Germany's Ferrous Metallurgy: How Goering Cleverly Played Poor
Military-economic story Germany during the Second World War, despite a mountain of books, has been studied so poorly that it periodically presents surprises. Somehow, the opinion was formed that Germany lacked raw materials, currency for purchases, so much so that the Nazis began to develop poor and difficult to process German iron ores. Various conclusions are drawn from this.
In 2016, Michael Barnscheidt defended his dissertation at the University of Düsseldorf on Germany’s foreign trade in rolled metal products from 1914 to 1945. He did not make any outstanding generalizations, but simply collected and systematized statistics scattered across hard-to-reach sources.
And what he achieved is amazing.
Disinformation with life-size scenery
It turns out that all that time, before and during the war, Germany actively traded rolled metal products: blanks, beams, railway material, wire. Moreover, it sold much more than it bought.
For example, in 1933, steel production in Germany was 7,3 million tons, and export of rolled steel was 1,4 million tons or 23,2% of production. Then, despite all the speeches of Hitler and Goering, export growth continued, although its share decreased somewhat due to the growth of production. In 1936, export was 2,8 million tons or 15,1% of production, in 1937 - 2,89 million tons, also 15,1% of production. In 1938, export decreased slightly to 2,1 million tons or 9,3%, and production jumped to 22,4 million tons against 19,1 million tons in 1937.
All this happened, let us note, in the era of the Four-Year Plan and the foundation of the first metallurgical plant of the Hermann Göring concern in Salzgitter. How are we told? Hitler demanded that all efforts be made to prepare Germany for war, and this was the task of the Four-Year Plan. But it turns out that German industrialists are exporting rolled metal instead of turning it into weapons and shells. Thus, statistics show us that everything was not quite as they say.
Looking at all this with amazement, I came to the conclusion that the four-year plan for the development of German ore mining had a dual nature. On the one hand, it was a grandiose disinformation campaign with life-size decorations. Hitler had to hide his plans and do it as convincingly as possible. Apparently, the stake was initially made on the seizure of iron ore deposits, but before the war these aspirations could not be shown.
So Goering got busy with the show. They started a quarrel in industrial circles, artificially contrasting German ore with imported ore, although in fact German ore had long been mined and added to the charge, and no one was embarrassed by this. Then, with pomp and advertising, they began to build a giant plant in Salzgitter: 32 blast furnaces for 4 million tons of pig iron per year. It was never completed, and with the beginning of the war, they actually abandoned construction.
Even what was built is impressive. A photo of the Salzgitter plant in May 1945
What conclusion should the intelligence officers and analysts have drawn at that very moment? That Germany was trying to adapt to its semi-isolation and was unlikely to plan anything serious in the near future. That was the goal of the disinformation. Goering cleverly and convincingly played the poor guy.
On the other hand, the mine and the plant in Salzgitter, as well as the mines elsewhere, did have a practical side. They were a reserve for the worst case scenario and were indeed useful when the war began. In the winter months of 1939/40, the import of iron ore to Germany almost ceased, not only because of the fighting, but also because of the harsh winter, when the waters of the ports, rivers and canals froze.
In Germany, ore and coal were often transported by barge along rivers and canals, and large industrial cities such as Duisburg had large river ports.
In the spring of 1940, German ore made up about half of the raw material for smelting iron. Then the Germans defeated France, and the need for it disappeared. Nevertheless, German ore allowed us to survive this peak moment.
The disinformation, created on such a scale that an entire metallurgical plant was built, was certainly successful. I would even say it was too successful, since post-war researchers of the history and economy of Nazi Germany reasoned in the vein set by Hitler and Goering, apparently not really realizing that they were being duped.
The famous photo of the start of construction of the Salzgitter plant in 1938. The main thing is a good shot
Excess steel
Both the Nazi leadership and German industrialists were betting on imported ore and, accordingly, on its capture during the planned war. Industrialists - because of the profit. For example, in 1936, a ton of iron ore was purchased by German factories at 9,11 Reichsmarks per ton. With a content of 62%, a ton of iron in the ore cost 8,9 Reichsmarks. At the same time, beams were sold at 99 Reichsmarks per ton, and semi-finished products - at 78 Reichsmarks per ton. Now, of course, it is difficult to make an exact calculation of the cost of converting ore into cast iron, cast iron into steel, and steel into rolled steel at German factories, but "by eye" we can say that they raised 15-20 Reichsmarks per ton of net profit. So it was profitable to process imported iron ore into export rolled metal products.
But the war began, the needs of military production arose, and then the export should have stopped. But no, the export continued. Moreover, during the war it grew and soon overtook the pre-war figures, especially in the middle of the war.
1939 - 1981,2 thousand tons,
1940 - 1393,4 thousand tons,
1941 - 2391,4 thousand tons,
1942 - 3277,9 thousand tons,
1943 - 2334,8 thousand tons.
1940 - 1393,4 thousand tons,
1941 - 2391,4 thousand tons,
1942 - 3277,9 thousand tons,
1943 - 2334,8 thousand tons.
Amazing! In 1942, during the heavy fighting, Germany had 3,2 million tons of finished rolled steel, which was not used for military production, but was exported. And where? For example, 73% of semi-finished products went to Italy, 37% of railway materials - to Romania. This, by the way, is 80,2 thousand tons, which made it possible to build 72 thousand km of tracks in single-track calculation. Sheets and wire went to the Netherlands (21%), France (14%), Sweden (12%) and so on. But slabs and ingots, of which 1942 thousand tons were exported in 1212,7, 28% went to France, 12% to the Netherlands, 10% to Italy and 9% to Sweden. France consumed 1942 thousand tons of German slabs and ingots in 339,5. And so on.
In 1943, a total of 34,6 million tons of steel were smelted in Germany, including the occupied territories, of which 2,3 million tons were exported, or 6,6% of the smelting. As a comparison, this export of metal was equivalent to the production of 155,6 million pieces of 10,5 cm FH Gr.38 howitzer high-explosive fragmentation shells. And in general, a lot of weapons and ammunition could have been made from this metal.
Statistics lead to an interesting and unexpected conclusion. Before and during the war, at least until the Americans bombed the steel plants, Germany had an excess resource of steel. Steel was exported to occupied and dependent countries, essentially exchanging it for resources more needed for the military economy. In addition, statistical analysis suggests that even before the war, the Germans created hidden reserves of metal in rolled products, blanks, and semi-finished products, because many millions of tons of steel disappeared somewhere, without reaching the point of being processed into rolled products.
The ruins of the Krupp steelworks in 1945
If this is so, then some circumstances become clear. Such as the cool attitude of the Germans to the restoration of the captured Donbass. Our experience of restoration work has shown that even a heavily damaged metallurgical plant can be brought to the start of smelting in just 3-4 months. The Germans could have done this too. It seemed a mystery why they didn’t. It seems now, in light of the discovered data, that they didn’t really want it and didn’t really need it. The atmosphere of the summer-fall of 1942 for the Germans: the Bolsheviks are fleeing to the Volga and the Caucasus, victory is just around the corner, the Reich’s factories are smelting so much that more than 3 million tons of steel are sold abroad. Why bother with destroyed metallurgical plants? This will be done sometime later. True, this “later” never came due to the abrupt change in the situation in 1943.
So when Goering or German generals play the poor guy and claim they didn't have this or that, it should be treated with caution because it could be disinformation.
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