28 Panfilovites. Anatomy of a feat

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28 Panfilovites. Anatomy of a feat


The article, taking into account the emergence of new documents, is an addition to the article “The battle at Dubosekovo. Anatomy of a feat».



Entry


Dubosekovo, a symbol of the Battle of Moscow. More than 80 years ago, a well-known episode of the war took place, which still gives rise to debates about the authenticity of the feat of the Panfilov soldiers under the command of political instructor Vasily Klochkov. Especially after the appearance of the following document - "Reference-report "On 28 Panfilov soldiers" by the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Lieutenant General of Justice N. Afanasyev dated May 10, 1948. This important reference-report was classified for a long time, and only relatively recently did current researchers gain access to it. This document denied the feat of 28 Panfilov soldiers, presenting it as the fantasies of war correspondents. Let's not focus on this document for now (we will clarify this misunderstanding later) and try to restore historical justice, without hiding behind the historical significance of the feat.

And let's start with the most common argument of the doubters - the Germans simply did not notice any particular resistance not only from a platoon of the 4th company, but from almost the entire 1075th Rifle Regiment. And the documents (ZBD - combat journal) of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht (whose units and subdivisions fought in the area of ​​the Dubosekovo junction) clearly do not show the difficulties in overcoming the defense on 16.11.41 (unless, of course, you read them very carefully and without certain training). But there is an interesting document, an entry in the ZBD of the 11th TD from 16.11.41. (in brackets, Moscow time - in the original, Berlin).

At (14:00 Moscow time) 13:00 a radiogram arrives from XXXXVI (46th) tank (motorized) corps with the task of striking from Shitkovo via Lama, since the advance of 2 Pz.D. (TD) has stalled under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo. The division commander decides to postpone today's attack to 17.11 due to ongoing marches.

This document records the EVENT - "the advance of the 2nd Pz.D. has stalled", and we will consider how it is connected with the battle near Dubosekovo. We will also take into account that the advance of the 2nd TD has STALLED was noticed not only in the 5th AC (which included the division), but also in the 4th TG. That is where the commanding reprimand from Gen. Gepner (commander of the 4th TG) came from both in the 5th AC and in the 46th MK. The time is characteristic - 14:00 (MSK). Let's remember. And based on the available documents (ours and the enemy's), we will determine the time and place of this EVENT.

Disposition


Now let us consider the position (battle formation) of the 316th Rifle Division on 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.


(1 schema)

After leaving Volokolamsk, the division retreated to previously prepared (relatively, naturally) positions and occupied the defensive zone shown in diagram 1. Along the front, 16 km (in October it was more - 42 km), and included sections of regiments (1073 Rifle Regiment, 1075 Rifle Regiment, 1077 Rifle Regiment) and the attached 690 Rifle Regiment.

“For about 5-6 days, the regiment had the opportunity to dig itself into the ground, since the prepared positions turned out to be unusable... It was necessary to essentially redo everything from scratch...”
— commander of the 1075th rifle regiment, Colonel Kaprov.

There is evidence that the positions were already 90-100% ready by the start of the German offensive. The regiments were pretty battered (no more than half of the list remained), combat capability was restored through redistribution (the 1073rd Rifle Regiment did not have a 3rd battalion, and the 1075th Rifle Regiment did not have a 1st battalion, the remaining companies were reserves). But literally on the eve of the German offensive, the division received reinforcements. artillery it was significantly worse than in October (in October there were as many as 8 regular and attached artillery regiments), by November there were already 4 battered artillery regiments - the regular 857th AP (since 18.11.41/27/358 the 768th Guards AP), the attached 296th AP and XNUMXth, XNUMXth anti-tank regiments.

Based on the presented scheme (the scheme was drawn up on 5.11.41, but certain changes on 16.11.41 should be taken into account), the enemy's main attack was expected to come from the front from Volokolamsk (building obstacles, minefields and AT areas). On the night of 15.11.41, the enemy (units of the 5th TD) conducted reconnaissance on the left flank (all the way to Petelino). And Panfilov decided to place his reserve - the 1st battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (Momysh-Uly) in Goryuny (Anino). Along the Volokolamsk highway there were AT gun positions (768th, 296th AT regiments). And in the event of a retreat of our troops during the German offensive from Volokolamsk to Moscow, the infantry was to take up positions nearby and cover the artillery.

The battle formation of the 1075th Rifle Regiment of interest to us was built taking into account the enemy's advance from the western direction, along the Volokolamsk highway. The main attention was paid to the third battalion, which covered the southern side of the highway. And therefore the 3rd battalion was built in two echelons, blockages (obstacles) and minefields were arranged. Of the AT weapons in the 3rd battalion (excluding grenades and lighters), there were 7 AT guns (out of 11 in the regiment). Behind the first position were the regiment's artillery AT weapons (initially the regiment had two 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 model, several 76-mm mountain guns of the 1909 model and 75-mm French divisional guns Mle.18, well, taking into account the losses on 16.11 there were no more than 2-4 guns). So the 1075th Rifle Regiment had only conditional AT artillery. And the reserve, the remnants of the companies of the 1st battalion (in the area of ​​the regiment's command post).

“…my regiment had absolutely no anti-tank artillery – it was replaced by old mountain guns, and at the front I received several French museum guns. …At the end of October 41, the regiment received 11 anti-tank rifles… 4 rifles were transferred to the 2nd battalion, which included the 4th company.”
- Colonel Kaprov.

The 4nd Battalion occupied the defensive positions of the 6th and 300th companies (Dubosekovo station - east of Bolshoe Nikolskoye, 5 m north of Petelino), including the railway line - an arc (the cuts and embankments of which were a natural element of the BRO and the subsequent line of defense) and the 50th company strongpoint (Shiryaevo - Dubosekovo station) to the junction with the 244,0th Cavalry Division. The intermediate line during the retreat were the positions near the height of XNUMX (minefields, blockages). This would cover the important road (roundabout) Morozovo - Matrenino station - Lystsevo, with the Volokolamsk highway crossing it and the road from Ivantsevo adjoining it.

The railway track (naturally, without rails and sleepers, the latter went to dugouts and covered cracks) contained relatively deep cuts and a high embankment. Therefore, tanks could pass only at the Dubosekovo siding (passage width - up to 250 m) or south of Petelino (passage width - up to 150 m) or directly along the Petelino - Shiryaevo road. Moreover, if the tanks went (in the supposed direction of the attack from west to east) to the arc, they could pass mainly through the Dubosekovo siding. There, in the most accessible (tank-hazardous) direction for tanks, the 2nd platoon (tank destroyer team) was stationed (as expected).

Let us repeat, it is necessary to take into account that the scheme of the defense zone of the 316th Division from 5.11.41, and in 10 days there will be changes. This means an even greater strengthening of the defense (obstacles, minefields). Somewhere by 11.11.41 the division's defense zone was already 90-100% prepared in engineering terms. Let us also note that the day before (15.11.41) the 16th Army received an order to attack Volokolamsk. The offensive on 15-16.11.41 was carried out by the division's right neighbors (58th TD, 17th Cavalry Division, 44th Cavalry Division). The left neighbor, Dovator's cavalry group (50th Cavalry Division, 52nd Cavalry Division), reinforced by the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, was also preparing for the offensive. And it is necessary to take into account that at 9.00 on 16.11.41 the 316th SD planned to support the attack of its neighbors (a strike tying up the enemy reserves) when the latter reached certain lines. This means that the corresponding measures should have already been carried out, this concerns mainly the artillery. Hence, the location of the regular and attached artillery may differ from the diagram.

"But the enemy was ahead of us in the attack..."

- Colonel Kaprov.

And the Germans went another way. The German offensive was on Klin (from the southwest to the north and northeast). And this direction determined (later, in the second attack) the defeat of the 2nd battalion, squeezed from the east, south and north by two combat groups of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht.

Enemy


The enemy (5th Army Corps) with forces of two divisions (2nd TD - 7.30:35 Moscow time), (14.30th ID - from 16.11.41:4 Moscow time) in converging directions on XNUMX (two days before the general offensive of the XNUMXth TG) began a private offensive.

Divisional order 030 2nd tank division 14.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

"On day X-2 (16.11.41) the 2nd Panzer Division conducts a private offensive with the aim of clearing the area east of Volokolamsk and occupying the starting positions for the offensive on day X... (18.11.41). ("...the 2nd Panzer Division as part of the V Army Corps on X-day Y-time advances from the Lyscevo-Avdotyino line")"

The 5th TD (46th MK) was also supposed to support the offensive on the right. It was conducting reconnaissance of the flanks on 15.11.42/46/5. But by the evening, it was decided to replace the 11th MK (which included the 11th TD) with the 5th TD. The divisional order for the 20th TD to occupy the 00th TD's offensive zone was issued at 21:00 (15.11.41:11 Moscow time) on 5/16.11.41/XNUMX. The XNUMXth TD did not have time to occupy the XNUMXth TD's offensive zone and did not enter the battle on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.

The 11th TD will begin its offensive only on 17.11.41 against the 50th Cavalry Division and wedge itself into the unprotected flank of the 316th Rifle Division. That is, on 16.11.41, two divisions participated in the offensive against the 316th Rifle Division. The direction of the offensive (as stated earlier) of the 2nd TD was from the southwest to the north and northeast, and not from the west to the east (i.e., not along the Volokolamsk highway - to Moscow, but across at an angle - to Klin). By the way, we note that this cut off part of our anti-tank artillery (the 857th AP and the 768th anti-tank artillery), located along the Volokolamsk highway, from our units. And the anti-tank artillery, deprived of cover in the forest on the clearings, became easy prey for the German infantry.

For the 2nd TD, reaching the Lyscevо-Avdotyino line was the task of the day together with the 35th ID (and they were supposed to take Chentsy along the way). And on the second day (X-1) only clear the area of ​​encircled small groups, establish supplies and prepare for a general offensive on 18.11.41/35/16.11.41. But the 316th ID (58/XNUMX/XNUMX) was under attack by the right neighbor of the XNUMXth Rifle Division - our XNUMXth TD, and was only able to begin the planned offensive with an attack on Chentsy in the second half of the day... (running ahead).

ZhBD 35th PD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

……… Division III./35 from 13:30 (14:30 Moscow time) supported the attack on Cheptsy (on the 1077th rifle regiment). Our infantry lay down in front of the enemy fortifications at Cheptsy.

In short, the Germans did not take Chentsy on 16.11.41.

But we are most interested in the actions of the 2nd TD, which attacked the 1975th Rifle Regiment, which occupied a defensive sector on the left flank of the 316th Rifle Division (Diagram 2).

For the offensive, according to divisional order No. 029 2 TD 13.11.41, three battle groups (Kampfgruppe -KG) were formed:

BG-1 under the command of the commander of the 2. Schtz.Brigade (2nd Rifle Brigade). Composed of: Schtz.Rgt.2 (2nd Rifle Regiment - in our tradition, and to avoid confusion - an infantry regiment), II./Pz.Rgt.3 (2nd Tank Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment), II./AR74 (2nd ADN of the 74th AP), 2./Pz.Jag.Abt.38 (2nd PT Company of the 38th IPTB).

BG-2 under the command of the commander Kradschtz.Btl.2: Kradschtz.Btl.2 (motorcycle battalion) without 1./Pz.AA5 (1st reconnaissance company), one company of heavy and one company of light tanks Pz.Rgt.3 (1 TB, 3 TP), one battery of AR74 (74th AP).

BG-3 under the command of the commander 2.Schtz.Rgt.304: Schtz.Rgt.304 (304 PP), I./Pz.Rgt.3 (1 TB, 3 TP - without two companies), III./AR74 (3 ADN, 74 AP), Bb.74 (74th reserve battalion), Nbl.Abt.74 (multiple launch mortar division).

Divisional order 030 2TD 14.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

….Battle group 1 at Y time is to move out of its security sector and occupy the heights in the Rozhdestveno-Lyscsevo-Golubtsovo-Avdotyino area……
……Battle Group 2 is to move out of its security sector at Y time and attack the enemy in front of Battle Group 3 in the direction of Nikolskoye-Nelidovo, overcome the enemy positions in front of Battle Group 3 and clear the area together with Battle Group 3 of encircled enemy groups. Battle Group 3 is to go on the offensive as soon as the offensive of Battle Groups 1 and 2 yields results, clear the area in front of its previous positions together with Battle Group 2 up to the location of Battle Group 1……..

In turn, in the BG 1 that interests us most, two subgroups of the PG (UG- untergruppe) were created:

PG Kelitsa (commander of 2 Schtz. Rgt. – (2nd rifle regiment), colonel). BG 1 K consisting of:
ZhBD (2 Schtz. Rgt.) BG 1 (2nd TD) 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
- 2st battalion of the 1nd rifle regiment, 38st company of the 3th infantry division, half of the 38rd company of the 2th artillery battalion, regimental units of the 1nd rifle regiment, 4 platoon of firlings (firling - 20-barrel 2-mm anti-aircraft mount) of the 47nd company of the 1th machine gun battalion, 74st battery of the 2nd division of the XNUMXth artillery regiment (XNUMXnd tank division) were allocated to support the offensive.


"...Problem: "Keliza's subgroup attacks through Morozovo-Shiryaevo and captures the heights northwest of the chapel (area of ​​elevation 231,5). During the advance in the direction of the Volokolamsk-Istra road, 1 reinforced rifle company is allocated to cover the right flank and 5 cm anti-tank guns and 1 gun from the 74nd division of the XNUMXth artillery regiment are allocated to protect against tanks [on the] road itself. Subsequently, Keliza's Kampfgruppe advances through the forest in a deeply echeloned order to the north toward Lyscievo and covers the right flank of the Kampfgruppe up to the road."

PG Hoppe (commander of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd Schtz. Rgt., major) BG 1 X- consisting of: — «: II battalion of the 2nd rifle regiment, II battalion of the 3rd tank regiment, 1st battery of the 74th artillery regiment, half of the 3rd company of the 38th artillery battalion, 2nd company of the 47th infantry battalion.

Problem:

"The Hoppe subgroup attacks across the Lama River east of Nelidovo to capture the heights east of Petelinka. During the further movement they quickly advance to the Volokolamsk-Istra road and through Rozhdestvenno capture the heights west of Lyscovo and Lyscovo...".

A very important fragment of the order, it obliges PG Hoppe (filled with tanks, about 60 units, staff - 71) to attack positions from the Dubosekovo siding and to the left, somewhere 1,2-1,5 km to Nelidovo. Let's pay attention. Well, Nelidovo (incl.) and to the left (according to divisional order No. 030) behind BG 2.

If you read the documents of the 2nd TD (division order No. 030), the first contradiction is the dividing lines of the offensive zones of BG 1 and BG 2. They do not correspond to the real (future) development of events. Let's assume that the tasks set for this plan on the map (in the order) were adjusted during reconnaissance on the ground. And it also seems (according to the 2nd TD's combat document) that the entire BG 1 went through Morozovo and Shiryaevo to Petelino and the Matrenino station. And the gap between BG 2 and BG 1 turns out to be somewhat unnatural. The main position, occupied in advance (prepared and developed in engineering terms), is attacked in a disjointed manner, when it is necessary to think about securing both flanks? In the depth of the defense (the density of the defense decreases there) this is still possible. But a breakthrough of the main position - well, that does not happen, this is not an operational level. And this order puts everything in place. BG 2 and PG Hoppe, in elbow contact, simultaneously advance north (BG 2 - to the left of Nelidovo (incl.), PG Hoppe - to the right). Now everything is correct.


2 schema

Having occupied the 14th TD zone on November 15 and 5 (according to divisional order #029), the 2nd TD began preparing for the upcoming private offensive (order #030). Having captured Vasilyevskoye, two crossings were created across the Lama River. One to the north of Vasilyevskoye (the Nelidovo-Vasilyevskoye road), and the other to the east (this will be used by BG Fricke of the 11th TD on November 17.11.41, 5 to advance to Morozovo). And they are taken under protection by a unit assigned to Hoppe. The crossing at Shitkovo is for now under the 1th TD. ZhBD BG 2 (15.11.41nd TD) November XNUMX, XNUMX.

“….The 2nd company of the 47th machine gun battalion takes over air protection of two crossing points across the Lama River and provides cover for the further advance of the majority of Hoppe’s subgroup from air attacks….”

Which additionally confirms the direction of the upcoming offensive of PG Hoppe to the north, through Lama and the railway to Petelino, according to the order. And this means that the battle (the first) at the Dubosekovo siding is predetermined.

The battle


Let's consider (selectively) the chronology of the German offensive according to the enemy's combat documents (ZhBD 2 TD, ZhBD BG 1, ZhBD 11 TD, 5 AK, 46 MK) and ours - Combat Report (BD) No. 22 316 SD, etc. Comparing our combat documents and the enemy's, it is obvious that they basically correspond to each other. The time difference is insignificant and quite explainable. And let's try to reconstruct the picture of the combat actions of the 2 TD. Advancement from the initial area of ​​PG Kielica.

ZhBD BG 1 (2 TD) 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

05:00 (6:00 Moscow time) the commander [of the Kelits regiment] advances from Levlevo [in the text Levlevo] through Sapegino [in the text Sapergino] - Yuryevo to Sosnino...

ZhBD 2TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

6.30 (7.30 Moscow time) Start of the offensive. (ZhBD 2TD)…. From (8.00 Moscow time) 7.00 support of the assault aviation.

Ours confirms - BD No. 22 316 SD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

The enemy launched an offensive on the left flank of the 8.00th Rifle Division at 16.11:316 on XNUMX/XNUMX – Shiryaevo, Petelino.

First, let's determine what forces and in what direction BG 1 and BG 2 were operating (diagram 2). So, at 6.30 (7.30 Moscow time), during the fire preparation period (aviation, artillery):

BG 1 (PG Kelits) from the initial area (Ivlevo) consisting of 1 battalion with part of the regular regimental artillery, the 2nd AT company of the 38th IPPT Battalion, a tank reconnaissance group consisting of 5 tanks (a TB reconnaissance platoon, T-2 tanks) with one platoon of riflemen, 1 sapper group and one AT platoon of the 1st company of the 38th IPDT, a repair and recovery and medical unit, are already moving to the attack line. For attacks on open spaces (Morozovo, Shiryaevo), Kelits should have had up to a platoon of tanks (4-5 T-III tanks). Gabidulin (a witness to the battle) indicates the presence of 4 tanks. After completing the task, they retreated again to Hoppe. And Kelits then went through the forests and ravines, he did not really need tanks (although a reconnaissance platoon of a tank battalion (5 T-II) could have been).

BG 1 (PG Hoppe) was in the initial area of ​​Krasikovo, Yuryevo. In Krasikovo there was a command post of the BG 1 and 11 companies (regimental artillery), and was advancing (the first echelon) according to the order through Vasilyevskoye to the north, through Lama to the railway track Nelidovo - Dubosekovo siding.

The firing positions of the 74th AP divisions, attached to BG 3 and BG 2, were presumably located in the Zhdanovo area behind the crest of hill 228,5. And the 2nd adn. of the 74th AP (attached to BG 1) had an OP in the Shiryaevo area as the group advanced. One battery was assigned to organize anti-tank screens (lines) together with the 2nd anti-tank company of the 38th independent tank battalion. The firing positions (before the offensive) of the regimental artillery were located, BG 1 ZhBD (2nd TD) 15.11.41/11/00, XNUMX:XNUMX:

The 11th company of the 2nd rifle regiment (an infantry gun company with 4 75mm and 2 150mm infantry guns) advances and takes up firing positions: 1 heavy platoon in Yuryevo, 1 light platoon in Sosnino and 1 light platoon in Vasilyevskoye.

And BG 2 (the first echelon) from the initial area of ​​Krasikovo, having bypassed the floodplain of Lama on the left, began to advance in the direction of Nelidovo. The subsequent forces (reserves and rear) most likely advanced from Zhdanovo. Perhaps part of the forces of the first echelon (part of the tank company or even the whole) followed the route of PG Hoppe's advance to the crossing (well, this was after coordination with the division commander), and then along the road to Nelidovo.

ZhBD 2nd TD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

7.40 (8.40 Moscow time). Battle Group 2 reaches Nelidovo. The enemy is outnumbered…

According to the combat formation diagram of the 316th Rifle Division (diagram 1), where the main positions of the 316th Rifle Division are located 1–0,5 km east of the settlements of Nelidovo and Bolshoe Nikolskoye), it can be determined that BG 2 begins to cut off only the combat outposts. Hence the “few enemy.”

BG-1 (PG Kelitsa) after fire preparation, the first echelon (two infantry companies, sappers, a tank platoon) attacked the 1075th Rifle Regiment at the junction with the 50th Cavalry Division.

BD No. 22 316th SD:

….The enemy launched an offensive on the left flank of the 8.00th Rifle Division at 16.11:316 on XNUMX/XNUMX – Shiryaevo, Peteleno….

ZhBD 2-y TD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

8.00 (9.00 Moscow time). Report from the 74th Artillery Regiment (AR74): Morozovo and Shiryaevo have been occupied by Battle Group 1. Enemy resistance is quite weak….

BG 1 (PG "Keliza"), having knocked out the combat outpost east of Morozovo (and captured it), crushed the left flank of the 5th company of the 2nd battalion, took Shiryaevo and advanced into the depths. And there was a feat there, and there the Germans suffered losses and were delayed for some time, these settlements were mainly covered by the BO. Part of the 5th company of the 2/1075th rifle regiment retreated to the right into the forest, and part went to the left behind the ravine to the floodplain of the Lama. Then the Germans, continuing to advance (BG-1), covered the flank (behind Morozovo in accordance with the order, see below) - the 2nd AT company and the battery of the 2/74th AP moved to the first AT line (diagram 2).

ZhBD BG 1 (2nd TD). 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

7.40 (8.40 Moscow time)…. Battle Group 1 [Kielitz] receives orders to establish strong security with 5-cm anti-tank guns and light howitzers on the road to Istra and to set up obstacles against a possible attack by enemy tanks….

Here you can see that one battery of the 2/74th AP was present in the advancing part of BG 1 (they were afraid of the KV-1). During the further advance, the disposition of the Kelitsa units was as follows: the 1st company advanced on a wide front to the right of the railway to Petelino to the Matrenino station; the 2nd company at Morozovo and to the east; the 3rd company moved behind the 1st company (later) to Petelino (from Shiryaevo); the 4th company to the east of Morozovo and advancing north (the Morozovo - Matrenino station road) to elevation 231,5 to the positions of Kraev's company. It should also be taken into account that the Germans formed teams on the basis of infantry platoons (reinforced platoon), which even included units and several units of equipment, including tanks.

ZhBD BG 1 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

….from the last populated area, reconnaissance is conducted by one rifle platoon in the northern direction to point 231,5. There, the enemy is detected with a force of approximately 1 company with light machine guns and shooters in the trees…

A BG 1 (PG Hoppe) according to the order “...attacks across the Lama River east of Nelidovo...».

And the execution of this order is confirmed by the following document: evening report in the V AK 21.05 (22.05 Moscow time) 16.11.41:

...By 8.00:9.00 (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time) the railway was crossed at Nelidovo and east of....

And Hoppe attacks, of course, simultaneously with BG-2. The attack front of the battle groups (taking into account the previously occupied defense) could be up to 1,2 km (the Germans are still impudent). In the first echelon, one tank company (17-19 tanks) and 2 infantry companies, and in front - a platoon of sappers-reconnaissance (pioneers). In the text, for understanding the formation of the battle order, there may be a designation "first", but remember: the 2nd tank battalion is the 4th, 5th and 6th companies, the same applies to the infantry, Hoppe has the 6th-10th companies.

The second echelon (more likely a reserve) of BG 1 PG Hoppe is another (second) tank company in a marching column, following the attacking units at a distance of 2-3 km (or maybe even closer, given that our artillery is sparse). That is, at the time of the attack of the first echelon, the second is just forming into columns in the initial area or is just beginning to advance.

So, having crossed the railway east of Nelidovo, PG Hoppe first of all attacks the positions of our PT platoon. And it cannot be any other way. There are no options that the Germans did not notice, went around, slipped through, jumped over, etc. And in turn, the witnesses of the battle were right, telling about the first battle. But it is this battle that is denied by the witnesses of the "you are all lying" sect, who claim that the Germans went around the platoon (and the 4th company), and then easily and simply cleaned it up. NO!!!

It is not known for certain how the Germans "read" and exposed our positions. The 2nd TD learned about the enemy from the words of the 5th TD. Nelidovo hides our positions from the enemy's optical reconnaissance. But, most likely, they calculated that the main position is to the east of Nelidovo up to 1 km. Since the railway line from Nelidovo up to 700-800 m has cuts and embankments, and then there is a gap, a place free of cuts and embankments up to 250-300 m, then all the way to the Dubosekovo siding there is another cut impassable for tanks. So they calculated that the front would run from north to south, from Petelino to the beginning of this cut (which, in theory, should cover the right flank). And to go through the Dubosekovo siding means to go to the rear of the main position. And by the way, during the enemy's artillery preparation, not much "hit" our actual positions and there were no losses. This shows that the Germans did not completely open our defense.

