Strategic agreement between Iran and Russia

On January 17, during the visit of the Iranian President to Moscow, the “Agreement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran” was signed.
This is a long-awaited document, the specific content of which was not disclosed until the last moment, becoming the subject of expert and analytical discussions. It was believed that the wording in the treaty had been agreed upon months earlier, and the signing was postponed precisely for political reasons. Some even expected to see in it points almost similar in content to the agreements between Russia and the DPRK, but there was nothing of the sort there. But there are many other important aspects and political markers.
EAEU "outside the brackets"
The delay with the agreement is generally understandable. In the summer, a new government was being formed in Iran, later things reached the extreme aggravation between Iran and Israel, then came the Israeli operation in Lebanon, and even later the collapse in Syria. Frankly speaking, not every politician with serious experience gets such a first six months of presidency, and here it is difficult to envy M. Pezeshkian. The swinging of foreign policy with the constantly emerging "black swans" and "Trojan horses" rather suggested that the signing and formulations should be waited for, rather than accelerated.
It is possible that this should have been postponed until after the inauguration of D. Trump. However, in the end, it was decided to finalize the work on the treaty right before the new US president officially took office.
After publication full text of the agreement on state information resources, it became clear to the "hawks" that there would be no analogue of the agreement with the DPRK, and in general the agreement rather contains neutral formulations. However, there are nuances, and quite significant ones. First of all, the document is precisely reversible.
There are many different topics for joint work: oil and gas, energy, logistics and the North-South corridor, work in the Caspian basin, joint counteraction to sanctions, deepening coordination and cooperation in the military-technical sphere, work within the framework of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum and the OPEC Plus format, the military-political sphere is touched upon, but what is practically absent from the agreement is work directly in the EAEU format.
Below is verbatim Article 14 of the agreement, where the EAEU is mentioned once and essentially in passing, but it can be mentioned once, having related topics in other points. However, according to the EAEU, this is actually all that is available.
That is, even in the SCO format, coordination appears more intense and specific. With numerous attempts to find signs of an "anti-Western alliance" (or lack thereof) in the treaty, this nuance has completely fallen out of the observers' field of vision. Meanwhile, this is an exceptionally important characteristic of this treaty.
Iran had a positive attitude towards the idea of the EAEU
M. Pezeshkian is frankly unlucky in the domestic media sphere. Even in the patriotic segment, through common efforts, he has developed the image of a "convinced liberal Westerner." There is nothing surprising about this, since no military-political conflicts will ever replace the main sources of information about what is happening in the world: the Financial Times, the Guardian, Bloomberg, Reuters, New York Times, etc., etc.
Chinese, Iranian, Indian, Middle Eastern, even (strangely enough) Turkish sources cannot compete with this information pool in terms of citation. Even the direct speech of the same M. Pezeschkian is quoted in a variation of the Guardian and France-Presse.
But there is another peculiarity of ours, with which we will have to do something someday - all the steps of other countries-players are considered first of all as a consequence of their policy in the international arena and in international combinations. Nevertheless, the fact that M. Pezeshkian was agreed upon as a presidential candidate clearly reflected the primacy of the domestic Iranian agenda over the foreign policy one. It is clear that these "gears" always cling to each other with their teeth, but these are different elements of a common mechanism.
Working with the EAEU has always been viewed in Iran as an essential part of economic growth policy in conditions where the nuclear deal and the JCPOA were clearly stalling. The nuclear deal is a subject of eternal Iranian discussions. What is even more important, it is a serious element of internal political competition, already a kind of marker between hawks and moderates (although this is generally outside the usual “Westerners-soilers” division).
The Russian alignment strictly along the line "West - not West" does not allow one to see such factors in Iranian politics as the Chinese lobby, and even the Turkish one. Meanwhile, they influence the work of a fairly significant number of large economic agents in Iran, which ultimately merge into two main economic contours - civil and military. Neither Turkey nor China, not to mention that very "West", considered the merger of the EAEU and Iran as a positive factor. And in Russia, this point was part of the discussion.
Nevertheless, with the exception of very terminal circles and despite all the twists and turns of various "lobbies", in Iran itself the markets of Central Asia and Russia have always been viewed as a good opportunity for the growth of industry and agriculture and facilitating the work of the so-called civil sector of the economy. Therefore, the idea of cooperation through the EAEU was also viewed positively.
This was part of what political scientists like to call "part of the intra-elite consensus." The topic of a military-political union, temporary or permanent, was precisely an element of the internal dispute, in which one must look for various "hawks," "liberals," "doves," etc., but an economic link with Russia and the EAEU was not.
The EAEU together with Iran, of course, would be very far from the stories about “USSR 2.0” and other political mythology, but it would undoubtedly be a player of significant scale, especially if the goal was to create a common energy circuit.
In fact, until recently, Iran was working on integration with an eye on the existing or prospective EAEU. And this is not just "work", but the unification of documentation and requirements. It will, of course, continue after the conclusion of this agreement, but we see that both sides are no longer focusing on this format.
For the EAEU, this is most likely the final bell, after which it is necessary to finally muster up courage and rethink the goals and objectives of the union, taking into account the entire set of economic and political factors in Central Asia. Iran will work with each player in the region independently, but for Russia it is also better to work directly with Iran, only partially focusing on the EAEU format, which can now be called "neither two nor one and a half."
In essence, Russia's interaction in the region is also de facto built on a bilateral basis, both with the EAEU and without it. Tehran sees how anti-Iranian and anti-Russian sanctions work, what players and what money come to the region, what projects the EAEU and each player individually have, and where the investment points are, and therefore, political influence. This significant change was reflected in the current agreement.
