7 December will mark 69 years from the day when Japanese troops attacked the American naval base at Pearl Narbor. In connection with this event, several conspiracy theories appeared that asserted that the US administration knew in advance about the plans of the Japanese, but did not take any action to prevent the tragedy, allegedly so that the United States could have a reason to start a war with Japan.
Few events in stories The United States has caused so much controversy as the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Rumors abounded during the war, and even the publication of the July 26 congressional investigation report on July 1946, despite the fact that it contained information that refuted most of them, did not put an end to speculation. The Pearl Harbor Attack Investigation Report (PHA for short) consisted of 40 parts and around 23 volumes. Getting answers to strange stories that quickly spread was a challenge even for the most serious researchers.
Today, however, with the help of a computer search, you can find information about events and people that has been buried in piles and attics of the university for decades. Of course, no one can convince diehard Roosevelt-haters that he did not arrange, or at least allowed an attack, but for those of us who just want to get answers to questions such as "Why did the radar signal from the Opana Point radar not reach Admiral Kimmel? "The testimony of the participants will clarify the situation in the most satisfactory manner.
Each link points to a document that explains why a particular myth is either a falsehood or a distortion of facts.
MYTH: The United States hastily removed the aircraft carriers from the port just before the attack, in order to “save” them for war, Roosevelt already knew that aircraft carriers would dominate.
FACT: Two aircraft carriers that at the time were located at Pearl Harbor, Enterprise and Lexington, were seconded to deliver additional fighters for Wake and Midway. See document. These aircraft carriers were sent to the west, in the direction of Japan and IJN, far from each other and with light accompaniment.
On December 7, Enterprise was about 200 miles west of Pearl and included in Pearl. Lexington was in 400 miles to the west and in front of the Midway. See Admiral Kimmel's report on these missions.
"Good, but they are still not in port!" Yes, but Enterprise is doing its best to return to Pearl. Her first ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival) was Saturday evening, but the storm delayed it. The next time was 7 in the morning, 55 minutes before the attack began, but this turned out to be too optimistic, as well. She was, however, close enough to Pearl to send her plane ahead to land on Ford Island, and some of them were shot down by “friendly fire”. See the first document in this section.
The fact that the withdrawal of “aircraft carriers from the port hastily” is a myth that proves that Enterprise’s arrival at the port was scheduled for December 6 and 7, as shown in the Schedule released in August, 41 of the year. Orders to change it was not.
MYTH: An urgent message was not sent to Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. Options include using commercial telegraph instead of military radio in order to delay the message.
FACT: Atmospheric conditions prevented radio communication between DC (District of Columbia - District of Columbia) and Pearl Harbor. The choice of a commercial telegraph, perhaps not the best means of communication, was chosen for the reasons given in the investigation.
See congressional inquiry.
The army committee was much more critical to the choice made.
It is important to note that the DID (Direct Dial) message arrived in Hawaii at 7: local time, and was delayed due to the attack.
MYTH: USN (United States Navy - United States Navy) thought that the harbor of Pearl Harbor was too small to attack a torpedo.
FACT: The document has a message from the chief of naval operations which says that no harbor should be considered safe from a torpedo attack. However, at Pearl Harbor, it was envisaged that the fleet should be ready to leave the harbor in a short time and the removal of the anti-torpedo network could lead to a slower exit of the units from the harbor. See document.
MYTH: "Fourteen Parts" The message that the Japanese ambassador was to deliver to the US Secretary of State for 1 / 2 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor was a declaration of war, or at least a break in diplomatic relations that would make it clear that the war had begun.
FACT: the message is not a declaration of war, and not even a break of diplomatic relations. It seems that the repetition of the accusations of the Japanese against the United States, and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, was not the real purpose of the message. See document.
So when did the Japanese government prepare a declaration of war? Was it just not delivered on time? Record from Japanese sources shows that the meeting that was convened to compile this message did not take place before 12: 44 PM, 7 December Pearl Harbor time. See document.
The Japanese delivered a message from the 2 lines to Ambassador Grew on the afternoon of December 8 Tokyo time (late morning, December 7, THTime.) The imperial rescript, which told the Japanese people that they were at war, could be heard in the US at 4 in the afternoon, December 7 DC.
MYTH: USS WARD captain, anti-submarine patrol at the entrance to Pearl Harbor, sent a message that he had sunk the submarine an hour before the start of the air attack.
FACT: See the actual report file in the ComFOURTEENTH message center. Captain Outerbridge reported attacking a submarine, but did not drown it. (If time permits, we will follow the message through Admiral Kimmel’s systems, who would not play golf while this happens.) [See. document.]
Play Bishop's Point Radio.
which shows reports in Com 14. Another important message is 1810Z, when a coded confirmation request came to WARD. It took time to decode the message and encode the response, and by the time everything was ready, the bombs were already falling.
MYTH: The Opana Point radar station reported that Japan had attacked 1 an hour before the planes arrived at the harbor, but Admiral Kimmel refused to do anything.
FACT: Eliot and Lokard were members of the radar crew at Opana Point. They noticed a large surge and called the fighter information center, which was not yet fully functioning. Private MacDonald accepted the call and informed the only employee at the Center who asked him to call the operators. Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, completing his first training tour in the newly created Fighter Control Center, received a report and thinking it was a B-17 flight from the mainland, told the operators "forget it." Above the report did not go.
There are only a few people who actually participated in any job or creation and the Figher Information Center (FIC). The rank and file of Lokard and Elliot were at Opana Point, Pvt. MacDonald and Lieutenant Tyler were at FIC. Other "interested parties" were Colonel Bergquist, who created FIC with Colonel Tyndall, and US Navy Commander Taylor, who was in Hawaii to teach sailors how to use the radar. All their testimony is now available. See documents.
Back at the beginning of the article, the authors write that they have access to a huge number of documents related to these events, and are going to publish a refutation of the myths in the future. In addition, they give their e-mail address at which anyone can ask a question about a specific event. If you speak English, you can ask the question directly, and if not, you can ask your question in the form of a comment, I will translate this question into English, send it to the authors, and as soon as I receive the answer, I will post it here.
Pearl Harbor Myths
- Originator:
- http://ibiblio.org/pha/myths/index.html"rel =" nofollow ">http://ibiblio.org/pha/myths/index.html