So Hoppe "pushed" most of his first echelon, up to 14-15 tanks, through the Dubosekovo siding. Part (up to 4 tanks) could pass through the passage 1 km east of Nelidovo (although some nuances show that all the tanks went through the Dubosekovo siding). First, the pioneers went beyond the siding, and they went brazenly, as witnesses of the battle claimed. They were fired upon. Then the tanks went, followed by a chain of infantry. And so, when deploying tanks in a battle line, the Germans had to make a flank movement (in Shemyakin - a column of tanks). The infantry in the trenches and behind the embankments covers the deployment, so that later they can move in a chain behind the tanks.

The Germans did not expect stubborn resistance and did not even use artillery or mortars beforehand. They relaxed. And they started getting a bunch of bullets in the sides from the antitank rifles. T-III tanks, even modernized (up to 30 mm of side armor), are penetrable at 250 m. And they were from 50 m to 200 m from our positions. And so the first battle of our antitank platoon began.

It can be noted that almost simultaneously the battle groups (as expected) attack the positions of the left flank of the 1075th Rifle Regiment. BG 2 is lighter, it continues to knock out our combat security west of Nelidovo, without crashing into the main positions of the 1075th Rifle Regiment. The attacking part of BG 1 (Kelits) continues to develop the offensive in the direction of the Shiryaevo - Petelino road (1 company) to the right (east) of the railway track, to mark 244,0 through the forest to Matrenino station (right flank in the offensive zone of the 2nd TD). The 4th company is east of Morozovo to the north (partially along the forest road Morozovo - Matrenino station) to the chapel (mark 231,5). The 3rd company has positions from Shiryaevo to Petelino.

ZhBD 2TD 16.11.41/10.13/XNUMX (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time):

9:13 Battle Group 1 reaches Petelinka.

BD 316 SD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

By 10:00… captured Nelidovo, Petelino.

So, Kelits is advancing from the right of the railway, and Petelino could only be taken by Hoppe. But Hoppe (most of the first echelon) was stuck at Dubosekovo. However, part of the forces of the left flank could, without any particular delays (our positions were not there), advance north to Petelino. This is a little more than 1 km. And in 20-30 minutes they could be at the western outskirts of Petelino. At the same time, the battle at the Dubosekovo junction is still going on.

In the same way, a group of tanks (temporarily attached to Kelits to solve the problem of open spaces), after taking Shiryaevo, again comes under Hoppe's command and moves from the east (along the Shiryaevo-Petelino road) to the specified village. Our troops are not there. Well, and then, the blow from the front and rear allows the Germans to take Petelino. The 6th company of the 1075th rifle regiment was partially pushed back to the positions of the 3rd battalion, and partially withdrew to the trench northeast of Petelino. Also, the right-flank units of our 4th company were pressed to the Dubosekovo junction. By this time, BG 2 clears Nelidovo (the 2nd battalion's BO withdrew there) and continues to advance on B. Nikolskoye (there are also only BO positions from the 3rd battalion of the 1075th rifle regiment).

There is also a possibility that the right flank of BG 2 (under orders from the 2nd TD commander) participated in the attack on Peteleno, attacking the western outskirts of the village. Confirmation in the following document: BD No. 22 316 SD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. “At 11:30 the enemy left Peteleno and sent its tanks to Volokolamsk…”, which indirectly confirms the participation of BG 2 tanks (and infantry too) in the attack on Peteleno, which then went to their offensive zone (to the west, in the direction of Volokolamsk).

What's going on at the Dubosekovo junction? When the antitank rifles started firing, they weren't identified as priority targets (just like regular riflemen). First of all, the machine gun, there were no guns. The effect of the antitank rifle is not strong (5-10 hits and up to 3-5 penetrations are needed). And only then can one or another unit of the tank be damaged. Moreover, the tank, as a rule, will not stop immediately, but only when the effect of the engine or transmission malfunction begins to clearly manifest itself. Moreover, the tank can crawl to the enemy positions and stop there. And the probability of being destroyed then will be very high. One lighter can only char the paint, but five is already a crematorium for the crew. And if a couple of antitank grenades or a mine are dragged under the bottom. And if the attack is successful for the Germans (the battlefield is behind them), then the tanks, having received damage from the antitank rifles, are quickly restored. And if not, and the attack is called off, then the tanks stuck in our positions are finished off (destroyed).

The main factor of success against a strong enemy is surprise. Reasons: first, the Germans did not penetrate our defenses in this area accurately enough, hence; second, the platoon, and the positions of the 4th company, were not reliably suppressed during the fire preparation and later; third, the Germans thought that there were rear units in front of them (quick reconnaissance did not reveal any significant fire weapons), and they lost their caution and were determined to break the resistance without much expense; fourth, the trenches and embankments forced us to deploy into a battle line, making a flanking movement in front of our positions. This also happens when passing through passages in minefields, but at this time there should be an intensive fire raid - artillery support, but this did not happen. And how did it all end? The answer is in the next report.

Interim summary to the V Army Corps 16.11.41:

13:30 (14:30 Moscow time): Battle Group 1 is engaged in combat with the enemy, who is stubbornly defending himself on the forest edges south of the highway, along a line north of Shiryaevo - 1,5 km south of Petelinka.

And this is the area one. Dubosekovo, and five and a half hours after the first attack. Yes, the summary (information) was an hour or two late, but there was a message about the ongoing battle. What our witnesses claimed is all true. So four hours (about this) taking into account the first attack. And this means that the first attack was unsuccessful. And by the feeling, even very unsuccessful. So unsuccessful that there is no message at all in the 2nd TD's ZBD. How did "Hoppe" end up in Petelino? Zero information.

On the left, BG boasts about how he is dispersing our small BO. On the right, Kelits is in the same spirit (though until his 2nd company met Kraev's company at the 231,5 mark). And Hoppe, filled with tanks (TB, three companies, up to 60 or even more tanks), crossed the railway east of Nelidovo according to orders, which was later confirmed in the evening report, well, brag. Not to brag. And suddenly, in Petelino.

But it was necessary to pass the main positions of the 1075th SP, and not the BO at Nelidovo, Morozovo and Shiryaevo (which the order does not order to stubbornly defend). Well, okay, it is not noted in the 2nd TD's combat log, but there is no information about the advance of PG Hoppe in Petelino and in the combat log of BG 1 (which reflects the actions of only two subgroups).

It is strange and suspicious. But here we need to understand what kind of document ZhBD is. ZhBD is an almanac (collection) of victories and achievements of a unit (formation). It is composed of fragments of orders, instructions, reports, reports, telephone messages received by the operational duty officer of the headquarters, other documents of the heads of services, etc. The entry (or rather, it is printed) at the end of the day (or even later, depending on the circumstances), and, accordingly, the most "juicy" places from the specified documents are selected. In peacetime, this is transferred to the historical form of the unit (formation), so that descendants can be proud of their ancestors. This is the norm both for us and for them (and in general in any army in the world).

And as an example of objectivity, let's consider one event of 16.11.41, where ours and the Germans reflected it completely differently. This is the battle at Matrenino station.

Report com. 1st battalion 1073rd joint venture art. Lt. Momysh-Uly 20.11.41:

At 12.00:16.11.41 on 2, the enemy, up to an infantry battalion with 1 tanks and supported by one mortar battery, launched an offensive on the Matrenino station from the northwest. The 1st rifle company /Captain Lieutenant Filimonov/ also entered the battle…. On the eve of the battle, the area of ​​the 13.00st rifle company was subjected to bombardment. At 16.11.41:1 on 400……. The 1st rifle company was pushed back from its defensive positions by 2 meters. I ordered the commanders of the 1st and 1nd companies (Kraev’s company was also surrounded there) to counterattack the enemy…. As a result of the battle….. The XNUMXst rifle company restored its previous position and pushed the enemy back XNUMX km.

DB No. 79 Dovator's Cavalry Group. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

16:00 1st Guards Tank Brigade counterattacked and pushed back up to a battalion of the enemy from Matrenino station and captured Goryuny and Matrenino station…

1st Guards Tank Brigade 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

...To destroy the enemy at the Matryonino station and its subsequent defense, at 17:00 on 16.11.1941, a combined NKVD battalion with 1 tanks was sent from the 6st Guards Tank Brigade. By the time the battalion reached the station area, the enemy had been driven out by units of the 316th Rifle Division.

All our documents confirm that the Germans took Matrenino station. Yes, there is an exaggeration in the forces - an enemy battalion (as usual). And the Dovatorites generally attributed everything to themselves, even Goryuny, which the Germans never reached.
And what about the Germans?

ZhBD BG 1 (2 TD) 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

The 1st Company (PG Kelitsa), moving east along the railroad, at times joining the 7th Company (PG Hoppe) to the left, fought a fierce battle in the forest 2 km west of Goryuny (in the text Goyuni - Anninskoye), where the Russians attacked three times in a row with a force of about a battalion. The attack was repelled with heavy losses in personnel for the enemy…….. In fulfillment of its mission, the company reached the Volokolamsk - Istra road shortly after 16:00. Here they dug in together with the [5] cm [PT] and the 1st PT platoon of the 1st company of the 38th IPPT, one group of the 38th SAB and a 105-mm light field howitzer of the 74nd battalion of the XNUMXth artillery regiment.

They were walking peacefully (picking mushrooms), wild Russians jumped out (a whole battalion), but the Germans quickly laid it down. Where is the occupation of Matrenino station (and this designation is on German maps)? The toponym of Matrenino station is not indicated, which is clearly part of the offensive zone of the 2nd TD, up to Anino (Goryuny) inclusive, according to order No. 029. And the station must be taken. And what is there to write down if they were knocked out, and very quickly. Then it is better to write a non-binding entry - "battle in the forest 2 km west of Goryuny". And it wasn't the battalion that knocked it out, but Filimonov's company, reinforced by a machine-gun platoon. Without tanks or artillery support. And the Germans ran so fast that Momysh-Uly barely stopped ours after 1 km. And he took trophies along the way (including French cognac).

Here you have the objectivity of the reflection in the ZhBD, where the document records an outright lie. Moreover, the report is … In fulfillment of its mission (to establish a PT barrier on the Volokolamsk highway), the company reached the Volokolamsk-Istra road shortly after 16.00:5. Here they dug in together with the [1] cm [PT] and the 1st PT platoon of the XNUMXst company… — was clearly left in the ZhBD in its original form according to the report, although in an hour or two the Germans would be thrown out of Matrenino station. They entrenched themselves and then disengaged themselves, but the latter was not recorded in the ZhBD. Moreover, the toponym “Matrenino station” was not used (and Matrenino station is marked on German maps), and instead of this, the incomprehensible — “…2 km west of Goryuny…”. Why? I really don't want to mention the point from which they were knocked out.

Well, and then 21.05 (22.05 Moscow time) 16.11.41. Evening report to the V Army Corps:

….. On the eastern flank, south of the highway, there are still combat-ready units; to neutralize them, help from the right neighbor is required…

…In short, let the right neighbor (11th TD) sort it out.

Let's say that more truthful information is in reports (and with a short shoulder) than "filtered" records in the ZhBD. And even then, not always, as soon as the boss is further away (16 A), you can, as in ZhBD No. 79, attribute everything to yourself. Well, it happens. There are mistakes in documents, when the left neighbor turns out to be the right one, and the regiment number does not correspond, and exaggeration of enemy forces is a constant practice for all armies of the world. This is to say that it is not enough to simply read the document, you need to understand its essence and the intricacies of army bureaucracy. Well, and the corresponding correction.

And then (given the complete lack of information in the ZhBD about how Hoppe's Panther got to Petelino) we can assume that the battle at the Dubosekovo junction was also extremely unsuccessful for the Germans. They failed to break through the defense (see the reasons above), and had to call off the attack in this area. And it was not the shots that scared the Germans, but the specific losses in forces and equipment. In short, having lost up to 7 tanks (including up to three destroyed), the attack on these positions was stopped.

And what should be written in the ZhBD? According to the reports, the picture is unsightly. Then they act according to the principle: only the good or nothing. The good — ZhBD 2-y TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

9.13 (10.13 Moscow time)… Battle Group 1 reaches Petelinka…

And how did it achieve this? - then they turn on "or nothing". And if the information about the battle at Matrenino station in German documents is absolutely false, then the battle at Dubosekovo junction is simply hushed up. A striking example of an "objective" reflection of the situation in German documents. Yes, the Germans are fond of hiding their losses and failures, the objectivity of the presentation of information in documents is lame (well, this happens with ours too). And this must be taken into account. The following documents are available about the losses of the Germans in the defense sector of the 1075th Rifle Regiment.

Political report from the head of the political department of the 316th rifle division, battalion commissar Galushko[54] to the head of the political department of the 16th army, regimental commissar Maslenov. Village of Guseneyo, 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

On the morning of 16.11.41 at 8.00:1075 the enemy began an offensive on the left flank of our defense in the area of ​​the 50th Rifle Regiment before us. ……. The enemy was attacking with 60–XNUMX heavy and medium tanks and a fairly large number of infantry and machine gunners…..
The 1075th Rifle Regiment had 2 antitank gun platoons and one antitank gun in the fight against such a number of tanks…….. The 1075th Rifle Regiment suffered heavy losses, 2 companies were completely lost, the data on losses is being clarified, we will report in the next report.
……According to unspecified data, at least 1075 enemy tanks were destroyed in the area of ​​the 9th Rifle Regiment….

Report of the military commissar of the 1075th regiment from 19.11.41/25/8 and B.D. No. 19.11.41 of the XNUMXth Guards Division for XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX:

….1075th Rifle Regiment fought enemy tanks and infantry from 16.11 to 18.11 in Bol. Nikolskoye, Shishkino, Guseneyo. During the days of fighting, the regiment destroyed up to 120 infantrymen, 4 tanks…..

The data, although given for the entire defensive sector of the 1075th Rifle Regiment, and even for a certain period (3 days), but the most inconvenient and unexpected place for the Germans was right at the Dubosekovo junction. They did not pass there, although they should have. And here we must understand that the regiment (with reinforcements) in the positions occupied in advance on 16.11 (it spent two weeks improving the defense) could have inflicted a corresponding defeat on the enemy. And not on 17-18 November in intermediate, hastily occupied positions, while being terribly battered by previous battles. So 4 destroyed (excluding those knocked out) tanks - this is 16.11.41, and, most likely, by a PT platoon.

Well, as I said earlier, the positions of the 4th company with the AT platoon turned out to be a "bone in the throat" of the 2nd TD offensive. It turned out that the further offensive of BG-1 began to experience difficulties. Part of the forces are in Petelino, clearly insufficient to continue the offensive. It is impossible to move the reserve (marching column) from Vasilyevskoye to the north across the Lama River and regroup when there is an enemy on the flank and in the rear (south of Petelino). And BG-2 continues the offensive, pushing back the BO (from the 3rd battalion) already at B. Nikolskoye.

9:45 (10:45 Moscow time) 2nd TD combat unit. Report from combat group 2:

Enemy fortifications north of Potinki (most likely a mistake – correct is Nelidovo) have been captured. The southern outskirts of Nikolskoye have been reached. The enemy is in field fortifications north of Nikolskoye. The offensive continues. ….

DB No. 22 316 SD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

At 11:00 the enemy captured Bol. Nikolskoye. At 11:30 he left 5 tanks and an infantry company in Bol. Nikolskoye…

Judging by the nature of the actions of BG 2 (according to the ZhBD), it is clear that until (around) 11:00 (Moscow time) it only cut off the combat security up to the junction with the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (elevation 251,0) and did not attack the 2nd battalion of the 1075th Rifle Regiment. And at 11:30, having wedged itself into the combat formations of the main division line at the junction of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and the 1075th Rifle Regiment (mainly at the position of the 3/1075th Rifle Regiment) at elevation 251,0. From the west, from the Zhdanovo-Muromtsevo area, BG 2 was supported by BG 3 (fire support, possibly also a demonstrative deployment of part of the group's forces and an imitation of an offensive).

BD No. 22 316 SD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

…At 11:30… conducts an offensive in the area of ​​height 251,0…

But then it was forced to suspend the offensive, since the neighbor on the right (BG 1) did not reach the appropriate line with the appropriate forces (the EVENT we noted occurred). And to continue the offensive into the depths of the enemy defense, when you have little strength and need to cover two flanks. According to the canons, two BGs (two battalions) are needed as a united front. This is not France (and not even this summer), now, as General Halder said, "the regulations must be followed in full." In short, BG 2 suspended the offensive, waiting for BG 1. Diagram 2 shows the position of BG 2, BG 3 and units of BG 1 at 11.00:11.30–1:1073. And almost at this time, Kielce with part of its forces attacks Kraev's company of the 131.5/2 Rifle Regiment (mark 1) and is unable to get past it. Although his other units have advanced quite far to the north, advancing on a broad front east of the railway and on the approach to Matrenino station (scheme 1073). There are practically no our troops there (rear units). But it was not possible to take control of the Morozovo - Matrenino station road from Kraevo (XNUMX/XNUMX Rifle Regiment). And this is a flank cover (there is no right neighbor).

What should Hoppe do? It is not possible to continue the offensive together with BG 2 (they are not strong enough), and the positions of the 4th company are preventing the second echelon (reserves) from being pulled up from Vasilyevskoye along the field from the railway to Petelino (as was indicated earlier). And through Nelidovo and to the left is the second echelon (reserves) of BG 2, whose columns have blocked all the routes of advance (the forward units of BG 2 are already in B. Nikolskoye). It is possible to pull the column along the positions of the 4th company, pressing close. But you can also get a bunch of treats from anti-tank rifles in the sides, and the Germans have already felt it (they did not know that there were 4 companies and only two anti-tank rifles in the positions). In short, the situation is -

ZhBD 11 TD 16.11.41:

At 13:00 (14:00 Moscow time)………since the advance of 2 Pz.D. had stalled…

— The 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht has come to a standstill.

It is necessary to understand that it will not be possible to simply clear the 4th company. This is if the first echelon had pushed through the company, destroying the organized defense, the second echelon can chase after broken and scattered groups of fighters with a Schmeisser from the hip. But breaking through the advance defense must be done scientifically, seriously and carefully: artillery, tanks, infantry and everything according to the norms. Yes, the Germans are on our flanks and in the rear, it will be easier, but we still have to strain ourselves. And here the 5th company went into the forest to the left of the Shiryaevo-Petelino road and, not crushed by Kelits, is snapping back. And in order to solve all this in one fell swoop, the event must be prepared. And still, we must think about how to continue the division's offensive. And here it is extremely important to drive the second echelon (or rather, the reserve) to Petelino. And therefore PAUSE.

So, PG Hoppe stopped the offensive (left flank of BG 1) and at the same time stopped the offensive of the entire 2nd TD. But PG Kielica continues the offensive.

DB No. 22 16.11.41/316/XNUMX. XNUMX SD:

- 11.30 a.m. company 1/1073 Rifle Regiment, located at mark 231,5, is fighting a company of machine gunners. The enemy in the area of ​​mark 244,0 has entered a minefield.

As noted earlier, part of BG 1 (Kelitsy) advanced to Matrenino station in a coordinated manner in two units (1st and 2nd companies) with the task of taking Matrenino station and capturing the Morozovo - Matrenino station - Lyscovo road (the right flank in the offensive zone of the 2nd TD) and digging in. As a result, the 2nd company attacked Kraev's company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment). And the 1st reinforced company, somewhere around 11:00–11:30 (Moscow time), advancing from Petelino to Matrenino station, came across rubble and a minefield (mark 244,0, just 1 km north of Petelino).

10.12 (11.12 Moscow time) 16.11.41. ZhBD 2nd TD:

…..Battle Group 1 reaches the edge of the forest 1 km north of Petelinka. …

The minefield that covered the intermediate positions in case of withdrawal of the 2/1075 units (during the enemy's attack from the Volokolamsk direction) and the positions of Kraev's company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment), covering the road to Matrenino station, are the same forest edge (clearing). And the fact that these two units reached it almost simultaneously indicates the planned nature of their actions. Well, and then the 1st company continues to advance to Matrenino station.

11.00 (12.00) radiogram from the 2nd Rifle Brigade: (subgroup) Kielica with the left flank along the railway is advancing north to the road...

Here we repeat again: expecting the Germans to advance along the Volokolamsk highway, it was assumed that our retreating units would consistently occupy intermediate defensive positions with minefields and anti-tank artillery. But the Germans, with a strike across the highway, cut off the units of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (the 2nd Battalion in its entirety, which determined the terrible losses of this unit) from the inability to retreat to the intended intermediate positions. Moreover, there were no troops of ours up to the Matrenino station (up to Filimonov's company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment))

The problems of the left flank of BG-1 (PG Hoppe), which stalled the offensive of the 2nd TD, were resolved as follows:

1) Replacement of Hoppe's already battered first echelon with the second (reserve). And at a certain time, together with BG-2, continue the general offensive to the north, to the positions of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and the 1075th Rifle Regiment (3rd Battalion); And here is a maneuver showing the withdrawal of part of the forces of the first echelon.

DB No. 22 316 SD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

At 11:30 the enemy left Petelino and directed its tanks towards Volokolamsk and Shiryaevo.

To Shiryaevo these are the forces of PG Hoppe, and to Volokolamsk (to the west) these are BG 2 (as indicated earlier).

ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

10:00 (11:00 Moscow time) II Battalion of the 2nd Rifle Regiment with II Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment from Petelinka [is advancing] in the indicated direction……
It looks like the first echelon is being withdrawn from Petelino. And the second is moving towards Petelino through Morozovo and Shiryaevo.

Combat report of the 50th Cavalry Division No. 156 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
11:35 …. The enemy, with a force of up to a motorized division, 80 tanks and up to 50 guns, is advancing along the Morozovo-Shiryaevo road. The noise of the battle is fading to the north……

Our report confirms the advance of the second echelon and Hoppe's reserve, two TPs with infantry (and again with exaggeration, there must have been a little more than 40 tanks).

ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

11.15:12.15 (2:11.00 Moscow time) radiogram from the XNUMXnd Rifle Brigade: “Hoppe moved north at XNUMX:XNUMX.”

2) the task of defeating the 4th company near Dubosekovo, and the 5th company in the forest to the left of Shiryaevo was assigned to Kelitsa with the involvement of the tank company of the first echelon (it should operate in open terrain, mainly against the 4th company).
ZhBD BG 1.16.11.41:

10.40 (11.40 Moscow time) radiogram from the 2nd Rifle Brigade: “...the forest 1 km southeast of Petelinka must be cleared by [subgroup] Kelitsa.”

Well, somewhere around 12:20–13:00, the 2nd TD (in this direction), after fire preparation by forces of BG 2 and BG 1 (Hoppe), continued the joint offensive:

……..After new preparations and reconnaissance of the roads, the offensive on the highway began. Which was reached by 14.00 (15.00 Moscow time) on a wide front
(summary of the 2nd TD in the 5th AC).

Road reconnaissance is reconnaissance of the route of the second echelon's advancement to determine how dangerous it is to carry out this procedure (to drag a bunch of troops in a rookade almost along the line of combat contact). Significant risk. Well, and then new fire training and a relatively successful offensive. Everything is correct - "after new training, the offensive began", and the main thing is that 11.00:2 is the extreme point at this time (BG 15.00) and 2,5:XNUMX, which is XNUMX km to the north.

ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
12.50 (13.50 Moscow time) radiogram from the 2nd Rifle Brigade: quickly advance with the main forces to the left of the railway.


If on the left, then this is PG Hoppe, up to the Volokolamsk highway, and the offensive is in full swing.

Here is the time interval, plus the time from the beginning of the attack on Nelidovo and Petelino. Colonel Kaprov, unaware of this recording, in 1947 confirmed exactly what was recorded (he was slightly mistaken in the time):

"Around 14-15.00 the Germans opened heavy artillery fire on all positions of the regiment, and German tanks went on the attack again... More than 50 tanks attacked the regiment's sector, with the main attack being directed at the positions of the 2nd battalion, since this sector was the most accessible to enemy tanks. Within 40-50 minutes the tanks had crushed the position of the 2nd battalion, including the sector of the 4th company."

Thus, two battle groups (BG 2 and PG Hoppe) continued their offensive as a united front (BG 2 at elevation 251, BG 1 (PG Hoppe) to the right) to the forest area, which adjoins Yadrovo from the west. Then BG 2 went to Yadrovo, bypassing the area on the left. And PG Hoppe skirted the forest area along the forest edges on the right, with the right flank to the railway, to Lyscovo. The 7th company (Hoppe) to the left of the railway adjoined the 1st company (Kelits), which was advancing to the right of the railway, in the direction of the Matrenino station. Subsequently, PG Hoppe (advanced units) took Rozhdestveno and reached Lyscovo. And later, part of BG 2 (which had previously taken Yadrovo - KP 1073 Rifle Regiment, and then Mykanino) approached Rozhdestveno.

As we know, the reason given for the delay in the 2nd TD's offensive was that units of BG 1 (Kielica) came under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo.

ZhBD 11th TD 16.11.41:

At 13:00 (14:00 Moscow time)……since the advance of 2 Pz.D. was stalled under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo.

