because of imperfect improvement of the Port Arthur Admiralty believed that:

It would be more correct to assemble these destroyers in Vladivostok

[bayard]

Quote: Alexey RA

In La Spezia it stood, in the dock - after in Gibraltar it almost went the way of the "Gangut". As a result, three months were lost - September, October and November.

But we believe that Witte was put in shackles no later than the turn of January-February 1903. Together with his pool of henchmen saboteurs. And now the right decisions are being made. And since the new Minister of Finance knows where to get money for all projects (he himself is the author of the "Theory of Absolute Money" and has already tested it brilliantly during the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway), in short, with normal or rather even increased financing of shipbuilding programs, the "Oslyabya" is definitely delivered a little earlier than the known deadline, and therefore does not run into a rock on the passage to Gibraltar and arrives in Arthur in full working order with other ships somewhere in early autumn. And we have enough time for everything, even if it is tight.

Quote: Alexey RA

Yeah... and RIF finds itself in a very familiar situation: you can’t go to sea on budget rubles, and the process of approval, ordering abroad or manufacturing at home drags on for years, because the industry is weak, and the Customer himself doesn’t know what he wants and changes the technical specifications almost monthly.

Alexey, well, we are talking about the very pre-war year of 1903, after all, we put Witte and his gang in chains in order to have time to fix what was possible in a year. We don’t have time to order ships abroad, but we have money to buy them, and if not ships, then at least everything necessary to equip a naval base in the Far East. And it’s always easier to solve problems with money than without it. With comprehensive financing, we manage to bring two dredges to Artur and are deepening the fairway/fairways with all our might, we are bringing in coastal artillery and building coastal batteries for the full protection of Artur and Dalniy, using old guns from the Sisoes and Navarin for this, as well as everything that we managed to buy - Dalniy and Artur must be RELIABLY covered. Immediately after deploying the batteries in Dalniy, we transfer all the main forces of the Fleet there... Perhaps I'm wrong, but in Dalniy, it seems, they even managed to build a dry dock... I'm too lazy to check, but if this is so, then this is a double reason. Until the fairways are ready for the withdrawal of ships even at low tide, the main forces of the fleet are based in Dalniy.
All construction work is carried out by the Chinese. There is enough money, so a lot of people can be brought in and everything can be done quickly. Including the future defensive lines from the land part of Liaodong.

Quote: Alexey RA

To do this, we need to clean up not the Ministry of Finance, but the Ministry of Defense.

That's what I'm saying - Witte and his henchmen in shackles. In a year, and with comprehensive financing, a lot can be fixed, everything that our industry can't do quickly can be purchased, including all the necessary equipment and machine tools for Arthur, Vladivostok and Dalniy. If Witte managed to grab 11 billion in gold in loans in the name of the Russian Empire in just over a year and flush them all down the toilet, then even without loans, one billion is more than enough for us to fix everything possible, and in banknotes (this is also important). So we will meet the war with bases that are already more or less built and equipped, well fortified and with forces sufficient to meet the challenge. Sufficient not for victory, but for persistently challenging supremacy at sea. The Japanese, due to their high squadron speed, are always able to avoid combat and choose the distance themselves, but we surpass them in the number of battleships and 12" and 10" guns. If we manage to produce a sufficient number of high-quality shells within a year and deliver them to Arthur, we will have almost equal chances. In any case, we will definitely not allow them to land on Liaodong and take Dalniy and in general we will drive them away from the Chinese shores. And we are also unlikely to allow an operational base on Formosa ... and they will not be as comfortable as it happened in the original.
And the reinforced Ground Army, having much better supplies and ammunition reserves, as well as mountain passes taken under control and well-fortified, will simply seal the Japanese landing in Korea. We will hardly be able to drive the Japanese out of Korean ports in 1904, but we will be able to carry out raids, say, with our fast armored deck ships and destroyers.
By the way, we could try to buy back the destroyers ordered by the Japanese from the Shikhau company. With a bonus. And at the same time apologize for the tricks of Witte's quadrobots, who stole the technical documentation of the Novik. Witte and his gang in chains are the best form of apology and a reason to compensate for previous troubles with a new order and a bonus for the bought-back destroyers for the Japanese.
Well, then everything is as described above - a maneuverable war at sea waged by Makarov, a positional war on the mountain passes in Korea, accumulation of ground forces for an offensive and waiting for the arrival of the "Borodinites" and armored cruisers. After the turning point of the war at sea, depriving the Japanese in Korea of ​​supplies, conducting a series of tactical landings in Korean ports with the subsequent defeat or capture of Japanese forces in Korea. In 1905, we defeat Japan itself, blockade, knocking out the main ships, forcing peace and disarmament of Japan. Indemnities, annexation of the Kuril Islands, and if the war and negotiations drag on, then Hokkaido as well. Was it in vain that Yesaul Shabalin staked out Hokkaido for the Russian Empire?
After the victory, we immediately begin Industrialization of the Far East, build shipyards and a powerful ocean fleet in the Pacific Ocean. Korea and Manchuria come under our protectorate and... World History begins to move along completely different tracks. Approximately along the same lines as Alexander III had planned.

[goose]

Quote: bayard

But even this was not done in 1903 because of the fantastic stupidity of the Tsar and the evil machinations of Witte. Even money for the accelerated completion of the "Borodinets" was not allocated. Not even money for shells for training shooting!! Savings!!!

2 Far Eastern battleships were not completed by 1903 due to the theft of funds directly from shipyards by members of the royal family. Here they personally distinguished themselves in the reasons for the death of the Russian Empire. Having 2 more 1st class battleships in that theater of military operations, the war would have been excluded due to the too great superiority of the Russian squadron.

[bayard]

Quote: goose

Two Far Eastern battleships were not completed by 2 due to the theft of funds directly from shipyards by members of the royal family.

Everyone knows that "Slava" was not completed, but it was also laid down later than all the others, and what about the second battleship? "Andrey Pervozvanny" and its sister ship were laid down after the beginning of the Russian Navy. Or are you talking about the Black Sea "Potemkin"? It was not planned for the Far East.
Or that the slipways stood idle for a whole year before the laying of the "Borodinites" while these smart guys from the "Tsarevich" project were composing the project of the freaks-Borodinites?
My opinion is that if they had not bought into Witte's patronage with the "Tsarevich" project, but had laid down the Borodinets according to the "Potemkin/Retvizan" project with machines from the "Tsarevich", they would have received battleships in service a year earlier, of much better quality, with more powerful and easy-to-use auxiliary artillery and much cheaper. But in the Russian Empire, with a stupid tsar, thieving servants and under the supervision of the evil genius Witte from the Rothschild clan, they not only chose all the worst decisions, but also overfulfilled the plan for the worst decisions ... having accomplished the impossible.

[Jura 27]

Two other shells penetrated the armour near the waterline, one causing the 10th coal pit to flood, the other the 16th.

Hello, Alexey! Can you post a plan with the location of the 10th and 16th coal pits, so that it would be clear whose armor was penetrated - the main gun or the casemate (VP)?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

so that it would be clear what armor was penetrated

You'd better ask for confirmation that the armor was penetrated at all...

[Jura 27]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Jura 27

so that it would be clear what armor was penetrated

You'd better ask for confirmation that the armor was penetrated at all...

One hundred percent confirmation of whether it was penetrated/not penetrated lies at the bottom of the Tsushima Strait.

[bayard]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

You'd better ask for confirmation that the armor was penetrated at all...

Most likely the armor was really penetrated, because the entire batch of armor plates for the Oslyabya was defective, but they did not wait for a new batch and established the defect. In the previous part about the armor plates tests, they were penetrated and cracked during test firing. I had not previously known about such a feature of the Oslyabya armor, but if this is so, there is no need to be surprised at the rapid death of the battleship.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: bayard

Most likely the armor was indeed penetrated, since the entire batch of armor plates for Oslyabya was defective.

You see, here's the thing. When I discussed this topic with Mr. Alexey, it turned out that the hit itself in one of the pits remains in question. Alexey previously wrote that he believes that there was a hit because water appeared there (and it could have been from neighboring compartments or the hull leaked from a nearby explosion, or a plate shifted without penetration...). And now he writes that there was a hit and the armor was penetrated. So I wonder where he got this information from.

[rytik32]

Andrey, wait until part 4, there I will consider all hits near the VL.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Andrey, wait until part 4, there I will consider all hits near the VL.

Very good, thank you.

[rytik32]

Yuri, good afternoon!
In the 4th part there will be "Oslyabya" schemes and analysis of hits

[foxes]

Japan modernized the country and created a new ruling elite. This is what primarily influenced the outcome of the war. And the decrepit "Russian" monarchy with the dominance of the Germans was already flying full steam into the abyss. And I feel sorry for Rozhdestvensky as a human being. There is a good series about the RYaV on "Taktik Media".

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: Vulpes

There is a good series about RYAV on Tactic Media.

Authored by FVL?
Throw it in the firebox... :)
People "in the know" laughed a lot and for a long time.

[Cartographer]

Quote from: navycat777

Japan tactically outplayed the Russian squadron, both in terms of the timing of the battle and in terms of the tactics of conducting the battle.

It is very interesting how they chose the time? Rozhdestvensky chose the time to pass the strait during the day. All analyses show the impossibility of somehow influencing the tactics due to the lower speed.

[Comrade]

A logical continuation of the description of the participation of the Oslyabya in the Battle of Tsushima will be an analysis of the circumstances and reasons for its death.

Hello dear Alexey!
The topic is very interesting, and the most interesting thing, in my opinion, is the assessment of the shells fired and hitting the Oslyabya. This is not in the article, but perhaps colleagues in the discussions will present their versions of the number of shells hitting the Oslyabya.

[rytik32]

Good afternoon, dear Valentine!
The assessment of the fire impact on the Oslyabya will be in the 5th article of the series.

[MCmaximus]

Well, there you go. As soon as the battle scheme appeared without unnecessary clutter of the entire battle, everything becomes clear. Shells..., armor.., etc. etc.
And also some first maneuver of Rozhestvensky, which provided something there. And some "mistakes" of Togo. His whole mistake - he went fast or simply did not realize that the Russian squadron could crawl so slowly.
The fight was lost in the first 20 minutes.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

As soon as a battle plan appeared without unnecessary clutter of the entire battle, everything became clear.

Unfortunately, this is what is dangerous about such schemes - they are understandable to you and form a certain picture of the battle in your mind, but you do not see that they are extremely contradictory.
That there was no "all of a sudden" turn with a probability of 100%, but rather a sequential turn, that the position of the ships at the moment of opening fire (13.49) was indicated with errors, etc.

Quote: MCmaximus

And also some first maneuver of Rozhdestvensky, which provided something there. And some "mistakes" of Togo.

Togo's loop was an obvious mistake by the Japanese admiral; the battle was won not because of it, but in spite of it.

[MCmaximus]

It's not a question of details. But of courses and time. Distances one way or another.
I can figure out how to maneuver myself.
You can move the Japanese back and forth. It won't change anything. Reorganization of the Russian squadron at low speed = death. Rozhestvensky was just driving. And Togo was starting the fight. And logically and clearly. That's the only difference. The initiative was simply given away right away.
In such a situation, there simply could not have been any concentration of fire on any one head. These are some kind of fantasies of Rozhdestvensky.
As fantasies, what we had to do, what ships to make, etc. now. With such logistics we should have simply not gotten involved in the war at any cost. And the rest is just trifles.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

In such a situation, there simply could not have been any concentration of fire on any one head. These are some kind of fantasies of Rozhdestvensky.

Yeah. True, the "fantasies" are confirmed by the statistics of hits on the Japanese flagship, but what trifles are these, really...

[MCmaximus]

Andrey, we have already talked about this. But! Having taken a lot of hits, "Mikasa" went through the entire battle. And the Russian squadron lost the battle 20 (!!!) minutes after such a successful start to the battle. Not in the evening, not the next day. But in 20 minutes. If you don't like 20, let it be 30.
And the main reason for these 20 minutes is a successful maneuver to rebuild in one wake. And the main thing is the incapacitation of the author of this successful maneuver. And Togo's mistake with a 180 degree turn (almost).
Although, looking at the diagram, the most successful maneuver would be for the first detachment to turn RIGHT and for the second detachment to follow in the wake of the first.
Or couldn’t at least the first Russian detachment have gone 14-15 knots for those half an hour?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

But! Having taken a lot of hits

They say that somehow the concentration of fire on Mikasa worked out:)))

Quote: MCmaximus

And the Russian squadron lost the battle 20 (!!!) minutes after such a successful start to the battle.

