28 Panfilovites. Anatomy of a feat

The article, taking into account the emergence of new documents, is an addition to the article “The battle at Dubosekovo. Anatomy of a feat».
Entry
Dubosekovo, a symbol of the Battle of Moscow. More than 80 years ago, a well-known episode of the war took place, which still gives rise to debates about the authenticity of the feat of the Panfilov soldiers under the command of political instructor Vasily Klochkov. Especially after the appearance of the following document - "Reference-report "On 28 Panfilov soldiers" by the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Lieutenant General of Justice N. Afanasyev dated May 10, 1948. This important reference-report was classified for a long time, and only relatively recently did current researchers gain access to it. This document denied the feat of 28 Panfilov soldiers, presenting it as the fantasies of war correspondents. Let's not focus on this document for now (we will clarify this misunderstanding later) and try to restore historical justice, without hiding behind the historical significance of the feat.
And let's start with the most common argument of the doubters - the Germans simply did not notice any particular resistance not only from a platoon of the 4th company, but from almost the entire 1075th Rifle Regiment. And the documents (ZBD - combat journal) of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht (whose units and subdivisions fought in the area of the Dubosekovo junction) clearly do not show the difficulties in overcoming the defense on 16.11.41 (unless, of course, you read them very carefully and without certain training). But there is an interesting document, an entry in the ZBD of the 11th TD from 16.11.41. (in brackets, Moscow time - in the original, Berlin).
This document records the EVENT - "the advance of the 2nd Pz.D. has stalled", and we will consider how it is connected with the battle near Dubosekovo. We will also take into account that the advance of the 2nd TD has STALLED was noticed not only in the 5th AC (which included the division), but also in the 4th TG. That is where the commanding reprimand from Gen. Gepner (commander of the 4th TG) came from both in the 5th AC and in the 46th MK. The time is characteristic - 14:00 (MSK). Let's remember. And based on the available documents (ours and the enemy's), we will determine the time and place of this EVENT.
Disposition
Now let us consider the position (battle formation) of the 316th Rifle Division on 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

(1 schema)
After leaving Volokolamsk, the division retreated to previously prepared (relatively, naturally) positions and occupied the defensive zone shown in diagram 1. Along the front, 16 km (in October it was more - 42 km), and included sections of regiments (1073 Rifle Regiment, 1075 Rifle Regiment, 1077 Rifle Regiment) and the attached 690 Rifle Regiment.
There is evidence that the positions were already 90-100% ready by the start of the German offensive. The regiments were pretty battered (no more than half of the list remained), combat capability was restored through redistribution (the 1073rd Rifle Regiment did not have a 3rd battalion, and the 1075th Rifle Regiment did not have a 1st battalion, the remaining companies were reserves). But literally on the eve of the German offensive, the division received reinforcements. artillery it was significantly worse than in October (in October there were as many as 8 regular and attached artillery regiments), by November there were already 4 battered artillery regiments - the regular 857th AP (since 18.11.41/27/358 the 768th Guards AP), the attached 296th AP and XNUMXth, XNUMXth anti-tank regiments.
Based on the presented scheme (the scheme was drawn up on 5.11.41, but certain changes on 16.11.41 should be taken into account), the enemy's main attack was expected to come from the front from Volokolamsk (building obstacles, minefields and AT areas). On the night of 15.11.41, the enemy (units of the 5th TD) conducted reconnaissance on the left flank (all the way to Petelino). And Panfilov decided to place his reserve - the 1st battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (Momysh-Uly) in Goryuny (Anino). Along the Volokolamsk highway there were AT gun positions (768th, 296th AT regiments). And in the event of a retreat of our troops during the German offensive from Volokolamsk to Moscow, the infantry was to take up positions nearby and cover the artillery.
The battle formation of the 1075th Rifle Regiment of interest to us was built taking into account the enemy's advance from the western direction, along the Volokolamsk highway. The main attention was paid to the third battalion, which covered the southern side of the highway. And therefore the 3rd battalion was built in two echelons, blockages (obstacles) and minefields were arranged. Of the AT weapons in the 3rd battalion (excluding grenades and lighters), there were 7 AT guns (out of 11 in the regiment). Behind the first position were the regiment's artillery AT weapons (initially the regiment had two 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 model, several 76-mm mountain guns of the 1909 model and 75-mm French divisional guns Mle.18, well, taking into account the losses on 16.11 there were no more than 2-4 guns). So the 1075th Rifle Regiment had only conditional AT artillery. And the reserve, the remnants of the companies of the 1st battalion (in the area of the regiment's command post).
The 4nd Battalion occupied the defensive positions of the 6th and 300th companies (Dubosekovo station - east of Bolshoe Nikolskoye, 5 m north of Petelino), including the railway line - an arc (the cuts and embankments of which were a natural element of the BRO and the subsequent line of defense) and the 50th company strongpoint (Shiryaevo - Dubosekovo station) to the junction with the 244,0th Cavalry Division. The intermediate line during the retreat were the positions near the height of XNUMX (minefields, blockages). This would cover the important road (roundabout) Morozovo - Matrenino station - Lystsevo, with the Volokolamsk highway crossing it and the road from Ivantsevo adjoining it.
The railway track (naturally, without rails and sleepers, the latter went to dugouts and covered cracks) contained relatively deep cuts and a high embankment. Therefore, tanks could pass only at the Dubosekovo siding (passage width - up to 250 m) or south of Petelino (passage width - up to 150 m) or directly along the Petelino - Shiryaevo road. Moreover, if the tanks went (in the supposed direction of the attack from west to east) to the arc, they could pass mainly through the Dubosekovo siding. There, in the most accessible (tank-hazardous) direction for tanks, the 2nd platoon (tank destroyer team) was stationed (as expected).
Let us repeat, it is necessary to take into account that the scheme of the defense zone of the 316th Division from 5.11.41, and in 10 days there will be changes. This means an even greater strengthening of the defense (obstacles, minefields). Somewhere by 11.11.41 the division's defense zone was already 90-100% prepared in engineering terms. Let us also note that the day before (15.11.41) the 16th Army received an order to attack Volokolamsk. The offensive on 15-16.11.41 was carried out by the division's right neighbors (58th TD, 17th Cavalry Division, 44th Cavalry Division). The left neighbor, Dovator's cavalry group (50th Cavalry Division, 52nd Cavalry Division), reinforced by the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, was also preparing for the offensive. And it is necessary to take into account that at 9.00 on 16.11.41 the 316th SD planned to support the attack of its neighbors (a strike tying up the enemy reserves) when the latter reached certain lines. This means that the corresponding measures should have already been carried out, this concerns mainly the artillery. Hence, the location of the regular and attached artillery may differ from the diagram.
- Colonel Kaprov.
And the Germans went another way. The German offensive was on Klin (from the southwest to the north and northeast). And this direction determined (later, in the second attack) the defeat of the 2nd battalion, squeezed from the east, south and north by two combat groups of the 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht.