And after the “appropriate” submission of information to the 5th Army Corps, and from there to the 4th Tank Group (whose operations department monitored the units’ actions), the debriefing began. Gepner had a “gentle” conversation with the commanders of the 5th Army Corps and the 48th Motorized Rifle Corps (and further down) with the involvement of the closest female relatives (well, like us). Where the eternal Russian question arose – WHO IS TO BLAME and WHAT TO DO. But there were no difficulties with the first one (in the “best” army traditions, the 2nd Tank Division set up its neighbor) – of course, the 11th Tank Division. It did not provide (or rather, did not start the offensive in a timely manner) support for the 2nd Tank Division’s attack. And later (in its zone, already on the day of the offensive on 17.11.41) the 11th TD was unable to reach (although it crashed into the defense zone of the 316th Rifle Division) the offenders of the 2nd TD (the 11th TD would only enter battle with the 18.11st Battalion of the 1rd Rifle Regiment of the 1073th Guards Rifle Division on 8.) Well, and "congratulations" flew to the 46th MC and then to the 11th TD. Where the duty officer made (without dissembling) the famous entry, stroking the chafed place. Well, and for the full pleasure. This is a justifying entry in the documents of the 46th MC - an "explanatory" at the level of "I came, you are not", where it is obvious that their order sometimes turns into the mess we are familiar with:

46 MK. 16.11.41.… The replacement of the 5th Panzer Division itself, due to a misunderstanding, does not take place in full. The 11th Panzer Division believed that it could not enter the designated area, since the place was still occupied by the 5th Panzer Division, and the 5th Panzer Division, on the contrary, thought that it could not leave until the replacement arrived….

Well, how reliable is this reason? There is nothing like this in the documents of the 2nd TD and BG-1. Kelits set up a PT screen behind Morozovo and calmly advanced his units (described above). There were no problems. The fact that there could have been remnants of the 5th company in the area (and few in number, the main part was to the left of Shiryaevo) and combat security at Morozovo, and these are extremely insignificant forces. Or the result of the "hospitality" in the area of ​​​​mark. 231,5 Kraev's company (also 1/1073 rifle regiment). This is more like a "cunningly invented" reason to blame the failure on the 46th MK. Knowing how the 11th TD acted later, and on 17.11.41/2/16.11.41 they advanced significantly to the right, to the village of Matrenino (not to be confused with the station). And they attacked a completely different group of our troops, not the one that opposed the 2nd TD. And they would not have been able to prevent (even if they had started on XNUMX) the delay of the XNUMXnd TD.

The next reason to stop the offensive, if the Germans had identified a group that threatened their flanks? Yes, there were forces there that were capable of stopping the offensive of the 2nd TD on 16.11.41. But they practically did not show themselves until 15:00 Moscow time. This group was there as a result of preparation for our offensive, but was partially busy repelling the offensive of the 5th TD (which was turning right while fighting). But no, they did not identify it, because this is not reflected in the documents of the 2nd TD. But in the best army traditions (as was indicated earlier), they set up their neighbors (the 48th MK), indicating their inaction as the reason for the delay in the offensive. Well, the Germans did not manage to get through Dubosekovo. They did not get through the second platoon. Other units of the 4th company also participated in the battle, cutting off the infantry with machine gun fire, but knocking out tanks at Dubosekovo (in the first attack, the tanks never reached other units of the 4th company). And these losses disrupted the German attack (PG Hoppe) in this area. Yes, they broke through to Petelino (3-5) tanks. But the failure at the Dubosekovo junction forced the Germans to suspend the offensive to regroup (albeit briefly, 1,5-2 hours). And then Kraev added. These problems first stopped the offensive of BG 1, and then BG 2 (which finally attacked the main positions of the units of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and the 1075th Rifle Regiment). And that means the entire 2nd TD. And so the initially mentioned event occurred. – “STALLED”. This is "hello" to everyone who claims: "the Germans passed this area and did not notice." Well, yes, at the level of TG and "DIDN'T NOTICE."

It must be said that there was an opportunity to disrupt the offensive of the 2nd TD on 16.11.41. Dovator's group had (were attached) three tank brigades (1st Guards Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade - more than 100 tanks) and army artillery units (in addition to its own) for the planned offensive on 16.11.41. It did not work out. But if they had started shelling the advancing columns (especially when Hoppe began to advance) and deployed tank units of up to 50 tanks (even if demonstratively), then the offensive of the 2nd TD on 16.11.41 would have been disrupted. The Germans (2nd TD) would have consolidated their gains and would have waited for support from the 11th TD. And this was not earlier than 17.11.41. But such a decision was made by the command of the 16th Army, and, apparently, did not appreciate the danger of the situation. And the decision to strengthen the defense of the 316th SD in the area of ​​the Matrenino station (a separate NKVD battalion and a company - 6 tanks of Senior Lieutenant Burda from the 1st Guards Tank Brigade) was belated. Apparently, all attention was focused on the unsuccessful attack of our 58th TD on Volokolamsk.

But what happened happened. The Germans easily "drove away" not only the units of Kielce, but also the second echelon and the reserve of PG Hoppe. And then they moved the AT screen near Morozov to Shiryaevo, handing over the positions to the vanguard (advanced units) of the 11th TD, which would be knocked out at 15:00 by the 50th Cavalry Division. And the rear of BG 1 (after the Germans routed the 13th company with the AT platoon with their second attack (00:4 Moscow time), and then the 5th company) began to move forward through Vasilyevskoye, the Lama River, the railway line, across the field to Petelino. Thereby avoiding the dangerous movement along the front from Morozov to Shiryaevo.

Why the Germans did not reflect the battle at the Dubosekovo junction in their documents (the Germans do not have such a toponym on their maps, for them it would be to the south (southeast) of Petelino or to the north (northwest) of Shiryaevo) has already been discussed.

But let's try to figure out why our operational documents (combat reports) do not mention the battle at Dubosekovo anywhere. The battle at Dubosekovo, and even higher up to Petelino, could only be seen by the commander of the 2nd battalion, Mr. Reshetnikov, with the ability to pass the information up the chain of command. So, the first battle (at 9.00:9.30 Moscow time) takes place at Dubosekovo, and at about 6:3 the attack on Petelino, where the battalion commander's command post is, has already begun. That's it, from that moment the connection is lost. The 9.30th company, together with the battalion commander, retreat north to the 4rd battalion, and partly northeast to the forest. And if you look at the map, what can our troops see in the area south of Petelino, including Dubosekovo? The area is completely closed to observation. There is no connection. There is zero information. From that moment (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time) the most senior commander who saw the battle was only the commander of the XNUMXth company, Captain Gundilovich, who came out to his own after dark.

This is the case when there was a feat, but at first no one saw it. And later, when questioning the surviving witnesses, they learned about the battle, learned about the feat. And that is what they reported to the correspondents. And here there is no doubt that there were two attacks with a time gap (exactly 2,5-3 hours, and taking into account the beginning of the first and the end of the second battle, about 4 hours). Both documents and testimonies (from both sides) confirm the time and place of the event of interest to us and the role of the platoon in this, which went down in history.

Platoon


And what kind of platoon was it? The first thing that catches the eye is that the unit is entirely made up of "old-timers", all fighters from the first draft. How did this happen? The regiment had been in serious battles for a month, suffering significant losses. In early November, it received reinforcements (according to some sources, after 10.11.1941), which, to be honest, could not significantly strengthen the regiment. Our men could not effectively retain experience (and the Germans did not give them time to train and get along). Until the formation was completely knocked out, reinforcements were not given. And the division, the regiment could not have the same combat qualities that they had in October, and this is natural. In October, the division held a front of 42 km and retreated 15 km in battle. True, it should be noted that it was supported by 8 artillery regiments (regular, attached) and several artillery battalions. In November the front was already 16 km and there were already four rifle regiments (690th rifle regiment was attached), but the situation with artillery was worse. And after the first battles the division suffered huge losses.

Now, let's say, after a month of fighting, there were 4-70 fighters left in the 60th company (or even less). And then, without taking into account the 2nd platoon, 2/3 of the company are newcomers, which determines the low combat effectiveness of this part of the company. And what, suddenly an entire platoon consisted of old men? Why? The order of the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 6, 1941 demanded: "... in order to intensify the fight against enemy tanks, immediately create companies and teams in regiments and battalions to destroy enemy tanks. Allocate the most courageous, brave and proactive people to these teams. Arm the teams with anti-tank grenades, bottles with flammable liquid, packages with explosives and, if there are firing points, flamethrowers from light tanks." Back in July. The military council of the Western Front then ordered the formation of “one anti-tank fighter detachment in each rifle regiment, consisting of one mid-level commander and 15 fighters, including a detachment of sappers... 150 anti-tank grenades, 75 bottles of KS, PPSh-3, anti-tank mines, semi-automatic rifles.”

Well, and the corresponding orders at the chain of command. The division also began forming PT units (tank destroyer teams) in certain structures. When and where? The answer is in Beck's book "Volokolamsk Highway":

“Then he (Panfilov) asked: “Have you allocated a team of tank destroyers?” This was not the first time… he asked this question.
- Yes. Platoon.
— A platoon? The whole thing? So you didn’t select people?
— People in the platoon have gotten along. They trust each other.
“You may be right.”

From here we can see the time of formation of the PT-team - after leaving Volokolamsk, i.e. the beginning of November. And the team was part of the battalion structure. Panfilov was surprised that people were not selected - this means that in other battalions it could have been different. It was different in another battalion (the second) of the same 1073 Rifle Regiment, and there the selected fighters were commanded by platoon commander Dikarev, and the time of creation was the end of October. And in the battalion of interest to us - 2/1075 Rifle Regiment, Mr. Reshetnikov (battalion commander) selected the team. Klochkovites testify.

I.R. Vasiliev:

“We were all trained in a fighter platoon. They didn’t give themselves such horror that they would immediately go into panic ... "

G.M.Shemyakin:

"I went from the 5th company to the 4th. They said: "Who will go as volunteers to destroy tanks?" We went. From our area there was Grigory Konkin. We were with him the whole time... We went voluntarily. We took grenades, bottles, anti-tank rifles..."

Here Shemyakin is a little confused: first as a volunteer in the fighters, and then he ended up in the 4th company. There is such a short period of time that it was difficult to keep the chronology. And together (in this team) they were no more than two or three weeks. I do not use the Klochkovites' battle certificate, understanding that they are obliged by the article. But some moments (not related to the article) are very interesting.
Shemyakin:

Just before this battle, on the 15th, we received bottles of fuel. Our fighter platoon was called to receive gifts… We were then stationed in the large village of Petelino… We then received a large number of both bottles of fuel and grenades.

So, the tank destroyer team (hereinafter referred to as the AT platoon of the battalion) consisted of selected experienced fighters from the entire battalion. And this AT platoon had to perform tasks in the interests of the entire battalion (and it could perform tasks in the interests of the regiment, in isolation from the battalion). Moreover, the 2nd platoon is not the 2nd rifle platoon of the 4th company, but, most likely, a separate platoon of the 2nd battalion (and from there the 2nd AT platoon). But this is a non-staff unit, and therefore it was assigned to the 4th company, and, apparently, it was created on the basis of one of the company's platoons.

The PT platoon consisted of no more than 25 people. It was later that the company commander, Captain Gundilovich, had to include in the platoon the most distinguished soldiers who had died and who had not participated in the battle of 16.11.41, in order to bring the total to 28 (at the urgent request of Krivitsky). The PT platoon commander was Junior Lieutenant Dzhura Shirmatov (Sherpatov). The platoon was initially led by Senior Sergeant Mitin (in the article he will be listed as a participant in the battle), who was killed (or wounded) at the beginning of the battle during the enemy's fire preparation, which, in fact, did not cause the platoon any major losses (they dug in well, and used railroad ties for the dugout). Then Sergeant Dobrobabin. And when the tanks arrived, Klochkov took command of the platoon.

The training, by the way, took place as shown in the film, as it is taken from A. Bek (Momysh-Ula's testimony). So this PT platoon consisted not only of experienced and tested, but also trained desperate fighters (and this is certain). The rest of the company's units were heavily diluted with newcomers and in terms of combat stamina were inferior to the PT platoon (and this is also certain).

As was stated earlier, this PT platoon covered one of the possible (main) passages of enemy tanks. Yes, the Germans attacked from a different direction, but that was even better (for the platoon). Moreover, Panfilov turned the flank so that the front passed in front of the junction. Vasiliev I.R. 1942:

They ordered us to dig in near the Dubosekovo siding. We dug in. Panfilov and Kaprov, the regiment commander, arrived. "Who gave you permission to dig in here?" We said: the command. "You don't need to dig in here. Dig in on this hillock, near the road...". We dug in again. We took horses and a sleigh and started hauling sleepers... Shemyakin G. M., 1947... We started digging trenches... General Panfilov arrived and said:
- You don't belong here, you can stay here...

Tanks, overcoming the passage to reach the deployment line in the battle line behind the railway embankment, must make a flank movement. And this, from the side of the platoon positions, resembles a column. It is convenient to hit the sides of tanks from a distance of 100-150 m (or even less). And the testimony of Panfilov's men about the column of tanks. Well, and more information about the platoon's AT weapons.

Vasiliev I.R.:

…We accepted the battle with these tanks. They were firing from the right flank with an anti-tank rifle, but we didn’t have an anti-tank rifle. We had to jump out of the trench…. Shemyakin G.M.… We had two machine guns, two anti-tank rifles, bottles with liquid, grenades and rifles….. I shot down two tanks with an anti-tank rifle…

The Germans committed all four platoons of the tank company (the first echelon of the battalion) to the battle. This means that 3 platoons went to the Dubosekovo siding in the first line - 12-14 tanks (it is unlikely that the platoons were at full strength), but with the tanks of the company and battalion command, mobile artillery points - up to 17-19. And one platoon on the left flank, 1 km to the right of Nelidovo. They thought they would get through. It worked on the left flank (our positions did not reach Petelino). And those who went through the Dubosekovo siding did not get through.

Political report from the head of the political department of the 316th rifle division, battalion commissar Galushko, to the head of the political department of the 16th army, regimental commissar Maslenov. Village of Guseneyo, 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

……
According to unspecified data, at least 1075 enemy tanks were destroyed in the area of ​​the 9th Rifle Regiment……

That is, it is indicated that 7-8 tanks were most likely knocked out in the first battle. At the Dubosekovo junction there were 6-7 tanks, plus 1 tank at Petelino (Vikhrev). Moreover, the number of knocked out tanks was determined not even by our BD, but by the subsequent reaction of the enemy, regrouping through Morozovo, Shiryaevo (castling to the long side). This was later noticed by both the commanders and political workers. Who, having collected information about the battles, gave it to the correspondents. Well, and later, albeit with exaggeration (and at the same time confusing everything) in their articles about the feat, the correspondents reported.

Abbreviations. JBD - combat operations journal, BD - combat report, AK - army corps, MK - motorized corps, SD - rifle division, TD - tank division, PD - infantry division, KD - cavalry division, TBR - tank brigade, SP - rifle regiment, PP - infantry regiment, PT - anti-tank.

Sources:
Reference-report of the Chief Military Prosecutor N. Afanasyev "On 28 Panfilov's Men" - GA RF. F. R-8131
Documents of the formations of the Red Army
The memory of the people
Aerial photography
Wehrmacht documents 2 TD, 35 PD, 11 TD
A. Beck "Volokolamsk Highway".
Memories of Melnikov - political instructor Yegordiev (Georgiev).
165 comments
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  1. +9
    27 January 2025 06: 34
    Yes, it's all clear... Some fought, others drew up funeral documents; some laid down their lives for our Soviet Motherland, while others are investigating whether they laid them down at the right angle...
    This is probably why Tvardovsky is not held in high esteem today, while Solzhenitsyn is a “great” Russian writer...
    1. +3
      27 January 2025 08: 33
      Quote: yuriy55
      This is probably why Tvardovsky is not held in high esteem today.
      Why would that be? How did you determine that? Did Medinsky criticize him? Was he excluded from the school curriculum?
      1. +3
        27 January 2025 08: 51
        Quote: Puncher
        Why would that be? How did you determine that?

        Films are being made based on Solzhenitsyn's works, but I haven't heard anything about Vasily Terkin, at least...
        1. +6
          27 January 2025 10: 31
          Quote: yuriy55
          Films are being made based on Solzhenitsyn's works, but I haven't heard anything about Vasily Terkin, at least...

          Moscow, Satire Theatre, 29.01.2025/19/00 at 500:2, performance "Vasily Terkin", tickets from 500 - XNUMX ₽
          Karen Gevorkyan is filming a movie for the 80th anniversary of the Victory. Vasily Terkin, that's about cinema.
          The fact that you haven't heard it doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Maybe you just don't want to hear it?
          1. +3
            27 January 2025 10: 42
            Quote: Puncher
            Moscow, Satire Theatre, 29.01.2025/19/00 at 500:2, performance "Vasily Terkin", tickets from 500 - XNUMX ₽

            Oh, how could I? Just 4 km and I'm in the theater...
            Some films based on the works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn:
            "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" (1970). A film adaptation of the story about an ordinary Gulag prisoner.
            "Incident at Krechetovka Station" (1964). Soviet short film.
            "Candle in the Wind" (1973). French television film based on a script by Solzhenitsyn.
            "The First Circle" (1973). A one-and-a-half-hour film based on the novel, shot by Polish director Aleksander Ford.
            The First Circle (1992) is a dramatic thriller directed by Canadian filmmaker Sheldon Larry.
            "The First Circle" (2006). A TV series directed by Gleb Panfilov, the script for which was written by Solzhenitsyn himself.
            Quote: Puncher
            The fact that you haven't heard it doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Maybe you just don't want to hear?

            Perhaps I don’t want the history of my country to be represented by Solzhenitsyn’s books, democracy by GMS and EBN, and economic successes by Manturov...
            I can't listen to lies and empty, worthless arguments...
            1. +3
              27 January 2025 10: 45
              Listen, there are plays based on Tvardovsky every year, not only in Moscow. The fact that you don't go to them doesn't mean that people don't go.
              1. +1
                27 January 2025 10: 50
                Quote: Puncher
                Just because you don't go to them doesn't mean people don't go.

                What is your purpose in "picking at" me? I am 70 years old and I go where I really need to... And I read Tvardovsky at evenings 55 years ago...
                Are you a supporter of Solzhenitsyn? I am not...
                Bye! hi
                1. +8
                  27 January 2025 12: 00
                  You were rightly pointed out that Tvardovsky's work is held in high esteem today, but you played the "offended child" instead of admitting the obvious, that you were wrong.
                  And if we talk about Tvardovsky and Solzhenitsyn in one sentence, it was Tvardovsky who put a lot of effort into publishing Solzhenitsyn’s story.
                  1. -2
                    27 January 2025 12: 08
                    Quote: Oldrover
                    You were rightly told that Tvardovsky's work is held in high esteem today.

                    Stop telling me about honor and respect...I'm closer
                    The author of the novel "The Living and the Dead" is Konstantin Mikhailovich Simonov, what is this Propaganda lie of Solzhenitsyn
                    https://topwar.ru/146141-propagandistskaja-lozh-solzhenicyna.html?ysclid=m6etrw0bpi686487028
                    And I don’t think there’s any need to continue this topic.
                    hi
                    1. +8
                      27 January 2025 12: 12
                      You continue to be stubborn, no one here said anything good about Solzhenitsyn, you were the one who remembered him, but at the same time you were told that plays based on Tvardovsky's work are regularly staged.
            2. +1
              28 January 2025 10: 18
              Quote: yuriy55
              Perhaps I don’t want the history of my country to be represented by Solzhenitsyn’s books,

              You just kicked the USSR fool fool whether?
              In which films based on Solzhenitsyn were shot
              Quote: yuriy55
              (1970)

              Quote: yuriy55
              (1964)

              Quote: yuriy55
              (1973)

              3 (three)film in the USSR and 1 under the Russian Federation!!!! - you should have at least not cited the year back then!!!
              It is impossible to influence Canadians, Poles and French
    2. +15
      27 January 2025 11: 13
      You will be surprised, but Tvardovsky is Solzhenitsyn's "literary father". It was he, as editor-in-chief of the Novy Mir magazine, who published both One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich and Matryona's House. He supported and defended Isayevich everywhere and at all levels. Moreover, he bequeathed all his property to him. That's how things turn out.
    3. +1
      28 January 2025 23: 49
      Quote: yuriy55
      Yes, everything is clear... Some fought, others drew up funeral documents;

      One of my uncles was listed as missing in action until 1980. Until they saw his full name on the obelisk. As my father used to say, the hardest kind of war is retreat.
      The article is long and is more appropriate in historical circles.
      Thank you, at least"albeit with exaggeration (and at the same time confusing everything) in his articles about the feat, correspondents reported."
      P.S. Two Panfilov uncles lie in a mass grave. Kryukovo.
      PSI Anniversary of the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade. In Kolpino lies another dead uncle in a mass grave.
  2. +8
    27 January 2025 06: 48
    The article is certainly necessary and useful. But it is very long and full of abbreviations. Therefore, it is difficult to read and poorly perceived. It has 62798 characters, while the norm for online material is 8-9 thousand, and a maximum of 14. There were articles of 29 thousand here and even then readers complained that the volume was too large. 29! And here there are 62. In the magazine "Questions of History" or "Rodina" it would look great, provided that the source base was correctly formatted. But online journalism has its own laws...
    1. Fat
      +11
      27 January 2025 10: 06
      Nevertheless, Vyacheslav Olegovich, the article is very good and, despite its considerable volume, it is quite readable...
      1. +2
        27 January 2025 10: 19
        Quote: Thick
        Nevertheless, Vyacheslav Olegovich, the article is very good and, despite its considerable volume, it is quite readable...

        Andrey Borisovich! I don't argue with that. But what percentage of those "read it quite well"? I'm not sure that there are even 50% of them, and most likely, judging by experience, there are only 20% of them at most. And it would be preferable the other way around, wouldn't it?
      2. -5
        28 January 2025 16: 12
        Nevertheless, Vyacheslav Olegovich, the article is very good.
        an article built on fantasies and outright lies, and aimed at proving the historicity of a fairy tale at all costs, cannot be good a priori
        1. Fat
          0
          28 January 2025 16: 18
          "A priori" means "foreknowledge" in Kant. This means that you most likely did not read the article. request
          1. -4
            28 January 2025 18: 30
            I do not intend to get involved in a discussion about the correct interpretation of the word "A priori"

            And I really didn't read the article to the end - half of it was enough for me to appreciate the level of the author and his method of putting forward hypotheses, which he immediately clothes in the status of an indisputable truth.
    2. +11
      27 January 2025 10: 25
      Quote: kalibr
      But it is very large and full of abbreviations. Therefore it is read with great difficulty and poorly perceived.

      Yes, it is difficult to perceive. In the article- platoon fight- it was necessary to rework the documents of the 16th Army, 316th Infantry Division, as well as units and subdivisions, 58th TD, Dovator Cavalry Group, 1st TBR (further in Part 2 - several articles about the battle, documents of the prosecutor's office). And also Wehrmacht documents - 5th Army Corps and 46th Motorized Rifle Divisions, 2nd TD, 35th Infantry Division, 5th TD, 11th TD. Yes, the article is more for specialists. And ordinary readers should pay attention to the substantiated evidence of the FIRST battle (the second battle is not denied, even by the most stubborn opponents - well, the platoon didn't die from a cold).
      In my previous article (without having documents - the 2nd regiment's ZhBD (ZhBD BG 1), I was forced to prove that the BG 1 tanks went on a patrol because tactical expediency, and instructions in the report 2 TD "8.00 .. The railway was crossed at Nelidovo and east of.." , then new documents already instruct PG Hoppe to attack in exactly this way. That's it, the first battle took place. And then, the battle was clearly unsuccessful for the Germans.
      1. +3
        29 January 2025 00: 06
        Excellent article! Thank you, very high-quality analysis of the tactical situation, the course of action of the enemy and our troops. I read it like I was singing, he-he )))
        Big? Of course! But the small ones are the ones that science fiction fans want to read, apparently they have a problem with perceiving anything bigger than TikTok )))
        I reconstructed the circumstances of the battle on Lake Seliger on November 5-7, 1941, where my grandfather died, January 1944, where my wife's grandfather died - without a scrupulous study of the BD, ZhBD and other reports of that regiment and battalion, and even related ones, it is impossible to understand anything in essence. It took almost half a year to reconstruct "my" battles, I can imagine the volume of your work...
        1. +1
          29 January 2025 00: 32
          Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky
          Big? Of course! But the small ones are the ones that science fiction fans want to read, apparently they have a problem with perceiving anything bigger than TikTok )))

          "You're trying to offend me!" wink
          The author has done a lot of work. This article is not journalism, but a historical work. I think that someone else has done similar work. The discussion is for professionals. Just reading is not right.
          You yourself confirmed this: “It took almost half a year to reconstruct ‘our’ battles.”
          1. +1
            29 January 2025 14: 52
            "This article is not journalism, but a historical work."
            That's right, and the more we get acquainted with works of this level, the faster we will fill the vacuum that has formed after the ninth wave of humiliating articles by newly-minted "historians" and "exposers" starting from the time of the old bastard Yakovlev...
            The Katyn tragedy, with the dirty light hand of these "historians", also awaits a real conversation on the merits, and not to please the "partners"...
            We have many mistakes, miscalculations and tragedies in our history. Keeping them silent will cost us more in the historical perspective. And official recognitions should be disavowed in the same way, officially, when they are made to meet the needs of the current moment...
            And a strong leader, confident in his rightness and historical memory, can and should be able to admit his mistakes, and not hide behind a cowardly “we”...
            Liberal scum will always find lackeys for themselves, like Makarevich and the like, if you don’t stop them, expect trouble.
            The author professionally, with a very good source base, internal consistent logic of the research restored the good name of the Soviet soldier at the Dubosekovo junction, it is necessary to wash off (even though shit does not stick to a feat) the story from the slops of the alleged execution of Poles in the Katyn forest by NKVD troops, and it is the head of state who must admit with his statement that he took a sin on his soul, admitting guilt that did not exist.
            And so on, with Matrosov, and with Kosmodemyanskaya, and other episodes of that war.
            Or are they afraid?
            After all, soon we will have to admit the mistakes of this war... The strong will admit them, the weak will keep silent, erase them, torture them...
            Once again, my respects to the author hi drinks
            1. 0
              29 January 2025 20: 12
              Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky
              After all, soon we will have to admit the mistakes of this war...

