Unmanned boats: only a system of systems can resist them
So, we return to the topic of confrontation with unmanned boats (UB), including enemy kamikaze UUBs.
In the previous article BEC vs. Helicopters: So, Have We Waited? Or Not Yet?? we talked about the fact that hunting for BECs using combat helicopters is not the most optimal solution, since the enemy is actively integrating into the BEC weapons capable of hitting air targets - machine guns and automatic rapid-fire cannons modified for launching from the surface missiles air-to-air, and in the future, anti-tank missile systems (ATGM) such as the Sguna-P and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
As an alternative to combat helicopters, it was proposed to use Orion unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - the only medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs that are mass-produced for the Russian Armed Forces (RF Armed Forces), but we cannot get by with Orion UAVs alone.
Initiative and stealth
This is what determines the success of the BEC on the battlefield. The BECs used by the enemy are weapons attacks, and they are small, low-visibility targets, which are extremely difficult to detect on the water surface, especially in rough seas. Do not forget that the enemy has the initiative - it is he who chooses the time and place for the attack, of course, that he will do this based on the advantages that he can get.
The thermal radiation of the BEC can be minimized by providing engine cooling with seawater, and you can be sure that the hour is not far off when the enemy will begin to use fully electric or hybrid BECs - their range will increase, and thermal visibility will decrease even more.
Detecting BECs using radar stations is also not an easy task, and the stronger the sea waves, the more difficult this task is, especially for radars located at a low altitude above the water surface.
The BECs themselves will also be improved - their speed, maneuverability and range will increase, their profile will be reduced, to the point that only the satellite communications antenna and the optical-electronic system (OES) will stick out above the water, and the presence of weapons on the BECs will allow them to fight back if someone tries to attack them.
So how do you detect and destroy BECs?
This is what requires a "system of systems" that includes subsystems for detection, additional search, and destruction of UAVs. We have already considered something similar in the context of solving the problem of countering long-range kamikaze UAVs, now let's see what kind of "system of systems" is required to counter UAVs.
Image army.ric.mil.ru
Detection subsystem
To counter long-range kamikaze UAVs, the author proposed subsystem "Global ear", which includes a number of hardware and software solutions designed to detect kamikaze UAVs by the sound they produce, through its triangulation - a similar system has been deployed in Ukraine for several years now.
Currently in Russia, the company JSC NPP together with the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Research Institute of Radio is creating a system of acoustic reconnaissance of UAV routes based on hydrophones. The system will have two echelons of protection - near and far zones.
According to the official representative of JSC NPP Igor Potapov, the detection system is based on fiber-optic acoustic vector sensors (vector hydrophones), which were originally developed for underwater conditions, but have the ability to adapt to work on the surface. These hydrophones measure both sound pressure and particle velocity, which allows determining the direction of the sound source.
It sounds complicated, the question is, how quickly and in what quantities will it be possible to deploy such a system at least in the European part of Russia? However, now we are more interested in the moment: "...which were originally designed for underwater conditions...".
What does this mean in terms of BEC detection?
That hydroacoustic buoys attached to cables, including above-water and underwater parts, as well as communications equipment, could potentially be developed. These buoys should provide primary detection of enemy UAVs by their acoustic signature in the water and in the air, as well as any other underwater, above-water, and possibly flying objects - the same long-range kamikaze UAVs and cruise missiles.
In addition to stationary buoys, hydroacoustic detection systems could potentially be deployed on Russian BEKs, which are also supposedly being developed, but there are no or very few cases of their use yet. However, in the absence of domestic high-speed satellite communications, this direction will not have great prospects for us.
Perhaps the most important issue, in addition to the development and deployment of hydroacoustic buoys, is the creation of data processing centers (DPC) and special software (SSP) for them based on artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms or simply neural networks.
For example, a joint analysis by Foreign Policy and IEEE Spectrum describes how AI systems process massive amounts of data collected from distributed sensor networks across vast expanses of ocean. AI algorithms trained to detect subtle disturbances in these data sets can detect anomalies such as the slight underwater displacements caused by submarines.
In the near future, this may lead to significant problems with stealth in submarines of traditional design. In fact, the need to create a data center with AI was also considered by the author in the above-mentioned material, as part of solving the problem of detecting long-range kamikaze UAVs.
Search and Destruction Subsystem
The primary means of additional search for UAVs should be the previously mentioned Orion UAVs. In fact, they can and should perform primary detection during patrolling of the area, but their main task should be to move to the place of possible detection of enemy UAVs and their additional search using their own OES.
