Trump Administration's Possible Impact on Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Program
Saudi Arabia's first nuclear research reactor at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology on the outskirts of Riyadh is nearing completion but has not yet been launched.
In September 2024, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud announced that the kingdom would sign the full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Small Quantities Protocol, the most basic safeguards agreements that the International Atomic Energy Agency has been asking for years. However, the kingdom continues to refuse to sign the Additional Protocol, which would allow the agency to conduct more thorough oversight.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House could mean the end of the non-proliferation regime. As the Iran-Israel confrontation escalates and the threat of an Iranian nuclear breakthrough mounts, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may see a second Trump administration as an opportunity to finally get the nuclear cooperation the Saudis have long dreamed of.
Riyadh has been very clear about the kind of nuclear partnership it expects. And it is no secret that its preferred option is cooperation with South Korea, similar to the 123 agreement (the nuclear cooperation document that sets the legal basis and prerequisites for nuclear deals with the United States). This would allow it to enrich uranium domestically.
The problem, however, is the last part of the proposal. The United States is currently pushing for a deal that requires the Saudis to give up their enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, the two paths to building a bomb. Trump’s reelection could be a chance for the Saudis to tip the scales in their favor.
Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Program
There are many reasons for the kingdom's desire to develop its nuclear know-how. First, the Saudis argue that it is their right to do so under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. weapons (NPT) to enrich uranium for domestic energy purposes. They point to a double standard given that India and Japan have received “full consent” to seek enrichment or reprocessing capabilities under their respective 123 agreements.
To add insult to injury, in the eyes of the Saudis, their archrival Iran was allowed to enrich uranium under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. The Saudis are seeking to benefit from the same privileges by developing their own nuclear program.
Saudi Arabia is also seeking to reduce its reliance on external fuel suppliers, a vision that applies to its uranium ore production. Saudi Arabia’s vast uranium reserves, sufficient for domestic use, are currently being mined in partnership with China. This has been done despite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development describing the project as “extremely unprofitable».
The third reason for Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions is the alleged looming nuclear threat from Iran. Iran is a nuclear threshold state: its current stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent is estimated at about 182 kilograms, which, if enriched to 90 percent, would be enough fissile material for four nuclear weapons.
By some estimates, Iran could reach the 90 percent enrichment threshold in less than two weeks. Additionally, Trump’s return to the White House could mean a likely return to the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran’s economy and, potentially, US support for Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. And Israel would continue to engage in military action against Iran and its proxies, reducing Iran’s deterrent capabilities. These factors have created a particularly volatile situation that could be fatal for Iran and prompt Iran to ramp up its nuclear program as a deterrent. Such developments, in turn, could push the Saudis to develop their own nuclear capability to deter Iran, as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman previously said he would do in 2018 and again in 2023.
Warranties
The Saudi Arabian government has been active in the civilian nuclear sector in recent years, creating a nuclear and radiological regulatory commission and a holding company to develop and operate nuclear power facilities. If the United States continues to press the Saudis to accept a copy of the United Arab Emirates’ 123 agreement, also known as the “Gold Standard” agreement, in which the UAE would voluntarily give up its enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, the kingdom will likely expand its nuclear partnership with China.
Saudi Arabia is unwilling to give up enrichment as long as Iran remains a threshold nuclear state. Such a partnership could be worrisome given historical China's flexibility on nuclear safeguards agreements: Unlike Washington, Beijing is unlikely to demand that Saudi Arabia sign and ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which gives the agency deeper verification tools.
According to the IAEA, Saudi Arabia’s current safeguards are inadequate for the scale of its nuclear energy program. The agency has been asking the kingdom for years to implement the most basic safeguards agreements – the full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP). The kingdom only recently announced its intentions to do so as it nears completion of a research reactor at King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology. The Saudis have also categorically refused to sign and ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (AP).
The Kingdom is not alone in this position: Egypt, for example, refuses to enter into the Additional Protocol unless Israel becomes a party to the NPT and therefore abides by the relevant safeguards. The Saudis, on the other hand, perceive the protocol as restrictive, refusing to submit to further verification unless the NPT requires it.
At this point, it appears the only way Saudi Arabia could sign a 123 agreement that excludes uranium enrichment and reprocessing would involve a US defense treaty ratified by Congress that included a NATO Article 5-style provision. Any such US commitment would likely have to include normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which seems highly unlikely in the current context.
The Saudis are determined not to act as junior partners in the Abraham Accords, which remain a UAE-centric initiative. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s leadership role in the region could be undermined if it decides to normalize relations with Israel.
