The Myth of War Experience and Its Role in Nation-Building after World War I
The memory of a glorious heroic past plays an important role in the formation and maintenance of national pride among members of a community – the French philosopher E. Renan, in particular, defined national memory as the foundation of a nation. Historical traumas are also factors of national consolidation. Thus, J. Hutchinson in his studies paid special attention to the importance of war in the formation of national identity and its maintenance and emphasized that war acts as a catalyst for the growth of a sense of responsibility to the homeland, and, as a result, explains the willingness of people to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the nation [2].
The state plays a major role as an actor in the politics of memory. As is known, images of the military past are actively used by the state in the processes of nation-building and to maintain national identity. The origins of the formation of such a view on the memory of wars can be traced back to the end of the 3th century: the French philosopher E. Renan was the first to speak about national memory as the foundation of the nation, and his position fit into the historical context - after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, the first "memorial boom" followed [XNUMX].
The role of the state in positioning the memory of war is examined in detail in the book by the American historian George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. In this book, Mosse examines the formation and development of the so-called “Myth of the War experience,” which was the foundation of the ideology of civic nationalism in Western European states. In the myth of the war experience, war is seen as a sacred event [3].
This material will be devoted to the myth of military experience and its role in national construction after the First World War.
The Birth of the "Myth of Military Experience"
While World War I is often seen as a conflict between nations, in reality it was fought by bureaucratic states with a distinct gap between government and society. It is important to note, however, that multinational empires were the first to succumb to the scale and intensity of modern warfare. The introduction of conscription actually contributed to the collapse of these empires, since the armies created in this way were ineffective unless they were imbued with patriotism.
Not surprisingly, these empires were in most cases replaced by more ethnically homogeneous successor states. Thus, the war of 1914-1918 contributed to the spread of ethnic nationalism throughout Europe [5].
As Professor Anthony Smith points out, we can conclude from this that long and total wars tend to strengthen national or ethnic identities (and therefore destroy multinational states) and certainly create a host of images and stereotypes that governments can exploit for military purposes. A long war is thus the last chance for a state beset by internal contradictions to overcome these contradictions or else ultimately collapse [5].
The reality of the military experience of World War I was transformed into what might be called the “myth of the military experience” – a view of war as an intensely meaningful, even sacred, event. This view of war developed primarily, though not exclusively, among the defeated countries, where it was most needed. The myth of the military experience gave the memory of the war a sacred significance, offering the nation a host of heroes and martyrs, sacred sites, and a legacy worthy of emulation. The cult of the fallen soldier became a central element of nationalism after the war, exerting the greatest political influence in many countries, especially Germany, which had lost the war and was on the brink of chaos.[1]
Mosse connects the origin of the myth of military experience with the figure of the volunteer soldier of the era of the wars of revolutionary France, as well as the liberation struggle of the Germans against Napoleon. Mosse emphasizes that
"To study the origins of the myth of military experience means to understand the role of volunteers, who to a large extent gave birth to this myth [4]."
The formation of a myth about military experience, according to the historian, was a pressing need of states in the face of ever-increasing human losses in wars. However, it was the interwar period in Europe that became a kind of culmination of the myth about military experience.
Mosse notes that Germany was particularly susceptible to this myth, which had a strong influence on post-war politics – the defeat of the Second Reich, combined with the traumatic transition from war to peace and social tensions, contributed to the strengthening of the myth of the war experience. However, this myth was also of great importance in other countries, particularly Italy, France and England [1].
Cult of the fallen warriors
J. Mosse notes that the world wars of the 13th century became the first experience for humanity when it came face to face with the mass loss of life: Mosse cites calculations according to which the First World War took more lives (1790 million people) than all the wars in Europe from 1914 to 3. The consequences of this war, often referred to in Western literature as the Great War, significantly changed the “myth of military experience” [XNUMX].
The long-term trench warfare on the Western Front profoundly changed the perception of the war not only among those who fought in it, but also among future generations (especially through works of fiction). The volunteers who shared their emotions were in the minority, but since others remained silent, their poetry and prose found themselves in the spotlight. Writers such as Ernst Jünger were undoubtedly sincere in their recollections of the war, and their works eventually became part of the patriotic canon [1].
The war in both England and Germany reinforced stereotypes of masculinity, but in Germany the image of masculinity during this period was perhaps most strongly associated with the death of the enemy. Lieutenant Ernst Wurhe, who personifies the ideal German youth in Walter Flex's novel The Wanderer Between Two Worlds, wants to become a stormtrooper in order to experience what he calls the beauty of combat. Looking at his sword, the youth says that "war is in his blood" - paraphrasing Ernst Jünger's description of the ideal German soldier [1].
