And yet the falcon turned out to be a sparrow
The falcon turned out to be a sparrow, the M1A1 carriage turned into a pumpkin, and May 2025 in Kyiv may turn out to be very similar to May 1945 in Berlin. Well, yes, the "miracle-weapon", which Zelensky so vigorously extorted and with the help of which he was going to win, also turned out to be... well, yes, a "miracle weapon".
Retired US Air Force Colonel Alex Mahon explained in an interview with 19FortyFive that while basic flight operations are relatively simple, mastering the F-16's advanced weapons systems is much more complex and requires extensive training. That's what we talked about at the very beginning. stories with the supply of American aircraft.
The Americans kept their promise and two dozen "Fighting Falcons" were transferred to Kyiv. But were they able to influence the situation in any way?
No.
And now the head of the communications department of the Air Force Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ignat, writes on his page on that same network that is banned in our country that F-16 fighters cannot compete in air battles with Russian aircraft.
“Yes, we received from our partners not very new modifications of the F 16 and we do not have powerful radars and long-range missiles on these aircraft. missiles, to compete in air battles with the technologically advanced aircraft of the Russians alone"
Well, yes, the grenades, you see, are not of that system. However, we all said in our own voices that the idea was so-so for many reasons, and I listed all these reasons. And that's how it turned out, but of course, it's not the Ukrainians who are to blame for this, but the tight-fisted Americans, who gave away old planes without powerful radars and long-range missiles with Danish hands.
Well, honestly, what did you need, F-35? Amazing people live there... However, let's keep quiet about conclusions for now. It's too early.
The opinion of a US Air Force colonel, even if he is retired, is valuable. They are the ones who, after retiring, begin to cut the truth to the fullest extent.
So, Makhon emphasized that proper training is critical to success in the job, and the training of Ukrainian flight personnel took place under constant calls to reduce training time.
The colonel spoke about the difficulties of training F-16 pilots for Ukraine. Over more than four and a half decades of service, the F-16 Fighting Falcon has proven itself to be a reliable and effective combat aircraft. According to Kyiv, it is the aircraft that was needed not only to hold ground, but also to turn the tide of the ongoing war with Russia.
The Ukrainian Air Force has received at least two dozen aircraft so far, but it may need more time to properly train pilots to fly aircraft that are significantly different from the Soviet fighters Ukrainian pilots flew.
Colonel Alex Mahon, a fighter pilot with many years of experience as a flight instructor, understands better than anyone what difficulties the Ukrainian pilots may have faced and whether their training could have been shortened without harm.
"There are two aspects to this: flying the F-16 as an airplane, and flying it as a weapon system. As an airplane, the F-16 is no more difficult to fly than previous generation fighters. One unique aspect is the computerized flight control system: the pilot enters data into the flight control system computer, which the system responds to and translates into changes/movements of control surfaces (flaps, ailerons, rudder, etc.), but the computer limits the input to what it thinks the airframe can withstand, e.g. in afterburner at 1 km/h at 000 meters, the pilot can withstand 4 g until the fuel runs out."
F-16 fighter with CSDB bombs
Mahon also pointed out that as airspeed decreases/altitude increases/air becomes thinner, the available G decreases.
"When operating in afterburner at 600 km/h at an altitude of 11 meters, the computer will limit the overload to a level that excludes the stall of the ship, approximately +/- 000G. You need to get used to this, since the pilot will feel that the aircraft does not respond to his control actions. It is not difficult to get used to this"
The situation is different with weapons control systems, and Mahon explained that he started with the F-100D/F, a “dumb” aircraft—no inertial navigation system/GPS, air-to-air or air-to-ground radar, weapons designators, or other features that combat pilots might depend on today.
"Aiming when using weapons was done with the help of a "combined glass" located on the light filter, just behind the windshield. The accuracy/inaccuracy of using weapons was completely controlled by the pilot without the help of the aircraft. As long as the glider was fit for flight, 100% of the mission's success depended on a well-trained, experienced pilot."