It's hard to say where this assessment comes from and even more unclear are its criteria. Do you want to say that during these 20 minutes 2TOE still had a chance to win against Togo?:)

Quote: MCmaximus

And the main reason for these 20 minutes is a successful maneuver to rebuild in one wake. And the main thing is the incapacitation of the author of this successful maneuver. And Togo's mistake with a 180 degree turn (almost).

The main reason is that the Japanese had combat experience, could shoot better, had better equipment, and ours had very useless shells. Generally speaking, if Rozhestvensky had fired shells of the 1907 model, then this Loop of Togo could have cost this very Togo dearly...

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

That there was no "all of a sudden" turn with a 100% probability

The earliest sources contain precisely the "sudden" turn, rather than a sequential one. These include the "Izumrud" VZh, the memoirs of the scribe Stepanov, and Levitsky's diagram.
By the way, the work of the historical commission also came to an unambiguous conclusion: "4R suddenly."

[MCmaximus]

Most likely, the maneuver was so "crumpled" that someone analyzed it as consistent, and someone, as if it all happened suddenly. The speed is terrible. From the side you can't even understand what is happening when it is happening in a small space. The same "Oslyabya" almost stopped. Many people wrote about this. And it is difficult to miss a stationary target.
Let us remember that in World War II, when ships maneuvered at high speeds, the rate of fire was low and the percentage of hits was negligible.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

By the way, the work of the historical commission also came to an unambiguous conclusion: "4R suddenly."

That's true. But there are a ton of objections to this conclusion. Simply put, after the 1st armored ship turned "all of a sudden" it should have commanded a reversal of formation into the wake, and where is the information about this in the testimony? The same historical commission points out that the next signals to the cruisers were "please keep to the right" and "2nd detachment, join the wake of the 1st detachment"

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

he should have commanded the reversal of the formation into the wake

"Suvorov" simply turned, and that was enough.
Rozhdestvensky trained everyone to understand him even without a signal

[rytik32]

There is another argument.
If the goal is to change lanes as quickly as possible, then they make a "sudden" turn.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: MCmaximus

Well, there you go. As soon as the battle scheme appeared without unnecessary clutter of the entire battle, everything becomes clear.

And there are a lot of questions and complaints about the scheme.

[MCmaximus]

In general, it reflects the beginning of the battle without the unnecessary things that happened later. It was not for nothing that I wrote that the Japanese can be moved here and there. But the result is plus or minus the same. And it is visible. It does not happen that a couple of degrees or cables decide something. If it is done fundamentally correctly.
I understand Togo's maneuvers completely. Well, wait 10 minutes. Knowing that the Russians will do nothing during this time. They shoot poorly. There is zero initiative in maneuvers.
And then... Then the exit to the head and the defeat. And so on again and again.
All military schools always say one thing: a decision, even if not correct, but timely, is better than no decision. I can't bring myself to consider Rozhdestvensky's reorganization a decision. Accepting battle in two columns was just nonsense. Although, perhaps, this nonsense would have helped. While Togo was messing around with the old stuff, the first detachment could have done something. Under a different commander.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: MCmaximus

Overall, it reflects the beginning of the battle without the extra things that happened later. It's not for nothing that I wrote that the Japanese can be moved here and there.

But we are writing about the impact specifically on Oslyabya. I wrote above about the main problem of this scheme. It turns out that 10 ships are shooting at Oslyabya, 2 are shooting at Suvorov, and they are out of action at the same time. This is unrealistic.

[MCmaximus]

It is likely that "Oslabya" has stopped or almost stopped. And for normal fleets, shooting at a stationary target is about 70% of hits.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: MCmaximus

It is likely that "Oslabya" has stopped or almost stopped. And for normal fleets, shooting at a stationary target is about 70% of hits.

It doesn't matter whether it's worth it or not if the distance is determined correctly. Rytik cited the British experience as an example. Remember shooting at 35 kb at a target the size of an armoured ship. There are 80% hits for main calibre and 50% for medium calibre. But the rate of fire of main calibre at that time was low, a salvo in 1.5-2 minutes maximum. You need a lot of guns to do a lot of damage in such a short time.

[MCmaximus]

If the course and speed of both sides change mutually, it is difficult to hit. But if only one side changes, then no.

[Grossvater]

Quote: bayard

RYAV became the pinnacle of SHAME of the Romanov dynasty and the system of state administration and planning of the Russian Empire

Yes! And I completely agree with the rest of your reasoning.

[Trapperxnumx]

At 14:00, the Oslyabya turned sharply to the right and sharply reduced speed, letting the Orel pass ahead.

Tsushima's first mistake. Perhaps the main one.

Two other shells penetrated the armour near the waterline, one causing the 10th coal pit to flood, the other the 16th.

I wonder what kind of shells they were and what kind of armor they penetrated?

The gunners and crews of the 75mm guns on the left side suffered heavy losses, but continued to fire. The crews of the guns on the right side came to replace the killed and wounded.

I don't understand the point of these guns participating in the battle at all. This is anti-mine artillery and it must be saved for possible repelling of the attack of destroyers. And the damage to large ships from it is zero.

The Russian squadron's formation was so stretched out that the rear ships found themselves at a huge distance from the enemy and practically dropped out of the battle.

And this is at 11 knots...
So many years have passed, but my heart still bleeds when I read about this battle. And on paper everything is fine - the speed is not much inferior, the number of main caliber barrels is equal, fight and win... but in reality, look how it is

[rytik32]

Quote: Trapper7

I wonder what kind of shells they were and what kind of armor they penetrated?

I think they were 8-inch or 12-inch armor-piercing shells, they penetrated the upper belt about the same as on the Pobeda

[rytik32]

Quote: Trapper7

This is anti-mine artillery.

During the design and even in the instructions of Peresvet in 1903, 75 mm was the medium caliber.

[27091965]

Quote: rytik32

During the design and even in the instructions of Peresvet in 1903, 75 mm was the medium caliber.

I can add that the effective firing range for these guns was envisaged to be up to 3000 meters.

[rytik32]

I'll add. The armor-piercing 75-mm shells were tested on 115-mm armor, the shell had to penetrate it. Apparently they expected the battle to reach the range of a rifle shot.

[MCmaximus]

"Tsushima's first mistake. Possibly the main one"
The flagship of the 2nd detachment is not at all to blame here. There was no room for it to the right. To the left - this is towards the Japanese and does not give the "Eagle" a pass.
ZPR has pulled off a talented maneuver.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

The flagship of the 2nd detachment is not at all to blame here.

Well, sort of guilty. He saw clearly that the "Eagle" was not going to make it, but he proudly went forward until he had to brake urgently. But he could have simply slowed down, reduced the speed and let the "Eagle" pass, then picked it up again

[MCmaximus]

Actually, he's not going alone. He's got a tail of other ships. He has no brakes. Given ZPR's management style, this option is completely out of place. After all, Rozhdestvensky commands EVERYONE. It was he who turned the squadron into a flock of sheep that can only follow the leader. And everyone has it hammered into their heads to look at the flagship and get instructions. And he could have hung a signal to increase speed not to 11 knots, but to whatever was needed. He's a Sailor. He has an eye, etc., etc.
Your comment only shows Rozhestvensky's poor way of thinking. The Japanese with their separate units maneuvering with one goal independently - that's space.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

Actually, he's not going alone. He's got a tail of other ships. He has no brakes.

That's exactly it. That's why he had to gradually slow down, giving the ships behind him time to get their bearings, and not wait until the last minute and then abruptly hit the brakes.

Quote: MCmaximus

In the end, Rozhdestvensky commands EVERYTHING. It was he who turned the squadron into a flock of sheep that can only follow the leader.

Name me at least one naval unit of those years, which after the loss of the flagship retained control and in which the ordinary ship commander (Alexander III) made an unexpected, bold and very successful maneuver, throwing himself at the Japanese formation in order to pass under the stern of the 1st Japanese detachment. Alexander, essentially sacrificing himself, leads the squadron into an attack and the scales swung again - ours managed to get closer to the Japs, there was a chance to blow up the "Fuji" (but no luck) the Japanese had to essentially flee, breaking the distance and leaving the battle.
And you always tell stories about a flock of sheep.

Quote: MCmaximus

He is a Sailor. He has an eye, etc., etc.

Yes, and he thought that he had time to line up the column. He was mistaken, it happens. But if Oslyabya had acted correctly, the mistake would not have been serious. And if Peresvet had been in the place of Oslyabya, the matter most likely would not have ended with the ship's destruction.

Quote: MCmaximus

The Japanese, with their separate units, maneuvering independently with one goal in mind, are simply out of this world.

The Japanese had two admirals for each combat unit - one at the head, the other at the rear. Rozhestvensky had exactly one admiral for two combat units - himself. There was also Felkersam, but he died

[MCmaximus]

Well, that's how I served in the army. And there is one positive thing among many negative ones. There is always someone to blame. And it is the commander, if he did not have time to appoint someone else. It happens that Rozhdestvensky made a mistake, screwed up a maneuver, and Baer is to blame

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

The fact that Rozhdestvensky made a mistake, screwed up the maneuver, and Baer is to blame

I am a supporter of shared responsibility. Everyone should be guilty for their own.
Rozhestvensky is to blame for the mistake during the rebuilding. There is nothing to argue about here.
However, this error in itself was not critical, since it could be corrected by Baer relatively easily.
Translating into the road plane. Rozhestvensky is a driver leading a column of trucks. He is at an intersection, turning. He sees that cars are catching up with him, but he thinks that his column will have time to turn around the turn and will not create any obstacles. He is wrong.
The driver of a car sees that a column of trucks will not have time to complete the maneuver and will create obstacles for him. But instead of slowing down and letting the column pass, he rushes 120 km to the victorious point, and then applies emergency braking. The result is an accident.
Can the blame for this be placed solely on the driver of the lead truck?

[MCmaximus]

In military affairs, everything works differently. If there is some plan within which Baer (Felkersam) had his own goals and powers in the common cause, then that is one question. But when there is a fierce one-man command in the squadron, where initiative is nipped in the bud, then that is a different situation. The military is distinguished by the fact that they are brought up and selected all their lives so that they must do what they are ordered. And not do what they are not ordered. Baer does not know Rozhdestvensky's plans. He must take his place in the ranks and lead the detachment. And that is all we know about that time.
Let's remember how, according to eyewitness testimony, officers tried to fire "at the head" until the very end. Although there was little sense in it. That's how everything is arranged in the Armed Forces.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MCmaximus

In military affairs, things don't work that way.

Of course. However, the analogy I give is correct. Although conditional.

Quote: MCmaximus

The military is distinguished by the fact that they are brought up and selected all their lives so that they must do what they are ordered to do. And not do what they are not ordered to do. Baer does not know Rozhdestvensky's plans.

You are mistaken. In this case, Baer received a direct order from Rozhdestvensky.
At 13.20 Rozhestvensky begins to rebuild. At 13.25 he raises the signal "2nd detachment to join the wake of the 1st detachment". "Suvorov", if you remember, took its place at the head of the column after 13.40 (opened fire at 13.49, having completed the turn to the combat course). That is, Baer
1. He had clear and precise orders from the leadership, and understood what exactly Rozhdestvensky expected from him.
2. Had more than enough time to execute the order correctly received

Quote: MCmaximus

Let's remember how, according to eyewitness testimony, officers tried to fire "at the head" until the very end. Although there was little sense in it.

Let's clarify:)))))) According to witnesses, 4 Borodinets and, possibly, "Oslyabya" fired at Mikasa, but I have no data on "Oslyabya". "Sisoy" did not even start firing at Mikasa, "Nakhimov" started firing at Mikasa, but very quickly the angle became unfavorable and it independently transferred fire to other enemy ships (the closest one, by the way). Navarin, because of its old guns, could not fire as far as Mikasa in principle. It is unknown who Nebogatov's detachment was firing at, but purely technically it could fire at Mikasa, if at all, then only slightly.

[rytik32]

At 13.20 Rozhdestvensky begins to rebuild

Much later, just before the opening of fire

At 13.25 he raises the signal "2nd detachment to join the wake of the 1st detachment"

Around the time of opening fire

took his place at the head of the column after 13.40:XNUMX

Very much later )))

"Sisoy" didn't even start shooting at Mikasa

The entire 2nd Brigade opened fire specifically on Mikasa.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Much later, just before the opening of fire

Quote: rytik32

Around the time of opening fire

Quote: rytik32

Very much later )))

And, of course, confirmation of this is the observations from Japanese ships?

Quote: rytik32

The entire 2nd Brigade opened fire specifically on Mikasa.