Enemy
The enemy (5th Army Corps) with forces of two divisions (2nd TD - 7.30:35 Moscow time), (14.30th ID - from 16.11.41:4 Moscow time) in converging directions on XNUMX (two days before the general offensive of the XNUMXth TG) began a private offensive.
Divisional order 030 2nd tank division 14.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
The 5th TD (46th MK) was also supposed to support the offensive on the right. It was conducting reconnaissance of the flanks on 15.11.42/46/5. But by the evening, it was decided to replace the 11th MK (which included the 11th TD) with the 5th TD. The divisional order for the 20th TD to occupy the 00th TD's offensive zone was issued at 21:00 (15.11.41:11 Moscow time) on 5/16.11.41/XNUMX. The XNUMXth TD did not have time to occupy the XNUMXth TD's offensive zone and did not enter the battle on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
The 11th TD will begin its offensive only on 17.11.41 against the 50th Cavalry Division and wedge itself into the unprotected flank of the 316th Rifle Division. That is, on 16.11.41, two divisions participated in the offensive against the 316th Rifle Division. The direction of the offensive (as stated earlier) of the 2nd TD was from the southwest to the north and northeast, and not from the west to the east (i.e., not along the Volokolamsk highway - to Moscow, but across at an angle - to Klin). By the way, we note that this cut off part of our anti-tank artillery (the 857th AP and the 768th anti-tank artillery), located along the Volokolamsk highway, from our units. And the anti-tank artillery, deprived of cover in the forest on the clearings, became easy prey for the German infantry.
For the 2nd TD, reaching the Lyscevо-Avdotyino line was the task of the day together with the 35th ID (and they were supposed to take Chentsy along the way). And on the second day (X-1) only clear the area of encircled small groups, establish supplies and prepare for a general offensive on 18.11.41/35/16.11.41. But the 316th ID (58/XNUMX/XNUMX) was under attack by the right neighbor of the XNUMXth Rifle Division - our XNUMXth TD, and was only able to begin the planned offensive with an attack on Chentsy in the second half of the day... (running ahead).
ZhBD 35th PD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
In short, the Germans did not take Chentsy on 16.11.41.
But we are most interested in the actions of the 2nd TD, which attacked the 1975th Rifle Regiment, which occupied a defensive sector on the left flank of the 316th Rifle Division (Diagram 2).
For the offensive, according to divisional order No. 029 2 TD 13.11.41, three battle groups (Kampfgruppe -KG) were formed:
BG-1 under the command of the commander of the 2. Schtz.Brigade (2nd Rifle Brigade). Composed of: Schtz.Rgt.2 (2nd Rifle Regiment - in our tradition, and to avoid confusion - an infantry regiment), II./Pz.Rgt.3 (2nd Tank Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment), II./AR74 (2nd ADN of the 74th AP), 2./Pz.Jag.Abt.38 (2nd PT Company of the 38th IPTB).
BG-2 under the command of the commander Kradschtz.Btl.2: Kradschtz.Btl.2 (motorcycle battalion) without 1./Pz.AA5 (1st reconnaissance company), one company of heavy and one company of light tanks Pz.Rgt.3 (1 TB, 3 TP), one battery of AR74 (74th AP).
BG-3 under the command of the commander 2.Schtz.Rgt.304: Schtz.Rgt.304 (304 PP), I./Pz.Rgt.3 (1 TB, 3 TP - without two companies), III./AR74 (3 ADN, 74 AP), Bb.74 (74th reserve battalion), Nbl.Abt.74 (multiple launch mortar division).
Divisional order 030 2TD 14.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
……Battle Group 2 is to move out of its security sector at Y time and attack the enemy in front of Battle Group 3 in the direction of Nikolskoye-Nelidovo, overcome the enemy positions in front of Battle Group 3 and clear the area together with Battle Group 3 of encircled enemy groups. Battle Group 3 is to go on the offensive as soon as the offensive of Battle Groups 1 and 2 yields results, clear the area in front of its previous positions together with Battle Group 2 up to the location of Battle Group 1……..
In turn, in the BG 1 that interests us most, two subgroups of the PG (UG- untergruppe) were created:
PG Kelitsa (commander of 2 Schtz. Rgt. – (2nd rifle regiment), colonel). BG 1 K consisting of:
ZhBD (2 Schtz. Rgt.) BG 1 (2nd TD) 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
PG Hoppe (commander of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd Schtz. Rgt., major) BG 1 X- consisting of: — «: II battalion of the 2nd rifle regiment, II battalion of the 3rd tank regiment, 1st battery of the 74th artillery regiment, half of the 3rd company of the 38th artillery battalion, 2nd company of the 47th infantry battalion.
Problem:
A very important fragment of the order, it obliges PG Hoppe (filled with tanks, about 60 units, staff - 71) to attack positions from the Dubosekovo siding and to the left, somewhere 1,2-1,5 km to Nelidovo. Let's pay attention. Well, Nelidovo (incl.) and to the left (according to divisional order No. 030) behind BG 2.
If you read the documents of the 2nd TD (division order No. 030), the first contradiction is the dividing lines of the offensive zones of BG 1 and BG 2. They do not correspond to the real (future) development of events. Let's assume that the tasks set for this plan on the map (in the order) were adjusted during reconnaissance on the ground. And it also seems (according to the 2nd TD's combat document) that the entire BG 1 went through Morozovo and Shiryaevo to Petelino and the Matrenino station. And the gap between BG 2 and BG 1 turns out to be somewhat unnatural. The main position, occupied in advance (prepared and developed in engineering terms), is attacked in a disjointed manner, when it is necessary to think about securing both flanks? In the depth of the defense (the density of the defense decreases there) this is still possible. But a breakthrough of the main position - well, that does not happen, this is not an operational level. And this order puts everything in place. BG 2 and PG Hoppe, in elbow contact, simultaneously advance north (BG 2 - to the left of Nelidovo (incl.), PG Hoppe - to the right). Now everything is correct.

2 schema
Having occupied the 14th TD zone on November 15 and 5 (according to divisional order #029), the 2nd TD began preparing for the upcoming private offensive (order #030). Having captured Vasilyevskoye, two crossings were created across the Lama River. One to the north of Vasilyevskoye (the Nelidovo-Vasilyevskoye road), and the other to the east (this will be used by BG Fricke of the 11th TD on November 17.11.41, 5 to advance to Morozovo). And they are taken under protection by a unit assigned to Hoppe. The crossing at Shitkovo is for now under the 1th TD. ZhBD BG 2 (15.11.41nd TD) November XNUMX, XNUMX.
Which additionally confirms the direction of the upcoming offensive of PG Hoppe to the north, through Lama and the railway to Petelino, according to the order. And this means that the battle (the first) at the Dubosekovo siding is predetermined.
