Sergey Ustyantsev on how the CIA assessed the technical capabilities of the T-34-85

4
Sergey Ustyantsev on how the CIA assessed the technical capabilities of the T-34-85

In September of the distant 1951, the American company Chrysler published a rather interesting report on the study of the Soviet tank T-34-85. Generally speaking, it was far from the first - in the XNUMXs, the Americans (as well as the British, by the way) had already issued similar documents. However, unlike its predecessors, this material was not just a dry description of the vehicle and its components and assemblies, but a full-fledged collection of information on the development of the tank.


Of course, Chrysler did not take up this topic to create a kind of encyclopedia that would be informative and valuable only in terms of study. stories Soviet tank building. In fact, the customer of the study was the US government itself and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in particular - and they were interested in the tank for a reason.



The fact is that the T-34-85 tanks, contrary to popular belief, were not immediately shoved into storage depots after the end of World War II. Even in the 50s, despite the appearance of the T-XNUMXs, which were superior in armor, armament, and other parameters, they remained the quantitative basis of the Soviet Union's armored fleet, which is understandable, given the overall production volume of these vehicles.

It was this circumstance that became the reason for such close and, it seems, belated attention from American researchers. After all, if in the same Korea, torn apart by the war between pro-Soviet and pro-Western forces (North and South), tanks of the T-34 type did not represent such a significant threat, then in a potential large-scale conflict in Europe, the T-XNUMXs were to become the basis of the USSR's land "fist".

Considering this fact, it becomes clear that the US interest in the T-34-85 was far from idle - having studied the vehicle in detail, they actually received information not only about its combat and operational characteristics, but also about the technological level of the Soviet tank industry. Well, and what conclusions they made, says the scientific editor of the public relations department, historian Sergei Ustyantsev - a video with his story, filmed as part of the program "First Tank", we offer for viewing.
4 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. The comment was deleted.
  2. -3
    16 January 2025 11: 30
    Now, in the conditions of the SVO, when the failure rate of armored vehicles is enormous, it is necessary to launch production or restore from storage the T-55M medium tank, with weapons and armor protection and a fire control and combat control system fully adapted to realities, and with trawls in the base. This tank is like a Kalashnikov assault rifle, and these are the words of our enemies am
    1. +8
      16 January 2025 22: 13
      Maybe it's time to stop following the methodology - women will still give birth.
      1. +8
        17 January 2025 00: 11
        When used from closed firing positions, a tank with a rifled gun surpasses tanks with a smoothbore in range and accuracy. At the same time, it has a lower cost of HE ammunition.
        Compared to 120-122 mm self-propelled guns, the T-55 has better armor - unlike self-propelled guns, fragments from six-inch guns will not penetrate its armor.
        In addition, the T-55 has a reserve of shells that it would be a sin not to use.
        The power of a 100mm projectile is sufficient for the absolute majority of targets in the theater of air defense.
        1. +1
          17 January 2025 13: 03
          Quote: Captain Pushkin
          When used from closed firing positions, a tank with a rifled gun surpasses tanks with a smoothbore in terms of range and accuracy.

          Are you sure that the tank will be used in this way, and not ordered to support the attack of assault groups or rush to the ambush site and rescue soldiers? The tank is half a century old, at what capacity will they be restored from mothballing? Where will they get crews, pull people out of the infantry, transfer them from the self-propelled guns or artillery? Who will do the maintenance, where will they get spare parts? In the first year, when there was not enough equipment, they were used out of desperation. And now there is a drone war and keeping a self-propelled gun 5-10 km from the front is suicide.