No, this is refuted by their own testimony.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

And, of course, confirmation of this is the observations from Japanese ships?

Not only. Logbooks of Russian ships.

No, this is refuted by their own testimony.

Battery commander "Sisoya" says he fired at "Mikasa"

At about 1:45 a.m. a short alarm was sounded on the left side. The distance was about 55 cables. Fire was opened from 12" guns, and soon from 6" and 75 m/m. The order was to shoot at the lead one. I commanded the left 6" battery. The shooting was continuous. No damage occurred, but due to the fog it was impossible to follow the flight of the shells.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Not only. Logbooks of Russian ships.

If you try very hard to find confirmation there and select only the necessary records, ignoring the rest - then yes.
For example, the VZ of "Oleg" gives a detailed report - the 1st detachment "described the coordinates to the left", began to enter the lead, and only after that opened fire. But the VZ of "Aurora" is terribly brief: "the battleships turned to the 2nd and 3rd detachments and opened fire on the enemy". It is possible, comparing with the VZ of "Oleg" and assessing the brevity of the description of "Aurora", to understand that they began to shoot, already completing the maneuver, or it is possible - that the battle began long before the end of the reorganization ...

Quote: rytik32

Battery commander "Sisoya" says he fired at "Mikasa"

No, he doesn't say that. That's how you interpret his words. Let's start with the fact that the commander of the "Sisoi" directly stated that he did not fire at the "Mikasa"

At 1:45 a.m., the battleship Sisoii Velikiy entrusted to me could open fire, but not at the lead enemy ship, but first at the 5th in their line (Nissin), then at the 6th (Kasuga), and then at the cruisers.

Accordingly, there are several options as to why the battery commander said so. Perhaps he simply meant the signal raised by the Suvorov. Perhaps he believed that the 12-inch guns of the Sisoya opened fire specifically on Mikasa (he did not command them, did not know the orders, and thought that they were executing the signal from the Suvorov). Perhaps he was talking about the lead, but lead cruiser, that is, the lead ship of Kamimura.
What is interesting is that the ships closest to the Oslyaba (both the Orel and the Sisoj) unanimously estimate the distance to the Mikasa as about 55-57 cables. According to the battery commander, the Sisoj did not even try to sight in with the 6-inch gun due to the distance.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

began to join the main

"Started to join" - that's not "joined", right?
And there is even a diagram

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

"Started to join" - that's not "joined", right?

True. But "began to enter" is not "began maneuver", "began to enter" means "came to the required position, but has not yet completed the maneuver". Considering that the maneuver is described as "coordinate" (and, by the way, not only here, another refutation of the "all at once" turn), began to enter should be understood as "the lead ship(s) completed the coordinate and lay (lay) on a combat course, but not all"

[rytik32]

not only here, another refutation of the "all of a sudden" turn

Why a refutation? The coordinates are usually carried out by the "all of a sudden" maneuver.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

The coordinates are usually carried out with the "all of a sudden" maneuver.

But it is not at all necessary. At the same time, the signal "2nd detachment to follow in the wake of the 1st" becomes clear: after all, the formation of the ledge during the turn "all at once" - not a wake at all

[rytik32]

This makes it clear

I understood it before. The sequence is clearly written in the Izumrud's VZ. First, 1st BrO turns to the right, into the wake, and then orders 2nd BrO to enter the wake of 1st BrO.

[rytik32]

And the VZh "Aurora" is brief to the point of disgrace

But the historical journal "Aurora" writes a little more in detail

... the Japanese took a course almost parallel to ours and opened fire at 1:45. Since at that time the first detachment of battleships was on the right and was describing the coordinates to the left, then in order to enter the head of our battleships, the column was led into battle by Admiral Felkersam on the battleship "Oslyabya", on which all the enemy fire fell

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

But the historical journal "Aurora" writes a little more in detail

Yes. As I said, if desired, you can justify almost any version by referring to this or that document. But if we want to understand what happened there, then we should
1. Give priority to the testimonies of those who were at that time on the 1st and 2nd armored detachments - they, obviously, could best observe what was happening to them.
2. Consider the quantitative factor - if three testify one way, and one another, it is worth accepting the interpretation of the three:)

[rytik32]

Andrey, the issue of criticism of sources is well developed in such a science as source studies.
I'll write a couple of important points.
1. The time that has passed since the event plays a major role. The value of memories written down from memory many months later is not great.
2. The number of sources does not matter if these sources are dependent, i.e. one author could retell a version taking into account the opinion of another author. As a result, there will be many variations of the same story. And the fact that the version was retold many times does not make it more truthful.
That is why "Oleg" and "Aurora" write that there were two columns at the moment of opening fire.
"Emerald" and "Brave" are also two columns, although Fersen and Durnovo could only meet after sending their reports, so they can be considered independent sources.
But the memories of those who were captured cannot be considered independent sources, because they communicated in captivity and wrote their reports taking into account what they heard from others.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

The issue of source criticism is well-developed in such a science as source studies.

Who would argue? However, in the description of naval battles (and not only) the ability of the source to observe and correctly evaluate this or that event is extremely important. And third-party observers have problems with this, which, by the way, is very well evidenced by... even the data from the "Oleg" and "Aurora"

Quote: rytik32

That is why "Oleg" and "Aurora" write that there were two columns at the moment of opening fire.

Actually, Oleg's VZh doesn't write about this. He has the canonical version of events: that the battleships of the 1st detachment described their coordinates and "began to enter as the vanguard of the battleship detachment." Only after that was the combat alert declared and fire opened. But in "Aurora" it can be interpreted as if the battle began when the 1st battleship had just begun to rebuild, + the historical journal you cited (by the way... when was it filled in?)

Quote: rytik32

The number of sources does not matter if these sources are dependent, i.e. one author could retell a version taking into account the opinion of another author.

This applies to cases where 10 authors make a statement based on the same source, which is their primary source.

Quote: rytik32

But the memories of those who were captured cannot be considered independent sources, because they communicated in captivity and wrote their reports taking into account what they heard from others.

It is highly unlikely that the same Osipov, while on the Oslyaba, forgot what his battleship was doing in battle and wrote it down from someone else’s words.

At this time the battleship "Prince Suvorov" changed course to the left and gave the signal: "2nd armored detachment, enter the wake of the 1st detachment"; the battleship "Oslyabya", in order to enter the wake more quickly, slowed down, raising the balls. At 1:35 p.m. the enemy squadron crossed the line of our course and found itself on the left side and began to lean to a counter-course with our squadron. At 1:40 p.m. the battleship "Prince Suvorov" began to turn to a course north-east 23°, and the battleship "Oslyabya" began to bring the 1st armored detachment into the wake.

Osipov himself is the primary source; he does not refer to anyone, but speaks on his own behalf.
The same with Shcherbachev

We are approaching the Oslyabya, which has slowed down to let us through; its balloons are raised to “low speed”.

At the same time, it cannot be said that the testimonies of the officers of the 1st and 2nd armored detachments are similar to each other, there are also enough contradictions there. But in general, a fairly consistent picture emerges - the 1st detachment came to the head of the squadron and laid down a combat course, Oslyabya slowed down, letting it pass, but Rozhestvensky turned a little more to the right than necessary, which is why Oslyabya had to turn to the right to form a single column. That is, in fact, there could very well have been two columns at the beginning of the battle, only the distance between them was minimal, justified by the usual approximate maneuver, and the 1st armored was in front.

[rytik32]

the ability of the source to observe and correctly evaluate a particular event is extremely important

Engelhardt had the best view of the events from the foretop of the Nakhimov, where 1st Brigade also suddenly turns 4R and the reorganization ends after the battle has begun.

Actually, Oleg's VZh doesn't write about this.

I have provided a diagram from the extract to the Orel's logbook, which clearly shows the formation.

When was it filled?

Around the same time as the logbook.

It is highly unlikely that the same Osipov, while on the Oslyaba, forgot

There is a possibility that he deliberately distorted...

But overall, the picture is quite consistent - the 1st detachment went to the head of the squadron and took a combat course, Oslyabya slowed down, letting it pass, but Rozhestvensky turned a little more to the right than necessary, which is why Oslyabya had to turn further to the right to form a single column.

Everything you write is correct, the Japanese observed the same thing. Just pay attention to the time.

Sikisisma: Same hour 20 minutes. Both enemy columns, right and left, together turned slightly to the right in succession, the left column is lagging far behind and in disarray. The enemy, going parallel to us, almost formed a single-wake formation

Fuji: 2:19 Suspended fire. At this time, the Oslyabya detachment entered the tail of the Borodino-class detachment
Below is a diagram of this maneuver.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Engelhardt saw the events taking place from the foretop of the Nakhimov better than anyone else,

Hardly better than the same Osipov

Quote: rytik32

There is a possibility that he deliberately distorted...

Conspiracy theories - no more :)))) There was no point in distorting anything there. And if we were to assume a conspiracy of officers with the aim of distorting the real picture, then everyone would lie coherently, showing the same thing - but this is not observed. And it would have been possible to come up with something much more coherent - for example, that "Oslyabya" slowed down because of a breakdown in the car, etc.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Hardly better than the same Osipov

Osipov's writing is absolutely crazy.
This is the position at 1:40 according to his description

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Osipov's writing is absolutely crazy.
This is the position at 1:40 according to his description

There is nothing wild about it, and you didn't draw the formation correctly. You depicted one of the options that fits his description, but there are much more realistic ones.

[rytik32]

There are no other options. The course that the 1st BrO is rebuilding is not specified, let it be NNW. The Oslyabya receives the order to "join the wake" when the 1st BrO turns to NNW, waits, lets the Orel pass, and when it passes, turns to join its wake. Is the Orel's course at this moment NNW or are there any options? And the Suvorov at this moment has already begun to turn to NNO

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

There are no other options.

let's get a look

Quote: rytik32

The course that is being rebuilt by 1BrO is not specified, let it be NNW.

Are you sure you want to use the old courses? OK, have it your way.
So, the initial course is NNO (it seems to be NO, but what's the point in getting confused about the points of the compass? Let it be NNO), which the squadron follows until 13.20, and then Suvorov turns left 4 points of the compass and goes to NNW.
At the same time, on Alexander they understand it correctly and go in Suvorov's wake, but on Borodino - incorrectly, and Borodino turns not sequentially, but "all of a sudden", "Orel" is trying to figure out who is right and so far does not turn anywhere at all. On our cruisers and destroyers, people are quietly freaking out from such a zoo, so someone writes in the VZ that the 1st armored ship turned "all of a sudden", and someone, to be on the safe side, writes about "coordinates" because both sequentially and all of a sudden - that same coordinate will work out and there will be no mistake. Borodino, however, returns to the wake - from the Japanese side this must look completely incomprehensible.
Well, okay, the 1st armored, having somehow sorted out the formation, goes to intercept the 2nd and 3rd detachments. And it seems that at 13.25 Suvorov raises the order "2nd detachment to keep in the wake of the 1st"
Baer looks at this with the calm of a stone woman from a Ural burial mound, which is basically true for now. But then the oxymoron begins.
Rozhdestvensky with his

To determine what distance was at 1 h. 49 m between the head of the first squad and the head of the second squad, we can assume that the first was walking, with an average speed close to 11¼ knots, along a line close to the hypotenuse of the triangle, 29 minutes (and walked, therefore, about 5,5 miles), and the other walked on a large side, at a speed of 9 knots, and passed 29 4/1 miles in 3 minutes. Since the small leg of the same triangle (the distance between the columns) was 0,8 miles, the entire length of the large leg should have been equal to 5,4 miles, and the distance between Suvorov and Oslyabya was 1 hour 49 m. it should have been 5,4 - 4,33 = 1,07 miles.
Thus, I brought the squadron into battle with the calculation that by the time my flagship turned to the course of the column of the II and III armored detachments, all the ships of the I detachment could fit between my flagship and the armored ship Oslyabya, even counting the two-cable distances from ship to ship, not between their centers (middles), but between the stem of one and the sternpost of the other.

geometrically he was right, but he didn't take into account the "diagonal movement" of the "Borodino" - if we assume that it was the attempt to first go "all at once" and then - to take up formation in the wake that led to the "Borodino", and then the "Orel" being pulled back, then it turns out that when the "Orel" was reorganizing, when it entered the course of the 2nd detachment, it cut off, or even rammed, the "Oslyabya"
So Rozhestvensky might not have seen this, he was obviously more interested in the Japanese at that moment, but Baer couldn't have failed to see it. And that's where he should have slowed down in advance, but where there... He proudly went forward to the very end and then - emergency braking.
At this time, Suvorov, not having reached the course of the 2nd detachment by a little, turns back to NNO.