The battle
Let's consider (selectively) the chronology of the German offensive according to the enemy's combat documents (ZhBD 2 TD, ZhBD BG 1, ZhBD 11 TD, 5 AK, 46 MK) and ours - Combat Report (BD) No. 22 316 SD, etc. Comparing our combat documents and the enemy's, it is obvious that they basically correspond to each other. The time difference is insignificant and quite explainable. And let's try to reconstruct the picture of the combat actions of the 2 TD. Advancement from the initial area of PG Kielica.
ZhBD BG 1 (2 TD) 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
ZhBD 2TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
Ours confirms - BD No. 22 316 SD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
First, let's determine what forces and in what direction BG 1 and BG 2 were operating (diagram 2). So, at 6.30 (7.30 Moscow time), during the fire preparation period (aviation, artillery):
BG 1 (PG Kelits) from the initial area (Ivlevo) consisting of 1 battalion with part of the regular regimental artillery, the 2nd AT company of the 38th IPPT Battalion, a tank reconnaissance group consisting of 5 tanks (a TB reconnaissance platoon, T-2 tanks) with one platoon of riflemen, 1 sapper group and one AT platoon of the 1st company of the 38th IPDT, a repair and recovery and medical unit, are already moving to the attack line. For attacks on open spaces (Morozovo, Shiryaevo), Kelits should have had up to a platoon of tanks (4-5 T-III tanks). Gabidulin (a witness to the battle) indicates the presence of 4 tanks. After completing the task, they retreated again to Hoppe. And Kelits then went through the forests and ravines, he did not really need tanks (although a reconnaissance platoon of a tank battalion (5 T-II) could have been).
BG 1 (PG Hoppe) was in the initial area of Krasikovo, Yuryevo. In Krasikovo there was a command post of the BG 1 and 11 companies (regimental artillery), and was advancing (the first echelon) according to the order through Vasilyevskoye to the north, through Lama to the railway track Nelidovo - Dubosekovo siding.
The firing positions of the 74th AP divisions, attached to BG 3 and BG 2, were presumably located in the Zhdanovo area behind the crest of hill 228,5. And the 2nd adn. of the 74th AP (attached to BG 1) had an OP in the Shiryaevo area as the group advanced. One battery was assigned to organize anti-tank screens (lines) together with the 2nd anti-tank company of the 38th independent tank battalion. The firing positions (before the offensive) of the regimental artillery were located, BG 1 ZhBD (2nd TD) 15.11.41/11/00, XNUMX:XNUMX:
And BG 2 (the first echelon) from the initial area of Krasikovo, having bypassed the floodplain of Lama on the left, began to advance in the direction of Nelidovo. The subsequent forces (reserves and rear) most likely advanced from Zhdanovo. Perhaps part of the forces of the first echelon (part of the tank company or even the whole) followed the route of PG Hoppe's advance to the crossing (well, this was after coordination with the division commander), and then along the road to Nelidovo.
ZhBD 2nd TD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
According to the combat formation diagram of the 316th Rifle Division (diagram 1), where the main positions of the 316th Rifle Division are located 1–0,5 km east of the settlements of Nelidovo and Bolshoe Nikolskoye), it can be determined that BG 2 begins to cut off only the combat outposts. Hence the “few enemy.”
BG-1 (PG Kelitsa) after fire preparation, the first echelon (two infantry companies, sappers, a tank platoon) attacked the 1075th Rifle Regiment at the junction with the 50th Cavalry Division.
BD No. 22 316th SD:
ZhBD 2-y TD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
BG 1 (PG "Keliza"), having knocked out the combat outpost east of Morozovo (and captured it), crushed the left flank of the 5th company of the 2nd battalion, took Shiryaevo and advanced into the depths. And there was a feat there, and there the Germans suffered losses and were delayed for some time, these settlements were mainly covered by the BO. Part of the 5th company of the 2/1075th rifle regiment retreated to the right into the forest, and part went to the left behind the ravine to the floodplain of the Lama. Then the Germans, continuing to advance (BG-1), covered the flank (behind Morozovo in accordance with the order, see below) - the 2nd AT company and the battery of the 2/74th AP moved to the first AT line (diagram 2).
ZhBD BG 1 (2nd TD). 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
Here you can see that one battery of the 2/74th AP was present in the advancing part of BG 1 (they were afraid of the KV-1). During the further advance, the disposition of the Kelitsa units was as follows: the 1st company advanced on a wide front to the right of the railway to Petelino to the Matrenino station; the 2nd company at Morozovo and to the east; the 3rd company moved behind the 1st company (later) to Petelino (from Shiryaevo); the 4th company to the east of Morozovo and advancing north (the Morozovo - Matrenino station road) to elevation 231,5 to the positions of Kraev's company. It should also be taken into account that the Germans formed teams on the basis of infantry platoons (reinforced platoon), which even included units and several units of equipment, including tanks.
ZhBD BG 1 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
A BG 1 (PG Hoppe) according to the order “...attacks across the Lama River east of Nelidovo...».
And the execution of this order is confirmed by the following document: evening report in the V AK 21.05 (22.05 Moscow time) 16.11.41:
And Hoppe attacks, of course, simultaneously with BG-2. The attack front of the battle groups (taking into account the previously occupied defense) could be up to 1,2 km (the Germans are still impudent). In the first echelon, one tank company (17-19 tanks) and 2 infantry companies, and in front - a platoon of sappers-reconnaissance (pioneers). In the text, for understanding the formation of the battle order, there may be a designation "first", but remember: the 2nd tank battalion is the 4th, 5th and 6th companies, the same applies to the infantry, Hoppe has the 6th-10th companies.
The second echelon (more likely a reserve) of BG 1 PG Hoppe is another (second) tank company in a marching column, following the attacking units at a distance of 2-3 km (or maybe even closer, given that our artillery is sparse). That is, at the time of the attack of the first echelon, the second is just forming into columns in the initial area or is just beginning to advance.
So, having crossed the railway east of Nelidovo, PG Hoppe first of all attacks the positions of our PT platoon. And it cannot be any other way. There are no options that the Germans did not notice, went around, slipped through, jumped over, etc. And in turn, the witnesses of the battle were right, telling about the first battle. But it is this battle that is denied by the witnesses of the "you are all lying" sect, who claim that the Germans went around the platoon (and the 4th company), and then easily and simply cleaned it up. NO!!!
It is not known for certain how the Germans "read" and exposed our positions. The 2nd TD learned about the enemy from the words of the 5th TD. Nelidovo hides our positions from the enemy's optical reconnaissance. But, most likely, they calculated that the main position is to the east of Nelidovo up to 1 km. Since the railway line from Nelidovo up to 700-800 m has cuts and embankments, and then there is a gap, a place free of cuts and embankments up to 250-300 m, then all the way to the Dubosekovo siding there is another cut impassable for tanks. So they calculated that the front would run from north to south, from Petelino to the beginning of this cut (which, in theory, should cover the right flank). And to go through the Dubosekovo siding means to go to the rear of the main position. And by the way, during the enemy's artillery preparation, not much "hit" our actual positions and there were no losses. This shows that the Germans did not completely open our defense.
