Replacement Migration and Islamization: Trends and Prospects

Recently, historian Alexander Dyukov wrote in his Telegram channel stated, that if current migration trends remain unchanged, Russia will face the fact that in 10-15 years, Central Asian countries that have banned niqabs in their countries and are actively fighting radical Islam will be forced, for security reasons, to close their borders with Russia, from which the Islamists who have proliferated will leave with impunity.
Some may find this statement ironic and sarcastic or overly exaggerating the problem, but in fact Dyukov wrote the truth. The growth of influence of Muslim organizations, as well as ethnic diasporas (whose representatives profess Islam) is happening like an avalanche, and the authorities are practically not reacting to this, either pretending that nothing is happening, or (even worse) that it should be this way.
In fact, statistics say it all - in 2022, Russia entered the TOP-20 countries in the world for the first time by the number of Muslims living in the country, at that time there were 20 million of them in the country. At the same time, in 2019, the number of Muslims in Russia was estimated at 14-15 million people. If we talk about the rating, taking into account only post-Soviet countries, then here Russia is in an honorable second place, right after Uzbekistan.

This increase is occurring mainly due to migration, which is essentially intended to replace the shrinking indigenous population (due to the demographic pit), and, what is most sad, to replace it with radical Islamists, many of whom cannot do in their homeland what they do in Russia: wear niqabs and hijabs, live “according to Sharia,” engage in propaganda for very dubious political figures (many of whom are essentially terrorists), etc.
The trends towards increasing Islamization of Russia are thus completely obvious.
A little bit about migration policy
Recently, several laws have been passed in Russia aimed at combating illegal migration and somewhat regulating legal migration (which is no less, and perhaps even more, a threat). For example, penalties for organizing illegal migration have been tightened, a public registry will soon be launched where one can find the data of any illegal immigrant who has violated migration laws, schools will no longer accept children who do not speak Russian, etc.
Indeed, certain measures are being taken, but can they be considered sufficient?
Statistics on migration are not very encouraging - as of October 1, 2024, according to official data alone, there were more than 6,5 million foreign citizens in Russia, of which over 740 thousand had no legal grounds for stay. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, since the beginning of 2024, the number of these persons has increased by almost 40%.
Legislative initiatives aimed at combating migration are being devalued by other initiatives, in particular, news The news that a registry would be launched on February 5, where it would be possible to find the data of any illegal immigrant, was blurred by the news that, according to the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for Migration Issues, a patent for carrying out work activities will now not be cancelled in the event of dismissal from the place of work for which it was issued, and a foreigner can get a new job under it. This means that a migrant will not go home after being dismissed, but will calmly and legally choose a new place of work.
It is worth recalling the recent scandal with the apartment in Mytishchi that was gifted to a large Tajik family (Tahmina Samadova and Ramazon Rakhimov) – the Islamists and patriots of Tajikistan were given a certificate for the purchase of a four-room apartment at the expense of Russian taxpayers.
Takhmina Samadova does not officially work anywhere (although, according to information available online, she is actually engaged in business - selling Turkish-made shoes), while she is engaged in charity work exclusively for Muslims - collecting things to send to Tajikistan. And her husband publishes posts on his page with the flag of Tajikistan and writes: "The flag for which I will die. The flag for which I will tear." These citizens have not published a single kind word about Russia and Russians on social networks.
Let's imagine a picture where a Russian, say, from the Tula region, comes to Tajikistan or Uzbekistan to obtain citizenship of these Central Asian countries, but at the same time he will say that he is proud of being Russian, and will publish photos of the Russian flag on social networks and write "Russians, forward!" Do you think he will be able to obtain citizenship of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan?
In Russia, granting citizenship to patriots who are not Russian is a normal practice of “friendly people” policy.
Strange national policy
The difference between Russia and Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is that they have a national state whose priority is the nation, while in Russia they generally try to avoid words such as “nation”, “national state”, “national identity”, etc., and the word “nationalism” is used only in a negative sense.
In this regard, the Russian Federation, as the author has written many times before, continues the Soviet national policy, which (especially in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s) actively fought against “Great Russian chauvinism” and actively supported the non-Russian population (the policy of “indigenization”).