When at 1:49 pm "Suvorov", leading to NO 23 °, opened fire, it seemed to me that "Oslyabya" was not on the alignment of the masts of "Suvorov", but somewhat to the left, ten, fifteen fathoms.

Accordingly, in order to follow in the wake of the Orel, the Oslyaba had to turn right - a small coordinate of about twenty meters, maybe a little more.

[rytik32]

You mixed up the maneuvers again)

from the Japanese side it must look completely incomprehensible

I definitely didn't see this restructuring)

And Osipov described it like this:
At 12:20 p.m. the armored "Prince Suvorov" signaled: "I armored detachment to turn sequentially to the right by 8 points, give a speed of 11 knots; armored "Oslyabya" canceled, course north-east 23°." When the last ship of the I detachment turned 8 points to the right, the lead ship of the I detachment turned 8 points to the left and at 12:45 p.m. the squadron lined up in two wake columns.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

You mixed up the maneuvers again)

:)
The gist of my version is that Rozhestvensky turned 4 points, but for one reason or another (he miscalculated the maneuver or the Oryol pulled back for one reason or another, it doesn't matter) the Oslyabya, closer to the moment Suvorov returned to his previous course, risked crashing into the Oryol, that is, the columns were close to each other. Your version, in which they were separated by a large space, does not explain why the Oslyabya would brake sharply, and it was noted by many, up to a complete stop. And the turn of the Oslyabya to the right was a small coordinate, since the 1st armored ship rebuilt slightly to the right of its course.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

why did "Oslyabya" brake abruptly,

"Oslyabya" had two variants.
1. Continue approaching the enemy. But the distance is already 4700, the fire is strong and accurate.
2. Turn right and wait for the Eagle to pass.
We chose the 2nd option...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

"Oslyabya" had two variants.
1. Continue approaching the enemy. But the distance is already 4700, the fire is strong and accurate.

Everything would be fine, but the same Osipov (and not only him) clearly writes that the braking happened before the start of the battle. So - no lights.

[rytik32]

but the same Osipov

And Kazmichev (and he is not the only one) writes that the braking occurred already during the battle. Kazmichev even indicates the exact speed...

I wonder if there is at least one source for the version of braking before the start of the battle, which:
1. Dated no later than a month after the battle.
2. The author could observe "Oslyabya" with his own eyes.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

There was no point in distorting anything there.

What Zinovy ​​Petrovich distorted is obvious to the naked eye if you compare his diagrams attached to the reports of July 1905 and March 1906.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

What Zinovy ​​Petrovich distorted is visible to the naked eye.

At least the diagram you provided in the link does not have any fundamental contradictions with Rozhdestvensky's testimony in court. And I can only repeat - even children of primary school age are often able to lie consistently, it is unclear why you refuse this to the vice-admiral.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Perhaps he simply meant the signal raised by the Suvorov.

It is impossible, he could not see the Suvorov from the left-hand battery.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

It is impossible, he could not see the Suvorov from the left-hand battery.

Why did he need to see him? He could have found out about it after the battle.

[rytik32]

yes... but why would Blinov write in the report something that doesn’t concern him?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

but why would Blinov write in his report something that doesn’t concern him?

The simplest thing is that he could have easily confused his own memories and what was said in captivity. Or he simply heard about this signal from someone on the ship, although he himself could not see it. Or it was all about Kamimura's head. Or... other "or":)

[rytik32]

Andrey, I don’t know anymore whether you are sincere or just kidding?

Here Malechkin also suggests:

The battleship Sisoj Velikiy opened fire on the enemy immediately after Oslyabya from the 12" guns of the bow turret, and from the battery 6" guns could only fire at the 5th or 6th enemy ship.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Andrey, I don’t know anymore whether you are sincere or just kidding?

What's the mockery? I can't figure it out.

[rytik32]

It's as clear as day to me. "Sisoy" immediately after "Oslyabya" opened fire from the bow 12-inch turret of "Mikase", and a little later, from the 6-inch battery - at "Kasuga". This version completely fits in with what Ozerov, Blinov and Malechkin wrote.
Can you outline your version?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

It's as clear as day to me. "Sisoy" immediately behind "Oslyabya" opened fire from the forward 12-inch turret of "Mikase"

But why did you decide that he shot at "Mikasa"? Ozerov directly indicates that

At 1:45 p.m. the battleship Sisoei Velikiy entrusted to me could open fire, but not at the lead enemy ship, but first at the 5th in their line (Nissin), then at the 6th (Kasuga), and then at the cruisers. The distance of 49 cables at the beginning of the opening of fire soon decreased to 43 and 39 cables. At this time it was possible to notice how a 12-inch shell from the bow turret hit a three-funnel cruiser of the Iwate type and caused a large fire on her starboard spar deck. The gunnery conductor Kalashnikov fired.

At the same time, Kamimura's lead ship was a cruiser "of the Iwate type":))) Whether they hit it or not is another question, but they were obviously aiming at it.
That is, the 12-inch turret could have initially started firing at Nishin or Kasuga - there are no indications that they fired specifically at Mikasa. And the commander of the 6-inch battery could have been ordered to fire at the lead cruiser of the Iwate type, to which the fire from the 12-inch was transferred after the sighting

[rytik32]

But why did you decide that he shot at "Mikasa"?

1. Blinov writes that the target was "Mikasa"
2. Ozerov writes, strangely: "could have opened", but does not write when he opened it
3. Malechkin writes that he opened fire immediately behind the Oslyabya from a 12-inch turret.
4. Look at the diagram of the Japanese fleet's position; at the very beginning there was no one to fire at except Mikasa.
... about 5 minutes later, the Kasuga appeared in the battery's range

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

1. Blinov writes that the target was "Mikasa"

Blinov writes: “The order was to shoot at the head.”

Quote: rytik32

3. Malechkin writes that he opened fire immediately behind the Oslyabya from a 12-inch turret.

Literally

The battleship "Sisoy the Great" opened fire on the enemy immediately after the "Oslyabya" from 12 "bow turret guns, and from the battery 6" guns it could fire only at the 5th or 6th enemy matelot.

That is, there is no direct indication of who he shot at.

Quote: rytik32

4. Look at the diagram of the Japanese fleet's position; at the very beginning there was no one to fire at except Mikasa.

The problem is that we don't quite understand when "Sisoy" entered the battle in the first place.
"Suvorov" opened fire at 13.49, and according to the officers of "Sisoy" the battle began 4-7 minutes earlier, at 13.42-13.45, but Blinov does not indicate the time, according to him it turns out that fire could have been opened after 13.45. And this is most likely some kind of misperception. That "Sisoy" began shooting at the same time as "Oslyabya" may be true, but it may not be
Malechkin claims that

The battleship "Sisoy Veliky" opened fire on the enemy immediately after "Oslyabya"

But Ozerov reports that

At 1:42 a.m., Oslyabya opened fire on the enemy.

And Blinov claims that "Sisoy" fired somewhere around 13.45:XNUMX

At about 1:45 a.m. a short alarm was sounded on the left side. The distance was about 55 cables. Fire was opened from 12" guns.

That is, according to them, "Sisoy" opened fire three minutes later than "Oslyabya".
In general, everything is very contradictory. And even if we consider that "Sisoy" opened fire immediately after "Oslyabya", then we, again, do not understand very well when "Oslyabya" started shooting. There is an opinion that he started the battle, there is an opinion that he opened fire after "Suvorov". However, it is absolutely certain that if "Oslyabya" started the battle 4-7 minutes before "Suvorov", everyone would remember it.
Therefore, the time indicated by the officers of "Sisoy" is clearly incorrect and I see no point in relying on it. But the timings and distances... That's more interesting.
Blinov writes

At about 1 hours a short alarm sounded to the port side. Distance about 45 cab. They opened fire from 55 "guns, and soon from 12" and 6 m / m. It was ordered to shoot in the head.

But Malechkin writes

Fire was opened from room 52.

A Ozerov

At 1:45 a.m., the battleship Sisoii Velikiy entrusted to me could open fire, but not at the lead enemy ship, but first at the 5th in their line (Nissin), then at the 6th (Kasuga), and then at the cruisers.

But at the very beginning of the battle, as you correctly write, the Siso could not fire at any Nissin - it had not yet passed the Loop of Togo.
Two sources (Blinov, Ozerov) claim that fire was opened around 13.45:13.45, Malechkin does not contradict this. But Ozerov claims that by XNUMX:XNUMX the battleship could no longer fire at the Mikasa. Therefore, I see things this way
1) The battleship entered the battle much later than 13.45, namely, when Togo's 1st detachment was already completing its reorganization (Nissin was entering the loop). This seems to be contradicted by Malechkin, who claims that fire was opened immediately behind Oslyabya, but it coincides with the timings of Ozerov ("Oslyabya opened fire at 13.42") and Blinov (Sisoy began firing at 13.45)
2) Ozerov initially ordered to shoot at the lead aircraft. But while the starter Malechkin was working out a firing solution, it became impossible to shoot at the Mikasa. Or maybe it was so that Malechkin ordered Blinov to shoot at the Mikasa, but he could not carry out the order.
This is precisely why Ozerov writes as if apologizing.

At 1:45 a.m. the battleship Sisoy Veliky entrusted to me could open fire, but not at the enemy's lead ship.

The text, you are right, looks strange, but if we assume that Ozerov gave the order to shoot at the lead gunner, and the artillerymen could not carry out his order, then everything falls into place.
3) There is no doubt that they started shooting from a 12-inch cannon, but they started shooting not at the lead ship, but at another ship - otherwise, Ozerov had no reason to claim that at the moment of opening fire, Sisoes could not have been shooting at the Mikasa

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

And yes, they started firing from the 12-inch gun not because the bow turret could aim at the Mikasa, but because the distance was too great for firing from the 6-inch gun.

[rytik32]

direct indication

but we know who was the head...

when did "Sisoy" even enter the battle?

Time dances in all the testimonies. And there is nothing surprising in this: all the rough notes were lost. They wrote from memory. One can cite the phrase that immediately after "Oslyabya", and it began the battle at the same minute as "Suvorov"

Malechkin ordered Blinov to shoot at Mikasa, but he could not carry out the order.

It is quite possible, and the bow tower was able to...

and because the distance was too great for shooting 6 dm

IMHO it was the angle, not the range. Judging by the diagram, the aft 12-inch turret of the Sisoya had the same 45-degree angle from the traverse as the 6-inch guns of the gun

[Cartographer]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: MCmaximus

Actually, he's not going alone. He's got a tail of other ships. He has no brakes.

That's exactly it. That's why he had to gradually slow down, giving the ships behind him time to get their bearings, and not wait until the last minute and then abruptly hit the brakes.

Quote: MCmaximus

In the end, Rozhdestvensky commands EVERYTHING. It was he who turned the squadron into a flock of sheep that can only follow the leader.

Name me at least one naval unit of those years that, after the destruction of the flagship, retained control and in which the ordinary ship commander (Alexander III) made an unexpected, bold and very successful maneuver by throwing himself at the Japanese formation in order to pass under the stern of the 1st Japanese detachment. Alexander, essentially sacrificing himself, leads the squadron into the attack and

You know very well that such situations, except for Vitgeft and Makarov, simply did not exist, at least in the period described, because there were no major battles of armored fleets

[North watchmen]

Quote: bayard

The 2nd Squadron should not have gone to Tsushima at all. It was worth making Cam Ranh Bay its operational base, cutting off Japan's supply of military supplies and, in general, Japan's supply, and becoming that factor

Stop fantasizing already - the main part of Japan's supplies to the Russian Empire came from the USA (more than 70%) - and the leadership of the Russian Empire shit itself out of fear after signals from the USA about the inadmissibility of the seizure or destruction of American goods for Japan.
Why do you think the Vladivostok detachment ended up not on the east coast of Japan, which is, by the way, completely defenseless, but in the Korean Strait?

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Dozorny_ severa

And why do you think the Vladivostok detachment ended up not on the east coast of Japan, which is absolutely defenseless, but in the Korean Strait?

Because he was going to join the 1st TOE?

[North watchmen]

Quote: MCmaximus

The fight was lost in the first 20 minutes.

The battle was lost at the moment when they decided to build submarines of the Borodino and Oslyabya type.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Dozorny_ severa

Quote: MCmaximus

The fight was lost in the first 20 minutes.

The battle was lost at the moment when they decided to build submarines of the Borodino and Oslyabya type.