              You are an optimist. Who will let you stir up the "skeletons in the closet" of those in power?
              1. 0
                29 January 2025 22: 18
                You guessed it, I really am an optimist)
                There is simply nowhere lower to fall, and the questions have not gone away, and there are no answers even on the horizon, but the number of people with questions is growing... And sooner or later, you will have to answer.
                About “they thought they were already at the bottom, but there was a knock from below” - of course, but this only multiplies the number of questions.
                Now is not the time, but it is not forever.
                After the Victory... Churchill was kicked out precisely after, I don’t see a figure of such magnitude today...
                Let me remind you that the film "28 Panfilov's Men" was made with public money. Not so long ago. And it seems that the main opponent of the author of the article is haunted by this...
                1. 0
                  29 January 2025 23: 08
                  Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky
                  Now is not the time, but it is not forever.

                  I envy your optimism.
    3. -6
      28 January 2025 16: 07
      The article is certainly necessary and useful.
      The article is not science fiction, and personally I see no benefit in stubbornly defending the historicity of myths invented by Soviet propaganda
      1. +1
        28 January 2025 18: 21
        Quote: Lewww
        composed by Soviet propaganda

        So a person tries to find where the myth is and where the truth is.
        1. -5
          28 January 2025 18: 23
          This man is not trying to find anything, for 5 years now he has been trying to prove the historicity of the newspaper fight at the time by fantasizing and outright distortion of information from documents. Dubosekovo
          Instead of searching for the truth, man stubbornly defends a fable
          1. 0
            28 January 2025 18: 29
            Quote: Lewww
            This man is not trying to find anything, for 5 years now he has been trying to prove the historicity of the newspaper fight at the time by fantasizing and outright distortion of information from documents. Dubosekovo
            Instead of searching for the truth, man stubbornly defends a fable

            Lev! I read both the article and your comment. As a journalist, I don't like such articles. As a historian, I can welcome working with documents. But I'm not familiar with them and I can't say anything. You specifically, with examples, and referring to documents, both ours and German, point to his fantasies. If everything is as you have it and all this is confirmed, then I'm for you, but for now I can't be an arbiter, since I myself am not in the know. As a journalist wrote about this event at the time with references to the Pravda newspaper. And nothing more. I didn't look at the documents and especially the maps.
            1. 0
              28 January 2025 18: 34
              As a historian, I welcome working with documents.
              Although I am not a historian, I can also welcome working with documents.
              But I cannot welcome the distortion of information presented in documents, and even more so unfounded statements presented as the undoubted truth.

              And it’s poorly written not because the article is too long, but because it’s chaotic - there’s no logic to the narrative and there are many unnecessary episodes that go beyond the topic.
              Even complex historical articles can be written in a way that is easy to read and understand, but this is clearly not the case with Gunner.
              1. 0
                28 January 2025 21: 09
                Quote: Lewww
                Even complex historical articles can be written in a way that is easy to read and understand, but this is clearly not the case with Gunner.

                That's it!
  3. +4
    27 January 2025 08: 11
    Good article. Informative. But for a scientific publication. It was necessary to adapt it for VO, it is unclear why the editors of VO did not point this out to the author.
  4. +1
    27 January 2025 08: 21
    So what, suddenly a whole platoon consisted of old people? Why?

    Because the journalist chose the names from the lists of those who had left; there were no real lists at that time, there was no time for that. That is why it was written that everyone had died. Krivitsky published the family list in January 42, much later than the main article.
    1. +7
      27 January 2025 10: 36
      Because the PT platoon (tank destroyer team) was selected from fighters of different units (it was listed on the rations in the 4th company). And the SECOND, it is rather not the rifle platoon number, but the battalion number. And it acted in the interests of the battalion and even the 1075th Rifle Regiment. At one time, two PT platoons were stationed at mark 251,0. Later, the 2nd platoon was transferred to the Dubosekovo division.
      And the figure of -28 is definitely wrong. The PT platoon did not exceed -25 people (it could have been less). And that is why it was necessary to pick up the most distinguished dead fighters.
      1. +5
        27 January 2025 10: 43
        And therefore it was necessary to recruit especially distinguished fallen soldiers.

        There is a version that Captain Gundilovich named the names from memory a month later.
        1. +6
          27 January 2025 11: 10
          From some register. And this confirms the truth. The list of the platoon can only be in the "Bi P training log" there are no more official documents. And knowing that the reports were written on anything. I can safely assume that there was no such document. Well, the personnel record book is only in the company, and it is very difficult to get information from there about the platoon at a certain point in time (constant losses and changes in composition, and the platoon is non-staff). So, what to take from the register (money, soap distribution, instructions, etc.) tied to a certain time period. Who knows this kitchen - will understand.
  5. +2
    27 January 2025 08: 35
    Krivitsky is the revived volunteer Marek, what's the point in discussing him?
    1. +2
      27 January 2025 08: 56
      what's the point of discussing it?

      Well, the author of the article builds his own versions... But for some reason he ignores the testimony of the regiment commander Kaprov from 1948.
      1. +6
        27 January 2025 10: 42
        Quote: Konnick
        ..But for some reason he ignores the 1948 testimony of the regiment commander Kaprov.

        The second part will be about this. Moreover, Kaprov drove the prosecutor's office into a stupid position, and therefore they stopped questioning combat officer witnesses.
  6. +3
    27 January 2025 09: 26
    How many times has this all been discussed? It is clear that the 1075th regiment fought heroically, there are no questions about that. But everything else looks more like an attempt to stretch an owl onto a globe.
  7. +4
    27 January 2025 10: 39
    Quote: Puncher
    Krivitsky is the revived volunteer Marek, what's the point in discussing him?

    You, read carefully the second article by Krivitsky, will be surprised - there are about ten destroyed tanks. You just have to be very attentive. And this corresponds to Ivanov's article (written five days earlier).
    1. +1
      27 January 2025 11: 17
      If you read Krivitsky’s second article carefully, you’ll be surprised – there are about ten destroyed tanks there.


      Yes, there is one of the 28 I. Vasiliev in his stories

      We accepted the fight with these tanks. They were firing from the right flank with an anti-tank rifle, but we didn’t have any… They started jumping out of the trenches and throwing bundles of grenades under the tanks… They threw bottles of fuel at the crews. I don’t know what was exploding there, only huge explosions in the tanks… I had to blow up two heavy tanks. We repelled this attack, destroyed 15 tanks. Five tanks retreated in the opposite direction to the village of Zhdanovo… There were no losses on my left flank in the first battle.

      It's hard to comment on this. There was mass heroism, but someone wanted to be the most... "had to blow it up"....
      1. +4
        27 January 2025 11: 47
        Quote: Konnick
        It's hard to comment on this. There was mass heroism, but someone wanted to be the most... "had to blow it up".

        I cite the memories of the surviving Panfilov men as supporting arguments that determine the formation, position of the platoon, availability of resources, etc. And I do not include them as an argument in the description of the battle. There are other arguments there. I understand that there is a subjective perception and distortion of this or that event.
  8. +6
    27 January 2025 10: 44
    Quote: klackon
    But everything else is more like trying to fit an owl onto a globe.

    This platoon is the only one that did not let the tanks through on 16.11.41 (in the first attack). If you have arguments to refute them, present them. If not, then it is better to remain silent.
  9. +5
    27 January 2025 11: 41
    Bb.74 (74th Reserve Battalion)


    Beobachtungsabteilung - [artillery] observation detachment, i.e. artillery instrumental reconnaissance division (I'm being picky here)

    An exemplary article. Anyone who writes or plans to write articles on military history should learn from the author. The author knows the subject and understands what he is writing about. The problem with the tactical media sect is that the vast majority of these people, who often talk about "command errors" and "source studies", are not military men or historians, and as a result, they are simply unable to understand what kind of documents they have in front of them and what information they contain. (What is popularly called the 2nd TD's RD is the RD of the operational department of the 2nd TD headquarters, it reflects its activities, it is not an hourly chronicle of the combat operations of the division's units and subdivisions. In fact, the author of the article mentions this) The main advantage of the article for me is that the author reconstructs events based on documents, which is what a "professional historian" should do in an ideal world. Not rewriting the parties' documents in chronological order (that's just a problem), but exactly as in this article - analyzing information from the parties' documents, identifying connections and correlations between seemingly contradictory information, placing it in a general context and creating on its basis the most detailed and reliable version of events
    1. +5
      27 January 2025 13: 20
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      Beobachtungsabteilung - [artillery] observation detachment, i.e. artillery instrumental reconnaissance division (I'm being picky here)

      Thanks for the clarification. I don't know German, I use someone else's translation. Only sometimes (with the help of automatic translation). I clarified the details.
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      The author knows the subject and understands what he is writing about.

      Thank you! The author, in the past, served in the 8th Guards Motorized Rifle Division. And for some time (2 months) in the 23rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (former 1075th Rifle Regiment). Moreover, in the 2nd battalion (as commander of the 2nd mortar battery). This was (45 years ago) during the deployment of the unit, and I had to replace an absent officer, and that's how I ended up on "samovars" (in my regiment, I was a battalion commander in the ADN,
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      which is what a "professional historian" should do in an ideal world.

      A professional historian, unfortunately, does not have a military education (as a rule). And there is a reflection of the recorded information from the documents, and a check of the chronology. Well, as you said. And without understanding how this document is written, what it reflects, and what it hides, it is difficult to get to the meaning. Well, the corresponding conclusions appear.
      This, you understand, and the majority act on the principle - believe what is written, and if it is not written, it did not happen.
      1. +2
        27 January 2025 18: 29
        This, you understand, and the majority act on the principle - believe what is written, and if it is not written, it did not happen.
        Absolutely right. There is even an argument like this: "It's written over there." What I like about the article is its critical analysis of all the documents - both ours and German. For example, there is a recognized naval authority - Miroslav Morozov. He has written many books. In one of them, he "proved" that Lunin could not have torpedoed Tirpitz. One of the arguments is that the entire logbook of the K-21 is filled in the same handwriting. That is, it was rewritten. Okay, but did Morozov see Tirpitz's logbook, or is it customary to take gentlemen's word for it? It should have been added that the author had not seen the German logbook. But he, this "expert", did not make such an addition.
        1. +1
          27 January 2025 19: 24
          Quote: Aviator_
          There is even an argument like this: “But that’s what it says over there.”

          I specifically, at length and in detail, clarified the situation at Matrenino station, as an example of the reflection of reality in our and German documents.
          Well, first of all, both ours and the Germans exaggerate their forces. Our battalion attacked Filimonov's company (although it was the 1st reinforced company of the 2nd rifle regiment of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht).
          The Germans attacked a company (three times) Red Army battalion (with a hint at divisional reserve). And this was done by Filimonov's company, reinforced by a machine gun platoon (well, this information is from A. Bek Volokolamsk highway), without tanks and artillery.
          But in terms of the situation, we have a more truthful situation. and it is reflected (in the article) by several sources - the report of the battalion commander Momysh-Uly, BD cavalry group, 1 tank brigade, and the memoirs of Momysh-Uly (Volokolamskoe highway).
          And the Germans, in order to hide the great losses, wrote it all off as an attack by an entire battalion, which attacked them three times. But this certainly couldn't have happened, even the army reserve (part) of the 1st tank company and the NKVD battalion had the task of restoring the situation and defending. Filimonov accomplished the first task, and they accomplished the second without a fight.
          That is, active actions, even in this version, are NOT PROVIDED,
          And the Germans openly lied in their documents.
          This is what you need to take into account. Don't trust your eyes. You need to not only read, you need to think and know.

          It was exactly the same at Dubosekovo, the Germans gave it their all there, and it was total silence.

          Here the principle worked, it was not the tanks of the 2nd rifle regiment of the Wehrmacht that were destroyed (they are not listed as such), but the tanks of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd tank regiment (which were attached to BG 1), let them write about it. The BG 1 tank destroyer is essentially the tank destroyer of the 2nd rifle regiment. Here the successes of PG Hoppe (reinforced by tanks) were recorded, and the failures can be ignored.
          Here you have the situation when the fight took place, and the Germans didn't notice him. (or rather, they didn’t want to notice the UNPLEASANT).
    2. -2
      28 January 2025 16: 15
      The main advantage of the article for me is that the author reconstructs the events based on documents,
      The author is engaged in distorting the contents of documents and presenting his own fantasies, claiming that this is what the documents say.

      Well, the structure of the article is complete chaos.
  10. +5
    27 January 2025 11: 52
    The author deserves respect for the work done and the highest marks for the article.
    I have a question for the author.
    Why was the tank destroyer platoon commanded by Senior Sergeant G. Mitin and where did Junior Lieutenant Dzhura Shirmatov go?
    Why after the injury (death) of G. Mitin, I. Dobrobabin takes command of the platoon, and not political instructor V. Klochkov. And only then, as you write, when the tanks went, Klochkov begins to command the platoon.
    I read somewhere that Dobrobabin was captured in this very battle.
    1. +4
      27 January 2025 13: 29
      Quote: ee2100
      The author deserves respect for the work done.

      Thank!.
      Quote: ee2100
      I have a question for the author.
      Why was the tank destroyer platoon commanded by Senior Sergeant G. Mitin and where did Junior Lieutenant Dzhura Shirmatov go?

      Dzhura Shirmatov was wounded the day before, and the command passed to the senior in rank senior sergeant Mitin (he was, I think, a ZKV, or more precisely an Assistant KV). I also had other information that after Shirmatov (or Shirpaty) was wounded, Dobrobabin became more experienced. Klochkov led the platoon by chance, after the first attack of the pioneers, when tanks began to approach.
      1. +3
        27 January 2025 13: 46
        Thank you, it’s clear with Shirmatov.
        Quote: chenia
        Klochkov led the platoon by chance.

        He is the political instructor of the 4th company. He is terrible in the antitank platoon, even by rank. And only by chance he leads it.
        Rather, they put experienced people in charge, rather than political workers.
        1. +2
          27 January 2025 19: 32
          Quote: ee2100
          Rather, they put experienced people in charge, rather than political workers

          Klochkov was both experienced and capable of acting as a commander. He was tough and demanding. He had already led a unit out of encirclement, and was distinguished by his courage and bravery. And most likely he volunteered to lead the platoon. Gundilovich did not send him (well, that's what I think).
    2. 0
      28 January 2025 16: 18
      Why, after the injury (death) of G. Mitin, did I. Dobrobabin take command of the platoon, and not political instructor V. Klochkov?
      If you want a truthful answer - it is unknown who commanded what and where exactly Klochkov died.
      Gundilovich's letter to Klochkov's widow says that they fought in the same trench, Klochkov died from a bullet and the word TANK is not mentioned in the letter - a battle with infantry is described

      The author, instead of reconstructing events, is busy composing fairy tales
  11. +1
    27 January 2025 14: 01
    I liked the film about them. It was well-made.
  12. 0
    27 January 2025 19: 49
    I would like to draw attention to the following points.
    First, the battle at 9.00:XNUMX near Dubosekovo took place. Hoppe's tanks could not bypass the platoon, and then the witnesses kept saying it. And the Germans, with their silence, only confirmed it (they THROWN AWAY the reports from that time when they filled out the ZhBD at the end of the day). I already gave the example from Matrenino station.

    Secondly, in the first battle, the tanks never reached the other units of the 4th company. That is why the platoon was subsequently allocated. Moreover, it was the ONLY UNIT that did NOT LET the enemy tanks through in the first attack.
    Well, the second attack, this is the already surrounded 4th company (on the edges of the forest) the Germans attacked using artillery and tanks Hoppe. And the 5th company (in the forest) was attacked by Kielitz.
  13. +2
    28 January 2025 15: 58
    Gunner, you are again beginning to defend the historicity of the tale through various stretches.
    Now let us consider the position (battle formation) of the 316th Rifle Division on 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    (The 1073rd Rifle Regiment did not have a 3rd battalion, and the 1075th Rifle Regiment did not have a 1st battalion,

    you are mistaken, on 16.11/1075 the 1st battalion of the XNUMXth regiment was present
    But literally on the eve of the German offensive, the division received reinforcements.
    The statement is unfounded - not supported by documents
    And so the 3rd Battalion was built in two echelons.
    the fact that the 3rd battalion of the 1075th regiment was built in two echelons is not confirmed by documents - again, unfounded statements

    The intermediate line during the retreat were positions near height 244,0 (minefields, rubble).
    244,0 is not a height, but a mark, there was one minefield, the documents are silent about the rubble - again, fantasy
    The railway track (naturally, without rails and sleepers, the latter were used for dugouts and covered cracks)
    the fact that the railway track was without a rail-sleeper grid is yours another free fantasy, of which there are certainly at least 30 in your article
    That is, on 16.11.41, two divisions took part in the attack on the 316th Rifle Division.
    again your fantasy - according to enemy documents on 16.11.41/316/XNUMX the XNUMXth SD participated in the offensive on the positions only one tank division - 2 td
    "The Hoppe subgroup attacks across the Lama River east of Nelidovo to capture the heights east of Petelinka. During the further movement they quickly advance to the Volokolamsk-Istra road and through Rozhdestvenno capture the heights west of Lyscovo and Lyscovo...".

    A very important fragment of the order, it obliges PG Hoppe (filled with tanks, about 60 units, staff - 71) to attack positions from the Dubosekovo junction and to the left, somewhere 1,2-1,5 km towards Nelidovo.
    I have already pointed out to you ten times that there is NO Lama River to the east of Nelidovo, therefore the order refers to the AREA of attack - to the right of Nelidovo, apparently Shiryaevo and Petelino, where On November 16.11, German tanks passed through., which advanced in large numbers from Shitkovo, which is noted in the documents of the 50th Cavalry Division of Dovator's cavalry group
    And also the impression is created (according to the 2nd TD ZhBD) that the entire BG 1 went through Morozovo and Shiryaevo to Petelino and Matrenino station. And the gap between BG 2 and BG 1 turns out to be somewhat unnatural.
    I'm very glad that this finally reached you. And yet, in this gap, where is located once. Dubosekovo, you by the power of your imagination You stubbornly continue to send German tanks
    So Hoppe pushed forward with most of his first echelon, up to 14–15 tanks, through the Dubosekovo siding.
    Gunner, I have pointed out to you 100 times before that the battle at Dubosekovo is not reported in ANY document of the Red Army and Wehrmacht compiled in 1941.
    And even the commander of the 2nd SR Gundilovich in his letter to Klochkov’s widow NEVER mentions the word tank, and reports that Klochkov fought next to him in a battle with German infantry, He died from a bullet hit and did not make any patriotic speeches before his death.
    Let us finally release this fabulous battle of the 28 at Dubosekovo to the land of legends and traditions of our native land.
    All our documents confirm that the Germans took Matrenino station.
    I have informed you 5 times before that according to Momysh Uly's report from 20.11.41 and the diagram attached to it, the Germans did not capture Matrenino station on 16.11, the battle took place near the western outskirts of the station settlement and according to the diagram, the enemy did not even occupy the settlement.
    But you stubbornly refuse to work with documents - you prefer to fantasize
    By 8.00:9.00 (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time) the railway was crossed near Nelidovo and to the east….

    And Hoppe attacks, of course,
    It's obvious that this is your next fantasy - this entry refers to the actions of BG-2, not BG-1.
    Kelits was supposed to have up to a platoon of tanks (4-5 T-III tanks).
    Who should?
    There is nothing written in the documents about the presence of tanks in Kielce - you are fantasizing again
    13:30 (14:30 Moscow time): Battle Group 1 is engaged in combat with the enemy, who is stubbornly defending himself on the forest edges south of the highway, along a line north of Shiryaevo - 1,5 km south of Petelinka.

    And this is the area one. Dubosekovo, and five and a half hours after the first attack.
    Gunner, I understand that you are almost 80 and your head is not working well. But this does not give you the right to refer to documents and spew out fantasies.
    I have explained to you 100 times before that 1) the entry is not clear enough and does not allow for any clear conclusions; b) the phrase "on the forest edges" cannot in any way be interpreted as "near the railroad tracks"; 3) the point "1,5 km south of Petelinka" is located deep in the forest south of the railroad siding.
    Most likely this entry reports ABOUT BATTLES IN THE FOREST MASSIF and its outskirts on the line from west of mark 231,5 (company of the SB Momysh Uly) to the outskirts of the forest massif, which is 1,5 km south of Petelino (battles with people from the 1075th Rifle Regiment who were trying to break out of encirclement). And tanks certainly did not participate in these battles.

    In addition, I have informed you 100 times that according to the reporting documents of the headquarters of the 316th Infantry Division and the 1075th Infantry Regiment, in the battle on 16.11.41/1075/XNUMX, the XNUMXth Infantry Regiment did not cause any losses to the Germans in tanks
    What confirmed by German documents

    I didn't bother to analyze the rest of your 20+ fantasies - it's pointless
    1. 0
      28 January 2025 18: 47
      Quote: Lewww
      you are mistaken, on 16.11/1075 the 1st battalion of the XNUMXth regiment was present

      In the text - “Well, and the reserve, the remnants of the companies of the 1st battalion (in the area of ​​the regiment’s command post
      Quote: Lewww
      the fact that the 3rd battalion of the 1075th regiment was built in two echelons is not confirmed by documents - again, unfounded statements

      Do you know what an echelon is? I remember you said that (an offensive) tanks move in the first echelon, and infantry in the second.
      Quote: Lewww
      the fact that the railway track was without a rail-sleeper grid is another of your free imaginations,

      I understand that you are a lawyer through and through, but only you could have suggested that the soldiers would not use the ready-made material. From the text - "They took horses and sleds and started hauling sleepers..." Shemyakin G. M., 1947. There are many military people on the site, and they will appreciate your intelligence.
      Quote: Lewww
      I have already pointed out to you ten times that there is NO Lama River to the east of Nelidovo, therefore the order refers to the AREA of attack - to the right of Nelidovo, apparently Shiryaevo and Petelino,

      Even the most remote person from topography, looking at the map can determine the area to the east of Nelidovo - the south and east of the area is the railway arc, the north is Petelino, the west is actually Nelidovo (well, and further east, of course). But a lawyer with a head doesn't see this. And stop playing with commas - to execute is impossible to pardon.
      Right-..through Lama, east of Nelidovo. The unit guarding the bridge (crossing) over the Lama is assigned to Hoppe (how many times, I poked and pointed at you). There was no sign of BG 2 there. Krasikovo, Vasilyevskoye, Yuryevo - all of them are BG 1. BG 2 is only indicated in orders #29 and #30, the area where they should be. And they could have crossed the railway at Nelidovo through Krasikovo (going around the floodplain on the left). But according to the report in the 5th AK [i]-...The railway was crossed at Nelidovo and to the EAST... [/i] And to the east- concerns only Hoppe. Any military man will say this. Well, and the order through Lama, east of Nelidovo to perceive as - a march to Shitkovo, then Morozovo, then to Shiryaevo, and then to Peteleno (and east of PETELENO to cross the railway, only a lawyer like you can. Not a single sane person (I'm not talking about the military in general) WILL PERCEIVE SUCH an execution of the order. A bunch of toponyms and not a single one IS NOT INDICATED.
      WELL and the MAIN THING- and where is there any mention in German documents of such a wild maneuver?
      1. 0
        28 January 2025 20: 01
        Quote: chenia
        you are mistaken, on 16.11/1075 the 1st battalion of the XNUMXth regiment was present

        In the text - “Well, and the reserve, the remnants of the companies of the 1st battalion (in the area of ​​the regiment’s command post
        There is no point in arguing with you, because you either do not know the content of the documents or you are distorting them.
        BP No. 20 1075 sp 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
        "1/1075th Rifle Regiment with two AT guns is concentrating in the area of ​​the command post..." - therefore the regiment had a 1st battalion - it is stupid to deny this
        the fact that the 3rd battalion of the 1075th regiment was built in two echelons is not confirmed by documents - again, unfounded statements

        Do you know what an echelon is?
        I am aware that there is no mention in any document of the 3rd SB being built in two echelons - as usual, you are fantasizing.
        There, even with just one echelon, it was difficult to build a defense, since there was a severe shortage of combat personnel.
        And here is the summary in 5 AK -...The railway was crossed at Nelidovo and to the EAST...
        Gunner, as always, you tear out a piece from the document and then begin to freely comment on it, distorting the meaning to support your fantasies.
        The JBD says:
        1) Development of the situation: at 6.30 Battle Groups 1 and 2 went on the offensive from the Sosnino-Korsikovka line. By 8.00:9.00 the railway was crossed at Nelidovo and to the east, at XNUMX:XNUMX Shiryaevo and Morozovo were taken.
        BG-2 had the primary goal of capturing Nelidovo, which it apparently did. by encircling Nelidovo from the west and east, it was her tanks that crossed the railway east of Nelidovo.
        And BG-1 (where Hoppe's tanks were) takes Morozovo and Shiryaevo at 9.00:XNUMX - that's what follows from this fragment

        It is impossible to conclude from this entry that UG Hoppe crossed the railway precisely to the east of Nelidovo in order to then go to Dubosekovo and lose 18 tanks there.
        I wrote this to you 5 times before, but alas, the situation is still the same - we can’t get through it.