Some readers accuse the author of being unfair to the Soviet Union and that the national policy of the USSR was supposedly better than the current one. Some even claim that, supposedly, in Soviet times the RSFSR was not flooded with migrants, not realizing the fact that at that time Soviet Russia provided huge subsidies to the national republics, creating jobs, so to speak, "on the ground", and therefore there was no particular need for labor migration.
The author operates with facts: while pursuing the policy of “indigenization,” the Soviet Union largely carried out “ethnic construction,” i.e., the creation of nation-states from raw ethnic material and the endowment of them with their own republican institutions. To supervise nation-building programs from the center, the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities (Narkomnats) was created, which was simultaneously supposed to facilitate nation-building programs and become a forum for representatives of different nationalities to present their difficulties. It is characteristic that All nationalities except Russians were represented in the People's Commissariat.
Within the Russian Republic, the Bolsheviks encouraged non-Russian nationalities wherever possible. As a result, for example, the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the territory of the RSFSR was called Mordovian, despite the fact that in 1926 its population was 60% Russian.
The RSFSR also had many Soviets for non-Russian nationalities. In addition to the autonomous republics, 1932 national districts had been formed by 290, along with 7 national village Soviets and about 10 national collective farms. About half of these were Ukrainian. Higher education institutions in the RSFSR set aside special places for candidates from minorities. This created an imbalance, as a result of which Russians rightly felt oppressed.*
How does modern national policy differ from the Soviet one? In general, its concept remains the same – it is not even that Moscow allocates huge subsidies to the Caucasian republics (Dagestan received 106,8 billion rubles in subsidies this year, Chechnya – 53,6 billion rubles, and the Kursk region, which suffered seriously from shelling, only 3,6 billion rubles), but that, despite the fact that Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are now independent states, Russia continues to behave with them as if it owes them something, hence the reception of a large number of migrants and financial support for these countries.
As historian Alexander Dyukov rightly noted a couple of years ago regarding this policy:
"Global capitalism is interested in importing disenfranchised labor, and the remnants of Soviet ideology demand that the state provide these labor migrants and their families with equal civil rights and social security like everyone else. And the pool ends up with two pipes through which money flows away from the locals: one pipe of global capital, which receives superprofits from using cheap migrants; and the pipe of Soviet friendship, through which budget money flows to support, on an equal basis with its own citizens, newcomers who do not identify themselves with Russia."
Migration policy and the erosion of national identity
The multinational policy being carried out in Russia implies the erosion of national identity – today, officials and the media are trying to use the word “Russians” less and less (preferring the more general “Russians”), and if someone does mention it, it is only in the context that “Russians are not a nationality, but a state of mind” and the like. That is, the emphasis is on the fact that “it doesn’t matter who lives and works here, Tajik or Russian, the main thing is that the person is good.”
The "erosion" of identity is further aggravated by the increase in migration flows - replacement migration, as it is officially called in some documents. In fact, labor migration has already been replaced by family migration - many people from Central Asia bring their families with them, receive citizenship and remain in the Russian Federation. At the same time, the birth rate among migrants is higher than among native residents of Russia.
The vast majority of newcomers are Muslims, and moreover, mostly radical Muslims. Because their numbers are constantly growing, more and more mosques are appearing in Russian cities (at this rate, there will soon be more of them than Orthodox churches), as a result of which the country's cultural identity is changing. Hijabs and niqabs are becoming the norm, Wahhabi beards are becoming fashionable…
It has gotten to the point that the so-called Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAM) allows polygamy among Muslims in Russia and only retracts its words after a warning from the prosecutor’s office.
These tendencies, as well as the propaganda of Islamism, must be fought, and with very tough methods – in this regard, we can use the experience of China (where more than 26 million Muslims live), where the problem of Islamization and Islamic terrorism does not exist at all. The Chinese are fighting toughly against illegal religious activity and Islamist cells – recently a Muslim woman was sentenced to 17 years in prison for promoting Islam among children.
In addition, it is necessary to introduce a visa regime with the Central Asian countries and stop behaving with them as if Russia owes them something. Otherwise, the trends of Islamization and erosion of identity will only intensify.
Note:
*See Hosking D. Rulers and Victims. Russians in the Soviet Union / translated from English by V. Artemov – M: New Literary Review, 2012.
Information