So Hoppe "pushed" most of his first echelon, up to 14-15 tanks, through the Dubosekovo siding. Part (up to 4 tanks) could pass through the passage 1 km east of Nelidovo (although some nuances show that all the tanks went through the Dubosekovo siding). First, the pioneers went beyond the siding, and they went brazenly, as witnesses of the battle claimed. They were fired upon. Then the tanks went, followed by a chain of infantry. And so, when deploying tanks in a battle line, the Germans had to make a flank movement (in Shemyakin - a column of tanks). The infantry in the trenches and behind the embankments covers the deployment, so that later they can move in a chain behind the tanks.
The Germans did not expect stubborn resistance and did not even use artillery or mortars beforehand. They relaxed. And they started getting a bunch of bullets in the sides from the antitank rifles. T-III tanks, even modernized (up to 30 mm of side armor), are penetrable at 250 m. And they were from 50 m to 200 m from our positions. And so the first battle of our antitank platoon began.
It can be noted that almost simultaneously the battle groups (as expected) attack the positions of the left flank of the 1075th Rifle Regiment. BG 2 is lighter, it continues to knock out our combat security west of Nelidovo, without crashing into the main positions of the 1075th Rifle Regiment. The attacking part of BG 1 (Kelits) continues to develop the offensive in the direction of the Shiryaevo - Petelino road (1 company) to the right (east) of the railway track, to mark 244,0 through the forest to Matrenino station (right flank in the offensive zone of the 2nd TD). The 4th company is east of Morozovo to the north (partially along the forest road Morozovo - Matrenino station) to the chapel (mark 231,5). The 3rd company has positions from Shiryaevo to Petelino.
ZhBD 2TD 16.11.41/10.13/XNUMX (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time):
BD 316 SD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
So, Kelits is advancing from the right of the railway, and Petelino could only be taken by Hoppe. But Hoppe (most of the first echelon) was stuck at Dubosekovo. However, part of the forces of the left flank could, without any particular delays (our positions were not there), advance north to Petelino. This is a little more than 1 km. And in 20-30 minutes they could be at the western outskirts of Petelino. At the same time, the battle at the Dubosekovo junction is still going on.
In the same way, a group of tanks (temporarily attached to Kelits to solve the problem of open spaces), after taking Shiryaevo, again comes under Hoppe's command and moves from the east (along the Shiryaevo-Petelino road) to the specified village. Our troops are not there. Well, and then, the blow from the front and rear allows the Germans to take Petelino. The 6th company of the 1075th rifle regiment was partially pushed back to the positions of the 3rd battalion, and partially withdrew to the trench northeast of Petelino. Also, the right-flank units of our 4th company were pressed to the Dubosekovo junction. By this time, BG 2 clears Nelidovo (the 2nd battalion's BO withdrew there) and continues to advance on B. Nikolskoye (there are also only BO positions from the 3rd battalion of the 1075th rifle regiment).
There is also a possibility that the right flank of BG 2 (under orders from the 2nd TD commander) participated in the attack on Peteleno, attacking the western outskirts of the village. Confirmation in the following document: BD No. 22 316 SD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. “At 11:30 the enemy left Peteleno and sent its tanks to Volokolamsk…”, which indirectly confirms the participation of BG 2 tanks (and infantry too) in the attack on Peteleno, which then went to their offensive zone (to the west, in the direction of Volokolamsk).
What's going on at the Dubosekovo junction? When the antitank rifles started firing, they weren't identified as priority targets (just like regular riflemen). First of all, the machine gun, there were no guns. The effect of the antitank rifle is not strong (5-10 hits and up to 3-5 penetrations are needed). And only then can one or another unit of the tank be damaged. Moreover, the tank, as a rule, will not stop immediately, but only when the effect of the engine or transmission malfunction begins to clearly manifest itself. Moreover, the tank can crawl to the enemy positions and stop there. And the probability of being destroyed then will be very high. One lighter can only char the paint, but five is already a crematorium for the crew. And if a couple of antitank grenades or a mine are dragged under the bottom. And if the attack is successful for the Germans (the battlefield is behind them), then the tanks, having received damage from the antitank rifles, are quickly restored. And if not, and the attack is called off, then the tanks stuck in our positions are finished off (destroyed).
The main factor of success against a strong enemy is surprise. Reasons: first, the Germans did not penetrate our defenses in this area accurately enough, hence; second, the platoon, and the positions of the 4th company, were not reliably suppressed during the fire preparation and later; third, the Germans thought that there were rear units in front of them (quick reconnaissance did not reveal any significant fire weapons), and they lost their caution and were determined to break the resistance without much expense; fourth, the trenches and embankments forced us to deploy into a battle line, making a flanking movement in front of our positions. This also happens when passing through passages in minefields, but at this time there should be an intensive fire raid - artillery support, but this did not happen. And how did it all end? The answer is in the next report.
Interim summary to the V Army Corps 16.11.41:
And this is the area one. Dubosekovo, and five and a half hours after the first attack. Yes, the summary (information) was an hour or two late, but there was a message about the ongoing battle. What our witnesses claimed is all true. So four hours (about this) taking into account the first attack. And this means that the first attack was unsuccessful. And by the feeling, even very unsuccessful. So unsuccessful that there is no message at all in the 2nd TD's ZBD. How did "Hoppe" end up in Petelino? Zero information.
On the left, BG boasts about how he is dispersing our small BO. On the right, Kelits is in the same spirit (though until his 2nd company met Kraev's company at the 231,5 mark). And Hoppe, filled with tanks (TB, three companies, up to 60 or even more tanks), crossed the railway east of Nelidovo according to orders, which was later confirmed in the evening report, well, brag. Not to brag. And suddenly, in Petelino.
But it was necessary to pass the main positions of the 1075th SP, and not the BO at Nelidovo, Morozovo and Shiryaevo (which the order does not order to stubbornly defend). Well, okay, it is not noted in the 2nd TD's combat log, but there is no information about the advance of PG Hoppe in Petelino and in the combat log of BG 1 (which reflects the actions of only two subgroups).
It is strange and suspicious. But here we need to understand what kind of document ZhBD is. ZhBD is an almanac (collection) of victories and achievements of a unit (formation). It is composed of fragments of orders, instructions, reports, reports, telephone messages received by the operational duty officer of the headquarters, other documents of the heads of services, etc. The entry (or rather, it is printed) at the end of the day (or even later, depending on the circumstances), and, accordingly, the most "juicy" places from the specified documents are selected. In peacetime, this is transferred to the historical form of the unit (formation), so that descendants can be proud of their ancestors. This is the norm both for us and for them (and in general in any army in the world).
And as an example of objectivity, let's consider one event of 16.11.41, where ours and the Germans reflected it completely differently. This is the battle at Matrenino station.
