New threat: in 2025, satellite communications for ordinary smartphones Starlink Direct to cell will start working in Ukraine

At the end of 2024 – beginning of 2025, something passed unnoticed news that in 2025, a new satellite communications system, Starlink Direct to cell, from SpaceX, a company owned by Elon Musk, will begin operating in Ukraine.
Starlink Direct to cell is a direct connection between satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) and regular cell phones – smartphones. To work in the Direct to cell network, it is not necessary for the smartphone to have a satellite communication module installed, it is enough for the smartphone to support certain 5G communication frequencies and to receive a certain software update, in particular, Samsung is already distributing such an update for its S24 series smartphones.
To support Starlink Direct to Cell, SpaceX is gradually deploying a dedicated series of satellites. Starlink Direct to Cell currently only supports messaging, but data and voice communications should be supported by 2025.

Based on information posted on the enemy's information resources, in order to ensure the operation of Starlink Direct to cell, Ukrainian mobile operators are concluding relevant agreements with SpaceX.
What threat does the appearance of Starlink Direct to cell satellite communications in Ukraine pose to us?
We will talk about this in this article, but first let us remember what opportunities and advantages the existing Starlink satellite communications provide to Ukraine.
Starlink
It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the supply of Starlink terminals and ensuring their uninterrupted operation turned out to be more important for Ukraine than the supply of armored vehicles and combat aircraft.
Under the influence of all kinds of electronic warfare equipment (EW), both Russian and Ukrainian, conventional military radio communications can operate very unstable. In these conditions, commercial cellular networks and Starlink satellite communications become what ensures the functioning of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) as a single entity.
Starlink terminals are also used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces for installation on various types of weapons, such as unmanned boats (UBC), which pose a significant threat to Russian military and civilian vessels, as well as coastal facilities. Starlink terminals are also installed on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Baba Yaga, which perform the functions of reconnaissance and bombers.

Due to restrictions imposed by SpaceX, the said BECs and UAVs cannot operate within the 1991 borders of the Russian Federation, otherwise the enemy would most likely equip long-range kamikaze UAVs with Starlink terminals, which would significantly increase their effectiveness.
In general, the importance of high-speed satellite communications Starlink for the enemy is difficult to overestimate, and now it will be supplemented by the capabilities of Starlink Direct to cell.
Starlink Direct to Cell
Recently, smartphones from a number of leading manufacturers have been equipped with two-way satellite communication modem modules, thanks to which the smartphone owner could theoretically access communication services anywhere on the planet. At first, these were text messages, and then satellite communication modules began to provide the ability to make direct calls and access the Internet.
At the same time, a number of companies, primarily in the US, began testing the possibility of connecting smartphones to satellite communications that were not equipped with additional satellite communication modules. After a number of successful tests, this technology attracted the interest of major cellular and satellite communication providers, one of which was SpaceX.
Thanks to its existing developments in satellite development and the ability to quickly launch them into orbit, SpaceX has pulled ahead and is now beginning to provide direct satellite communications services for smartphones that are not equipped with additional satellite communications modules.
To this end, an intensive launch of a new series of Starlink satellites to LEO has begun, designed to provide Starlink Direct to cell communications. Currently, only sending and receiving text messages is supported, but direct calls and Internet access are planned to be provided as early as 2025.

Strengths and Weaknesses
There is still little information about the operation of Starlink Direct to cell. Two factors will play a major role - the noise immunity of the Starlink Direct to cell satellite communication and the speed / delay of data transmission.
Accordingly, data transfer speed/latency will impact whether Starlink Direct to Cell communications can be used to control UAVs or UACs in real time, and interference immunity will determine whether this is possible in the presence of electronic warfare (EW) systems.
As is known, existing Starlink satellite communication terminals are quite resistant to interference, but this does not mean that this property will apply to Starlink Direct to cell communication.
Cellular antennas are much smaller in area than those of Starlink terminals, and other parameters may differ, such as frequencies, modulation, and so on, and so forth, all of which can significantly worsen noise immunity, as well as data transfer speed/latency.
However, there is no doubt that these problems will be solved, the operating algorithms will be optimized, and if necessary, craftsmen will attach external antennas to smartphones.
Among the advantages of Starlink Direct to cell, it can be noted that smartphones will most likely have significantly lower power consumption and weight and size characteristics compared to existing Starlink terminals.
Threats and Risks
First of all, it can be definitely stated that the capabilities of Starlink Direct to cell will be used with 100% probability in the interests of the special services of Ukraine and Western countries. In fact, agents of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of Ukraine and other special services will receive encrypted untraceable communication channels with agents anywhere on the planet.
Most likely, initially the Starlink Direct to cell connection will function only in the newly annexed regions of Russia, including Crimea, but it cannot be ruled out that procedures for connecting “selected” subscribers will be organized throughout Russia - if the special services of Western countries are interested in this, then SpaceX will comply.