        Moreover, I have suggested to you 10 times: since you are so keen to throw tanks to Dubosekovo with the power of your thoughts, send them first through Shiryaevo to Petelino (where they were going according to the documents of the 50th Cavalry Division), and after capturing Petelino, deploy the tanks on the large field located there in a battle line and send them to attack the positions of the 2nd RB from the rear, which is at least tactically justified.
        For some reason, in your fantasies you stubbornly make idiots out of the Germans, either sending tanks to Dubosekovo from Shiryaevo through the forest and a deep ravine, or throwing them from Nelidovo into a frontal attack.

        In short, your article contains nothing but fantasies and outright lies.
    2. 0
      28 January 2025 19: 29
      Quote: Lewww
      again your fantasy - according to enemy documents on 16.11.41/316/2 only one tank division participated in the offensive on the positions of the XNUMXth SD - the XNUMXnd TD

      Really? And in the text - ZhBD 35 PD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.-……… Division III./35 from 13:30 (14:30 Moscow time) supported the attack on Cheptsy (on the 1077th rifle regiment). Our infantry lay down in front of the enemy fortifications at Cheptsy.
      Oh! Who is this? Or what? I pointed out that it didn't work out with 35 PD - they failed with 1077 SP. It happens.
      Quote: Lewww
      the AREA of attack is meant - to the right of Nelidovo, apparently Shiryaevo and Petelino, where on 16.11 German tanks passed, having advanced in large numbers from Shitkovo, which is noted in the documents of the 50th Cavalry Division of Dovator's Cavalry Group

      And when was that? Oh, 11.30:XNUMX Moscow time.then the question is - who crossed the railway at 8.00 (9.00 Moscow time) VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO? You won't believe that Hoppe was ordered to. He didn't really disobey. The prankster stayed late at the divisional brothel, overslept, and his PG only stirred up at 11.30:XNUMX. Well, it happens. Lawyers do. And the version is more plausible than yours. And with such a detour (while drunk), He could cross the railway east of Nelidovo. But only if you turn from Shiryaevo to the crossing. That's how I used to send tanks (when there were no documents for BG 1) based on tactical expediency and the above-mentioned document - a summary in the 5th AK. Because otherwise it DOESN'T WORK out to the east of Nelidovo. But it works out to the east of PETELINO. Although I'm tired of refuting your nonsense.
    3. 0
      28 January 2025 19: 56
      Quote: Lewww
      Gunner, I have pointed out to you 100 times before that the battle at Dubosekovo is not reported in ANY document of the Red Army and Wehrmacht compiled in 1941.
      And even the commander of the 2nd SR Gundilovich in his letter to Klochkov’s widow NEVER mentions the word tank, and reports that Klochkov fought alongside him in a battle with the German infantry,

      There was not a word about tanks, artillery, machine guns. Knowing the positions of the platoon and the 4th company, one can assume (well, if you are a lawyer) that the Germans stupidly attacked like the Kapelevites. Well, they are stupid. So shall we write it down?
      I have already indicated the main point in that letter- Klochkov died before my eyes. And not missing in action.

      Quote: Lewww
      You, by the power of your imagination, stubbornly continue to send German tanks

      Not me, but the order. And this is the verdict of history. And your attempts to redirect Hoppe to bypass the platoon at 9.00:XNUMX Moscow time are not supported by a single document. Not ours, not German. Period. And your assumption about how Hoppe should move out (at the specified time) shows your level of research. I applaud you, continue.

      Quote: Lewww
      ) the phrase "on the forest edges" can in no way be interpreted as "near the railroad tracks"; 3) the point "1,5 km south of Petelinka" is located deep in the forest south of the railroad siding.

      Listen, stop talking nonsense - forest edges, this is an important point. And a mistake of a hundred meters (it also depends on which edge of the village you count from) is not so important. And this is the area one. Dubosekovo (the 4th company was pressed there when the Germans were in Petelino)
      .
      Quote: Lewww
      1075th Rifle Regiment did not cause any losses to the Germans in tanks
      Which is confirmed by German documents

      Who could have seen the battle at Dubosekovo? From ours. Reshetnikov retreated while the battle was still going on. No one could see it afterwards.
      The Germans have - Well, the above-mentioned document
  14. 0
    28 January 2025 17: 45
    As a result, the 2nd company attacks Kraev’s company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment). 1st reinforced company somewhere around 11:00 AM – 11:30 PM (Moscow time), advancing from Petelino to Matrenino station, came across rubble and a minefield (mark 244,0, just 1 km north of Petelino).
    Gunner, point your finger at any place in your article and you will definitely get into your fantasy.

    1. The 1st company from the Kelitsa subgroup, advancing from Petelino, did not advance at 11-11.30 Moscow time, but much later, since according to the combat mission report of the 2nd regiment of the 2nd tank division, this company was already on the Volokolamsk highway shortly after 17:XNUMX (Moscow time).
    Subtract 17 hours from 3 hours (1 hour to travel from the highway to the positions of the company of the 1/1073rd regiment, 1 hour to fight, 1 hour to move to the highway) and you get the start time of the advance of approximately 14 hours Moscow time.

    And she didn’t run into any rubble or minefield, because according to the railway document she was moving east. by rail, and the mark 244,0 is located in a forest area approximately 3 km east of the railway.
    1st company moving to the east by rail, at times joining the 7th company to the left, fought a fierce battle in the forest 2 km west of Goryuny, where the Russians attacked three times in a row with a force of about a battalion.


    2) mark 244,0, not 1 km north of Petelino, but approximately 3 km east of Petelino (see map)
    1. 0
      28 January 2025 20: 09
      Quote: Lewww
      The 1st company from the Kelitsa subgroup, advancing from Petelino, did not advance at 11-11.30 Moscow time, but much later, since according to the combat mission report of the 2nd regiment of the 2nd tank division, this company was already on the Volokolamsk highway shortly after 17:XNUMX (Moscow time).

      Yes. This is all in the background. I showed the battle at Matrenino station as an example of LIES IN GERMAN DOCUMENTS. The main thing is the battle at Dubosekovo. Where German tanks did NOT get through right away, the Germans also did not get through Kraevo, nor at Matrenino station (or rather they got through there, well they were asked to do it with a kick in the ass (so that they got three). But there were no tanks there (except for the reconnaissance platoon -5 t-II).
      1. 0
        28 January 2025 20: 43
        Quote: chenia
        I showed the battle at Matrenino station as an example of LIES IN GERMAN DOCUMENTS. The Germans didn't get through either neither Krayeva, nor near Matrenino station ( or rather they passed through there, well, they were asked to give them a kick in the ass (so that they got tripled).
        They didn't pass, but rather they did pass - the ravings of a madman.
        It seems like everything has come to a complete standstill in your head, which is not surprising for a person under 80.
    2. 0
      30 January 2025 11: 54
      Quote: Lewww
      1. The 1st company from the Kelitsa subgroup, advancing from Petelino, did not advance at 11-11.30 Moscow time, but much later, since according to the combat mission report of the 2nd regiment of the 2nd tank division, this company was already on the Volokolamsk highway shortly after 17:XNUMX (Moscow time).

      LEFF, you are talking nonsense and gibberish every time. Well, you can't do that. Read Momysh-Ula's report. It indicates the time of the battle between Filimonov's company and the 1st company of the Kelitsa PG. And there are pluses and minuses. And we don't need your stupid and dumb calculations. And we don't need to drag Hoppe's tanks (even the first echelon - a tank company) through the forest through the cuts and embankments to the right of the railway. Stop being stupid.
      1. 0
        30 January 2025 12: 25
        Read Momysh-Uly's report. It indicates the time of the battle between Filimonov's company and the 1st company of the Kelitsa PG.
        Are you suggesting we go to the 11th circle?
        OK, I'll explain to you for the 11th time that Momysh uly made a report three days after this battle. During these days, his companies fought several heavy battles, then there was a difficult breakout from encirclement, so Momysh uly could have simply forgotten and mixed up the time and also mixed up the sequence of events.
        And there is no need to drag Hoppe’s tanks (even the first echelon - a tank company) through the forest through the cuts and embankments to the right of the railway.
        And who moves them?
        In my version, the ENTIRE Hoppe group moved out from Shitkovo on 16.11/XNUMX, and then went in front of UG Kelitsa along the road through Morozovo, Shiryaevo and Petelino.

        I presented this version to you a year ago and then repeated it many times, but alas, my arguments never stay in your head.
        1. 0
          30 January 2025 12: 49
          Quote: Lewww
          therefore Momysh uly could simply forget and confuse the time and also confuse the sequence of events.

          It begins. When it is advantageous for you, you refer to him, and when it is not, he got it wrong. But according to my calculations, he could have been wrong by no more than an hour. It is necessary to remember that the Germans also filled out the ZhBD at the end of the day. Both the beginning of the battle and the occupation of Matrenino station and the end of the battle (when they were driven out) are several hours. And the Germans (in order to hide unpleasant moments) brought them together in one FIERY battle, where they were attacked THREE TIMES by an entire BATTALION. And therefore. they did not clearly indicate the time. You do not understand. this kitchen, when it is necessary to hide certain unpleasant moments.
          1. 0
            30 January 2025 12: 59
            Quote: chenia
            In my version, the ENTIRE Hoppe group moved out from Shitkovo on 16.11/XNUMX, and then went in front of UG Kelitsa along the road through Morozovo, Shiryaevo and Petelino.

            Well, that's nonsense again. PG Hoppe was ahead of PG Kelitsa? And where is this reflected? In the BG-1 ZhBD, only PG Kelitsa takes Morozovo and Shiryaevo. And in yours, Hoppe slipped ahead of Kelitsa, and in such a way that neither the Germans nor ours NOTICED. If we consider that Hoppe's first echelon was a company of tanks and one or two companies of infantry with reinforcements, then this is some kind of miracle. Hoppe was very nimble, and most importantly, no one saw anything. (There is no such thing in documents, neither ours nor German.
            LEFF, you should see a doctor, it’s too much to say.
          2. 0
            30 January 2025 15: 23
            When it is advantageous for you, you refer to him, and when it is not, he is confused. But according to my calculations, he could have been mistaken by no more than an hour.
            You are mistaken - I am not looking for profit, unlike you, I do not fantasize and do not fight to the death to defend the undoubted truth of my hypotheses.
            I use the scientific method: first I collect all available sources, then I analyze the information they contain, compare them with each other, identify and discard obviously false information, and ultimately I form a hypothesis that is close to historical reality.

            But you are not given this, because 1) you lack the ability to perceive what is stated in documents literally; 2) the content does not remain in memory, which does not allow for analysis; 3) in addition to what is stated, you have an irrepressible tendency to fantasize.

            There is a BD№22 known to you 13.00 headquarters of the 316th rifle division, and it says there that the 1/1073rd rifle regiment is fighting ONLY at mark 231,5. And this battle began at 11.30:12, and not at 20.11:XNUMX as Momysh uly indicated on XNUMX. The battle near Matrenino station is not mentioned in this database.
            From this we can conclude that the time 12.00:XNUMX indicated by Momysh uly is wrong.
            How wrong is unknown, but it doesn't really matter.
            Although I seriously doubt that the Huns fought fiercely with the riflemen for FOUR HOURS - they would have simply run out of ammunition in an hour. And they are not idiots to stubbornly break through a position that can be bypassed
            And the Germans (to hide the unpleasant moments) brought them together in one FIRST battle, where they were attacked THREE TIMES by an entire BATTALION.
            Why are you surprised? No one likes to admit failures.
            And the beginning of the battle and the occupation of Matrenino station
            You are impenetrable.
            I have already told you before 10 times reported that according to Momysh Uly's Report and the diagram attached to it, one can make an absolutely precise conclusion: the Germans did not even try to occupy the Matrenino station that day, the battle took place near the western outskirts of the VILLAGE near the station, and the Germans (judging by the diagram) did not advance beyond this outskirts.

            Let's already let this tale, composed after the war by Momysh Uly and Bek, go to the land of legends and traditions of the native land, where the tale of the battle near the village of Dubosekovo has lived for a long time. laughing
            1. 0
              31 January 2025 17: 47
              Quote: Lewww
              First I collect all available sources, then

              And then you falsify them, distorting their original meaning. I know.
              Quote: Lewww
              And this battle began at 11.30:12, and not at 20.11:XNUMX as Momysh uly indicated on XNUMX.

              And how wrong was he?
              And what does the battle at Matrenin station have to do with it? Where was the other one (the first company of Kelitsa).?
              Quote: Lewww
              The battle near Matrenino station is not mentioned in this database.

              And the fight was a little later, an hour later, and lasted longer.
              Quote: Lewww
              And they are not idiots to persistently break in

              How are they not idiots? They were at a position near Dubosekovo, in an open field without tanks, you claimed this, referring to Gundilovich's letter. Have you forgotten? Or is it something else?
              Quote: Lewww
              that according to Momysh Uly's Report and the diagram attached to it, one can make an absolutely precise conclusion: the Germans did not even try to occupy Matrenino station that day,

              Quote: Lewww
              Let's already release this fairy tale, composed after the war by Momysh Uly and Bek into the land of legends and traditions of our native land,

              Okay, let's assume that Momysh-Uly deceived the gullible reader. He is a liar. But why did he deceive his superiors?
              ! Guards Tank Brigade…For destruction of the enemy at the Matryonino station and its subsequent defense at 17:00 on 16.11.1941, a combined NKVD battalion with 1 tanks was sent from the 6st Guards Tank Brigade. By the time the battalion reached the station area, the enemy had been driven out by units of the 316th Rifle Division.
              Naturally, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade DIDN'T SEE this battle, but they received information that it was occupied (in the text it is stated) from the higher command and they were given the task of liberating it. The command was the 16th Army, of which the brigade was a reserve. And who reported on the situation to 16th Army, the headquarters of the 316th Rifle Division. And to them? CORRECTLY MOMYSH-ULY. Momysh-Uly himself could have seen that battle, it was not far away, and there was communication and messengers. And he reported that Matrenino st. occupied by the enemy. LIED, as he lied in A. Beck's book (written a year later).
              . Pathological liar. But you are not a liar, prove that Momysh-Uly is a liar. In the report Momysh-Uly indicated that he had retreated from the occupied positions (and the depth was up to 500 m., i.e. up to 1 km from the front line), and there was no desire to indicate the enemy's successes. And the pathetic diagram, which formally displayed the events and was extremely primitive, is not convincing evidence. But the fact that the information about the capture of the station by the Germans is the absolute truth. The eccentric is not in the know, they are trying to hide unpleasant news (this is normal), in an attempt to correct the situation, but on the contrary, NEVER,
              WE ARE WAITING FOR YOUR EVIDENCE,
  15. 0
    28 January 2025 20: 16
    Quote: chenia
    There was not a word about tanks, artillery, machine guns. Knowing the positions of the platoon and the 4th company, one can assume (well, if you are a lawyer) that the Germans stupidly attacked like the Kapelevites. Well, they are stupid. So shall we write it down?
    Gunner, I have no desire to debate with demagogues.
    Once again: the commander of the 2nd SR Gundilovich in his letter to Klochkov’s widow NEVER mentions the word tank, and reports that Klochkov fought alongside him in a battle with the German infantry,
    It is well known that in such letters commanders tried to heroize the actions of their subordinates at the moment of their death. So Gundilovich cannot be accused of deliberately downplaying Klochkov's heroism by writing that he was killed by a bullet in a fight with infantry, and not by trying to blow up a German tank with a grenade.

    In addition, I have already informed you 100 times that according to the reporting documents of the 316th rifle division and the 1075th rifle regiment in battle on 16.11.41/1075/XNUMX XNUMX did not cause any losses to the enemy in tanks.
    This correlates with information from the German military records, which indicate the loss of only two tanks on that day, which were blown up by mines.
    This is also confirmed by information about the losses of tank crews of the 2nd tank division in all combat clashes on 16.11.41 - 3 killed and two wounded (apparently at the moment of leaving the tanks or as a result of an explosion)

    So if there was a battle at the railway station Dubosekovo, then it was a battle with infantry, although I repeat: there is no information about this in the documents of the Red Army and Wehrmacht of 41.

    I'll finish here, because... I don't see any point in arguing with believers about their creed
  16. 0
    28 January 2025 20: 35
    Quote: chenia
    again your fantasy - according to enemy documents on 16.11.41/316/2 only one tank division participated in the offensive on the positions of the XNUMXth SD - the XNUMXnd TD

    Really? And in the text - ZhBD 35 PD 16.11.41.-……… Division III./35 from 13:30 (14:30 Moscow time) supported the offensive on Cheptsy (to the 1077th rifle regiment). Our infantry lay down in front of the enemy fortifications at Cheptsy.
    Oh! Who is this? Or what? What 35 PD didn't get
    That's why I have long since lost the desire to engage in polemics with you - you don't understand the meaning of my arguments.

    The second time: I wrote that on 16.11.41/316/XNUMX the XNUMXth Infantry Division was attacked (on the left flank) by only one TANKOVA divisions (not two tank divisions, as you stated in your previous publication).
    It is completely unclear why you brought Chentsy into this - this has nothing to do with the battle of the 1075th Infantry Regiment
    And when was it? Oh, 11.30 Moscow time. Then the question is - who crossed the railway at 8.00 (9.00 Moscow time) VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO?
    Well, you see - the same thing again, you either don't read my answers and arguments, or you forget them 15 minutes after reading them, and you ask the same questions 10 times, and my answers don't change anything - you ask them again and again
    1. 0
      28 January 2025 22: 28
      Quote: Lewww
      Second time: I wrote that on 16.11.41/316/XNUMX the XNUMXth Infantry Division was attacked (on the left flank) by only one TANK division (not two tank divisions, as you stated in your previous publication).

      This is your whole essence.
      In the text-
      "The enemy (5th Army Corps) with forces of two divisions (2nd TD - 7.30:35 Moscow time), (14.30th ID - from 16.11.41:4 Moscow time) in converging directions on XNUMX (two days before the general offensive of the XNUMXth TG) began a private offensive."
      You wrote: "your fantasy again - according to enemy documents on 16.11.41, only one tank division - the 316nd tank division - participated in the offensive on the positions of the 2th rifle division"
      Why such stupidity? Moreover, this article is four years old. YOU WERE PUT IN A POSITION, and you want to get out of it with third-rate stupid arguments.

      Quote: Lewww
      Well, you see - the same thing again, you either don't read my answers and arguments, or you forget them 15 minutes after reading them, and you ask the same questions 10 times, and my answers don't change anything - you ask them again and again

      This is the main question, and you are jumping around like a flea on a comb. They ask you: why didn’t Hoppe carry out the order? This is according to your version. I do not have German documents confirming their losses. But we have documents indicating losses in the area of ​​the 1075th Rifle Regiment. This is Galushko and the military correspondent. - 9 tanks. Of which 3 were destroyed. It is not specified where exactly. But the Germans DIDN'T PASS THE PLATOON. Everyone admits this - even in the interpretation - THEY SIMPLY BYPASSED. But Hoppe had orders to attack the main positions of the 1075th regiment - there is a document. And there is confirmation that he did it.
      And you can't refute it. And then the word is - just bypassed, disappears and appears WERE FORCED TO GO AROUND.
      That's it.
      And the losses should be looked for in the documents (not even in the ZhBD - they can lie there too) of the chief of services of the 3rd tank regiment of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht. And why write to the 2nd regiment about the failures of comrades (it is possible to write about successes).
      1. 0
        28 January 2025 22: 58
        Quote: chenia
        But we have documents that indicate that losses in the area of ​​1075 SP This is Galushko and the military correspondent. -9 tanks. Of which 3 were destroyed..
        You are lying, in Galushko's document (which, by the way, was not signed by him) it is written:
        "By unspecified data in the area of ​​the 1075th regiment, at least 9 enemy tanks were destroyed"

        The key phrase is "unspecified data". Then they clarified it, and it turned out that Not one (see BD No. 25 316 SD 19.11.41/1075/27 in conjunction with BD XNUMX Rifle Regiment No. XNUMX).
        And I wrote this to you 10 times before.

        Your entire evidence base is based either on lies, or on distortion of information from documents, or on a free interpretation of various ambiguities, contained in the documents.
        But the Germans DID NOT PASS THE PLATOON.
        Well, here we go - another lie.
        There is NO such information in the Political Report of 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
        But Hoppe had orders to attack the main positions of the 1075th regiment - there is a document.
        Gunner, stop lying - there is no such document. The Germans do not mention the numbering of enemy regiments at all and do not say which of their positions (main or secondary) should be attacked.
        Stop lying - there are reasonable limits to everything.

        And if you consider the positions at the railway line to be "the main positions", Dubosekovo, justify this with at least something other than TRUST ME - I KNOW.
        And the losses must be looked for in the documents (not even the ZhBD - they can lie there too) of the chief of services of the 3rd tank regiment of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht.
        those who are seriously involved in this topic have already found them, and even ordered cards of the killed Hans from the US archive and posted them, but as always you are not aware of it, and you are not interested in it, the main thing for you is - believe
      2. +1
        29 January 2025 15: 07
        It is in vain that you spend so much energy (and time, what is more important!!!) on convincing an opponent who does not hear you.
        The result is obvious - a mixture of arrogant rudeness and far-fetched arguments. You tell him about Foma, he tells you about Yerema... and again in a circle.
        And one more remark:
        reading military documents to a "military officer" is like talking to a mirror... or a tree stump, excuse me...
        Those who have never worked with a map in military planning, have never written a ZhBD or BD, an operational report, or, finally, have never prepared a line of defense (at least at the level of school summer camps) - for them, all this that you cited in the article is a worthless document, since they do not see anything beyond it...
        No offense - but a civilian, even a good historian, will never be able to evaluate the same ZhBD, OS, BD (combat report journal, operational summary, combat report) even 10% of what a military person will see in these papers, and even more so - a middle and high-level management.
        A wish - (I think I'm not the only one who says this) - publish in a good specialized press, if they let you, of course... everything is not easy there either...
        1. 0
          29 January 2025 19: 35
          Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky
          In vain do you spend so much energy (and time, what is more important!!!) on convincing an opponent who does not hear you.

          This is not for him. He belongs to the category of people clearly defined by Medinsky. And he is ready to look like an absolute I.D....TOM just to not admit the obvious. And he makes false statements in order to confuse me and lead me away from the main idea of ​​the article. It should be noted that LEFF has an excellent command of the material and often resorts to falsification (incorrect translation, a truncated fragment of a document, a cunning chronology based on a real document, etc.). But I know all his tricks. And then he starts to provoke with insults, etc. But it is difficult for others, who have a slight command of the material, to argue with him. Well, and the main thing is a weak knowledge of military affairs, I always teased him so that he would learn the "Sergeant's Manual", I was tired of correcting his childish blunders. The little man wants to grab some foreign grant, that's why he tries.
          And thank you for your support.
  17. 0
    28 January 2025 21: 25
    Quote: Lewww
    BG-2 had the primary goal of capturing Nelidovo, which it apparently did by encircling Nelidovo from the west and east; its tanks crossed the railway east of Nelidovo.

    Do you have at least one document confirming such a maneuver?. NO. In order #030 from Nelidovo and in front of the BG3 and that's all. Yes, they were a little to the right. But east of you know, when translated by a person who knows German it sounded like - in the area east of Nelidovo.[i][/i] That's why you were frantically pulling Hoppe, all the way through Shitkovo, to Morozovo, etc. Complete nonsense. In the BG 1 ZBD, everything is said about the position of the combat group units, the location of the 5th TD. But there is zero information about BG 2. Krasikovo, Yuryevo, Vasilyevskoye - all of them are BG 1. The crossings are guarded by anti-aircraft platoons assigned to Hoppe (how many times have you had your noses rubbed in this). And having such an order -to attack East of Nelidovo Hoppe should drive not to the north, but to the south (southeast) to Shitkovo and make a circle. There is also a tactical expediency. The distance from Nelidovo to the railway (from the Dubosekovo junction to Petelino) is up to 2 km. Who will cover the right flank of BG 2? I am not even writing this to you. But to someone who understands who I am dealing with. Advance with a united front (when breaking through the main position). This is the basics of tactics. Already in the depths (the density of the defense falls) it is still permissible. But, you recently stated that the Germans are advancing exclusively along the roads. Okay, you can and are forgiven.
    1. +1
      28 January 2025 22: 32
      Quote: chenia
      That's why you frantically pulled Hoppe, all the way through Shitkovo, to Morozovo, etc. Complete nonsense.
      I don't see the point in discussing this with you for the 20th time - you forget my arguments 15 minutes after reading them, and you ask the same questions 15 times
      And having such an order - to attack to the east of Nelidovo, Hoppe should drive not to the north, but to the south (southeast) to Shitkovo and make a circle.
      I also answered you about this 10 times on the forum - Hoppe's task capture the heights east of Petelino. (see ZhBD 2 sp 2 td)
      That is, the height to the east of the railway (to the right of the railway). To do this, it is easiest to move from Shitkovo, and after Shiryaevo without crossing the railway move along the line to the height.
      And not cross the railway at Nelidovo in order to break through the forward zone of the 4th Sverdlovsk Region with a frontal attack, then again with a frontal attack knock out the BO in front of Petelino, and then cross the railway again in order to take possession (it is not clear why) of the heights east of Petelino.
      To attack with a united front (when breaking through the main position) is the basics of tactics.
      If this is the basics of tactics, then why didn't you deploy Hoppe's tanks into a battle line on the field near Petelino and send them "as a united front" into the attack? from the rear in position 4 cf?
      Why do you stubbornly send the Germans? in a frontal attack at once. Dubosekovo, which does not represent any tactical value for the Germans?