The Battle of Langemarck, fought on 16–18 August 1917, became a symbol of the transformative power of war in Germany, serving as a metaphor for the cultivation of masculinity (and later becoming the political myth of Langemarck). Masculinity was embodied in the figure of a warrior who symbolized youth coming of age. Poetry and prose about Langemarck often emphasize this transformation, as in lines such as:
"Here I stand, erect at my full height, proud and alone, delighted to be a man [6]."
According to Mosse,
“The First World War gave the myth of war experience its full expression and the possibility of a direct transition in people’s memory from the horrors of war to its significance and glorious moments [4].”
In Germany, throughout the Weimar Republic, the memory of the war was an important resource of power and meaning, on which political positions and demands could be legitimized, strengthened, or, on the contrary, delegitimized.
The sacralization of fallen soldiers through the construction of war memorials and monuments had a distinctly secular religious character. War graves and war commemorations were created like a temple of the nation, and the planning of such sacred places was given as much attention as the construction of temples. These were precisely the places where the myth of military experience, in contrast to the realities of war, found its complete expression [4].
The myth of military experience and the cult of heroes reached its apogee in the Third Reich, although it was also strong in Italy, France, England, Russia and the USA.
War as a factor of national consolidation
War acts as a catalyst for the growth of a sense of responsibility to the homeland and, as a consequence, explains the willingness of people to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the nation, regarding it as a moral duty. At the same time, the memories that remain after the end of the war are much more significant than the experience of its conduct itself. This is expressed in the practice of “remembrance” or “remembrance” (remembrance), which is supported by the state through various ceremonies perpetuating the memory of war heroes and depends on whether the community emerged from the conflict as a winner or a loser [2].
War can produce various myths that help to strengthen the national identity of a group. Thus, legends about the founding of a community (the Battle of Sedan as a prologue to the unification of Germany) and about a golden age (the Reconquista in Spain) can be singled out as a special category. Myths are often created about events that have traumatized a nation, but which then serve to explain the failures that haunt it in the present (the memory of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389).
J. Hutchinson notes that rituals of commemoration of those killed in wars serve to maintain a sense of unity among members of the collective and, moreover, to instill in them the idea that they have withstood the threat of death, and therefore, have overcome death. In this regard, the tradition of honoring fallen soldiers, which has become a kind of link between the living and the dead, is central to the nationalist cult. In the conditions of total wars during the industrialization era of the 2th century, the cult of individual heroism was replaced by the worship of the unknown soldier, personifying the sacrifice of the entire nation [XNUMX].
The formation of a myth about military experience was thus an urgent need of states in the face of ever-increasing human losses in wars.
The Decline of the Myth of Military Experience
After the Second World War, the "myth of military experience" is in decline everywhere. Fallen soldiers are gradually desacralized, from being war heroes they become victims of war, the general emphasis of war memory is shifted from the figure of the hero to the figure of the victim. The very forms of war commemorations are changing: from a cult, "liturgical" function (liturgical function), monuments change form in favor of a utilitarian function (parks, gardens, libraries [4].
Nowadays, state memory policy in relation to a particular war begins with the fact that the very use of the word “war” in the name of an armed conflict is an act of memory policy. After all, the state is not always ready to use the term “war” for a military conflict and recognize its political aspects.
The memory of past wars can also be used within the framework of symbolic politics to legitimize contemporary armed conflicts. Recently, there has been a decontextualization of the memory of wars, with special emphasis being placed on the memory of fallen soldiers as an example of the continuity of military virtues and devotion to the Fatherland. This separates the "the causes of war from its participants, and also encourages the refusal to publicly discuss the dilemmas of modern conflicts" [five].
This is happening, among other things, because modern states, which are increasingly experiencing the processes of globalization, are finding it increasingly difficult to conceptualize the nature of modern wars.
Использованная литература:
[1]. George L. Mosse. Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. 1991. Oxford University Press, New York.
[2]. S. V. Kuznetsova. Historical memory and everyday nationalism in the interpretation of ethno-symbolism. // Bulletin of the Lobachevsky University of Nizhny Novgorod. - 2012. No. 6 (3) - P. 131-136.
[3]. Batishchev R. Yu. Theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the memory of wars in modern MEMORY STUDIES. // Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 12. Political sciences. 2021, No. 3. P. 48-68
[4]. Batishchev R. Yu. Memory of wars and “memory wars” in modern memory studies: main approaches to study and key actors // Tempus et Memoria. 2021. Vol. 2. No. 1. Pp. 34–42.
[5]. Anthony D. Smith. War and ethnicity: The role of warfare in the formation, self‐images and cohesion of ethnic communities. – 1981. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 4, 4, 375-397.
[6]. From the play Langemarck, quoted by Theodor Maus, “Langemarck, Geschichte und Dichtung,” Zeitschrift für Deutsche Bildung, Heft 11, vol. 13 (November 1937), 503.
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