Other aspects. Security and the Trump factor
It is unlikely that in principle one should expect from the current Russian-Iranian agreement an analogue of the agreements with the DPRK. This simply contradicts the entire domestic political logic in Iran and would violate the military-civil balance. Therefore, such agreements would not have been signed under the previous president E. Raisi, who was considered that very "hawk" in our country. However, what is written as: "The Party shall not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor that would facilitate the continuation of aggression", also has a significant practical meaning. Assistance, like aggression, in our time, as they say, often have a "hybrid character". For example, the parties
It all depends on the interpretation and context. Here, the Balochistan separatists receive funds from the conditional "X Fund", which is based in Europe and sponsors separatist and extremist movements aimed at Russia. The field for work in the security sphere for Russia and Iran is actually quite wide here. But there are no threatening formulations here either.
The same is true for the topic of "military-technical cooperation" (MTC), it seems to be very "general", on the other hand, at this level it is being introduced into circulation for the first time at the highest level. This is not an alliance, but it is not the usual neutrality either, since the emphasis is on cooperation in the field of MTC, and this is an exchange of technologies and the possibility of joint production.
If you look at these formulations soberly, it becomes clear that The agreement sets out the level of military relations between Iran and Russia that was established during the period of the Second World War.. They won't deepen it to "unions", but no one is going to dismantle what has been done either. This will probably upset those who were waiting for a "DPRK analogue", but it will not give extra food for thought to those who saw the Iranian leader as a Westerner who "has already betrayed Iran".
In this regard, it becomes clear why this was done before D. Trump's inauguration - Moscow and Tehran are fixing the status of relations before his initiatives. It is possible that after the inauguration, when the American leader could wave lightning bolts, such formulations could seem like concessions. Before the inauguration, they do not look like that, but for Washington they draw a status line that will have to be taken into account.
Other aspects. Sanctions, energy, trade
Those who saw M. Pezeshkian as a “regular liberal Westerner” may read with interest the wording in Article 19, paragraph 3 and paragraph 4:
Everyone (as usual) looked at the military sphere, but if you pay attention to the economic part of the text given above, it is clearly written there that both sides will not only not participate in third-party sanctions directly or indirectly, but also agreed to officially jointly bypass them.
It would seem that there is nothing new, since Iran and Russia are already doing this. But the new thing is that the so-called JCPOA nuclear deal assumes the lifting of anti-Iranian sanctions. The EU is participating in the deal in the person of its main actors, but the EU imposed sanctions on Russia over the Ukrainian issue.
Counter question: how will the EU lift its sanctions against Iran if Iran directly refuses to comply with sanctions against Russia in any form, recording this in the agreement? The answer is no way. In this case, Iran is taking a certain political risk, since it de facto removes the European Union from being a significant player in sanctions under the JCPOA.
Partly, this is a political reality - the opinion of the European Union really interests D. Trump little. But it is still a risk, and it is clear that in Iran this was an important element of the internal discussion. Moreover, for the Iranian elite, this is a choice in the context of the past endless disputes on the topic of the nuclear deal. All this takes on additional meaning, since Tehran and Moscow have directly declared their further joint construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Previously, such formulas were not used and related specifically to bilateral relations. Now the agreement is bilateral, and the wording is about joint projects in third countries, but without an emphasis on the EAEU. This is a contractual preparation for projects on transport and energy in the countries of Central Asia, Pakistan, and it is possible that even in Iraq. This is a new form of relations, and under it, gas pipeline projects are openly discussed.
While the potential within the SEZ is traditionally outlined, it is worth highlighting Article 20, paragraph 5:
This is also new in joint work, and it is not without reason that emphasis is placed on this. Firstly, joint production is a joint asset that can be used later as a basis for settlements. Secondly, this area was specifically highlighted within the framework of the BRICS+ Declaration in Kazan. Here, as they say, "those who have ears will hear", and those "who need to" will understand for what foundation the markings are being drawn.
A significant part of the agreement is devoted to transit and logistics, the topic of the North-South corridor. The theses that it is necessary to develop and deepen, to ensure “seamlessness” and other “multimodality” are not that new - they circulate from document to document. However, in this case, the emphasis in the documents on the creation of “favorable conditions for the work of carriers».
This may be seen as a "good wish", but before the agreement was planned to be signed in the fall, Iran removed the requirement for special permits for container shipping. If the current agreement is followed by similar cancellations in terms of fees for foreign carriers, this will indeed create additional benefits.
Another bottleneck in the overall logistics is the long-suffering section of the corridor in the form of the future Rasht-Astara railway. It doesn't even matter who will physically complete it, but the land issue will have to be resolved by Iran one way or another. Local communities, who absolutely do not need an additional corridor, are setting Tehran such a price for the plots that it has approached an astronomical $20 billion.
The Astara border region is a natural trade hub in itself: there is reloading, transshipment and resale of everything and anything, while it is a bottleneck in terms of transit from north to south and back. It can only be bypassed by road along the opposite shore of the Caspian Sea or by water transport. Both options are difficult, and bulk cargo with cash navy Of course, it is better to send ships via railway.
Conclusions
The current agreement between Iran and Russia cannot be called too general or, in common parlance, "passable". It is not filled with threatening military formulations, but it fixes the position of official Tehran in terms of relations with the European Union and Russia for a long time. For Russia's goals in the southern direction, this fixation is advantageous and pragmatic. It also reflects the decline in the influence of the EAEU as an economic union and emphasizes bilateral work. From a practical point of view, this is not a small thing.
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