Report com. 1st battalion 1073rd joint venture art. Lt. Momysh-Uly 20.11.41:
DB No. 79 Dovator's Cavalry Group. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
1st Guards Tank Brigade 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
All our documents confirm that the Germans took Matrenino station. Yes, there is an exaggeration in the forces - an enemy battalion (as usual). And the Dovatorites generally attributed everything to themselves, even Goryuny, which the Germans never reached.
And what about the Germans?
ZhBD BG 1 (2 TD) 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
They were walking peacefully (picking mushrooms), wild Russians jumped out (a whole battalion), but the Germans quickly laid it down. Where is the occupation of Matrenino station (and this designation is on German maps)? The toponym of Matrenino station is not indicated, which is clearly part of the offensive zone of the 2nd TD, up to Anino (Goryuny) inclusive, according to order No. 029. And the station must be taken. And what is there to write down if they were knocked out, and very quickly. Then it is better to write a non-binding entry - "battle in the forest 2 km west of Goryuny". And it wasn't the battalion that knocked it out, but Filimonov's company, reinforced by a machine-gun platoon. Without tanks or artillery support. And the Germans ran so fast that Momysh-Uly barely stopped ours after 1 km. And he took trophies along the way (including French cognac).
Here you have the objectivity of the reflection in the ZhBD, where the document records an outright lie. Moreover, the report is … In fulfillment of its mission (to establish a PT barrier on the Volokolamsk highway), the company reached the Volokolamsk-Istra road shortly after 16.00:5. Here they dug in together with the [1] cm [PT] and the 1st PT platoon of the XNUMXst company… — was clearly left in the ZhBD in its original form according to the report, although in an hour or two the Germans would be thrown out of Matrenino station. They entrenched themselves and then disengaged themselves, but the latter was not recorded in the ZhBD. Moreover, the toponym “Matrenino station” was not used (and Matrenino station is marked on German maps), and instead of this, the incomprehensible — “…2 km west of Goryuny…”. Why? I really don't want to mention the point from which they were knocked out.
Well, and then 21.05 (22.05 Moscow time) 16.11.41. Evening report to the V Army Corps:
…In short, let the right neighbor (11th TD) sort it out.
Let's say that more truthful information is in reports (and with a short shoulder) than "filtered" records in the ZhBD. And even then, not always, as soon as the boss is further away (16 A), you can, as in ZhBD No. 79, attribute everything to yourself. Well, it happens. There are mistakes in documents, when the left neighbor turns out to be the right one, and the regiment number does not correspond, and exaggeration of enemy forces is a constant practice for all armies of the world. This is to say that it is not enough to simply read the document, you need to understand its essence and the intricacies of army bureaucracy. Well, and the corresponding correction.
And then (given the complete lack of information in the ZhBD about how Hoppe's Panther got to Petelino) we can assume that the battle at the Dubosekovo junction was also extremely unsuccessful for the Germans. They failed to break through the defense (see the reasons above), and had to call off the attack in this area. And it was not the shots that scared the Germans, but the specific losses in forces and equipment. In short, having lost up to 7 tanks (including up to three destroyed), the attack on these positions was stopped.
And what should be written in the ZhBD? According to the reports, the picture is unsightly. Then they act according to the principle: only the good or nothing. The good — ZhBD 2-y TD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
And how did it achieve this? - then they turn on "or nothing". And if the information about the battle at Matrenino station in German documents is absolutely false, then the battle at Dubosekovo junction is simply hushed up. A striking example of an "objective" reflection of the situation in German documents. Yes, the Germans are fond of hiding their losses and failures, the objectivity of the presentation of information in documents is lame (well, this happens with ours too). And this must be taken into account. The following documents are available about the losses of the Germans in the defense sector of the 1075th Rifle Regiment.
Political report from the head of the political department of the 316th rifle division, battalion commissar Galushko[54] to the head of the political department of the 16th army, regimental commissar Maslenov. Village of Guseneyo, 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
The 1075th Rifle Regiment had 2 antitank gun platoons and one antitank gun in the fight against such a number of tanks…….. The 1075th Rifle Regiment suffered heavy losses, 2 companies were completely lost, the data on losses is being clarified, we will report in the next report.
……According to unspecified data, at least 1075 enemy tanks were destroyed in the area of the 9th Rifle Regiment….
Report of the military commissar of the 1075th regiment from 19.11.41/25/8 and B.D. No. 19.11.41 of the XNUMXth Guards Division for XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX:
The data, although given for the entire defensive sector of the 1075th Rifle Regiment, and even for a certain period (3 days), but the most inconvenient and unexpected place for the Germans was right at the Dubosekovo junction. They did not pass there, although they should have. And here we must understand that the regiment (with reinforcements) in the positions occupied in advance on 16.11 (it spent two weeks improving the defense) could have inflicted a corresponding defeat on the enemy. And not on 17-18 November in intermediate, hastily occupied positions, while being terribly battered by previous battles. So 4 destroyed (excluding those knocked out) tanks - this is 16.11.41, and, most likely, by a PT platoon.
Well, as I said earlier, the positions of the 4th company with the AT platoon turned out to be a "bone in the throat" of the 2nd TD offensive. It turned out that the further offensive of BG-1 began to experience difficulties. Part of the forces are in Petelino, clearly insufficient to continue the offensive. It is impossible to move the reserve (marching column) from Vasilyevskoye to the north across the Lama River and regroup when there is an enemy on the flank and in the rear (south of Petelino). And BG-2 continues the offensive, pushing back the BO (from the 3rd battalion) already at B. Nikolskoye.
9:45 (10:45 Moscow time) 2nd TD combat unit. Report from combat group 2:
DB No. 22 316 SD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
Judging by the nature of the actions of BG 2 (according to the ZhBD), it is clear that until (around) 11:00 (Moscow time) it only cut off the combat security up to the junction with the 1073rd Rifle Regiment (elevation 251,0) and did not attack the 2nd battalion of the 1075th Rifle Regiment. And at 11:30, having wedged itself into the combat formations of the main division line at the junction of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and the 1075th Rifle Regiment (mainly at the position of the 3/1075th Rifle Regiment) at elevation 251,0. From the west, from the Zhdanovo-Muromtsevo area, BG 2 was supported by BG 3 (fire support, possibly also a demonstrative deployment of part of the group's forces and an imitation of an offensive).
BD No. 22 316 SD 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
But then it was forced to suspend the offensive, since the neighbor on the right (BG 1) did not reach the appropriate line with the appropriate forces (the EVENT we noted occurred). And to continue the offensive into the depths of the enemy defense, when you have little strength and need to cover two flanks. According to the canons, two BGs (two battalions) are needed as a united front. This is not France (and not even this summer), now, as General Halder said, "the regulations must be followed in full." In short, BG 2 suspended the offensive, waiting for BG 1. Diagram 2 shows the position of BG 2, BG 3 and units of BG 1 at 11.00:11.30–1:1073. And almost at this time, Kielce with part of its forces attacks Kraev's company of the 131.5/2 Rifle Regiment (mark 1) and is unable to get past it. Although his other units have advanced quite far to the north, advancing on a broad front east of the railway and on the approach to Matrenino station (scheme 1073). There are practically no our troops there (rear units). But it was not possible to take control of the Morozovo - Matrenino station road from Kraevo (XNUMX/XNUMX Rifle Regiment). And this is a flank cover (there is no right neighbor).