People fight with equipment - give him a ZPR dreadnought, and he'll get it from the Japs.

[North watchmen]

It’s not about individuals at all, but about the system that shapes the individual.
Personal beatings of sailors and insults to officers by Admiral Togo or Beatty were simply unthinkable.
Thanks to the Bolsheviks, they cured my lordly habits with lead.

[Jura 27]

Thanks to the Bolsheviks, they cured my lordly habits with lead.

Some were cured, others appeared who cursed their subordinates during the Great Patriotic War and even killed them without any sentence.

[Non-fighter]

Firstly, read "Were the Parquet Cruiser" #19 in my opinion, where the sailors in the PJS discussed the film "Battleship Potemkin" which they accidentally showed during the day. A picture from life in my opinion.
Secondly, I witnessed a very interesting scene. A sailor patted a lieutenant on the shoulder, "Combatant, you're wrong." Considering that one of our group commanders was a freshly hatched lieutenant a year older than me, it's not surprising. The first mate saw it. He told Godka on the spot everything he thought about him. To the lieutenant, "Come see me later." I don't know what happened next. Pikul's "Moosund," exactly the same.
Secondly, I read somewhere on the Internet how the BC-5 commander got into a car with a bicycle chain, and when they tried to do something dark, he beat them with all his might, and then he identified his offenders by their tracks and gave them a good time. I somehow believe this.

[Cartographer]

Quote: Not the fighter

Firstly, read "Were the Parquet Cruiser" #19 in my opinion, where the sailors in the PJS discussed the film "Battleship Potemkin" which they accidentally showed during the day. A picture from life in my opinion.
Secondly, I witnessed a very interesting scene. A sailor patted a lieutenant on the shoulder, "Combatant, you're wrong." Considering that one of our group commanders was a freshly hatched lieutenant a year older than me, it's not surprising. The first mate saw it. He told Godka on the spot everything he thought about him. To the lieutenant, "Come see me later." I don't know what happened next. Pikul's "Moosund," exactly the same.
Secondly, I read somewhere on the Internet how the BC-5 commander got into a car with a bicycle chain, and when they tried to do something dark, he beat them with all his might, and then he identified his offenders by their tracks and gave them a good time. I somehow believe this.

My brother served in the 90th term in the dv. He sat in a bunker underground, worked in communications. And one day a new pilot came to them and said: from now on you will call me mister lieutenant. In response, he learned a lot of interesting things about himself, ran to complain.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Dozorny_ severa

Thanks to the Bolsheviks, they cured my lordly habits with lead.

Thanks to the social lift "from rags to riches" lordly habits can never be completely cured.

The lordly habits of the elite of late Soviet society, 86 years after the defeat at Tsushima, led to the self-liquidation of the USSR.

[MCmaximus]

Not cured. You think too highly of someone.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Dozorny_ severa

Personal beatings of sailors and insults to officers by Admiral Togo or Beatty were simply unthinkable.

Oh well. The squabbles between the Fischer and Beresford factions even reached the press.

[MCmaximus]

Oy! What? Were they beating each other with sailors?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: MCmaximus

Oy! What? Were they beating each other with sailors?

Nope. They did. personal insults to officers by admirals.

[Alexandra]

Do you think that if someone more intelligent had been in ZPR's place, he would have been able to avoid a linear artillery battle between armored squadrons despite Nicholas II's order to "go to Vladivostok"?

In an artillery battle between squadrons, given the real performance characteristics of even the newest Russian battleships demonstrated at Tsushima, the only chances were to slow down/deprive 1-2 Japanese armored cruisers of the Japanese line with successful hits in the initial phase of the battle, and then turn the battle into an uncontrollable melee in a decisive attempt to finish off these cruisers (in the expectation that the Japanese would still protect the "wounded" a la: "Admiral Iessen is trying to protect the "Rurik" that has lost control, hoping that the "Rurik" crew will fix the damage to the steering and the cruiser will again take its place in the wake formation")?

Unfortunately, Tsushima was the result of an inextricable combination of poor command and personnel training with unavoidable technical shortcomings. Trivially, on a hypothetical "Dreadnought" ZPR at least had every chance to escape from the Japanese.

[Jura 27]

It’s trivial that on the hypothetical “Dreadnought” the ZPR would at least have had every chance of escaping from the Japanese.

If the steering had been damaged, it would not have been possible to escape either.

[Alexandra]

I look at the armor scheme in the stern - 102 mm side, 51 mm deck, 76 mm slope. Two more conning towers. The probability that the Japanese with their Tsushima shells would have irreversibly knocked out the "Dreadnought's" steering control is frankly small.

[Jura 27]

Quote: AlexanderA

I look at the armor scheme in the stern - 102 mm side, 51 mm deck, 76 mm slope. Two more conning towers. The probability that the Japanese with their Tsushima shells would have irreversibly knocked out the "Dreadnought's" steering control is frankly small.

The Borodinians, against the FS, were armored no worse than the Dreadnought. However, steering control was lost not only on the Suvorov.

[Alexandra]

Well, you know what the reason is, the design of domestic conning towers “having no analogues in the world”.

For those readers who are not aware:

"The main drawback of the Russian ships' deckhouses was the incorrect design of the roof, which overlapped the vertical armor of the cylinder by almost a foot in the form of a curved mushroom-shaped visor. With this design, between the roof visor and the armor cylinder of the deckhouse, there remained a gap of one foot not covered by armor. The mushroom-shaped overhang of the roof caught fragments reflected from below and directed them into the deckhouse. Additional horizontal visors, one inch thick, placed on the end of the vertical plates, reflected small fragments, but they were torn off when shells exploded below the gaps."

On the Dreadnought, the conning towers were normal, with viewing slits cut into the vertical armor. And there were two of them.

[rytik32]

On the Suvorov, the steering was damaged not by a direct hit, but by a hull shake, and in the aft part. The Asama had similar damage to the steering. And here, the armor does not protect in any way.

[Cartographer]

Quote: AlexanderA

Do you think that if someone more intelligent had been in ZPR's place, he would have been able to avoid a linear artillery battle between armored squadrons despite Nicholas II's order to "go to Vladivostok"?

In an artillery battle between squadrons, given the real performance characteristics of even the newest Russian battleships demonstrated at Tsushima, the only chances were to slow down/deprive 1-2 Japanese armored cruisers of the Japanese line with successful hits in the initial phase of the battle, and then turn the battle into an uncontrollable melee in a decisive attempt to finish off these cruisers (in the expectation that the Japanese would still protect the "wounded" a la: "Admiral Iessen is trying to protect the "Rurik" that has lost control, hoping that the "Rurik" crew will fix the damage to the steering and the cruiser will again take its place in the wake formation")?

Unfortunately, Tsushima was the result of an inextricable combination of poor command and personnel training with unavoidable technical shortcomings. Trivially, on a hypothetical "Dreadnought" ZPR at least had every chance to escape from the Japanese.

Unfortunately, he was not the first, nor the last to lose battles. Trafalgar, Aboukir, the battle of Lissa, Santiago, Pearl Harbor...

[Alexandra]

Quote from Kartograph

Unfortunately, he was not the first, nor the last to lose battles. Trafalgar, Aboukir, the battle of Lissa, Santiago, Pearl Harbor...

Tsushima is the most catastrophic defeat of the Russian Navy in its entire history. The Russian Navy has not yet gotten rid of the root, deep-seated reasons that led to this defeat.

[North watchmen]

Quote: bayard

Because of these debts, the stupid Tsar was then dragged into the Entente - against Germany.

In my opinion, what happened to your memory? The Entente took place under Alexander III in 3.
By the way, it is not correct to include England there. Unlike France and the Russian Empire, it did not take on any obligations.

[anzar]

In my opinion, what happened to your memory? The Entente took place under Alexander III in 3.

Ha ha, and for a whole decade afterwards France built armored cruisers against... who?
You are seriously mistaken. The "cordial agreement" between Britain and France took place after 1903, and the Russian Empire joined somewhere around 1908, although earlier due to the treaty with France from 1893G. ...

[North watchmen]

Thanks for the material - we look forward to the continuation.
I have a question: why was it necessary to build 18-knot battleships, sacrificing protection, firepower, survivability, resources, in order to crawl through battle at 9 knots?
After all, every kilogram of the battleship’s displacement came at a monstrous price - the hard labor of the Great Russian peasant and his hopeless, impoverished existence?
For such quirks he and his gang should have been shot 5 times.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Dozorny_ severa

Why was it necessary to build 18-knot battleships - sacrificing protection, firepower, survivability, resources - in order to crawl into battle at 9 knots?

They were dragging their feet not because of this at all, but because the "hodgepodge" included old and battered ships.

[Non-fighter]

There is such a thing as a concept of application. If I am not mistaken, these fast sub-armored cruisers were intended for cruiser warfare, that is, for intercepting trade. Such a ship should be able to cope with "ordinary" cruisers. And in order to cope with such a thing, it was necessary to dispatch a squadron of normal armored ships, and even the British could not have many of these squadrons. The battle at Coronel, the battle at the Falklands, where Spee was lured into a trap, the concept of a "pocket battleship."
P.S. The presence of a "running" 6 dm gun in the bow and the bow turret at a height of 10 m above the waterline, which allows it to fire in any weather, kind of hints at why these ships were built. And the fact that they were placed in a line... There were no others :(

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Alex, good afternoon!
I am, of course, glad about the appearance of a new article in your series. But, unfortunately, I am unable to agree with your theses.

Having decided that the enemy was going to attack his left column, Z. P. Rozhestvensky at about 13:42 ordered the 1st armored detachment to increase speed to 11 knots and turn “all at once” 4 points (45 degrees) to the left.

Z.P. Rozhestvensky directly refutes this thesis. He indicated in his testimony to the Investigative Commission

As soon as the Suvorov opened the Mikaza, the Suvorov immediately increased speed to 11½ knots, making the signal: "I-detachment have 11 knots", and leaned slightly to the left to enter the head of the left column. In the Grand Duke's memorandum book it is completely incorrectly stated that "at 1:20 a.m. the right column suddenly turned 8 R to the left", i.e. into the sea.
I was not as paralyzed with horror at the appearance of the enemy as the publicist, an employee of the Grand Duke, who apparently has access to all the official information of the Naval Ministry, tries to prove. Thus, the lead ship of the first detachment (Suvorov) leaned to the left at 1:20 a.m., and at 1:49 a.m. straightened out on a course of NO 23° ahead of the column of the II and III armored detachments; the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ships of the I detachment kept in its wake all this time..

This is confirmed by other officers. Take the same Clapier-de Colong

At this time, our 11st armored detachment increased its speed to 4 knots, turned sequentially 12 points to the left, coming out at the head of the XNUMXnd and XNUMXrd armored detachments, forming one common wake column of our XNUMX ships.

Of course, the testimony mentions that the 1st detachment turned everything "all of a sudden", but...
Firstly, we see from the example of Rozhestvensky's attempt to line up the Borodino-class battleships in a frontal formation (before the battle began) that even on the ships of the 1st armored detachment his signals could be misunderstood. Accordingly, already in view of the enemy, there can be nothing surprising in the fact that someone again messed up and decided that the 1st detachment was moving "everything at once"
Secondly, and this is the most important thing - since there are discrepancies in the sources, it is impossible to claim that the turn was carried out "all of a sudden". We can only say that there is a certain probability that the turn was not sequential, but "all of a sudden". That is, the turn "all of a sudden" is a hypothesis, but you present it as a historical fact that has no double interpretation.
The same goes for volley fire. You write

Almost every 30 seconds a new salvo hit the Oslyabya

I saw discussions on this subject on the Tsushima forums, where you participated and where you were opposed, with reference to authorities in Japanese artillery, that the Japanese did not fire in salvos (it is clear that when the ship was sighted in and the command was given to open fire to kill, it looked from the outside like a salvo). But again, you write about salvo firing as a fact, and not as a hypothesis.
By hits

The first shell fired at the Oslyaba fell short by about 30 m. The second shell fell slightly overshooting. The third shell, apparently a 12-inch shell, completely tore out the left hawse and damaged the chain stopper.

Why do you assume a 12-inch projectile?

A 12-inch shell exploded on the battery deck near the capstan drives.

What allows you to say that it was 12-inch?

Two 12-inch shells hit the 2nd coal pit on the living deck in one salvo. A hole the size of a gate was formed

What allows you to say for sure that the shells were 12-inch and there were 2 hits? "A hole the size of a gate" in the plating could easily have been made even by an 8-inch Japanese shell - let's remember the photo of damage after the VOK battle in the Korean Strait, where there were no 12-inch guns at all, but a hole the size of a gate is very much present.