      You have Dubosekovo as some kind of magic magnet, attracting all German tanks with magical power. laughing
      1. 0
        29 January 2025 20: 00
        Quote: Lewww
        That is, the height to the east of the railway (to the right of the railway). To do this, it is easiest to move out of Shitkovo, and after Shiryaevo, without crossing the railway, move along the line to the height.
        Don’t cross the railway at Nelidovo,

        What are you talking about?
        ZhBD BG 1 10.20 (11.20 Moscow time) radiogram from the 2nd Rifle Brigade: advance north to the road [Volokolamsk – Istra – mordig81]. Hoppe is advancing west of the railway on Christmas.
        11.00:2 radiogram from the 81nd Rifle Brigade: [subgroup] Kelitsa with the left flank along the railway is advancing north to the road [Volokolamsk – Istra – mordigXNUMX].
        [Subgroup] Hoppe advances to the left of the railway.

        The 1st Company [of the 2st Battalion of the 7nd Rifle Regiment], moving east along the railway, at times joining the 2th Company [of the XNUMXnd Battalion of the XNUMXnd Rifle Regiment from Hoppe’s subgroup] to the left,
        And who is making this up? To the right of the road, there could have been tanks of the Hoppe unit (with 5 T-III tanks) assigned to Kelitsa to overcome open spaces (near Morozovo and Shiryaevo), and Kelitsa always had tanks of the reconnaissance platoon of the TB (T-II), this is a reconnaissance detachment with a PT platoon that would then fly into the mines. Further, Hoppe was just west of the railway or to the left. Learn the materiel.
        Quote: Lewww
        Second time: I wrote that on 16.11.41/316/XNUMX the XNUMXth Infantry Division was attacked (on the left flank) by only one TANK division (not two tank divisions, as you stated in your previous publication).

        Again a LIE in the old article, written in the same way as in the new one.
      2. 0
        29 January 2025 20: 48
        Quote: Lewww
        You have Dubosekovo as some kind of magic magnet, attracting all German tanks with magical power.

        Show the document canceling Hoppe's order. -Attack east of Nelidovo.
        THERE IS NO SUCH THING IN NATURE? NO! AT ALL!
        And the summary shows 8.00 (9.00 Moscow time)-The railway has been crossed VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO,

        ORDER AND EXECUTION,
        AND OUR PLATOON IS WAITING FOR HIM THERE.
        And you won’t be able to refute this with a single document.
        In our documents this is confirmed by eyewitnesses - THAT THERE WERE TWO BATTLES WITH TANKS. But there could not have been reports, since the battle was going on, and the information flow (in Petelino) was interrupted. And then only eyewitnesses.
        The Germans are in a DEAD SILENCE, absolutely unnatural. Hoppe's tanks were performing the most difficult and important task at 9.00:2 Moscow time. BG-5 disperses the combat outpost (they have no task of stubbornly defending) and boasts, Kelits is similar, dispersed the combat outpost near Morozovo and Shiryaevo with 4 tanks (Gabidulin confirms - he talked about XNUMX tanks). And Hoppe has zero in the ZBD.
        Figuratively. The match of the century is being previewed. But they are showing a second league match, and there is zero information about the World Cup final.
        No, they didn't insert this information into the ZhBD. Well, they didn't want to disappoint impressionable descendants (reading the historical form) with such a bummer.
  18. +1
    29 January 2025 10: 45
    ZhBD 11th TD 16.11.41:

    At 13:00 (14:00 Moscow time)……as the advance of 2 Pz.D. stalled under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo.

    And after the “appropriate” submission of information to the 5th Army Corps, and from there to the 4th Tank Group (whose operations department monitored the units’ actions), the debriefing began. Gepner had a “gentle” conversation with the commanders of the 5th Army Corps and the 48th Motorized Rifle Corps (and further down) with the involvement of the closest female relatives (well, like we do). Where the eternal Russian question arose – WHO IS TO BLAME and WHAT TO DO. But there were no difficulties with the first (in the “best” army traditions, the 2nd Tank Division set up its neighbor) – of course, the 11th Tank Division.
    Gunner, from what document did you get the information that Gepner conducted a "debriefing" on the above-mentioned combat episode??? Or did you see this in your dream again?

    I have written to you many times before - step on the throat of your wild imagination and begin to study the available documents of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht gradually and carefully.

    The advance of the Kelitsa group was stalled for the following reasons:
    1. There were no tanks in his group, and without their support the Germans fought reluctantly;

    2. The group began to be attacked from the rear by groups of Red Army soldiers from the 1075th Rifle Regiment, who were breaking out of encirclement and trying to break through the Morozovo, Shiryaevo, Petelino road in order to reach the east;

    3. at 12.00:2 the 3nd and 857rd batteries of the 1075th regiment, which had previously supported the actions of the XNUMXth regiment with fire, due to the withdrawal of his men from their positions They also changed their positions, moved to Goryuny and began to provide fire support to the 1073rd Rifle Regiment, which had not withdrawn from its positions.
    And apparently they shelled Shiryaevo quite well, which was noted in the combat log of the 2nd infantry regiment of the 2nd tank division:
    Around 13.00:74, a strong enemy artillery attack on Shiryaevo resulted in the fire of two vehicles of the XNUMXnd Division of the XNUMXth Infantry Regiment.

    And an armored train also took part in the battle, perhaps it also added to Shiryaevo
    1. 0
      29 January 2025 20: 17
      Quote: Lewww
      The advance of the Kelitsa group was stalled for the following reasons:
      1. There were no tanks in his group, and without their support the Germans fought reluctantly;

      After taking Morozovo and Shiryaevo, Kelitsa didn't really need tanks (the reconnaissance platoon doesn't count. It advanced through forests and ravines. There, tanks were used as tankettes, along the road (to mark 231,5) behind the chain.

      Quote: Lewww
      2. The group began to be attacked from the rear by groups of Red Army soldiers from the 1075th Rifle Regiment, who were breaking out of encirclement and trying to break through the Morozovo, Shiryaevo, Petelino road in order to reach the east;

      This is already the second attack on the 4th company, and Kelits went into the forest for the 5th company with part of his forces. Well, and most importantly, by this time his 1st company reached the Matrenino station, and PG Hoppe and BG 2 began a new offensive.
      13.30 interim report to the V Army Corps: Combat group 1 is fighting the enemy, which stubbornly defends itself on the forest edges south of the highway, along the line north of Shiryaevo-1,5 km south of Petelinka.
      .Summary in 5 AK. After new preparations and reconnaissance of the roads, the offensive on the highway began. Which was reached by 14.00 on a wide front.
      Before this, none of ours had left their positions.
      So this is not the reason for the delay in the offensive.
      1. 0
        29 January 2025 21: 19
        I have no desire to enter into a discussion with you; I have long since realized that this undertaking is pointless.
        The entire system of your evidence for the historicity of the battle of the 28th at Dubosekovo is built either on your distortion of the information contained in the documents, or on a free interpretation of the ambiguities present there, or on your personal inventions.
        To prove this once again, I will look at one of the two cornerstones of your evidence base.
        You write:
        Problem:
        Hoppe's subgroup attacks across the river Lama east of Nelidovo, to capture the heights east of Petelinka.


        I have pointed out to you about 10 times before that the phrase “attacks through the Lama River east of Nelidovo” is meaningless, since the Lama does not flow east of Nelidovo, but approximately 1,7 km north of Nelidovo in the general direction from west to east. Something is clearly wrong with this phrase.

        But this did not bother you, and now, with the power of your thoughts, you are transporting Hoppe's tanks across the railway east of Nelidovo and throwing them into a frontal attack on Dubosekovo, so that they all die a heroic death there in an unequal battle with 28 Panfilov men.
        And when I point out to you that this battle is not recorded in the documents of the Red Army and Wehrmacht of 41, then you launch your ironclad counterargument in the form of a question: “Why should German and Soviet documents necessarily report on the battle at Dubosekovo?».
        They don’t owe this to anyone, therefore, the lack of mention of the battle in the documents convincingly proves its historicity (just as the lack of mention of German tanks near Dubosekovo in Gundilovich’s letter convincingly proves that there were tanks there).
        This is how your absurd logic works.

        And if you were really trying to find the historical truth, and not defend the historicity of the fairy tale, you would have figured out that the phrase from the ZhBD “Great Lama from Nelidowo" is correctly translated as "it is coming over the river Lama to the east of Nelidovo", or in full:
        "Task: Subgroup Hoppe advances over the Lama River east of Nelidovo in order to capture the heights east of Petelinka. During further movement, it quickly moves towards the Volokolamsk-Istra road…”

        In this version, this task immediately ceases to be absurd and becomes clear.

        And what is located above the river Lama (i.e. north of its bed) if you look at the map? Correct - Morozovo, Shiryaevo and the heights east of Petelino.
        And what is written in the documents of the 50th Cavalry Division for 16.11.41? That's right, it says that in the morning of 16.11, enemy tanks and infantry drove the Dovatorites out of Morozovo, then, advancing along the road, reached Shiryaevo, drove out of it the 5th regiment of the 2/1075th regiment, then went further and by 10.00 captured Petelino and height to the east of itAnd during the first half of the day about 50 tanks and 70 guns passed along this road.
        That is, the Hoppe group. NOT stepped from Nelidovo at once. Dubosekovo, she moved along the road Morozovo, Shiryaevo, Petelino - the documents completely shatter your imagination.

        And this course of events is fully consistent with the tasks set for Battle Group 1 the day before:
        “3.) Kampfgruppe 1 goes on the offensive at 06.30 from the Lama River and captures the heights west of Lyscovo.
        1st objective: Chapel – Petelinki line .
        2nd goal: Istra – Volokolamsk road.
        3rd objective: Lyscovo – and the heights to the west of it..".

        This is what we see from the documents of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht for 16.11: UG Kielica is trying to capture the heights in the Chasovnia area (near the 244,0 mark), and UG Hoppe is capturing Petelino and the heights to the east of it.

        And not about any time. There is not even a hint of Dubosekovo - the positions located there were of no tactical value for the Germans
        1. 0
          30 January 2025 12: 25
          Quote: Lewww
          then we would have figured out that the phrase from the ZhBD “greift uber Lama ost Nelidowo” is correctly translated as “advancing over the Lama River to the east of Nelidowo”, or in full:

          Stop hanging noodles on our ears. If you don't put the word river before Lama in the translation, then there appears a PORNOGRAPHIC essence, when the maniac Hoppe attacks the unfortunate Lama with certain intentions in the position from above, to the east of Nelidovo. And if you put the word river (in German, of course, the translation is THROUGH. We've already gone through this, you've apparently forgotten. You forgot that a person who knows German translated it like this- Hoppe, across the Lama River, attacks in the area east of Nelidovo. What, have you forgotten? Let me remind you. Moreover, this was presented by your like-minded person.
          But even in your stupidest version, you are talking nonsense.
          Why mention a toponym that is located a couple of kilometers away from the locations of the Hoppe units (and these are specific settlements Vasilyevskoye, Krasikovo, Yuryevo), while from these points sending even further a few kilometers away from Nelidovo - to other significant settlements Morozovo and Shiryaevo, to the exit to the next Petelino. And at the same time NOT MENTIONING any of them in the order. And why the toponym - Nelidovo. But you are pushing this nonsense.
          A person with a bit of brains, knowing that there is a road Vasilyevskoye-Nelidovo with a crossing over the Lama (which is also guarded by a unit assigned to Hoppe), the task is - attack, across the Lama River, in the area east of Nelidovo - is clearly perceived - the advance to the north, through Lama AND THAT'S IT. Further on there is the area East of Nelidovo.
          I understand that your sect (beings clearly designated by Medinsky) will never agree with this.
          Because to admit that there were two platoon battles (which witnesses constantly talked about) would destroy your sacred temple of lies. Because if there were two battles, then the first one was clearly unsuccessful for the Germans.
          1. 0
            30 January 2025 14: 25
            For to admit that there were two platoon battles (which witnesses constantly spoke about),
            Well, let's give me the memories of the people of the 1075th regiment, who declare themselves participants in the newspaper fight at the Dubosekovo site, and who precisely retell Krivitsky's article from the 1942 issue. laughing
            And also provide the recollections of people who do not declare themselves participants in the newspaper fight at Dubosekovo, but nevertheless state that this fight definitely took place.

            It is these memories that form the main foundation stone of your evidence base.
            By the way, can you also provide the award sheets - I'm surprised that you forgot about them.
        2. 0
          2 February 2025 21: 17
          Quote: Lewww
          And what is located above the river Lama? (i.e. north of its bed) if you look at the map?

          HA!!! That's right. Above Lama there is a road leading to Nelidovo and the VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO area.
          Even in your stupid translation, there is more confirmation of my version than yours. I have everything. and at once. And you, Hoppe advancing under Lama to Shtkovo, and further, from Lama attacks (who knows how many km. SOUTH- EASTERN NELIDOVO, the village of Morozovo. HOWEVER, THERE IS DISORDER.
          And if we take into account that the bridges (crossings) over the Lama (both to the north to Nelidovo and to Shiryaevo - the bridge northeast of Vasilevskoye) are guarded by a unit assigned to Hoppe, then there is no need to think about it. Everything is clear.
          1. 0
            2 February 2025 22: 13
            Gunner, don't write to me - I don't read your posts.
            I SEE NO POINT IN DISCUSSING WITH A BELIEVER ABOUT THE SANCTITY OF HIS SYMBOL OF FAITH
        3. 0
          6 February 2025 11: 08
          Quote: Lewww
          and not to defend the historicity of the tale, then we would have figured out that the phrase from the ZhBD “greift uber Lama ost Nelidowo” is correctly translated as “advancing over the Lama River to the east of Nelidovo”,

          Lies. The real translation from German, there is another word (preposition, conjunction) - "an" that needs to be taken into account.
          undergruppe Hoppe greift uber fluss Lama ostw Nelidovo an,
          It sounds like that.
          Hoppe's subgroup crosses the Lama River and advances east of Nelidovo
          1. 0
            6 February 2025 12: 43
            Not true, the correct translation is:
            Hoppe's subgroup crosses the Lama River and launches an offensive on the Dubosekovo siding.

            Fantast, I'm not interested in discussing with you.
    2. 0
      31 January 2025 18: 08
      Quote: Lewww
      The advance of the Kelitsa group was stalled for the following reasons:
      1. There were no tanks in his group, and without their support the Germans fought reluctantly;

      After taking Shiryaevo, Kelitsu did NOT NEED tanks, he crawled through forests and ravines (he had a reconnaissance detachment with twos, and that was enough. Further in his zone, he was earlier than Hoppe at the Matrenino station, albeit about an hour.11.00 (12.00) radiogram from the 2nd Rifle Brigade: (subgroup) Kielica with the left flank along the railway is advancing north to the road[/b]…Look, he’s already heading towards Matrenino station.
      And Hoppe is still at the railway station on the left. If he were at Matrenino station (at level), he would have broken away from the railway station and was heading towards the Volokolamsk highway. .[b] Hoppe slowed down.
      This meant that he had to regroup and drive the second echelon, instead of the battered tank company, to Petelino.
      DB.№ 22. At 11:30 the enemy left Petelino and directed its tanks towards Volokolamsk and Shiryaevo.

      At Shiryaevo - these are the forces of PG Hoppe, and to Volokolamsk (to the west) - this is BG 2 (as was indicated earlier). THIS BG 2 supported Hoppe's pants.
      ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
      10:00 (11:00 Moscow time) II Battalion of the 2nd Rifle Regiment with II Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment from Petelinka [is advancing] in the indicated direction……
      It looks like the first echelon is being withdrawn from Petelino. And the second is moving towards Petelino through Morozovo and Shiryaevo.
      Combat report of the 50th Cavalry Division No. 156 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
      11:35 …. The enemy, with a force of up to a motorized division, 80 tanks and up to 50 guns, is advancing along the Morozovo-Shiryaevo road. The noise of the battle is fading to the north……
      1. 0
        31 January 2025 18: 17
        Gunner, I repeat: I have no desire to discuss the visions that arise in your head after reading the documents of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army.
        I'm sick of constantly refuting your speculations and reinterpreting information from documents in my own way

        Don't write to me anymore - I won't answer.
  19. +1
    29 January 2025 21: 49
    Quote: chenia
    Show the document canceling Hoppe's order to attack east of Nelidovo.
    THERE IS NO SUCH THING IN NATURE? NO! AT ALL!
    And the report shows 8.00 (9.00 Moscow time) - the railway has been crossed VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO,
    Gunner, are you really that stupid, or are you just pretending to be?

    I have already written to you above: the entry in the ZhBD, which you freely paraphrase, is completely as follows:
    1) Development of the situation: at 6.30 Battle Groups 1 and 2 went on the offensive from the Sosnino-Korsikovka line. By 8.00:9.00 the railway was crossed at Nelidovo and to the east, at XNUMX:XNUMX Shiryaevo and Morozovo were taken.
    Where did you see the statement here that It was Hoppe's group that crossed the railway at Nelidovo, and not BG2, which was supposed to capture (and captured) Nelidovo????

    I wrote to you 100 times before: this fragment describes the actions TWO BATTLE GROUPS: BG2 captures Nelidovo, and BG1 (which includes Untergruppe Hoppe) captures Shiryaevo and Morozovo at 9.00:XNUMX, which is confirmed with almost minute accuracy by data from the KA documents.

    And there is no need to bring up this argument for the 101st time - I am really tired of answering it for the second year in a row

    And Hoppe attacked east of Nelidovo as he was ordered to do - read my post above 10 times
    1. 0
      30 January 2025 12: 37
      Quote: Lewww
      Where did you see the statement here that it was Hoppe's group that crossed the railway at Nelidovo, and not BG2, which was supposed to capture (and captured) Nelidovo????

      BG 2 crossed the railway at Nelidovo (moreover, going around the floodplain of Lama from the west), And Hoppe, -EAST OF NELIDOVO. If one group had done these, there would have been no point in singling them out. But - EAST (considering that the order for Hoppe (BG 1) specifies this, and it accurately defines PG Hoppe. Besides, it is tactically correct - a united front, where each BG covers one of the flanks of each other. Well, here you are out of the loop - you haven't mastered the "Sergeant's Manual" (although it's a bit more complicated).
      1. 0
        30 January 2025 14: 19
        This is crazy, according to your logic, the phrase is from the Germans' ZhBD "By 8.00:XNUMX the railway was crossed near Nelidovo and to the east" convincingly proves, what is it namely the Hoppe group crossed the railway to the east, and convincingly proves that then UG Hoppe moved to Dubosekovo to be routed in battle with the 28 Panfilov men there
        You are convinced of this by the use of the word EAST, which is the main feature that allows the Hoppe group to be unmistakably identified. laughing

        insanity grew fool
  20. 0
    30 January 2025 13: 02
    Quote: chenia
    Stop hanging noodles on our ears. If you don't put the word river before Lama in the translation, then there appears a PORNOGRAPHIC essence


    Well, as usual, the senile dementia began.
    Gunner, I have pointed out to you 100 times before that you have absolutely no ability to perceive what is written in documents LITERALLY. You quote some text from a document, and then retell it in your own words in such a way that its meaning is completely distorted.

    Fragment from the 2 sp 2 td concrete structure:
    "Task: Subgroup Hoppe advances over the Lama River east of Nelidovo to capture the heights east of Petelinka"

    you are reinterpreting into:
    "Task: Subgroup Hoppe advances across the railway near Nelidovo, in order to then capture the Dubosekovo siding."

    You support this interpretation with another fragment from the ZhBD 2 td:
    “1) Development of the situation: at 6.30 Battle Groups 1 and 2 "Go on the offensive from the Sosnino-Korsikovka line. By 8.00:9.00 the railway was crossed at Nelidovo and to the east, at XNUMX:XNUMX Shiryaevo and Morozovo were taken."

    which you reinterpret in
    «Hoppe Group At 8.00:XNUMX the railway was crossed east of Nelidovo."

    Then you support the historical truth of your first fantasy with your second fantasy, and the historical truth of your second fantasy with your first fantasy.
    As a result, you have one absurdity serving to reinforce another absurdity and vice versa, and you elevate this combination of two fantasies to the rank of an indisputable historical truth.
    This approach can only be described as senile dementia.

    And even if the Fragment from ZhBD 2 sp 2 td is left in the absurd form that you think is correct:
    "Task: Subgroup Hoppe advances ACROSS the Lama River east of Nelidovo to capture the heights east of Petelinka,"
    this will also exactly correspond to my hypothesis that Hoppe's subgroup moved out of Shitkovo on the morning of 16.11 in order to then ATTACK EASTERN NELIDOVO and capture the villages of Shiryaevo and Petelino with the heights around it located east of Nelidovo.
    Shiryaevo, Petelino and the heights east of Petelino are located EAST OF NELIDOVO, therefore, Hoppe's actions are fully consistent with the task assigned to him - finally learn how to work with the map and Step on the throat of your wild imagination.

    And this decision is tactically justified, since in the Kelitsa group (according to the information of the 2nd infantry regiment of the 2nd tank division) there were NO TANKS, and if this group had advanced from Shitkovo independently, it would have suffered heavy losses during the battle for Morozovo, defended by the Dovatorites.
    And so the Hoppe group, reinforced with tanks and artillery, entered the battle for Morozovo, which allowed Morozovo to be captured quickly and with few losses. And then just as quickly to drive the 5th sr 2/1073rd sp from Shiryaevo and capture Petelino.
    Then UG Hoppe launched an offensive to the east of the 1075th Rifle Regiment's forward line, while BG 2 launched an offensive to the west of this forward line. Then both groups joined up in the vicinity of B. Nikolskoye, and thus most of the 1075th Rifle Regiment's positions, along with the Dubosekovo battalion, were surrounded.
    This is how the Germans acted in 1941, and this version is supported by many historians.

    You always boast about your knowledge of tactics, but your hypotheses clearly show your ignorance of it, and the Germans are constantly portrayed as idiots.

    Let's end it here - arguing with you is pointless, because
    IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE TO A BELIEVER THE ERRORS OF HIS SYMBOL OF FAITH
    1. 0
      30 January 2025 20: 00
      Quote: Lewww
      Fragment from the 2 sp 2 td concrete structure:
      "Task: Subgroup Hoppe advances over the Lama River east of Nelidovo to capture the heights east of Petelinka"

      Listen, smart guy, even if you set the task on the sheet above the line (above the river) and under the line (under the river), then you still don't get it right. Hoppe (if it is put forward ACCORDING TO YOU, it will be UNDER THE LAMBA). Again, past. Again, a miss. But the thing is that you know the real translation -ACROSS THE LAMU RIVER And stop messing around with me.
      1. 0
        30 January 2025 20: 19
        Gunner, I realized that you are stupid 2 years ago when I first entered into a polemic with you.
        Morozovo is located southeast of Nelidovo, Shiryaevo to the east, Petelino and the heights that were supposed to be captured by Hoppe to the east of Nelidovo.

        All these points ABOVE THE RIVER LAMA (north of its bed),
        Hoppe's tanks had previously crossed the river north of Shitkovo
        And finally find a map of 39-40, posting Yandex maps in articles about the battles of 41 is a sign of amateurism
        1. 0
          31 January 2025 21: 05
          Quote: Lewww
          Hoppe's tanks had previously crossed the river north of Shitkovo

          You are already pre-dragging Hoppe over the Lama. This is because from the original area they are moving out UNDER THE LAMA, which does not fit your version at all. In short, Hoppe moving out of Krasikovo and Yuryevo is UNDER THE LAMA, and having crossed it, it leaves the LAMA. THIS IS NOT OKAY, Half a ton of Vaseline will not allow you to pull the owl onto the skyscraper. And it will not work pre-dragging
          First of all, it's stupid,
          Secondly, there are 5 more TDs moving into their lane, and only after it.
          1. 0
            31 January 2025 21: 08
            In short, Hoppe is moving out of Krasikovo and Yuryevo
            nominate him even from the moon, just leave me alone - I don't see the point in discussing your hallucinations
            Secondly, there are 5 more TDs moving into their lane.
            Is this the one that is deployed in your diagram in the battle line east of Shitkovo?