In case of detection, the information can be transferred to the means of destruction or the enemy's BEC can be independently destroyed by standard guided weapons, directly from the Orion UAV. Destruction of the detected enemy BEC directly from the Orion UAV minimizes the risks of losing the target, but the need to carry ammunition will reduce the patrol time of the Orion UAV.
In the material Destruction with confirmation: the use of the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV from the Orion UAV carriers will defiantly destroy Ukrainian Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS MLRS, as the name suggests, we looked at the possibility of integrating the Lancet-type kamikaze UAVs onto Orion carrier UAVs. This combination could be more than effective in hunting enemy kamikaze UAVs as well.
In principle, the scheme of launching a kamikaze UAV from a carrier UAV is already being used by both the enemy and the Russian Armed Forces on an initiative basis, so it can be considered quite operational.
Another platform designed to destroy enemy BECs should be Russian BEC hunters. As mentioned above, due to the lack of domestic high-speed satellite communication networks, we will have to bother with repeaters, otherwise the operating range of such BECs will be severely limited, however, this also applies to the Orion UAV.
The advantage of these platforms is the ability to remain in the open sea for a long time while waiting for information from the detection subsystem. To increase the efficiency of the additional search, BEK hunters can be equipped with a lifting mast with a light OES or the so-called "quasi-mast" - a tethered UAV on a power and control cable, the viewing range of which will be greater than that of any rigid mast.
To destroy enemy BEKs, Russian BEK hunters should presumably also carry kamikaze UAVs, such as FPV-drones. For greater efficiency and flexibility of use, these can be either radio-controlled FPV drones or fiber-optic controlled FPV drones.
Some sources talk about the difficulty of defeating highly maneuverable enemy BECs using FPV drones, well, here we can consider the option of a directed charge and its remote detonation by the FPV drone operator - after all, enemy BECs are clearly much worse protected than armored vehicles, a direct hit of a cumulative jet is not required here, that is, new warheads adapted to this type of target and an algorithm for their initiation are needed.
I would like to recall another platform that could potentially be used to hunt enemy BECs, namely UAV-seaplane "ADEBRA" from the company "IMPULS 82"According to the developer, the specified UAV "ADEBRA" can patrol the water surface for up to 24 hours, with periodic takeoffs and landings.
The working prototype of the UAV "ADEBRA"
The developers are working on the possibility of integrating a small-sized sonar on the ADEBRA UAV, which can be submerged on a cable to a depth of 70 meters, designed to monitor water areas. It can be assumed that equipment for detecting enemy UAVs can be installed in the same way.
The same FPV drones can be used as weapons – this possibility is also being worked out.
Does it make sense to use surface ships to hunt enemy BECs?
More likely no than yes - their location will always be revealed by the intelligence means of "third parties" who hang around the region with impunity, and whom we do practically nothing to counter. And after our ships are discovered, they themselves will become a priority target for attack for the enemy.
The argument is that fleet The fact that the US is successfully defending itself against the Houthi kamikaze submarines in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea can hardly be considered relevant – the quantity and quality of kamikaze submarines used by the Houthis are not comparable to the quantity and quality of ships that the US Navy has.
In addition, if the Houthi kamikaze BECs do not have the Starlink communications system, then their range is severely limited and they can be detected by the US Navy’s electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems and jammed by electronic warfare systems (EW), and if there is Starlink on them, then the data on the location of all Starlink terminals in the region can be transmitted to the US Navy directly by SpaceX - there are clearly not thousands of terminals in the open sea, you can check everything, at least by analyzing the coordinates and direction of movement.
Once again, without our own high-speed satellite communications system, both the BEK and the UAV will have extremely limited capabilities – in essence, between us and Ukraine, as well as between the Houthis and the US, there is now a “one-sided game”.
At the same time, despite all of the above, US Navy ships try to stay out at sea.
Conclusions
It is possible and necessary to fight the enemy’s BEC, but simple measures will not suffice here – it is necessary to create a “system of systems”, a comprehensive solution for the initial detection, additional search and destruction of BEC – potentially all the subsystems necessary for this either already exist in Russia or are in the development stage.
Time cannot be wasted, otherwise there is a risk that the enemy will completely seize the initiative in the Black Sea, which at the beginning of the Russian special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine seemed impossible in principle.
Information