Soon two 12-inch shells hit it simultaneously. One tore off the left barrel, the second pierced the roof above the embrasure and exploded inside.

What gives you grounds to consider these shells to be 12-inch? Where do you get the information that the shell actually penetrated the roof of the turret and exploded inside? Was it from Shcherbachev 4?

A large shell hit the roof of the 10" forward turret and, having penetrated it, exploded inside.

so here, firstly, it is not said that the shell is 12-inch, and secondly, the fact of penetration is doubtful - the shell could have exploded upon impact with the armor. A. Danilov describes a similar case - the explosion of an 8-inch shell made a hole in the roof of the "Eagle" turret.

Two other shells penetrated the armour near the waterline, one causing the 10th coal pit to flood, the other the 16th.

What allowed you to say with certainty that the armor near pit 16 was penetrated?
Alexey, to my deep regret, you have chosen a narrative style in which you give readers only your conclusions, without explaining the reasons and grounds on which you came to them. In all cases where there are other interpretations of a particular event, you do not introduce the reader to them, but give your interpretation as a historical fact. Accordingly, you deprive the reader of the opportunity to learn that there are other versions of the events you describe. Therefore, I again urge you to reconsider your approach to writing articles, to indicate controversial points (as in the case of a turn sequentially or all at once) and to highlight the initial data on the basis of which you came to certain conclusions.

[rytik32]

Andrey, good morning!

it is impossible to claim that the turn was made "all of a sudden"

So Zinovy ​​Petrovich himself initially attached a diagram where 1BrO turns "suddenly"
https://all-kruchinin.livejournal.com/17953.html

Would you like to find out why he later changed his testimony?

Well, there is a drawing of a mechanic from "Kasuga" made between rough notes, i.e. not from memory after the battle, where 1BrO is following the bearing

The Japanese did not fire volleys

The Japanese fired in volleys. There are direct references to this from both sides.
In particular, the work "On shooting and fire control in the Japanese fleet" of 1906

Why do you assume a 12-inch projectile?

According to the described effect - the hawse was completely torn out. And the author of this projectile is known with a probability of more than 90% - "Shikishima".

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

So Zinovy ​​Petrovich himself initially attached a diagram where 1BrO turns "suddenly"
https://all-kruchinin.livejournal.com/17953.htm

Alexey, there is no "all at once" on this diagram:))))) The dotted line that you took for the ships' courses is nothing more than an indication of the ships' positions after the reorganization (Suvorov is the lead, Alexander is behind him, etc.). If you disagree with this and claim that these are still the ships' courses during the reorganization, then it turns out that Suvorov, having changed course, went stern first, and Alexander III, Borodino and Orel after the reorganization were not going towards, but away from the Japanese, towards the Oslyaba:)

Quote: rytik32

Would you like to find out why he later changed his testimony?

Yes, with pleasure:)

Quote: rytik32

Well, there is a drawing of a mechanic from the "Kasuga" made between rough notes, i.e. not from memory after the battle, where the 1st Brigade is going in a bearing

Which doesn't mean anything at all, since it is extremely difficult to determine by eye in this case whether everything is sudden or sequential. I will tactfully remain silent about the mechanic's ability to observe the formation of Russian ships. And even more so about the mechanic's qualifications as an observer of maneuvers.

Quote: rytik32

The Japanese fired in volleys. There are direct references to this from both sides.

And there is an opposing point of view that you know about.

Quote: rytik32

According to the described effect, the hawse was completely torn out.

That is, you yourself undertake to determine the caliber of the projectile. Okay, at least this time you at least indicated "apparently". And in other cases?
P.S. I read the comments - I understand that this will be in the next articles?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

I didn't attach the diagram.
Here is a great explanation from Shcherbachev 4th

12:30 pm - Admiral's signal: "I armored detachment to turn sequentially 8 points to the left. (I insist on “sequentially”, because while still a prisoner in Japan I had to hear from officers of Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s staff that the signal was: “turn everyone suddenly to 8 R”. Meanwhile, the signal was precisely “sequentially”, I remember this well and here’s why: when the signal was raised, the senior navigator, Lieutenant Satkevich, having analyzed it, reported to the commander. At that time, the Alexander III was already rolling in the wake of the Suvorov, while the Borodino, having put down the rudder, immediately rolled to the left, as with the signal “suddenly”. Seeing this, the commander shouted to Lieutenant Satkevich: “You are mistaken. The signal is to turn suddenly. Lieutenant Slavinsky, check”. Lieutenant Slavinsky (the officer of the watch), having looked at the signal book, which I opened, said to the commander: “No way, turn sequentially, the Borodino is confused”. I also looked at the book and read out loud: turn sequentially to ... rhumb. to the left. At this time, the Borodino, having recovered, was already entering the wake of the Alexandra. This whole delay lasted no more than a minute, but I remember well that the signal was "sequentially").

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Here is a great explanation from Shcherbachev 4th

Shcherabchev writes about another restructuring)))
See diagram 7 to the report

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Shcherabchev writes about another restructuring)))

Yes, I made a mistake in the heat of debate:))))))

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Yes, I made a mistake in the heat of debate:))))))

You recovered just in time.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

They corrected me in time:)))))

[rytik32]

The dotted line that you took for the ships' courses is nothing more than an indication of the ships' position after reorganization.

Other turns are marked with one dotted line from the main one, this is what distinguishes the "suddenly" turn from the "sequentially" turn.

I will tactfully remain silent about the mechanic's ability to observe the formation of Russian ships.

Yes, he observed the formation, and the difference between the bearing and the wake was visible.
It’s in vain that you write like that about a document you haven’t seen.
His diary is much more detailed than the ship's commander's combat report.
For example, from this diary I know availability shells on the Kasuga, not just consumption.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Other turns are marked with one dotted line from the main one, this is what distinguishes the "suddenly" turn from the "sequentially" turn.

Unfortunately, this assumption of yours is refuted by the diagram, for the reason I stated above. In those cases when the dotted line indicates a turn, it clearly shows where the ship is going (attached), but in the case of the reorganization of the 1st combat detachment this does not happen. Hence the conclusion - the dotted line does not show the ship's course.
And even if it did show (no), so what? The testimony of Rozhdestvensky and Shcherbachev the 4th, for whom the conversation about "suddenly" or "consistently" was etched into memory, is already more than sufficient grounds to question any scheme
Next. Your version makes Rozhdestvensky look like a complete moron - according to you, he first draws one maneuvering scheme, and then, contradicting himself, shows another. That is, he testifies against himself. This is a frankly stupid act (children in elementary grades already know how to lie consistently), and ZPR was clearly not a fool.
Now, if you had provided Rozhdestvensky’s report, in which he talks about the “all of a sudden” turn, compiled before the trial, then yes, it would have been possible to build conspiracy theories.

Quote: rytik32

Yes, he observed the formation, and the difference between the bearing and the wake was visible.

I have no doubt that he observed the formation. I am absolutely certain that he could not determine exactly whether there was a bearing or a wake.

Quote: rytik32

It’s in vain that you write like that about a document you haven’t seen.
His diary is much more detailed than the ship's commander's combat report.

Alexey, you are making a mistake in your reasoning right now. You are assessing the reliability of a document based on how detailed the document is.
Yes, of course, when one person writes in passing, like, for example, about the formation of the 1st armored Slavic

The first armored detachment suddenly turned 4 points to the left and went to the second detachment to take its place at the head of the wake column.

And the second one (Shcherbachev) writes in detail

I insist on "sequentially", because while still a prisoner in Japan I had to hear from officers of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's staff that the signal was: "turn all at once to 8 R". Meanwhile, the signal was precisely "sequentially", I remember this well and here is why: when the signal was raised, the senior navigator, Lieutenant Satkevich, having understood it, reported to the commander. At that time, the Alexander III was already rolling in the wake of the Suvorov, while the Borodino, having put down the rudder, immediately rolled to the left, as with the signal "suddenly". Seeing this, the commander shouted to Lieutenant Satkevich: "You are mistaken. The signal is to turn suddenly. Lieutenant Slavinsky, check." Lieutenant Slavinsky (the officer of the watch), having looked at the signal book, which I opened, said to the commander: "No way, turn sequentially, the Borodino is confused." I also looked at the book and read out loud: turn sequentially to ... rumb. to the left.

Of course, a more detailed presentation inspires confidence.
But the fact is that credibility should still be assessed taking into account the capabilities of the person who wrote the document. That's what

Quote: rytik32

From this diary I know the availability of shells on the Kasuga, and not just the consumption.

I fully believe that the mechanic could have known the shell consumption. Or he could have not known, by the way, simply having said a figure he remembered from someone else's words. That is, such information should be considered highly (but still not absolutely) reliable. But in observing our formation, the mechanic could easily have made a mistake. At sea, in general, many things are not seen as they really are; you need to have a lot of experience to understand what you see correctly. The mechanic, whose role is not connected with regular observation of ship maneuvers, has little such experience.
At the same time, the angle of the Russian ships was such that it was extremely difficult to distinguish a wake from a step. At least for an engineer, at least for an admiral. There are a million sources of error. According to Shcherbachev, Borodino first turned suddenly - could this have caused the error? Yes, easily. The wake of the "Borodino" when turning was very conditional, because the radii of the ships' circulation did not coincide - that is, after turning, each of them left the wake of the ship ahead and then spent time returning to it. Could this have been taken by an outside observer as "all of a sudden"? Easy. And so on and so forth.

[rytik32]

In those cases where the dotted line indicates a turn, it clearly shows where the ship is going (attached), but in the case of the reorganization of the 1st combat unit this does not happen

The lines of the 1st Brigade ships clearly demonstrate where the ships are being reorganized.

Rozhdestvensky's testimony

... who changed his own testimony

Shcherbacheva 4th

Shcherbachev describes this moment as follows:
The admiral raises the signal: "Make 11 knots" and transmits by semaphore along the line: "68 revolutions". The combat alarm is sounded on the "Eagle". The alarm is also heard from the "Borodino". The XNUMXst armored detachment, following the movement of the flagship "Prince Suvorov", begins to turn to the left in order to line up in one wake column with the XNUMXnd and XNUMXrd armored detachments.
You provide a quote describing the preceding maneuver.

Your version makes Rozhdestvensky look like a complete moron - according to you, it turns out that he first draws one scheme of maneuvering, and then, contradicting himself, shows another. That is, he testifies against himself.

Compare the two diagrams. At the moment of opening fire: on the earlier left one, Mikasa is 3R off course, on the later one, almost abeam.

[MCmaximus]

Guys! Yes, don't argue! What's the difference suddenly or sequentially? Actually, to get from two columns into one in a way that all at once is too tricky and difficult. Another thing is that it was done in such a way (the speed is simply low) that from the outside it could look like all at once.
And both versions may be correct. The main thing is not the maneuver, but its goal. Both squadrons in the wake.
Here about Jutland, someone writes that the Germans left suddenly, everything was clear, like at a parade, but someone starts to describe it in detail and it turns out to be chaos and panic.

[rytik32]

But in observing our formation, the mechanic could easily make a mistake.

The diary was clearly written during the battle: messy handwriting, corrections, diagrams and drawings between the lines. That is, in essence, it is one of the most reliable sources.

At sea, many things are seen differently than they actually are; you need to have a lot of experience to understand what you see correctly.

I don't understand what you're talking about... He simply drew ships on the horizon, with masts and pipes, but very well, even the intervals were maintained

According to Shcherbachev Borodino

Once again: this is an unsuccessful maneuver to reorganize the 1st Brigade to the front to the right of Oslyabya, as a result of which the 1st Brigade ended up in a separate column.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

That is, in essence, this is one of the most reliable sources.

Which doesn't change what I said above. The question is whether the man on board the Kasuga could have correctly identified the formation of the Russian ships at that moment. The answer is yes, he could, with a probability of about 50%:))))
He could go and count the shells on the Kasuga. But it is not at all necessary to understand the formation of the ships correctly.

Quote: rytik32

I don't understand what you're talking about...

What's so complicated about that? From that angle, both the wake and the step will look exactly the same - a line of ships with small intervals between them. It is possible to determine whether it is a step or a wake only by correctly understanding the course they are taking and by correlating the distance, speed of displacement and actual length of the ships with their observed dimensions.
For example, I am attaching a photo. It is almost impossible to determine whether the ships are sailing in a wake or a step formation.

Quote: rytik32

Once again: this is an unsuccessful maneuver of the 1st Brigade’s reorganization to the front to the right of “Oslyabya”,

True, I was a bit slow here.