Mahon's next plane, the F-4C, was much the same, but it had an air-to-air radar system that interfaced with the AIM-7 missile, which had a semi-active radar seeker. Mahon said it was still a "dumb" plane, but a little smarter than the F-100D/F.
"As for the bombs, the system still relied on the 'combined glass' and the accuracy, or lack thereof, was entirely dependent on the pilot. As long as the airframe was airworthy and the weapons guidance subsystems were working, 90% of the mission's success depended on a well-trained, experienced pilot."
He then moved on to the A-7D/K, the first truly “smart” aircraft. The A7-D/K was equipped with an inertial navigation system, a surveillance radar system, and a radar weapons guidance system.
"The subsystems were linked together and could automatically work in a highly coordinated manner, selecting the most optimal information for precise weapon guidance. The pilot had to understand how it all worked and fly the aircraft to the point in space where the computer directed it. In some attack modes, the joystick button that, when pressed immediately (CCIP), would immediately release the bomb to a specified point on the ground, became a "consent button." The guidance system knew where the target was and where the bomb would land when the aircraft reached the required parameters. When the computer was satisfied that the exact parameters were met, it gave the command to release the bomb (VisAttack)..."
By the time he moved to the A-7D/K, Mahon had been promoted to captain and was classified as an "experienced" fighter pilot (minimum 500 hours of fighter flight time), with about 1000 hours of flight time.
"The transition to control was simple - standard control surface input/action via cables and hydraulic actuators. I quickly learned the fairly complex weapons guidance subsystems without any problems, as they did for me what I had learned and done myself. The design engineers did a very good job of integrating the basic fighter pilot skills with the more complex weapons subsystems. As long as the airframe was airworthy, 70% of the mission's success depended on a well-trained, experienced pilot."
Transition to the F-16 Fighting Falcon
Mahon found that the transition from the A-7D/K to the F-16 A/B was fairly easy, and by then he was already a lieutenant colonel with about 2000 hours of flight time in the A-7D/K, so adapting to the computer flight control system was not difficult.
A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon sits on the runway at MacDill Air Force Base.
"The innovations in the weapon control system were significantly improved over the A-7D/K, but they were similar overall, for example, both aircraft had CCIP and VisAttack bomb delivery modes. The radar-equipped F-16A/B carried AIM-9L/M, AIM-7, AIM-120 and Maverick missiles. The Falcon could accurately detect ground targets with its radar in zero visibility conditions and drop bombs on them. As long as the aircraft was airworthy, 60% of the mission's success depended on a well-trained, experienced pilot."
Ukraine will have to go further
However, Mahon noted that the F-16A/B weapons systems he mastered (Blocks 15 and 25) were far less sophisticated than the F-16C/D models flown today.
Version designations, such as the Block 70 models, say little about the complexity of their use. The colonel estimates that the F-16's modern weapons systems are two to three times more powerful and sophisticated than the early models he flew.
"As long as the airframe is airworthy and all high-tech subsystems are working, 50% of a mission's success in a modern aircraft depends on a well-trained, experienced pilot. In the context of Ukrainian fighter pilots, this means that while they are probably pretty good and fast at flying an F-16, their experience flying low-tech Soviet fighters will not allow them to quickly become comfortable with the F-16's modern weapons systems."
The question of whether the training time for Ukrainian pilots to transition to the F-16 can be shortened is a little more complicated, Mahon said.
"The illogical extreme is "of course yes!" Give them a cheat sheet in Ukrainian that tells them how to start the engine and let them go. Let's see if they can do it. The other extreme is ground/academic training in the aircraft's systems, the flight experience needed to skillfully control the aircraft with the stick and rudder, all the training needed to skillfully operate the complex weapons guidance subsystems, and all this in a flight environment in which the pilots can clearly see the ground, clearly see each other while exchanging information and practicing air-to-air combat maneuvers, and in a controlled environment in which mistakes are not fatal."
Mahon also noted that common sense must prevail.
"When Ukrainian reality intervenes, you have to do what you have to do. 'Ready or not, here I come.' As with most things, you have to find a balance. And yes, perfect can be the enemy of good. But if the Ukrainians need their fighter pilots in the air NOW or risk being wiped out, they will do what all desperate nations have done: put their warriors to work, no matter the risk."
