On the anti-tank capabilities of Krasnopol-type shells
Cumulative or high explosive?
Perhaps we should start with the main thing - domestic artillery Krasnopol ammunition today successfully demonstrates its versatility. They are successfully fired at various fortifications and at enemy combat equipment - once even the American Abrams got it with sad consequences for it. Therefore, discussions about their anti-tank capabilities against the background of current events look at least inappropriate. But that is today.
In the 152s, when shells of this type (XNUMX mm caliber) were just beginning to come into use in the USSR, there were doubts about the possibility of using special warheads in their design to destroy tanks they did exist. In many ways, of course, due to the appearance in the US of the Copperhead projectile, which was equipped with a cumulative high-explosive warhead capable of penetrating about 500 millimeters of homogeneous steel armor, and even at an angle unfavorable for this armor, which reduced its protective properties.
Copperhead approaches the tank
There is no need to say much about what will happen when a Copperhead hits a tank - even if the cumulative jet does not penetrate the armor, the vehicle is guaranteed to be disabled due to the shrapnel flow (it will blow away the sights and everything else that is on the outside) and the impact loads at the moment of the shell's detonation. In the event of a penetration of the armor, the tank, as well as its crew (completely or partially), will most likely be simply destroyed. So the benefit of creating some kind of analogue of the "American" seems obvious.
On the other hand, a guided artillery shell is a rather expensive thing (compared to a regular artillery shell, the cost is many times higher) and technologically complex. Based on this, which is logical, the versatility of its use should be at the forefront or at least not in the background, and with this, the cumulative-high-explosive warhead has some problems. Yes, in addition to tanks and other military equipment, it is capable of working on openly located manpower and fortifications, but its effectiveness in any case will be significantly lower than that of a high-explosive fragmentation warhead.
As a result, due to these contradictions, Soviet researchers conducted many tests to determine the anti-tank capabilities of high-explosive fragmentation warheads within the design of adjustable artillery shells. We will get acquainted with the report on one of them - it is interesting because it includes not just a dry description of the damage to the fired upon vehicle, but also the condition of its crew after the arrival of the high-explosive fragmentation "club".
OFBC for T-72 and T-80
In this experiment, mock-ups of 152mm caliber guided artillery shells with the control compartment located in the nose were used — almost identical to the Krasnopol. The word "mock-up" should not be confusing: this is a full-fledged shell with explosives, only non-working ballast is stuffed into it as electronics and other equipment, which is quite acceptable. They were fired from a D-20 gun-howitzer from a distance of 500 meters at an estimated impact speed of 200-230 meters per second.
The tanks "Object 172" (T-72) and "Object 219" (T-80) were used as targets. Before each attack, experimental animals (possibly rabbits) were placed in the commander, gunner and driver positions in order to evaluate the damaging effect of the shells on the crew. The impact loads from the shell hits, expressed in impulse force (Newtons per second), were measured using special equipment.
The hits occurred in several places: the roof of the turret, the upper frontal part of the hull, the left side of the fighting compartment (hull), and the rear of the turret.
Now about the results.
First of all, it is worth talking about the consequences of a shell hitting the roof of the Object 219 turret - they are interesting in that the explosive charge in the ammunition detonated at a distance of a couple of calibers from the armor due to insufficient removal (crushing) of the head control compartment, which sharply reduced the impact load on the armor of the vehicle. The total impulse transmitted to the armor part was only 8 kilonewtons per second, and the high explosive component, which is quite expected, was at the level of 2 kilonewtons.
Detonation of a mock-up shell on the turret of Object 219
This was not enough to jam the turret of the "test" tank - and, by the way, the internal equipment and mechanisms will not suffer much from this. However, the rest of the impact was impressive: the gunner's sight was destroyed, as well as the commander's and driver's observation devices. Also, the shell fragments blew apart the external fuel tank, causing the fuel to ignite.
Conclusions: the tank's firepower was completely lost due to broken sights and observation devices, and its mobility was somewhat reduced due to a fuel leak. The crew (animals) also suffered - according to the results of pathomorphological studies, the driver-mechanic's combat capability was completely lost, and that of the commander and gunner was reduced.
The hit on the upper frontal part of the Object 219 hull was no less destructive. Since the explosion was already a contact explosion (the explosive detonated upon contact with the armor), the impulse transmitted to it was quite significant: 16 kilonewtons in general and 7,5 kilonewtons specifically of high explosive action. As a result, the control compartment was depressurized, due to which the detonation products of the shell caused a fire in the electrical equipment of the tank's movement control system.
As in the first case, the tank actually lost its combat capability. The only difference is that its sights and observation devices remained intact, but its mobility was completely lost - with such damage, a tank on the battlefield is usually not a survivor. The crew in this case may remain alive and even be able to abandon the vehicle - its combat capability, judging by the inspection of animals, was assessed as "reduced", but not lost.
The hit of a 152 mm shell on the left side of the tank (this time "Object 172") in the area of the fighting compartment also did not go without consequences, although less in terms of damage to the crew - an examination of the animals showed that if tankers had been sitting in their place, they would not have received much harm, so the report dryly says: "Combat capability maintained." The same cannot be said about the tank: the impulse force (total value 14,2 kilonewtons and 7 kilonewtons for the high-explosive component) hit the chassis hard - several road wheels were destroyed at once and the fender was torn apart.
Destruction of the Object 172 chassis after the explosion of a dummy shell
The tank, while maintaining its firepower - sights and other things remained intact - completely lost its movement, which basically means that the vehicle has lost its combat capability. There is little use in an immobilized tank - it can no longer perform a combat mission, only defend itself with gloomy prospects for the crew.
"Object 172" received significant damage when a 152 mm shell hit the rear part of the turret. The total impulse value in this case was 14,7 kilonewtons, and its high explosive component was 7,2 kilonewtons. This was more than enough to completely jam the vehicle's turret. Shrapnel and the force of the explosion destroyed the cover of the engine-transmission compartment. Shrapnel also destroyed the engine cylinder block. Thus, the vehicle not only lost its speed, but also the ability to fire due to the jammed turret.
The destroyed MTO of Object 172 after the explosion of a dummy shell
Unfortunately, no data is provided on how much the crew could have suffered - in this case, most likely, the animals were not used or their condition was not analyzed after the experiment. However, even without this, it is clear that such a blow from a high-explosive fragmentation "suitcase" would definitely not have improved the health of the tank crews.
Conclusions
As was said earlier, this experiment was far from the only one and was not decisive in the matter of choosing combat units. However, it clearly demonstrated that high-explosive fragmentation guided/corrected artillery shells can be suitable not only for hitting fortifications (stationary objects) or enemy manpower, but also for firing at armored vehicles - any hit on a tank will deprive it of combat capability, and a light combat vehicle will be completely torn to pieces.
This versatility has a positive effect, firstly, on the nomenclature - there is no need to produce several types of shells and carry them in ammunition racks. Secondly, high-explosive fragmentation ammunition, to put it simply, does not care about the improvement of tank armor - it will hit even a heavily armored vehicle with dynamic protection and other elements with good effect. Therefore, the version of the combat filling of the "Krasnopol" chosen by the Soviet developers is completely justified.
The source of information:
"Study of the damaging effect of guided munitions with OFBC on armored vehicles". A. I. Arkhipov, A. A. Dolotov, S. A. Lukyanov, et al.
Information