What should Hoppe do? It is not possible to continue the offensive together with BG 2 (they are not strong enough), and the positions of the 4th company are preventing the second echelon (reserves) from being pulled up from Vasilyevskoye along the field from the railway to Petelino (as was indicated earlier). And through Nelidovo and to the left is the second echelon (reserves) of BG 2, whose columns have blocked all the routes of advance (the forward units of BG 2 are already in B. Nikolskoye). It is possible to pull the column along the positions of the 4th company, pressing close. But you can also get a bunch of treats from anti-tank rifles in the sides, and the Germans have already felt it (they did not know that there were 4 companies and only two anti-tank rifles in the positions). In short, the situation is -
ZhBD 11 TD 16.11.41:
— The 2nd TD of the Wehrmacht has come to a standstill.
It is necessary to understand that it will not be possible to simply clear the 4th company. This is if the first echelon had pushed through the company, destroying the organized defense, the second echelon can chase after broken and scattered groups of fighters with a Schmeisser from the hip. But breaking through the advance defense must be done scientifically, seriously and carefully: artillery, tanks, infantry and everything according to the norms. Yes, the Germans are on our flanks and in the rear, it will be easier, but we still have to strain ourselves. And here the 5th company went into the forest to the left of the Shiryaevo-Petelino road and, not crushed by Kelits, is snapping back. And in order to solve all this in one fell swoop, the event must be prepared. And still, we must think about how to continue the division's offensive. And here it is extremely important to drive the second echelon (or rather, the reserve) to Petelino. And therefore PAUSE.
So, PG Hoppe stopped the offensive (left flank of BG 1) and at the same time stopped the offensive of the entire 2nd TD. But PG Kielica continues the offensive.
DB No. 22 16.11.41/316/XNUMX. XNUMX SD:
As noted earlier, part of BG 1 (Kelitsy) advanced to Matrenino station in a coordinated manner in two units (1st and 2nd companies) with the task of taking Matrenino station and capturing the Morozovo - Matrenino station - Lyscovo road (the right flank in the offensive zone of the 2nd TD) and digging in. As a result, the 2nd company attacked Kraev's company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment). And the 1st reinforced company, somewhere around 11:00–11:30 (Moscow time), advancing from Petelino to Matrenino station, came across rubble and a minefield (mark 244,0, just 1 km north of Petelino).
10.12 (11.12 Moscow time) 16.11.41. ZhBD 2nd TD:
The minefield that covered the intermediate positions in case of withdrawal of the 2/1075 units (during the enemy's attack from the Volokolamsk direction) and the positions of Kraev's company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment), covering the road to Matrenino station, are the same forest edge (clearing). And the fact that these two units reached it almost simultaneously indicates the planned nature of their actions. Well, and then the 1st company continues to advance to Matrenino station.
Here we repeat again: expecting the Germans to advance along the Volokolamsk highway, it was assumed that our retreating units would consistently occupy intermediate defensive positions with minefields and anti-tank artillery. But the Germans, with a strike across the highway, cut off the units of the 1075th Rifle Regiment (the 2nd Battalion in its entirety, which determined the terrible losses of this unit) from the inability to retreat to the intended intermediate positions. Moreover, there were no troops of ours up to the Matrenino station (up to Filimonov's company (1/1073 Rifle Regiment))
The problems of the left flank of BG-1 (PG Hoppe), which stalled the offensive of the 2nd TD, were resolved as follows:
1) Replacement of Hoppe's already battered first echelon with the second (reserve). And at a certain time, together with BG-2, continue the general offensive to the north, to the positions of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and the 1075th Rifle Regiment (3rd Battalion); And here is a maneuver showing the withdrawal of part of the forces of the first echelon.
DB No. 22 316 SD. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
To Shiryaevo these are the forces of PG Hoppe, and to Volokolamsk (to the west) these are BG 2 (as indicated earlier).
ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
It looks like the first echelon is being withdrawn from Petelino. And the second is moving towards Petelino through Morozovo and Shiryaevo.
Combat report of the 50th Cavalry Division No. 156 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
Our report confirms the advance of the second echelon and Hoppe's reserve, two TPs with infantry (and again with exaggeration, there must have been a little more than 40 tanks).
ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
2) the task of defeating the 4th company near Dubosekovo, and the 5th company in the forest to the left of Shiryaevo was assigned to Kelitsa with the involvement of the tank company of the first echelon (it should operate in open terrain, mainly against the 4th company).
ZhBD BG 1.16.11.41:
Well, somewhere around 12:20–13:00, the 2nd TD (in this direction), after fire preparation by forces of BG 2 and BG 1 (Hoppe), continued the joint offensive:
Road reconnaissance is reconnaissance of the route of the second echelon's advancement to determine how dangerous it is to carry out this procedure (to drag a bunch of troops in a rookade almost along the line of combat contact). Significant risk. Well, and then new fire training and a relatively successful offensive. Everything is correct - "after new training, the offensive began", and the main thing is that 11.00:2 is the extreme point at this time (BG 15.00) and 2,5:XNUMX, which is XNUMX km to the north.
ZhBD BG 1. 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
If on the left, then this is PG Hoppe, up to the Volokolamsk highway, and the offensive is in full swing.
Here is the time interval, plus the time from the beginning of the attack on Nelidovo and Petelino. Colonel Kaprov, unaware of this recording, in 1947 confirmed exactly what was recorded (he was slightly mistaken in the time):
Thus, two battle groups (BG 2 and PG Hoppe) continued their offensive as a united front (BG 2 at elevation 251, BG 1 (PG Hoppe) to the right) to the forest area, which adjoins Yadrovo from the west. Then BG 2 went to Yadrovo, bypassing the area on the left. And PG Hoppe skirted the forest area along the forest edges on the right, with the right flank to the railway, to Lyscovo. The 7th company (Hoppe) to the left of the railway adjoined the 1st company (Kelits), which was advancing to the right of the railway, in the direction of the Matrenino station. Subsequently, PG Hoppe (advanced units) took Rozhdestveno and reached Lyscovo. And later, part of BG 2 (which had previously taken Yadrovo - KP 1073 Rifle Regiment, and then Mykanino) approached Rozhdestveno.
As we know, the reason given for the delay in the 2nd TD's offensive was that units of BG 1 (Kielica) came under flanking fire from the forest east of Morozovo.