[rytik32]

I'll answer about the holes.

What allows you to say that it was 12-inch?

The hit near the capstan drives is suspiciously close to the hit near the 1st bulkhead, and happened at about the same time. And the light in the readings disappeared either from one or the other hit. Possibly from one salvo. Definitely 12 inches in consequences: fire and smoke throughout the entire forward compartment.

What allows you to say for sure that the shells were 12-inch and there were 2 hits?

The source says it like this: 2 shells in one salvo.
Here's another point, the 6-inch guns of the upper casemate were out of action because a plate had slid down. But how could it have slid down? There was another plate below! So, only the plates of two casemates could have slid down at once. If several frames had been broken under them... That was the hole the size of a gate...

Isn’t it from Shcherbachev on the 4th?

He, he was the one who could see it better than anyone else. The shell most likely hit above the embrasure, in the place where the cover was thrown back. Zavarin estimated the shell at 12 inches.

An 8-inch shell exploded and made a hole in the roof of the Eagle's turret.

I don't remember anything like that...

What allowed you to say for sure that the armor around pit 16 was penetrated?

Damage to the bulkhead between the 16th coal pit and the living deck.

without explaining for what reasons and on what grounds you came to them

Justifying each shell is boring. I'm thinking of writing an article about hits in "Orel", but in LJ, the material is too specific. It's not interesting for a wide range of readers.
I will justify the reasons for the death of the Oslyabya, because this is the very essence of the article series.

as in the case of a turn sequentially or all at once

This point was resolved unambiguously after the translation of Japanese sources.
I have some desire to write on this topic with justification, but this would require 2-3 articles.

[TermNachTer]

The fire-hold division was commanded by a sailor? Why so many pictures? If you are interested, you can find a movie on the Internet (it was very patriotic, the Japanese needed it after the defeat) and watch it.

[TermNachTer]

P.S. For some reason, many people think that "Togo's loop" is such a tricky maneuver))) I believe that Togo miscalculated the speed and distance and tried to correct his mistake by starting a dangerous maneuver right on the course of the 2nd TO, Rozhestvensky was unable to take advantage of his chance.

[rytik32]

The Japanese themselves write that this is a home-made preparation. The meaning of the maneuver is obvious - to quickly reach the effective firing range and take an enveloping position

[TermNachTer]

Crossing T is a favorite trick of many admirals, but not many succeeded. In hindsight, everything can be explained))) start a turn right on the enemy's course? Those who have already turned - block the directrix of those who have not yet completed the turn, and the Russians get the opportunity to hit the second line during flights. Awesome idea. Too bad Rozhestvensky did not take advantage of it.

[rytik32]

The enemy's situation is no better, only the head guns and only the bow guns can fight. Campbell also counted the number of guns that Togo was exposed to. It turned out to be very modest.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: TermNachTER

Crossing the T is a favorite trick of many admirals, but not many succeeded.

So Togo did it clumsily, but it worked at Tsushima. He put pressure on the head and knocked out the head ones because of the advantage in speed. Jellicoe at Jutland managed to turn around in front of Scheer magnificently. Classic crossing-T. Another thing is that the Germans turned out to be very quick and got out of the trap beautifully...)))

[TermNachTer]

Togo managed to do a big stupid thing and only Rozhestvensky's lack of initiative saved him from big problems. And he consistently knocked out Russian EBPs already being on a parallel course.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: TermNachTER

Togo managed to do something very stupid

Stupidity is when an action has consequences. Therefore, Togo's loop is not stupidity, but a brilliant maneuver.

while on a parallel course.

Only thanks to the speed he ended up ahead and smashed his head. Which, although a stretch, meets the criteria of crossing-T

[TermNachTer]

He became a genius because he did not lead to bad consequences. If he had, then now Togo would be bowed down on all corners, like Rozhdestvensky.
Fighting on parallel courses and crossing the T are two completely different things. Let's put it this way. Togo was "pressing" the head of the Russian column.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: TermNachTER

Let's put it this way. He "pressed" on the head of the Russian column.

Nikolay, how is "pressing on the head" different from "covering the head"? The gist is the same. Togo did even better than if he had set up a classic "T". He was simply ahead and had the opportunity to constantly press where he needed - on the lead ship. Even if they were on parallel courses. With an academic "T", the time of fire contact was limited, since the attacked ship would break the distance when changing course and the enemy would have to look for an opportunity to set up a "T" again. You don't have to go far - Scheer at Jutland. And the second time, Scheer himself went to the Grand Fleet.
So a battle on parallel courses at comparable speeds, where the matelots +- fight against each other - is one thing, but the same battle, when one of the sides, thanks to the advantage in speed, smashes the enemy's head - is ESSENTIALLY the same crossing-T, where only part of the ships can respond to the enemy. The problem is solved by increasing the speed (by the way, the Arthurians were saved by this, which gave Rozhdestvensky a false hope to endure). But this is already different. So personally, I consider "pressure on the head" as a variation of crossing-T

[TermNachTer]

It is possible that this can be considered. However, the classic "T crossing", which, incidentally, was achieved only in Surigayo Ave., is considered to be when one column crosses the course of another at an angle close to 90 degrees. Theoretically, it is considered that in such a case, at the head
4-6 ships can shoot at a ship from a column making a "crossing", but only one, the lead one, can shoot back, and not even with a broadside, but only with bow salvos, which is definitely weaker. A battle on parallel courses does not give such advantages, since others
ships also participate, with all the power of a broadside.
When did Scheer go to the Grand Fleet? As soon as he realized that almost all the English forces were against him, his only intention was to get out of there as quickly and as far as possible)

[Rurikovich]

Quote: TermNachTER

But, nevertheless, the classic "T crossing", which, incidentally, was achieved only in Surigayo Ave., is considered when one column crosses the course of another at an angle close to 90 degrees. Theoretically, it is considered that in such a case, at the head
4-6 ships will be able to shoot at the ship, from a column making a "crossing", but in response only one, the lead one, can shoot and not even with a broadside, but only with bow ones, which is definitely weaker.

I know what a classic T-crossing is. It can block the strait when the enemy has no room to maneuver. But in the open sea???

When did Scheer climb into the Grand Fleet?

After completing the turn, Scheer was in deep thought. According to his explanations, he wanted to help Wiesbaden and believed that it was too early to leave the battle, since the enemy could catch up with his slow battleships before dark. Therefore, at 18:55, he again ordered a combat turn. And at 19:00, König, having turned 180°, went east to meet the British fleet. Scheer was harshly criticized for this turn, since the explanations voiced were weak, and because of this course, the head of the German column again ran into the middle of the British formation.

[TermNachTer]

That's why I say that this was the only one that was realized out of many attempts.
Actually, Scheer's flagship was the Friedrich der Grosse, which was in the middle of the column, and the Koenig was the lead ship in the first phase of the battle. I don't think Scheer would have gone to the rescue of a light cruiser.
risk battleships. In the fourth phase, the "Koenig" and the "Kaiser" following behind it left the line to lay a smoke screen to cover their column, and not to attack the British. I repeat, when Scheer realized that practically the entire Grand Fleet was against him, his only goal was to get away from there)

[rytik32]

Good afternoon!

Quote: Rurikovich

Even if the courses are parallel

One must not forget about the purpose of maneuvering - to create the best conditions for artillery action. It is precisely when moving on almost parallel courses that the conditions for accurate fire are ideal: the distance and the sight adjustment change very little. Several Japanese reports specifically emphasize this.
With a crossing T, the conditions for firing are much more difficult.

[Rurikovich]

That's why I said that Togo's actions were effective in terms of achieving the goal. Using his speed advantage, he created pressure on the Russians' heads, while eliminating the influence of their end ships on his four battleships.

[MCmaximus]

I still need to find this paragraph in Parks. There was a mention of an interview with Togo. He said that the basic idea was to knock out the flagships with concentrated fire during a decisive approach at speed. And the Russians themselves are lacking initiative without admirals. They had experience.

[rytik32]

Tell me what job to look for. I haven't read Togo's interview.
I took the information from Admiral Togo, a memoir from 1934. Memories of the comrades of the now deceased Togo.

[MCmaximus]

I climbed there on purpose. My memory is failing me somewhere. I couldn't find it in that volume. So it was somewhere else. I'll send you a photo now of what he wrote.

[MCmaximus]

Here is a photo of the cover and some text. But not that one.

[MCmaximus]

He approached the Russian squadron from the other side. Well, he didn't have radars or aerial reconnaissance. Everything was the old-fashioned way. By visual. The weather was still lousy. And the battle had to be accepted from the windward side. The lower casemates of the English battleships were completely flooded by the waves.
Came out, saw, made a decision, course change, place to turn and loop.
No need for clever academies and reasoning. The samurai discovered the enemy and went to fight him. In the conditions that are favorable to him.
Why do we think that Togo had to be afraid of something? The Japanese are not a cowardly nation, actually. It was the Germans and Italians who, having received one shell, fled to port. But the Japanese, losing battleships and heavy cruisers, did not even think about stopping the mission (WWII, if that matters).

[TermNachTer]

I do not deny it. I say that Togo's mistake should not be presented as some very cunning plan. Togo wanted to put "crossing T" - he made a mistake in estimating the speed and distance. Most likely because he did not believe that the Russian squadron was going at a speed of 9 knots. But he decided not to abandon his idea and started a very dangerous
maneuver. Rozhdestvensky's passivity saved him from big problems. To dare - to cowardice - are relative concepts. Any person has a sense of self-preservation. To go to death yourself and drive a personnel carrier in front of you is a very dubious manifestation of courage (this is about WWII).

[MCmaximus]

When you actively fight, you always take risks. If it works, you are a great commander, if it doesn't work, you are a loser and maybe even a corpse.
Once upon a time in England, if an admiral broke the line and lost, he was executed. He broke the regulations. But if he broke the line into squads and won, he became Hood and Nelson. Well, and Ushakov.
That's the whole logic. And the maneuver is the same.

[MCmaximus]

And we must understand that whoever was in the Russian squadron would not have had time to do anything against this noose, except to leave the battle.
No timing calculation fits this situation. Even turning under the tail of the Japanese does not work. Rozhestvensky began to build a wake too late. It is simply too late.

[TermNachTer]

A version was voiced that Rozhestvensky should not have built a wake, but should have advanced in front formation against the Japanese in front formation (5 new EBRs), at the moment when a "loop" was formed and the rear ones could not shoot, and the Russians could hit the rear ones during the flights. And arrange a "dog fight", then the Japanese advantage in artillery would have been leveled by the "pistol ranges" of the battle.

[MCmaximus]

Well, they would have shortened the combat distance a bit. Moreover, in a configuration that was very disadvantageous for them. It is easy to see on the diagram how fast the Japanese would have advanced straight. Kamimura would have been caught in the crossfire. But he was moving separately and from behind. There was plenty of time to get away from the blow. And what next?
Reassemble the disintegrated squadron?
These proposals are a burp from the battle of Lissa. In those days, someone still hoped for a ram. But now...
Well, if there was VHF. But, to think, to calculate the maneuver in your head, to give the order, to collect the signal, to hang it up, to wait for understanding and to go. And the fire has already been opened. After all, the fleetingness of the first phase is visible every minute. And who has passed how much in these minutes, too.
And the Japanese were not afraid of these pistol ranges. And the casemate guns in a short time and aim faster and fire more shells. And the nose versus the side, well, is not an advantage at all. Especially at 12 inches. And many other things.

[TermNachTer]

It was a chance to have a fight at "pistol range" where the advantages
Japanese in training artillerymen, would no longer have had much significance. And in any case, it would not have been worse than what happened in the end.

[rytik32]

The trouble is that Rozhestvensky didn't even have a battle plan. He thought to endure the fire and advance in a dense formation towards Vladivostok. Such tactics are obviously devastating.
For example, it would be possible to order the old men led by Nebogatov to follow in their wake to Vladivostok, and to maneuver around them with 5 fast battleships.

[MCmaximus]

So this idea suggests itself. A caravan of slow-moving ships and a free-flying detachment of new ships. And these slow-moving ships could beat everyone up to Kamimura.

[Maxim G]

The smartest option is not to go through the Tsushima Strait, but to go through the La Perouse Strait.

[Cartographer]

Quote: Maxim G

The smartest option is not to go through the Tsushima Strait, but to go through the La Perouse Strait.

It's very crowded and foggy there. Semenov wrote all about it.

[Maxim G]

Nebogatov was planning to take this very path.