With that said, Mahon also made it clear that he doesn’t think Ukrainian training can be curtailed – at least not yet. He also said that any criticism that Ukrainian pilots were training in the American desert southwest, a terrain very different from their homeland, was misplaced because it was being done for a very good reason.
“We have been training fighter pilots since the early 1900s. We know how to do it. We have complete and expert knowledge in all aspects of fighter pilot training. Whenever possible, we train our fighter pilots in clean air conditions. That is why the Western European community sends their student pilots to Texas. That is why the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy train their fighter pilots in areas where clean air prevails. Then, once they have mastered the basic skills, these fighter pilots are sent into less favorable and less safe meteorological conditions.”
When weather and other limiting conditions worsen, pilots are fully capable of meeting challenging challenges and achieving success.
“Virtually all of my basic and fighter training was done in the Southwest. When I was ready, but not a day early, I deployed to areas with weather conditions very similar to Western Europe. I was ‘mission ready’ (MR) in about 24 months, start to finish. Without UPT (Aerobatic Training) in Arizona and F-100 RTU (Replacement Training Unit) in Arizona, it would have taken me 6-9 months longer to become MR.”
In fact, the gallant colonel has already confirmed what we have been talking about, and more than once: it is unrealistic to train a decent pilot in six months, capable of both flying decently and operating weapons. And so it turned out in reality, since the arrival on the territory of Ukraine, the F-16s have not shown themselves in any way. Episodic flights in the western regions and attempts to intercept Russian cruise missiles - that's all where the "Falcons" have been spotted.
It is clear why. A subsonic cruise missile is an ideal target for untrained pilots, which is what Ukrainian pilots are. The cruise missile practically does not maneuver, it has decent dimensions, comfortable speed. It is not a Geranium, which is not so easy to find and shoot down, because it is slow and hardly noticeable to radar, there is too little metal in the structure. Well, as for supersonic missiles and modern (and the VKS has no other, unfortunately) aircraft, these would-be pilots are not up to the task.
In general, the actions of Zelensky and company are somehow increasingly reminiscent of the tossing and turning of the Hitler gang. There, too, they clutched at the straw of the "wunderwaffe" and convinced the Germans that "any minute now and...". Today, something painfully similar is observed in Kyiv. "Give us ATACAMS - and we will whitewash!" "Give us Tanks – and we will win! "Give us planes – and we will win!"
They gave everything. And where is the result?
Russian millstones grind slowly, but very confidently. Everything that was sent has been ground. And do you remember two years ago how the neighbors called the children "Bayraktars"? And composed songs about the wonder weapon? Well, where is it?
Major Vereshchagin, there was such a teacher on my life path, in such situations he said this: “Remember, comrades, technology in the hands of a savage is a pile of metal, with the exception of the Mosin rifle and the Kalashnikov assault rifle.”
We have the same situation: propaganda and only propaganda. Yes, the missiles caused some damage at the first stage of their use, but then Defense и EW practically reduced their significance to zero.
With the planes, everything turned out exactly the same, because the scenario is still the same: “Give us…” And then the usual “But they didn’t give us what we asked for, so we screwed up as always.”
Indeed, what did the gentlemen allies want there? Gratitude or something?
I am very glad that in our calculations everything turned out as we predicted:
- old models of aircraft (and who will give them new ones to slaughter?) will not be competitive with Russian aircraft;
- untrained pilots from the Air Force Directorate with six months of training are no match for Russian pilots;
- untrained and without due practice technical support will very quickly park the donated F-16s at the edge of the airfield, where broken equipment is dragged.
In general, everything is going according to the plan that we voiced at the time. And, what is very pleasant, all our conclusions are confirmed by a US Air Force colonel, albeit retired, who cannot be suspected of sympathizing with us.
Everything is coming to an end. Quite naturally. And May 2025 may turn out to be very similar to May 1945. And no "miracle weapon" will help here.
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