ZhBD 11th TD 16.11.41:
And after the “appropriate” submission of information to the 5th Army Corps, and from there to the 4th Tank Group (whose operations department monitored the units’ actions), the debriefing began. Gepner had a “gentle” conversation with the commanders of the 5th Army Corps and the 48th Motorized Rifle Corps (and further down) with the involvement of the closest female relatives (well, like us). Where the eternal Russian question arose – WHO IS TO BLAME and WHAT TO DO. But there were no difficulties with the first one (in the “best” army traditions, the 2nd Tank Division set up its neighbor) – of course, the 11th Tank Division. It did not provide (or rather, did not start the offensive in a timely manner) support for the 2nd Tank Division’s attack. And later (in its zone, already on the day of the offensive on 17.11.41) the 11th TD was unable to reach (although it crashed into the defense zone of the 316th Rifle Division) the offenders of the 2nd TD (the 11th TD would only enter battle with the 18.11st Battalion of the 1rd Rifle Regiment of the 1073th Guards Rifle Division on 8.) Well, and "congratulations" flew to the 46th MC and then to the 11th TD. Where the duty officer made (without dissembling) the famous entry, stroking the chafed place. Well, and for the full pleasure. This is a justifying entry in the documents of the 46th MC - an "explanatory" at the level of "I came, you are not", where it is obvious that their order sometimes turns into the mess we are familiar with:
Well, how reliable is this reason? There is nothing like this in the documents of the 2nd TD and BG-1. Kelits set up a PT screen behind Morozovo and calmly advanced his units (described above). There were no problems. The fact that there could have been remnants of the 5th company in the area (and few in number, the main part was to the left of Shiryaevo) and combat security at Morozovo, and these are extremely insignificant forces. Or the result of the "hospitality" in the area of mark. 231,5 Kraev's company (also 1/1073 rifle regiment). This is more like a "cunningly invented" reason to blame the failure on the 46th MK. Knowing how the 11th TD acted later, and on 17.11.41/2/16.11.41 they advanced significantly to the right, to the village of Matrenino (not to be confused with the station). And they attacked a completely different group of our troops, not the one that opposed the 2nd TD. And they would not have been able to prevent (even if they had started on XNUMX) the delay of the XNUMXnd TD.
The next reason to stop the offensive, if the Germans had identified a group that threatened their flanks? Yes, there were forces there that were capable of stopping the offensive of the 2nd TD on 16.11.41. But they practically did not show themselves until 15:00 Moscow time. This group was there as a result of preparation for our offensive, but was partially busy repelling the offensive of the 5th TD (which was turning right while fighting). But no, they did not identify it, because this is not reflected in the documents of the 2nd TD. But in the best army traditions (as was indicated earlier), they set up their neighbors (the 48th MK), indicating their inaction as the reason for the delay in the offensive. Well, the Germans did not manage to get through Dubosekovo. They did not get through the second platoon. Other units of the 4th company also participated in the battle, cutting off the infantry with machine gun fire, but knocking out tanks at Dubosekovo (in the first attack, the tanks never reached other units of the 4th company). And these losses disrupted the German attack (PG Hoppe) in this area. Yes, they broke through to Petelino (3-5) tanks. But the failure at the Dubosekovo junction forced the Germans to suspend the offensive to regroup (albeit briefly, 1,5-2 hours). And then Kraev added. These problems first stopped the offensive of BG 1, and then BG 2 (which finally attacked the main positions of the units of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and the 1075th Rifle Regiment). And that means the entire 2nd TD. And so the initially mentioned event occurred. – “STALLED”. This is "hello" to everyone who claims: "the Germans passed this area and did not notice." Well, yes, at the level of TG and "DIDN'T NOTICE."
It must be said that there was an opportunity to disrupt the offensive of the 2nd TD on 16.11.41. Dovator's group had (were attached) three tank brigades (1st Guards Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Brigade, 27th Tank Brigade - more than 100 tanks) and army artillery units (in addition to its own) for the planned offensive on 16.11.41. It did not work out. But if they had started shelling the advancing columns (especially when Hoppe began to advance) and deployed tank units of up to 50 tanks (even if demonstratively), then the offensive of the 2nd TD on 16.11.41 would have been disrupted. The Germans (2nd TD) would have consolidated their gains and would have waited for support from the 11th TD. And this was not earlier than 17.11.41. But such a decision was made by the command of the 16th Army, and, apparently, did not appreciate the danger of the situation. And the decision to strengthen the defense of the 316th SD in the area of the Matrenino station (a separate NKVD battalion and a company - 6 tanks of Senior Lieutenant Burda from the 1st Guards Tank Brigade) was belated. Apparently, all attention was focused on the unsuccessful attack of our 58th TD on Volokolamsk.
But what happened happened. The Germans easily "drove away" not only the units of Kielce, but also the second echelon and the reserve of PG Hoppe. And then they moved the AT screen near Morozov to Shiryaevo, handing over the positions to the vanguard (advanced units) of the 11th TD, which would be knocked out at 15:00 by the 50th Cavalry Division. And the rear of BG 1 (after the Germans routed the 13th company with the AT platoon with their second attack (00:4 Moscow time), and then the 5th company) began to move forward through Vasilyevskoye, the Lama River, the railway line, across the field to Petelino. Thereby avoiding the dangerous movement along the front from Morozov to Shiryaevo.
Why the Germans did not reflect the battle at the Dubosekovo junction in their documents (the Germans do not have such a toponym on their maps, for them it would be to the south (southeast) of Petelino or to the north (northwest) of Shiryaevo) has already been discussed.
But let's try to figure out why our operational documents (combat reports) do not mention the battle at Dubosekovo anywhere. The battle at Dubosekovo, and even higher up to Petelino, could only be seen by the commander of the 2nd battalion, Mr. Reshetnikov, with the ability to pass the information up the chain of command. So, the first battle (at 9.00:9.30 Moscow time) takes place at Dubosekovo, and at about 6:3 the attack on Petelino, where the battalion commander's command post is, has already begun. That's it, from that moment the connection is lost. The 9.30th company, together with the battalion commander, retreat north to the 4rd battalion, and partly northeast to the forest. And if you look at the map, what can our troops see in the area south of Petelino, including Dubosekovo? The area is completely closed to observation. There is no connection. There is zero information. From that moment (XNUMX:XNUMX Moscow time) the most senior commander who saw the battle was only the commander of the XNUMXth company, Captain Gundilovich, who came out to his own after dark.
This is the case when there was a feat, but at first no one saw it. And later, when questioning the surviving witnesses, they learned about the battle, learned about the feat. And that is what they reported to the correspondents. And here there is no doubt that there were two attacks with a time gap (exactly 2,5-3 hours, and taking into account the beginning of the first and the end of the second battle, about 4 hours). Both documents and testimonies (from both sides) confirm the time and place of the event of interest to us and the role of the platoon in this, which went down in history.