Potential Paths
With Trump back in the White House and Republicans in control of Congress, the scope for the Saudi nuclear program could expand. The Saudis have historically been more willing to negotiate with Republicans, who have been less critical than Democrats of the kingdom’s human rights record. The current political environment in the U.S. appears ideal for the Saudis: They are likely to push hard to ratify the security agreement in the first half of a second Trump presidency, before the 2026 U.S. midterm elections, when Republicans could lose control of Congress.
Many American experts argue that the Saudi relationship with the United States is too important for either side to fail in negotiations, leading them to believe that the Saudis are unlikely to cooperate with China on its nuclear program. Some even argue that the Saudi-Chinese rapprochement on defense and nuclear weapons is simply intended to push the United States to get even closer and accommodate the Saudis’ defense needs. This has been true in the past, but the Saudis now realize that their relationship with the United States cannot protect them: the soft U.S. response to the Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 destroyed a security doctrine dating back to the World War II-era Quincy Pact, which revolved around the idea that the United States would ensure the kingdom’s security in exchange for access to its oil.
After Trump takes office, three possible scenarios could unfold:
• The United States agrees to an ironclad defense treaty signed and ratified by Congress, placing Saudi Arabia under its nuclear umbrella. In exchange for security guarantees, Washington would likely require Saudi Arabia to give up its enrichment and reprocessing capabilities under the 123 agreement, sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, and normalize relations with Israel. However, Hamas’s attacks on Israel on October 7 and the subsequent war in Gaza make such normalization unlikely for now. Trump could use the situation to his advantage, portraying himself as the deal’s main violator, pushing the Palestinians to accept the “Peace to Prosperity” offer of his first term. The deal would allow Israel to annex 30 percent of the remaining occupied West Bank in exchange for recognition of Palestinian statehood — and would likely mean an end to the war in Gaza.
This two-state proposal could provide the Saudis with the façade they need to normalize relations with Israel. Such a deal would allow the Saudis to pocket a ratified security agreement while saving face in the Arab world by ostensibly protecting the Palestinians. This scenario could prove the best option for most parties involved—with the notable exception of the Palestinians themselves. The Saudis would not have to compromise their integration into the international community, while still gaining the deterrence they need to fend off any potential threat to their territorial integrity. Trump would be seen as the negotiator in chief: he would be seen as the one who finally ended the Gaza war, created a long-standing settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reduced the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region, and prevented closer Saudi-Chinese relations—all at the same time. As for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he appears to have finally normalized relations with Saudi Arabia and thus completed Israel's integration into the Arab world.
• Saudi Arabia and the United States could sign a conventional 123 agreement allowing the Saudis to develop domestic enrichment capabilities and acquire advanced nuclear technology. If Trump is unable or unwilling to give the Saudis the defense deal they seek or succeeds in reaching a nuclear deal with Iran, he may see a 123 agreement allowing Riyadh to develop enrichment capabilities as his best option for stabilizing the situation. With the Saudi nuclear program still in its infancy, it could be a chance for the United States to develop new mechanisms to ensure the Saudis do not divert their civilian nuclear material for military purposes. If such an agreement is reached, Washington would likely push for a joint U.S.-Saudi consultative body to discuss issues such as enrichment and the kingdom’s signing and ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol.
• With or without an agreement limiting the Iranian threat, the United States could forego giving the Saudis a formal commitment to defend themselves against external attack and allow them to develop enrichment capabilities. In such a scenario, Saudi Arabia could expect a highly transactional relationship with the United States, with more arms sales than ever before and a wider range of weapons available to them. The Saudis could also see greater military engagement from the United States, with joint security and counterterrorism cooperation. In such a scenario, the prevailing sentiment in a Republican administration could be one of control over the kingdom’s actions, especially vis-à-vis China, believing that they have enough influence to deter the Saudis from calling their bluff and partnering with China on what U.S. experts believe would be a nuclear program that would include uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
• The Saudis realize that a second Trump administration may be their best chance to get the security guarantees they have long sought from the United States. If they fail to extract the concessions they want from Washington, they may feel unlikely to ever do so. But if the United States and Saudi Arabia fail to reach a nuclear deal during a second Trump term, a deepening Saudi-Chinese relationship could change the entire nuclear landscape of the Middle East, especially if the Chinese accept Saudi domestic enrichment capabilities without safeguards against potential nuclear program diversion. Such a scenario could open a “Pandora’s box” of proliferation and further complicate broader geopolitical issues in the region, including with countries such as Turkey and Egypt.
• The next US administration must recognize the importance of Saudi Arabia's national uranium enrichment capabilities and not underestimate the kingdom's willingness to sever ties with Washington unless the US makes concessions.
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