            What is she going to attack from the place where you deployed her?
            Or is your diagram a conditional one from a parallel universe?
        2. 0
          2 February 2025 22: 09
          Quote: Lewww
          All these points are ABOVE the Lama River (north of its bed),
          Hoppe's tanks had previously crossed the river north of Shitkovo

          Hoppe's tanks are in Krasikovo and Yuryevo. And they still have to crawl, according to your version, to Shitkovo, and UNDER A LAMBA. And there are tanks of the 5th TD of the Wehrmacht there for now.
          But if they turn north immediately at Vasilyevskoye and across the bridge OVER THE LAMA (guarded by a unit attached to Hoppe - 47th antiaircraft gun platoon of the 2nd company), and move OVER THE LAMA, then after 1 KM they will find themselves EAST OF NELIDOVO WHERE THEY SHOULD ATTACK. EVERYTHING FAST AND AT ONCE.
          Now you will lead the tanks to Hoppe, from the ORIGINAL AREA (and not cleverly devised preliminary transition) on your fucking awesome the correct route to Shitkovo UNDER LAMA most of the route. And you will have to attack in Morozovo and Shiryaevo Not EASTERN NELIDOVO, but SOUTH- to the east. At the same time, the order does not indicate any of the toponyms (Shitkovo-Morozovo-Shiryaevo, which is not acceptable).
          WELL, WHOSE ROUTE IS THE CORRECT ONE?..
          You are ready to look, well, completely stupid, just not to admit the obvious. Well, freedom to the free.
          1. 0
            2 February 2025 22: 13
            Gunner, don't write to me - I don't read your posts.
            I SEE NO POINT IN DISCUSSING WITH A BELIEVER ABOUT THE SANCTITY OF HIS SYMBOL OF FAITH
    2. 0
      30 January 2025 20: 05
      Quote: Lewww
      "to capture the heights east of Petelinka"

      By the way, the diagram where the height is indicated is 244. This is where I got it from. You stubbornly accused me of fantasizing.
      Well, where is the height to the east of Petelino??? There is one to the northeast. There is no one to the east. By the way, this is a lesson to you that mistakes can happen in documents.
      1. 0
        30 January 2025 20: 29
        By the way, the diagram where the height is indicated is 244. This is where I got it from. You stubbornly accused me of fantasizing.
        and he accused quite rightly, because when reconstructing the events of 1941, you use maps from the 80s and 90s, and in the end you found high. 244 not exactly there, where it is applied mark. 244,0 on the 1938 map used by the headquarters of the 316th rifle division.
        Well, where is the height to the east of Petelino???
        open the Schubert map, all the heights east of Petelinka are beautifully drawn there - choose the one you like laughing
    3. 0
      30 January 2025 20: 30
      Quote: Lewww
      my hypothesis is that Hoppe's subgroup moved out of Shitkovo on the morning of 16.11. in order to then ATTACK EASTERN NELIDOVO and capture the villages of Shiryaevo and Petelino with the heights around it located east of Nelidovo.

      I'm showing it to the weirdo
      ZhBD BG 1 .15.11.41. ...Task: Subgroup Kelitsa attacks through Morozovo - Shiryaevo and captures..
      And Hoppe should have sounded exactly like this - Task: ...Subgroup Hoppe, together with PG Kelitsa, attacks through Morozovo-Shiryaevo and captures the heights east of Petelino and Petelino....
      Then, you would be allowed to moo. The toponym VOSTOCHNEY NELIDOVO with such advancement, corresponds to VOSTOCHNEE BERLINA. Equally helpful for orientation
      Spread your nonsense among your like-minded people (they will applaud you).
      And if the - attack across the Lama River, east of Nelidovo- [b][/b], here you only need to look at the map, you can immediately see how to act. Even without the order to capture Petelino, but only the height to the east, it still forces you to take the village, because it is in the offensive zone.
      LEFF you are completely incompetent in military matters, and your nonsense is starting to tire. And remember. I will show your ridiculously low level as a researcher every time.
      1. 0
        30 January 2025 20: 34
        And Hoppe should have sounded exactly like that - Task
        hmm - the woodpecker doesn't have a headache laughing

        That's it, Gunner, the discussion is over, write whatever you want, even the most absurd fantasies - I don't see the point in infringing on the sanctity of your beliefs laughing

        It is thanks to the "works" of historians like you that the minds of ordinary people have formed the opinion that history is not a science, but a literary genre. Fantasy
    4. 0
      30 January 2025 20: 58
      Quote: Lewww
      since the Kelitsa group (according to the information of the 2nd infantry regiment of the 2nd tank division) DID NOT HAVE TANKS, and if this group had advanced from Shitkovo independently,

      And what prevented the transfer of a tank platoon to Kielce (5 T-III), a tank platoon and a platoon of pioneers and infantry. I have been saying this all the time. And you cannot deny it. In addition, Kielce has a reconnaissance detachment with 5 T-II. And I pointed this out. Well, and all sorts of other tankettes based on the two (artillery observers, control, communications). In a column of about 15 tanks they will be able to look like tanks (and ours from 50 CD will increase it by another half.)
      There were threes in the battle - 4 pieces, witness Gabidullin.
      And Hoppe's tanks, after completing the task of taking Morozovo and Shiryaevo, went to Peteleno from the east.
      Mukhamedyarov recalls: “When the Germans launched an offensive in the area of ​​the second battalion, in particular the 4th company, they could not break through there - twenty-eight did not let through. Then the Germans took a right turn, launched an offensive on the (6) 5th company of the same 2nd battalion. The offensive was carried out with tanks, the machine gunners sat on the tanks."
      There is a battle at Dubosekovo, and tanks and Hoppe's platoon, which was going with Kelishche, some on armor, who galloped at the eastern outskirts of Petelino, and at the western outskirts of BG 2 (the division commander forced this, otherwise the offensive would have stalled.)
      1. 0
        30 January 2025 21: 08
        Here we need to add why BG 2. Read our BD #22
        At 11.30:XNUMX the enemy left Petelino, heading their tanks to Volokolamsk and Shiryaevo.
        Tanks at Volokolams, these are tanks of BG 2 that are leaving for their offensive zone, after helping BG 1 take Petelino.
        And at 11.30:50, it’s time for regrouping, and then the 80th Cavalry Division reports that XNUMX tanks (this is the second echelon and reserve) are forced to move in a formation through Morozovo-Shiryaevo to Petelino.
        BECAUSE the direct road from Vasilevskoye to the north and east of Nelidovo is BLOCKED by our platoon. THAT'S HOW IT IS.
        1. 0
          30 January 2025 21: 23
          Gunner, once again: I have no desire to participate in a discussion of your fantasies and hallucinations.

          If you want to believe that Hoppe's tanks were routed in an unequal battle by 28 riflemen at Dubosekovo - good luck!

          I have no right to encroach on the sanctity of your creed. hi
  21. 0
    31 January 2025 18: 13
    Quote: chenia
    WE ARE WAITING FOR YOUR EVIDENCE,

    Gunner, I have no desire to debate with people who present their own fantasies as data from documents, and in addition completely forget my arguments 15 minutes after reading them.

    Don't write to me anymore - I don't read your comments and won't answer.
    1. 0
      31 January 2025 21: 14
      Quote: Lewww
      once again: I have no desire to participate

      Quote: Lewww
      I have no desire to discuss

      YES, don't worry, you are like a punching bag for me for training. This is for others. And the main thing is that you have no opportunity to convey your position. You have amateurish stretches everywhere. By demanding a document from me that directly confirms my position (and I have an indirect one), you forget that you have nothing at all. Not even a hint of confirmation. And therefore you are engaged in manipulation and falsification. And this is your whole essence.
      1. 0
        31 January 2025 21: 16
        Demanding a document from me,
        I don't demand anything anymore - fantasize as much as you like.

        But I'm curious: why did you deploy the tanks of the 5th TD in a battle line to the east of Shitkovo in the diagram in the article?
        What exactly are you planning to storm from this position at 9.00:16.11.41 on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX?
        1. 0
          1 February 2025 16: 00
          Quote: Lewww
          Why did you deploy the tanks of the 5th TD in a battle line to the east of Shitkovo in the diagram in the article?

          Do not use terms whose meaning you DO NOT UNDERSTAND. I have shown the direction of the offensive zone of an unmarked formation of the 5th TD. And they are already there, determining when and where to deploy in a battle line, when they move in pre-battle order or in a column. Yes, it would be better to use a double arrow - the general direction of the offensive of the 5th TD, I was lazy.
          1. 0
            1 February 2025 16: 12
            . Yes, it’s better to use a double arrow - the general direction of attack of the 5th TD, I was too lazy.
            Better, but also wrong - at 9.00:5 the 5th tank division did not advance from the line that you indicated, at that moment the remnants of the XNUMXth tank division were moving out of Shitkovo in a marching column, or maybe they were no longer in Shitkovo at all.
            And on November 16.11, the 5th TD advanced not from west to east, but from south to north.

            Well, okay, let's forget about it, in your article, even without this, the jamb jumps on the jamb and drives the jamb laughing
  22. 0
    1 February 2025 08: 07
    Excellent research. Because on the LBS, reliability in real time, and even more so, historically, is practically simply absent. But the army is the army: records are kept. My grandfather received a notice that he was missing in action at the end of October 1941... They also began to sort things out and everything became clear. He fought as a machine gunner in the 1st battalion of the 1073rd regiment (according to the P/P of his letters). He died on October 26 in a field near the Volokolamsk highway (Timonino).
    1. 0
      1 February 2025 08: 13
      and was buried in the village of Mikhailovskoye by local residents in November 1941...
    2. 0
      1 February 2025 12: 26
      Excellent research.
      It can only be remarkable for its intricacy and fantastic nature. laughing
      I doubt you even read a third of the article.

      You can read about how your grandfather fought and died at the link.
      https://gurbolikov.livejournal.com/459029.html?ysclid=m6lzmn6bxx341960393
  23. -1
    1 February 2025 13: 46
    The article misses an important point.
    If, as the author writes, the positions were strengthened in engineering terms, then there must definitely be mining.
    So it turns out that there were guns, there were grenades, there were bottles, but there were no mines?
    And most importantly - on what basis do we trust the Germans? (and not the Germans), we fought with the Germans.
    There, the casualty count was carried out with faith in the word of a gentleman. And gentlemen they were.
    Why don't we trust ourselves!
    At this point in the comment I would like to add a strong word!
    We won and referring to a lying vanquished one (Goebbels alone is worth something) is, in my opinion, inadequate.
    In my opinion, we should leave the history of the Great Patriotic War alone, and self-taught historians who are looking for sensations in who knows where, for the money of the defeated, should be brought to criminal responsibility as accomplices of NGOs.
    1. 0
      1 February 2025 15: 56
      Quote: 26_Sergey_26
      If, as the author writes, the positions were strengthened in engineering terms, then there must definitely be mining.
      So it turns out that there were guns, there were grenades, there were bottles, but there were no mines?

      And the article states
      "Let's repeat, we must take into account that the plan of the 316th SD's defense zone is from 5.11.41, and there will be changes in 10 days. This means, further strengthening of defense (barriers, minefields). By 11.11.41, the division’s defense zone was 90–100% prepared in engineering terms.”

      Quote: 26_Sergey_26
      And most importantly, on what basis do we trust the Germans?

      That is why I described the battle at Matrenino station in such detail, to show the obvious lies in the German documents. Yes, and the ZhBD as a source of information, one must be very critical (everywhere they trust, and here too, this is the norm). And when there is a very unpleasant moment, they try to gloss it over.
      1. -1
        1 February 2025 16: 34
        A huge amount of work has been done to write the article. Respect.
        The Germans' lies are confirmed by the fact that not a single tank was blown up by mines.
        My personal opinion on how events could have developed (I am not taking into account the feat of Russian soldiers): an eyewitness saw the battlefield with his own eyes;
        Then he retold what he remembered to his command. In this case, there should be no errors in the destroyed equipment (+- 1-2). The command passed this story on to political instructors or correspondents, here too they did not particularly like to repaint.
        Frontline newspapers were published - it is useless to sell them to a soldier who fought, otherwise people will stop believing them altogether. That is why I am inclined to believe the official version. But how exactly it all happened, there may be some artistic invention here.
        This does not in any way diminish the feat of Panfilov's men!
  24. 0
    2 February 2025 22: 18
    Quote: 26_Sergey_26
    In this case, there should be no errors in the damaged equipment (+- 1-2).
    According to the reporting data of the 316th SD, on 16.11.41, Kaprov's regiment did not cause any losses to the enemy in tanks, in 3 days of fighting from 16 to 18.11. incl. caused losses in tanks Only 4 near the village of Gusenevo
    1. 0
      3 February 2025 11: 14
      Quote: Lewww
      for 3 days of fighting from 16 to 18.11 incl.. inflicted losses in tanks only 4 near the village of Gusenevo

      Well, first of all, in three days of fighting, and not near Gusenevo.
      Secondly, it is not the damaged ones that are indicated, but destroyed tanks. And this can only be done (with poor anti-tank weapons) when the battlefield is ours.
      Which, of course. it could have been when the Germans attacked positions prepared by our troops in advance (with minefields and obstacles, etc.). And, certainly not a terribly battered regiment, on the hastily occupied intermediate (regiment, and these are the remains of the 2nd and 3rd battalions, pushed back from their sector). And only once. Dubosekovo a situation developed when the Germans retreated, and the knocked-out tanks remained in our positions. So they were finished off with mines, grenades, and lighters through open hatches. And the knocked-out tanks outside our position, the Germans pulled back (it is difficult to finish them off without trenches). I repeat, The infantry has no other way to destroy a tank. For this, good artillery is needed. The report you provided mentions tanks burned by artillery (and those knocked out, too).
  25. 0
    3 February 2025 12: 23
    Quote: chenia
    Well, first of all, in three days of fighting, and not near Gusenevo.

    Gunner, why do you always lie?
    It was near Gusenevo - read 10 times in a row the BD No. 27 of the headquarters of the 1075th regiment where it is written about this.

    You the whole article is based on lies and free fantasies:

    You are lying that there were tanks in the Kelitsa group - there is no such information in the documents;
    you are lying that according to the order, PG Hoppe was supposed to “attack positions from the Dubosekovo siding and to the left, somewhere 1,2–1,5 km toward Nelidovo” - this is not written verbatim in the order, and the name Dubosekovo is never mentioned in the Germans’ military documentation;
    you are lying that there were 60 tanks in PG Hoppe - there is no such information in the documents;
    you are lying that the 3rd battalion of the 1075th regiment was built in two echelons - there is no such information in the documents;
    You are lying that the 1075th Rifle Regiment did not have a 1st battalion - in the documents of the 1075th Rifle Regiment it is written that it did:
    you are lying that the 1075th Rifle Regiment had 16.11 anti-tank guns by 11, according to the regiment's headquarters documents the maximum number of anti-tank guns in the regiment was 6, but by 16.11 it was reduced to two, and they were NOT at the Dubosekovo base, but in the 1st battalion, which according to your statement did not exist, and the 2 guns that the regiment had were also NOT at the Dubosekovo base;
    you are lying that on 16.11/XNUMX PG Hoppe was moving in the first echelon through Vasilyevskoye to the north, through Lama on the Nelidovo railway line - Dubosekovo siding, the German railway records do not say so verbatim, where exactly PG Hoppe crossed the railway (near Nelidovo or near Petelino) no precise information is given;
    you are lying that in the PG Hoppe advancing on Dubosekovo “In the first echelon there was one tank company (17-19 tanks) and 2 infantry companies, and in front was a platoon of sappers-reconnaissance (pioneers)” and that “Hoppe “pushed” most of his first echelon, up to 14-15 tanks, through the Dubosekovo siding” - there is not a word about this in the Germans’ ZhBD, it does not say at all that UG Hoppe fought near Nelidovo, and it is impossible to prove this with your repeatedly repeated lies;
    you are lying that about once. Dubosekovo German tanks "began to receive a bunch of bullets in the sides from anti-tank rifles", because according to the documents of the 1075th Rifle Regiment, there were no anti-tank rifles in Gundilovich's company;
    You repeatedly lie that the Germans occupied the Matrenino station on 16.11 - this is refuted by the report of the commander of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment Momysh Uly and the diagram attached to the report:
    and your biggest lie is that the battle at once. Dubosekovo lasted FOUR hours.

    Your entire publication is based on lies and fabrications.
    Secondly, it is not the knocked out tanks that are indicated, but the destroyed ones. And this can only be done (with the wretched AT weapons) when the battlefield is ours.
    Gunner, I have advised you many times - Step on the throat of your wild imagination and try to study the documents of the 316th rifle division.
    In them, knocked out and destroyed tanks are synonymous words and mean a tank disabled during combat, and, as the headquarters then wrote in the documents - a trophy.
    I'm not going to prove it to you - it's futile, you're impenetrable
    1. 0
      3 February 2025 17: 30
      Quote: Lewww
      specifically near Gusenevo - read 10 times in a row BD No. 27 of the headquarters of the 1075th regiment where it is written about this.

      You brought a document where a military correspondent writes about 4 destroyed tanks in three days of fighting of 1075 SP, and you mumble about BD No. 26.
      Quote: Lewww
      You are lying that there was a tank in Kelitsa's group

      Read the article. I write that for the capture of Morozovo, Shiryaevo Kelitsa tanks were needed There were 5 tanks in the reconnaissance detachment, and then up to 5 tanks (platoon) or more could be given. And then they attacked Peteleno from the east, and completely went over to Hoppe. The order of the Brigade commander (commander of BG 1) is enough. And that's it. It is difficult for you as a lawyer to understand this (if you do not have seals, signatures, witnesses and fingerprints), then the event does not happen. I get it.

      Quote: Lewww
      you are lying that according to the order, PG Hoppe was supposed to “attack positions from the Dubosekovo junction and to the left, somewhere 1,2–1,5 km towards Nelidovo

      This is the offensive zone of two companies reinforced by tanks (TR). I also specified that the Germans are impudent (I widened the zone a bit). Everything, according to the order - ATTACK IN THE AREA EAST OF NELIDOVO. And what's wrong?
      Quote: Lewww
      You are lying that there were 60 tanks in PG Hoppe - there is no such information in the documents

      Here I use the information given by Yu. Pashalok - and at that time in the 2nd TD there were about 130 tanks. There is more precise information, refute it.. Hence the minus control, and in two battalions there are 69 tanks.

      Quote: Lewww
      the name Dubosekovo is never mentioned in the Germans' ZhBD;

      Yes, it is not on the German maps. But they have a designation - st. Matrenino. Well, when Momysh-Uly gave them a kick in the ass, their memory went AWAY. It happens.
      1. 0
        3 February 2025 17: 44
        You brought a document where a military correspondent writes about 4 destroyed tanks in three days of fighting of 1075 SP, and you mumble about BD No. 26.
        you are lying again, I have provided a fragment of DB #25 of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division on 19.11.41/16/17, which indicates ALL LOSSES inflicted by the division's units over THREE days of fighting on November 18, 1075 and 27. And it indicates that over three days the 1075th rifle regiment lost ONLY THREE TANKS, and according to DB #XNUMX of the headquarters of the XNUMXth rifle regiment, this loss was inflicted in the battle near Gusenevo 18 November.
        I am writing that tanks were needed to take Morozovo, Shiryaevo, Kelitsa. There were 5 tanks in the reconnaissance detachment.
        lie - in the ZhBD 2 sp 2 td there is no such information

        Everything, according to the order - ATTACK IN THE AREA EAST OF NELIDOVO. And what's wrong?
        it's not so that you're lying that Hoppe's group crossed the railway at Nelidovo and fought at once. Dubosekovo - This is not written verbatim in the Germans' JBD - this is your invention
        Here I use the information given by Yu. Pashalok - and at that time there were about 2 tanks in the 130nd TD.
        give a link to the source or better yet admit it right away this is your invention as if on 16.11.41 there were 60 tanks in Hoppe's group - there is no such information anywhere
        Quote: Lewww
        the name Dubosekovo is never mentioned in the Germans' ZhBD;

        It's not on the German maps.
        How do you know? Clairvoyant?
        Have you seen all the maps that the 2nd TD headquarters used?
        Where did you see?

        Stop lying and fantasizing - don't disgrace the resource
        1. 0
          4 February 2025 19: 13
          Quote: Lewww
          And it is indicated there that in three days the 1075th Rifle Regiment lost ONLY THREE TANKS, and according to BD No. 27 of the 1075th Rifle Regiment headquarters, this loss was inflicted in the battle near Gusenevo on November 18.

          Liar. You, why did you cut off the evidence base? And so below there is a description of the division of tanks into damaged and burnt (destroyed). And in the document above there are 4 destroyed tanks in 3 days of fighting. DESTROYED. And where are they indicated in the database? KNOCKED OUT tanks. You forgot that we already went through this on another resource (where I pulled your knees up to your ears. YOU CONSTANTLY LYE, and at the same time blame the opponent. All the KILLED and DESTROYED (burned) converge.
          I have already said that the enemy lost most of its tanks in the 1075th Rifle Regiment area on 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
          BECAUSE
          First, the Germans broke through the PREPARED and occupied defenses,
          Second, the regiment is still relatively combat-ready and had two weeks of respite.
          Thirdly, in order to destroy a tank with primitive means, the battlefield must be behind us. This is what happened at Dubosekovo. There, THREE tanks were DESTROYED. They were knocked out and stuck in our positions, the Germans called off the attack. And the tanks were finished off (burned).
          -
          Quote: Lewww
          How do you know? Clairvoyant?

          I have seen the maps and will provide them on another issue. On German maps, it is NOT MARKED.
          However, when even a designated toponym evokes unpleasant memories for Germans (as with the station Matrenino), they forget about it.
          1. 0
            4 February 2025 19: 30
            And in the database where the DAMAGED tanks are indicated.
            The database shows LOSSES CAUSED BY UNITS OF THE 316TH RIFLE BRIGADE.
            The 1075th Infantry Regiment is credited with losing 4 tanks - Step on the throat of your wild imagination. and learn to perceive what is written LITERALLY
            I have seen the maps and will provide them on another issue. On German maps, it is NOT MARKED.
            Well, I understand: I haven't seen any German maps that were used by the 2nd TD headquarters and its units, but I KNOW FOR SURE that Dubosekovo is not marked on them.

            Let's finish - I don't see the point in discussing with dreamers
      2. 0
        8 February 2025 12: 41
        Quote: chenia
        Read the article. I write that tanks were needed to take Morozovo, Shiryaevo, Kelitsa. There were 5 tanks in the reconnaissance detachment, and then up to 5 tanks (platoon) or more could be given. And later they attacked Peteleno from the east, and completely moved to Hoppe.

        It should be noted here that in the morning of 1511.41. 5 TD conducted reconnaissance of the flanks (there is no order yet to clear the strip for 11 TD - it will be only at 20.00 (21.00 Moscow time). And there a reconnaissance detachment with 5 tanks passed Morozovo. Shiryaevo, all the way to Petelino.
        ZhBD BG 1 2 TD 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX ...The enemy in Morozovo and Shiryaevo was driven north by the reconnaissance detachment of the 5th Panzer Division. Two villages were partially burned.
        It was certain that Morozovo and Shiryaevo had only BOs, not main positions. Thus, Kelitsa was given no more than a platoon of tanks to solve these tasks, as indicated in Article -5 T-III (this does not include the tanks of the reconnaissance detachment -5 T-II).
        ZhBD 2 TD.8.00 (9.00 Moscow time).. Report of the 74th Artillery Regiment (AR74): Morozovo and Shiryaevo have been occupied by battle group 1. The enemy's resistance is quite weak..
        And here is the confirmation. And there were no problems.
        ZhBD 2 TD ....Battle group 1 receives orders to establish strong security with 5-cm anti-tank guns and light howitzers on the road to Istra and to set up obstacles against a possible attack by enemy tanks....
        Not after. So, in the best army traditions, they blamed their failures at Dubosekovo and at mark 231,5 on the 46th MK.
    2. 0
      3 February 2025 17: 35
      Quote: Lewww
      You are lying that the 3rd battalion of the 1075th regiment was built in two echelons.

      I would have had a diagram, but it turned out that it was lost. The 3rd battalion covered the main direction of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (this was during an attack from west to east).
      1. 0
        3 February 2025 17: 46
        I would have had a diagram, but it turned out that it disappeared.
        It's not the diagram that you've lost, but your memory - I refuted all your fabrications with arguments a year ago, but alas - everything flew out of my head, again from a clean slate.

        And your lost memory is replaced by hypertrophied fantasy.
    3. 0
      3 February 2025 17: 56
      Quote: Lewww
      You are lying that the 1075th Rifle Regiment did not have a 1st battalion - in the documents of the 1075th Rifle Regiment it is written that it did

      I wrote that the remnants of the 1st battalion companies were in the area of ​​the regiment's command post. If the 16.11st battalion was restored by 41/XNUMX, provide documents.
      Quote: Lewww
      you are lying that the 1075th Rifle Regiment had 16.11 anti-tank guns by 11, according to the regiment's headquarters documents the maximum number of anti-tank guns in the regiment was 6, but by 16.11 it was reduced to two, and they were NOT at the Dubosekovo base, but in the 1st battalion, which according to your statement did not exist, and the 2 guns that the regiment had were also NOT at the Dubosekovo base;

      Political report of the chief of the political department of the 316th rifle division battalion Commissar Galushko[54] to the head of the political department of the 16th Army, regimental commissar Maslenov. Village of Guseneyo, 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

      On the morning of 16.11.41 at 8.00:1075 the enemy began an offensive before us on the left flank of our defense in the area of ​​the XNUMXth Rifle Regiment…….
      The enemy was attacking with 50-60 tanks…..The 1075th Rifle Regiment had 2 antitank rifle platoons and one antitank gun in the fight against such a number of tanks. …The 1075th Rifle Regiment suffered heavy losses… According to unspecified data, at least 1075 enemy tanks were destroyed in the area of ​​the 9th Rifle Regiment…..
      P-k Kaprov- "... I had absolutely no anti-tank artillery in my regiment - it was replaced by old mountain guns, and at the front I received several French museum guns. Only at the end of October 1941 the regiment received 11 anti-tank rifles, of which 4 rifles were transferred to the 2nd battalion of our regiment...,
      ……I don’t remember now whether there were anti-tank rifles in the 4th company, but I repeat that in the entire 2nd battalion there were only 4 anti-tank rifles…...