Platoon
And what kind of platoon was it? The first thing that catches the eye is that the unit is entirely made up of "old-timers", all fighters from the first draft. How did this happen? The regiment had been in serious battles for a month, suffering significant losses. In early November, it received reinforcements (according to some sources, after 10.11.1941), which, to be honest, could not significantly strengthen the regiment. Our men could not effectively retain experience (and the Germans did not give them time to train and get along). Until the formation was completely knocked out, reinforcements were not given. And the division, the regiment could not have the same combat qualities that they had in October, and this is natural. In October, the division held a front of 42 km and retreated 15 km in battle. True, it should be noted that it was supported by 8 artillery regiments (regular, attached) and several artillery battalions. In November the front was already 16 km and there were already four rifle regiments (690th rifle regiment was attached), but the situation with artillery was worse. And after the first battles the division suffered huge losses.
Now, let's say, after a month of fighting, there were 4-70 fighters left in the 60th company (or even less). And then, without taking into account the 2nd platoon, 2/3 of the company are newcomers, which determines the low combat effectiveness of this part of the company. And what, suddenly an entire platoon consisted of old men? Why? The order of the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 6, 1941 demanded: "... in order to intensify the fight against enemy tanks, immediately create companies and teams in regiments and battalions to destroy enemy tanks. Allocate the most courageous, brave and proactive people to these teams. Arm the teams with anti-tank grenades, bottles with flammable liquid, packages with explosives and, if there are firing points, flamethrowers from light tanks." Back in July. The military council of the Western Front then ordered the formation of “one anti-tank fighter detachment in each rifle regiment, consisting of one mid-level commander and 15 fighters, including a detachment of sappers... 150 anti-tank grenades, 75 bottles of KS, PPSh-3, anti-tank mines, semi-automatic rifles.”
Well, and the corresponding orders at the chain of command. The division also began forming PT units (tank destroyer teams) in certain structures. When and where? The answer is in Beck's book "Volokolamsk Highway":
- Yes. Platoon.
— A platoon? The whole thing? So you didn’t select people?
— People in the platoon have gotten along. They trust each other.
“You may be right.”
From here we can see the time of formation of the PT-team - after leaving Volokolamsk, i.e. the beginning of November. And the team was part of the battalion structure. Panfilov was surprised that people were not selected - this means that in other battalions it could have been different. It was different in another battalion (the second) of the same 1073 Rifle Regiment, and there the selected fighters were commanded by platoon commander Dikarev, and the time of creation was the end of October. And in the battalion of interest to us - 2/1075 Rifle Regiment, Mr. Reshetnikov (battalion commander) selected the team. Klochkovites testify.
I.R. Vasiliev:
G.M.Shemyakin:
Here Shemyakin is a little confused: first as a volunteer in the fighters, and then he ended up in the 4th company. There is such a short period of time that it was difficult to keep the chronology. And together (in this team) they were no more than two or three weeks. I do not use the Klochkovites' battle certificate, understanding that they are obliged by the article. But some moments (not related to the article) are very interesting.
Shemyakin:
So, the tank destroyer team (hereinafter referred to as the AT platoon of the battalion) consisted of selected experienced fighters from the entire battalion. And this AT platoon had to perform tasks in the interests of the entire battalion (and it could perform tasks in the interests of the regiment, in isolation from the battalion). Moreover, the 2nd platoon is not the 2nd rifle platoon of the 4th company, but, most likely, a separate platoon of the 2nd battalion (and from there the 2nd AT platoon). But this is a non-staff unit, and therefore it was assigned to the 4th company, and, apparently, it was created on the basis of one of the company's platoons.
The PT platoon consisted of no more than 25 people. It was later that the company commander, Captain Gundilovich, had to include in the platoon the most distinguished soldiers who had died and who had not participated in the battle of 16.11.41, in order to bring the total to 28 (at the urgent request of Krivitsky). The PT platoon commander was Junior Lieutenant Dzhura Shirmatov (Sherpatov). The platoon was initially led by Senior Sergeant Mitin (in the article he will be listed as a participant in the battle), who was killed (or wounded) at the beginning of the battle during the enemy's fire preparation, which, in fact, did not cause the platoon any major losses (they dug in well, and used railroad ties for the dugout). Then Sergeant Dobrobabin. And when the tanks arrived, Klochkov took command of the platoon.
The training, by the way, took place as shown in the film, as it is taken from A. Bek (Momysh-Ula's testimony). So this PT platoon consisted not only of experienced and tested, but also trained desperate fighters (and this is certain). The rest of the company's units were heavily diluted with newcomers and in terms of combat stamina were inferior to the PT platoon (and this is also certain).
As was stated earlier, this PT platoon covered one of the possible (main) passages of enemy tanks. Yes, the Germans attacked from a different direction, but that was even better (for the platoon). Moreover, Panfilov turned the flank so that the front passed in front of the junction. Vasiliev I.R. 1942:
- You don't belong here, you can stay here...
Tanks, overcoming the passage to reach the deployment line in the battle line behind the railway embankment, must make a flank movement. And this, from the side of the platoon positions, resembles a column. It is convenient to hit the sides of tanks from a distance of 100-150 m (or even less). And the testimony of Panfilov's men about the column of tanks. Well, and more information about the platoon's AT weapons.
Vasiliev I.R.:
The Germans committed all four platoons of the tank company (the first echelon of the battalion) to the battle. This means that 3 platoons went to the Dubosekovo siding in the first line - 12-14 tanks (it is unlikely that the platoons were at full strength), but with the tanks of the company and battalion command, mobile artillery points - up to 17-19. And one platoon on the left flank, 1 km to the right of Nelidovo. They thought they would get through. It worked on the left flank (our positions did not reach Petelino). And those who went through the Dubosekovo siding did not get through.
Political report from the head of the political department of the 316th rifle division, battalion commissar Galushko, to the head of the political department of the 16th army, regimental commissar Maslenov. Village of Guseneyo, 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
……
That is, it is indicated that 7-8 tanks were most likely knocked out in the first battle. At the Dubosekovo junction there were 6-7 tanks, plus 1 tank at Petelino (Vikhrev). Moreover, the number of knocked out tanks was determined not even by our BD, but by the subsequent reaction of the enemy, regrouping through Morozovo, Shiryaevo (castling to the long side). This was later noticed by both the commanders and political workers. Who, having collected information about the battles, gave it to the correspondents. Well, and later, albeit with exaggeration (and at the same time confusing everything) in their articles about the feat, the correspondents reported.
Abbreviations. JBD - combat operations journal, BD - combat report, AK - army corps, MK - motorized corps, SD - rifle division, TD - tank division, PD - infantry division, KD - cavalry division, TBR - tank brigade, SP - rifle regiment, PP - infantry regiment, PT - anti-tank.
Sources:
Reference-report of the Chief Military Prosecutor N. Afanasyev "On 28 Panfilov's Men" - GA RF. F. R-8131
Documents of the formations of the Red Army
The memory of the people
Aerial photography
Wehrmacht documents 2 TD, 35 PD, 11 TD
A. Beck "Volokolamsk Highway".
Memories of Melnikov - political instructor Yegordiev (Georgiev).
Information