[TermNachTer]

That's the problem, Rozhestvensky didn't make any plans, initially giving the initiative to the Japanese. The problem is that the five fast EBRs weren't fast at all. Considering the overload, wear and tear of the machines, and fouling of the underwater part.

[MCmaximus]

I also got the impression that Togo slightly miscalculated the speed of the Russian squadron. It is hard to expect such idiocy. That is how transport ships move. Not ships.

[rytik32]

Quote: TermNachTER

The fire-hold division was commanded by a sailor?

Yes, the senior marshal on staff.

Who is interested

Not everyone knows about this film. Pictures are for atmosphere

[TermNachTer]

Well, you've given the title, if anyone is interested enough. The article is already quite long. The pictures overload it)))

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: TermNachTER

The pictures overload her)))

But they give a better visual representation than any diagrams)))

[TermNachTer]

And how does this picture replace the battle scheme? Not to mention that the movie is so-so, very patriotic, in order to sweeten the aftertaste of defeat in WWII.

[Trapperxnumx]

I'm not saying it replaces it, but the visual understanding becomes better)
And how they smoke, how they shoot)))

[TermNachTer]

If anyone is interested in how a 152mm. goes boom, I advise them to go to SVO - it's more visual there. Words and pictures can't convey it.

[27091965]

Good afternoon.
Dear Alexey, thank you for continuing the series of articles.

The Russian squadron concentrated its fire on Mikasa, which received 15 hits in the first 19 minutes of the battle.

The hit of such a number of shells did not cause serious damage to the flagship of the Japanese fleet. At the same time, hits to the Oslyabya essentially put it out of action. The Japanese ships divided and concentrated fire on several targets. From this we can conclude that the tactical preparation of the Japanese fleet was superior to that of the RIF. Apparently, there was communication between the Japanese ships, with the help of which they could distribute targets. Tactical and artillery preparation helped the Japanese to defeat the 2nd TOE.

[Maxim G]

Quote: 27091965i

Tactical and artillery preparation helped the Japanese defeat the 2nd TOE.

First of all, the ZPR helped the Japanese defeat 2TOE.

[rytik32]

Quote: 27091965i

Good afternoon.
Dear Alexey, thank you for continuing the series of articles.

The Russian squadron concentrated its fire on Mikasa, which received 15 hits in the first 19 minutes of the battle.

The hit of such a number of shells did not cause serious damage to the flagship of the Japanese fleet. At the same time, hits to the Oslyabya essentially put it out of action. The Japanese ships divided and concentrated fire on several targets. From this we can conclude that the tactical preparation of the Japanese fleet was superior to that of the RIF. Apparently, there was communication between the Japanese ships, with the help of which they could distribute targets. Tactical and artillery preparation helped the Japanese to defeat the 2nd TOE.

Good evening!
Dear Igor, Of ​​these 19 hits, only 3 (three) hit below the upper deck level.
This is also one of the reasons why Mikasa survived the first 15 minutes so easily.

[27091965]

Quote: rytik32

Good evening!
Dear Igor, Of ​​these 19 hits, only 3 (three) hit below the upper deck level.
This is also one of the reasons why Mikasa survived the first 15 minutes so easily.

Good afternoon.
And not a single fire, we again return to the “projectile version”.

[rytik32]

Good afternoon!
Two fires were recorded: from 12-inch shells hitting the roof of the casemate and the forward conning tower.

[27091965]

Quote: rytik32

Two fires were recorded: from 12-inch shells hitting the roof of the casemate and the forward conning tower.

Good morning.
That is, the fires on the Mikasa were caused by shells loaded with gunpowder. Alexey, do you have information about fires on other Japanese ships and an assumption about what shells caused them?

[rytik32]

Good evening!

Do you have any information about fires on other Japanese ships?

I have not translated all the damage to Japanese ships...
The 12-inch shell that hit the "Sixisima" also caused a fire, I described this hit in the article https://topwar.ru/236748-luchshij-snarjad-cusimy.html

[North watchmen]

Quote: Not the fighter

There is such a thing as a concept of application. If I am not mistaken, these fast sub-armored cruisers were intended for cruiser warfare, that is, for intercepting trade

Once again, after shouts from the Americans, the Vladivostok detachment stopped fighting against the supply of resources to Japan from the USA through the east coast - Yokohama.
Hence the conclusion: it is not a matter of having a weapon, but of being able to use it.
I wrote about this. It was stupid to keep Oslyabya with the old slow-moving guys in the 2nd detachment.

[North watchmen]

Quote: Trapper7

Because he was going to join the 1st TOE?

Yeah, he was walking, not having any connection with the 1st TOE, continuing the campaign when the squadron returned to Arthur.
And who prevented the cruisers of the VO detachment from being sent on campaigns one by one to the east coast of Japan? The Japanese had concentrated all their forces to the West to block the PA.
And why the hell did they keep Diana and Pallas in PA? They were absolutely useless there.

[North watchmen]

Quote: anzar

You are seriously mistaken. The "cordial agreement" between Britain and France took place after 1903, and the Russian Empire joined somewhere around 1908, although earlier due to the treaty with France from 1893...

Once again, for those who don’t know, the Entente is a military alliance between France and the Russian Empire, which provided for a joint action in the event of an attack on one of the parties to the agreement.
Great Britain was NOT a member of this union until August 4, 1914.

[Simulations]

Not about the battle. The article is illustrated with frames from a Japanese series and immediately I thought, where are our series about our history? All TV channels and online cinemas are filled with brain-melting products of domestic filmmakers. If there are no domestic products on historical topics, but only high-quality ones, then no lessons of patriotism with raising the flag will help.
P.S. And then I thought, what am I talking about, there is developed capitalism in the yard, nothing will happen.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Simplication

and where are our series about our history?

We have more than enough historical series (true, most of them with the prefix pseudo, but still). It's just that filmmakers usually don't make films about lost wars, and RYaV, alas, is exactly that.

[Crimea26]

The ship is beautiful and interesting, but... not at all squadron-grade. The probability of its destruction was 100%. But Rozhestvensky only read the word "Battleship"...

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Crimea26

But Rozhdestvensky only read the word "Battleship"...

So Makarov and Vitgeft also put "Pobeda" and "Peresvet" in line... It turns out that they are also stupid???
These creations were simply not designed for squadron combat and their opponents were supposed to be slightly different. But they had big bangs and our guys happily attached "EBR" to them and shoved them into the line. For quantity...

[Cartographer]

Quote: Rurikovich

Quote: Crimea26

But Rozhdestvensky only read the word "Battleship"...

So Makarov and Vitgeft also put "Pobeda" and "Peresvet" in line... It turns out that they are also stupid???
These creations were simply not designed for squadron combat and their opponents were supposed to be slightly different. But they had big bangs and our guys happily attached "EBR" to them and shoved them into the line. For quantity...

So, in your opinion, putting Oslyabya in line is stupid, but not Nissin or Iwate?

[Rurikovich]

Quote from Kartograph

So, in your opinion, putting Oslyabya in line is stupid, but not Nissin or Iwate?

In essence, this is all due to desperation. The problem with the Oslyabya is in the confluence of circumstances. If the Arthurs in the same battle in the Yellow Sea ran at a speed of 13 knots, then even if the fire was concentrated on the same Peresvet, then even with adjustments for the lead, the hits were smeared across the ship. Not only did the Oslyabya at one fine moment turn out to be the closest to the Japanese fleet under the admiral's flag, but it also almost had to stop. As a result, in addition to the fact that it received 12" shells from the main forces in the bow in its bulk. Which led to sad consequences. And the Japanese cruisers, even if in the line, received according to the general menu, and not according to the reinforced one, like the Oslyabya ... Therefore, if hypothetically the three Peresvets acted against the Japanese armored cruisers, the situation would be different, because they would more easily tolerate 8" shells.

[MCmaximus]

And what can we say about the Japanese then? Not a single one of their armored cruisers could hold a candle to the Oslyaba. Some of them probably couldn't even escape.
The British had 2nd class battleships. And the 1st class ones - "Canopuses" and "Duncans" - did not shine with armor. Especially the first ones.
Enough already crying over the ruined combat qualities of our battleships.

[dragon772]

Does it make sense to analyze the Battle of Tsushima 1000 times?
1st Pacific Fleet fought better than 2,3nd and XNUMXrd, but the fate was decided by successful hits on the Tsarevich.
But! Not a single ship of the 1st Pacific Fleet was sunk!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: dragon772

Does it make sense to analyze the Battle of Tsushima 1000 times?
1 Pacific Fleet fought better than 2,3,

Considering that 2TOE fought much better than 1TOE, but you don't know that - it turns out that there is a point

[dragon772]

1 TOE did not lose a single ship in the battles in the Yellow Sea.
Of the 2,3 TOE, 6 squadron battleships, 1 coastal defense battleship, 3 cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser and 3 destroyers were lost (sunk by the enemy); 1 armored cruiser, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers were heavily damaged and sunk by their crews; 2 squadron battleships and 2 coastal defense battleships surrendered.
Do you all know about all aspects of the Russo-Japanese War on land and sea? I doubt it.
There is absolutely no point in stirring up the past, when the current generation doesn’t even remember the Russo-Japanese War (1,5 pages in a history textbook).

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: dragon772

1 TOE did not lose a single ship in the battles in the Yellow Sea.
And 2,3 TOE died

True. But why did you assume that this is the result of the worst preparation of the 2nd TOE, and not the best - of the United Fleet?
According to this logic, it turns out that the fascists lost the war not because our army became stronger, but because the Wehrmacht became weaker, right?

[dragon772]

Firing practice near Madagascar in January 1904 revealed the poor training of gunners.
On January 19, during training exercises, a 6-inch cast-iron training shell from the squadron flagship hit the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy and damaged the cruiser’s bridge.
“No one was killed, thank God!” wrote Politovsky.
On January 24, the admiral again took the squadron out for firing and evolutions. In his order of January 25, he wrote:
"The squadron's maneuvering was poor. The simplest consecutive turns by 2 and 3 points when changing the squadron's course in the wake formation were not successful for anyone: some went inside the formation, others fell outside, although the sea was completely calm and the wind did not exceed 3 points. The "sudden" turns were especially bad. Firing from large guns was a useless throwing away of ammunition."
And this is not logic, but historical facts.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: dragon772

And this is not logic, but historical facts.

I agree with you - this is not logic. Because logically, it is not important whether 2TOE shot well or badly at Madagascar, but whether it shot worse or better than 1TOE.
2TOE may have shot poorly (no), but that doesn't mean 1TOE shot better.
And the historical facts are as follows. In roughly 4,5 hours of combat in the ZhM, 6 ships of the 1st TOE scored 22 hits on Mikasa. At the same time, in the second phase of the battle, Mikasa slowly moved along the Russian line for an entire hour and then fought, it received 14-15 hits.
And 4-5 lead battleships of the 2nd TOE in Tsushima threw 19 hits at Mikasa in the first quarter of an hour of the battle. During the battle, the 1st TOE achieved 31-32 hits with shells of 120 mm and higher, despite not being destroyed. And the 2nd TOE achieved 120 hits with the same calibers, although it was routed.
Now these are indeed historical facts.

[rytik32]

Andrey, the whole question is in the distance. Let's take the distances of "Mikasa"
Fight in ZhM
5: 43 7800
5: 46 8000
5: 48 8200
6: 01 7600
6: 25 7500
6: 30 8000
6: 42 7300

That is, an hour of combat at distances from 7300 to 8200

Cusima
2: 10 6400
2: 11 6200
2: 21 4900
2: 22 4600
2: 40 5700
2: 47 5800
2: 51 5400
2: 57 4700
from 4600 to 6400 (and then at the very beginning, then no more than 5800)

If we compare the number of hits by 10...12-inch shells in Tsushima and in ZhM, the result will be approximately proportional to the number of barrels. And taking into account the distance...
Well, the main conclusion: the total number of hits in Tsushima was higher due to the shorter distance and wider use of medium-caliber guns. "Tsarevich", for example, did not bring 1-inch guns into action at all in the first phase of the battle.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Andrey, the whole question is in the distance. Let's take the distances of "Mikasa"

Let's take it:)))
Whose distances are these?:)))))

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Whose distances are these?:)))))

To the goal )))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

That's exactly it:))) And what thoughts come to mind about this?:)

[rytik32]

The distance from the target to "Mikasa" was the same )))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

From the target - of course. But who was Mikasa shooting at in ZhM and who was he shooting at in Tsushima?:))

[rytik32]

But who was Mikasa shooting at in JM?

Target changed: 1st, 2nd and 3rd ship

for whom - in Tsushima?

I also changed, but always the 1st ship

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32