      And about the guns at Dubosekovo, that's your invention, there's nothing like that in the article.
      Quote: Lewww
      you are lying that on 16.11 PG Hoppe was moving in the first echelon through Vasilyevskoye to the north,

      Not in the first echelon, but Hoppe's first echelon. So his units were there, and covered Hoppe. ZhBD Bg 1.
      Subgroup Hoppe [commander II battalion 2nd rifle regiment] (units: II battalion 2nd rifle regiment, II battalion 3rd tank regiment, 1 battery 74th artillery regiment, half of the 3rd company 38th artillery battalion, 2nd company of the 47th antiaircraft battalion.
      The 2nd company of the 47th machine gun battalion takes over air protection for two crossing points across the Lama River and provides cover for further advancement most of the Hoppe subgroup from air attacks.
      1. 0
        3 February 2025 20: 59
        I wrote that the remnants of the 1st battalion companies were in the area of ​​the regiment's command post. If the 16.11st battalion was restored by 41/XNUMX, provide documents.
        I'm not your nanny - look for it yourself.
        I can report that as of 12.11/1, there were 1075 people in the 150/XNUMXth regiment.
        Political report of the head of the political department of the 316th rifle division, battalion commissar Galushko
        Not true: according to the regiment headquarters document, by the beginning of the day on 16.11 there were 2 anti-tank rifles and 2 45-mm guns.
        Colonel Kaprov: “….. in my regiment there was absolutely no anti-tank artillery - it was replaced by old mountain guns,

        P-k Kaprov:
        "..There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo junction on November 15, 1941 - This is pure fiction."

        The 2nd company of the 47th machine gun battalion takes over air protection of two crossing points across the Lama River.
        and why on earth did you imagine that one of these two crossings over the Lama was precisely between Nelidovo and Vasilyevskoye?
        Have you been rolling your crystal ball again according to the 1980 plan? laughing

        Well, old age is no joy
        1. 0
          4 February 2025 19: 19
          Quote: Lewww
          I can report that as of 12.11/1, there were 1075 people in the 150/XNUMXth regiment.

          Eccentric. According to the staff, the battalion should have about 800 people. Rifle company - 178 people. The battalion has three rifle and one machine gun company, several platoons (Maintenance, Intelligence, Communications, Sanitary PT. and Mortar), command and staff.) If they even rarely turned on their brains, they would understand that they are only trying to restore the battalion. But for now, these are the remains of the companies - as was indicated in the article.
          1. 0
            4 February 2025 19: 22
            Eccentric. According to the staff, there should be about 800 people in a battalion. A rifle company - 178 people.
            You are truly insane.

            I wrote to you that the headquarters of the 1075th Rifle Regiment believes that the regiment has a first battalion, writes about this in the headquarters documents, and sets combat missions for the battalion.

            And I am not interested in your personal visions on this issue - travel in your parallel universe yourself
    4. 0
      3 February 2025 18: 01
      Quote: Lewww
      No precise information is provided as to where exactly PG Hoppe crossed the railway (near Nelidovo or near Petelino);

      Read the order and see where the crossings are located, across the Lama. And who guards them (units attached to Hoppe), which Hoppe should cover from the air.
      This is so detailed because you are slow-witted.
      1. 0
        3 February 2025 21: 13
        Read the order and see where the crossings are located across the Lama.
        Read it yourself and see that the order does not say where these crossings are.
        I noticed a long time ago: you use the texts of documents only to speculate about them and end up spewing out fantasies
        1. 0
          4 February 2025 19: 25
          Quote: Lewww
          Read it yourself and see that the order does not say where these crossings are.

          For this it is enough to have a head. But this is not for you.
          Map (there is also the Matrenino station) of the advancement of BG Fricke 11 TD on 17.11. (actions of 11 TD on the next day. It shows the advancement of part of the group along the northern route (there is one crossing point on Lama). And the second one is through Lama, on the road from Vasilyevskoye to Nelidovo.
          1. 0
            4 February 2025 19: 34
            The crossing is near Shitkovo, behind 5 TD, and to the north (2 TD strip). Here are two crossing points that are covered by a unit attached to Hoppe (a platoon of the 47th antiaircraft gun battalion). And there is NO SMELL in the area of ​​BG 2. BG 1 is everywhere. And first of all, we are interested in the bridge (crossing) to the north of Vasilyevskoye. And how easy it is to carry out the order - THROUGH THE LAMA, ATTACK IN THE AREA EAST OF NELIDOVO, you don't even have to think, everything is clear.
          2. 0
            4 February 2025 19: 41
            To do this, you just need to have a head.
            and have a map from 39-40, not the 1980 area plan that you are using
            There is a designated advance of part of the group along the northern route (there is one crossing point on Lama).
            You are crazy, this is not a route, but an axis of attack.
            Where the dotted line is, the terrain is impassable for tanks - forest, then the floodplain of the Lama River and then a ravine.. There is no crossing marked on the MAP in this place, there is not even any dirt road or clearing.
            Only infantry can get through there if it is not too lazy to trudge through the swamp and the river.

            It is simply insanity to reconstruct the events of the 41 battle using a 1980 terrain plan.
            However, your entire article is sheer nonsense - it simply cannot be done any other way with the approach you use.
            1. 0
              4 February 2025 22: 16
              Quote: Lewww
              you are crazy, this is not a route, but an axis of attack

              An illiterate miracle, everything up to the line of attack (and this is before Morozovo) is an advance along the route to the designated line. And then advancement in the offensive zone. And it is clear that advancement to Morozovo through Lama is possible for troops. Most likely there was a road directly to Shiryaevo,
              Morozovo... Moreover, the map, the plan of the upcoming offensive, dotted arrows (though poorly designed).
              And Kelits built it. A miracle. Forgot that BEFORE 21.00:5 Moscow time (maybe an hour and a half earlier) the 2th TD should advance from Shitkovo. And the 16.11.41nd TD should not plan to advance through Shitkovo (unless there was a mutual agreement on the priority of passage. And also different corps, well, here it is, without Gepner and a bottle they won’t figure it out). And that means the option northeast of Vasilyevskoye should be provided for. And on 17.11/XNUMX/XNUMX it may not have been needed (Kelits went to Soskino). But Fricke is planning for XNUMX/XNUMX.
              And the second crossing point (via Lama) is definitely on the road from Vasilyevskoye to Nelidovo.
              Everything should be clear here. But not for you, take up embroidery.
              1. 0
                4 February 2025 23: 01
                An illiterate miracle, everything up to the line of attack (and this is before Morozovo) is an advance along the route to the designated line. And then advancement in the offensive zone. And it is clear that advancement to Morozovo through Lama is possible for troops. Most likely there was a road directly to Shiryaevo,
                Most likely you have schizophrenia.
                When will you step on the throat of your imagination and start READING DOCUMENTS???

                ZhBD 2 td
                16.11. ...At 13.00 a radiogram arrives from the XXXXVI Tank Corps with the task strike from Shitkovo through Lama, since the advance of 2 Pz.D. was stalled under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo.
                The division commander decides to postpone today's offensive until 17.11/XNUMX due to ongoing marches. The division will go on the offensive on 17.11, cross the Lama and, advancing in a north-easterly direction, reach the Volokolamsk-Novo-Petrovskoye highway...

                17.11 ...At 10.30, Fricke's battle group, together with II./SR111, went on the offensive on a broad front and overcame Lama. After a short, heavy battle with the enemy defending well-fortified positions, the village of Morozovo was taken at 13.00...

                The documents of the 50th Cavalry Division noted that on the night of 16-17, enemy tanks and infantry were concentrated in Shitkovo.

                Why would tanks have to go through a forest and a swamp, where sappers would have to spend a long time cutting down trees and then building a crossing over the Lama, if they could have launched an offensive FROM SHITKOVO, as they were ordered on 16.11 and as the tankers of the 5th TD and 2nd TD did before???

                Don't write to me anymore - I'm tired of sorting out your fantasies
                1. 0
                  5 February 2025 21: 41
                  Quote: Lewww
                  Why would tanks have to trudge through a forest and a swamp, where sappers would have to spend a long time cutting down trees and then building a crossing over the Lama, if they could have started an offensive FROM SHITKOVO, as they were ordered to do on 16.11 and as the tankers of the 5th TD and 2nd TD had done before???

                  Why so many letters? What a weird map, this is. plan the upcoming offensive. And there are three routes of advance to the attack lines. And I don't give a damn how they went. I indicated that there was a planned northern route. THAT'S IT. So there was a crossing (which Kelits left). And whether it was used or not, that's no longer of interest to me. Turn on your brain, I claim that this crossing is one of the two prescribed in the BG 1 ZhBD. AND THAT'S IT! And it was created by Kelits' sappers, because as soon as it becomes clear in the morning of 16.11.41/11/5 that Kelits will be able to use the crossing at Shitkovo (the XNUMXth TD does not have time to get to its zone, to replace the XNUMXth TD in Shitkovo). You do not understand military affairs at all and do not keep the situation in your head, and all the changes that are happening.
                  Take up embroidery.
    5. 0
      3 February 2025 18: 31
      Quote: Lewww
      you are lying that in the advancing on Dubosekovo PG Hoppe “In the first echelon there was one tank company (17-19 tanks) and 2 infantry companies, and in front was a platoon of sappers-reconnaissance (pioneers)” and that “Hoppe “pushed” most of his first echelon, up to 14-15 tanks, through the Dubosekovo siding” - there is not a word about this in the Germans’ ZhBD, it does not say at all that UG Hoppe fought near Nelidovo,

      Order for HOPPE attack VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO was in ZhBD. WAS.
      Execution - At 8.00 (9.00 Moscow time) the railway crossed at Nelidovo and to the EAST. It was in the report. WAS.
      EVERYONE. PROVE THE OPPOSITE,
      And I know about the formation of the BP, but you don't. You have tanks in the first echelon, and infantry in the second - and for you these statements are the norm.
      Quote: Lewww
      because according to the documents of the 1075th Rifle Regiment, there were no antitank rifles in Gundilovich’s company;

      This is not Gundilovich's company, but a separate antitank platoon of the battalion. And it had antitank rifles. And since it is unstaffed, it is on allowance and under general command (supervision, so that they do not misbehave). And the platoon commander was wounded.
      Quote: Lewww
      it is not said that UG Hoppe fought near Nelidovo,

      According to German documents, she teleported to Petelino magically. WHAT'S VERY STRANGE, SOMETHING WAS BEING HIDDEN,
      Quote: Lewww
      You repeatedly lie that the Germans occupied the Matrenino station on 16.11 - this is refuted by the report of the commander of the 1/1073rd regiment Momysh Uly and the diagram attached to the report:

      I have already written to you that in Bek's book (1942) the memoirs of Momysh-Ula (where he talks about the capture of the station and the village) are a LIE for you (tales and epics). But why is it indicated in the documents of the 1st Tank Brigade,
      To destroy the enemy at the Matryonino station and its subsequent defense at 17:00 on November 16.11.41, 1, a consolidated battalion of the NKVD with 6 tanks was sent from the XNUMXst Guards Tank Brigade.
      By the time the battalion entered the station area, the enemy was driven out of there by units of the 316th rifle division.
      Having occupied the Matryonino station, parts of the brigade settled down:

      The document states that the station is occupied by the enemy, and the task is to liberate it and then defend it. Let's take the first part of the information about the situation - THE STATION IS OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY. Your trick that the 1st Guards Brigade did not see this - WILL NOT WORK. BECAUSE the information came from the 16th Army (of which the 1st Guards Brigade was a reserve), and the information about the occupation of Matrenino station came from the 316th Rifle Division. And the 316th Rifle Division came from MOMYSH-ULA. Ah, this is NOT AN EPIC. And such a report is under threat of a tribunal. And they usually keep quiet and try to correct the situation. But they do not report a screw-up that DOESN'T EXIST.
      Your brain is atrophied, and you are not able to understand the simple and understandable essence. Let's write it down like this
      1. 0
        3 February 2025 20: 43
        The order for HOPPE to attack EASTERN NELIDOVO was in the ZhBD. WAS.
        Execution - At 8.00 (9.00 Moscow time) the railway was crossed at Nelidovo and to the east. It was in the report.
        it's a lie, the railway records don't say verbatim that Hoppe's group crossed the railway at Nelidovo - you made that up yourself
        This is not Gundilovich's company, but a separate anti-tank platoon of the battalion.
        it's a lie, not a single document of the Red Army of 1941 says that the 28 Panfilovites defending Dubosekovo were a separate anti-tank platoon of the battalion - you made this up yourself
        Not tired of lying?
        I already wrote to you that in Beck's book
        I don't give a damn what you read in Beck's work.
        I have explained to you 10 times that based on the REPORTING DOCUMENT - Momysh uly's Report compiled on 20.11.41 and the diagram attached to it, it clearly follows that the GERMANS DID NOT CAPTURE THE MATRENINO STATION ON 16.11.

        And you first lie that the Germans captured the station, and then you accuse the compiler of the German ZhBD of hiding the fact that the Germans captured the station. And the key conclusion: you see, a clear example of how the Germans constantly lie in their documents

        But in the end it’s not the Germans who are lying, but you.
        1. 0
          4 February 2025 19: 49
          Quote: Lewww
          The railway does not say verbatim that Hoppe's group crossed the railway at Nelidovo

          And so she crossed VOSTOCHNEE NELIDOVO. You are obviously stuck.
          Well, if that's the case, then it's not written LITERALLY that Nelidov's railway and BG 2 crossed. So what to do now? You see how your LITERALLY can be turned against you. That's how it is.
          Quote: Lewww
          I don't care what you read in Beck's

          Well, Mamysh-Uly lied to the readers, announcing that the Germans had captured Matrenino station. BUT why did he deceive the command as well. Are you completely out of your mind? - INFORMATION ABOUT THE CAPTURE OF THE STATION DISPLAYED IN THE DOCUMENTS of the Dovatora Group, and the 1st Tank Brigade came from the 16th A. AND MOMYSH-ULY TOOK THEM THERE BY INSTRUCTION. YES, you, young man, need to see a psychiatrist.
          I've already said this several times. And you still HAVE NOT MOVE IN.
          Both the report and the diagram to it are NOT INTERESTING up to the third degree. He could write and draw whatever he wanted in it (especially on 20.11.41)

          Quote: Lewww
          But in the end it’s not the Germans who are lying, but you.

          NO, in the end it's the GERMANS who are LYING and YOU are LEFF (and constantly)
          1. 0
            4 February 2025 19: 54
            Well, if that’s the case, then it’s not written LITERALLY that Nelidov’s railway and BG 2 crossed over.
            but it is written that she captured Nelidovo.
            And the fact that Nelidovo had Hoppe's group YOUR FANTASY on 16.11/XNUMX
            Well, Mamysh-Uly lied to the readers, announcing that the Germans had captured Matrenino station. BUT why did he deceive the command as well.
            he deceived the command only in your crazy head
            1. 0
              4 February 2025 22: 22
              Quote: Lewww
              And the fact that Nelidovo had Hoppe's group YOUR FANTASY on 16.11/XNUMX

              His. not my fantasy. but the order obliges. And your option, it's your nonsense - where to the east of Nelidovo, to use when there are several toponyms. Not yours, embroidery 9this will calm your nerves.
              1. 0
                4 February 2025 23: 07
                It's not my fantasy, but the order obliges.
                hmm, the woodpecker doesn't have a headache laughing
            2. 0
              4 February 2025 22: 40
              Quote: Lewww
              he deceived the command only in your crazy head

              You are in a position where you have nothing to say. It is you who claim that the documents of Dovator's group and the 1st Tank Brigade are lies. Like, they themselves did not see the battle, so they can be wrong. (Why is there no such approach with Kaprov). I showed you what kind of system of reports and dispatches where the headquarters do not see but control based on information from below. And you got yourself into a stupid position. It is not important what he wrote in the report (and he wrote that he retreated), but what he passed on to the higher headquarters.
              Now we skip the intermediate details - AND WE CLEARLY SEE THAT THE GERMANS IN THEIR DOCUMENTS They're lying, it's proven Your attempt to whitewash them has FAILED. Congratulations on that. I don't think you'll object.
              1. 0
                4 February 2025 23: 08
                Do not text me anymore - I don't see the point in discussing your fantasies, I'm tired of it
        2. 0
          5 February 2025 21: 16
          Quote: Lewww
          not a single document of the Red Army of 1941 states that the 28 Panfilovites defending Dubosekovo were a separate anti-tank platoon of the battalion - you came up with that yourself

          Officially-tank destroyer team. Composed of experienced fighters. specifically for fighting tanks (as part of the division (Ugryumov) regiment - in the 316th SD as part of battalions (and carried out the tasks of the battalion, and even the regiment for anti-tank defense) A non-staff unit and therefore assigned to one of the battalion companies. There are a bunch of orders from the front. up to 16 A about this.
          I called it a PT platoon, in the article it says - "...we will call it a PT platoon..." Write faster, the meaning does not change.
    6. 0
      3 February 2025 18: 40
      Quote: Lewww
      and your biggest lie is that the battle at once. Dubosekovo lasted FOUR hours.

      You read the article, it goes on and on, I'm hammering in that there were TWO FIGHTS. And of course there was a certain break.
      The Germans got their asses handed to them. Then regrouping. New offensive by PG Hoppe, from Peteleno together with BG 2, and at about the same time, the Germans begin a battle with the 4th company (and our platoon) and also with the 5th company.
      ALL.
      It's you who are constantly lying. You want foreign gingerbread. It's too late, time has passed.
      1. 0
        3 February 2025 20: 35
        You read the article, it goes on and on, I keep telling you that there were TWO FIGHTS
        this is your personal fantasy, born from your speculation of the texts of the documents - the documents do not literally say this
        New offensive by PG Hoppe, from Peteleno together with BG 2
        Again, your personal fantasy - there is not a word about it in the documents

        You are not a researcher, you are a storyteller - a worthy successor to the tradition established by Krivitsky laughing
        1. 0
          4 February 2025 19: 53
          Quote: Lewww
          about this verbatim

          Again, verbatim. So the second battle, even your category designated by Medinsky, does not deny. Otherwise, why did they die? And, now it is becoming increasingly difficult for you to deny the first battle. You are talking such nonsense that is incompatible with common sense, my head is bursting.
          1. -1
            4 February 2025 20: 01
            So the second fight, even your category designated by Medinsky, does not deny.
            I don't know which category denies what.

            I just see that You constantly distort the contents of documents, because there is no other way to support your crazy fantasies.

            And the fact that the battle of the 28th at Dubosekovo is a FICTION, even Kaprov reported:
            ...There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo junction on November 16, 1941 - this is pure fiction...
            ...None of the correspondents approached me during this period; I never told anyone about the battle of the 28 Panfilov men, and I could not tell anyone, because... there was no such fight.

            And I agree with him in his assessment.
            However, you can claim that he showed this under torture - I won't be surprised.
            1. 0
              4 February 2025 22: 27
              Quote: Lewww
              ...There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo siding on November 16, 1941 - this is a complete fabrication...

              This is not an argument, especially since he spoke correctly for the entire company. But he did not see the battle, and in your opinion he is not a witness.
              Quote: Lewww
              However, you can claim that he showed this under torture - I won't be surprised.

              Why? To put psychological pressure on him, and he will say something else about the platoon. It's just a matter of fact. For the Prosecutor's Office.
        2. +1
          5 February 2025 21: 49
          Quote: Lewww
          New offensive by PG Hoppe, from Peteleno together with BG 2
          Again, your personal fantasy - there is not a word about it in the documents

          You're lying.ZhBD 2 TD
          ....After new preparations and reconnaissance of the roads, the offensive on the highway began. Which was reached by 14.00 on a wide front. By 15.15 the combat units occupied Lyscevo and Rozhdestvenno.
          LEFF, you forgot who you are dealing with, you won’t be able to deceive me.
  26. 0
    3 February 2025 21: 05
    Quote: chenia
    Here I use the information given by Yu. Pashalok - and at that time there were about 2 tanks in the 130nd TD.

    Gunner, a link to the source where you got the data that on 16.11.41 there were 60 tanks in PG Hoppe, can you imagine, or honestly admit that and you came up with this yourself?

    And he is not Pashalok, but Pasholok
    1. 0
      4 February 2025 19: 54
      You'll find it yourself. That's how you seem to answer.
      1. 0
        4 February 2025 19: 55
        no, unlike you I indicate the name of the documents
        In short, about 60 tanks, that's also your fantasy - and write
        1. +1
          4 February 2025 22: 28
          In short, refute with documents. What's the problem?
  27. -1
    5 February 2025 11: 24
    But let's try to figure out why our operational documents (combat reports) do not mention the battle at Dubosekovo anywhere. The battle at Dubosekovo, and even higher up to Petelino, could only be seen by the commander of the 2nd battalion, Mr. Reshetnikov, with the ability to pass the information up the chain of command. So, the first battle (at 9.00:9.30 Moscow time) takes place at Dubosekovo, and at about 6:3 the attack on Petelino, where the battalion commander's command post is, has already begun. That's it, from that moment the connection is lost. The 9.30th company, together with the battalion commander, retreat north to the 4rd battalion, and partly northeast to the forest. And if you look at the map, what can our troops see in the area south of Petelino, including Dubosekovo? The area is completely closed to observation. There is no connection. There is zero information. From that moment (XNUMX Moscow time) the most senior commander who saw the battle was only the commander of the XNUMXth company, Captain Gundilovich, who came out to his men after dark. This is the case when there was a feat, but at first no one saw it.
    .

    “You think so? Then please listen,” the cat responded, squinting from
    pleasure, told about how he once wandered for
    nineteen days in the desert and the only food he ate was the meat of a tiger he had killed. Everyone listened to this entertaining story with interest, and when Behemoth finished it, they all exclaimed in chorus:
    - Lies!
    “And the most interesting thing about this lie,” said Woland, “is that it—”
    a lie from the first to the last word.

    M.A. Bulgakov The Master and Margarita


    Gunner has an interesting feature: once he starts to compose something, it ends up being a lie, from the first to the last word.
    A letter from Gundilovich to Klochkov's widow has been made public, in which he reports that he and Klochkov fought in the same trench and that he died from a bullet. The word TANK is not used in the letter - a battle with infantry is described.

    Gunner - write more! drinks
    1. +1
      5 February 2025 21: 23
      Quote: Lewww
      A letter from Gundilovich to Klochkov's widow has been made public, in which he reports that he and Klochkov fought in the same trench and that he died from a bullet. The word TANK is not used in the letter - a battle with infantry is described.

      Definitely, in an open field the Germans were going to our trenches and machine guns without tanks and did not use artillery and mortars (as it is written in the letter). Well, they are stupid. Researcher LEFF determined so.
      1. -1
        5 February 2025 21: 27
        Gunner, I have already answered you FOUR TIMES today:

        DON'T ANSWER ME ANYMORE - I don't see the point in having discussions with science fiction writers
  28. 0
    8 February 2025 12: 11
    Kaprov's early testimony.
    "...By November 16, the division was preparing for an offensive battle, but the Germans were ahead of us. From early in the morning of November 16, 1941, the Germans carried out a large air raid, and then a strong artillery barrage….At about 11 o’clock, small groups of enemy tanks appeared in the battalion’s sector. In total, there were XNUMX tanks in the battalion’s sector.she 10-12 enemy tanks. How many tanks were going to the 4th company's sector, I don't know, or rather, I can't determine. With the resources of the regiment and the efforts of the 2nd battalion, this tank attack of the Germans was repelled. In the battle, the regiment destroyed 5-6 German tanks, and the Germans retreated... Around 14:00-15:00, the Germans opened heavy artillery fire on all positions of the regiment, and the German tanks went on the attack again... ".

    The time is slightly shifted, but it is consistent with the ZhBD 11 TD.

    В 13.00 (14.00) a radiogram arrives from the XXXXVI Tank Corps with the task of striking from Shitkovo through Lama, since the advance of 2 Pz.D. stalled under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo.
    It is understandable that it is a bit late - 2 TD is already conducting a second offensive, but the delay is indicated. And there was no flanking fire according to the documents of 2 TD. It was when they got stuck that they started to expose their neighbors 46 MK (they messed up with the regrouping of 5 TD and 11 TD. There were problems at Dubosekovo and with Kraev's company (mark 231,5) at Chapel.
    And here is confirmation of the continuation of the offensive - after it "STOPPED"
    2 TD. 21.05 Evening report to the V Army Corps:

    ……After new preparations and reconnaissance of the roads, the offensive on the highway began. Which was achieved by 14.00 on a wide front....
    So, Kaprov described everything correctly in general terms. And he did NOT SINGLE OUT the platoon. And he emphasizes that the regiment's resources and the efforts of the 2nd battalion thwarted the tank attack.
    Here you have two battles. Here you have lost tanks, because WITHOUT LOSSES THEY DO NOT STOP.