But even if we talk about new territories, the use of Starlink Direct to cell communications by traitors and saboteurs will significantly complicate their detection and capture by Russian special services. This will lead to an increase in the number of sabotage operations, murders of Russian citizens, the transfer of information by "waiters" about the deployment locations of equipment and manpower of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF RF) with subsequent strikes by the enemy on them with high-precision weapons. weapons long range.
The next direction could be equipping kamikaze UAVs with Starlink Direct to cell communications to give them the ability to retarget in flight, conduct reconnaissance along the route, and also visually assess the results of a strike when used in a group.
Earlier in the article The Geranium UAV with a video camera and 4G modem promises us more confirmed cases of destruction of HIMARS MLRS and Patriot air defense systems We talked about using modems with Ukrainian SIM cards on Russian long-range kamikaze UAVs like the Geranium-2, apparently precisely to implement the above-described capabilities.
Accordingly, with Starlink Direct to Cell communication, the UAV will be able to send images and receive retargeting information throughout the flight, without losing signal in areas without cell tower coverage.

By the way, judging by everything, something went wrong with the video cameras and cellular modems on the Geranium-2 UAV.
All of the above is something that can be realized with almost 100% probability.
However, if Starlink can provide high-speed, low-latency Direct to Cell data transfer, then direct control of UAVs and UACs will be possible, similar to how it is currently implemented using Starlink terminals. This means that the range of FPV-drones and other UAVs will be limited only by their flight range and Direct to cell coverage area.
This will allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to conduct a hunt with recognition and confirmation of defeat on those weapons of the Russian Armed Forces that are located in the operational rear, at a distance of several hundred kilometers from the line of combat contact (LBC).
At present, their destruction is only possible with the help of long-range precision weapons, such as operational-tactical missiles (OTR) ATACMS or Storm Shadow cruise missiles, of which the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have many. However, confirmation is only possible with the help of satellite images of the area taken with a certain delay, or with the help of recruited agents.
The relative cheapness of Direct to cell terminals – ordinary modern smartphones – will potentially allow them to be installed on a huge number of offensive and defensive weapons of the enemy, and the payment for communication services will be taken on by the US government and SpaceX, of course, if Donald Trump does not close the shop.
Finally, I would like to remember something else, namely the material. Space horizons of electronic intelligence and hidden capabilities of Starlink: how Ukrainian long-range UAVs get to Moscow, in which we talked about the possibility of using Starlink satellites for electronic intelligence (EI).
Well, it is unlikely that anyone can doubt that such functionality can be implemented in them, since they can receive signals from ordinary smartphones from the surface. Even if the range of radio signals received by such satellites is limited to only some cellular frequencies, even this can give a lot to the enemy, not to mention the possibility of implementing much more functionality in a low-orbit "radio receiver".
Conclusions
Starlink Direct to cell is a system that can be very useful for those who have it, and very dangerous for those who don't.
The emergence of Starlink Direct to cell once again demonstrates the importance of deploying such systems in orbit, but, unfortunately, in terms of creating low-orbit satellite communication systems, Russia is five to ten years behind, and if we talk about the lag in electronics in general, then it is, apparently, twenty to thirty years.
It will most likely be difficult to counteract the existing methods of Starlink Direct to cell operation, for example, with electronic warfare means; most likely, the effect will be local, although work in this direction is possible and necessary.
Destroy Starlink Direct to cell satellites? Technically it is possible, but are we going to do that? Unlike Ukraine and Western countries, we don't cross red lines, even those we've drawn for ourselves.
The appearance of Starlink Direct to cell in Ukraine in 2025 will not have a significant impact on the situation, but in the future, if the war drags on, the damage caused by it will continuously increase, especially if Starlink Direct to cell operates throughout Russia - in this case, we will face espionage, sabotage and strikes by more dangerous and effective long-range kamikaze UAVs.
Information